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



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



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CHIEFS OF STAFFS, STAFF CONF. & REPTS
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COPY NO. 43

U.S. ABC-4/1
British TT

December 20, 1941

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND
UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS
IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

P.R.C.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/1
British Serial WW

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

Report by the U.S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:-

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

a. The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

b. The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

(1) The Azores.
(2) The Cape Verde Islands.
(3) The Canary Islands.
(4) French West Africa.
(5) French North Africa.
(6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
(7) Curacao and Aruba.
(8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

a. To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

b. To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

c. To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial WW) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of troop transport, in view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying US and UK field armies, garrisons, and naval forces. Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

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COPY NUMBER 9

ABC-4/2

WW(J.P.C.)2

December 27, 1941.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, 27th December, 1941:

W. P. SCOBEY,
Colonel, U.S. Army.

L. R. McDONELL,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Joint Secretaries

R. D. COLERIDGE,
Commander, R.N.

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PROJECT - GYMNAST

1. We submit below a provisional examination of the project for joint operations in northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following hypotheses:

(a) We receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance there will be only token resistance.

(b) That owing to their current pre-occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefore anticipate a possible maximum period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

(c) That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

2. Objective. — We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control could be extended over all North Africa and into Europe.

3. Base. — The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This small port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies 175 miles outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of A.A. defences and air forces a single main base must be used for the whole force in French North Africa.

4. Establishment of Base. — There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca which has a considerable garrison and coast defences. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States can make available an amphibious assault division for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

5. Support to French in Tunisia. — The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco or perhaps a condition of their entry would be a demand from the

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French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two A.A. Regiments and three Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through by sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance force at Casablanca.

6. Defense of Moroccan Area. — It will be essential to get in sufficient forces into the Casablanca area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being seriously damaged by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and A.A. defences.

7. The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco.

8. The Initial Joint Force. — The initial joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first four months, inclusive of the Tunisia Detachment, are estimated at:-

1 Amphibious Assault Division - combat loaded (US)
3 Infantry Divisions (1 - U.S., 2 - British)
2 Armoured Divisions (1 - U.S., 1 - British)
232 First line fighter aircraft (160 - U.S., 72 - British)
57 First line medium bomber aircraft (U.S.)
57 First line light bomber aircraft (U.S.)
39 First line observation aircraft (U.S.)
120 Heavy A.A. guns (British)
216 Light A.A. guns (British)
Base and L. of C. units

9. Total Forces Required: — It would be premature to recommend the scope of tasks and the strengths of the total forces that might ultimately be required in French North Africa.

10. Joint American-British Effort Necessary. — Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility as defined in ABC-1. As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detail planning can proceed.

NAVAL FORCES

11. British: - Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

12. There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United

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Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal UK to Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a considerable period.

13. United States: - The U.S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support for the transit and landing of U.S. Expeditionary Forces.

14. American Convoy Protection: -

(a) Advance American Division -
One Amphibious Assault Division embarked in 15 vessels protected by units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

(b) Remainder of initial U.S. forces -
Three convoys at about one month intervals, and successive logistic convoys protected by units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

(c) The protection given this new line of sea communications would be at the expense of the protection now being given to Atlantic trade routes by the United States.

15. Timings. — D.1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

(a) U.S. Forces. — The U.S. Amphibious Assault Division could reach Casablanca on D.20.

(b) British Forces. — The first British convoy could reach Algiers on D.40 to 47, or Casablanca on D.37 to 44. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British forces, totalling 1 armoured and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another 12 weeks. Its movement would therefore be complete about D.120.

16. Summary of Plan. —

(a) One U.S. Amphibious Assault Division combat loaded and closely supported by United States Naval forces to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

(b) A British force consisting of:-
1 Armoured Brigade,
1 Infantry Brigade Group,
2 Anti-Aircraft Regiments, (24 heavy, 36 light guns),
3 Fighter Squadrons (48 aircraft),

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with (a) to

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Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance force.

(c) Main body to follow (a) and (b):-
1 American Army Division.
1 American Armoured Division.
2 British Divisions (less detachments in (b))
1 British Armoured Division (less detachments in (b))
11 Anti-Aircraft Regiments (120 heavy and 216 light guns).

Air Forces:
13½ First line fighter aircraft
5½ First line medium bomber aircraft
5½ First line light bomber aircraft
3½ First line observation aircraft.

(d) Base and L. of C. organizations. Anti-Aircraft defences of the base area to be found by the British for the initial joint force.

17. Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities.

18. U.S. to provide as high a proportion as possible of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

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COPY NO
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY, 1942

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATRE

First Half of 1942

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the Atlantic Theatre and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942 and submit our conclusions below.

MOVEMENTS AND RELIEFS.

2. Iceland and Ireland.

We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland (C) garrison should proceed as expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Middle East and to release forces for operation "Gymnast."

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom should proceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available so as to increase the weight of attack on Germany.

4. Relief of Aruba and Curacao.

The relief of Aruba and Curacao, ~~is already arranged and~~, subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be completed before the end of January.

JOINT UNITED STATES-BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the period under consideration to force an

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entry into French North Africa. We cannot therefore initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are: (a) that due to Spanish resistance the Germans will require a period of three months before they can mount a land attack from Spain against French Morocco, (b) that once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the Spanish there will not attack us, and (c) that French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if any. During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above (Paragraphs 2,3,4) should continue.

6. If the opportunity to undertake the North Africa operation occurs it should be launched only if the following adverse effects on other projects can be accepted.

Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and Far East by 25,000 men.

Suspension of the operations against the Canaries and Diego Suarez.

Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland (c) by U. S. troops.

Material reduction in the rate of movement of U. S. troops to North Ireland.

Weakening of British strength in the United Kingdom.

Prevent the movement of U. S. troops to Northeast Brazil if required at this time.

Possibly reduce the supply of British fighter aircraft to Russia.

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Materially reduce U. S. reinforcements and supplies to the Far East.

Possible reduction in Atlantic shipping because of shortage of naval escorts.

Involves a risk of material reduction in the support of Britain and Russia in Lend Lease supplies.

7. CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

Any move which results in German invasion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial of Gibraltar as a Naval Base and in all probability the involvement of Portugal as well as Spain in the war. In these circumstances it will be necessary to secure the Canaries as an alternative Naval Base. It is possible that the Spaniards would themselves offer us facilities in the Canaries ~~since they are unlikely to acquiesce fully in a German invasion of their mainland. In this case all that would have to be provided would be additional air and A.A. defences and harbour protection for the Naval Base~~. particularly if they do not acquiesce in a German occupation of their mainland. On the other hand the Spaniards may be influenced to oppose our occupation of the Canaries by fear of German reprisals in their homeland. While a Spanish offer of facilities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, it would be necessary to provide sufficient additional air and A.A. defences to meet the threat of strong German air forces based on the mainland of Africa as well as harbour protection for the Naval Base.

If we ~~undertake operation "Gymnast"~~ have gained an entry into French North Africa and the Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Sapin we could not at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries. ~~It would~~

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~~be necessary in this case to mask the Canaries until such time as forces became available for an operation for their reduction.~~

8. If the opportunity to carry out operation "Gymnast" does not occur and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish acquiesence, the capture of the Canaries against opposition and the occupation of the Cape Verdes will become ~~of first priority~~ essential. It has been agreed that the responsibility for ~~this operation~~ the occupation of the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain Naval assistance from the United States, if such assistance can be provided in addition to the naval requirements for the occupation of the Cape Verdes. At least three large aircraft carriers will be required for the operation against the Canaries and these could not all be provided by the British in the near future. A British assaulting force is already earmarked for this operation and should, we consider, be kept in being. Likewise the United States should earmark a force for the occupation of the Cape Verdes.

9. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula it is almost certain that Portugal will admit British forces into the Azores. For the security of these islands the chief requirement will be air and anti-aircraft defences and harbour protection. The provisions of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should be earmarked. Considerably difficulty however will be found in providing the shipping for this operation simultaneously with Gymnast.

10. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible we are of the opinion that a ~~small~~ United States occupying force should be sent to the Cape Verdes in order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured for future use. The occupation of the Cape Verdes will be of considerable

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importance if we do not succeed in gaining entry into French North Africa and are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date.

11. OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA

Failing an Allied occupation of French North Africa occupation of French West Africa becomes ~~of primary importance~~ essential. It is improbable that if we do not succeed in obtaining French co-operation in French North Africa we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore necessary to plan the capture of French West Africa against opposition. With the joint resources available it is not, in our opinion, possible to undertake an operation of this nature until the late Autumn of 1942 when the weather conditions become favourable. It has been agreed that the United States should be responsible for this operation and we suggest that the planning and training should be put in hand. We propose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously with the occupation of the Cape Verdes, U.S. ~~Pursuit squadrons~~ Air and other appropriate forces should be moved to Freetown - Bathurst area. Their presence in this area will increase the security of the Trans-African Reinforcement Route and the naval base at Freetown. They will also be in a position to move rapidly to French North Africa for operation Gymnast if French co-operation is secured.

NORTH EAST BRAZIL

12. The security of North East Brazil is of strategic importance as a link in the communications between America and the Trans-African reinforcement route. Germany established in West Africa immediately becomes a threat to the South American Continent. The danger of an Axis inspired uprising in Brazil, which would interrupt the airroute through Africa to the Middle and Far East

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cannot be disregarded. We consider that plans should be put in hand to carry out this operation ~~if we fail to secure an entry into French North Africa and if the French agree to the movement of German forces into French North Africa~~. The operation is a United States responsibility.

DIEGO SUAREZ

13. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the enemy is of considerable strategic importance, no British force will be available to undertake this operation within the period under consideration if the force for the Canaries operation ~~Gymnast~~ is kept in being. Moreover, if this operation were carried out in the near future it might prejudice our chance of obtaining French collaboration in North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that we cannot hold a force ready to undertake this operation at present.

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COPY NO. 5
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY, 1942

U.S. Serial ABC-4/6 (Draft)

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATRE

First Half of 1942

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the Atlantic Theatre and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942 and submit our conclusions below.

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS.

Iceland and England.

2. We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland (c) garrison should proceed as expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Middle East and to release forces for operation ~~Gymnast~~ in French North Africa.

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom should proceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available so as to increase the weight of attack on Germany.

Relief of Aruba and Curacao.

4. The relief of Aruba and Curacao, subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be completed before the end of January.

JOINT UNITED STATES-BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the period under consideration to force an entry into French North Africa. We cannot therefore initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are: (a) that due to Spanish resistance the Germans will require a period of three months before

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they can mount a land attack from Spain against French Morocco, (b) that once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the Spanish there will not attack us, and (c)that French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if any. During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above (Paragraphs 2, 3, 4) should continue.

6. If ~~the opportunity to~~ undertake the North Africa operation ~~occurs~~ it will have the ~~should be launched only if the~~ following adverse effects on other projects; ~~are accepted.~~

a. Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and Far East by 25,000 men.

b. Suspension of ~~the~~ major operations against the Canaries and Diego Suarez.

c. Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland (c) by U. S. troops.

d. Material reduction in the rate of movement of U. S. troops to North Ireland.

e. Weakening of British strength in the United Kingdom.

f. Inability to move sizeable forces to northeast Brazil if such action should become necessary.

g. ~~Possibly reduce~~ Reduction in the supply of British fighter aircraft to Russia.

h. Serious delay in the dispatch of urgently needed U. S. reinforcements and supplies to Pacific island positions and the Far East, to the Pacific Fleet, and to the outlying island bases.

i. ~~Possible~~ Reduction in Atlantic ~~shipping because of shortage of naval escorts.~~ convoys to U.K. or Russia due of the diversion of shipping & escorts.

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~~Divert shipping from the material support of Britain and Russia.~~

7. CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

~~Any move which results~~ in German invasion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial of Gibraltar as a Naval Base, and in all probability the involvement of Portugal as well as Spain in the war. In these circumstances it will be essential to secure the Canaries as ~~an alternative~~ a Naval Base. It is possible that the Spaniards would themselves offer us facilities in the Canaries, ~~particularly if they do not acquiesce in a German occupation of their mainland.~~ On the other hand the Spaniards may ~~be influenced to~~ oppose our occupation of the Canaries, ~~by fear of German reprisals in their homeland.~~ While a Spanish offer of facilities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, it would be necessary to provide ~~sufficient~~ additional air and A.A. defences ~~to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland of Africa as well as~~ harbour protection ~~for~~ the ~~Naval Base~~ bases, and for an air patrol of the sea.

all left in.

If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Spain we could not at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries.

8. If the opportunity to carry out operation ~~"Gymnast"~~ does not occur and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish acquiescence, the capture of the Canaries against opposition and the occupation of the Cape Verdes will become essential.

It has been agreed that the responsibility for the occupation of the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain Naval assistance from the United States. A British assaulting force is already earmarked for

the capture of the Canaries & the Cape Verdes even against opposition & the occupation of

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this operation and should, we consider, be kept in being.

Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a U. S. responsibility. A portion of the U. S. Army forces set-up for "Super-Gymnast" would be used for this operation. The necessary naval support would have to be provided by U. S. Naval Forces.

9. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula it is almost certain that Portugal will admit British forces into the Azores & probably Madeira. For the security of these islands the chief requirement will be air and anti-aircraft defences and harbour protection. The provisions of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should be earmarked. Considerable difficulty however will be found in providing the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for North Africa or the Canaries.

10. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible we are of the opinion that the United States should occupy the Cape Verdes in order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured for future use. The occupation of the Cape Verdes will be of considerable importance if we do not succeed in gaining entry into French North Africa and are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date.

11. OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA

Failing an Allied occupation of French North Africa occupation of French West Africa becomes essential. It is improbable that if we do not succeed in obtaining French cooperation in French North Africa we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore necessary to plan the capture of French West Africa against opposition. With the joint resources available it is not, in our opinion, possible to undertake an operation of this nature

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until the late Autumn of 1942 when the weather conditions become favourable. It has been agreed that the United States should be responsible for this operation and we suggest that the planning and training should be put in hand. We propose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously with the occupation of the Cape Verdes, U. S. Air and other appropriate forces should be moved to Freetown - Bathurst area. Their presence in this area will increase the security of the Trans-African reinforcement route and the naval base at Freetown.

NORTH EAST BRAZIL

12. The security of North East Brazil is of strategic importance as a link in the communications between America and the Trans-African reinforcement route. Germany established in West Africa immediately becomes a threat to the South American Continent, in addition to the threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis inspired uprising in Brazil, which would interrup the airroute through Africa to the Middle and Far East cannot be disregarded. The operation is a United States responsibility. Plans have been prepared and formations set-up for this task.

DIEGO SUAREZ

13. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the enemy is of considerable strategic importance, no British force will be available to undertake this operation within the period under consideration if the force for the Canaries operation is kept in being. Moreover, if this operation were carried out in the near future it might prejudice our chance of obtaining French collaboration in North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that we cannot hold a force ready to undertake this operation at present.

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S E C R E T COPY NO. 17

U. S. Serial ABC-4/CS2 ashington
2nd DRAFT January 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH
CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Immediate Assistance to China.

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country's resources against Japan. Information, currently available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and materially, in China's war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps as may be practicable and are consistent with other commitments be promptly taken to reverse this trend.

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country's almost complete isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to delay and possible interception. The long, poorly maintained and insecure Burma Road can, at the best, support only a limited truck-tonnage,--while air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are indicated as necessary:

(a) Closer and more effective liaison with the Generalissimo.

(b) Increased security for Rangoon and the Burma Road, by air and ground.

(c) Improvement in the control, maintenance, and management of the Burma Road.

(d) Increase in base facilities and technical services.

(e) Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures.

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(f) Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding General, [illegible] Area.

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps to meet the requirements listed in paragraph 2:

a. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept Lt. General Hugh A. Drum as the U. S. Military Representative in China, and to agree to the following as General Drum's functions:

(1) Supervise and control all U. S. Defense Aid affairs for China.

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all U. S. Forces in China, and such Chinese forces as may be assigned. To command any U. S. or Chinese forces in Burma which have been alloted by their respective governments for service under him, operating these forces in collaboration with the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area.

(3) Represent the U. S. Government on any international War Council in China.

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China.

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that a is, in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.)

b. Dispatch to the South China - Burma area additional aviation strength, initially raising and maintaining the A.V.G. at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under General Drum's command.

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c. Arrange, (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon facilities as are allocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of the Burma Road.

4. To make this project reasonably effective, British cooperation and agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event that Generalissimo accepts to Gen. Wedemeyer the authority and liaison indicated in par. 3 a above.

Points on which British agreement is sought, under conditions stated in paragraph 3 a

a. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, General Wedemeyer to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in and north of Burma.

b. General Wedemeyer to be authorized to assume control and maintenance of the Burma Route from Rangoon to Chunghking.

c. General Wedemeyer to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary airfields in Burma.

d. General Wedemeyer's command of American and/or Chinese forces in the Burma region to be exercised in cooperation with the Supreme Commander of the S.E.A. area.

e. General Wedemeyer to be accepted as the liaison agency between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek.

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Possible: Please determine what U.S. air commitments under Combined Plans require.

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BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 5

U. S. Serial ABC-4/7
January 10, 1942

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

1. Mission. United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for the accomplishment of the following mission:

a. To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers.

b. To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense thereof.

2. Forces. The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting of the 32d, 24th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the command of Major General Edmund L. Daley, U.S. Army. The strength of the field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and antiaircraft units, is approximately 105,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 ship tons are required. The strength of the antiaircraft personnel (to be provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942 if shipping is available. When the air and antiaircraft support is assumed by the United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required.

3. Command. ~~Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in Northern Ireland will be vested in~~ the "Commander United States Army Forces in Northern Ireland", ~~which~~ will function under the ~~direction~~ command of the Commander United States Army Forces in the British Isles. The

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term "command" is defined as that control of individuals, forces, functions and establishments which is normally vested in and exercised by United States Army commanders by law, regulations and competent orders.

While command is vested entirely in the Army chain of command, the Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles, is authorized to arrange for certain controls to be exercised by other commanders: For example the coordinated employment of U. S. ~~air~~ army air defense units under British direction.

4. Strategic Direction. The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in ~~Northern Ireland~~ will be exercised by the British Government through the Commander U. S. Army Forces in the British Isles. It is agreed, ~~however~~, that ~~the exercise of strategic~~ direction ~~by the British Government~~ will not involve the movement to areas outside Ireland of any part of the United States Army Forces in Northern Ireland (except air forces participating in air missions from bases in Northern Ireland) without the prior consent of the Commanding General, Field Forces, U. S. Army. The term "strategic direction" is defined to mean the function of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative matters.

5. Arrangements for the Operation. The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at:

a. Questions relative to dispatch of U. S. Army Forces and materials from the United States that may require British collaboration will be handled through the British Mission in

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the United States.

b. Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accomodation and maintenance of the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland that may require collaboration between the two governments will be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles.

c. Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Antiaircraft. Initially all antiaircraft protection for U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually antiaircraft protection for U. S. forces in Northern Ireland will be provided from United States personnel equipped and maintained for armament and ammunition from British sources.

(2) Field Artillery. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 rounds per gun, will be delivered by the British to U. S. Forces in Northern Ireland. The British will supply additional ammunition and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles.

(3) Air. It will be the responsibility of the British to provide adequate air protection and support for the U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in their mission, until such time as the means are made available to the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles to assume this responsibility.

d. Shelter.

It will be the responsibility of the British to provide shelter for the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland.

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12 January, 1942

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE.

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION.

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

1. We appreciate the courtesy of the British Chiefs of Staffs in furnishing the information in W.W.8 as to the representatives it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure of the Arcadia party.

2. We agree to the suggestion that hereafter the application of the word "Joint" to inter-service collaboration and the word "Combined" to collaboration between two or more Allies would tend to avoid confusion.

3. We feel that a representative of the British Minister of Defense remaining in Washington is a matter for decision by the Prime Minister and the President.

4. The Report of the United States-British Staff Conversation (ABC-1) with its annexes, March 27, 1941, provides for collaboration and for the establishment of Military Missions to represent the respective Chiefs of Staffs in the British and United States capitals. The same document lays down principles for the integration of the existing military intelligence organizations of the two powers. The complete machinery for collaboration along the lines indicated in ABC-1 has been established for some months and is functioning. We believe it

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is adequate, in general, and should be continued without major change. The Planning Committee should be directed to work out and submit for approval a detailed plan of procedure.

5. Collaboration procedure for priorities and allocation has been the subject of an exchange of letters between Gen. Macready and Gen. Moore. It is agreed in principle that a procedure must be provided to ensure the priorities and allocation of war materials in conformity with the necessities of approved strategic policy. Details of procedure have not yet been completely developed, but should be ready for decision shortly.

6. Movements of British and United States troops and equipment are so intimately connected with the success of military operations that the combined Chiefs of Staffs must coordinate such movements. It would appear that representatives on both British and United States Missions would be the appropriate agencies for collaboration on Military movements with representatives of the British and United States Chiefs of Staffs, respectively.

7. An appropriate U.S. Secretariat is being organized to work with the British Secretariat in Washington.

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8. It is understood, of course, that an American counterpart to the British agencies established in Washington with generally similar organization, function, procedure, responsibility and authority, in connection with collaboration, will be set up in London and accorded the same status in all respects as enjoyed by British agencies in the United States.

Chief of Staff. Chief of Naval Operations.

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File #1

Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers

use tab WW-1 etc

File #2

Joint ~~Planners~~ Chiefs of Staff Committee

Minutes of Meetings

use Tab JCCS-1 etc

~~File #3~~

Index

Tab

File

File #3 Joint Planning Committee Reports

Index

File Subject Date Completed

ABC-4/1

ABC-4/2

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File #3 ABC-4/1 12/27
4/2 12/28
4/2A # 1/13
4/3 12/27
4/4 12/30
4/5 12/27
4/6 1/10
4/7 1/10
4/8 1/10
4/9 1/10

File #4 Minutes of Meeting Joint Army Council

File No. Subjects Discussed Date of Meeting

M/1 1
M/2 2/5
6
7
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9
10

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STATUS OF REPORTS MADE BY JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE TO U.S. - BRITISH CHI

Subjects Reported by Joint Planning Committee to The Chiefs of Staff	File No. and Date	Meeting at which approved. JCCS No. Date	
Priorities for U.S. and U.K. Overseas Expeditions in the At.Ocean	ABC-4/1 27 Dec./41	JCCS-5	29 Dec./41
Northwest Africa Project	ABC-4/2 28 Dec./41	Not yet approved.	
Operation Super Gymnast	ABC-4/2A 13 Jan./42	Accepted as basis of information to be furnished President and Prime Minister JCCS-12. Jan. 14, 1942	
Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific (Far East ea and Adjacent Regions)	ABC-4/3 29 Dec./41	As amended JCCS-7 31 Dec./41	See Annex 2 to JCCS-7 for Final Form.
Proposed Tasks for the Joint Planning Committee	ABC-4/4 30 Dec./41	As amended JCCS-7 31 Dec./41	See Annex 4 to JCCS-7 for Final Form.
Draft Directive to Supreme Commander in ABDA area	ABC-4/5 29 Dec./41	JCCS-7 31 Dec./41	See Annex 1 to JCCS-8 for Final Form
Movements and Projects in Atlantic Theatre - First half of 1942	ABC-4/6 10 Jan./42	As amended JCCS-11 13 Jan./42	See Annex 2 to JCCS-11 for Final Form
Establishment of U.S. Forces in North Ireland	ABC-4/7 10 Jan./42	As amended JCCS-9 11 Jan./42	See Annex 1 to JCCS-9 for Final Form
Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii & Australia	ABC-4/8 10 Jan./42	As amended JCCS-10 12 Jan./42	See Annex 2 to JCCS-10 for Final Form
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J.P.C. REPS.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORTS

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/3. COPY NO. 4

British Serial W.W.(J.P.C.) 3.

Superseded by US ABC-4/3 British W.W.(JPC) 3 Dec 26

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC.

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS)

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Directive.

1. Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Joint Planning Committee.

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements.

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the South West Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, expected to be available in the South West Pacific Area on:-

(a) 15th January, 1942.

(b) 1st February, 1942.

on the following alternative assumptions:-

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.

(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.

(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold.

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Concept of Operations.

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the South West Pacific Area. The present strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position. After providing immediate reinforcements for defence, and As additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defence, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive.

3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:-

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China.

(c) To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and to and within the Far East Area.

(d) To re-establish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

(e) To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements.

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Forces and Reinforcements.

4. The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached table. Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard to the essential requirements of other theatres.

Recommendations.

5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved:-

(a) Under the assumption that the Philippines and Singapore both hold, the reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942 as shown on the attached table, should go forward as now arranged, subject to the direction of the commander to whom they are assigned.

(b) Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not, the U.S. reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, should be employed for protection of the vital lines of communication from the east, and in furtherance of the defences of key points on the Malay Barrier. In the absence of unity of command, detailed dispositions of these reinforcements must be left to the senior U.S. Army commander, in collaboration with the senior British, Dutch, and Australian commanders. Under this assumption the planned disposition of British reinforcements remains unchanged.

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(c) Under the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold, the reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, be used for the defence of the remainder of the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia, U.S. reinforcements being used to the eastward, and British reinforcements to the westward.

NOTE:- The subject of reinforcements for New Zealand and Fiji is being considered separately.

Washington, D.C.,
DECEMBER, 1941.

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British WW (JPC)8

COPY NO. 7

Washington, D.C.
January 10, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, January 10, 1942:

Joint Secretaries

W. P. SCOBEY
Colonel, U.S. Army

I. R. McDOWELL
Commander, U. S. Navy

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R. N.

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BRITISH MOST SECRET

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942.

U.S. Serial ABC-4/8
British Serial WW (JPC)8

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

REPORT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

COMMITTEE

Subject: Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

1. There is under development and approaching completion an air route suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces.

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important Japanese objective since it is the principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply and limited loading facilities.

3. It is planned also to establish at Bora Bora, in the Society Islands, which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels and other shipping en route to and from the South West Pacific.

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route depends ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review.

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In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division supported by strong naval and air forces.

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia is unknown.

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa and Bora Bora.

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed will be supplied in the near future.

8. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially be at the expense of the ABDA area. An opinion should also be obtained from Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. A list has been received of their requirements.

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Recommendations.

9. (a) That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Bora Bora. This is now being accomplished.

(b) That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local defense of the Fiji Islands.

(c) That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands.

(d) That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as a temporary measure furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of the island, even if this has to be at the expense initially of the ABDA area. The question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from Australia as to the priority.

(e) Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

(f) That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia.

(g) The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en route and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and naval escorts become available.

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1. NEW CALEDONIA	One Co. A.I.F. Approximately 3,000 Free French Forces (inadequately equipped) 2 6" Fixed Defense Guns (Free French)	Army 1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 12 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft) 1 Medium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft) Air Warning Service. Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). Do Free Fre This island i 30 miles protecti fields, half of of Noum Note (b). T garriso as a re sance a afforde entails of Free

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

ES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
. A.I.F. imately 3,000 Free French es (inadequately equipped) ixed Defense Guns (Free ch)	Army 1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 12 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft) 1 Medium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft) Air Warning Service. Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). Does not include Free French Forces. This island is 230 miles long and 30 miles wide. Force envisages protection of the 3 to 4 air fields, and in the southern half of the island the harbour of Noumea. Note (b). The size of the garrison is subject to review as a result of early reconnaissance and degree of assistance afforded by Free French; latter entails completing re-equipment of Free French.

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	
2. FIJI	Naval 1 Minesweeper 4 Motor patrol boats Army 6 New Zealand Inf. Bns. 1 Regular Fiji Bn. (1/3 European) 1 Territorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 European). 28 Field Guns 2 6" C.A. guns at Momi 2 6" C.A. guns at Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 4 Bofors 4 3" A.A. guns 6 A.A. Searchlights Air 9 Reconnaissance Bombers* 9 Miscellaneous Aircraft* 4 Singapore Flying Boats 700 Men, Air Corps) 25 Airplanes, Fighters) U.S. 2 Sets RADAR)	Naval 1 Minesweeper 8 Motor Patrol Boats Army 8 Inf. Bns. 16 Heavy A.A. guns 28 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 12 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks) Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) 1 Medium Bombardment Squad. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 aircraft) 4 Sets RADAR	Air U.S. Army pursuit *Obsolete Hudsons approved

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

...SES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
	Naval	
...sweeper ...r patrol boats	1 Minesweeper 8 Motor Patrol Boats	
	Army	
...Zealand Inf. Bns. ...lar Fiji Bn. (1/3 European) ...itorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 ...pean). ...ld Guns ...C.A. guns at Momi ...C.A. guns at Suva ... C.A. guns at Suva ...Pounders ...Howitzers ...rs ...A.A. guns ... Searchlights	8 Inf. Bns. 16 Heavy A.A. guns 28 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 12 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks)	
...nnaissance Bombers* ...ellaneous Aircraft* ...apore Flying Boats ...n, Air Corps) ...rplanes, Fighters) U.S. ...ts RADAR)	Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) 1 Medium Bombardment Squad. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 aircraft) 4 Sets RADAR	Air U.S. Army is supplying the pursuit squadron. *Obsolete. Should be replaced by Hudsons due to New Zealand under approved allocations.

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	
3. SAMOA	4 6" guns 18 3" A.A. guns 42 .50 M.G's. 42 .30 M.G's. 415 Marines 150 Samoan Marines 1 Regiment of Marines 12 75 m.m. guns 1 Co. Light Tanks (13 Tanks) Hq.'s Troops 6 5" guns Total - 5,015 U.S. Marines 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) 2 Sets RADAR	As in column (b)	
4. CANTON	45 Engineers 10 Medical and Communication 10 Artillery Personnel 2 75 m.m. guns 12 Machine guns	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

FENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
6" guns 3" A.A. guns .50 M.G's. .30 M.G's. 5 Marines 0 Samoan Marines Regiment of Marines 75 m.m. guns Co. Light Tanks (13 Tanks) Hq.'s Troops 5" guns Total - 5,015 U.S. Marines Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Sets RADAR	As in column (b)	
Engineers Medical and Communication Artillery Personnel 75 m.m. guns Machine guns	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)
(a)	(b)	(c)
5. CHRISTMAS ISLAND	125 Engineers, Medical and Signal Personnel 10 Artillery Personnel 12 Machine Guns 4 3" A.A. guns 2 75 m.m. guns 2 155 m.m. guns	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 Sets, RADAR
6. PALMYRA	479 Marines 4 5" guns 4 3" A.A. guns 8 .50 A.A. Machine Guns 8 .30 A.A. Machine Guns 2 Sets, RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft)
7. BORABORA	NONE	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbour Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

FENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
5 Engineers, Medical and Signal Personnel Artillery Personnel Machine Guns 3" A.A. guns 75 m.m. guns 155 m.m. guns	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 Sets, RADAR	
9 Marines 5" guns 3" A.A. guns .50 A.A. Machine Guns .30 A.A. Machine Guns Sets, RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft)	Certain other equipment now installed, details of which are not now available.
NONE	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbour Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services	

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COPY NO. 46

U.S. Serial ABC-4/1

British Serial W.W.(JPC)1.

Agreed to by the Joint Planning Committee

superseded by ABC 4/1 British W.W.(JPC)1 Dec 27

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

Report by the U.S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarised as follows:-

> Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British toops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:
>
> (a) The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.
>
> (b) The occupation by invitation of the following positions:
>
> (1) The Azores.
> (2) The Cape Verde Islands.
> (3) The Canary Islands.
> (4) French West Africa.
> (5) French North Africa.
> (6) Diegos Suarez in Madagascar.
> (7) Curacao and Aruba.
> (8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

> (a) To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.
>
> (b) To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
>
> (c) To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial W.W.(JPC) 2) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any

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other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of troop transport, in view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying US and UK field armies, garrisons, and naval forces. Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

25th December, 1941.

(Revised - December 27, 1941.)

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ABC-4/2

WW(J.P.C.)2

December 27, 1941.

(revised)

Superseded by
US ABC 4/2
British WW (JPC) 2
Dec 28th

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT

Copy Number 27

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PROJECT - GYMNAST

We submit below a provisional examination of the project for joint operations in northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following hypotheses:

(a) We receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance there will be only token resistance.

(b) That owing to their current pre-occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefore anticipate a possible maximum period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

(c) That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

Objective. We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control could be extended over all North Africa and into Europe.

Base. The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This small port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies 175 miles outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of A.A. defences and air forces a single main base must be used for the whole force in French North Africa.

Establishment of Base.
There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca which has a considerable garrison and coast defences. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States can make available an amphibious assault division for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

Support to French in Tunisia.
The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco or perhaps a condition of their entry would be a demand from the French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two A.A. Regiments and three

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It would be premature to recommend the scope of tasks and the strengths of the total forces that might ultimately be required in French North Africa.

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Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through by Sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance force at Casablanca.

Defense of Moroccan Area.

It will be essential to get in sufficient forces into the Casablanca area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being seriously damaged by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and A.A. defences.

The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco.

The initial joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first three months are estimated at:-

1 Amphibious Assault Division (combat loaded)
3 Infantry Divisions
2 Armoured Divisions
232 ~~240~~ First line fighter aircraft (160 U.S.) (72 British, 24 to be used as army observation as well as fighters)
57 First line medium bomber aircraft U.S.
57 First line light bomber aircraft U.S.
39 ~~48~~ First line observation aircraft (U.S.)
144 ~~189~~ Heavy A.A. guns
252 ~~316~~ Light A.A. guns
Base and L. of C. units

inclusive of the Turnour detachment.

~~As further forces [illegible] will the all points of entry along the coast will be secured.~~

Total Forces Required:

The size of the British and American forces will be affected by the assistance that may be furnished by French and Spanish units in North Africa. The [redacted] forces must be sufficient in strength to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy and to open the Mediterranean route. These tasks will necessitate offensive air operations against Axis bases and ports in the Mediterranean area. The combined British and U. S. forces might amount to about:

2½ Armoured Divisions
5 Infantry Divisions
A.A. weapons (350 heavy and 700 light)
First line aircraft:
800 Pursuit
105 Heavy Bombardment
228 Medium Bombardment
171 Light Bombardment
100 Naval Patrol

"A"
OUT

Joint American-British Effort Necessary.

Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility as defined in ABC-1. As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detail planning can proceed.

It is premature to determine the exact [illegible] now necessary to meet the task [illegible] be decided in the future.

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NAVAL FORCES

British. Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal UK to Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a considerable period.

United States:

The U.S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support for the transit and landing of U.S. Expeditionary Forces.

American Convoy Protection.

(a) Advance American Division -
One Amphibious Assault Division embarked in 15 vessels protected by units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

(b) Remainder of initial U.S. forces -
Three convoys at about one month intervals, and successive logistic convoys protected by units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

(c) The protection given this new line of sea communications would be at the expense of the protection now being given to Atlantic trade routes by the United States.

Timings. D.1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

(a) U.S. Forces.
The U.S. Amphibious Assault Division could reach Casablanca on D.20.

(b) British Forces.
The first British convoy could reach Algiers on D.40-47, or Casablanca on D.37-44. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British forces, totalling 1 armoured and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another 12 weeks. Its movement would therefore be complete about D.120.

Summary of Plan.

(a) One U.S. Amphibious Assault Division combat loaded and closely supported by United States Naval forces to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

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(b) A British force consisting of:-
1 Armoured Brigade,
1 Infantry Brigade Group,
2 Anti-Aircraft Regiments, (24 heavy - 36 light)
3 Fighter Squadrons, (48)

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with (a) to Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance force.

(c) Main body to follow (a) and (b):-
1 American Army Division.
1 American Armoured Division.
2 British Divisions.
1 British Armoured Division (less detachments in (b))

Air Forces:
184 ~~320~~ First line fighter aircraft
57 First line medium bomber aircraft
57 First line light bomber aircraft
39 ~~68~~ First line observation aircraft.

See B above.

(d) Base and L. of C. organizations. ~~The~~ defences of the base area to be found by ~~the~~ British ~~[illegible]~~. Anti-aircraft for the initial force.

Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities.

U.S. to provide as high a proportion as possible of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

~~The ultimate force to be built up as rapidly as possible.~~

120 Heavy AA guns 5 Reg
216 Light AA guns 6 Reg

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ABC-4/2

WW(J.P.C.)2

December 25, 1941.

Replaces w/draft dtd ABC 4/2 WW (J.P.C.) 2 Dec 25th

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT

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PROJECT - GYMNAST

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(b) That owing to their pre-occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would then take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefore anticipate a period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

(c) That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

Objective. We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also

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form a base from which Allied control of all North Africa could be extended.

Base. The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of A.A. defenses and air forces a single main base must be used for the whole force in North Africa.

Establishment of Base.

There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca which has a considerable garrison and coast defenses. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States Marine Division is eminently suitable for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

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The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco or perhaps a condition of their entry would be a demand from the French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two A.A. Regiments and three Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through by sea to, say Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance guard at Casablanca.

Defense of Moroccan Area.

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expedition being driven out by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and A.A. defenses.

The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco.

The joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first three months are estimated at:

Amphibious

1 Marine (combat loaded) Division

3 Infantry Divisions

2 Armoured Divisions

320 First line fighter aircraft

57 First line medium bomber aircraft

57 First line light bomber aircraft

60 First line observation aircraft.

120 Heavy A.A. guns

216 Light A.A. guns

Base and L. of C. units

As further forces become available all points of entry along the coast will be secured.

Total Forces Required.

The total forces ~~ultimately~~ required to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy, and to open the Mediterranean route ~~by providing air cover along the coast~~ will depend on the assistance that may be furnished by the French and Spanish. The combined British and United States forces might amount to about:

2½ - 2 Armored Divisions

5 - 3 Infantry Divisions

A.A. weapons (350 heavy and 700 light)

First line aircraft:

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First line aircraft (cont'd)

830 Pursuit

105 Heavy Bombardment

228 Medium Bombardment

171 Light Bombardment

100 Naval Patrol

Joint American-British Effort Necessary.

Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility as defined in ABC-1. As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detail planning can proceed.

NAVAL FORCES

British

Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal UK to Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a considerable period.

United States:

The U.S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support for the transit and landing of U.S. Expeditionary Forces.

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American Convoy Escorts.

(a) Advance American Division -

One Marine Division embarked in 15 vessels escorted by units from Task Force Three.

(b) Remainder of initial U.S. forces -

Three convoys at about one month intervals, escorted by units withdrawn from Task Forces Three and Four. Successive logistic convoys require escorts withdrawn from Task Force Four.

Timings

D.1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

(a) U.S. forces.

The U.S. Marine Division could reach Casablanca on D 20 ~~D.30.~~

(b) British Forces.

The first British convoy could reach Algiers on D. _____, or Casablanca on D. _____. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British forces, totalling 1 armoured and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another _____ weeks. Its movement would therefore be complete about D. _____.

Summary of Plan.

(a) U.S. Marine Division combat loaded and closely supported by United States Naval forces to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

(b) A British force consisting of:

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1 Armoured Brigade,

1 Infantry Brigade Group,

2 Antiaircraft Regiments

3 Fighter Squadrons,

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with (a) to Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance guard.

(c) Main body to follow (a) and (b):

1 American Army Division.

1 American Armoured Division.

2 British Divisions

1 British Armoured Division (less detachments in (b))

Air Forces:

320 First line fighter aircraft

57 First line medium bomber aircraft

57 First line light bomber aircraft

63 First line observation aircraft.

(d) Base and L. of C. organizations. Air defenses of the base area to be found by the British initially.

Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities.

U.S. to provide as high a proportion of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

The ultimate force to be built up as rapidly as possible.

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ABC-4/2

WW(J.P.C.)2

December 25, 1941.

Approved by ABC-4/2 WW(J.P.C.)2 Dec 28

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT

Copy Number 16

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PROJECT - GYMNAST

We submit below a provisional examination of the project for joint operations in northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following hypotheses:

(a) We receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance there will be only token resistance.

(b) That owing to their pre-occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefore anticipate a period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

(c) That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

Objective. We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control ~~of all North Africa~~ could be extended into Europe.

Base. The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of A.A. defences and air forces a single main base must be used for the whole force in North Africa.

Establishment of Base.
There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca which has a considerable garrison and coast defences. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States ~~Marine Division~~ 9th Infantry Division is eminently suitable for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

Support to French in Tunisia.
The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco or perhaps a condition of their entry would be a demand from the French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two A.A. Regiments and three Fighter Squadrons. The

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forces should be ready to go straight through by sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance force at Casablanca.

Defense of Moroccan Area.

It will be essential to get in sufficient forces into the Casablanca area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being driven out by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and A.A. defences.

The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco.

The joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first three months are estimated at:-

1 Marine (combat loaded) Amphibious Division
3 Infantry Divisions
2 Armoured Divisions
First line fighter aircraft
57 First line medium bomber aircraft
57 First line light bomber aircraft
63 First line observation aircraft
120 Heavy A.A. guns
216 Light A.A. guns
Base and L. of C. units

As further forces become available all points of entry along the coast will be secured.

Total Forces Required.

The total forces ultimately required to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy, and to open the Mediterranean route by providing air cover along the coast will depend on the assistance that may be furnished by the French and Spanish. The combined British and United States forces might amount to about:

2½ - 2 Armoured Divisions
5 - 3 Infantry Divisions
A.A. weapons (350 heavy and 700 light)
First line aircraft:
800 Pursuit
105 Heavy Bombardment
228 Medium Bombardment
171 Light Bombardment
100 Naval Patrol

Joint American-British Effort Necessary.

Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility as defined in ABC-1. As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detail planning can proceed.

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NAVAL FORCES

British. Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal UK to Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a considerable period.

United States:

The U.S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support for the transit and landing of U.S. Expeditionary Forces.

American Convoy Escorts.

(a) Advance American Division –
One Marine Division embarked in 15 vessels escorted by units from Task Force Three.

(b) Remainder of initial U.S. forces –
Three convoys at about one month intervals, escorted by units withdrawn from Task Forces Three and Four. Successive logistic convoys require escorts withdrawn from Task Force Four.

Timings. D.1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

(a) U.S. Forces.
The U.S. Marine Division could reach Casablanca on D.20.

(b) British Forces.
The first British convoy could reach Algiers on D.____, or Casablanca on D.____. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British forces, totalling 1 armoured and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another ____ weeks. Its movement would therefore be complete about D.____.

Summary of Plan.

(a) U.S. Marine Division combat loaded and closely supported by United States Naval forces to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

(b) A British force consisting of:-
1 Armoured Brigade,
1 Infantry Brigade Group,
2 Anti-Aircraft Regiments,
3 Fighter Squadrons,

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with (a) to

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Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance guard.

(c) Main body to follow (a) and (b):-
1 American Army Division.
1 American Armoured Division.
2 British Divisions.
1 British Armoured Division (less detachments in (b))

Air Forces:
320 First line fighter aircraft
57 First line medium bomber aircraft
57 First line light bomber aircraft
63 First line observation aircraft.

(d) Base and L. of C. organizations. Air defences of the base area to be found by the British initially.

Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, save ring the base area and port facilities.

U.S. to provide as high a proportion of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

The ultimate force to be built up as rapidly as possible.

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Aug 27
ABC-4/1
WW(JPC)1 Dec 27

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/1

British Serial W.W.(JPC)1.

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

Report by the U.S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarised as follows:-

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

(a) The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

(b) The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

(1) The Azores.
(2) The Cape Verde Islands.
(3) The Canary Islands.
(4) French West Africa.
(5) French North Africa.
(6) Diegos Suarez in Madagascar.
(7) Curacao and Aruba.
(8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

(a) To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

(b) To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

(c) To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial W.W.(JPC) 2) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any

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major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

25th December, 1941.

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CHIEFS OF STAFFS CONFERENCES.

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U.S.Serial APC-4/CS-1
British Serial W.W.-1 (Final)

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It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

Washington War Conference

American-British Strategy.

Memorandum by the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff.

Note: The circulation of this paper should be restricted to the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates.

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A-B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

Note:-
* For brevity the abbreviated A-B is used to denote American-British

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b. The maintenance of essential communications.

c. Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.

d. Wearing down and undermining German resistence by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.

f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests (see paragraph 10) and deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY.

The Security of Areas of War Production

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:-

a. The United Kingdom.

b. Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.

c. Russia.

6. The United Kingdom. - To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.

7. The United States. - The main centers of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea-borne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not.

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8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defense of the United States are matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess.

9. Russia. - It will be essential to afford the Russians assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.

Maintenance of Communications

10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:-

a. From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.

b. From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.

c. The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.

d. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.

e. The route through the Panama Canal, and U. S. coastal traffic.

f. The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East.

In addition to the above routes, we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.

11. The main air routes which must be secured are:-

a. From the U. S. to South America, Ascension, Freetown, Takoradi, and Cairo.

b. From the U. K. to Gibraltar, Malta and Cairo.

c. From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.

d. From the U. S. to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.

e. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.

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f. From the U. S. to the U. K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.

g. From the U. S. to the U. K. via the Azores.

h. From the U. S. to Vladivostok via Alaska.

12. The security of these routes involves:-

a. Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions.

b. Holding and capturing essential sea and air bases.

Closing and Tightening the Ring Around Germany

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows: ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE.

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

14. If this ring can be closed the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.

The Undermining and Wearing Down of the German Resistance

15. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:-

a. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.

b. Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means.

c. The blockade.

d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

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Development of Land Offensives on the Continent

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The Safeguarding of Vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre

18. The security of Australia, New Zealand and India must be maintained and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:-

a. Hawaii and Alaska.

b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier and the Philippines.

c. Rangoon and the route to China.

d. The Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion.

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Washington War Conference

American-British Strategy.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.

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1. At the A-B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

(a) The realisation of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

Note:-
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(b) The Maintenance of essential communications.

(c) Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.

(d) Wearing down and undermining German resistence by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

(e) The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.

(f) Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany and deny Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY.

The security of Areas of War Production.

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:-

(a) The United Kingdom.

(b) Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.

(c) Russia.

6. The United Kingdom. To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.

7. The United States. The main centres of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea-borne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska are held or not.

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9. Russia. It will be essential to afford the Russians materiel assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.

Maintenance of Communications.

10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:-

(a) From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.

(b) From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.

(c) The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.

(d) The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.

(e) The route through the Panama Canal, and U.S. coastal traffic.

(f) The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East.

In addition to the above routes we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.

11. The main air routes which must be secured are:-

(a) From the U. S. to South America, Freetown, Takeradi, and Cairo.

(b) From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.

(c) From the U.S. to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.

(d) The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.

(e) From the U.S. to the U.K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.

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(f) From the U.S. to the U.K. via the Azores.

(g) From the U.S. to Vladivostok via Alaska.

12. The security of these routes involves:-

(i) Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions.

(ii) Holding and capturing essential sea bases. The main sea bases which are, or may be, required, apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:-

Iceland
Gibraltar or the Canaries
The Azores
Cape Verdes
Freetown
Dakar
Madagascar
Ceylon
Hawaii

(iii) Holding and capturing essential air bases. The main air bases which are or may be required, apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:-

Newfoundland	Basra
Greenland	Teheran
Iceland	Kuibyshev
Azores	Bahrein Dhahran
Bermuda	Karachi
Trinidad	Calcutta
Belem	Hawaii
Natal	Christmas Island
Freetown	Palmyra
Ascension Island	Canton
Takoradi	Samoa
Lagos	Fiji
Kano	New Caledonia
Ft. Lamy	Townsville
Khartoum	Darwin
Massaua	Gloncurry
Cairo	Kefang (Timor) Koepang (Timor)
Habbaniyeh Habbaniya	Soerabaja

Closing and Tightening the Ring around Germany.

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows:

ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE.

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The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

14. If this ring can be closed the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.

The Undermining and wearing down of the German Resistance

15. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:-

(a) Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.

(b) Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means.

(c) The blockade.

(d) The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

Development of land offensives on the Continent

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, either across the Mediterranean or from Turkey into the Balkans, or by simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of North-Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final

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assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory programme should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The safeguarding of vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre

18. The security of Australia, New Zealand and India must be maintained and Chinese resistance supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:-

(a) Hawaii and Alaska.

(b) Singapore, the East Indies Barrier and the Philippines.

(c) Rangoon and the route to China.

(d) The Maritime Provinces of Russia.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter for mutual discussion.

Signed DUDLEY POUND

J.G.DILL

C. PORTAL

Washington, D. C.

22nd December 1941

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REPORTS OF CHIEFS OF STAFFS

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ANNEX 3
to
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(Document mentioned in paragraph 1, JCCSs-5)

COPY NO. 25

U.S. ABC-4/1
British "T" 5

December 27, 1941

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/1
British Serial WW(JPC)1

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

Report by the U.S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:-

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

a. The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

b. The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

(1) The Azores.
(2) The Cape Verde Islands.
(3) The Canary Islands.
(4) French West Africa.
(5) French North Africa.
(6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
(7) Curacao and Aruba.
(8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

a. To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

b. To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

c. To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial WW) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of troop transport, in view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying US and UK field armies, garrisons, and naval forces. Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

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COPY NO. 36

U.S. ABC-4/5
British WW 3 (Final)

December 31, 1941.

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

superseded by
WS ABC 4/5
British WW 6 (approved)

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December 31, 1941.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/5 (Final)
British Serial WW 3

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS:

1. Area. -

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are:

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic defensive. The ABDA Governments intend to provide immediate reinforcements for defense. As additional forces become available, it will become possible to take the offensive and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Although your operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further preparations for that offensive.

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6. The general strategic policy will therefore be: -

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander. -

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly designated by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force.

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In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. If any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.

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ANNEX 1

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BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows:

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East, westward to the meridian of 114° East, thence northwestward to latitude 13° South, longitude 92° East.

On the West: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

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ANNEX 2

U. S. SECRET
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December 31, 1941.

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

a. The provision of reinforcements.
b. A major change in policy.
c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

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Lt. Col George

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COPY NO. 28

December 30, 1941

U.S. ABC-4/5
British WW 3

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

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superseded by
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MINUTES

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

British-United States

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COPY NO. 16

U.S. Serial ABC-4/MC

January 3, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

Minutes - Sixth Meeting

Section I

1. The United States - British Joint Planning Committee met at 3:00 P.M., January 3, 1942, in Room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D. C.

2. Presiding: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy.

PRESENT

U.S. Navy Members
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner
Captain Ralph Davison

U.S. Army Members
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Colonel T. T. Handy
Lieut. Colonel A. C. Wedemeyer
Lieut. Colonel K. N. Walker
Major H. S. Hansell

British Members
Brigadier V. Dykes, O.B.E.
Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.M.G.
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., C.B.E.
Commander Galbraith
Commander Curry

Secretariat
Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U. S. Navy
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N.

Section II

Relief of Iceland and Ireland.

3. In opening the meeting Rear Admiral Turner stated that there had been prepared a Joint Army and Navy Plan for the relief of forces in Ireland and Iceland. This plan, while lacking some of the details applicable to the British forces, shows what is proposed and contains certain things which could well be agreed to in advance. It was agreed to present this plan for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

4. The Committee then undertook a discussion of the defenses of island bases between Hawaii and Australia. The United States Members felt that, in accordance with the agreed principles of ABC-1, the security of the various islands should be the responsibility of the Power in whose area of strategic responsibility they lay, and that all relative discussion must proceed on this basis rather than on the

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basis of priority. The discussion centered on the defenses of New Caledonia and Fiji. The British stated that these would normally be the responsibility of Australia and New Zealand but that these latter countries lack the means for properly safeguarding the islands and that it appeared more feasible for the United States to undertake their defense than to necessitate the provision of troops and equipment from the British Isles.

5. The United States Members stated that defenses of all island bases along the route for which this country is responsible was being undertaken simultaneously, and that Samoa in particular, being considered a base of major importance, was being garrisoned and equipped on a scale to sustain defense against strong attack.

6. It was eventually decided that the British would ascertain from the Australian and New Zealand Governments just what those countries could provide for the defense of New Caledonia and Fiji. Once this was determined, the United States might, if necessary, plan to augment their garrisons and equipment to the extent required to provide for adequate defense, pointing out that men and equipment so used would have to be at the expense of reinforcements earmarked to the ADDA area.

Victory Program.

7. The Committee then discussed the Victory Program on which British and Joint United States Army and Navy papers had been prepared. Lieut. Colonel Wedemeyer explained the manner in which the United States program for land and air had been developed, Rear Admiral Turner supplementing this with an explanation of the naval program.

8. The British Planning Committee Members undertook a further consideration of the papers which had been prepared in an endeavor to combine the two into a single paper for the Joint Planning Committee's presentation of the subject to the Chiefs of Staff.

9. In closing, Rear Admiral Turner read a dispatch in which the British requested that the six United States transports now engaged in carrying troops to the Far East be further employed by them to take reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific. Inasmuch as the request was rather general, the British Members agreed to obtain answers to the following questions:

(a) What troops will be moved?

(b) What is the point of departure and destination of the trip?

(c) Are the troops now ready to be embarked?

(d) If not, how long would the transports be delayed before the troops are ready?

Upon receipt of this specific information the United States authorities will decide whether or not the transports can be loaned as requested.

10. The meeting then adjourned at 7:15 P.M. to reconvene at a time to be decided later.

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OF THE AAF
HISTORICAL OFFICE



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AIR WAR PLANS DIVISION
MUNITIONS BLDG

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by

P.R.C.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSIFIED
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AIR WAR PLANS DIVISION
MUNITIONS BLDG

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APPROVAL OF CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE PAPERS

FILE	SUBJECT	JPC FILE	MEETING APPROVED	DATE APPROVED
WW-1	American - British Grand Strategy	None	JCCSs-7	Dec. 31, 1941
WW-2	Operations in Northwest Africa (Gymnast)	ABC-4/2	Not Approved	
WW-3	Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area (NOTE: WW-3 is superseded by WW-6 (Approved)	ABC-4/5	Not Approved	
WW-4	Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific.	ABC-4/3	JCCSs-7	Dec. 31, 1941
WW-5	Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean.	ABC-4/1	JCCSs-6	Dec. 29, 1941
WW-6	Report by United States - British Chiefs of Staff -- Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area.	ABC-4/5	JCCSs-8	Jan. 10, 1942
WW-7	(No paper under this file)			
WW-8	Post Arcadia Collaboration (Development).		Not Approved	
WW-9	Procedure for Assumption of Command by General Wavell.	ABC-4/CS-3	JCCSs-8	Jan. 10, 1942
WW-10	Immediate Assistance to China	ABC-4/9	JCCSs-8	Jan. 10, 1942
WW-11	Super Gymnast (Northwest Africa) Development	ABC-4/2A	Not Approved	
WW-12	Establishment of U.S. forces in North Ireland	ABC-4/7	JCCSs-9	Jan. 11, 1942
WW-13	Defense of Island Bases Between Hawaii and Australia	ABC-4/8	JCCSs-10	Jan. 12, 1942
WW-14	Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater -- First Half of 1942	ABC-4/6	JCCSs-11	Jan. 13, 1942
WW-15	Proposed Tasks for the Joint Planning Committee	ABC-4/4	JCCSs-7	Dec. 31, 1941
WW-16	Post Arcadia Collaboration	ABC-4/CS-4	JCCSs-12	Jan. 14, 1942
WW-17	Time Factor for Super Gymnast	ABC-4/2A	JCCSs-12	Jan. 14, 1942

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U.S. ABC-4/2A
British WW-17

COPY NO. 8

January 14, 1942

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

ACCEPTED AS AMENDED - JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT, AS A BASIS ON WHICH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF SHOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER REGARDING THE TIME FACTOR FOR SUPER-GYMNAST

U.S. Serial ABC-4/2A,
British Serial WW (J.P.C.)2A

OPERATION SUPER-GYMNAST

WW 17

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Washington, D. C.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/2 A
British Serial WW (JPC) 2A

January 13, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF OPERATION

SUPER-GYMNAST

1. The Joint U.S. - British Planning Committee has been advised that the President and the Prime Minister have agreed to the immediate dispatch of additional United States reinforcements from the east coast to Australia, the terms of the agreement being as follows:

a. Approved the proposal put forward by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the U. S. convoy sailing on the 15th January should be reduced from 16,000 to 4,000 for Northern Ireland and from 8,000 to 2,500 for Iceland, in order to permit of the dispatch to the Far East of 21,000 troops, with aircraft and other equipment.

b. Agreed that the remainder of the proposed shipping adjustments set out in the Annex should be referred to London for confirmation.

c. Invited Mr. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook to investigate the effect of the above shipping adjustment on the delivery of United States supplies to Russia during the next three months and to coordinate the provision of shipping to make good any deficiency, it being understood that nothing must be done to interfere with the planned flow of tanks, aircraft and ammunition from the U.S.A. to the Middle East.

2. Based on the above terms of agreement, the combined Chiefs of Staff have directed the Combined Planning Committee to examine and report on the following questions:

a. The earliest date which could be fixed for D-1 of Operation Super-Gymnast on the assumption that the shipping adjustments approved in 1 a above are carried out and that shipping to carry U. S. supplies to Russia is provided in full.

b. To what extent Operation Super-Gymnast could be executed on the assumption that the favourable opportunity arises at some date between the end of February and the date on which D-1 of the full operation could be fixed (vide 2 a above).

REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION

British

1. The movement of United States troops to Australia will not affect the readiness date of the British to carry out their part of Super-Gymnast.

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United States

2. The readiness of U. S. Troops to carry out Super-Gymnast will not be affected by the movement of reinforcements to the Far East. The delay to Super-Gymnast caused by the Far East movement will depend upon the date of return to Atlantic ports of the ships involved in that movement.

3. We estimate that the vessels diverted from the Atlantic to make the Far East move can be back in the Atlantic ports on the following dates:

a. Passenger vessels ..... April 10 - 20
b. Cargo vessels ..... May 15 25

(Capacity of the above group of vessels is 22,000 troops and 230,000 tons of cargo).

4. The execution of Super-Gymnast as originally planned is dependent upon the return of the Far East convoy, therefore the earliest date that could be fixed for D-1 is May 25.

5. The May 25 date can not be accepted without certain reservations, since no allowance has been made for ship losses and possible increased demands for shipping arising from enemy operations, accelerated production and additional lend-lease commitments. Furthermore, it seems probable that these vessels may continue to be needed in the Pacific for further movements to Australia.

REPLY TO THE SECOND QUESTION

British Available Forces

6. British land forces, i.e., one armored division and two divisions with antiaircraft units will be ready for dispatch. The British air contingent of Gymnast consisting of three fighter and two A.C. squadrons could also be made ready. This force is not alone sufficient, but could not be increased from British resources.

United States Available Forces

7. United States Forces, as originally planned for Super-Gymnast, will be available, but their participation will be limited by the withdrawal of shipping for the troop movements in the Pacific. Combat loaded ships for one Division (12,000) are being held in readiness. This shipping will permit the employment of that division. It can be supported by one carrier group of naval aircraft or equivalent disembarked from an aircraft carrier. All antiaircraft troops would have to be found by the British, also base troops, until additional U. S. shipping could be made available, either from Pacific or from shipping now employed on other tasks. This latter shipping is more fully discussed in Paragraph 11 below.

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RATE OF MOVEMENT

8. The rate at which the British force could be received would not be limited, as in the Super-Gymnast plan, by the capacity of Casablanca Port. It would depend upon the provision of shipping and naval escorts. The following table is based upon the assumption that the British could not afford to rob the Middle and Far East reinforcements of more than 25,000 men from one reinforcement convoy. The United States program is based upon the repeated use of the combat loaded ships, and the use of no other troop transports until the return to the Atlantic Coast of the Far East cargo convoy about 15 - 25 May. For movements after the first one, 8 additional cargo vessels will be required. Possible acceleration of the movement will be governed by the priority needs stated in Paragraph 11 below.

9. The table below shows the earliest dates on which British and United States forces can arrive at Casablanca if D-1 falls on March 1st:

		Casablanca		Algiers
March 1	D-1	British	U.S.	British
Mar. 28	D-28	5,000	12,000	7,000
	D-43	6,000 *		16,000
	D-73	22,000		
	D-88		12,000	
	D-103	22,000		
	D-118		22,000	
July 21	D-133	12,000 *		
	D-148		12,000	
	D-163		22,000	
Sept.19	D-193		12,000	
	Totals	67,000	92,000	23,000

* See Paragraph 10.

ACCELERATION OF MOVEMENT

British

10. If the situation were such that we could afford to stop the flow of British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East completely for a time, the second British convoy could be increased from 6,000 to 18,000 capacity, thus eliminating the fifth British convoy shown above.

United States

11. The priorities listed below will govern the availability of additional U. S. vessels for Super-Gymnast:

1st Priority: Continuous maintenance of existing overseas Army and Navy garrisons and the United States Fleets.

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2nd Priority: Continued delivery of supplies to Russia, and planned flow of tanks, aircraft, and ammunition to Middle East.

3rd Priority: Continuous movements and maintenance of United States forces in the Far East.

12. All military requirements for shipping other than those listed above will have to be deferred, including:

a. Reinforcements to Hawaii and other overseas possessions and bases.

b. Movements to Iceland and North Ireland.

13. If this is done, we estimate that additional passenger vessels up to an estimated capacity of 12,400 might be available after about four weeks' notice.

14. Approximately 13 - 15 cargo vessels will be required in addition to the passenger vessels. The availability of the cargo ships will have to be determined by the Maritime Commission.

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U. S. ABC-4/CS4
British WW-16

COPY NO. 9

January 14, 1942.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPROVED AS AMENDED - U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF
MEMO

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION

WW 16

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U. S. ABC-4/CS4
British WW-16

January 14, 1942.

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION

Memorandum by Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. In order to provide for the continuance of the necessary machinery to effect collaboration between the United Nations after the departure from Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (formerly designated as "Joint Chiefs of Staff") propose the broad principles and basic organization herein outlined.

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of one nation, and the word "combined" to collaboration between two or more of the United Nations.

3. Definitions. -

a. The term "Combined Chiefs of Staff" is defined as the British Chiefs of Staff (or in their absence from Washington, their duly accredited representatives), and the United States opposite numbers of the British Chiefs of Staff.

b. The term "Combined Staff Planners" is defined as the body of officers duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make such studies, draft such plans, and perform such other work as may from time to time be placed on the "Combined Chiefs of Staff Agenda" by that Body, and duly delegated by them to the Combined Staff Planners.

c. The "Combined Secretariat" is defined as the body of officers duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to maintain necessary records, prepare and distribute essential papers, and perform such other work as is delegated to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Personnel. -

a. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshall A. T. Harris, will represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

b. The Joint Staff Planners will be

(1) For the British (for the time being):

Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N.
Lt. Col. G. K. Bourne, British Army
Group Captain S. C. Strafford, R.A.F.

(2) For the United States, the principal members are:

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy
Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, U.S. Army,
Capt. R. E. Davison, U.S. Navy
Col. E. L. Naiden, U.S. Army

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c. Combined Secretariat

The British members of the Combined Secretariat will be headed by Brigadier Dykes. The United States members will be headed by Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff shall develop and submit recommendations as follows:

a. For the ABDA Area, specifically as set forth in the Directive, Annex 2 to U.S. ABC-4/5, British [illegible] dated January 5, 1942.

b. For other areas in which the United Nations may decide to act in concert, along the same general lines as in a above modified as necessary to meet the particular circumstances.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff shall accordingly

a. Recommend the broad program of requirements based on strategic considerations.

b. Submit general directives as to the policy governing the distribution of available weapons of war. (It is agreed that finished war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs; to effectuate this principle, we recommend the utilization of appropriate bodies in London and Washington, under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff).

c. Settle the broad issues of priority of overseas military movements.

7. The question of the production and dissemination of complete Military Intelligence to serve the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff Planners has been referred to the latter body for a report. Here also, it is contemplated that existing machinery will be largely continued.

8. It is planned that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet weekly, or more often if necessary; an agenda will be circulated before each meeting.

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COPY NO. 9

December 31, 1941.

U.S. ABC-4/4 (Final)
British WW-15

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved as amended

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

(U.S. Serial ABC-4/4 (Final), British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 4)

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

WW 15

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/4 (Final)
British Serial W. W. - 15

Washington, D. C.

December 31, 1941

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

1. A study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military projects and movements which affect the Atlantic theatre and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942.

This report will include consideration of the following:

A. Movements

(a) Relief of Iceland.

(b) Movement of three Divisions and one armored Division from the United States to Northern Ireland.

(c) Movement of United States air forces to the United Kingdom.

(d) Relief of British in Aruba and Curacao.

B. Projects

(a) Joint United States-British occupation of French North Africa.

(b) United States occupation of:

(1) French West Africa and Cape Verde Islands.

(2) Northeast Brazil.

(c) British occupation of:

(1) The Azores.

(2) The Canaries and Madeira.

(3) Diego Suarez.

2. Coordination of the Victory Programs of the United States and the British Commonwealth and adjustment of their broad outlines in accordance with strategic considerations and production possibilities.

3. A consideration of any steps that should be taken in the light of experience up to date to implement, improve, or extend the system of collaboration between the United States-British Staffsas laid down in ABC-1; the need for allocating joint resources on a strategic basis to be taken into account.

Note: Consideration of the southwest Pacific theatre, including the matter of unity of command therein, were treated as a first priority and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the foregoing document.

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January 13, 1942.

U.S. ABC-4/6
British WW-14

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved as amended

REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES - BRITISH
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
U.S. Serial ABC-4/6, British Serial WW (J.P.C.)6

WW 14

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER -

FIRST HALF OF 1942

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January 13, 1942.

U.S. ABC-4/6
British WW-14

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER - FOR FIRST HALF OF 1942

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the Atlantic Theater and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942 and submit our conclusions below.

MOVEMENTS AND RELIEFS.

Iceland and Ireland

2. We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland (c) garrison should proceed as expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Middle East and to release forces for operations in French North Africa.

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom should proceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available so as to increase the weight of attack on Germany.

Relief of Aruba and Curacao

4. The relief of Aruba and Curacao, subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be completed before the end of January.

JOINT UNITED STATES-BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the period under consideration to force an entry into French North Africa. We cannot, therefore initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are:

a. That, due to Spanish resistance, the Germans will require a period of three months before they can mount a land attack from Spain against Morocco;

b. That once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany, our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the Spanish there will not attack us; and

c. That French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if any.

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During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above (Paragraphs 2, 3, 4) should continue.

6. If we undertake the North Africa operation, it will have the following adverse effects on other projects:

a. Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and Far East by 25,000 men.

b. Suspension of major operations against the Canaries, Cape Verdes, and Diego Suarez.

c. Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland (c) by U. S. troops.

d. Reduction in the rate of movement of U. S. troops to North Ireland.

e. Weakening of British strength in the United Kingdom.

f. Inability to move sizeable forces to Northeast Brazil if such action should become necessary.

g. Reduction in the supply of British fighter aircraft to Russia.

h. Serious delay in the dispatch of urgently needed U. S. reinforcements and supplies to Pacific island positions and the Far East, to the Pacific Fleet, and to the outlying island bases.

i. Reduction in Atlantic convoys to the United Kingdom and Russia, due to diversions of shipping and escorts.

(Note: If any of the other operations mentioned in this paper are undertaken, they will adversely affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or less extent).

CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS.

7. A German invasion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial of Gibralter as a Naval Base and in all probability the involvement of Portugal as well as Spain in the war. In those circumstances, it will be essential to secure the Canaries as a Naval Base. It is possible that the Spaniards would themselves offer us facilities in these islands. On the other hand, the Spaniards may oppose our occupation of the Canaries. While a Spanish offer of facilities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, it would be necessary to provide sufficient additional air and antiaircraft defenses to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland of Africa, as well as harbor protection for the Naval Base, and for an air patrol of the sea.

8. If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Spain, we could not at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries.

9. If the opportunity to carry out North Africa operations does not occur, and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish acquiescence, the capture of the Canaries even against opposition and the occupation of the Azores and Cape Verdes will become essential.

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10. It has been agreed that the responsibility for the occupation of the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain Naval assistance from the United States. A British assaulting force is already earmarked for this operation and should, we consider, be kept in being.

11. Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a U. S. responsibility. A portion of the U. S. Army forces set-up for North Africa would be used for this operation. The necessary naval support would have to be provided by U. S. Naval Forces.

12. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula, it is almost certain that Portugal will admit British forces into the Azores and probably Madeira. For the security of these islands the chief requirement will be air and antiaircraft defenses and harbor protection. The provision of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should be earmarked. Considerable difficulty, however, will be found in providing the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for North Africa or the Canaries.

13. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible we are of the opinion that the United States should occupy the Cape Verdes in order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured for future use. The occupation of the Cape Verdes will be of considerable importance if we do not succeed in gaining entry into French North Africa and are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date.

OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA

14. If we fail to occupy North Africa and Axis occupation appears imminent, then the capture of French West Africa will be essential. If we do not obtain French cooperation in French North Africa, it is unlikely that we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore necessary to plan the capture of Dakar against opposition. With the joint resources available it is not, in our opinion, possible to undertake an operation of this nature until the late Autumn of 1942 when the weather conditions become favorable. It has been agreed that the United States should be responsible for this operation and we suggest that the planning and training should be put in hand. We propose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously with the occupation of the Cape Verdes, U. S. Air and other appropriate forces should be moved to Freetown - Bathurst area. Their presence in this area will increase the security of the Trans-African Reinforcement Route and the naval base at Freetown.

NORTHEAST BRAZIL

15. The security of Northeast Brazil is of strategic importance as a link in the communications between America and the Trans-African reinforcement route. Germany established in West Africa immediately becomes a threat to the South American Continent, in addition to the threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis inspired uprising in Brazil, which would interrupt the air route through Africa to the Middle and Far East cannot be disregarded. The operation is a United States responsibility. Plans have been prepared and formations set up for this task.

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DIEGO SUAREZ

16. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the enemy is of considerable strategic importance, no British force will be available to undertake this operation within the period under consideration if the force for the Canaries operation is kept in being. Moreover, if this operation were carried out in the near future it might prejudice our chance of obtaining French collaboration in North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that we can not hold a force ready to undertake this operation at present.

17. We therefore recommend that:

(1) The movement of United States Army and Air forces to Iceland (c), Ireland, and the United Kingdom should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

(2) That the perfection of a Joint U.S.-British Plan and preparations for operations in French North Africa should proceed as rapidly as possible.

(3) That under the hypotheses set out in this paper the United States should prepare plans for:

(a) The occupation of the Cape Verde Islands both against opposition and by invitation.

(b) The capture of Dakar against opposition for the Autumn of 1942.

(4) That the United States plan for the security of Northeast Brazil should be kept active.

(5) That under the hypotheses set out in this paper, the British should prepare or perfect plans for:

(a) The capture of the Canaries.

(b) The occupation of the Canaries by invitation.

(c) The occupation of the Azores and Madeira by invitation.

(d) The capture of Diego Suarez against opposition.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/8
(Approved)
British Serial WW 13

Washington, D. C.
January 13, 1942.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved

REPORT BY THE U.S.-BRITISH

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

U.S. ABC-4/8 British WW 13

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

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BRITISH MOST SECRET

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942.

U.S. Serial ABC-4/8
British Serial WW (JPC)8

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

REPORT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

COMMITTEE

Subject: Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

1. There is under development and approaching completion an air route suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces.

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important Japanese objective since it is the principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply and limited loading facilities.

3. It is planned also to establish at Bora Bora, in the Society Islands, which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels and other shipping en route to and from the South West Pacific.

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route depends ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review.

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In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division supported by strong naval and air forces.

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia is unknown.

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa and Bora Bora.

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed will be supplied in the near future.

8. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially be at the expense of the ABDA area. An opinion should also be obtained from Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. A list has been received of their requirements.

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Recommendations.

9. (a) That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Bora Bora. This is now being accomplished.

(b) That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local defense of the Fiji Islands.

(c) That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands.

(d) That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as a temporary measure furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of the island, immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA Area. The question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from Australia as to the priority.

(e) Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

(f) That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia.

(g) The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en route and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and naval escorts become available.

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

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DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(
1. NEW CALEDONIA	One Co. A.I.F. Approximately 3,000 Free French Forces (inadequately equipped) 2 6" Fixed Defense Guns (Free French)	Army 1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 12 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft) 1 Medium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft) Air Warning Service. Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). I Free F This island 30 mil protec fields half o of Nou Note (b). garris as a r sance afford entail of Fre

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(S)	(c)	(d)
I.F. tely 3,000 Free French (inadequately equipped) d Defense Guns (Free	Army 1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 12 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft) 1 Medium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft) Air Warning Service. Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). Does not include Free French Forces. This island is 230 miles long and 30 miles wide. Force envisages protection of the 3 to 4 air fields, and in the southern half of the island the harbour of Noumea. Note (b). The size of the garrison is subject to review as a result of early reconnaissance and degree of assistance afforded by Free French; latter entails completing re-equipment of Free French.

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARK
(a)	(b)	(c)	
2. FIJI	Naval 1 Minesweeper 4 Motor patrol boats Army 6 New Zealand Inf. Bns. 1 Regular Fiji Bn. (1/3 European) 1 Territorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 European). 28 Field Guns 2 6" C.A. guns at Momi 2 6" C.A. guns at Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 4 Bofors 4 3" A.A. guns 6 A.A. Searchlights Air 9 Reconnaissance Bombers* 9 Miscellaneous Aircraft* 4 Singapore Flying Boats 700 Men, Air Corps) 25 Airplanes, Fighters) U.S. 2 Sets RADAR	Naval 1 Minesweeper 8 Motor Patrol Boats Army 6 Inf. Bns. 16 Heavy A.A. guns 24 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 12 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks) Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) 1 Medium Bombardment Squad. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. ~~(8 aircraft)~~ 4 Sets RADAR	Air U.S. Arm pursui *Obsolet Hudsons approved

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

W THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
	Naval	
er rol Boats	1 Minesweeper 8 Motor Patrol Boats	
	Army	
nd Inf. Bns. iji Bn. (1/3 European) al Fiji Bn. (1/3 . ns uns at Momi uns at Suva guns at Suva rs ers uns cnlights	6 Inf. Bns 16 Heavy A.A. guns 28 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 12 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks)	
sance Bombers* eous Aircraft* Flying Boats r Corps) es, Fighters) U.S. DAR	Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) 1 Medium Bombardment Squad. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. ~~(8 aircraft)~~ 4 Sets RADAR	Air U.S. Army is supplying the pursuit squadron. *Obsolete. Should be replaced by Hudsons due to New Zealand under approved allocations

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	
3. SAMOA	4 6" guns 18 3" A.A. guns 42 .50 M.G's. 42 .30 M.G's. 415 Marines 150 Samoan Marines 1 Regiment of Marines 12 75 m.m. guns 1 Co. Light Tanks (13 Tanks) M.P.'s Troops 6 5" guns Total - 5,015 U.S. Marines 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) 2 Sets RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Fighter Squadron (By U. S. Marines) 1 Dive Bomber Squadron	
4. CANTON	45 Engineers 10 Medical and Communication 10 Artillery Personnel 2 75 m.m. guns 12 Machine guns	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadron (25 Aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

WHERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
as	As in column (b) 1 Fighter Squadron (By U. S. 1 Dive Bomber Squadron Marines)	
rines Marines as nks (13 Tanks) s		
15 U.S. Marines ation seaplanes (Navy)		
Communication ersonnel s s	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadron (25 Aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	
5. CHRISTMAS ISLAND	125 Engineers, Medical and Signal Personnel 10 Artillery Personnel 12 Machine Guns 4 3" A.A. guns 2 75 m.m. guns 2 155 m.m. guns	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 Sets, RADAR	
6. PALMYRA	479 Marines 4 5" guns 4 3" A.A. guns 8 .50 A.A. Machine Guns 8 .30 A.A. Machine Guns 2 Sets, RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft)	Certain ot installed are not n
7. BORABORA	NONE	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbor Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services	

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(b) NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	(c) ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	(d) REMARKS
neers, Medical and Signal onnel llery Personnel ine Guns .A. guns .m. guns m.m. guns	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 Sets, RADAR	
nes uns .A. guns A.A. Machine Guns A.A. Machine Guns , RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft)	Certain other equipment now installed, details of which are not now available.
NONE	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbor Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services	

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WW 12

U.S. Serial ABC-4/7
(Approved)
British Seriel WW 12

Washington, D. C.
January 11, 1942.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved

REPORT BY THE U.S.-BRITISH

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

U.S. ABC-4/7 British WW 12

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

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U.S. SECRET
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COPY NO._____

U.S. Serial ABC-4/7
British Serial WW (JPC)7

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

1. Mission.--United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for the accomplishment of the following mission:

a. To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers.

b. To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense thereof.

2. Forces.--The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting of the 32d, 24th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the command of Major General Edmund L. Daley, U.S. Army. The strength of the field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and antiaircraft units, is approximately 105,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 ship tons are required. The strength of the antiaircraft personnel (to be provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942, if shipping is available. When the air and antiaircraft support is assumed by the United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required.

3. Command.--Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in the British Isles, including those in North Ireland, is vested in Major General James E. Chaney, who has been designated "Commander U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles." The term "command" is defined as that control of individuals,

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forces, functions, and establishments which is normally vested in, and exercised by, United States Army commanders by law, regulations, and competent orders. General Chaney is authorized to arrange with appropriate British authorities for the employment: (1) of organizations of his command under British control, and (2) of British organizations under United States control.

4. Strategic Direction.--a. The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the Commander United States Army Forces in the British Isles.

b. The term "strategic direction" is defined to mean the function of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative matters.

c. It is agreed however that units assigned to the United States North Ireland Force will not be moved to areas outside Ireland without prior consent of the Commanding General Field Forces United States Army.

5. Arrangements for the Operation.--The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at:

a. Questions relative to dispatch of U. S. Army Forces and materials from the United States that may require British collaboration will be handled through the British Mission in

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the United States.

b. Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accomodation and maintenance of the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland that may require collaboration between the two governments will be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles.

c. Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Antiaircraft. Initially all antiaircraft protection for U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually antiaircraft protection for U. S. forces in Northern Ireland will be provided from United States personnel equipped and maintained for armament and ammunition from British sources.

(2) Field Artillery. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 rounds per gun, will be delivered by the British to U. S. Forces in Northern Ireland. The British will supply additional ammunition and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles.

(3) Air. It will be the responsibility of the British to provide appropriate air protection and support for the U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in their mission, until such time as the means are made available to the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles to assume this responsibility.

d Shelter.

It will be the responsibility of the British to provide shelter for the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland.

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W.W. 11.

10th JANUARY 1942.

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE

SUPER GYMNAST.

Note by Secretary.

In accordance with the instructions of the British Chiefs of Staff, the attached study of the Time factor of Super Gymnast is circulated for the information of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Signed L.C. HOLLIS.

WASHINGTON.
10th. JANUARY 1942.

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1. The following is an examination from the British point of view of the various factors which affect the timing of Super-Gymnast. It must be emphasized that there are certain points, on which the British Staffs in Washington are not yet fully informed, and some of the assumptions on which this study is based can therefore only be provisional.

TIME REQUIRED FOR JOINT PLANNING.

2. Immediately the naval, military and air commanders for any operation assemble in London they receive their directives from the Chiefs of Staff, examine the outline plan prepared by the Joint Planning Staff, study the intelligence and topographical information, and appreciate the problem for themselves. They then submit their joint outline plan to the Chiefs of Staff for approval, at the same time asking for any alteration which they may consider necessary to the forces provisionally allotted for the operation.

3. More detailed planning meanwhile goes ahead. From an administrative appreciation by the War Office, the policy for maintenance and scales of reserves, ammunition and supplies are decided upon. Not until this is done can the composition of the Base and Line of Communication troops be arrived at and consequently the firm "order of battle". The exact allocation of personnel, vehicles and stores to the ships of the first convoy can then be worked out. The instructions for movement to the ports and for embarkation are then worked out in consultation with the railways and Ministry of War Transport, and issued to all concerned.

4. Experience has shown that a period of 21 days is required for British Commanders to complete their plans (14 days) and for the Movements Staff to issue their detailed instructions for loading the first convoy (7 days).

5. On this occasion there will be many matters to be discussed between British and U.S. commanders and planning staffs. The plans which the British Commander had already made for a purely British "Gymnast" will have to be altered now that it is to be a combined U.S.-British operation at Casablanca. Taking this into account, and the fact that the British Commander or his representative should come to Washington to see the U.S. Commander, we estimate that a period of about four weeks will be required for planning purposes.

READINESS OF FORCES.

6. British. The British land forces will be ready to start movement as soon as planning is completed. The readiness of the air forces depends on a decision to begin mobilization of the air force contingent (see para.18 below).

7. American. We understand that the first American convoy will consist not only of Marines, but also of Army base units and of Army Air units, and the latter two elements may not be ready before mid-February. We also understand that in addition to the combat-loaded ships for the Marines, the Americans will need 15-knot ships for 5,000 Army 4,000 Air units and for vehicles, guns and cased aircraft for their first convoy. We have not yet been informed, however, whether these ships will be available.

PERIOD BETWEEN D.1. AND ARRIVAL OF FIRST CONVOY.

8. Assuming planning to have been completed, the following would be the timings:-

British. D.1. Date of decision to load M.T. and store ships, (i.e. Special ships which are already held.)

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British D.2 - 14 Movement of stores and vehicles to port of embarkation and loading.

D.10. Movement of personnel to port of embarkation starts.

D.16. Convoy B 1 sails (13 knots)

D.26. Casablanca section (B 1a) dropped at Gibraltar towait till Americans have opened door at Casablanca.

D.28. Algiers section (B 1b) arrives Algiers.

American.

D.1. Date of decision to load ships.

D.2 - 14 Movement to port and loading.

D.15 Convoy A 1 sails (15 knots)

D.28. Convoy arrives Casablanca.

This assumes that the Americans have immediately available the necessary shipping of requisite speed for Army (5,000) and Air Corps (4,000) and their vehicles, cased aircraft and stores as well as for Marine Division.

(N.B. The time for loading has been estimated from the average time taken in U.S. ports to load a store ship for the Middle East, i.e. at least 7 days.)

COMPOSITION OF CONVOYS.

9. First Convoys.

American.

To Casablanca

Marine Div.	15,000
Pursuit group (80 aircraft) and Air Corps ground organisation.	5,000
Base units	4,000
	24,000

British.

To Casablanca

A.A. units and any Docks Units needed to supplement American first convoy	5,000

To Algiers.

One Inf. Bde. Group. One Hvy. One Lt. A.A. Regt. Three Fighter Sqns. Administrative Units.	7,000

These figures are within the capacity of the special shipping now held in the United Kingdom for an oversea expedition.

10. Second British Convoy.

To Algiers.

One Armd. Bde Group. Balance of Div Troops and L of C. Units.	16,000

To Casablanca.

Probably additional A.A. and Base units and 2 A.C. Sqns.	6,000

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11. Subsequent British and American convoys to Casablanca.

Composition will depend on requirements of Force Commander. A guess would be:-

American.

A.2. Air Forces.
Armoured Brigade Group.
Infantry Brigade Group.
Corps and L.of C.Troops.

A.3. Balance of Armoured Division.
Corps Troops.

A.4. Infantry Division
less one Brigade.
Balance of Corps and
L.ofC. Troops.

British.

B.3. Armoured Brigade Group.
Infantry Brigade Group.
Corps Troops.

B.4. Infantry Division.

B.5. Infantry Brigade Group.
Balance of Corps and
L.of C. Troops.

PORTS.

12. We have already asked London for their views on use of other Atlantic ports to relieve Casablanca. Port Lyautey seems the only possible one: though its capacity is small it might be used, e.g. for unloading vehicles. They would be outside the air defence umbrella of Casablanca, but this might be acceptable.

RATE OF UNLOADING.

13. Algiers. We anticipate no difficulty as regards port facilities at Algiers.

14. Casablanca. First Convoy. The first American - British convoy into Casablanca is exceptionally large, comprising 29,000 men and 3,500 vehicles. We are relying on the use of all the berths in the port to clear this convoy within the fortnight.

15. Subsequent Convoys. For subsequent convoys we cannot count on more than 12 berths out of 18 at which to unload, since we estimate that one third of the port will be required for use by the French and by the British and American Navies, e.g. for oilers and damaged vessels. All our experience goes to show that, even when undisturbed by air attack we cannot expect to unload more than 450 tons of material and stores at each berth in 24 hours.

Allowing for this rate of unloading, and assuming that 12 berths will be available, a British convoy should be unloaded in 12 days.

It is necessary to allow some margin for delay, bad weather, etc., hence one convoy every 15 days is the maximum rate on which it would be safe to base our plans. We understand that in American convoys the number of vehicles and tonnage of stores is likely to be larger, and hence in their case the margin is likely to be even less.

16. All the above calculations are dependent on the full co-operation of the French in moving men and material through the port and away by rail.

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POSSIBLE CONVOY PROGRAMME.

17. A possible convoy programme is attached as an Annex. This is based on the use of Casablanca only. The only other port of any value, Port Lyautey, is small and will add little to our port capacity. The programme is already very tight and we still await confirmation from London that it is in fact practicable. Port congestion would be extremely serious owing to the length of the voyage and the separate points of origin of the British and U.S.Convoys.

EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIMETABLE.

18. Taking all the above factors into consideration, the following as we see it, is the earliest possible time-table that could be achieved if all preparations are pushed forward at maximum speed:-

D minus 28	January 7th	On this day the U.S.Corps Commander, Major-General Stillwell was initiated into the plan. Joint Planning is taken to have started on this day.
D.1.	February 4th.	The decision to load the first convoys can be given on this day if joint planning has gone smoothly and no unforeseen difficulties have arisen.
D.28.	March 3rd.	Simultaneous arrival of first convoys at Algiers and Casablanca (29,000 men and 3,500 vehicles.)
D.41.	March 16th.	Arrival of second British convoy at Casablanca. (6,000 men).
D.43	March 18th.	Arrival of second British convoy at Algiers. (16,000 men).
D.58.	April 2nd.	Arrival of second American Convoy at Casablanca. (22,000 men).

Thereafter alternate British and American convoys (each of approximately 22,000 men) arrive at 15 day intervals at Casablanca.

19. Before the above timetable can be accepted confirmation is required of the following points, on which we are not fully informed:-

(a) From U.S. Staffs.

(1). Would sufficient U.S. shipping of suitable speed and type be available for loading by February 4th?

(2). Would the U.S.Army, air and base units, which are to sail in the first convoy, be ready to begin loading on Feb.4th?

(3) Would sufficient U.S. shipping be available for the second American convoy and would the Army, Air and Land forces be fully mobilized and equipped and ready to sail on March 20th?

(4). Would the U.S. Navy be able to undertake the escort and general cover commitment on the dates proposed?

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(b) From London.

(5) Is there any likelihood of being able to relieve Casablanca by the use of other ports on the Atlantic coast?

(6) Is the suggested Convoy Programme agreed?

Washington, D.C.

11th January, 1942.

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SUPER GYMNAST

SUGGESTED CONVOY PROGRAMME

Convoy	Numbers Pers.	M.T.	Ships Pers.	M.T.	Speed Knots	Sail	Arrive	Por
B 1, a	5,000	450	3	3	13	D.16	D.30	Casa
b	7,000	750	4	5	13	D.16	D.28	Alg
A 1	24,000	3,000				D.15	D.28	Cas
B 2, a	6,000	900	3	6	14 & 9	D.32	D.41 & 46	Cas
b	16,000	2,700	7	18	14 & 9	D.32	D.43 & 48	Alg
A 2	22,000	4,000				D.45	D.58	Cas
B 3	22,000	3,600	10	24	14 & 9	D.64	D.73 & 78	Cas
A 3	22,000	4,000				D.75	D.88	Cas
B 4	22,000	3,600	10	24	14 & 9	D.94	D.103 & 108	Cas
A 4	22,000	4,000				D.105	D.118	Cas
B 5	12,000	1,800	5	12	14 & 9	D.124	D.133 & 138	Cas

D.1 - Date loading of ships is ordered.

A Convoys American - B Convoys British.

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SUPER GYMNAST

SUGGESTED CONVOY PROGRAMME

Ships Pers.	Ships M.T.	Speed Knots	Sail	Arrive	Port	Remarks
3	3	13	D.16	D.30	Casablanca	Held at Gibraltar 4 days.
4	5	13	D.16	D.28	Algiers	
			D.15	D.28	Casablanca	
3	6	14 & 9	D.32	D.41 & 46	Casablanca	
7	18	14 & 9	D.32	D.43 & 48	Algiers	
			D.45	D.58	Casablanca	
10	24	14 & 9	D.64	D.73 & 78	Casablanca	
			D.75	D.88	Casablanca	
10	24	14 & 9	D.94	D.103 & 108	Casablanca	
			D.105	D.118	Casablanca	
5	12	14 & 9	D.124	D.133 & 138	Casablanca	

D.1 - Date loading of ships is ordered.

A Convoys American - B Convoys British.

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U.S. ABC-4/9
British WW 10

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January 10, 1942

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPROVED REPORT

By

U. S. - BRITISH JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
U. S. Serial ABC-4/9, British Serial WW-JPC-9

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

WW 10

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U.S. ABC-4/9
British WW 10

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January 10, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country's resources against Japan. Information, currently available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and materially, in China's war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps as may be practicable and are consistent with other commitments be promptly taken to reverse this trend.

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country's almost complete isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to delay and possible interception. The long, poorly maintained and insecure Burma Road can, at the best, support only a limited truck-tonnage, -- while air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are indicated as necessary:

a. Closer and more effective liaison with the Generalissimo.

b. Increased security for Rangoon and the Burma Road, by air and ground.

c. Improvement in the control, maintenance, and management of the Burma Road.

d. Increase in base facilities and technical services.

e. Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures.

f. Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding General, ABDA Area.

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps to meet the requirements listed in paragraph 2:

a. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept a U. S. Army officer of high rank as the U. S. Representative in China, and to agree to the following as his functions:

(1) Supervise and control all U. S. Defense Aid affairs for China.

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all U. S. Forces in China, and such Chinese Forces as may be assigned. Should it be necessary for any of these forces to engage in joint operations in Burma,

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they will come under the command of the Supreme Commander of the AFDA Area, who will issue the necessary directions for the cooperation of the U. S. Representatives' Forces with the forces under the British Commanders in Burma.

(3) Represent the U. S. Government on any international War Council in China.

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China.

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that a is, in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.)

b. Dispatch to the South China - Burma area additional aviation strength, initially raising and maintaining the A.V.G. at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under command of the U. S. Representative.

c. Arrange, (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon facilities as are allocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of the Burma Road.

4. To make this project reasonably effective, British cooperation and agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event that the Generalissimo accords to the U. S. Representatives the authority implied and indicated in paragraph 3 a above.

Points on which British Agreement is Sought, Under Conditions Stated in Paragraph 3 a

a. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, the U. S. Representative to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in and north of Burma.

b. The U. S. Representative to be authorized to make every effort to increase the capacity of the Burma route, throughout its length from Rangoon to Chungking. To do this he will probably be given complete executive control of the China Section of the route. On the British Section control will still be exercised by the British authorities, both military and civil. To achieve the general aim these British authorities will be instructed to carry out every possible improvement to the route in accordance with the requirements of the U. S. Representative and will accept such American technicians and equipment as may be necessary for the improvement of facilities in the Port of Rangoon and along the route itself.

c. The U. S. Representative, by arrangement with the British Commanders in Burma, to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary airfields in Burma.

d. The U. S. Representative to be accepted as the principal liaison agency between the Supreme Commander of the APDA AREA and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

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COPY NO. 33

January 10, 1942.

U.S. ABC-4/CS-3
British W -9 (Revised)

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPROVED AS AMENDED - BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY GENERAL WAVELL

WW 9

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January 10, 1942.

U.S. ABC-4 C/S 3
British W. M. 9 (Revised)

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WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY GENERAL WAVELL

Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff.

1. General Wavell was informed on 28th December, 1941, by the Prime Minister that he was to be the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. He was told that his directive would be given to him shortly and that any observations which he might wish to make on its terms would be considered.

2. When the directive was finally approved by the President and the Prime Minister, orders were sent to London (2nd January) that it should be telegraphed to General Wavell immediately - copies were also to be sent to General Pownall and all other British Commanders concerned.

3. At the same time the terms of the directive were communicated to the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand Governments.

4. The Dutch Government have suggested certain amendments to Annex (ii) to the directive, and these are still under discussion. It is not known whether they have communicated the directive to the Dutch Commanders in the ABDA Area.

5. The Australian Government has put forward views and opinions about the whole arrangement, and have not yet notified their agreement with the directive. It is presumed that they have not yet informed any of their Commanders.

6. The New Zealand Government is only indirectly concerned. There has been no comment on the directive from them.

7. On 2nd January General Wavell was told that much importance was attached to his taking over as soon as possible, and he was asked to specify the earliest date on which he would be ready to assume command. He is now at Singapore, but is expected to be in Batavia today, 10th January. No observations have yet been received from him about his directive, nor has he yet specified a date for assuming command.

8. Neither the Dutch nor the Australian Governments have yet agreed to the directive, though their objections are mainly to the machinery of control laid down in Annex (ii) rather than to the

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directive itself. The discussions which are proceeding with those Governments may of course be successfully concluded before it becomes necessary to promulgate the date of General Wavell's appointment; but even if they are not we do not think there need be any delay on that account. We suggest that General Wavell's appointment should be promulgated as soon as he reports he is ready, and that he should then be instructed to carry on pending the final confirmation of his directive.

9. We accordingly propose that the following action should be taken as soon as General Wavell reports the date on which he will be ready to assume command: -

a. His Majesty's Government should make a communication in the terms of Annex A to the Governments of the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, India, and China.

b. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should telegraph to General Wavell in the terms of Annex B.

c. On receipt of the communication in a above, the Governments of the United States, the Netherlands, and Australia should at once notify their local Commanders of the date of the assumption of command by General Wavell, and should give any necessary consequential instructions so that the system planned for the ABDA Area can become effective.

d. The terms of the directive for General Wavell, including Annex (ii), should be settled as soon as possible, and the outcome notified to all concerned.

10. We propose to telegraph home in the terms of Annex C to secure the assent of the Dutch and Australian Governments to this procedure.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND.
J. G. DILL.
C. PORTAL.

Washington, D. C.

January 10, 1942.

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ANNEX "A"

Draft communication from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the Governments of the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, China, and India.

Instructions are being sent today to General Wavell that he should assume command of the ABDA Area as from January .

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned on the terms of his directive and on the machinery for the higher direction of war in the ABDA Area, (Annex II to the Directive), General Wavell is being instructed to proceed in accordance with the directive as at present drafted and to communicate with Washington and London as laid down in paragraph 18 thereof.

Please inform all Commanders concerned, accordingly.

ANNEX "B"

Draft telegram from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to General Wavell.

You are to assume supreme command in the ABDA Area on January .

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned on your directive, you should act in accordance with the directive sent to you in Telegram No. and you should address communications to superior authority in accordance with Paragraph 18 thereof.

General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the United States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of Combined Naval Forces, respectively, in the ABDA Area.

Governments concerned are notifying their Commanders accordingly.

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ANNEX "C"

Draft telegram from British Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of Staff Committee, London.

Please put following to Lord Privy Seal.

It is of highest importance that General Wavell should exercise supreme command without delay, as soon as he reports himself ready to do so.

Please propose to Dutch and Australian Governments that as soon as General Wavell reports himself as ready he should be authorized to assume command pending the acceptance by those Governments of the ABDA machinery as set out in Annex II of his directive.

United States Chiefs of Staff agree.

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W.W. 8

8TH JANUARY, 1942.

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE.

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. We think that the United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to know what representatives of the Minister of Defence and the British Chiefs of Staff organisation it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure of the Arcadia party.

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration and the word "Combined" to collaboration between two or more Allies.

Representative of the Minister of Defence.

3. Field Marshal Sir John Dill is remaining in Washington as representative of the Minister of Defence. He will have contacts with such authorities on the highest level as may be arranged between the President and the Prime Minister.

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A.T. Harris, will continue to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It is hoped that a meeting between the U.S. Chiefs of Staff or their representatives and the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff may be held weekly or more often if necessary. An agenda would be circulated before each meeting.

WW 8

Combined Planning.

5. For the time being the British representatives on the Planning Staff will be -

Navy

Captain C.E. Lambe

Army

Lieut.-Colonel G.F. Bourne

R.A.F.

Group Captain S.C. Strafford

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Combined Intelligence.

6. The arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve the Planning Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter should either be referred to the Combined Planning Staffs for report or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting.

7. We have here representatives of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London and these are available to work in conjunction with any organisation the United States Chiefs of Staff may desire.

Priorities and Allocation.

8. In our view the Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad programme of requirements based on strategic policy. We suggest that it will be the duty of the Combined Planning Staffs, advised by appropriate Allocation Officers, to watch on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the production programmes and to bring to notice instances where output does not conform to strategic policy.

9. Similarly the Combined Chiefs of Staff should from time to time issue general directives laying down policy to govern the distribution of available weapons of war. Effect should be given to these directives by appropriate Combined Allocation Committees. These would meet periodically and make both long-term allocations (on which planning and training of forces must be based), and short-term allocations to meet immediate military needs.

10. The British representatives on the appropriate Combined Allocation Committees will for the present be -

Navy

Rear Admiral J.W.S. Dorling

Army

Brigadier D. Campion

R.A.F.

Air Commodore E.B.C. Betts

11. Allocation should be made as between the United States and the British Commonwealth, each caring for the needs of the Allies for whom it has accepted responsibility.

Military Movements.

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad issues of priority of overseas movement. In order to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to co-ordinate the movement of U.S. and British troops and equipment so that the shipping resources of both countries are put to the best use, it appears to us that a Combined Body is desirable. The British representatives for such a body are available under Brigadier R. Kerr.

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13. It is suggested that this Combined Body should work in close touch with the Combined Planning Staffs through whom their advice to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be submitted.

Secretariat.

14. A British Secretariat under Brigadier Dykes is available to serve the above organisations and to work in with any similar Secretariat system which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may establish.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND,

" J.G. DILL,

" A.T. HARRIS,
(for C.A.S.).

Washington, D.C.,

8th January, 1942.

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COPY NO. 73

U.S. ABC-4/5 (Approved)
British WW 6
(Supersedes ABC-4/5, WW 3 Final)

January 2, 1942.

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

WW 6

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January 2, 1941.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/5
British Serial WW 6 (Approved)

Supersedes ABC-4/5, British WW 3 (Final)

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS:

1. Area. -

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are or will be:-

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

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6. The general strategic policy will therefore be -

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander. -

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly appointed by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force, except in the case of urgent necessity.

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In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 14.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.

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ANNEX 1

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BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows:

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East, westward to the meridian of 114° East, thence northwestward to latitude 15° South, longitude 92° East.

On the West: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

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ANNEX 2

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January 2, 1942

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

a. The provision of reinforcements.
b. A major change in policy.
c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

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ANNEX 1
to
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COPY NO._____

Lt Col George

WW 1

U.S.Serial ABC-4/CS-1
British Serial W.W.-1 (Final)

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

Washington War Conference

American-British Strategy.

Memorandum by the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff.

Note: The circulation of this paper should be restricted to the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates.

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A-B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

Note:-
* For brevity the abbreviated A-B is used to denote American-British

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b. The maintenance of essential communications.

c. Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.

d. Wearing down and undermining German resistence by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.

f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests (see paragraph 10) and deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY.

The Security of Areas of War Production

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:-

a. The United Kingdom.

b. Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.

c. Russia.

6. The United Kingdom. - To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.

7. The United States. - The main centers of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea-borne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not.

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8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defense of the United States are matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess.

9. Russia. - It will be essential to afford the Russians assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.

Maintenance of Communications

10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:-

a. From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.

b. From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.

c. The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.

d. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.

e. The route through the Panama Canal, and U. S. coastal traffic.

f. The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East.

In addition to the above routes, we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.

11. The main air routes which must be secured are:-

a. From the U. S. to South America, Ascension, Freetown, Takoradi, and Cairo.

b. From the U. K. to Gibraltar, Malta and Cairo.

c. From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.

d. From the U. S. to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.

e. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.

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f. From the U. S. to the U. K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.

g. From the U. S. to the U. K. via the Azores.

h. From the U. S. to Vladivostok via Alaska.

12. The security of these routes involves:-

a. Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions.

b. Holding and capturing essential sea and air bases.

Closing and Tightening the Ring Around Germany

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows: ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE.

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

14. If this ring can be closed the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.

The Undermining and Wearing Down of the German Resistance

15. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:-

a. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.

b. Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means.

c. The blockade.

d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

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Development of Land Offensives on the Continent

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The Safeguarding of Vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre

18. The security of Australia, New Zealand and India must be maintained and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:-

a. Hawaii and Alaska.

b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier and the Philippines.

c. Rangoon and the route to China.

d. The Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion.

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CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCES

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

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COPY NO. 10

ABC-4
JCCSs-12

January 14, 1942.

JCCS 12

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

3:00 P.M., JANUARY 14, 1942

Present

British Officers

Navy

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission

Army

Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Lt. General Sir C. Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission
Brigadier C. S. Napier
Lt. Colonel G. K. Bourne

Air Force

Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff
Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission

United States Officers

Navy

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U.S.M.C.
Lt. Commander R. E. Libby, U.S.N.

Army

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division
Brig. General Brehon Somervell, Chief, G-4, W.D.G.S.

Joint Secretaries

Brig. General R. E. Lee
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Captain F. C. Denebrink, U.S.N.
Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M.
Brigadier V. Dykes
Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ
Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

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I

1. Move of U. S. Reinforcements to the Far East. -

Brigadier Napier, referring to the arrangements proposed for the move of urgent U. S. reinforcements to the Far East, said that information had now been received from London that the Queen Mary would take U. S. troops from New York via the Cape to Australia, sailing early in February. To make up for the loss of transportation from America to Northern Ireland thereby occasioned, it was proposed to allot additional British personnel ships returning from the Middle East to sail about February 10 for Northern Ireland. Their total carrying capacity would be about 15,000. The Queen Elizabeth would sail early in February from San Francisco with U. S. troops for Australia, and the Aquitania would go into the Hawaiian run at the end of February. This program had been agreed by General Somervell.

2. Super-Gymnast. -

The Conference had before them a paper prepared by the U. S. Planning Staff based upon a report by the Joint Planning Staff (U.S. ABC-4/2A, British WW (J.P.C.)2A).

This paper was discussed paragraph by paragraph, and a number of amendments agreed

Sir Charles Portal asked whether more U. S. ships could not be provided by further sacrifices, e.g., cutting into trade.

General Somervell said that the whole range of U.S. shipping, both passenger carrying and freight, had been reviewed and no further resources could be tapped. All passenger ships, including those on the South American lines, would be taken up. The only way of increasing the number of freight ships would be to use ships already earmarked for supplies to Russia and the Middle East.

Admiral Turner confirmed that escorts could be provided for the last American convoy but one shown in paragraph 9 on D.163 instead of D.178. (See Annex 1)

The Conference accepted the paper prepared by the U.S. Planning Staff, subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, as a basis on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the President and the Prime Minister regarding the time factor for Super-Gymnast. (See Annex 1)

3. Post Arcadia Collaboration. -

The Conference had before them a draft prepared by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on Post Arcadia Collaboration (U.S. ABC-4/CS4).

This draft was considered paragraph by paragraph and certain amendments agreed.

The Conference approved the draft as amended in discussion and agreed that it should be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister. (See Annex 2)

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U.S. ABC-4/2A
British WW-17

ANNEX 1
TO
JCCSs-12

COPY NO._____

January 14, 1942

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

ACCEPTED AS AMENDED - JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT, AS A BASIS ON WHICH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF SHOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER REGARDING THE TIME FACTOR FOR SUPER-GYMNAST

U.S. Serial ABC-4/2A,
British Serial WW (J.P.C.)2A

OPERATION SUPER-GYMNAST

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Washington, D. C.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/2 A
British Serial WW (JPC) 2A

January 13, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF OPERATION

SUPER-GYMNAST

1. The Joint U.S. - British Planning Committee has been advised that the President and the Prime Minister have agreed to the immediate dispatch of additional United States reinforcements from the east coast to Australia, the terms of the agreement being as follows:

a. Approved the proposal put forward by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the U. S. convoy sailing on the 15th January should be reduced from 16,000 to 4,000 for Northern Ireland and from 8,000 to 2,500 for Iceland, in order to permit of the dispatch to the Far East of 21,000 troops, with aircraft and other equipment.

b. Agreed that the remainder of the proposed shipping adjustments set out in the Annex should be referred to London for confirmation.

c. Invited Mr. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook to investigate the effect of the above shipping adjustment on the delivery of United States supplies to Russia during the next three months and to coordinate the provision of shipping to make good any deficiency, it being understood that nothing must be done to interfere with the planned flow of tanks, aircraft and ammunition from the U.S.A. to the Middle East.

2. Based on the above terms of agreement, the combined Chiefs of Staff have directed the Combined Planning Committee to examine and report on the following questions:

a. The earliest date which could be fixed for D-1 of Operation Super-Gymnast on the assumption that the shipping adjustments approved in 1 a above are carried out and that shipping to carry U. S. supplies to Russia is provided in full.

b. To what extent Operation Super-Gymnast could be executed on the assumption that the favourable opportunity arises at some date between the end of February and the date on which D-1 of the full operation could be fixed (vide 2 a above).

REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION

British

1. The movement of United States troops to Australia will not affect the readiness date of the British to carry out their part of Super-Gymnast.

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United States

2. The readiness of U. S. Troops to carry out Super-Gymnast will not be affected by the movement of reinforcements to the Far East. The delay to Super-Gymnast caused by the Far East movement will depend upon the date of return to Atlantic ports of the ships involved in that movement.

3. We estimate that the vessels diverted from the Atlantic to make the Far East move can be back in the Atlantic ports on the following dates:

a. Passenger vessels ..... April 10 - 20
b. Cargo vessels ..... May 15 25

(Capacity of the above group of vessels is 22,000 troops and 230,000 tons of cargo).

4. The execution of Super-Gymnast as originally planned is dependent upon the return of the Far East convoy, therefore the earliest date that could be fixed for D-1 is May 25.

5. The May 25 date can not be accepted without certain reservations, since no allowance has been made for ship losses and possible increased demands for shipping arising from enemy operations, accelerated production and additional lend-lease commitments. Furthermore, it seems probable that these vessels may continue to be needed in the Pacific for further movements to Australia.

REPLY TO THE SECOND QUESTION

British Available Forces

6. British land forces, i.e., one armored division and two divisions with antiaircraft units will be ready for dispatch. The British air contingent of Gymnast consisting of three fighter and two A.C. squadrons could also be made ready. This force is not alone sufficient, but could not be increased from British resources.

United States Available Forces

7. United States Forces, as originally planned for Super-Gymnast, will be available, but their participation will be limited by the withdrawal of shipping for the troop movements in the Pacific. Combat loaded ships for one Division (12,000) are being held in readiness. This shipping will permit the employment of that division. It can be supported by one carrier group of naval aircraft or equivalent disembarked from an aircraft carrier. All antiaircraft troops would have to be found by the British, also base troops, until additional U. S. shipping could be made available, either from Pacific or from shipping now employed on other tasks. This latter shipping is more fully discussed in Paragraph 11 below.

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RATE OF MOVEMENT

8. The rate at which the British force could be received would not be limited, as in the Super-Gymnast plan, by the capacity of Casablanca Port. It would depend upon the provision of shipping and naval escorts. The following table is based upon the assumption that the British could not afford to rob the Middle and Far East reinforcements of more than 25,000 men from one reinforcement convoy. The United States program is based upon the repeated use of the combat loaded ships, and the use of no other troop transports until the return to the Atlantic Coast of the Far East cargo convoy about 15 - 25 May. For movements after the first one, 8 additional cargo vessels will be required. Possible acceleration of the movement will be governed by the priority needs stated in Paragraph 11 below.

9. The table below shows the earliest dates on which British and United States forces can arrive at Casablanca if D-1 falls on March 1st:

		Casablanca		Algiers
March 1	D-1	British	U.S.	British
Mar. 28	D-28	5,000	12,000	7,000
	D-43	6,000 *		16,000
	D-73	22,000		
	D-88		12,000	
	D-103	22,000		
	D-118		22,000	
July 21	D-133	12,000 *		
	D-148		12,000	
	D-163		22,000	
Sept.19	D-193		12,000	
	Totals	67,000	92,000	23,000

* See Paragraph 10.

ACCELERATION OF MOVEMENT

British

10. If the situation were such that we could afford to stop the flow of British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East completely for a time, the second British convoy could be increased from 6,000 to 18,000 capacity, thus eliminating the fifth British convoy shown above.

United States

11. The priorities listed below will govern the availability of additional U. S. vessels for Super-Gymnast:

1st Priority: Continuous maintenance of existing overseas Army and Navy garrisons and the United States Fleets.

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2nd Priority: Continued delivery of supplies to Russia, and planned flow of tanks, aircraft, and ammunition to Middle East.

3rd Priority: Continuous movements and maintenance of United States forces in the Far East.

12. All military requirements for shipping other than those listed above will have to be deferred, including:

a. Reinforcements to Hawaii and other overseas possessions and bases.

b. Movements to Iceland and North Ireland.

13. If this is done, we estimate that additional passenger vessels up to an estimated capacity of 12,400 might be available after about four weeks' notice.

14. Approximately 13 - 15 cargo vessels will be required in addition to the passenger vessels. The availability of the cargo ships will have to be determined by the Maritime Commission.

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U. S. ABC-4/CS4
British WW-16

ANNEX 2
TO
JCCSs-12

COPY NO._____

January 14, 1942.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPROVED AS AMENDED - U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF
MEMO

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION

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U. S. ABC-4/CS4
British WW-16

January 14, 1942.

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION

Memorandum by Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. In order to provide for the continuance of the necessary machinery to effect collaboration between the United Nations after the departure from Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (formerly designated as "Joint Chiefs of Staff") propose the broad principles and basic organization herein outlined.

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of one nation, and the word "combined" to collaboration between two or more of the United Nations.

3. Definitions. -

a. The term "Combined Chiefs of Staff" is defined as the British Chiefs of Staff (or in their absence from Washington, their duly accredited representatives), and the United States opposite numbers of the British Chiefs of Staff.

b. The term "Combined Staff Planners" is defined as the body of officers duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make such studies, draft such plans, and perform such other work as may from time to time be placed on the "Combined Chiefs of Staff Agenda" by that Body, and duly delegated by them to the Combined Staff Planners.

c. The "Combined Secretariat" is defined as the body of officers duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to maintain necessary records, prepare and distribute essential papers, and perform such other work as is delegated to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Personnel. -

a. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshall A. T. Harris, will represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

b. The Joint Staff Planners will be

(1) For the British (for the time being):

Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N.
Lt. Col. G. K. Bourne, British Army
Group Captain S. C. Strafford, R.A.F.

(2) For the United States, the principal members are:

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy
Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, U.S. Army,
Capt. R. E. Davison, U.S. Navy
Col. E. L. Naiden, U.S. Army

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c. Combined Secretariat

The British members of the Combined Secretariat will be headed by Brigadier Dykes. The United States members will be headed by Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff shall develop and submit recommendations as follows:

a. For the ABDA Area, specifically as set forth in the Directive, Annex 2 to U.S. ABC-4/5, British [illegible] 6 dated January 5, 1942.

b. For other areas in which the United Nations may decide to act in concert, along the same general lines as in a above modified as necessary to meet the particular circumstances.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff shall accordingly:

a. Recommend the broad program of requirements based on strategic considerations.

b. Submit general directives as to the policy governing the distribution of available weapons of war. (It is agreed that finished war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs; to effectuate this principle, we recommend the utilization of appropriate bodies in London and Washington, under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff).

c. Settle the broad issues of priority of overseas military movements.

7. The question of the production and dissemination of complete Military Intelligence to serve the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff Planners has been referred to the latter body for a report. Here also, it is contemplated that existing machinery will be largely continued.

8. It is planned that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet weekly, or more often if necessary; an agenda will be circulated before each meeting.

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ABC-4
JCCSs-11

January 13, 1942.

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

4:00 P.M., JANUARY 13, 1942

Present

British Officers

Navy

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Admiral Sir C. Lyttle, Joint Staff Mission

Army

Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Lt. General Sir C. Nemyss, Joint Staff Mission

Air Force

Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff
Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission

United States Officers

Navy

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. L. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U.S.M.C.

Army

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division

Joint Secretaries

Brigadier V. Dykes
Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M.
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Captain F. C. Denebrink, U.S.N.
Lt. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ
Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

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1. Post Arcadia Collaboration. -

The Conference had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on Post Arcadia Collaboration (WW 8).

Sir Dudley Pound said that the arrangements for collaboration on the operational side proposed in the paper would be suitable not only for ABDA, but for all other operational matters as well. The question of intelligence was closely bound up with planning and this aspect was also dealt with in the paper. As regards the allocation of war material, the British Chiefs of Staff felt that if we were to get the best use out of our resources, allocation must be made on strategical grounds in accordance with general directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. America and Great Britain would each take on certain groups of Associated Nations and, after receiving bulk allocations from U. S. and British production, would suballocate them among their own groups.

The Conference then considered the paper paragraph by paragraph.

It was agreed that paragraph 2 would be better worded as follows:

> "2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "joint" should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of one Nation and the word "combined" to collaboration between two or more United Nations".

Admiral Stark, referring to paragraph 3, said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff felt that if anyone could carry out the duties laid down therein, they would rather have Sir John Dill than anyone else. They felt strongly, however, that there should be no Military Representative of the British Government above the Chiefs of Staff level. They would not desire for a moment to have any similar arrangement in London whereby a Military Representative of the United States had direct access to higher political authority. He thought it only right to express the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff quite frankly on this matter, though he realized that the President and the Prime Minister might have come to some other agreement on the matter.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff would have to refer the matter to the Prime Minister as any decision on this point would have to be taken on a higher level.

Admiral Stark said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff accepted, without comment, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the paper, but in paragraph 6 would like to have the following amendments made:

Line 4 - delete "either".

Lines 5 and 6 - delete "or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting".

The principle that coordinated intelligence should be available for the Planning Staffs was fully accepted, but the details would have to be worked out by the Planning Staffs in collaboration.

As regards paragraphs 8 to 11 (Priorities and Allocation), the U. S. Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the principle enunciated

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in the first sentence of paragraph 8. The U. S. organization for allocation was not, however, yet in final shape, and before accepting the remainder of these paragraphs, they would like to examine the matter further.

Sir Dudley Pound suggested that the principle involved in this matter was so important that it would be desirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to submit their recommendations to the President and the Prime Minister.

A draft minute was handed round for discussion and agreed subject to certain amendments. A copy of the agreed minute is attached to Annex 1.

General Marshall in this discussion emphasized that there could be no question of having any duplication of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington and in London. There could only be one Combined Chiefs of Staff who would give broad directions on the allocation of material. He saw no objection whatever to having parallel Allocation Committees in Washington and London, dealing with the allocation of American and British war material respectively.

The discussion then turned on the control of shipping dealt with in paragraph 12.

General Marshall felt that the Chiefs of Staff should have control over shipping resources so that they could apply them to the best strategic purposes. It was hoped that something similar to the British system for the control of shipping would be set up in the United States; but the problem was more difficult since they were not a maritime nation like Great Britain, and the importance of shipping was not well realized in the United States. Many other interests clashed with strategic requirements when it came to dealing with shipping.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff had no control over the Ministry of War Transport in the matter of shipping, but they had access to all the facts and could make their case to the Prime Minister on military grounds if there was a clash of interests between strategical requirements and imports.

Admiral Stark said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff could not accept anything more than the first sentence of paragraph 12, since their own organization for the control of shipping was not yet settled. It followed, therefore, that paragraph 13 also could not be accepted at present.

Sir Dudley Pound undertook to let the U. S. Chiefs of Staff have a short memorandum on the British system for the control of shipping and raw materials.

The conference -

a. Took note of the proposals for Post Arcadia Collaboration made by the British Chiefs of Staff in WW 8, and of the extent to which these had been accepted by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in the discussion recorded above.

b. Agreed that the minute on the principle for the allocation of finished war material, as amended in discussion, should be submitted by the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister respectively. (See Annex 1. Portions in Annex 1 indicated as deleted are those indicated in the discussion above as subjects for further consideration by the American Chiefs of Staff.)

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2. Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater - First Half of 1942.

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on Movements and projects in the Atlantic theater for the first half of 1942 (U. S. Serial ABC-4/6, British Serial WW (J.P.C.)6).

Sir Dudley Pound welcomed the idea of U. S. forces being sent to the Freetown-Bathurst area in certain circumstances as proposed in paragraph 14.

Admiral King pointed out that the adverse effects on other operations of carrying out various projects had only been set out in the case of North Africa. It should be made clear that any of these projects would have repercussions on others. Some reference should also be made in the final paragraph to the Northeast Brazil project.

The Conference -

Approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee subject to the following amendments:

a. At the end of paragraph 6, add

"Note. If any of the other operations mentioned in this paper are undertaken, they will adversely affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or less extent".

b. Paragraph 17, insert new subparagraph (4) as follows:

"(4) That the U. S. plans for the security of Northeast Brazil should be kept active".

Renumber existing subparagraph (4) as subparagraph (5).

(See Annex 2.)

3. Operation Super Gymnast. -

The Conference agreed to postpone consideration of the Joint Planning Committee's reports on Super Gymnast (U. S. ABC-4/2 and 4/2A and British WW (J.P.C.)2 and 2A) until the next meeting.

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It is requested that special care should be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

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ANNEX 1
to
JCCSs-11

W.W. 8

8TH JANUARY, 1942.

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE.

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. We think that the United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to know what representatives of the Minister of Defence and the British Chiefs of Staff organisation it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure of the Arcadia party.

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of one nation and the word "Combined" to collaboration between two or more ~~Allies~~ united nations.

Representative of the Minister of Defence.

3. Field Marshal Sir John Dill is remaining in Washington as representative of the Minister of Defence. He will have contacts with such authorities on the highest level as may be arranged between the President and the Prime Minister.

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A.T. Harris, will continue to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It is hoped that a meeting between the U. S. Chiefs of Staff or their representatives and the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff may be held weekly or more often if necessary. An agenda would be circulated before each meeting.

Combined Planning.

5. For the time being the British representatives on the Planning Staff will be -

Navy

Captain C.E. Lambe

Army

Lieut.-Colonel G.F. Bourne

R.A.F.

Group Captain S.C. Strafford

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Combined Intelligence.

6. The arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve the Planning Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter should ~~either~~ be referred to the Combined Planning Staffs for report ~~or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting~~.

7. We have here representatives of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London and these are available to work in conjunction with any organisation the United States Chiefs of Staff may desire.

Priorities and Allocation.

8. In our view the Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad programme of requirements based on strategic policy. ~~We suggest that it will be the duty of the Combined Planning Staffs, advised by appropriate Allocation Officers, to watch on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the production programmes and to bring to notice instances where output does not conform to strategic policy~~.

~~9. Similarly the Combined Chiefs of Staff should from time to time issue general directives laying down policy to govern the distribution of available weapons of war. Effect should be given to these directives by appropriate Combined Allocation Committees. These would meet periodically and make both long-term allocations (on which planning and training of forces must be based), and short-term allocations to meet immediate military needs~~.

~~10. The British representatives on the appropriate Combined Allocation Committees will for the present be -~~

~~Navy~~

~~Rear Admiral J.W.S.-Dorling~~

~~Army~~

~~Brigadier D. Campion~~

~~R.A.F.~~

~~Air Commodore E.B.C. Betts~~

~~11. Allocation should be made as between the United States and the British Commonwealth, each caring for the needs of the Allies for whom it has accepted responsibility~~.

Military Movements.

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad issues of priority of overseas movement. ~~In order to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to co-ordinate the movement of U.S. and British troops and equipment so that the shipping resources of both countries are put to the best use, it appears to us that a Combined Body is desirable. The British representatives for such a body are available under Brigadier R. Kerr~~.

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~~13. It is suggested that this Combined Body should work in close touch with the Combined Planning Staffs through whom their advice to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be submitted.~~

Secretariat

14. A British Secretariat under Brigadier Dykes is available to serve the above organisations and to work in any similar Secretariat system which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may establish.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND,

" J.G. DILL,

" A.T. HARRIS,
(for C.A.S.).

Washington, D.C.,

8th January, 1942.

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DRAFT MINUTE FOR SUBMISSION BY THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRIME MINISTER

"We, the combined U.S.-British Chiefs of Staff are agreed in principle that finished war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs. We accordingly submit that an appropriate body should be set up, under the authority of the combined Chiefs of Staff, in Washington, and a corresponding body in London, for the purpose of giving effect to this principle."

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COPY NO. 18

ANNEX 2
TO
JCCSs-11

January 13, 1942.

U.S. ABC-4/6
British WW-14

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved as amended

REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES - BRITISH JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

U.S. Serial ABC-4/6, British Serial WW (J.P.C.)6

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER - FIRST HALF OF 1942

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U. S. SECRET
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January 13, 1942.

U.S. ABC-4/6
British WW-14

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER - FOR FIRST HALF OF 1942

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the Atlantic Theater and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942 and submit our conclusions below.

MOVEMENTS AND RELIEFS.

Iceland and Ireland

2. We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland (c) garrison should proceed as expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Middle East and to release forces for operations in French North Africa.

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom should proceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available so as to increase the weight of attack on Germany.

Relief of Aruba and Curacao

4. The relief of Aruba and Curacao, subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be completed before the end of January.

JOINT UNITED STATES-BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the period under consideration to force an entry into French North Africa. We cannot, therefore initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are:

a. That, due to Spanish resistance, the Germans will require a period of three months before they can mount a land attack from Spain against Morocco;

b. That once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany, our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the Spanish there will not attack us; and

c. That French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if any.

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During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above (Paragraphs 2, 3, 4) should continue.

6. If we undertake the North Africa operation, it will have the following adverse effects on other projects:

a. Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and Far East by 25,000 men.

b. Suspension of major operations against the Canaries, Cape Verdes, and Diego Suarez.

c. Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland (c) by U. S. troops.

d. Reduction in the rate of movement of U. S. troops to North Ireland.

e. Weakening of British strength in the United Kingdom.

f. Inability to move sizeable forces to Northeast Brazil if such action should become necessary.

g. Reduction in the supply of British fighter aircraft to Russia.

h. Serious delay in the dispatch of urgently needed U. S. reinforcements and supplies to Pacific island positions and the Far East, to the Pacific Fleet, and to the outlying island bases.

i. Reduction in Atlantic convoys to the United Kingdom and Russia, due to diversions of shipping and escorts.

(Note: If any of the other operations mentioned in this paper are undertaken, they will adversely affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or less extent).

CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS.

7. A German invasion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial of Gibralter as a Naval Base and in all probability the involvement of Portugal as well as Spain in the war. In those circumstances, it will be essential to secure the Canaries as a Naval Base. It is possible that the Spaniards would themselves offer us facilities in these islands. On the other hand, the Spaniards may oppose our occupation of the Canaries. While a Spanish offer of facilities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, it would be necessary to provide sufficient additional air and antiaircraft defenses to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland of Africa, as well as harbor protection for the Naval Base, and for an air patrol of the sea.

8. If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Spain, we could not at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries.

9. If the opportunity to carry out North Africa operations does not occur, and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish acquiescence, the capture of the Canaries even against opposition and the occupation of the Azores and Cape Verdes will become essential.

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10. It has been agreed that the responsibility for the occupation of the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain Naval assistance from the United States. A British assaulting force is already earmarked for this operation and should, we consider, be kept in being.

11. Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a U. S. responsibility. A portion of the U. S. Army forces set-up for North Africa would be used for this operation. The necessary naval support would have to be provided by U. S. Naval Forces.

12. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula, it is almost certain that Portugal will admit British forces into the Azores and probably Madeira. For the security of these islands the chief requirement will be air and antiaircraft defenses and harbor protection. The provision of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should be earmarked. Considerable difficulty, however, will be found in providing the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for North Africa or the Canaries.

13. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible we are of the opinion that the United States should occupy the Cape Verdes in order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured for future use. The occupation of the Cape Verdes will be of considerable importance if we do not succeed in gaining entry into French North Africa and are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date.

OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA

14. If we fail to occupy North Africa and Axis occupation appears imminent, then the capture of French West Africa will be essential. If we do not obtain French cooperation in French North Africa, it is unlikely that we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore necessary to plan the capture of Dakar against opposition. With the joint resources available it is not, in our opinion, possible to undertake an operation of this nature until the late Autumn of 1942 when the weather conditions become favorable. It has been agreed that the United States should be responsible for this operation and we suggest that the planning and training should be put in hand. We propose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously with the occupation of the Cape Verdes, U. S. Air and other appropriate forces should be moved to Freetown - Bathurst area. Their presence in this area will increase the security of the Trans-African Reinforcement Route and the naval base at Freetown.

NORTHEAST BRAZIL

15. The security of Northeast Brazil is of strategic importance as a link in the communications between America and the Trans-African reinforcement route. Germany established in West Africa immediately becomes a threat to the South American Continent, in addition to the threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis inspired uprising in Brazil, which would interrupt the air route through Africa to the Middle and Far East cannot be disregarded. The operation is a United States responsibility. Plans have been prepared and formations set up for this task.

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DIEGO SUAREZ

16. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the enemy is of considerable strategic importance, no British force will be available to undertake this operation within the period under consideration if the force for the Canaries operation is kept in being. Moreover, if this operation were carried out in the near future it might prejudice our chance of obtaining French collaboration in North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that we can not hold a force ready to undertake this operation at present.

17. We therefore recommend that:

(1) The movement of United States Army and Air forces to Iceland (c), Ireland, and the United Kingdom should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

(2) That the perfection of a Joint U.S.-British Plan and preparations for operations in French North Africa should proceed as rapidly as possible.

(3) That under the hypotheses set out in this paper the United States should prepare plans for:

(a) The occupation of the Cape Verde Islands both against opposition and by invitation.

(b) The capture of Dakar against opposition for the Autumn of 1942.

(4) That the United States plan for the security of Northeast Brazil should be kept active.

(5) That under the hypotheses set out in this paper, the British should prepare or perfect plans for:

(a) The capture of the Canaries.

(b) The occupation of the Canaries by invitation.

(c) The occupation of the Azores and Madeira by invitation.

(d) The capture of Diego Suarez against opposition.

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Col. George

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ABC-4
JCCSs-10

January 12, 1942.

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

4:00 P.M., JANUARY 12, 1942

Present

British Officers

Navy

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Admiral Sir C. Lyttle, Joint Staff Mission

Army

Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Lt. General Sir C. Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission
Brigadier Napier, British War Office

Air Force

Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff
Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission

United States Officers

Navy

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. L. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U.S.M.C.

Army

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division

Joint Secretaries

Brigadier V. Dykes
Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M.
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Captain F. C. Denebrink, U.S.N.
Lt. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ
Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

JCCS 10

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1. Shipping for U. S. Reinforcements for the Far East. -

General Marshall gave the Conference an outline of certain proposals which had been submitted by the United States Staffs for expediting the move of American reinforcements to the Pacific and ABDA Area. (See Annex 1) He explained that these proposals had been developed since the meeting of U. S. and British shipping experts on the previous evening. If the proposals were accepted, it would be possible to sail a convoy of 21,800 men from New York for the Far East on January 20. Of this, some 10,000 were earmarked for the defense of New Caledonia, the remainder being ground staffs for air squadrons. The effect would be to reduce the Iceland convoy sailing on January 5 from 8,000 to 2,500, and the Northern Ireland convoy from 16,000 to 4,000. Certain additional American ships not at present scheduled for troop movements would also be employed, such as ships on the South American trade and train ferries.

Brigadier Napier said that the proposal for the Queen Mary to take American troops to the United Kingdom and pick up a load there for the Middle East was a new idea which he had not yet had time to study. At the shipping conference the proposal had been that she should take troops from New York to South Africa for onward carriage in the U. S. ships West Point and Wakefield across the Indian Ocean. The proposal that the Mount Vernon, Wakefield and West Point should be left in the Indian Ocean for a second round trip from the Middle East to the Far East was also new. London had already arranged an Indian Ocean convoy program which excluded these ships, in order that they should revert to American use, and must be consulted as to their most useful employment.

Sir Charles Portal inquired whether the shipment of some 400 aircraft to the Far East would cut into American aircraft replacements to the Middle East. It seemed very probable that there would be intensive air operations in the near future in the Mediterranean, and the rate of attrition there was likely to be much more heavy than in the Pacific where air operations were sporadic and on a comparatively light scale. In these circumstances he would not be able to agree to any diversion from the Middle East. It was the P-40 and Martin 187 Baltimores in which he was particularly interested.

General Arnold, after inquiry, confirmed that the proposed program would not interfere with the dispatch of replacement aircraft of the P-40 and Martin 187 types to the Middle East.

General Marshall pointed out that the reinforcements proposed would involve a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly deliveries to Russia. This would be in addition to a certain deficiency which was already likely to arise on the program of supplies to Russia up to April 1, 1942. The ships involved in the United States reinforcement program would be diverted from carrying supplies to Russia for a period of up to four months.

Sir John Dill said that there would be undoubtedly considerable pressure on political grounds not to cut down Russian supplies in any way.

Admiral King pointed out that it was doubtful whether the Russians could clear the full amount of supplies which was delivered to them. Insofar as this was the case, therefore, a cut in deliveries would be of no consequence.

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Sir John Dill said that the effect of the proposed program so far as Ireland was concerned appeared to be a postponement of the arrival of some 20,000 troops by one month. In the case of Iceland, the rate of relief of British troops and the U. S. Marines would be cut down to about 2,500 per month. He thought these reductions could be accepted in view of the urgent needs of the Far East. A token force of some 4,000 at least would be going to Northern Ireland and that was of great political significance.

Brigadier Napier inquired whether, if 21,000 men were sailed from New York on January 20 in the ships which were loading for Iceland (C and Ireland, they would not arrive in the Pacific Area before their equipment, which would have moved in slower freight ships. He had had this consideration in mind when suggesting that the Queen Mary should take U. S. personnel to South Africa for onward carriage after she had finished docking in New York. Under this arrangement the troops would have arrived about the same time as their equipment.

General Marshall said that it seemed important to rush in personnel in one convoy if possible in order to simplify the escort problem. Moreover, it was likely to be easier to get the troops through without enemy interference if it was done earlier rather than later. It might be necessary to accept the fact that the personnel would arrive without all of their equipment. At the present time the only American forces in Australia were the ground staff for one bomber group with a certain number of pilots, and an artillery brigade which had no ammunition. Ammunition and a certain amount of equipment for this brigade was due to arrive there almost immediately.

In his view the whole question was one of priorities. For example, was the dispatch of some 10,000 troops for New Caledonia of greater strategic importance than the relief of British troops in Northern Ireland, or supplies to Russia? An immediate decision was necessary on the Ireland and Iceland (C) shipping, since ships already loading in New York would have to be unloaded and re-stowed if they were to get away on January 20.

Admiral Stark summed up the effect of General Marshall's proposals as follows:

a. They would set back the relief of Northern Ireland by one month.

b. The Middle and Far East would not be affected.

c. The supply and Lend-Lease materials to Russia would be reduced by 30% for a period of three to four months.

d. The situation in the Far East would be commeasurably strengthened.

After some discussion it was generally agreed that the postponement of the dispatch of some 20,000 troops to Northern Ireland by one month and the reduction in the rate of relief of the troops in Iceland could be accepted, but that there should be no interference with the supply of American aircraft to the Middle East. The crux of the position, therefore, was whether a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly deliveries to Russia could be accepted for a period probably of four months.

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The Conference

a. Agreed that the provisional program as outlined by General Marshall would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for a ruling on the question of interruption of Russian supplies;

b. That, before the proposals for the use of the Queen Mary and the three U. S. ships in the Indian Ocean could be accepted, it would be necessary to consult the British Shipping Authorities in London in order to insure that convoy programs already worked out were not upset, and that shipping was used in the most economical manner.

2. Defense of Island Bases Between Hawaii and Australia. -

General Marshall signified his acceptance of the report of the Joint Planning Committee on the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia (U.S. ABC-4/S, British [illegible] (J.P.C.)8) subject to the amendments which had been agreed in discussion at the previous meeting. (See Annex 2)

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ABC-4
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COPY NO. 8

January 10, 1942

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

3:00 P.M., JANUARY 10, 1942

Present

British Officers

Navy

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Admiral Sir C. Little, Joint Staff Mission
Captain Belben, R.N.

Army

Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Lt. General Sir G. Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission
Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office

Air Force

Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff
Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission

United States Officers

Navy

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. L. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Lt. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U.S.M.C.

Army

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Brig. General D. D. Eisenhower, General Staff Corps

JCCS 8

Joint Secretaries

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M.
Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ
Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

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ANNEX 1

TO

JCCSs-10

MEMORANDUM OF PROPOSED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENTS

Ireland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 16,000 as follows:

4,100 troops to sail January 15
7,000 troops on Queen Mary to sail February 1
9,000 troops on Andes, Oronzay, and Orion, to sail February 15, 20
4,400 troops on George Washington to sail February 24.

Total... 24,500 to sail January 15 to February 24.

(Note: Cargo tonnage extremely short. British must provide shelter, or lumber to winterize tents).

Iceland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 8,000 as follows:

2,500 troops on January 15.

(Note: Remainder as shipping becomes available. Probably about 2,500 per month.)

British Troops

Near East and Far East

7,000 Queen Mary to load in England
5,100 from Cairo on Mount Vernon - now in Far East.
11,800 from Cairo on second round trip of West Point and Wakefield - now engaged in first round trip for Far East.

Total... 23,900 British troops for Near and Far East on U. S. ships and Queen Mary.

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U. S. Troops

Far East

21,800 troops, to sail from New York January 20.

250 Pursuit planes
86 Medium Bombers
57 Light Bombers

228,000 Cargo Tons.

4-1/2 million gallons of gasoline.

(Note: Troops are air and supporting services, except for a reinforced brigade for New Caledonia of 10,000 men).

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(13 June 46)

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ANNEX NO. 2
TO
JCCSs-10

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 28

U.S. Serial ABC-4/8
(Approved)
British Serial WW 13

Washington, D. C.
January 14, 1942.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved

REPORT BY THE U.S.-BRITISH

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

U.S. ABC-4/8 British WW 13

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

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U.S. SECRET COPY NO.

BRITISH MOST SECRET

U.S. Serial ABC-4/8
British Serial WW (JPC)8

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

REPORT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

Subject: Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

1. There is under development and approaching completion an air route suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces.

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important Japanese objective since it is the principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply and limited loading facilities.

3. It is planned also to establish at Bora Bora, in the Society Islands, which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels and other shipping en route to and from the South West Pacific.

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route depends ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review.

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In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division supported by strong naval and air forces.

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia is unknown.

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa and Bora Bora.

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed will be supplied in the near future.

8. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially be at the expense of the ABDA area. An opinion should also be obtained from Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. A list has been received of their requirements.

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Recommendations.

9. (a) That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Bora Bora. This is now being accomplished.

(b) That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local defense of the Fiji Islands.

(c) That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands.

(d) That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as a temporary measure furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of the island, immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABC Area. The question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from Australia as to the priority.

(e) Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

(f) That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia.

(g) The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en route and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and naval escorts become available.

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	
1. NEW CALEDONIA	One Co. A I.F. Approximately 3,000 Free French Forces (inadequately equipped) 2 6" Fixed Defense Guns (Free French)	1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 12 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft) 1 Medium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft) Air Warning Service. Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). Free This islan 30 mi prote field half of No Note (b). garri as a sance affor ental of Fr

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
A I.F. ately 3,000 Free French (inadequately equipped) ed Defense Guns (Free)	Army 1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 12 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft) 1 Medium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft) Air Warning Service. Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). Does not include Free French Forces. This island is 230 miles long and 30 miles wide. Force envisages protection of the 3 to 4 air fields, and in the southern half of the island the harbour of Noumea. Note (b). The size of the garrison is subject to review as a result of early reconnaissance and degree of assistance afforded by Free French; latter entails completing re-equipment of Free French.

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMA
(a)	(b)	(c)	
2. FIJI	Naval 1 Minesweeper 4 Motor patrol boats Army 6 New Zealand Inf. Bns. 1 Regular Fiji Bn. (1/3 European) 1 Territorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 European). 28 Field Guns 2 6" C.A. guns at Momi 2 6" C.A. guns at Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 4 Bofors 4 3" A.A. guns 6 A.A. Searchlights Air 9 Reconnaissance Bombers* 9 Miscellaneous Aircraft* 4 Singapore Flying Boats 700 Men, Air Corps) 25 Airplanes, Fighters) U.S. 2 Sets RADAR	Naval 1 Minesweeper 4 Motor Patrol Boats Army 6 Inf. Bns 16 Heavy A.A. guns 28 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 12 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks) Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) 1 Medium Bombardment Squad. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 aircraft) 4 Sets RADAR	Air U.S. A purs *Obsol Hudson approv

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

HERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
b)	(c)	(d)
	Naval 1 Minesweeper 4 Motor Patrol Boats	
Inf. Bns. Bn. (1/3 Barbuda) Fiji Bn. (1/3	Army 3 Inf. Bns 16 Heavy A.A. guns 24 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 12 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks)	
at Momi at Suva ns at Suva		
lights		
ce Bombers* s Aircraft* lying Boats orps) Fighters) U.S.	Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) 1 Medium Bombardment Squad. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 aircraft) 4 Sets RADAR	Air U.S. Army is supplying the pursuit squadron. *Obsolete. Should be replaced by Hudsons due to New Zealand under approved allocations

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	
3. SAMOA	4 6" guns 18 3" A.A. guns 42 .50 M.G's. 42 .30 M.G's. 415 Marines 150 Samoan Marines 1 Regiment of Marines 12 75 m.m. guns 1 Co. Light Tanks (13 Tanks) Hq.'s Troops 6 5" guns Total - 5,015 U.S. Marines 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) 2 Sets RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Fighter Squadron (By U. S. Marines) 1 Dive Bomber Squadron	
4. CANTON	45 Engineers 10 Medical and Communication 10 Artillery Personnel 2 75 m.m. guns 12 Machine guns	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadron (25 Aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

HERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NOTICES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
as	As in column (b) 1 Fighter Squadron (By U. S. 1 Dive Bomber Squadron Marines)	
rines Marines as nks (13 Tanks) os		
015 U.S. Marines vation seaplanes (Navy)		
Communication ersonnel s s	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadron (25 Aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	
5. CHRISTMAS ISLAND	125 Engineers, Medical and Signal Personnel 10 Artillery Personnel 12 Machine Guns 4 3" A.A. guns 2 75 m.m. guns 2 155 m.m. guns	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 Sets, RADAR	
6. PALMYRA	479 Marines 4 5" guns 4 3" A.A. guns 8 .50 A.A. Machine Guns 8 .30 A.A. Machine Guns 2 Sets, RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft)	Certain oth installed, are not no
7. BORABORA	NONE	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbor Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services	

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ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
rs, Medical and Signal el ry Personnel Guns guns guns . guns	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 Sets, RADAR	
	As in column (b)	Certain other equipment now installed, details of which are not now available.
guns . Machine Guns . Machine Guns RADAR	1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft)	
ONE	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbor Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services	

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COPY NO. 28

ABC-4
JCCSs-9

January 11, 1942.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

4:00 P.M., JANUARY 11, 1942

Present

British Officers

Navy

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Admiral Sir C. Little, Joint Staff Mission
Captain Delben, R. N.

Army

Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Lieut. General Sir C. Nemyss, Joint Staff Mission

Air Force

Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission

United States Officers

Navy

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. D. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. M. C.

Army

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
(Present for only part of the Conference)
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division
(Present for only part of the Conference)

Joint Secretaries

Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office
Colonel D. I. C. Jacob
(Present for only part of the Conference)
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Captain F. C. Denebrink, U. S. Navy
Lieut. Colonel F. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ
Lieut. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, U.S.C.S.
Lieut. Commander R. D. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet

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1. Establishment of Command in the ABDA Area. -

Admiral Pound read to the Conference Part I of a telegram which had been received from General Wavell, in which he gave an account of a Conference held on the afternoon of 10th January, with Admiral Hart, General Brett, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, and other Commanders, and stated that he was establishing his Headquarters ten miles north of Bandoeng. Part II of the telegram had not yet been received.

The Conference took note of the telegram.

2. Situation in the ABDA Area. -

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had been giving thought to the situation in the ABDA Area, which appeared to be critical. They felt that there was a good case for subordinating everything in the immediate future to the necessity for getting reinforcements quickly into that Area. Might it not be right, for example, to cut down the flow of United States troops to Northern Ireland and Iceland, if by so doing further assistance could be sent across the Pacific?

General Marshall said that it was not a question of diverting troops since these were available for both purposes. The problem was to find the necessary tonnage. The immediate necessity was to convey to Australia antiaircraft troops, ground staff and equipment for the aircraft arriving out there, and personnel to organize and operate the bases which must be established in Australia.

The United States Chiefs of Staff had considered whether additional shipping could be provided by cutting down the programme of reinforcements to Hawaii, but there was little to be obtained in that way, as urgent reinforcements had already been diverted to Christmas and Canton Islands, and to Samoa. The present programme of shipments of men and material across the Pacific would take three months, the situation being what it was. Should not the priorities over the next few weeks be weighed, with a view of deciding whether the reinforcement of ABDA could be accelerated by diverting ships from other projects, such as the moves to Iceland and Northern Ireland, and operation Super-Gymnast?

Marshall Dill sugrested that the best way of tackling the problem would be for the shipping experts to get together, consider total tonnage available, and see what sort of a programme could be drawn up.

Admiral Stark asked whether Singapore was in immediate danger, and how long it might be expected to hold out.

Marshall Dill said that it would be a race between the arrival of reinforcements, and the progress of the Japanese. If the projected reinforcements arrived, there seemed no reason why Singapore should not hold out

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indefinitely. A risk had had to be taken in moving the Australian Division from the Mersing Area over to the Northwestern front, but one Indian Brigade Group had already arrived, and a British Brigade Group and 51 Hurricanes were due to arrive on 13th January.

Admiral Stark thought that if there were a chance that the race could be won, it would be worth while doing anything possible to hasten the arrival of reinforcements, and to build up the position as quickly as possible. If Singapore and the Philippines were captured by the Japanese, they would be free to bring their whole weight to bear on the Netherlands East Indies.

General Marshall said that already the Japanese could move troops from the Philippines and use them for other purposes, and, in his opinion, certain indications pointed to their already being in process of doing so.

Air Chief Marshall Portal said that it would certainly be a great waste of material if aircraft reinforcements were poured into the ABDA Area without the necessary ground staff to operate and maintain them. He felt that before a decision was taken to sacrifice the North Atlantic move in order to provide ships for the Pacific moves, it would be well worth while holding a general review of the shipping situation. This might reveal other resources which would enable us to carry on with both projects. It should be borne in mind that the move of United States troops to Northern Ireland and Iceland was part of a chain of movements extending through the Middle East to the Far East; and he would be reluctant to see it abandoned.

General Marshall said that he did not think it would be necessary to do more than cut down the strength of the convoy which was shortly due to sail for Magnet to approximately 10,000 men. The ships required for the Pacific move would have to be of a certain type in order to manage the long sea passage.

Admiral King inquired whether, if the North Atlantic convoy were cut so as to release personnel ships to carry 10,000 men, the urgent Pacific moves could then be accomplished.

General Marshall said that it would accommodate three anti-aircraft regiments badly needed in the ABDA Area; that it was not only a question of personnel ships; freight ships would also be required. That the basic problem was to accelerate movements requiring three months to consummate, into one month; those contemplated within the next few weeks to be undertaken within the next two weeks; that time -- even days -- was a pressing factor.

After further discussion it was agreed that the problem should be put forthwith to the British and American shipping experts, and the following terms of reference were approved: -

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"To make proposals for providing shipping from United States and British resources to carry to the ABDA Area the urgent reinforcements of men and material which the United States Army wishes to send in the immediate future; and to show at what cost to other commitments this shipping can be found."

The above terms of reference were conveyed without delay to General Somervell, U. S. Army, and to Brigadier Napier, British Army, for immediate action. General Gerow left the Conference in order to be present at the discussion.

3. Establishment of U. S. Forces in Northern Ireland. -

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on the establishment of U. S. Forces in Northern Ireland. (U.S. ABC-4/7, British WW (J.P.C.) 7)

Air Chief Marshall Portal referred to Paragraph 5 (c) (3) in which it was stated that it would be the responsibility of the British to provide adequate air protection and support for the U. S. field forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland. He explained that the British forces in Northern Ireland were generally protected by our own system of fighter defense, the local air forces in Northern Ireland for protection and support being one night fighter squadron, two day fighter squadrons, one Army cooperation squadron. It was proposed to make no change in these forces so long as the U. S. forces were not engaged in active operations, except that in some emergency it might be necessary to make a temporary reduction in the British air forces in Northern Ireland, for example, if concentrated attacks were made on convoys on the Eastern coast of England. If active operations developed in Ireland, the present British plan was to send three bomber and two fighter squadrons in addition to the air forces already there. These additions were, of course, dependent on the general situation at the time. If the main attack on the United Kingdom was being put in at some other point and an attack on Ireland were only a feint, it might not be possible to send all these additional forces. On the other hand, if the main point of danger seemed to be in Ireland, they might well be increased. He inquired whether these arrangements would be satisfactory to the American Chiefs of Staff. He did not wish them to expect a higher scale of air support than the British would be able to provide.

General Arnold said that the scale proposed would be acceptable to him in the circumstances.

Admiral King pointed out that since it was a matter of judgment whether the air protection and support would be "adequate", it would be more correct to change the word "adequate" to "appropriate."

The Conference approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. Serial ABC-4/7, British Serial W. W. (J.P.C.) 7), subject to the substitution of the word "appropriate" for "adequate" in line 2 of paragraph 5 (c) (3). See Annex 1.

(General Marshall left the Conference at this point).

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4. Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia. -

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia (U.S. ABC-4/8, British W.W. (J.P.C.) 8).

General Arnold, referring to Paragraph 9 (d), questioned the advisability of sending air forces to New Caledonia "even if this has to be at the expense initially of the ABDA Area." Even if shipping were available there were not available a pursuit squadron and a medium bomber squadron to be sent immediately except at the expense of the ABDA Area. He did not think that New Caledonia should have priority over Fiji or Samoa. Samoa was of particular importance, since if it were lost the air route for the heavy bombers from America to the ABDA Area would be cut.

Admiral King pointed out that New Caledonia was of great importance to the ABDA Area. Not only were the nickel mines a tempting bait for the Japanese, but also if the Island was in Japanese possession, all reinforcements to the ABDA Area would have to take the long route south of New Zealand.

General Holcomb said that the garrison proposed for Samoa (in the Annex to the paper) was already en route. There was no question of diverting any part of it.

Admiral Pound suggested that the shipping experts who were examining the possibility of providing additional shipping for reinforcing the ABDA Area should be instructed to take into account the needs of New Caledonia and see if it were not possible to send in the necessary reinforcements without taking anything away from what was proposed for the ABDA Area itself. General Gerow was notified of this.

General Arnold pointed out that shipping was the limiting factor only for the land forces; in the case of air forces it was availability.

After some discussion it was agreed that the first sentence of Paragraph 9 (d) should be amended to read as follows: -

> "That the defense of New Caledonia should, in principle, be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should, as a temporary measure, furnish forces for the defense of the Island immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA Area."

Admiral King said that the following addition should be made to Column (c) of the Annex under Item 3, Samoa:

> 1 Fighter Squadron
> 1 Dive Bomber Squadron

Admiral Turner explained that reference had been made to the need for obtaining from Australia an opinion as to the priority for

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arming the Free French on the Island because there was some doubt whether, in view of the shortage of equipment and shipping, these troops were worth arming at the expense of other requirements in, say, Australia. It had not been intended by the Joint Planning Committee that these forces should never be armed at all.

The Conference: -

a. Accepted, in principle, the report of the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. ABC-4/5, British W.M. (J.P.C.) 8), subject to confirmation by General Marshall, and to the amendments agreed in the discussion.

b. Invited the British Chiefs of Staff: -

(1) To obtain without delay from Australia an opinion as to the priority for arming the 3,700 Free French in New Caledonia;

(2) To take up immediately with the Free French the question of the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines, and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

c. Agreed that the American and British Shipping Experts should be instructed to include in the examination which they had been ordered to carry out (vide Minute 2) the possibility of sending urgent reinforcements from America to New Caledonia, without retarding the rate of reinforcing the ABDA Area itself.

5. Inclusion of Port Darwin in the ABDA Area. -

Admiral Pound said that a telegram had been received from General Wavell pointing out that it was not clear whether Port Darwin was included in the ABDA Area as defined in his directive or not. He felt that it should be, since it was linked up with the control of the Timor Sea, which was his responsibility. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that there was more to be considered than the mere local defence of the port, but Australia would, of course, have to be consulted. It appeared that since Port Darwin was an essential base of the ABDA Area, the case might be covered by Paragraph 2 of the directive, which placed General Wavell in command of forces "located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective Governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area."

Admiral Stark expressed, on behalf of the American Chiefs of Staff, the opinion that the defence of Port Darwin should be made the responsibility of General Wavell, in view of the fact that it was a necessary base for the ABDA Area.

The Conference adjourned at 6:00 P.M., to meet at 2:00 P.M., January 12, 1942.

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ANNEX NO. I
TO
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U.S. SECRET
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COPY NO. 27

U.S Serial ABC-4/7
(Approved)
British Serial WW 12

Washington, D. C.
January 11, 1942

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved

REPORT BY THE U.S.-BRITISH

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

U.S. ABC-4/7 British WW 12

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

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U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO._____

U.S. Serial ABC-4/7
British Serial WW (JPC)7

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

1. Mission.--United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for the accomplishment of the following mission:

a. To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers.

b. To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense thereof.

2. Forces.--The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting of the 32d, 24th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the command of Major General Edmund L. Daley, U.S. Army. The strength of the field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and antiaircraft units, is approximately 105,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 ship tons are required. The strength of the antiaircraft personnel (to be provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942, if shipping is available. When the air and antiaircraft support is assumed by the United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required.

3. Command.--Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in the British Isles, including those in North Ireland, is vested in Major General James E. Chaney, who has been designated "Commander U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles." The term "command" is defined as that control of individuals,

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forces, functions, and establishments which is normally vested in, and exercised by, United States Army commanders by law, regulations, and competent orders. General Chaney is authorized to arrange with appropriate British authorities for the employment: (1) of organizations of his command under British control, and (2) of British organizations under United States control.

4. Strategic Direction.--a. The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the Commander United States Army Forces in the British Isles.

b. The term "strategic direction" is defined to mean the function of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative matters.

c. It is agreed however that units assigned to the United States North Ireland Force will not be moved to areas outside Ireland without prior consent of the Commanding General Field Forces United States Army.

5. Arrangements for the Operation.--The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at:

a. Questions relative to dispatch of U. S. Army Forces and materials from the United States that may require British collaboration will be handled through the British Mission in

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the United States.

b. Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accomodation and maintenance of the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland that may require collaboration between the two governments will be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles.

c. Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Antiaircraft. Initially all antiaircraft protection for U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually antiaircraft protection for U. S. forces in Northern Ireland will be provided from United States personnel equipped and maintained for armament and ammunition from British sources.

(2) Field Artillery. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 rounds per gun, will be delivered by the British to U. S. Forces in Northern Ireland. The British will supply additional ammunition and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles.

(3) Air. It will be the responsibility of the British to provide appropriate air protection and support for the U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in their mission, until such time as the means are made available to the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles to assume this responsibility.

d Shelter.

It will be the responsibility of the British to provide shelter for the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland.

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1. Super Gymnast. -

Admiral Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff had made a careful examination of the various factors which affected the timing of this operation, and the earliest date on which the first convoy could arrive at Casablanca. He explained these to the Conference and undertook to let the U. S. Chiefs of Staff have a note on the subject. So far as the British were concerned, it appeared that if January 7 were taken as the date on which planning really began, the earliest date for D-1 on which the decision to load the first convoy could be given would be February 4. In this event the first convoy would arrive at Algiers and Casablanca on D-28, that is, March 3, depending upon the availability of shipping on that date.

Admiral Pound pointed out that the whole undertaking would depend upon the planning, the shipping, and the availability of troops and material. As to details at points of debarkation, Admiral Pound said that he anticipated no difficulty in Algiers, and that in the British opinion, 28,000 men and 3,000 vehicles could be unloaded at Casablanca in the fortnight.

General Marshall asked Admiral Pound if the British could undertake both Casablanca and Algiers.

Admiral Pound replied in the affirmative.

General Marshall then expressed some concern about the availability of shipping for the second convoy.

General Marshall undertook to confirm that January 7 could be accepted, from the American point of view, as the date on which planning began.

2. Directive for the Supreme Commander of the ANDA Area - Attitude of the Dutch. -

Admiral Stark recalled that certain amendments to Annex 2 of the draft directive for General Wavell had been proposed by the British in order to meet certain points raised by the Dutch. These had not yet been accepted by the Dutch, but had been approved by the President and the Prime Minister.

He confirmed that these proposed amendments were acceptable to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that the Dutch representative in Washington had been into the War Department a good deal over the question of the Dutch position. It appeared that the population of the Netherlands East Indies were feeling rather hurt at not having been consulted over the question of supreme command. They did not consider that the Dutch

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Government in London was fully representative of them. Some trouble had also been caused through the omission from General Wavell's directive of any instruction to set up his Headquarters in Java. In the original communication to the Dutch Government, which proposed the setting up of a supreme commander, a passage to this effect had been included.

Every endeavor had been made by Brigadier General Gerow to smooth down the feelings of the Dutch representative in Washington and to induce him to fall in with the agreed views of the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff, but in view of the fact that negotiations with the Dutch Government were being conducted with the British, the position was somewhat embarrassing.

Admiral Pound expressed the appreciation of the British Chiefs of Staff for the way in which the U. S. Staffs were dealing with this matter. A telegram had been sent to General Wavell instructing him to set up his Headquarters in Java, and in fact, he was establishing himself at Batavia on January 10.

The Chiefs of Staff took cognizance of the prior approval of ABC-4/S, WW 6, with Annex 2 amended, and also that further amendments would possibly be made upon reply from the Dutch and Australian Governments. (See Annex 1)

3. Procedure for the Assumption of Command by General Wavell. -

The Conference had before it an amendment by the British Chiefs of Staff on the procedure for the assumption of command of General Wavell (WW 9). Various minor amendments were agreed to.

Admiral King suggested that it would be advisable to insert in the draft telegram to General Wavell a sentence to indicate that instructions were being sent to Admiral Hart and General Brett telling them to report to him for duty in their respective posts. The following addition to the draft telegram at Annex B was accordingly agreed to:

"General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the U. S. Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of the combined naval forces in the ABDA area respectively."

IT WAS AGREED:

a. That the draft telegram at Annex C to the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff (WW 9) should be dispatched forthwith.

b. That the procedure proposed in the memorandum should be adopted and the memorandum, subject to the amendments agreed upon in discussion, should be approved.

(See Annex 2)

4. Immediate Assistance to China. -

The Conference had before them a memorandum received from the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on immediate assistance to China. (ABC-4/9 (WW (J.P.C.)9).

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Admiral Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff recognized the importance of doing everything possible to facilitate assistance to China, and were in general agreement with the proposals in the paper. They wished to suggest certain amendments to it, which were designed to make it conform to the idea of Unity of Command.

The British Chiefs of Staff proposed certain amendments, which were discussed at some length.

At the suggestion of General Marshall the word "operate" in the fourth line of the first amendment was altered to "engage in joint operation". Similarly in the last line but one of the second amendment the words "General Wavell" were altered to "the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area".

The following further amendment was agreed to.

On page 3, paragraph 4, line 5, the words "General Drum" were amended to read, "the U. S. Representative".

Marshall Dill suggested that the U. S. Representative in China might be informed of the existence and scope of the organization which had been built up in China under General Donnys. He undertook to forward a note on this point to General Marshall.

The Conference approved the memorandum (Annex 3) on immediate assistance to China as amended in discussion.

5. - Post Arcadia Collaboration. -

This paper was brought up by British Chiefs of Staff and discussed briefly. (Annex 4)

The Conference adjourned at 5:30 P.M., to meet at 4:00 P.M., January 11, 1942.

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Annex 1
to
JCCSs-8

COPY NO. 0

U.S. ABC-4/5 (Approved)
British WW 6

(Supersedes ABC-4/5, WW 3 Final)

January10, 1942.

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

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January 10, 1941.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/5
British Serial WW 6 (Approved)

Supersedes ABC-4/5, British WW 3 (Final)

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS:

1. Area. -

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are or will be:-

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the conbined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

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6. The general strategic policy will therefore be:-

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Gerrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander. -

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the international administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 16, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly appointed by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force, except in the case of urgent necessity.

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In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.

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ANNEX 1

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BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows:

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East, westward to the meridian of 114° East, thence northwestward to latitude 13° South, longitude 92° East.

On the West: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

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ANNEX 2

January 5, 1942.

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, on behalf of ABDA Governments. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

a. The provision of reinforcements.
b. A major change in policy.
c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London having consulted Dutch Staff, will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement at every stage, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of the ABDA Governments and respective governments will be fully informed.

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January 10, 1942.

ANNEX 2
TO
JCCSs-8

U.S. ABC-4/CS-3
British T-9 (Revised)

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPROVED AS AMENDED - BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY

GENERAL WAVELL

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January 10, 1942.

U.S. ABC-4 C/S 3
British C. O. S (Revised)

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

ABDACOM

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY GENERAL WAVELL

Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff.

1. General Wavell was informed on 23th December, 1941, by the Prime Minister that he was to be the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. He was told that his directive would be given to him shortly and that any observations which he might wish to make on its terms would be considered.

2. When the directive was finally approved by the President and the Prime Minister, orders were sent to London (2nd January) that it should be telegraphed to General Wavell immediately - copies were also to be sent to General Pownall and all other British Commanders concerned.

3. At the same time the terms of the directive were communicated to the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand Governments.

4. The Dutch Government have suggested certain amendments to Annex (ii) to the directive, and these are still under discussion. It is not known whether they have communicated the directive to the Dutch Commanders in the ABDA Area.

5. The Australian Government has put forward views and opinions about the whole arrangement, and have not yet notified their agreement with the directive. It is presumed that they have not yet informed any of their Commanders.

6. The New Zealand Government is only indirectly concerned. There has been no comment on the directive from them.

7. On 2nd January General Wavell was told that much importance was attached to his taking over as soon as possible, and he was asked to specify the earliest date on which he would be ready to assume command. He is now at Singapore, but is expected to be in Batavia today, 10th January. No observations have yet been received from him about his directive, nor has he yet specified a date for assuming command.

8. Neither the Dutch nor the Australian Governments have yet agreed to the directive, though their objections are mainly to the machinery of control laid down in Annex (ii) rather than to the

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directive itself. The discussions which are proceeding with those Governments may of course be successfully concluded before it becomes necessary to promulgate the date of General Wavell's appointment; but even if they are not we do not think there need be any delay on that account. We suggest that General Wavell's appointment should be promulgated as soon as he reports he is ready, and that he should then be instructed to carry on pending the final confirmation of his directive.

9. We accordingly propose that the following action should be taken as soon as General Wavell reports the date on which he will be ready to assume command: -

a. His Majesty's Government should make a communication in the terms of Annex A to the Governments of the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, India, and China.

b. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should telegraph to General Wavell in the terms of Annex B.

c. On receipt of the communication in a above, the Governments of the United States, the Netherlands, and Australia should at once notify their local Commanders of the date of the assumption of command by General Wavell, and should give any necessary consecuential instructions so that the system planned for the ABDA Area can become effective.

d. The terms of the directive for General Wavell, including Annex (ii), should be settled as soon as possible, and the outcome notified to all concerned.

10. We propose to telegraph home in the terms of Annex C to secure the assent of the Dutch and Australian Governments to this procedure.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND.
J. G. DILL.
C. PORTAL.

Washington, D. C.

January 10, 1942.

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ANNEX "A"

Draft communication from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the Governments of the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, China, and India.

Instructions are being sent today to General Wavell that he should assume command of the ABDA Area as from January .

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned on the terms of his directive and on the machinery for the higher direction of war in the ABDA Area, (Annex II to the Directive), General Wavell is being instructed to proceed in accordance with the directive as at present drafted and to communicate with Washington and London as laid down in paragraph 18 thereof.

Please inform all Commanders concerned, accordingly.

ANNEX "B"

Draft telegram from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to General Wavell.

You are to assume supreme command in the ABDA Area on January .

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned on your directive, you should act in accordance with the directive sent to you in Telegram No. and you should address communications to superior authority in accordance with Paragraph 18 thereof.

General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the United States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of Combined Naval Forces, respectively, in the ABDA Area.

Governments concerned are notifying their Commanders accordingly.

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ANNEX "C"

Draft telegram from British Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of Staff Committee, London.

Please put following to Lord Privy Seal.

It is of highest importance that General Wavell should exercise supreme command without delay, as soon as he reports himself ready to do so.

Please propose to Dutch and Australian Governments that as soon as General Wavell reports himself as ready he should be authorized to assume command pending the acceptance by those Governments of the ABDA machinery as set out in Annex II of his directive.

United States Chiefs of Staff agree.

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ANNEX 3
to
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U.S. ABC-4/9
British WW 10

COPY NO. 8

January 10, 1942

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPROVED REPORT

By

U. S. - BRITISH JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
U. S. Serial ABC-4/9, British Serial WW-JPC-9

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

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U.S. ABC-4/9
British WW 10

COPY NO._____

January 10, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country's resources against Japan. Information, currently available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and materially, in China's war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps as may be practicable and are consistent with other commitments be promptly taken to reverse this trend.

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country's almost complete isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to delay and possible interception. The long, poorly maintained and insecure Burma Road can, at the best, support only a limited truck-tonnage, -- while air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are indicated as necessary:

a. Closer and more effective liaison with the Generalissimo.

b. Increased security for Rangoon and the Burma Road, by air and ground.

c. Improvement in the control, maintenance, and management of the Burma Road.

d. Increase in base facilities and technical services.

e. Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures.

f. Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding General, ABDA Area.

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps to meet the requirements listed in paragraph 2:

a. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept a U. S. Army officer of high rank as the U. S. Representative in China, and to agree to the following as his functions:

(1) Supervise and control all U. S. Defense Aid affairs for China.

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all U. S. Forces in China, and such Chinese Forces as may be assigned. Should it be necessary for any of these forces to engage in joint operations in Burma,

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they will come under the command of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, who will issue the necessary directions for the cooperation of the U. S. Representatives' Forces with the forces under the British Commanders in Burma.

(3) Represent the U. S. Government on any international War Council in China.

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China.

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that a is, in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.)

b. Dispatch to the South China - Burma area additional aviation strength, initially raising and maintaining the A.V.G. at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under command of the U. S. Representative.

c. Arrange, (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon facilities as are allocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of the Burma Road.

4. To make this project reasonably effective, British cooperation and agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event that the Generalissimo accords to the U. S. Representatives the authority implied and indicated in paragraph 3 a above.

Points on which British Agreement is Sought, Under Conditions Stated in Paragraph 3 a

a. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, the U. S. Representative to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in and north of Burma.

b. The U. S. Representative to be authorized to make every effort to increase the capacity of the Burma route, throughout its length from Rangoon to Chungking. To do this he will probably be given complete executive control of the China Section of the route. On the British Section control will still be exercised by the British authorities, both military and civil. To achieve the general aim these British authorities will be instructed to carry out every possible improvement to the route in accordance with the requirements of the U. S. Representative and will accept such American technicians and equipment as may be necessary for the improvement of facilities in the Port of Rangoon and along the route itself.

c. The U. S. Representative, by arrangement with the British Commanders in Burma, to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary airfields in Burma.

d. The U. S. Representative to be accepted as the principal liaison agency between the Supreme Commander of the ABDA AREA and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

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ANNEX 4
to
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January 10, 1942.

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ANNEX 8

8th January, 1942.

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE

POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. We think that the United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to know what representatives of the Minister of Defence and the British Chiefs of Staff organization it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure of the Arcadia party.

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration and the word "Combined" to collaboration between two or more allied nations.

Representative of the Minister of Defence.

3. Field Marshal Sir John Dill is remaining in Washington as representative of the Minister of Defence. He will have contacts with such authorities on the highest level as may be arranged between the President and the Prime Minister.

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. T. Harris, will continue to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It is hoped that a meeting between the U. S. Chiefs of Staff or their representatives and the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff may be held weekly or more often if necessary. An agenda would be circulated before each meeting.

Combined Planning.

5. For the time being the British representatives on the Planning Staff will be -

Navy

Captain C. E. Lambe

Army

Lieut. Colonel G. W. Bourne

R.A.F.

Group Captain S. C. Strafford

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Combined Intelligence.

6. The arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve the Planning Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter should either be referred to the Combined Planning Staffs for report or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting.

7. We have here representatives of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London and these are available to work in conjunction with any organisation the United States Chiefs of Staff may desire

Priorities and Allocation.

8. In our view the Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad programme of requirements based on strategic policy. We suggest that it will be the duty of the Combined Planning Staffs, advised by appropriate Allocation Officers, to watch on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the production programmes and to bring to notice instances where output does not conform to strategic policy.

9. Similarly the Combined Chiefs of Staff should from time to time issue general directives laying down policy to govern the distribution of available weapons of war. Effect should be given to these directives by appropriate Combined Allocation Committees. These would meet periodically and make both long-term allocations (on which planning and training of forces must be based), and short-term allocations to meet immediate military needs.

10. The British representatives on the appropriate Combined Allocation Committees will for the present be -

Navy

Rear Admiral J.W.S. Dorling

Army

Brigadier D. Campion

R.A.F.

Air Commodore E.P.C. Betts

11. Allocation should be made as between the United States and the British Commonwealth, each caring for the needs of the Allies for whom it has accepted responsibility.

Military Movements.

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would settle the broad issues of priority of overseas movement. In order to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to co-ordinate the movement of U. S. and British troops and equipment so that the shipping resources of both countries are put to the best use, it appears to us that a Combined Body is desirable. The British representatives for such a body are available under Brigadier P. Kerr.

13. It is suggested that this Combined Body should work in close touch with the Combined Planning Staffs through whom their advice to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be submitted.

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Secretariat.

14. A British Secretariat under Brigadier Dykes is available to serve the above organizations and to work in with any similar Secretariat system which the U. S. Chiefs of Staff may establish.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND,

" J. G. DILL,

" A. T. HARRIS,
(for C.A.S.).

Washington, D. C.,
8th January [illegible]

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COPY NO. 39

ABC-4
JCCSs-7

December 31, 1941.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 P.M., DECEMBER 31, 1941.

Present

British Officers

Navy

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Admiral Sir C. Lyttle, Joint Staff Mission

Army

Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Lieut. General Sir C. Weeyes, Joint Staff Mission

Air Force

Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission.

United States Officers

Navy

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. L. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Present for only part of the Conference)
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Lieut. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. M. C.

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Army

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division
Brigadier General D. D. Eisenhower, General Staff Corps.

Joint Secretaries

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Lieut. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ, U.S.A.
Major W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

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1. Withdrawal of United States Marines from Iceland. -

Admiral Stark said that he was very anxious to withdraw the 4,500 U. S. Marines from Iceland as soon as possible, as they were urgently needed for other tasks. He hoped that this could be arranged even at the risk of delay in the relief of British troops.

Marshall Dill agreed as to the importance of withdrawing the Marines. He suggested that the local Commanders might be instructed to draw up the best possible plan for arranging this withdrawal as early as possible. He would telegraph to England to give the necessary instructions.

Admiral Stark said that the details of what was required could be furnished by Brigadier General Gerow.

It was agreed that the withdrawal of the 4,500 U. S. Marines now serving in Iceland should be arranged as soon as possible and Sir John Dill undertook to telegraph the necessary instructions to England on receipt of the details of what was required from Brigadier General Gerow.

2. American-British Strategy. -

The Conference considered a revised version, prepared by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, of the Memorandum on American-British Strategy. (W.W.1. U.S. Revised). The various amendments proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were considered, and with a few exceptions were agreed to. It was also decided that the lists of sea and air bases contained in Paragraph 12 should be omitted. It was further agreed that the paper should be circulated only to the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates, and that a note should be inserted in the paper to this effect.

Air Marshall Harris said he would like to check with General Arnold the list of Air Routes which had been inserted.

Subject to a final check by Air Marshall Harris with General Arnold of the Air Routes paragraph, the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff approved the memorandum (Annex No. 1, American-British Strategy, WW-1 (Final)), on American-British Strategy as amended in the discussion, and agreed that it should be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister.

3. Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific. -

The Conference considered a report (U.S. ABC-4/3, British WW (J.P.C.) 3), by the Joint Planning Committee on supporting measures for the Southwest Pacific.

Admiral Pound said that as there would be an interval before General Lavell could take up his command, he thought it would be desirable to dispatch a telegram to the U. S. and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East to inform them of the general policy which had been agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff. He handed across copies of a telegram which he had drafted for this purpose. The draft telegram was considered and a number of amendments were agreed upon.

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Later in the meeting, after Admiral King had entered, further consideration was given to the telegram, and some additional amendments made. A few minor amendments to the report were also accepted by the Joint Planning Committee.

It was agreed:

a. That the telegram, as amended in the discussion, should be dispatched forthwith to U. S. and British Commanders in the Far East.

b. That the report by the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the incorporation of the minor amendments agreed to in the discussion, should be approved.

The report and the telegram in their final form were subsequently circulated as U.S. ANC-4/3, British WM-4, Annex 2.

4. Northwest Africa Project. -

Admiral Stark said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were not ready to discuss the report by the Joint Planning Committee on this subject, (U.S. ANC-4/2, British WM. (J.P.C.) 2).

Admiral Pound said that certain officers bringing full information on reinforcements and shipping programs were expected to arrive from the United Kingdom on the following day. He thought that the Joint Planning Committee should then be in a position to examine the three main problems which were confronting us in the near future; namely,

a. Northwest Africa Project.
b. Relief of British Garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland.
c. Reinforcements for the Far East and consequent replacements in the Middle East.

He thought that there were two cases which should be considered. First, one should assume that reinforcements to the Far East must be given priority; to what extent then must the gaps in the Middle East be filled, and could the Northwest Africa project be carried out? Alternatively, supposing the Northwest Africa project had to be carried out by invitation in the immediate future, what would happen to the rest of the program?

Admiral Stark said that with the naval resources at present available, it did not appear possible to undertake anything which involved opening up a new convoy route.

Rear Admiral Turner said that the Joint Planning Committee felt the Northwest Africa project should be considered under more realistic hypotheses. Guidance from the Chiefs of Staff was required on this point. It should be realized that entry into French North Africa was only possible through Casablanca, which was a good but small port. The maximum rate at which forces could be disembarked was that given in the report, and this would be inadequate if opposition was likely to be met.

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Admiral Stark thought that the Joint Planning Committee should consider what could be done in French North Africa if the situation was different from that assumed in the present report.

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Joint Planning Committee should be instructed to examine the questions in view of the discussion which had been raised.

General Marshall asked, if on the assumption that it would be impossible to enter Morocco under resistance and the Germans moved through Spain, what would be the next move?

Admiral Pound replied, the occupation of the Canaries.

(At this point Admiral King entered the meeting).

5. Relief of the British Garrison in Northern Ireland. -

Admiral King said that it had been decided that for the present, U. S. forces destined for the relief of the British garrison in Northern Ireland should be transported in the S. S. George Washington, which would shortly be fit for service, this vessel being used on a continuous shuttle service to and from Northern Ireland. In a few weeks' time, when the general trend in the Atlantic theatre could be judged, a decision could be taken as to whether the transport of these troops should be accelerated or not.

The Conference took note of this statement.

6. Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. -

The Conference gave further consideration to this directive (U.S. ABC-4/5, British W.W.(J.P.C.) 5). One minor verbal alteration was agreed to and it was also decided to bring the statement of the general strategic policy into line with that telegraphed out to Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East (see WW-4) by defining the Malay Barrier.

Admiral King said that he had reason to believe that the directive would meet with the approval of the President, and this also applied to the statement on the higher direction of war in the ABDA Area contained in U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW-3 (Final), Annex 3. He had also received a request that the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff should draft for consideration the public announcement setting up the unified command in the ABDA Area. He thought this should be completed on Friday.

The U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff gave final approval to the draft directive to the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area as amended in the discussion (U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW-3 (Final), Annex 3), and took note of Admiral King's statement.

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7. Proposed Tasks for the Joint Planning Committee. -

The Conference considered the statement of tasks proposed for the Joint Planning Committee in U. S. Serial ABC-4/4, British WW (J.P.C.) 4, Annex 4. At the suggestion of Admiral Stark, it was decided that the following note should be added to the end of the paper:

"Consideration of the Southwest Pacific theatre, including the matter of unity of command therein, was treated as a first priority, and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the foregoing document."

The U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff accepted the statement (Annex 4, U.S. ABC-4/4, British WW (J.P.C.) 4), of the proposed tasks for the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the insertion of the note recorded above.

8. Naval Dispositions. -

Sir Dudley Pound suggested that one of the matters which might be discussed was the size of the Naval Forces available in the ADA Area, and whether they were sufficient for the tasks they would encounter.

There was some discussion on this point in the course of which Admiral King pointed out that such a study would necessitate examination of the Naval resources in other theatres.

It was stated that the Naval staffs were already at work on this, and it was finally agreed that this point should continue to be dealt with by them in direct consultation.

The Conference adjourned at 5:15 P.M.

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ANNEX 2
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COPY NO. 92

December 31, 1941

U.S. ABC-4/3
British W.W. 4

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

(FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS)

UNTIL ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIED COMMAND.

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COPY NO._____

U.S. ABC-4/3

Washington

British WW(JPC)3

December 31, 1941

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint Planning Committee report of December 29, 1941, on "Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific" as appropriate action to be taken in the interim prior to the establishment of the unified command of the forces in that region.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to send immediately to the United States and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East Area the following telegram:

"The general strategic policy for operations in the Far Eastern theater which has been agreed upon by the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff is as follows:-

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and North Australia, as the basic defensive position in that theater and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance;

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the theater, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

(c) To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

(d) To maintain essential communications within the theater.

In disposing of the re-inforcements arriving in that theater, you should be guided by the above policy and consider the needs of the theater as a whole. To this end, close co-operation among the British, Dutch and United States Commanders is essential, and you should continue to concert measures accordingly.

British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, will inform the Dutch and request their cooperation."

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/3

COPY NO._____

British Serial W.W.(J.P.C.) 3.

WASHINGTON,
December 28, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC

(THE FAR EAST, ARFA AND ADJACENT REGIONS)

Directive.

1. Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Joint Planning Committee.

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements.

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the South West Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, expected to be available in the South West Pacific Area on:-

(a) 15th January, 1942.

(b) 1st February, 1942.

on the following alternative assumptions:-

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.

(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.

(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold.

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Concept of Operations.

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the South West Pacific Theater. The present strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.

After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive.

3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:-

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defense of India.

(c) To re-establish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

(d) To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and to and within the Far East Area.

(e) To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements.

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4. The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached tables (Annexes I, II, and III). Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard to the essential requirements of other theatres.

Recommendations.

5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved:-

(a) Under the assumption that the Philippines and Singapore both hold, the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, as shown on the attached table, should go forward as now arranged, subject to the direction of the commander to whom they are assigned.

(b) Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not, the total U.S. reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, should be employed in furtherance of the defences of key points on the Malay Barrier, and for protection of the vital lines of communication from the east. In the absence of unity of command, detailed dispositions of these reinforcements must be left to the senior U. S. Army commander, in collaboration with the senior British, Dutch, and Australian commanders. Under this assumption the planned disposition of British reinforcements remains unchanged.

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(c) Under the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold, the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, be used for the defense of the remainder of the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia, U.S. reinforcements being used to the eastward, and British reinforcements to the westward.

NOTE:- The subject of reinforcements for New Zealand and Fiji is being considered separately.

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

Forces Now in the Far East	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Pla Under Order for
(a) Naval 2 Cruisers 13 Destroyers (3 damaged) 21 Submarines (less losses.) 7 Patrol Bombers	(a) Naval 12 Patrol Bombers	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None
(b) Army Philippines (Luzon) 40,000 as of December 22, 1941. Australia 2 Regts. Field Artillery Service Troops	(b) Army Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	(b) Army None	(b) Army Supplies &
(c) Air Philippines (Dec. 25) Few Pursuit planes for reconnaissance Australia 18 Pursuit planes 52 Dive bombers 11 Heavy Bombers	(c) Air 55 Pursuit 23 Heavy Bombers	(c) Air 67 Pursuit 57 Heavy Bombers	(c) Air To make t 4 Gps. P 2 Gps. H 2 Gps. M 1 Gp. Li (plus c

Annex I

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

the	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East.
	(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval
	12 Patrol Bombers	None	None
s (3 damaged) s (less losses.) ombers			
	(b) Army	(b) Army	(b) Army
s (Luzon)	Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	None	Supplies & Gasoline
cember 22,			
Artillery s			
	(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air
es (Dec. 25)	55 Pursuit 23 Heavy Bombers	67 Pursuit 57 Heavy Bombers	To make total of: 4 Gps. Pursuit (320) 2 Gps. Heavy Bombers (70) 2 Gps. Medium Bombers (114) 1 Gp. Light Bombers (57) (plus certain reserves)
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Annex I

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Forces in the Far East on 7 December, 1941	Due in Far East by January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East
(a) Naval [illegible] Cruisers [illegible] Destroyers	(a) Naval 5 Additional Escort Vessels	(a) Naval 2 Submarines	(a) Naval None
(b) Army 9 and 11 Ind.Divs. } Malaya 8 Aus. Div. } (less one Bde.) One Div. (Burma) 2 Inf. Bdes. (Singapore)	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind.Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. Two AA Regt. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Antitank Regt.	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind.Divs. One Sq. Light Tanks.	(b) Army (Malaya) Two AA Regts. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Bde. Gp. 14 Ind. Div. 18 Div. (less two Bde. Gps). To Burma 14 Ind.Div. (less one Bde.Gp.) One Bde. Gp. 17th Ind. Div. 5th or 34th Ind. Div.
(c) Air Malaya 2 Bomber Sqns. 2 Bomber Recce Sqns. 6 Fighter Sqns. [illegible] Sqns. 1 G.R. Flying Boat Sqn.	(c) Air Malaya 4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricanes) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	(c) Air Malaya 2 Fighter Sqns. (48 Hurricanes)	(c) Air Plans not complete
Burma ½ Bomber Sqn. ½ Fighter Sqn.	Burma None	Burma 1 Fighter Sqn. (Hurricanes)	

ANNEX II

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

the Far East mber, 1941	Due in Far East by January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East
s ers	(a) Naval 5 Additional Escort Vessels	(a) Naval 2 Submarines	(a) Naval None
Ind.Divs.) Malaya v. e Bde.) (Burma) es. (Singapore)	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind.Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. One AA Regt. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Antitank Regt.	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind.Divs. One Sq. Light Tanks.	(b) Army (Malaya) Two AA Regts. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Bde. Gp. 14 Ind. Div. 18 Div. (less two Bde. Gps). To Burma 14 Ind.Div. (less one Bde.Gp.) One Bde. Gp. 17th Ind. Div. 5th or 34th Ind. Div.
Sqns. Recce Sqns. Sqns. qns. lying Boat Sqn.	(c) Air Malaya 4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricanes) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	(c) Air Malaya 2 Fighter Sqns. (48 Hurricanes)	(c) Air Plans not complete
Sqn. r Sqn.	Burma None	Burma 1 Fighter Sqn. (Hurricanes)	

ANNEX II

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AUSTRALIA

Forces now in the Far East

(a) Naval

2 Heavy Cruisers
2 Light Cruisers
4 Destroyers

(b) Army

1 Brig. Gp. of 8th Australian Div.
5 Divisions (Infantry)
2 Divisions (Cavalry)
1 Division (Armored)
(Not as yet equipped)

(c) Air

160 Mixed line planes
300 - 400 Training planes
15,000 Air officers and men
40,000 In Training

DUTCH

Forces Now in the Far East

(a) Naval

4 Cruisers
7 Destroyers
15 Submarines
2 - 3 Submarines (Expected) (Later)

(b) Army

3 Div's. Java
7 Bn's Sumatra
4 Bn's Borneo
1 Bn Celebes
1 Bn Timor
1 Bn Moluccas

(c) Air

6 Bomber Sqns.
4 Fighter Sqns.
108 Navy Aircraft
40 Patrol Planes

ANNEX III

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ANNEX 3
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COPY NO._____

U.S. ABC-4/8
British WW 3 (Final)

December 31, 1941.

REPORT

BY

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

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U. S. SECRET
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December 31, 1941.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/5 (Final)
British Serial WW 3

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS:

1. Area. -

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are:

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic defensive. The ABDA Governments intend to provide immediate reinforcements for defense. As additional forces become available, it will become possible to take the offensive and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Although your operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further preparations for that offensive.

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6. The general strategic policy will therefore be: -

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander. -

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly designated by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force.

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In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. If any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expedited method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.

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ANNEX 1

U. S. SECRET
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BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows:

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East, westward to the meridian of 114° East, thence northwestward to latitude 13° South, longitude 92° East.

On the West: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

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ANNEX 2

December 31, 1941.

U. S. SECRET
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HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

a. The provision of reinforcements.
b. A major change in policy.
c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

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ANNEX 4
to
JCCSs-7

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

Copy No. 39

Washington, D. C.

U.S. Serial ABC-4/4 (Final)
British Serial W. W.(J.P.C.)4

December 31, 1941

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

1. A study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military projects and movements which affect the Atlantic theatre and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942.

This report will include consideration of the following:

A. Movements

(a) Relief of Iceland.

(b) Movement of three Divisions and one armored Division from the United States to Northern Ireland.

(c) Movement of United States air forces to the United Kingdom.

(d) Relief of British in Aruba and Curacao.

B. Projects

(a) Joint United States-British occupation of French North Africa.

(b) United States occupation of:

(1) French West Africa and Cape Verde Islands.

(2) Northeast Brazil.

(c) British occupation of:

(1) The Azores.

(2) The Canaries and Madeira.

(3) Diego Suarez.

2. Coordination of the Victory Programs of the United States and the British Commonwealth and adjustment of their broad outlines in accordance with strategic considerations and production possibilities.

3. A consideration of any steps that should be taken in the light of experience up to date to implement, improve, or extend the system of collaboration between the United States-British Staffsas laid down in ABC-1; the need for allocating joint resources on a strategic basis to be taken into account.

Note: Consideration of the southwest Pacific theatre, including the matter of unity of command therein, were treated as a first priority and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the foregoing document.

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COPY NO. 16

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ABC-4
JCCSs-6

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 P.M., DECEMBER 30, 1941.

Present

British Officers

Navy

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Admiral Sir Charles Lyttle, Joint Staff Mission
Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N., Deputy Director of Plans, Admiralty

Army

Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Lieut. General Sir C. Weeyes, Joint Staff Mission
Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office

Air Force

Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, Director of Plans, Air Ministry

JCCS 6

United States Officers

Navy

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (Presiding)
Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Major General Commandant, U.S.M.C.
Lieut. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Admiral E. J. King.

Army

General G. C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brigadier General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
Brigadier General D. D. Eisenhower, G.S.C.

Joint Secretaries

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N.
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations
Lt. Col. P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ, U.S.A.
Major W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

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1. Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area. -

The Committee gave further consideration to their Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area which had been telegraphed to Ottawa, and had received the approval of the Prime Minister, together with a redraft of this paper, which had been forwarded by Mr. Hopkins for their attention, Annex 1, Memorandum of Mr. Hopkins, December 30, 1941.

In the course of discussion, the following points were made: -

a. It did not appear desirable to set up a special body to deal with ABDA problems, as only the United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, through their representatives in Washington, could weigh the needs of the ABDA Area in relation to those of other theatres.

b. As the Dutch Government was in London, and as the machinery for consultation with the Dominions Governments already existed there, it seemed proper that consultation with these Governments should take place in London, and that the British Government should be responsible for obtaining the views and agreements of these Governments, and for submitting them to the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff. While the representatives of the Dutch and Dominions Governments in Washington could, if thought desirable, be kept informed of developments, official consultation could only take place in London.

c. In order to avoid delay, communications from the Supreme Commander should be telegraphed to London and Washington simultaneously -- the telegram for Washington being for action, and that to London to furnish a basis for immediate comment to Washington.

In view of the above considerations, it was felt that while some of the suggestions in the redraft forwarded by Mr. Hopkins could be accepted, the main principles contained in their original Memorandum should be retained. The Committee accordingly prepared a revised version of their Memorandum, Annex 2 in two parts.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed that the revised Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area should be submitted to the President for his approval under a covering Memorandum setting out the reasons for the machinery proposed.

2. Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. -

The Committee had before them a Report by the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. ABC-4/5, British W.W. (J.P.C.)5).

Discussion took place on the extent of the ABDA Area.

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Admiral Stark reminded the Committee that a telegram had been sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, in which it had been suggested that Indo-China and Thailand should be included in the Chinese theatre, and his comments on this arrangement had been requested. He felt, therefore, that for political reasons it would be necessary to exclude Indo-China and Thailand from the ABDA Area.

Admiral Pound and Marshall Dill agreed with this view, and explained that they felt that Burma should be included in the ABDA area as an essential supply route to China. Burma had recently been transferred from the Far Eastern Command to the Indian Command, as being an important outpost of the Indian defence, but the British Chiefs of Staff now agreed that it should be included in the ABDA Area.

The British Chiefs of Staff agreed to a proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff that a paragraph should be included to the effect that the Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a Commander of the combined Naval forces, should be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff accepted the Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area, as amended by the Committee and including the Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area (Annex 2 to the Report), as an agreed report, Annex 3, U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW 3, December 30, 1941, for submission to the President and the Prime Minister.

3. Next Meeting. -

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to meet at 2 p.m. the following day, Wednesday, December 31, 1941, to consider two reports by the Joint Planning Committee: -

a. Northwest Africa Project.

(U.S. ABC-4/2; British WW (J.P.C.)2).

b. Supporting Measures for the Southwestern Pacific.

(U.S. ABC-4/3; British W.W. (J.P.C.)3).

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ANNEX 1
to
JCCSs-6

The White House
Washington

December 30, 1941.

Dear Betty:

Here is the re-draft which the President did last night and which he would like to have the Joint Staffs chew over.

Cordially yours,

/s/ HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

Admiral Harold R. Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department.

- -

Proposed method of handling matters concerning the Southwest Pacific Theatre.

It is assumed that the chief matters on which decisions would have to be given would be:

(a) The provision of reinforcements.
(b) A major change in policy.
(c) Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. It is suggested that a special body be set up for this purpose in Washington.

(a) Three Americans and Three British.
(b) And one Australian, one New Zealander and one Dutch for consultation and advisory purposes.

3. It is proposed, therefore, that above machinery should be used in the following manner:

(a) The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the above Committee in Washington his proposal, whatever it might be.
(b) The Committee in Washington would immediately telegraph to London to ask for any recommendations or opinions.
(c) On receipt of these opinions, the Washington Committee would ssubmit their recommendations to the President and by telegraph to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister would then inform the President whether he was in agreement with their recommendations. He could of course consult with Australia, New Zealand and Netherlands if advisable.

4. Agreement, having been reached between the Prime Minister and the President, the orders to the Supreme Commander would then be despatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

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Part I

ANNEX 2
to
JCCSs-6

December 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

The Chiefs of Staff have somewhat revised their original memorandum on the above subject, so as to incorporate certain of the President's suggestions. With respect to those points where the revised memorandum, hereto attached, differs from the President's re-draft, the following explanation is submitted:

(a) The U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff through their representatives in Washington, are in an especially favorable position to weigh the needs of the ABDA area in relation to those of other theaters of war. Recommendations to the President and to the Prime Minister emanating from the joint Chiefs of Staff would reflect this balanced perspective.

(b) Consultations with the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand governments can not well be carried out in several places without serious loss of time, and creation of confusion. For the reasons set out in paragraph 4 of the attached revised memorandum, London would appear to be the logical place for carrying on such consultations. The Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington can of course, keep the representatives of the Dutch and Dominion governments informed, should this be considered desirable.

(c) The suggested duplication of messages from the Supreme Commander to London and Washington is for the purpose of saving time. The copy sent to Washington would be the action copy, but the one to London would furnish the basis for immediate comment to Washington.

(d) Admiral Pound feels that, in view of his conversation with the Prime Minister this morning the attached procedure will be entirely acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Chief of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations

Commander in Chief
U. S. Fleet

Chief of Air Forces

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PART II

ANNEX 2
to
JCCSs-6

December 30, 1941.

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

a. The provision of reinforcements.
b. A major change in policy.
c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

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ABC-4
JCCSs-5

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 P.M., DECEMBER 29, 1941

Present

British Officers

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Admiral Sir C. Lyttle, Joint Staff Mission
Lt. General Sir C. Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission
Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission

U. S. Naval Officers

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. L. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief, Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Lt. Commander R. E. Libby, United States Navy

JCCS 5

U. S. Army Officers

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department

Joint Secretaries

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N.
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ, U.S.A.
Major W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

1. Priorities for U.S. and U.K. Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. -

The Conference approved a final draft of the Joint Planning Committee's Report on Priorities for United States and U.K. Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Serial ABC-4/1, British Serial WW(JPC)1)

2. American - British Strategy (WW1). -

At the request of Rear Admiral Turner, action on this paper was deferred.

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3. Northwest Africa Project WW(JPC)2. -

Action on this paper was deferred at the request of the British.

4. Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific. -

Action on U. S. ABC-4/3, British WW(JPC)3, was deferred by common consent.

At this time, the following officers withdrew from the Conference: Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, U.S.N.; Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S.N.; Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U.S.N.; Major General Thomas Holcomb, U.S.M.C.; Captain J. L. McCrea, U.S.N.; Brigadier General Raymond Lee, U.S.A.; and Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N.

5. Unity of Command in the Southwestern Pacific Theater. -

a. Method of handling questions concerning that theater. -

Admiral Pound said that the proposal for the establishment of unity of command in the Southwestern Pacific Theater had been referred by the Prime Minister to London, for consideration by the War Cabinet. In his telegram, he had included the following sentence: "He (General Wavell) would receive his orders from an appropriate joint body, who will be responsible to him as Minister of Defense, and to the President of the United States, who is also Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces."

The Prime Minister had received an immediate reply, asking for information as to the nature of this joint body. He had been asked to defer giving his views to London on this point until the Chiefs of Staff had had an opportunity of putting forward their views.

One of the main objects in setting up a supreme commander was to achieve rapidity of decision on important matters. It would be difficult to attain this object if a cumbersome machine were erected to deal with important matters arising from the Southwestern Pacific Theater. The right course would be to utilize existing machinery, and the British Chiefs of Staff had formulated certain proposals which they hoped would prove acceptable to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Pound then read his proposals, Annex 1, to the Conference.

Admiral King said that he had been asked to consider this matter, and advise the President at very short notice. He had set down on paper an outline of a solution which he thought would achieve the object in view, namely, rapid decision through the use of existing machinery. His proposal was that the Prime Minister should appoint a deputy in Washington, who would act with the President on recommendations to be made by a Southwestern Pacific Council, which would be a military body composed of one representative from each of the U.S. Joint Board, the British Joint Staff Mission, the Dutch military representatives in Washington, together with one Anzac representative. The members of this Council would be instructed as necessary by the military bodies which they represented.

General Marshall suggested that it might be better not to introduce at this stage the complicated question of machinery

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into the business of setting up unity of command. He thought that an amendment might be made to the documents establishing the unified command, which would include a phrase to the effect that "matters would be dealt with by such joint machinery as the Associated Powers may hereafter set up".

Admiral King thought that the establishment of machinery was an indispensable part of the establishment of unity of command, if the latter were to start operating at once.

General Marshall said that if that were so, then he was prepared to accept the proposals put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral King and Admiral Stark signified their agreement to these proposals.

Admiral Horne suggested that in order to achieve unity of command without delay, it should be agreed upon and established by the British and United States Governments forthwith - the other Governments concerned being presented with a fait accompli, and being asked to notify their acceptance.

Admiral Pound said that the Prime Minister had already sent off telegrams to the New Zealand and Australian Governments, so that there was unlikely to be much delay. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed to telegraph their proposals to the Prime Minister forthwith for his approval.

Admiral Stark said that he would also submit them forthwith to the President.

The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff approved the proposals for handling matters concerning the Southwestern Pacific Theater, as set out in the Memorandum as Annex 1, and agreed to submit them forthwith to the President and the Prime Minister, for approval.

b. Letter of Instructions to the Supreme Commander. -

The Conference was informed that a draft Letter of Instructions, prepared by the Joint Planning Committee, would be circulated to them that evening. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed to telegraph its contents to London for comment.

The Conference took note of this, and agreed to meet at 11:30 the following morning to consider the Draft Letter.

6. Proposed Communication to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. -

General Marshall said that the President was very anxious to send a message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, so as to reach him before the public announcement of the setting up of unified command in the Southwestern Pacific Theater. General Magruder had reported that the Generalissimo was considerably upset by events in Burma, and particularly by the diversion to the British there of Lend-Lease material destined for China. It would therefore be desirable to send him an encouraging message, which would make clear that the other Associated Powers considered that he had an important part to play on the world's stage. This would obviate any danger which

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might exist of his resenting the fact that he had not been consulted about the setting up of the Southwestern Pacific Command. He (General Marshall) had accordingly drafted a message, which he read to the Conference.

In the course of discussion, two minor amendments were agreed to, to meet the following points:

a. That it would be unwise to define at this stage the Southwestern Pacific Theater.

b. That in view of the controversial problem presented by Burma, it would be inadvisable to include any part of Burma in the Chinese theater. It would be best, in defining the latter theater, to make clear that it was an initial definition only.

The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft message, Annex 2, to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as amended in discussion, and agreed to submit it to the President and to the Prime Minister, for their approval.

The Conference adjourned at 5:30 P.M. to meet at 11:30 A.M., December 30, 1941.

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December 29, 1941.

ANNEX 1
TO
ABC-4
JCCSs-5

PROPOSED METHOD OF HANDLING MATTERS
CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER

1. It is assumed that the chief matters on which decisions would have to be given would be:

(a) The provision of reinforcements.
(b) A major change in policy.
(c) Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. It is suggested that no special body should be set up for this purpose because it would tend to clog the machine for the following reasons:

(a) It would be necessary to have Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand representatives on this body.

(b) Each representative in (a) would probably wish for time to consult his Government before giving an opinion.

3. It is proposed, therefore, that existing machinery should be used in the following manner:

(a) The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, both in London and in Washington, his proposal, whatever it might be.

(b) The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London would immediately telegraph to the British Mission in Washington to say whether or not they would be telegraphing any opinions.

(c) On receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the Representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff would meet and consider the problem and would submit their recommendations to the President and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister would then inform the President whether he was in agreement with their recommendations.

4. As the Dutch Government is in London, and as the principal representatives of the New Zealand and Australian Governments are also in London, it is proposed that the agreement of these Governments to any proposal should be obtained by the British Government and this would be included in the final telegram to Washington.

5. Agreement having been reached between London and Washington, the orders to the Supreme Commander would then be despatched from Washington.

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December 29, 1941.

ANNEX 2
TO
ABC-4
JCCSS-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is suggested that as soon as a preliminary decision is reached as to the delimitation of the Southwest Pacific theater, and in agreement with the British and Dutch authorities, a communication in substance as follows be dispatched to Chiang Kai-shek:

1. In order to insure immediate coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a supreme commander for all British, Dutch, and American forces in the Southwest Pacific theater.

2. The advisability of a similar command of activities of the Associated Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. This theater we suggest should initially include such portion of Thailand and Indo-China as may become accessible to troops of the Associated Powers. In agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch Governments, I desire to suggest that you should undertake to exercise such command over all forces of the Associated Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

It is our thought that, in order to make such command effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, Dutch, American and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable, and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might be included. This staff should function under your supreme command.

The commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the closest liaison with your headquarters. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable.

Such arrangements would enable your counsel and influence to be given effect in the formulation of the general strategy for the conduct of the war in all theaters. Your views in this matter will be greatly appreciated by me.

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U.S. ABC-4/1
British WW 5

ANNEX 3
to
JCCSs-5
(Document mentioned in
paragraph 1, JCCSs-5).

COPY NO. 78

December 29, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved

REPORT BY THE U.S. - BRITISH JOINT
PLANNING COMMITTEE
U.S. ABC-4/1, BRITISH WW(JPC)1

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND
UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS
IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/1
British Serial WW(J.P.C.)1

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

Report by the U.S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:-

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

a. The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

b. The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

(1) The Azores.
(2) The Cape Verde Islands.
(3) The Canary Islands.
(4) French West Africa.
(5) French North Africa.
(6) Diegos Suarez in Madagascar.
(7) Curacao and Aruba.
(8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

a. To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

b. To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

c. To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial WW) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of troop transport, in view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying US and UK field armies, garrisons, and naval forces. Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

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Lt. Col. Dwyer (16)

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JCCS 4

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 P.M., DECEMBER 27, 1941.

Present

British Officers

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff
Admiral Sir C. Lyttle, Joint Staff Mission
Lieut. General Sir C. Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission
Air Marshall A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission
Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, Director of Plans, Air Ministry
Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N., Deputy Director of Plans, Admiralty

U. S. Naval Officers

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief, Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps

U. S. Army Officers

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff.
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division.

Joint Secretaries

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R. M.
Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N.
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Lt. Colonel P. K. Robinett, G-2, GHQ, U. S. Army
Major W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.

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1. ABC 4/1 -- Priorities for United States - United Kingdom Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. -

Admiral Stark presented a revised draft of ABC 4/1 to the Conference.

Admiral Pound said that he understood the Report of the Joint Planning Committee had already been approved, and that he could not understand why a new draft was being submitted.

Rear Admiral Turner explained the changes. He said that copies of the changes had been furnished the British Section, but that apparently they had not been able to see them before the meeting.

Admiral Stark said that there were few changes. The greater part of the paper had been previously agreed to.

After some further discussion, it was agreed that the paper should be referred to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration by both sections and then resubmitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting.

2. ABC 4/2 -- Plan for Expedition to Northwest Africa. -

Admiral Stark brought up ABC 4/2, copies of which were distributed.

Air Marshall Portal said that, with reference to the airplane allocations under this operation, he was horrified at the large number of planes contemplated; he thought it would be a mistake to send such a large number of planes to a theater of operations where they might not be utilized. He pointed out that in allocating planes, the large strategy must be the primary consideration, rather than local requirements; that in the matter of Greece it was realized that there was an insufficient number of troops and planes, yet those available were allocated despite the expectation that this force would be knocked down. Although this happened, the strategic importance of this operation was great because it delayed the attack on Russia for two months. He urged that in making allocations, the figures be viewed in the spirit of economy, that is, the minimum number that it would be safe to have.

General Arnold said that he had also objected to the large number of planes allocated, and thought the paper should be again referred to the Joint Planning Committee for further consideration.

General Marshall agreed that the paper should be referred back to the Planning Committee. He pointed out, however, that this operation might result in the first contact between American and German troops. Success should not be jeopardized by failure to provide adequate means. A failure in this first venture would have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the American people. In summing up, he said that this first operation, although in some respects a minor one, could not be treated in a routine manner.

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It was agreed that the paper would be referred back to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration, in the light of the discussion which had taken place, and revised draft submitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting.

3. American - British Strategy. -

Admiral Stark brought up WW/1, Joint American - British Strategy, which had previously been discussed.

Rear Admiral Turner said that the original British memorandum had not been fully agreed to.

Admiral Pound said that the papers had been agreed to as the basis for our joint strategy subject to some amendments which had been agreed to and to the inclusion of a revised paragraph on air routes as proposed by General Arnold.

Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Pound.

It was agreed that the paper would be referred back to the Joint Planning Committee and a revised draft incorporating the agreed amendments and the revised paragraph on routes should be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting.

4. Program of Work of the Joint Planning Committee. -

Rear Admiral Turner listed the various papers now in the hands of the Joint Planning Committee as follows:

(1) WW/1 -- Grand Strategy.

(2) ABC-4/2 -- Expedition to Northwest Africa.

(3) Diversion of Reinforcements in the Far East.

It was suggested that a definite statement of priorities should be presented to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting. In the meantime, the Joint Planning Committee was to concentrate on the directive concerning the disposal of reinforcements en route to the Far East.

5. Unity of Command.

Admiral Stark asked Admiral Pound if he cared to discuss the matter of unity of command for the Far East as proposed by General Marshall.

Admiral Pound stated that he would like to get it clear in his mind what the United States means by unity of command, particularly how Naval matters would be dealt with.

General Marshall said that it would be impossible to choose anyone for supreme command who would have full technical knowledge of all services. He felt, however, that the matter of appointing a supreme commander would be bound up in the assumption that a man of good judgment would be selected; otherwise the whole project would be a failure. He felt that a man with good judgment and unity of command has a distinct advantage over a man with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation.

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The whole matter, he said, rests on the consideration as to whether a directive could be drawn which would leave the supreme commander with enough power to improve the situation and still not give him power to destroy national interests or to exploit one theater without due consideration to another.

He then read a suggested form of letter, Annex 1, copies of which were distributed, of instructions to the supreme commander, which he stated was purely a form and a basis for further discussion concerning the Far Eastern area. Similar directives might be possible for other areas.

In urging the adoption of unity of command in the Far East, General Marshall said that the Associated Powers are opposed in that area by an enemy who has unity of command in its highest sense; that in light of the present conditions out there, any action whatsoever along this line would be an improvement. The situation in this respect could not be made worse than it exists at present.

Admiral Pound asked, on the assumption that four countries were involved, and a supreme commander were chosen from Power X, who would be on his Staff?

General Marshall replied that, personally, he envisaged a small staff, one representative from each Government possibly, who would act as a sort of liaison officer with local forces. The commander would possess two mobile elements -- one sea-going vessels and the other bombardment aviation. He said that at the present time the situation in the Far East is tragic; that General Brereton, who was the air officer in the Philippines, had left the Philippines with Heavy bombers and had been able to establish some contact with local commanders in Borneo and had ended up in Surabaya, Java. The information from General Brereton has been the most heartening from the Far East in the past few days.

Marshall Dill observed, with regard to General Marshall's draft, that the restrictions on the commander were too great; that the proposition formed a good basis to work on, but the restrictions would make it very difficult for the Commander-in-Chief to exercise command.

General Marshall agreed that the restrictions were great, but stated that if the supreme commander ended up with no more authority than to tell Washington what he wanted, such a situation was better than nothing, and an improvement over the present situation.

Air Chief Marshall Portal commended the paper for its realism; he observed that it separated a commander's resources in air defense and air offense, which indicated some of the problems of such a proposition. He stated that the primary consideration should be what is sound from a military point of view; that what might be gained by the military aspect of unified command might be lost by the necessity of political considerations. He asked if it would not

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be possible to give the commanders a free hand, and to have all the political questions resolved, say, in Washington, or, as an alternative suggestion, by a representative in the area, rather along the lines adopted by the British in the Middle East.

General Marshall said that political questions could be settled in Washington. He agreed that his paper had been drawn on realistic lines. He thought Air Marshall Portal was talking more in terms of ideals; that what he desired to do was to start something.

Admiral Stark pointed out that under the provisions of the draft directive, troops of one nation could not be moved out of its own possessions without approval of the home government. He felt that the restrictions were heavy, but realistic; and that it was better to have restrictions first and then remove them, than to fail in establishing the principle.

Air Marshall Portal pointed out that if the supreme commander desired to move the air forces of one of the elements of the command, he should know the capabilities of these forces, and that could only be accomplished by having a suitable liaison element.

Admiral King thought that it would be impossible to get the idea of a single Commander-in-Chief accepted by the governments concerned unless the limitations were imposed. He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff Conference prepare an outline plan for presentation to the Prime Minister and the President.

Admiral Pound stated that he realized the urgency of coming to a decision in the matter, whatever it might be; and asked, on the assumption that unified command was recommended, how would the many details be worked out? He pointed out that there are a large number of details involved. He thought that it would be difficult to keep the staff of the Commander-in-Chief small for he would have to have representatives of the services of each nation to advise him. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed as to the urgency of getting to a conclusion on the question immediately.

During the discussion it was suggested that the broad outline be prepared and the details worked out later.

6. Utilization of the U. S. Transports now being Used in the Indian Ocean.

Admiral Pound said that it might prove advantageous to the general scheme for reinforcing the Far East if these transports, when they had delivered the 18th British Division at its destination, could be used for carrying additional reinforcements from the Middle East to the Far East. He asked whether such a proposal would be approved by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Stark said that these ships would be available for use as seemed best in the joint cause.

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Admiral Pound said that he did not ask for an immediate decision in the matter, but thought it best to draw attention to the possibility that such a request might be made.

The Conference adjourned at 4:30 p.m.

ENCLOSURE
Annex 1 - Draft of Instructions to the Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater.

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ANNEX 1

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ABC-4
C/S USA

Proposed draft of instructions to the Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater, submitted by United States Chiefs of Staff for the consideration of the Joint United States-British Chiefs of Staff Conference.

Letter of Instructions to be signed by the government of the country from which the supreme commander is chosen, and countersigned by representatives of each of the other powers in the group, Australia, Dutch East Indies, British and the United States.

To: Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater.

(Letters, similar in content, will be sent by each of the ADBU governments to its highest Army, Navy and Air Commander in the Southwestern Pacific Theater.)

Subject: Letter of Instructions.

1. By agreement among the governments of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ADBU governments, the Southwestern Pacific Theater has been constituted, to comprise all land and sea areas included in the region Malaya - Australia - Philippine Islands, all inclusive.

2. You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the Southwestern Theater and of all armed forces afloat, ashore and in the air of the ADBU governments stationed therein and allotted by their respective governments for service in that theater, except that you are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ADBU governments land troops of that government except with the consent of the local commander or his government. You are authorized to employ naval and air forces in general support of operations in the theater assigned you. However, during the period of initial air reinforcement, it being the view of all the associated governments that air superiority over the enemy should be attained as soon as possible, each government reserves the right to assign and employ its pursuit and fighter airplanes at its own discretion. All accumulations of pursuit and fighter airplanes beyond the minimum requirements fixed by each government, will pass to your general reserve, for use under your direction.

3. The ADBU governments have further agreed as follows:

a. The mission of the armed forces in the Southwestern Pacific is immediately to

(1) Prevent further Japanese penetration of the Southwestern Pacific Theater.

(2) Establish security of essential land, air and sea communications within the theater. At this time essential communications in the Southwest Pacific theater are:

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(a) The approaches from India and to East Australia, and

(b) Extending from such approaches to Singapore, and, through the Dutch East Indies, to the Philippines.

(3) Eventually defeat the Japanese forces in the theater and expel them therefrom.

b. Your duties, responsibilities and authority are defined as follows:

(1) To coordinate in the Southwestern Pacific theater the tactical and strategic operations of all armed forces of the ADBU Governments, to assign them strategic and/or tactical missions and objectives, and, where desirable, to organize task forces for the execution of specific operations.

(2) To submit recommendations to the Associated Governments in all matters pertaining to that theater, regarding which specific authority is not herein delegated to you.

(3) To require, from the Commanders of the Armed Forces of each of the ADBU governments, such reports as you deem necessary in the determination of tactical strength and effectiveness, and/or in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

c. The following specific limitations are placed by the ADBU governments upon your authority as Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater.

(1) You may not relieve from duty the Commander of any of the Armed Forces of any of the ADBU governments, or any subordinate of such commander.

(2) You may not destroy, revise or alter the major tactical organization of the armed forces of any ADBU government. Each national component of a task force will operate under its own commander and will not be distributed into small units attached to the other national components of the task force.

(3) You may not take over for general use the supplies, munitions or other material resources belonging to any one of the ADBU governments without the consent of the appropriate commander, nor may you interfere in the administrative and/or disciplinary control of such Commander over his own forces.

(4) You may not prevent or interfere in direct communication between the Commander of the Armed Forces of any one of the ADBU governments with his home government.

(5) You may not prevent the Commander of the Armed Forces of any ADBU government from obeying the orders of his own government in detaching troops, individuals or material to any other theater.

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(6) You may not assume direct command of any portion or part of the forces assigned to the theater or of any particular portion or section of such theater, but will exercise your authority through the duly designated commanders of the ADBU governments.

(7) You may not, at any time, locate your headquarters within the limits of any critical tactical zone, but will so situate such headquarters as to facilitate establishment and maintenance of communications with all tactical zones and so as to provide you with a balanced perspective of the complete theater.

4. The ADBU governments have also agreed that they will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as above defined, and in the exercise of the authority as above defined, and in the exercise of the authority as above delegated and limited. Commanders of all naval, air and ground forces within your theater will be immediately informed by their respective governments that all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this letter will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your theater nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your theater except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. As Supreme Commander of the Southwestern Pacific Theater you are directly responsible to this government, and all instructions to you will follow established methods. Any recommendation, report, request, or other communication between you and any of the other governments of the ADBU Powers will be processed through this government.

6. Your headquarters will be established, initially, in Java.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ADBU representatives.

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Lt Col. George (4)

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ABC-4
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December 26, 1941

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 P.M., DECEMBER 26, 1941

JCCS 3

Present

British Officers

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound
Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Air Chief Marshall Sir C. Portal
Admiral Sir C. Lyttle
General Sir C. Wemyss
Air Marshall A. T. Harris

U. S. Naval Officers

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. J. King, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Asst. Chief, Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U.S.M.C.

U. S. Army Officers

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division

Joint Secretaries

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R. M.
Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N.
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations
Lieutenant Colonel Paul McD. Robinett, G-2, GHQ
Major W. T. Sexton, G.S.C.

1. Priorities for U.S. and U.K. Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean.-

Admiral Stark read the proposed plan and there followed a general discussion.

Admiral Turner said that the Joint Planning Committee recognized the importance of the North African project, but were not at this stage prepared to make recommendations on the relative priority of this and the other projects mentioned in paragraph 1(b) of their Report. The limitations on shipping and naval escort forces made it impossible to carry out the

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North African plan, and simultaneously relieve the British forces in Ireland and Iceland. If the North African project were carried out as envisaged, each power would produce the requisite amount of shipping for its own forces, but would have none extra available to lend to the other power. In addition, shipping required for the British part of "GYMNAST" would seriously interfere with British reinforcements to the Middle East.

The British delegation considered two possible moments at which the North African project would have to be put into effect as rapidly as possible; either (a) when British forces, moving from the eastward, had occupied Tripoli, or (b) when Marshal Petain resigned, as had been thought possible. The second occasion now seemed unlikely to occur, though the first remained; and it was felt that the Chiefs of Staff should obtain a decision from the President and the Prime Minister as to whether or not it had been decided to make a political approach to the French authorities in order to obtain an invitation to enter French North Africa. The British forces for "GYMNAST" were ready but their removal from the U.K. would leave the defense of the British Isles weak unless the U.S. took over the Iceland and Ireland Commitments. Nevertheless, the British view was that the North African project would have to go forward if an invitation was received.

It was generally agreed that, for the purposes of paragraph 3 of the Joint Planning Committee's Report, the major operations in the Atlantic area, only one of which could be carried out at one time, could be stated to be:-

Northwest Africa.
West Africa.
Northeast Brazil and the Cape Verdes Islands.
Northern Ireland and Iceland.

The occupation of the Canaries (by invitation), the Azores, and of Aruba and Curacao, fell into the category of minor operations. Further consideration would have to be given to the status of the Madagascar operation.

It appeared that the British Chiefs of Staff understood that this report, Annex 1, was accepted. However, the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that it was accepted in principle but should be restudied and resubmitted for further consideration.

2. North West Africa Project.-

The British delegation was of the opinion that it would take German forces six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, and without Spanish cooperation a further six weeks to become firmly established in the South of Spain, it was pointed out that this estimate was based on the best information available to the British, and took account of the fact that the Germans at the present time had not got forces readily available to undertake the operation. It was realized that with Spanish help the date of arrival in South Spain could be considerably accelerated.

Admiral Turner explained that the Joint Planning Committee felt that only Casablanca should be used, in the first instance, as the minor ports were difficult to protect from submarine attack and effective anti-air protection could only be given to one port.

Admiral Turner pointed out that the size of the North African expedition as envisaged by the Joint Planning Committee was greatly in excess of anything previously considered, and the implications on shipping

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were therefore enormous. Was this increase in size essential - particularly with regard to air? The British view was that the German Air Force was already stretched almost to its limit. It was decided that consideration of the size of the forces required should be deferred.

It was also pointed out that one reason why large forces had to be envisaged was that the French authorities would in all probability only issue the invitation if the bait were, in their opinion, adequate. It was suggested that the French air force in North Africa might, in the early stages, prove of some value in spite of its known lack of spares, but General Arnold said that from a recent conversation he had had with a French Officer who had recently left North Africa, he understood that only 40 of the French aircraft were capable of taking the air.

The U. S.-British Chiefs of Staff gave general approval to the Report, Annex 2, subject to certain amendments, and subject to further consideration of the strength of the forces required for the expedition.

2 ENCLOSURES:
Annex 1 - ABC-4/1; W.W.(J.P.C.)1
Annex 2 - ABC-4/2; W.W.(J.P.C.)2

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ANNEX 1

This paper was not approved but was returned to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration and re-submission for further consideration.

U.S.Serial /BC-4/1
British Serial J.P.(JPC)1.

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND [illegible] OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

Report by the U.S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows: -

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

(a) The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

(b) The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

(1) The Azores.
(2) The Cape Verde Islands.
(3) The Canary Islands.
(4) French West Africa.
(5) French North Africa.
(6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
(7) Curacao and Aruba.
(8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

(a) To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

(b) To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

(c) To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

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3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U. S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial W.W. (JPC) 2) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

25th December, 1941.

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ANNEX 2

This paper was not approved but was returned to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration and resubmission for further consideration.

U. S. serial ABC-4/2
British serial W.W.(J.P.C.)2

PROJECT - GYMNAST

We submit below a provisional examination of the project for joint operations in northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following hypotheses:

(a) We receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance there will be only token resistance.

(b) That owing to their pre occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefore anticipate a period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

(d) That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

Objective. We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control of all North Africa could be extended.

Base. The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of A.A. defences and air forces a single main base must be used for the whole force in North Africa.

Establishment of Base.

There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca which has a considerable garrison and coast defences. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States Marine Division is eminently suitable for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

Support to French in Tunisia.

The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco or perhaps a condition of their entry would be a demand from the French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must,

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therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two A.A. Regiments and three Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through by sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance guard at Casablanca.

Defense of Moroccan Area.

It will be essential to get in sufficient forces into the Casablanca area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being driven out by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and A.A. defences.

The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco.

The joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first three months are estimated at:-

1 Marine (combat loaded) Amphibious Division
3 Infantry Divisions
2 Armoured Divisions
320 First line fighter aircraft
57 First line medium bomber aircraft
57 First line light bomber aircraft
63 First line observation aircraft
120 Heavy A.A. guns
216 Light A.A. guns
Base and L. of C. units

As further forces become available all points of entry along the coast will be secured.

Total Forces Required.

The total forces ultimately required to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy, and to open the Mediterranean route by providing air cover along the coast will depend on the assistance that may be furnished by the French and Spanish. The combined British and United States forces might amount to about:

2½ - 2 Armoured Divisions
5 - 3 Infantry Divisions
A.A. weapons (350 heavy and 700 light)
First line aircraft:
800 Pursuit
105 Heavy Bombardment
228 Medium Bombardment
171 Light Bombardment
100 Naval Patrol

Joint American-British Effort Necessary.

Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility as defined in ABC-1. As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detail planning can proceed.

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NAVAL FORCES

British. Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal UK to Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a considerable period.

United States:

The U. S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support for the transit and landing of U.S. Expeditionary Forces.

American Convoy Escorts.

(a) Advance American Division -
One Marine Division embarked in 15 vessels escorted by units from Task Force Three.

(b) Remainder of initial U.S. forces -
Three convoys at about one month intervals, escorted by units withdrawn from Task Forces Three and Four. Successive logistic convoys require escorts withdrawn from Task Force Four.

Timings. D.1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

(a) U.S. Forces.
The U.S. Marine Division could reach Casablanca on D.20.

(b) British Forces.
The first British convoy could reach Algiers on D.____, or Casablanca on D.____. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British forces, totalling 1 armoured and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another _____weeks. Its movement would therefore be complete about D.___.

Summary of Plan.

(a) U.S. Marine Division combat loaded and closely supported by United States Naval forces to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

(b) A British force consisting of:-
1 Armoured Brigade,
1 Infantry Brigade Group,
2 Anti-Aircraft Regiments,
3 Fighter Squadrons,

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with (a) to Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance guard.

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(c) Main body to follow (a) and (b):-
1 American Army Division.
1 American Armoured Division.
2 British Divisions.
1 British Armoured Division (less detachments in (b))

Air Forces:
320 First line fighter aircraft
57 First line medium bomber aircraft
57 First line light bomber aircraft
63 First line observation aircraft.

(d) Base and L. of C. organizations. Air defences of the base area to be found by the British initially.

Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities.

U.S. to provide as high a proportion of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

The ultimate force to be built up as rapidly as possible.

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Lt. Col. George (4)

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December 25, 1941.

JCCS 2

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 P.M., DECEMBER 25, 1941

Present

British Officers

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound
Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Air Chief Marshall Sir C. Portal

U. S. Naval Officers

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. J. King, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Asst, Chief, Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division

U. S. Army Officers

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Brig. General D. D. Eisenhower, War Plans Division, W.D.G.S.

Joint Secretaries

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations
Lieut. Col. P. M. Robinett, G-2, General Headquarters, U.S.A.
Major W. T. Sexton, Asst. Secretary, General Staff, W.D.G.S.

1. Program of Planning.-

Rear Admiral Turner said that the Planning Committee had been working on two projects which were nearly completed: -

(1) Outline plan proposed for peaceful occupation of North Africa.

(2) Program of priorities in the Atlantic.

It was anticipated that they would be ready for presentation tonight.

2. Disposition of the Mount Vernon. -

General Marshall said that he had been given to understand that it was desired to alter the destination of the Mount Vernon.

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Admiral Stark stated that orders had been issued for the Mount Vernon to proceed to Singapore or any other place the British Admiralty desired, but stated that these instructions did not involve escort being furnished for the Mount Vernon by the United States. Admiral Pound indicated that the British had no intention of asking the United States to furnish escort, and stated that he regarded such escort as being a responsibility of the Royal Navy.

3. Diversion of Reinforcements.

General Marshall discussed the possible diversion of reinforcements to the Philippines. He stated that up to the present moment he had had no opportunity to consult with Admiral Stark on the matter, but he had been called on to submit a list of troop and equipment departures and anticipation of arrivals in Australia. He read this data, a copy of which was furnished to the British Chiefs of Staff, (Annex 1). He also stated that General Brett had been ordered to proceed immediately to Australia and place himself under the direction of General MacArthur, and to forward his recommendations as to the situation in the Philippine Islands. He stated that the question of his (General Brett's) continued subordination to General MacArthur would be determined later.

Air Chief Marshall Portal mentioned that the Australian representatives in Washington had stated that unless ten million gallons of 100-octane gasoline could be forwarded to Australia immediately, the planes there would shortly be immobilized. General Arnold said that this is no problem so long as we can keep contact with Sumatra, as Sumatra furnishes this gasoline. Air Chief Marshall Portal said that it was his understanding that the Sumatra gasoline was not satisfactory and that American-produced gasoline was involved.

General Arnold said that the only difficulty involved in the Sumatra gasoline was the aromatics in it, which affected adversely the self-sealing tanks. This difficulty had been anticipated and extra tanks for replacements were being forwarded to Australia. The new tanks would not be so affected by aromatics.

With reference to the diversion of reinforcements intended for the Philippine Islands, General Marshall said, "We do not have enough information at this time from General MacArthur to make a decision on this matter. However, we must not stand idle while waiting to know what he proposes. Until we know what the local situation is, we can not cut off reinforcements from him. We will know in 24 hours whether or not it is a fast withdrawal and where it goes, and whether or not pursuit planes can get to him."

Air Marshall Portal asked if General MacArthur has any instructions relative to the disposal of airplanes if he can not operate in the Philippine Islands. General Arnold replied that the bombers are already operating from Australia. He further stated that it must be assumed that the man on the ground will do the right thing. He said that General MacArthur has a good air officer who can be counted on to dispose properly of the remaining pursuit planes.

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Air Marshall Portal asked if General MacArthur would send his pursuit to Singapore. He added further that it was difficult for any man on the spot to make a decision relative to the disposal of his own means; that the decision should be made here by the responsible group.

4. Unified Command. -

General Marshall then brought up the question of command. He said, "I express these as my personal views and not those as a result of consultation with the Navy or with my own War Plans Division. As a result of what I saw in France and from following our own experience. I feel very strongly that the most important consideration is the question of unity of command. The matters being settled here are mere details which will continuously re-occur unless settled in a broader way. With differences between groups and between services, the situation is impossible unless we operate on a frank and direct basis. I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater -- air, ground, and ships. We can not manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.

"There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not achieve this. We never think alike -- there are the opinions of those on this side of the table and of the people on the other side; but as for myself, I am willing to go the limit to accomplish this. We must decide on a line of action here and not expect it to be done out there. I favor one man being in control, but operating under a controlled directive from here. We had to come to this in the first World War, but it was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much valuable time, blood, and treasure had been needlessly sacrificed. If we could decide on a unified command now, it would be a great advance over what was accomplished during the World War."

Air Marshall Portal said that the experience in London has been that the highest authority is the only one that can decide as to the allocation of forces; and when the allocation is decided upon and the directive has been formulated and the forces allotted, everything else moves smoothly. If allocations are controlled from Washington, there should be no difficulty.

General Marshall said that the British and Americans are in complete agreement as to allocations; that he was speaking of was operations in the field.

5. Disposition of Forces Destined for the Far East. -

Air Marshall Portal said that the disposition of our forces must be planned first. This can be considered a Staff study, without commitments, based on ultimate dispositions under the following two conditions:

a. The Philippine Islands holding.

b. In case the Philippine Islands can not hold.

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Admiral King said that he felt this study should probably have first priority.

Admiral Pound inquired as to whether or not a study could be made of this entire problem, stating that it was of such an urgent nature that other things should be set aside, and inquired as to the proper directive. The consensus was that this should be done, and the senior members of the Planning Committee were called in and so informed.

Admiral Stark requested Rear Admiral Turner to give his opinion as to the question of allocations of aircraft reinforcements now going to the Far East. Rear Admiral Turner replied that responsibility should be given to General MacArthur if he is in a position to accept it where the planes are to be delivered; otherwise to General Brett.

There followed a discussion as to the proper directive, and several preliminary directives were drafted by various members of the Chiefs of Staff group.

As the American officers were due at the White House for a meeting, the conference adjourned at 5:20 p.m.

After the main conference adjourned, Admiral Pound called into consultation Colonel Jacob, Commander Coleridge, and Colonel Robinett, and discussed the various phases of proposed directives. A directive for submission to the senior members of the Planning Committee was drawn up and submitted to Rear Admiral Turner, who at the time was presiding at another meeting in the Federal Reserve Building. It was understood that Rear Admiral Turner and Brigadier General Gerow were not to accept the directive unless it was entirely agreeable to them, and Brigadier General Gerow was so informed by Colonel Robinett.

1 ENCLOSURE:

Annex 1 - Utilization of U. S. Forces in Australia.

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ANNEX 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Utilization of U. S. Forces in Australia.

1. U. S. combat troops now in Australia and expected there at approximate dates indicated:

a. Now present:

18 pursuit planes
52 dive bombers
Elements of 2 regiments of 75 mm. artillery. (23 of its 48 guns are present. The 20 others are on a slow boat which left Suva December 18). Only 500 rounds of 75 mm. ammunition available until about January 8, when 5,000 rounds will arrive at Brisbane.

b. Expected soon:

(1) 55 pursuit planes and crews (about January 8).

(2) To begin arriving in theater on or about Jan. 3; three heavy bombers per day until a total of eighty is assembled. These planes are now directed to report to General MacArthur for orders upon arrival at Bangalore. For operations of the immediate future, there is an adequate number of 500 lb. and smaller bombs, as well as 56 - 1000 lb. bombs on the convoy now proceeding from Brisbane to Port Darwin. Already at Darwin are 560 of the 500 lb. type, with 260 at Port Moresby.

(3) 55 pursuit and crews, about January 16.

(4) 70 pursuit planes and crews, about January 18. (It is possible that capacity of ship will be found to be 40 planes).

(5) A pursuit group, complete as to material, including 80 planes, will leave San Diego on the Kitty Hawk about January 10. Additional ships will be necessary for the personnel.

Note: Dates at which there can arrive in Australia necessary ground crews and maintenance facilities for all the planes listed in the first three shipments are still uncertain. But, including the pilots sent from the Philippine Islands to Australia, and with maximum help from Australian sources, all planes can temporarily operate usefully pending the arrival of necessary maintenance units. Including planes already arrived or en route, the U. S. Air Corps has already allocated a grand total of 333 pursuit planes for shipment to Australia. The above represents the maximum capacity of ships now available.

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2. All U. S. Forces in Australia are to be commanded by Major General George H. Brett. General Brett has been under orders to take his instructions from General MacArthur. However, the situation in the Philippines apparently has changed to an extent that makes it improbable that pursuit plane reinforcements can be forwarded to General MacArthur. Therefore, the following instructions were sent General Brett at Chungking December 24th A.M.:

PROCEED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO AUSTRALIA TO ASSUME COMMAND OF U. S. ARMY INTERESTS IN THAT REGION. REPORT ARRIVAL AND FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY WITH A PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATION OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN VIEW OF SITUATION IN PHILIPPINES AT THAT TIME. MARSHALL.

3. It is intended that General Brett's status with regard to subordination to General MacArthur will be settled in the light of the situation in the Philippines at the time of his arrival in Australia.

4. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff jointly recommend:

a. That immediate request be made upon Australian, British, and Dutch authorities to render maximum assistance to the U. S. Commander in Australia in the preparation of his air elements for combat, and in the establishment and protection of the necessary bases, with a view to the immediate entry of these air forces into action.

b. That the responsible British and American Commanders be directed to make preliminary arrangements for effective combat cooperation between other forces of the Associated Powers and the U. S. Air Force in the Southwestern Pacific. Preliminary plans for early support of Singapore to be initiated at once.

5. The current U. S. Air Corps objective in the southwestern Pacific, exclusive of China and Russia, is:

2 Heavy Groups -- 80 planes
2 Medium Groups --114 planes
6 Pursuit Groups --480 planes
Necessary base and auxiliary units.

This strength can be attained as rapidly as shipping facilities permit.

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December 24, 1941.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

10:30 A.M., DECEMBER 24, 1941

Present

British Officers

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound
Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Air Chief Marshall Sir C. Portal
Admiral Sir C. Lyttle
General Sir C. Wemyss
Air Marshall A. T. Harris

U. S. Naval Officers

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral E. J. King, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet
Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President of the General Board
Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division
Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

U. S. Army Officers

General George C. Marshall, The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and
Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division.

Joint Secretaries

Brigadier Hollis, R. M.
Colonel Jacob
Commander Coleridge, R. N.
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy
Lieut. Colonel Paul McD. Robinett, G-2, General Headquarters, U.S.A.
Major W. T. Sexton, Asst. Secretary, War Department General Staff.

Admiral Stark Presiding

The substance of the conference consisted of informal discussions of various points which had been brought up at a conference the previous evening at the White House, at which the President and Mr. Winston Churchill had been present.

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1. Defense of the British Isles. -

Admiral Stark presided and opened discussion with the remark that he believed it apparent to all that the British Isles was the fortress which must be protected at all cost, and that in this there was no serious difference of opinion. He remarked that he was wondering as to the effectiveness of the United Kingdom defenses as regards invasion from the continent, remarking that at least two Marine Corps observers, after an inspection of the Island defenses, had come to the conclusion that they left much to be desired. Admiral Stark stated that the comments of these officers would be transmitted to the British for such use as they might care to make of them.

Marshall Dill remarked that the defenses were constantly being improved.

Admiral Pound welcomed Admiral Stark's proposal.

2. Heavy Bombers. -

Admiral Stark made the point that in the future, heavy bombers sent to Great Britain would be manned by American crews; that some would be sent as units. Air Chief Marshall Portal remarked that this had not been the original agreement. General Arnold stated that the R.A.F. was not to be deprived of any heavy bombers previously agreed to, but that units would be sent in addition. Details to be worked out later.

General Marshall remarked that Mr. Churchill had mentioned that the presence of American bombers, even in small numbers, in England would have an important influence on the French and the Germans.

3. Relief of British Troops in Northern Ireland and Iceland.-

The Prime Minister had requested that three British divisions in Northern Ireland be relieved at the earliest practicable date..

Marshall Dill remarked that it was his understanding that the relieving force was to consist of three divisions plus one armored division. General Marshall agreed. Admiral Pound asked at what time the troops in Ireland could be relieved. General Marshall replied that the troops are available now; the question is the availability of tonnage.

Admiral Pound asked whom he could get in touch with on the tonnage matter, and was told that they should see Colonel Gross of the G-4 Division, War Department General Staff.

Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, said that the United States was ready to take over the defense of Iceland, following which, however, base facilities would still be available to Great Britain. He also stated that the Marines in Iceland are an important element of the United States amphibious force, and that it was desired that they be relieved prior to beginning the relief of the British troops there.

Marshall Dill remarked that this would have to be worked out, and asked when the relief of the British could be accomplished. General Gerow replied that it could be completed by March, 1942.

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Admiral Stark added that the whole question of relief was largely a matter of shipping, and added that United States production is behind in antiaircraft weapons, and that the British might be able to help out.

It was agreed that the programs for these reliefs should be studied by the Joint Committee.

4. Greenland. -

Admiral Stark brought up the question of Greenland and asked General Arnold the status of air fields there. General Arnold stated that the United States now has a small force in Greenland; that two fields are projected; one field is ready now, but in the fog belt; another field, farther to the north, will be ready very soon. He stated that Greenland will be used essentially as a staging area between the United States and Europe. He said that he could furnish more details later.

5. Anti-submarine Measures and Escorts. -

Admiral Stark said that these would continue, in collaboration with the British; that the Prime Minister had mentioned the possibility of getting additional United States destroyers. Admiral Stark continued, "We just don't have any destroyers to spare, and in fact have far fewer than we require for our own needs." The construction program, he stated, was farthest behind in destroyers, battleships, and patrol vessels. He said that the situation along American seacoasts, with regard to the need for corvettes and other small patrol craft, is critical. In fact, it is desired that the British lend to the United States any available vessels suitable for coastal patrol work.

Admiral Pound then suggested that the whole question of general Naval dispositions of the two Navies be discussed.

6. Portuguese and Spanish Islands in the Atlantic. -

Admiral Stark asked Admiral Pound what importance he attached to the Azores. Admiral Pound stated that they attached tremendous importance to these Islands, particularly if Gibraltar should become untenable. He said, "We need the Azores very much; they have great importance from every point of view." Admiral Pound went on to say that the Canaries also are important; that they might be invited to go in there.

Admiral Stark then asked what importance the British attach to the Cape Verde Islands. Admiral Pound replied that it was only a question of denying them to the enemy, rather than their actual use by the British. Admiral King then remarked that United States interest in the Cape Verde Islands is strategic, because of their location between Dakar and Brazil. He went on to say that "we can not do all these things"; the British should take the responsibility for the Azores, and the United States for the Cape Verde Islands.

Admiral Stark suggested that further study be given to this question, to which Admiral Pound agreed.

7. Occupation of Africa. -

Admiral Stark said that he felt it undesirable for the United States to consider sending troops to Egypt or Libya. If the British can continue there and clean up, it would automatically protect Dakar,

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and at the same time Iran and Iraq would be of no great concern. So far as West Africa is concerned, the United States should fall in line with British action.

General Marshall read notes taken from a memorandum made at the White House conference yesterday, to the effect that if the British should reach Tunis there was the possibility of a French invitation to occupy North Africa.

Marshall Dill pointed out that the British had available to move in 23 days, an expeditionary force of 55,000 men which could be reinforced from Malta; that the Prime Minister had thought that if this occasion arose, it would be desirable for United States forces to land in Morocco, possibly to precede the British.

General Marshall said that at the present time a Corps Commander is planning an expedition to Africa which would include an emphibious corps. That this would be a task force, ready for any action that might present itself; and that if an opportunity existed to occupy North Africa without difficulty, the United States should take advantage of it. That United States troops for this purpose are available, but that there is a shortage in antiaircraft guns, .50 caliber ammunition and 37 mm. ammunition for both antiaircraft and anti-tank guns; also a shortage of planes. However, if the initial move could be made without fighting, the United States has already organized a sufficient number of squadrons to take care of the operation; that time is of greatest importance, and that while the American force could not complete its movement within 23 days, it could within approximately 30 days at the earliest, contingent on the availability of tonnage.

Admiral King asked as to the possibility of furnishing an American token force, such as a regiment.

General Marshall said that a token force as part of the British forces would be feasible, but that he could not put a lone regiment on the coast of Africa. The question was asked as to whether the Marines now in Iceland could be ready for this move. General Holcomb agreed that they could be.

It was decided that this question should be studied by the Joint Planning Committee.

8. Brazil. -

Admiral King said that the political situation in Brazil made the United States Marine-Naval position of a "touch and go" nature; that the Germans are well organized in Brazil and have followers among important members of the Government. If it becomes necessary to occupy Brazil, such a move might meet with armed resistance.

General Marshall said that after prolonged negotiations, the United States has been able to place only a small number of unarmed Marines in Brazil.

9. The Curacao-Aruba Area. -

Admiral Stark brought up the question of the critical situation in the Curacao-Aruba area with respect to Allied oil supply, pointing out that 95% of the oil used on the eastern coast comes from that area; and that one-half of the Lend-Lease oil for Britain comes from that area. He stated that the troops on those Islands should be placed on the strictest alert; that time was of the greatest importance; and suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff do everything they could with their own authorities in London to expedite American entry into these islands, particularly aviation units.

Admiral Pound agreed to take this matter up this afternoon.

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10. Pacific Area. -

Admiral Stark listed the joint aims in the Pacific, as follows:

Protection of the Burma Road
Aid to China
Aid to the Netherlands East Indies
To hold Singapore
To hold the Philippine Islands
Use of Australia as a base.

Admiral Stark then reviewed the Naval situation in the Far East as pertains to the Asiatic Fleet. General Marshall reviewed the arrangements which had been made to get planes to the Philippines, not only from Australia, but by convoys; also by flying by way of the eastern route. General Marshall stated that the critical feature of assistance to the Philippines from Australia was the existence of fields in Borneo; and that the present issue is to elaborate our plans for building up bases in Australia.

Admiral Pound then reviewed what the British Navy has around Singapore.

The question was asked Marshall Dill as to his opinion of the situation at Singapore, to which he replied that, with reinforcements, the British would be able to hold Johore State.

11. Bombardment of Japan. -

Admiral Stark asked as to the situation in China for air fields to be used as bases for bombing attacks against Japan.

General Arnold stated that General Brett had written for air transport planes for use in reconnaissance work and for supply. He stated that no bombing operations should be undertaken against Japan unless they are strong enough to create substantial damage; that the minimum number of bombers should be 50; that unsustained attacks would only tend to solidify the Japanese people.

12. Russian Situation. -

It was stated that it is not practicable at this time for Russia to begin operations in the Far East, as it might jeopardize her efforts in the west, and that Stalin should not be urged. The Prime Minister had quoted Stalin as saying that Russia was not ready to enter the war in the Far East now, but perhaps would be able to do so in the spring.

13. Spain and Portugal. -

Admiral Stark brought up the question of German intentions in the Iberian Peninsula, and expressed fear of German action through that area. He asked Admiral Pound for his views, who replied that British Joint Intelligence reports no signs of a concentration of German troops in the south of France. Admiral Stark remarked that, nevertheless, everyone should be on guard. He then asked Marshall Dill as to the significance of the change in the German high command. Marshall Dill stated that it probably concerned a difference of opinion on future operations.

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14. Airplane Carriers. -

Admiral Stark said that the United States situation with respect to airplane carriers was very bad, and that while the Navy was making plans to convert passenger ships and tankers into airplane carriers, in view of possible troop transport requirements, he had agreed to discuss proposed conversions with General Marshall. Admiral Stark stated that with respect to flying boats for the British, the situation was such that the United States could not furnish any.

15. P.B.Y's for the British. -

The conversation then was directed to the supply of heavy bombers and P.B.Y's for the British. Admiral Towers remarked that our present production of P.B.Y's was 46 per month, and that this was being stepped up to 180 of all types. Admiral King pointed out that the bottleneck was really one of personnel rather than anything else. Admiral Stark remarked that all possible help has been given the British in the matter of aircraft. Rear Admiral Towers pointed out that the four-engine bomber program can not but interfere with the Naval aircraft progress for at least the next eight months. To emphasize his statement, he remarked that some of our Naval aircraft factories, because of the four-engine bomber program, can only obtain material enough for an eight-hour, five-day week.

16. British Crews for American Ships. -

Admiral Stark said that available personnel for American merchant ships is so limited that he would like the British to consider the possibility of having British crews man American ships. Admiral Pound said the matter was questionable and that it should be discussed with Admiral Lyttle.

17. Guns for Merchant Ships. -

The question of guns for American ships was brought up. The United States Navy has furnished the British with 400 guns for arming merchant vessels. Admiral Stark inquired if any of these could be returned, as there was a shortage.

Admiral Pound stated that he would have the matter examined and do the best he could to meet the American requirements, which were to be made known to him.

18. Naval Dispositions in the Atlantic. -

Admiral Stark proposed that the British take over capital ship responsibility in the Atlantic, and listed fleet elements that would be required in that ocean.

19. Priorities in Expeditions. -

General Marshall brought up the question of priorities in expeditions, and asked Marshall Dill if he had set up any such priorities. Marshall Dill said that the priorities were in the following order:

Africa
Iceland
North Ireland.

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General Marshall then asked if the French do not invite an occupation, what disposition will be made of the expeditionary force of 55,000.

Marshall Dill said that if the Germans go through Spain, the British hope to take the Canaries, whether invited or not.

General Marshall then asked how many troops would be required, and Marshall Dill replied only a small force of a few battalions. The British do not want any more than that down there. The question was then asked, if the British take the offensive and occupy the Canary Islands, what cooperation would be expected of the United States. Admiral Pound, by nodded consent, indicated that the United States should take action in the Cape Verde Islands.

20. West Africa. -

General Marshall brought up the question of what was to be done at Freetown and Bathurst. This question was not settled.

Admiral Pound then asked about Dakar. Admiral Turner stated that the United States is getting up a plan for its occupation.

Admiral Stark asked Marshall Dill if he agreed that Dakar could be taken by direct attack. Marshall Dill stated that it could be done.

21. British Chiefs of Staff Memorandum. -

Admiral Pound then read a memorandum signed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which was amended in minor points.* During the discussion, the following points were brought out:

Marshall Dill was asked what is the maximum estimated need in United States troops for an offensive against Germany. The answer was 15 to 17 divisions in 1942, or early 1943, including armored divisions. Admiral Turner then stated that 45 divisions was the maximum which could be transported and supplied by available shipping in sight.

Admiral King pointed out that the most mischievous naval operations which the Germans could make at this time would be a mass surface and submarine attack on convoy routes in the Atlantic. Admiral Stark then stated that a most important target for the bombing operations against Germany should be shipyards where submarines and airplane carriers are being built. Air Chief Marshall Portal agreed.

Admiral Pound was given a copy of the American Naval building program. He stated to General Marshall that the United States Army should look into the matter of putting a force into North Africa if the British do, under either of the following conditions:

a. If invited by the French.

b. If Germany makes a move through the Iberian Peninsula.

In either case the attack should be a surprise.

* Revised version attached;
Annex 1.

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22. British Estimate of Attack on West Coast of North America. -

In response to a request from Admiral Stark, Admiral Pound read to the Conference a note which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the probable scale of attack on the West Coast of North America.

In view of the short time which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had to study the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum, further discussion on it was deferred. *

The meeting adjourned at 1:30 p.m., with instructions given that the Planning Committee would meet in the afternoon and that the Chiefs of Staff Conference would reconvene at 10:30 a.m., December 25th.

* Annex 2.

2 ENCLOSURES:
Annex 1.
Annex 2.

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ANNEX 2

PROBABLE MAXIMUM SCALE OF ENEMY ATTACK ON WEST COAST OF NORTH AMERICA

Examination of probable form of enemy attack.

1. Enemy attack on the western seaboard of North America might be undertaken with the object of reducing United States offensive power in the Pacific through material destruction at shipyards and bases and also with the object of containing forces in America.

2. The following forms of attack have been considered: -

(a) Seaborne expeditions;

(b) Naval bombardment;

(c) Carrier-borne air attacks;

(d) Mine-laying in ports and their approaches and attacks by human torpedoes.

Seaborne expeditions.

3. So long as a United States capital ship force is retained in the Pacific it is extremely improbable that the Japanese would venture to launch a large scale expedition against a North American objective without battleship cover. It must also be assumed that apart from the destroyer escorts for the convoys, destroyers would be essential for A/A and A/S protection for the battleships.

4. The diagram attached* to this Annex illustrates the large distances to be covered and shows that even if the enemy secured Dutch Harbour and Hawaii it would be necessary to carry out the refueling of destroyers at sea.

While the refueling of an expedition at sea in hostile waters can not be ruled out positively, the complications and risks of such an operation on a large scale are sufficiently great to make it extremely unlikely. Added to this factor is the problem of maintaining a large scale expedition over 4,000 miles from its base.

5. These difficulties do not apply so strongly to a small scale raiding force escorted by cruisers and aircraft carriers which have much greater endurance. For this reason it is necessary to take into account the possibility that a force comprising 10/15 fast merchant ships carrying up to 2 brigades on a low scale of transport might undertake a destructive raid.

Naval bombardment.

6. For the reasons given above, the employment of enemy battleships any great distance to the eastward of Hawaii is improbable. Naval bombardment of important objectives on the west coast of North America is therefore likely to be restricted to bombardment by armoured ships other than ships of the line and cruisers.

* APPENDIX A

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Carrier-borne air attacks.

7. The employment of a carrier force escorted by cruisers for the air attack of important naval and industrial objectives is the most probable threat which has to be met. It is considered that the Japanese could make available a force of from 2/3 aircraft carriers escorted by 4 cruisers, without interfering with her dispositions for the other operations upon which she is now engaged. This would involve an attack by some 80/100 dive and/or torpedo bombers, with ship escort of approximately 24 fighters.

Mine-laying in ports and their approaches and attacks by human torpedoes.

8. Mine-laying by raiders and submarines in coastal waters must be expected. The enemy's ability to carry out attacks by human torpedoes has, it is understood, been demonstrated at Hawaii. It cannot therefore be ignored.

CONCLUSIONS

So long as the United States maintains a battle fleet in the Pacific, large scale seaborne expeditions against the western seaboard of North America and the employment of capital ship forces in this area are considered impracticable. The most probable enemy threat is carrier-borne air attacks and sporadic naval bombardment, but a small scale destructive raid cannot be ignored. In view of the great distances over which these operations would have to be undertaken, it is probably not necessary to provide a strong scale of defense except at selected points of great importance which can be covered by the normal form of coast and air defense supplemented by mobile land and air striking forces.

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

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ANNEX 1
To
ABC-4
JCCSs-1

Lt Col. Lange

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W.W.-1.(U.S. Revised)

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

Washington War Conference

American-British Strategy.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Revised by U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A-B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

(a) The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

Note:-
* For brevity the abbreviated A-B is used to denote American-British

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(b) The Maintenance of essential communications.

(c) Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.

(d) Wearing down and undermining German resistence by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

(e) The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.

(f) Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests and deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY.

The security of areas of War Production.

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:-

(a) The United Kingdom.

(b) Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.

(c) Russia.

6. The United Kingdom. To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.

7. The United States. The main centres of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea-borne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska are held or not.

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8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defence of the United States are matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess.

9. Russia. It will be essential to afford the Russians materiel assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.

Maintenance of Communications.

10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:-

(a) From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.

(b) From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.

(c) The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.

(d) The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.

(e) The route through the Panama Canal, and U.S.coastal traffic.

(f) The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East.

In addition to the above routes we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.

11. The main air routes which must be secured are:-

(a) From the U.S. to South America, Freetown, Takeradi, and Cairo.

(b) From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.

(c) From the U.S. to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.

(d) The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.

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(e) From the U.S. to the U.K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.

(f) From the U.S. to the U.K. via the Azores.

(g) From the U.S. to Vladivostok via Alaska.

12. The security of these routes involves:-

(i) Well-balanced A - D naval and air dispositions.

(ii) Holding and capturing essential sea bases. The main sea bases which are, or may be, required, apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:-

Bermuda
Iceland
Gibralter or the Canaries
The Azores
Cape Verdes
Freetown
Dakar
Madagascar
Ceylon
Hawaii
Samoa

(iii) Holding and capturing essential air bases. The main air bases which are or may be required, apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:-

Newfoundland	Basra
Greenland	Teheran
Iceland	Kuibyshev
Azores	Dakar
Bermuda	Karachi
Trinidad	Calcutta
Belem	Hawaii
Natal	Christmas Island
Freetown	Palmyra
Ascension Island	Canton
Takoradi	Samoa
Lagos	Fiji
Kano	New Caledonia
Ft. Lamy	Townsville
Khartoum	Darwin
Massaua	Glencurry
Cairo	Koerang (Timor)
Habbaniya	Soerabaja

Closing and Tightening the Ring around Germany.

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows: ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE.

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The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

14. If this ring can be closed the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to Convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.

The Undermining and wearing down of the German Resistance

15. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:-

(a) Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.

(b) Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means.

(c) The blockade.

(d) The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

Development of land offensives on the Continent

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, via the Scandinavian Peninsula, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of Northwestern Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory programme should be such

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as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The safeguarding of vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre.

18. The security of Australia, New Zealand and India must be maintained and Chinese resistance supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:-

(a) Hawaii and Alaska.

(b) Singapore, the East Indies Barrier and the Philippines.

(c) Rangoon and the route to China.

(d) The Maritime Provinces of Russia.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion.

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REPORTS

by

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

to

CHIEFS OF STAFF

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

RE-
PORTS
J.P.C.

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British Serial WW (JPC)9

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Immediate Assistance to China.

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country's resources against Japan. Information, currently available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and materially, in China's war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps as may be practicable and are consistent with other commitments be promptly taken to reverse this trend.

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country's almost complete isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to delay and possible interception. The long, poorly maintained and insecure Burma Road can, at the best, support only a limited truck-tonnage,--while air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are indicated as necessary:

(a) Closer and more effective liaison with the Generalissimo.

(b) Increased security for Rangoon and the Burma Road, by air and ground.

(c) Improvement in the control, maintenance, and management of the Burma Road.

(d) Increase in base facilities and technical services.

(e) Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures.

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(f) Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding General, ABDA Area.

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps to meet the requirements listed in paragraph 2:

a. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept a U. S. Army officer of high rank as the U. S. Representative in China, and to agree to the following as his functions:

(1) Supervise and control all U. S. Defense Aid affairs for China.

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all U. S. Forces in China, and such Chinese forces as may be assigned. To command any U. S. or Chinese forces in Burma which have been alloted by their respective governments for service under him, operating these forces in collaboration with the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area.

(3) Represent the U. S. Government on any international War Council in China.

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China.

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that a is, in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.)

b. Dispatch to the South China - Burma area additional aviation strength, initially raising and maintaining the A.V.G. at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under command of the U. S. Representative.

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C. Arrange, (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon facilities as are allocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of the Burma Road.

4. To make this project reasonably effective, British cooperation and agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event that the Generalissimo accords to Gen. Drum the authority implied andindicated in par. 3 a above.

Points on which British Agreement is sought, under conditions stated in paragraph 3 a

a. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, the U. S. Representative to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in and north of Burma.

b. The U. S. Representative to be authorized to assume control and maintenance of the Burma Route from Rangoon to Chungking. Note: This to be drafted by British C/S.

c. The U. S. Representative to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary airfields in Burma.

c. The U. S. Representative's command of American and/or Chinese forces in the Burma region to be exercised in cooperation with the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area.

e. The U. S. Representative to be accepted as the liaison agency between General Wavell and Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek.

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COPY NO. 4

Washington, D.C.
January 10, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFENCE OF ISLAND BASES

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, January 10, 1942:

Joint Secretaries

W. P. SCOBLY
Colonel, U.S. Army

L. R. McDONELL
Commander, U. S. Navy

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R. N.

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January 10, 1942.

U.S. Serial ABC-4/8
British Serial WW (JPC)8

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

REPORT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

Subject: Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

1. There is under development and approaching completion an air route suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces.

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important Japanese objective since it is the principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply and limited loading facilities.

3. It is planned also to establish at Bora Bora, in the Society Islands, which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels and other shipping en route to and from the South West Pacific.

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route depends ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review.

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In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division supported by strong naval and air forces.

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia is unknown.

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa and Bora Bora.

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed will be supplied in the near future.

8. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially be at the expense of the ABDA area. An opinion should also be obtained from Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. A list has been received of their requirements.

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Recommendations.

9. (a) That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Bora Bora. This is now being accomplished.

(b) That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local defense of the Fiji Islands.

(c) That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands.

(d) That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as a temporary measure furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of the island, even if this has to be at the expense initially of the ABDA area. The question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from Australia as to the priority.

(e) Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore. in New Caledonia.

(f) That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia.

(g) The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en route and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and naval escorts become available.

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DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	REQUIRED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL BASE AND SUPPORTING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1. NEW CALEDONIA N.Z.	One Co. A.I.F. Approximately 3,000 Free French Forces (inadequately equipped) 2 6" Fixed Defense Guns (Free French)	Army 1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 40 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 6 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns. 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit Sq. (25 aircraft) Air Warning Service. 1 Bombardment Squadron (18 aircraft) Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). I Free Fr This island 30 mil protec fields half o of Nou Note (b). garris as a r sance afford entail of Fre

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DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

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(b)	(c)	(d)
W THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL BASE AND SUPPORTING BASES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
.I.F. tely 3,000 Free French (inadequately equipped) d Defense Guns (Free	Army 1 Inf. Division (4 regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 6 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns. 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit Sq. (25 aircraft) Air Warning Service. 1 Bombardment Sq. Medium (13 aircraft) Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). Does not include Free French Forces. This island is 230 miles long and 30 miles wide. Force envisages protection of the 3 to 4 air fields, and in the southern half of the island the harbour of Noumea. Note (b). The size of the garrison is subject to review as a result of early reconnaissance and degree of assistance afforded by Free French; latter entails completing re-equipment of Free French.

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PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)
(a)	(b)	(c)
2. FIJI	Naval 1 Minesweeper ~~1 Minelayer~~ 4 Motor patrol boats Army 6 New Zealand Inf. Bns. 1 Regular Fiji Bn. (1/3 European) 1 Territorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 European). 28 Field Guns 2 6" C.A. guns at Momi 2 6" C.A. guns at Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounder 2 6" Howitzer 4 Bofors 4 3" A.A. guns 6 A.A. Searchlights Air 9 Reconnaissance Bombers* 9 Miscellaneous Aircraft* 4 Singapore Flying Boats 700 Men, Air Corps) 25 Airplanes, Fighters) U.S. 2 Sets RADAR)	Naval 1 Minesweeper ~~1 Minelayer~~ 8 Motor Patrol Boats Army 8 Inf. Bns. 16 Heavy A.A. guns 28 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 6 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks) Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) ~~1 Heavy or~~ Medium Bombardment Squads. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 aircraft) 4 Sets RADAR.

* to be replaced by Hudson-Lockheed similar

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ES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(b)	(c)	(d)
esweeper ~~layer~~ tor patrol boats	Naval 1 Minesweeper ~~1 Minelayer~~ 8 Motor Patrol Boats	Naval ~~From N.Z.~~ 1 Minesweeper 4 Motor Patrol Boats
Zealand Inf. Bns. ular Fiji Bn. (1/3 European) ritorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 opean). eld Guns C.A. guns at Nomi C.A. guns at Suva " C.A. guns at Suva Pounder Howitzer ors A.A. guns . Searchlights	Army 8 Inf. Bns. 16 Heavy A.A. guns 28 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. ~~6~~ 66 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Nomi 4 6" C.A. guns at Nomi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks)	Army ~~From U.S. Sources.~~ 12 Heavy A.A. guns 24 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G's. 24 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns 1 Coy. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks) 4 RADAR
onnaissance Bombers* cellaneous Aircraft* gapore Flying Boats en, Air Corps) irplanes, Fighters) U.S. s RADAR)	Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) ~~1 Heavy or~~ Medium Bombardment Squads. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 aircraft) 4 Sets RADAR.	Air U. S. Army is supplying the pursuit squadron.

~~be~~ replaced by ~~B~~ 25
lson-Lockheed under
t approved allocation
N.Z.

ANNEX
TO
APC-4/8

~~* Obsolete aircraft to be~~

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PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMAR
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d
3. SAMOA	4 6" guns 18 3" A.A. guns 42 .50 M.G's 42 .30 M.G'S 415 Marines 150 Samoan Marines 1 Regiment of Marines 12 75 .m.m. guns 1 Co. Light Tanks (13 Tanks) Hq.'s Troops 6 5" guns Total - 5,015 U.S. Marines 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) 2 Radar	As in column (b)	
4. CANTON	45 Engineers 10 Medical and Communication 10 Artillery Personnel 2 75 m.m. guns 12 Machine Guns ~~2 Radar~~	2 Co. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
	(c)	(d)
	As in column (b)	
es rines s (13 Tanks)		
U.S. Marines tion seaplanes (Navy)		
Communication rsonnel	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR	

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PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. B).	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
5. CHRISTMAS ISLAND	125 Engineers, Medical and Signal Personnel 10 Artillery Personnel 12 Machine Guns 4 3" A.A. guns 2 75 m.m. guns 2 155 m.m. guns	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR Sets	
6. PALMYRA	479 Marines 4 5" guns 4 3" A.A. guns 8 .50 A.A. Machine Guns 8 .30 A.A. Machine Guns	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR Sets.	
7. BORABORA	NONE	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 ~~24~~ guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 32 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbour Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services	

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N ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. B).	REMARKS
	(c)	(d)
and Signal	1 Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal. .50 M.G's A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 8" Cal. .51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR Sets	
	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR Sets.	
uns uns	1 Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 ~~8~~ guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 32 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal. .50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbour Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy)	
	Services	

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British Serial WW (JPC)7

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, January 10, 1942:

Joint Secretaries

W. P. SCOBEY
Colonel, U. S. Army

L. R. McDONELL
Commander, U. S. Navy

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R.N.

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Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

1. Mission.--United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for the accomplishment of the follcwing mission:

a. To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers.

b. To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense thereof.

2. Forces.--The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting of the 32d, 24th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the command of Major General Edmund L. Daley, U.S. Army. The strength of the field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and antiaircraft units, is approximately 105,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 ship tons are required. The strength of the antiaircraft personnel (to be provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942, if shipping is available. When the air and antiaircraft support is assumed by the United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required.

3. Command.--Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in the British Isles, including those in North Ireland, is vested in Major General James E. Chaney, who has been designated "Commander U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles." The term "command" is defined as that control of individuals,

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forces, functions, and establishments which is normally vested in, and exercised by, United States Army commanders by law, regulations, and competent orders. General Chaney is authorized to arrange with appropriate British authorities for the employment: (1) of organizations of his command under British control, and (2) of British organizations under United States control.

4. Strategic Direction.--a. The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the Commander United States Army Forces in the British Isles.

b. The term "strategic direction" is defined to mean the function of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative matters.

c. It is agreed however that units assigned to the United States North Ireland Force will not be moved to areas outside Ireland without prior consent of the Commanding General Field Forces United States Army.

5. Arrangements for the Operation.--The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at:

a. Questions relative to dispatch of U. S. Army Forces and materials from the United States that may require British collaboration will be handled through the British Mission in

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the United States.

b. Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accomodation and maintenance of the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland that may require collaboration between the two governments will be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles.

c. Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Antiaircraft. Initially all antiaircraft protection for U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually antiaircraft protection for U. S. forces in Northern Ireland will be provided from United States personnel equipped and maintained for armament and ammunition from British sources.

(2) Field artillery. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 rounds per gun, will be delivered by the British to U. S. Forces in Northern Ireland. The British will supply additional ammunition and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles.

(3) Air. It will be the responsibility of the British to provide adequate air protection and support for the U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in their mission, until such time as the means are made available to the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles to assume this responsibility.

d. Shelter.

It will be the responsibility of the British to provide shelter for the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland.

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Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER -

FIRST HALF OF 1942

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, January 10, 1942:

Joint Secretaries

A. F. SCOBEY
Colonel, U. S. Army

L. R. McDOWELL
Commander, U. S. Navy

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, RN

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British Serial W.W. (J.P.C.)6

Washington, D.C.
January 10, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATRE - FOR FIRST HALF OF 1942

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the Atlantic Theatre and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942 and submit our conclusions below.

MOVEMENTS AND RELIEFS.

Iceland and Ireland.

2. We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland (c) garrison should proceed as expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Middle East and to release forces for operations in French North Africa.

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom should proceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available so as to increase the weight of attack on Germany.

Relief of Aruba and Curacao.

4. The relief of Aruba and Curacao, subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be completed before the end of January.

JOINT UNITED STATES-BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the period under consideration to force an entry into French North Africa. We cannot therefore initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are:

(a) That due to Spanish resistance the Germans will require a period of three months before

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they can mount a land attack from Spain against Morocco,

(b) That once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the Spanish there will not attack us, and

(c) That French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if any.

During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above (Paragraphs 2, 3, 4) should continue.

6. If we undertake the North Africa operation it will have the following adverse effects on other projects:

(a) Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and Far East by 25,000 men.

(b) Suspension of major operations against the Canaries, Cape Verdes, and Diego Suarez.

(c) Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland (c) by U. S. troops.

(d) Reduction in the rate of movement of U. S. troops to North Ireland.

(e) Weakening of British strength in the United Kingdom.

(f) Inability to move sizeable forces to northeast Brazil if such action should become necessary.

(g) Reduction in the supply of British fighter aircraft to Russia.

(h) Serious delay in the dispatch of urgently needed U. S. reinforcements and supplies to Pacific island positions and the Far East, to the Pacific Fleet, and to the outlying island bases.

(i) Reduction in ~~North~~ Atlantic convoys to the United Kingdom and Russia, due to diversions of shipping and escorts.

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CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS.

7. A German invasion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial of Gibraltar as a Naval Base and in all probability the involvement of Portugal as well as Spain in the war. In those circumstances it will be essential to secure the Canaries as a Naval Base. It is possible that the Spaniards would themselves offer us facilities in these islands. On the other hand the Spaniards may oppose our occupation of the Canaries. While a Spanish offer of facilities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, it would be necessary to provide sufficient additional air and A.A. defences to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland of Africa as well as harbor protection for the Naval Base, and for an air patrol of the sea.

8. If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Spain we could not at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries.

9. If the opportunity to carry out North Africa operations does not occur and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish acquiescence, the capture of the Canaries even against opposition and the occupation of the Azores and Cape Verdes will become essential.

10. It has been agreed that the responsibility for the occupation of the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain Naval assistance from the United States. A British assaulting force is already earmarked for

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this operation and should, we consider, be kept in being.

11. Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a U. S. responsibility. A portion of the U. S. Army forces set-up for North Africa would be used for this operation. The necessary naval support would have to be provided by U. S. Naval Forces.

12. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula it is almost certain that Portugal will admit British forces into the Azores and probably Madeira. For the security of these islands the chief requirement will be air and anti-aircraft defenses and harbor protection. The provisions of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should be earmarked. Considerable difficulty however will be found in providing the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for North Africa or the Canaries.

13. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible we are of the opinion that the United States should occupy the Cape Verdes in order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured for future use. The occupation of the Cape Verdes will be of considerable importance if we do not succed in gaining entry into French North Africa and are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date.

OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA

14. If we fail to occupy North Africa and Axis occupation appears imminent, then the capture of French West Africa will be essential. If we do not obtain French cooperation in French North Africa it is unlikely that we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore necessary to plan the capture of Dakar against opposition. With the joint resources available it is not, in our opinion, possible to undertake an

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operation of this nature until the late Autumn of 1942 when the weather conditions become favorable. It has been agreed that the United States should be responsible for this operation and we suggest that the planning and training should be put in hand. We propose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously with the occupation of the Cape Verdes, U. S. Air and other appropriate forces should be moved to Freetown - Bathurst area. Their presence in this area will increase the security of the Trans-African Reinforcement Route and the naval base at Freetown.

NORTH EAST BRAZIL

15. The security of North East Brazil is of strategic importance as a link in the communications between America and the Trans-African reinforcement route. German established in West Africa immediately becomes a threat to the South American Continent, in addition to the threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis inspired uprising in Brazil, which would interrupt the air route through Africa to the Middle and Far East cannot be disregarded. The operation is a United States responsibility. Plans have been prepared and formations set up for this task.

DIEGO SUAREZ

16. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the enemy is of considerable strategic importance, no British force will be available to undertake this operation within the period under consideration if the force for the Canaries operation is kept in being. Moreover, if this operation were carried out in the near future it might prejudice our chance of obtaining French collaboration in North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that we cannot hold a force ready to undertake this operation at present.

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17. We therefore recommend that:

(1) The movement of United States Army and Air Forces to Iceland (c), Ireland, and the United Kingdom should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

(2) That the perfection of a Joint U.S.-British Plan and preparations for operations in French North Africa should proceed as rapidly as possible.

(3) That under the hypotheses set out in this paper the United States should prepare plans for:

(a) The occupation of the Cape Verde Islands both against opposition and by invitation.

(b) The capture of Dakar against opposition for the Autumn of 1942.

(4) That under the hypotheses set out in this paper the British should prepare or perfect plans for:

(a) The capture of the Canaries.

(b) The occupation of the Canaries by invitation.

(c) The occupation of the Azores and Madeira by invitation.

(d) The capture of Diego Suarez against opposition.

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December 29, 1941

U.S. ABC-4/5
British WW (JPC)5

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDU AREA

ABC-4/5

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, 29th December, 1941:

W. P. SCOBEY
Colonel, U.S. Army

Joint Secretaries

L. R. McDOWELL
Commander, U. S. Navy

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R. N.

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U.S. SECRET
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British Serial W.W.(J.P.C.)5

December 29, 1941.

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ABDU GOVERNMENTS:

Area

1. A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise all land and sea areas included in general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex I. This area will be known as the ABDU Area.

Forces

2. You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDU Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore and in the air, of the ABDU governments which are:

(a) Stationed in the Area;

(b) Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDU Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDU governments land troops of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

Strategic Concept and Policy

4. The basic strategic concept of the ABDU Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic defensive. The ABDU Governments intend to provide immediate reinforce-

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ments for defense. As additional forces become available, it will become possible to revert to the offensive and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although your operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further preparations for that offensive.

5. The general strategic policy will therefore be:-

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier as the basic defensive position of the ABDU Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China.

(c) To maintain essential communications within the Area.

(d) To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

Duties, Responsibilities and Authority of the Supreme Commander:-

6. You will coordinate in the ABDU Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDU Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

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7. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

8. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDU Governments.

9. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

10. Within your Area you are authorized to control the issue of all official communiques concerning the forces under your command.

11. Through the channels specified in paragraph 17, you may submit recommendations to the ABDU Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

Limitations.

12. Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDU Area and to the forces assigned thereto will be habitually exercised through the commanders duly designated by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDU governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander; it will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

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Relations with ABDU Governments.

13. The ABDU governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all naval, air and ground forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

14. If any Commander considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDU Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the order. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

STAFF AND ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

15. Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDU powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view of obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDU governments through channels of communication described in paragraph 17.

16. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

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Superior Authority to be Defined.

17. As Supreme Commander of the ABDU Area you will be directly responsible to a superior authority to be defined. Until such authority is established, you are responsible to your own government. Any recommendation, report, request, or other communication between you and any of the governments of the ABDU Powers will be processed through your superior authority, information copies being sent to the governments concerned.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDU representatives.

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Boundaries of ABDU AREA

The ABDU Area is bounded as follows:-

On the North: By the boundary between India & Burma, thence eastwards along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East westwards to the meridian of 114° East thence northwestward to latitude 15° South, longitude 92° East.

On the West: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. The assignment of this area jointly to the ABDU Powers shall not be construed as restricting the forces of these individual Powers in the ABDU and adjacent areas from temporarily extending appropriate operations into other areas, as may be required by particular circumstances.

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U.S. SECRET
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U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/4
British Serial No. .(J.P.C.)4

Copy No. 7

Washington, D. C.

December 30, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPOSED TALKS FOR THE
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

ABC-4
14

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, December 30, 1941:

Joint Secretaries

W. P. SCOBEY
Colonel, U.S. Army.

L. R. McMORRILL
Commander, U.S. Navy.

R. D. COLLINGE
Commander, R.N.

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U. S. BRITISH C-4/4
British Serial . .(J.P.S.)4

Copy No._____
Washington, D. C.
December 30, 1941

REPORT TO THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

1. A study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military projects and movements which affect the Atlantic theatre and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942.

This report will include consideration of the following:

A. Movements

(a) Relief of Iceland.

(b) Movement of three Divisions and one armored Division from the United States to Northern Ireland.

(c) Movement of United States air forces to the United Kingdom.

(d) Relief of British in Aruba and Curacao.

B. Projects

(a) Joint United States-British occupation of French North Africa.

(b) United States occupation of:

(1) French West Africa and Cape Verde Islands.

(2) Northeast Brazil.

(c) British occupation of:

(1) The Azores.

(2) The Canaries and Madeira.

(3) Diego Suarez.

2. Coordination of the Victory Programs of the United States and the British Commonwealth and adjustment of their broad outlines in accordance with strategic considerations and production possibilities:

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5. A consideration of any steps that should be taken in the light of experience up to date to implement, improve, or extend the system of collaboration between the United States-British Staffs as laid down in ABC-1; the need for allocating joint resources on a strategic basis to be taken into account.

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British W.M.(JPC)3

December 29, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS)

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, 29th December, 1941:

Joint Secretaries

M. P. SCOBEY
Colonel, U.S. Army.

L. R. MC DOWELL
Commander, U.S. Navy.

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R.N.

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Forces in the Far East on 7 December, 1941	Due in Far East by January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Pla Under Order for
(a) Naval 2 Cruisers 8 Destroyers	(a) Naval 5 Additional Escort Vessels	(a) Naval 2 Submarines	(a) Naval None
(b) Army 9 and 11 Ind.Divs.) 8 Aus. Div.) Malaya (less one Bde.) One Div. (Burma) 2 Inf. Bdes. (Singapore)	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind.Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. One AA Regt. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Antitank Regt.	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind.Divs. One Sq. Light Tanks.	(b) Army (Malay Two AA Regts. One AA Regt. (One Bde. Gp. 1 18 Div. (less Gps). To Burma 11 Ind.Div. (1 One Bde. Gp. 1 5th or 34th In
(c) Air Malaya 2 Bomber Sqns. 2 Bomber Recce Sqns. 6 Fighter Sqns. 2 T.B. Sqns. 1 G.R. Flying Boat Sqn. Burma ½ Bomber Sqn. ½ Fighter Sqn.	(c) Air Malaya 4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricanes) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons) Burma None	(c) Air Malaya 2 Fighter Sqns. (48 Hurricanes) Burma 1 Fighter Sqn. (Hurricanes)	(c) Air Plans not complete

ANNEX II

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

st	Due in Far East by January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East
	(a) Naval 5 Additional Escort Vessels	(a) Naval 2 Submarines	(a) Naval None
alaya	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. One AA Regt. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Antitank Regt.	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind. Divs. One Sq. Light Tanks.	(b) Army (Malaya) Two AA Regts. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Bde. Gp. 14 Ind. Div. 18 Div. (less two Bde. Gps). To Burma 14 Ind. Div. (less one Bde. Gp.) One Bde. Gp. 17th Ind. Div. 5th or 34th Ind. Div.
ore)	(c) Air Malaya 4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricanes) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	(c) Air Malaya 2 Fighter Sqns. (48 Hurricanes)	(c) Air Plans not complete
Sqn.	Burma None	Burma 1 Fighter Sqn. (Hurricanes)	

ANNEX II

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/3 COPY NO. 4

British Serial W.W.(J.P.C.) 3. WASHINGTON, December 28, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS)

Directive.

1. Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Joint Planning Committee.

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements.

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the South West Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, expected to be available in the South West Pacific Area on:-

(a) 15th January, 1942.

(b) 1st February, 1942.

on the following alternative assumptions:-

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.

(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.

(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold.

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Concept of Operations.

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the South West Pacific Area. The present strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.

After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive.

3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:-

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China.

(c) To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and to and within the Far East Area.

(d) To re-establish com unications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

(e) To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements.

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Forces and Reinforcements.

4. The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached tables (Annexes I, II, and III). Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard to the essential requirements of other theatres.

Recommendations.

5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved:-

(a) Under the assumption that the Philippines and Singapore both hold, the reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, as shown on the attached table, should go forward as now arranged, subject to the direction of the commander to whom they are assigned.

(b) Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not, the U.S. reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, should be employed in furtherance of the defences of key points on the Malay Barrier, and for protection of the vital lines of communication from the east. In the absence of unity of command, detailed dispositions of these reinforcements must be left to the senior U. S. Army commander, in collaboration with the senior British, Dutch, and Australian commanders. Under this assumption the planned disposition of British reinforcements remains unchanged.

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(c) Under the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold, the reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, be used for the defense of the remainder of the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia, U.S. reinforcements being used to the eastward, and British reinforcements to the westward.

NOTE:- The subject of reinforcements for New Zealand and Fiji is being considered separately.

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

Forces Now in the Far East	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Under Order f
(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval
2 Cruisers 13 Destroyers (3 damaged) 27 Submarines 12 Patrol Bombers	None	None	None
(b) Army	(b) Army	(b) Army	(b) Army
Philippines (Luzon) 40,000 as of December 22, 1941.	Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	None	Supplie
Australia 2 Regts. Field Artillery Service Troops			
(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air
Philippines (Dec 25) Few Pursuit planes for reconnaissance	55 Pursuit 23 Heavy Bombers	87 Pursuit 57 Heavy Bombers	To make to 4 Gps. Pu 2 Gps. He 2 Gps. He 1 Gp. Li (plus cer
Australia 18 Pursuit planes 52 Dive bombers 11 Heavy Bombers			

Annex I

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East.
	(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval
maged)	None	None	None
	(b) Army	(b) Army	(b) Army
uzon)	Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	None	Supplies & Gasoline
22,			
ery			
	(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air
ec 25)	55 Pursuit 23 Heavy Bombers	87 Pursuit 57 Heavy Bombers	To make total of: 4 Gps. Pursuit (320) 2 Gps. Heavy Bombers (70) 2 Gps. Medium Bombers (114) 1 Gp. Light Bombers (57) (plus certain reserves)
r			

Annex I

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Forces in the Far East on 7 December, 1941.	Due in Far East by January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Pla Under Order for
(a) Naval 2 Cruisers 8 Destroyers	(a) Naval 5 Additional Escort Vessels	(a) Naval 2 Submarines	(a) Naval None
(b) Army 9 and 11 Ind.Divs.) Malaya 8 Aus. Div.) (less one Bde.) One Div. (Burma)	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind.Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. One AA Regt. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Antitank Regt.	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind.Divs. One Sq. Light Tanks.	(b) Army (Malaya Two AA Regts. (One AA Regt. (h One Bde. Gp. 14 18 Div. (less t Gps). To Burma 14 Ind.Div. (les One Bde. Gp. 17 5th or 34th Ind.
(c) Air Malaya 2 Bomber Sqns. 2 Bomber Recce Sqns. 6 Fighter Sqns. 2 T.B. Sons. 1 G.R. Flying Boat Sqn.	(c) Air Malaya 4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricanes) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	(c) Air Malaya 2 Fighter Sqns. (48 Hurricanes)	(c) Air Plans not co lete
Burma ½ Bomber Sqn. ½ Fighter Sqn.	Burma None	Burma 1 Fighter Sqn. (Hurricanes)	

ANNEX II

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

ast	Due in Far East by January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East
	(a) Naval 5 Additional Escort Vessels	(a) Naval 2 Submarines	(a) Naval None
alaya	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind.Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. One AA Regt. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Antitank Regt.	(b) Army (to Malaya) One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind.Divs. One Sq. Light Tanks.	(b) Army (Malaya) Two AA Regts. (light) One AA Regt. (heavy) One Bde. Gp. 14 Ind. Div. 18 Div. (less two Bde. Gps). To Burma 14 Ind.Div. (less one Bde.Gp.) One Bde. Gp. 17th Ind. Div. 5th or 34th Ind. Div.
Sqn.	(c) Air Malaya 4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricanes) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	(c) Air Malaya 2 Fighter Sqns. (48 Hurricanes)	(c) Air Plans not complete
	Burma None	Burma 1 Fighter Sqn. (Hurricanes)	

ANNEX II

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AUSTRALIA

Forces now in the Far East

(a) Naval

2 Heavy Cruisers
2 Light Cruisers
4 Destroyers

(b) Army

1 Brig. Gp. of 8th Australian Div.
5 Divisions (Infantry)
2 Divisions (Cavalry)
1 Division (Armored)
(Not as yet equipped)

(c) Air

160 First line planes
300 - 400 Training planes
15,000 Air officers and men
40,000 In Training

DUTCH

Forces Now in the Far East

(a) Naval

4 Cruisers
7 Destroyers
15 Submarines
2 - 3 Submarines (Expected) (Later)

(b) Army

3 Div's. Java
7 Bn's Sumatra
4 Bn's Borneo
1 Bn Celebes
1 Bn Timor
1 Bn Moluccas

(c) Air

6 Bomber Sqns.
4 Fighter Sqns.
108 Navy Aircraft
40 Patrol Planes

ANNEX III

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AUSTRALIA

Forces now in the Far East

(a) Naval

2 Heavy Cruisers
2 Light Cruisers
4 Destroyers

(b) Army

1 Brig. Gp. of 8th Australian Div.
5 Divisions (Infantry)
2 Divisions (Cavalry)
1 Division (Armored)
(Not as yet equipped)

(c) Air

160 First line planes
300 - 400 Training planes
15,000 Air officers and men
40,000 In Training

DUTCH

Forces Now in the Far East

(a) Naval

4 Cruisers
7 Destroyers
15 Submarines
2 - 3 Submarines (Expected) (Later)

(b) Army

3 Div's. Java
7 Bn's Sumatra
4 Bn's Borneo
1 Bn Celebes
1 Bn Timor
1 Bn Moluccas

(c) Air

6 Bomber Sqns.
4 Fighter Sqns.
108 Navy Aircraft
40 Patrol Planes

ANNEX III

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/2A
British Serial WW (JPC) 2A

Washington, D. C.
January 13, 1942.

ABC-4/2A

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION SUPER GYMNAST

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, January 13, 1942:

W. P. SCOBEY
Colonel, U. S. Army

Joint Secretaries

L. R. McDOWELL
Commander, U. S. Navy

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R.N.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/2 A
British Serial WW (JPC) 2A

Washington, D. C.
January 13, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION SUPER-GYMNAST

1. The Joint U.S.-British Planning Committee has been advised that the President and the Prime Minister have agreed to the immediate dispatch of additional United States reinforcements from the east coast to Australia, the terms of the agreement being as follows:

a. Approved the proposal put forward by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff that the U. S. convoy sailing on the 15th January should be reduced from 16,000 to 4,000 for Northern Ireland and from 8,000 to 2,500 for Iceland, in order to permit of the dispatch to the Far East of 21,000 troops, with aircraft and other equipment.

b. Agreed that the remainder of the proposed shipping adjustments set out in the Annex should be referred to London for confirmation.

c. Invited Mr. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook to investigate the effect of the above shipping adjustment on the delivery of United States Supplies to Russia during the next three months and to coordinate the provision of shipping to make good any deficiency, it being understood that nothing must be done to interfere with the planned flow of tanks, aircraft and ammunition from the U.S.A. to the Middle East.

2. Based on the above terms of agreement, the combined Chiefs of Staff have directed the Combined Planning Committee to examine and report on the following questions:

a. The earliest date which could be fixed for D1 of Operation Super-Gymnast on the assumption that the shipping adjustments approved in 1. a. above are carried out and that shipping to carry U.S. supplies to Russia is provided in full.

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b. To what extent Operation Super-Gymnast could be executed on the assumption that the favourable opportunity arises at some date between the end of February and the date on which D1 of the full operation could be fixed (vide 2. a. above).

REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION

British

1. The movement of United States troops to Australia will not affect the readiness date of the British to carry out their part of Super-Gymnast.

United States

2. It is estimated that the vessels diverted from the Iceland (c) and Ireland movement to the Far East can be back in the United States Ports as follows:

a. Passenger vessels April 10 - 20

b. Cargo vessels May 15 - 25

3. These above vessels can transport 22,000 troops and 230,000 tons of cargo.

4. This foregoing indicates that the group of vessels now scheduled for the Far East movement could not be made available in Atlantic ports for an organized movement to North Africa prior to May 15 - 25.

5. The May 15 - 25 date cannot be accepted without certain reservations. No allowance has been made for losses, possible emergency demands arising from enemy operations, and increased needs for raw materials from overseas sources.

6. Furthermore, it seems probable that these vessels may continue to be needed in the Pacific for further movements to Australia.

REPLY TO THE SECOND QUESTION

British Available Forces

7. British land forces, i.e., one armored division and two divisions with A.A. units will be ready for dispatch. The British air contingent of Gymnast consisting of three fighter and two A.C.

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squadrons could also be made ready. This force is not alone sufficient but could not be increased from British resources.

United States Available Forces

8. United States participation would be limited by the withdrawal of shipping for the troop movements in the Pacific. The Marine Division (12,000) in its combat loaded ships could still be used for opening the door at Casablanca. It could be supported by one carrier group of naval aircraft disembarked from an aircraft carrier. All A.A. and base troops would have to be found by the British until the United States shipping had returned from its Pacific tasks.

RATE OF MOVEMENT:

9. The rate at which the British forces could be dispatched would not be limited, as in the Super-Gymnast plan, by the capacity of Casablanca Port. It would depend upon the provision of shipping and naval escorts. The following table is based upon the assumption that we could not afford to rob the Middle and Far East reinforcements of more than 25,000 men from one reinforcement convoy. The United States program is based upon the use of the combat loaded ships for two trips. The full rate of transportation of United States troops could not be attained before June 11th, since the United States shipping for this can not be returned from Australia to the Atlantic Coast before the 15 - 25 of May.

10. The table below shows the earliest dates on which British and United States forces can arrive at Casablanca. Some staggering of British and United States convoys will be necessary to avoid congestion of Casablanca Port:

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		Casablanca		Algiers
		British	U.S.	British
Mar. 28	D28	5,000	12,000 Marines	7,000
	D43	6,000		16,000
	D73	22,000		
	D88		12,000	
June 11	D103	22,000	22,000	
	D133	12,000		
	D134		22,000	
Aug. 11	D164		31,000	
	Totals	67,000	90,000	23,000

ACCELERATION OF MOVEMENT:

British

11. If the situation were such that we could afford to stop the flow of British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East completely for a time, the second British convoy could be increased from 6,000 to 18,000 capacity, thus eliminating the fifth British convoy shown above.

United States

12. Additional United States vessels could be made available (after about four weeks notice) for Super-Gymnast only after the following priorities have been provided for:

1st Priority: Continuous maintenance of existing overseas Army and Navy garrisons and the United States Fleets.

2nd Priority: Continued delivery of supplies to Russia, and planned flow of tanks, aircraft and ammunition to Middle East.

3rd Priority: Continuous movements and maintenance of United States forces in the Far East.

13. All other military requirements for shipping will have to be deferred including:

a. Reinforcements to Hawaii and other overseas possessions and bases.

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b. Movements to Iceland and North Ireland.

14. If this is done, we estimate that additional passenger vessels up to an estimated capacity of 29,000 might be available after about four weeks' notice.

15. Approximately 23 cargo vessels will be required. The availability of these ships will have to be furnished by the Maritime Commission.

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COPY NUMBER 35

December 28, 1941.

ABC-4/2

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

NORTH WEST AFRICA PROJECT

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, 28th December, 1941:

W. P. SCOBEY,
Colonel, U.S. Army.

L. R. McDOWELL,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Joint Secretaries

R. D. COLERIDGE,
Commander, R.N.

DEC 28 '41 PM

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PROJECT - GYMNAST

1. We submit below a provisional examination of the project for joint operations in northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following hypotheses:

(a) We receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance there will be only token resistance.

(b) That owing to their current pre-occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefore anticipate a possible maximum period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

(c) That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

2. Objective. — We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control could be extended over all North Africa and into Europe.

3. Base. — The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This small port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies 175 miles outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of A.A. defences and air forces a single main base must be used for the whole force in French North Africa.

4. Establishment of Base. — There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca which has a considerable garrison and coast defences. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States can make available an amphibious assault division for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

5. Support to French in Tunisia. — The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco or perhaps a condition of their entry would be a demand from the

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French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two A.A. Regiments and three Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through by sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance force at Casablanca.

6. Defense of Moroccan Area. -- It will be essential to get in sufficient forces into the Casablanca area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being seriously damaged by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and A.A. defences.

7. The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco.

8. The Initial Joint Force. -- The initial joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first four months, inclusive of the Tunisia Detachment, are estimated at;-

1 Amphibious Assault Division - combat loaded (US)
3 Infantry Divisions (1 - U.S., 2 - British)
2 Armoured Divisions (1 - U.S., 1 - British)
232 First line fighter aircraft (160 - U.S., 72 - British)
57 First line medium bomber aircraft (U.S.)
57 First line light bomber aircraft (U.S.)
39 First line observation aircraft (U.S.)
144 Heavy A.A. guns (British)
252 Light A.A. guns (British)
Base and L. of C. units

9. Total Forces Required: -- It would be premature to recommend the scope of tasks and the strengths of the total forces that might ultimately be required in French North Africa.

10. Joint American-British Effort Necessary. -- Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility as defined in ABC-1. As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detail planning can proceed.

NAVAL FORCES

11. British: - Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

12. There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United

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Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal UK to Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a considerable period.

13. United States: - The U.S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support for the transit and landing of U.S. Expeditionary Forces.

14. American Convoy Protection: -

(a) Advance American Division -
One Amphibious Assault Division and one group of Army pursuit aircraft with essential services embarked in about 20 vessels protected by units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

(b) Remainder of initial U.S. forces -
Three convoys at about one month intervals, and successive logistic convoys protected by units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

(c) The protection given this new line of sea communications would be at the expense of the protection now being given to Atlantic trade routes by the United States.

15. Timings.--- D.1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

(a) U.S. Forces. -- The U.S. Amphicious Assault Division could reach Casablanca by the time of arrival of the first British convoy. The remainder of the U.S. initial forces could arrive within about 3 months of the arrival of the Amphibious Assault Division.

(b) British Forces. -- As of December 25, 1941, the first British convoy could reach Algiers on D.40 to 47, or Casablanca on D.37 to 44. This timing can probably be accelerated as British preparations proceed. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British forces, totalling 1 armoured and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another 12 weeks.

16. Summary of Plan. --

(a) One U.S. Amphibious Assault Division combat loaded with one group of Army pursuit aircraft (80), closely supported by United States Naval forces to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

(b) A British force consisting of:-
1 Armoured Brigade,
1 Infantry Brigade Group,
2 Anti-Aircraft Regiments, (24 heavy, 36 light guns),
3 Fighter Squadrons (48 aircraft),

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with (a) to

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Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance force.

(c) Main body to follow (a) and (b):-
1 American Army Division.
1 American Armoured Division.
2 British Divisions (less detachments in (b))
1 British Armoured Division (less detachments in (b))
11 Anti-Aircraft Regiments (120 heavy and 216 light guns).

Air Forces:
104 First line fighter aircraft
57 First line medium bomber aircraft
57 First line light bomber aircraft
39 First line observation aircraft.

(d) Base and L. of C. organizations. Anti-Aircraft defences of the base area to be found by the British for the initial joint force.

17. Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities.

18. U.S. to provide as high a proportion as possible of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

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ABC-4
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COPY NO. 9

U.S. ABC-4/1

British MM(JPC)1.

December 27, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, 27th December, 1941:

W. P. SCOBEY
Colonel, U.S. Army.

L. R. DOWELL
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Joint Secretaries

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R.N.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/1

British Serial W.W.(JPC)1.

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

Report by the U.S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarised as follows:-

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

(a) The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

(b) The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

(1) The Azores.
(2) The Cape Verde Islands.
(3) The Canary Islands.
(4) French West Africa.
(5) French North Africa.
(6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
(7) Curacao and Aruba.
(8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

(a) To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

(b) To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

(c) To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial W.W.(JPC) 2) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of troop transport, in view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying US and UK field armies, garrisons, and

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naval forces. Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

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MINUTES

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

United States-British



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U.S. Serial ABC-4/M10

January 13, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

Minutes - Tenth Meeting.

Section I

1. The United States - British Joint Planning Committee met at 10:40 a.m., January 13, 1942, in Room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D. C.

2. Presiding: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy.

ABSENT

U.S. Navy Members

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner
Captain L. T. Durrough
Captain C. S. Alden
Captain W. R. Davison
Captain S. J. Rodgers
Major M. L. Hitzenberg, U.S.M.C.

U.S. Army Members

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Colonel J. E. Hull
Colonel A. C. Wedemeyer, G.S.C.
Colonel L. Fisher
Colonel H. L. George, A.A.F., U.S.
Lieut. Colonel W. T. Ross
Major H. S. Hansell, A.A.F.S.

British Members

Brigadier E. A. Derr
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., R.A.F.
Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.V.O.
Colonel G. N. Bourne

Secretariat

Colonel W. P. Scobey, U.S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy

Section II

3. The meeting was held in order that the combined Planning Committee could furnish, for the combined Chiefs of Staff, the recommendations of the former body on two questions.

4. These questions, with their preliminary considerations, and the Joint Planning Committee replies thereto, were reported to the combined Chiefs of Staff under the title of "Operation Super Gymnast" (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2A, British Serial WW(JPC)2A.).

5. The meeting adjourned at 12:45 p.m. to reconvene at a time to be decided later.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/M9

January 10, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

Minutes - Ninth Meeting

SECTION I

1. The United States - British Joint Planning Committee met at 3:15 P.M., January 10, 1942, in Room 1202 Federal Reserve Building.

2. Presiding: Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U.S. Army.

PRESENT

U. S. ARMY

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Colonel T. T. Handy
Colonel H. L. George

U. S. NAVY

Captain H. W. Hill
Captain R. L. Ravison
Captain B. J. Rodgers
Captain F. P. Sherman
Lt. Colonel H. L. Litzenberg, Jr.

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION MEMBERS

Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.M.G.
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., C.B.E.
Colonel G. K. Bourne.

SECRETARIAT

Colonel W. P. Scobey, U.S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N.

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SECTION II

1. The Presiding Officer announced that the agenda for the meeting contained three subjects, to wit:

a. Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.
b. Establishment of U.S. Forces in North Ireland.

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c. Movement and Projects in the Atlantic Theater.

The Planning Committee then undertook a discussion of the several subjects and took action as indicated below.

2. Defense of Island Bases Between Hawaii and Australia. -- Following a general discussion of this paper the Committee made a detailed examination of the tables of defense garrisons as set forth in the annex. The Committee then agreed to the report and its submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, as Joint Planning Committee Report, U.S. Serial ABC-4/8, British Serial WW(JPC)8, dated January 10, 1942.

3. Establishment of U.S. Forces in North Ireland. — The members of the Committee agreed to the draft paper as submitted except paragraph 3, pertaining to "command." At the sugrestion of the British members, paragraph 3 would be redrafted by the U.S. Army and submitted informally for approval. When this paragraph was approved, the entire paper would be considered agreed to and submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee under the serial number of U.S. ABC-4/7, British WW(JPC)7, dated January 10, 1942.

4. Movement and Projects in the Atlantic Theater. — The draft of this report was revised and a final summary paragraph, submitted by Captain Lambe, was accepted. As thus revised, the report was agreed to for presentation to the Chiefs of Staff Committee under the serial number of U.S. ABC-4/6, British WW(JPC)6, January 10, 1942.

5. There being no further business to be considered, adjournment was taken at 6:45 P.M. to meet on call.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/M8

January 9, 1942

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

Minutes - Eighth Meeting

Section I

1. The United States - British Joint Planning Committee met at 10:40 a.m., January 9, 1942, in Room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D. C.

2. Presiding: Brigadier General L. T. Gerow.

PRESENT

U.S. Navy Members

Captain H. W. Hill
Captain R. L. Davison
Captain F. P. Sherman
Captain R. O. Glover

U.S. Army Members

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Brigadier General D. D. Eisenhower
Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Craig
Major H. S. Hansell
Colonel H. L. George

British Members

Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.M.G.
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., C.B.E.
Colonel G. N. Bownie

Secretariat

Colonel W. P. Scobey, U.S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy

M 8

Section II

3. In opening the meeting, Brigadier General Eisenhower presented the points of view, particularly those of General Marshall, which led to the proposals presented in the paper "Immediate Aid to China." (U.S. Serial ABC-4/CS2)

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4. General Eisenhower explained that a reported change in Japanese propaganda tactics, coupled with the fall of Hongkong and Manila, might cause Generalissimo Chang-Kai-shek to reverse his position from that of an ally to that of an active enemy of the ABDA Powers. General Marshall, therefore, proposed to select a high ranking Army officer of recognized ability in whom the Generalissimo, as well as the ABDA Powers would have the utmost confidence, equip him with ample power and funds (including immediate reinforcements for the A.V.G.), and send him to the Far East for the purpose of stiffening any wavering policy of Generalissimo Chang-Kai-shek to one of continuance as a strong and active ABDA ally.

5. The British section of the Committee pointed out that assistance might also be furnished the Chinese via Russia and this was agreed as a possibility for the future, although it appeared that at present the best way to furnish speedy aid would be by way of Burma and the Burma Route into China.

6. The Committee then proceeded to discuss the details of the project, which were eventually agreed upon and which are being separately presented in the paper "U.S. Serial ABC-4/CS2, Second Draft, January 9, 1942".

7. The meeting then adjourned at 12:40 p.m. to reconvene at a time to be decided later.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/M7

January 8, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

MINUTES -- SEVENTH MEETING.

Section I

1. The United States -- British Joint Planning Committee met at 3:15 P.M., January 8, 1942, in Room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D.C.

2. Presiding: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy.

PRESENT

U.S. Navy Members
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner
Captain H. W. Hill
Captain E. W. Burrough
Captain R. E. Davison
Captain F. P. Sherman

U.S. Army Members
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Colonel T. T. Handy
Lieut. Colonel H. L. George
Lieut. Colonel K. M. Walker

British Staff Mission
Brigadier V. Dykes, C.B.M.
Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.M.G.
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., C.B.E.
Commander D. H. Harries, R.A.N.
Lieut. Commander R. J. Bailey
Group Captain S. C. Strafford
Colonel F. W. Vogel, O.B.E.

Secretariat
Colonel W. P. Scobey, U.S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N.

M 7

Section II

The meeting first took under consideration the subject, "Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia." Following discussion, the Committee gave tentative agreement to Joint Planning Committee's report for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, U.S. Serial ABC-4/8, British Serial WW(JPC)8, Draft of 1/8/42, subject to review of the tables of proposed garrisons for the island bases, which were to be prepared by the Army and submitted on January 9.

The Committee next undertook a discussion of the Victory Program. In the consideration of this subject, the British representatives made the statement that the British Chiefs of Staff desired to undertake a discussion with the United States Chiefs of Staff on the subject and that a report from the Joint Planning Committee was not desired at this time. It was

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the British view that an examination of the United States and British programs would be a lengthy proposition for which time was not now available, that the Chiefs of Staff were expected to agree to setting up the necessary machinery for recommending adjustments in production to balance it with strategic plans. Admiral Turner stated that it was agreeable to him that the Planning Committee not put up a paper on this subject to the Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that the Army and the Navy would agree to the appointment of a Joint United States-British Committee specifically charged with examining the program in detail and making necessary recommendations. This suggestion was agreed to by the United States Army members and the British members of the Committee.

The next announced order of business was the consideration of the British draft report on "Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theatre -- First Half of 1942." Discussion on this paper was not complete when the British members announced that it would be necessary for them to ask for an adjournment. They requested that the United States members complete the examination of their paper and prepare a redraft along lines they desired. The meeting then adjourned at 8 P.M. to meet again at the call of the presiding officer.

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/MC

January 3, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

Minutes - Sixth Meeting

Section I

1. The United States - British Joint Planning Committee met at 3:00 P.M., January 3, 1942, in Room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D. C.

2. Presiding: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy.

PRESENT

U.S. Navy Members

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner
Captain Ralph Davison

U.S. Army Members

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Colonel T. T. Handy
Lieut. Colonel A. C. Wedemeyer
Lieut. Colonel K. N. Walker
Major H. S. Hansell

British Members

Brigadier V. Dykes, C.B.E.
Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.M.G.
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., C.B.E.
Commander Galbraith
Commander Curry

Secretariat

Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U. S. Navy
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N.

M 6

Section II

Relief of Iceland and Ireland.

3. In opening the meeting Rear Admiral Turner stated that there had been prepared a Joint Army and Navy Plan for the relief of forces in Ireland and Iceland. This plan, while lacking some of the details applicable to the British forces, shows what is proposed and contains certain things which could well be agreed to in advance. It was agreed to present this plan for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

4. The Committee then undertook a discussion of the defenses of island bases between Hawaii and Australia. The United States Members felt that, in accordance with the agreed principles of ABC-1, the security of the various islands should be the responsibility of the Power in whose area of strategic responsibility they lay, and that all relative discussion must proceed on this basis rather than on the

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basis of priority. The discussion centered on the defenses of New Caledonia and Fiji. The British stated that these would normally be the responsibility of Australia and New Zealand but that these latter countries lack the means for properly safeguarding the islands and that it appeared more feasible for the United States to undertake their defense than to necessitate the provision of troops and equipment from the British Isles.

5. The United States Members stated that defenses of all island bases along the route for which this country is responsible was being undertaken simultaneously, and that Samoa in particular, being considered a base of major importance, was being garrisoned and equipped on a scale to sustain defense against strong attack.

6. It was eventually decided that the British would ascertain from the Australian and New Zealand Governments just what those countries could provide for the defense of New Caledonia and Fiji. Once this was determined, the United States might, if necessary, plan to augment their garrisons and equipment to the extent required to provide for adequate defense, pointing out that men and equipment so used would have to be at the expense of reinforcements ear-marked to the ABDA area.

Victory Program.

7. The Committee then discussed the Victory Program on which British and Joint United States Army and Navy papers had been prepared. Lieut. Colonel Wedemeyer explained the manner in which the United States program for land and air had been developed, Rear Admiral Turner supplementing this with an explanation of the naval program.

8. The British Planning Committee Members undertook a further consideration of the papers which had been prepared in an endeavor to combine the two into a single paper for the Joint Planning Committee's presentation of the subject to the Chiefs of Staff.

9. In closing, Rear Admiral Turner read a dispatch in which the British requested that the six United States transports now engaged in carrying troops to the Far East be further employed by them to take reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific. Inasmuch as the request was rather general, the British Members agreed to obtain answers to the following questions:

(a) What troops will be moved?

(b) What is the point of departure and destination of the trip?

(c) Are the troops now ready to be embarked?

(d) If not, how long would the transports be delayed before the troops are ready?

Upon receipt of this specific information the United States authorities will decide whether or not the transports can be loaned as requested.

10. The meeting then adjourned at 7:15 P.M. to reconvene at a time to be decided later.

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FIRST DRAFT

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December 29, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
Minutes - Fifth Meeting.

Section I

1. The United States - British Joint Planning Committee met at 10:30 A.M., December 29, 1941, in Room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D. C.

2. Presiding: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy.

Present

U.S. Navy Member
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner.

U.S. Army Members
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Brigadier General D. D. Eisenhower
Lt. Colonel H. L. George.

British Members

Brigadier V. Dykes, C.B.M.
Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.M.O.
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., C.B.L.

Section II

1. The Committee took up the proposal, submitted by General Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for the establishment of unified command in the Southwest Pacific. Following an examination of the situation and a discussion of the various features incidental to the problem the Committee agreed to the following paper and directed it be sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee:

U.S. Serial - ABC-4/5
British Serial - W.(JPC)5

Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDU Area.

2. The Committee then adjourned at 6:40 P.M. to meet upon the call of the senior member.

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First Draft

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U.S. Serial ABC-4/M2.
British Serial WW(JPC)M2.

December 26, 1941.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

Minutes - Second Meeting.

Section I.

1. The United States - British Joint Planning Committee met at 4:00 P.M., December 25, in room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D. C.

2. Presiding: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy.

Present

U. S. Navy Member

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner

U.S. Army Members

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Colonel T. T. Handy
Lieut. Colonel H. L. George
Major H. S. Hansell

British Members

Brigadier V. Dykes, C.B.E.
Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., C.B.E.
Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., C.V.O.
Group Captain S. C. Strafford
Lieut. Colonel F. Vogel

Secretariat

Colonel W. P. Scobey, U.S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N.
Major R. F. G. Jayne, D.S.O.

3. Rear Admiral Turner announced that, at the Chiefs of Staff conference, the U.S.S. MOUNT VERNON had been placed at the disposal of the British, and that Admiral Pound had accepted the responsibility for her protection. Rear Admiral Turner also stated that the United States light forces in the eastern Netherlands East Indies were to be used in connection with the development of United States air and troop strength for future operations to be determined later.

4. The Committee as a whole then proceeded with a general discussion of two directives previously received from the Chiefs of Staff Committee for consideration and report. The results of these studies were mutually agreed upon by all members of the Joint Planning Committee and were presented to the Chiefs

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of Staff under the following titles:

A. Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean - Report by the United States - British Joint Planning Committee. (U. S. Serial ABC-4/1 British Serial WW(J.P.C.)1)

B. Joint Planning Committee Report to Chiefs of Staff, Northwest Africa Projects. (U. S. Serial ABC-4/2 British Serial WW(J.P.C.)2)

5. The Committee then received from the Chiefs of Staff a specific directive, quoted herewith, for early consideration and report.

"December 25, 1941.

"THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

"Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Joint Planning Committee.

"Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for insuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements.

"Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the Southwest Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, expected to be available in the Southwest Pacific Area on

"(a) 15 January, 1942,
"(b) 1 February, 1942,

on the following alternative assumptions:

"(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.

"(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.

"(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold."

6. The Joint Planning Committee adjourned at 8:00 P.M., to reconvene at a time to be decided later.

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BRITISH - MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 10

File:
U.S. ABC-4/M1
British Serial WW(JPC)1
24 December 41

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

MINUTES -- FIRST MEETING.

SECTION I

1. The United States-British Joint Planning Committee met at 3:05 p.m., 24 December 1941, in Room 1202, Federal Reserve Building, Washington.

2. Presiding: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy.

PRESENT

U. S. Army

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow
Brigadier General R. E. Lee
Brigadier General Carl Spaatz
Brigadier General B. B. Somervell
Colonel C. P. Gross, G.S.C.
Colonel T. T. Handy, G.S.C.
Colonel L. C. Allen, G.S.C.
Lt. Colonel H. L. George, A.A.F.S.
Major H. S. Hansell, A.A.F.S.

U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S.N.
Captain E. M. Burrough, U.S.N.
Captain C. S. Alden, U.S.N.
Comdr. B. J. Rodgers, U.S.N.
Comdr. F. P. Sherman, U.S.N.
Comdr. T. J. Ryan, Jr., U.S.N.
Lt. Comdr. B. S. Mansfield, U.S.N.
Major H. L. Litzenberg, U.S.M.C.

British Staff Mission

Brigadier V. Dykes
Lieutenant Colonel F. Vogel
Captain Lambe, R.N.
Captain G. D. Nelben, R.N.
Air Commodore Dickson, R.A.F.
Group Captain S. C. Strafford, R.A.F.

Secretariat

Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. Army
Commander L. R. McDowell, U. S. Navy
Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N.
Major R. F. G. Jayne, D.S.O.

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3. The Presiding Officer announced that the United States members of the Committee Secretariat had recommended that, for the purpose of designating a filing system, the proceedings of the Joint Planning Committee be recorded under the short title of ABC-4. Request was made for comments or suggestion. No objections being noted, the Presiding Officer announced that the proposal was adopted.

SECTION II

1. As the first order of business Admiral Turner presented his secret memorandum of requirements assigned to the Joint Planning Committee by the Chiefs of Staff Committee as follows:

December 24, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE:

It is my understanding that the Chief of Staff's Committee today assigned to the Joint Planning Committee the following projects for study and report:

1. A study of the availability of troop transports, U.S. and U.K., both combat loaded and convoy loaded, and cargo vessels which might be available for overseas expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean January 15, February 1, March 1, April 1.

2. A study of the availability of troop transports, both combat loaded and convoy loaded, and cargo vessels which might be available for overseas expeditions in the Pacific Ocean January 15, February 1, March 1, April 1.

3. A study of the relief of British troops in North Ireland by three U.S. infantry and one U.S. armored division. It would be understood that the provision of U.S. antiaircraft and pursuit planes would be deferred.

4. A study of the relief of British troops in Iceland by U.S. Army troops, giving a high priority to the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines.

5. A study of U.S. or British occupation by invitation, of the following positions:

(a) The Azores.
(b) The Cape Verde Islands.
(c) The Canary Islands.
(d) French West Africa.
(e) French North Africa.
(f) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
(g) Curacao and Aruba.
(h) Northeast Brazil.

6. A study of the U.S. reinforcement of Australia with troops and aircraft, in lieu of the withdrawal of Australian troops from the Middle East.

7. A study of the supporting measures to be undertaken in favor of the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies.

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8. It is understood that the Joint Planning Committee will recommend relative priorities for all of the foregoing troop movements.

9. In more extended form, and not a part of the report to be made at the current conference, studies will be prepared of a cooperative effort by the United States and United Kingdom in the capture of French North Africa and in the capture of French West Africa, the Azores, Cape Verdes, the Canaries, and Diego Suarez.

10. Referring to the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on "American-British Strategy", paragraph 10, a list of air routes which must be secured is to be added to the list of sea communications.

11. Recommendations concerning the joint dispositions of U.S. and U.K. naval and air forces in the immediate future for effecting the results aimed at by the grand strategy.

12. Recommendations as to the armed forces which should be ready:

(a) As soon as possible.
(b) By July 1, 1942.
(c) By July 1, 1943.
(d) By July 1, 1944.

These strengths would then be used as a basis for determining the "Victory Program" of production.

13. The scale of material assistance to China and Russia.

14. Providing an air supply line to China.

15. Preparation of a Joint Estimate (Appreciation) of the Situation.

2. Having presented the paper, the Presiding Officer, called for suggestions as to procedure in developing the Joint Planning Committee report.

3. Following a general discussion on the inter-relation of the several projects, the availability of force, the priority of importance of the several projects, the organization of sub-committees to make the several studies, and other aspects of the problem, without objection, the Presiding Officer appointed the following sub committees:

A. Study on Shipping Requirements and Availability of Shipping (Items 1 and 2)

Membership:

U.S. Navy: Captain E. W. Burrough, U.S.N.
Captain C. S. Alden, U.S.N.

U.S. Army: Brig. General B. B. Somervell
Colonel C. P. Gross

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British Staff Mission: Mr. McClay of the British Shipping Mission.

U. S. Maritime Commission: Mr. Wilcox.

Office of Production Management: To be designated.

B. Study on the Far East with Proposals for Meeting that Situation (Items 3,4,5,6, and 7):

U. S. Army: Colonel T. T. Handy
Major H. S. Hansell

U. S. Navy: Commander B. J. Rodgers
Commander F. P. Sherman
Major M. L. Litzenberg, Jr., M.C.

British Joint Staff Mission: To be designated.

C. Study on the U.S.-British Joint Occupation by Invitation of French North and Northwest Africa.

The members of the Joint Planning Committee.

4. Following appointment of committees and assignment of subjects the session was adjourned at 4:35 p.m. to meet at the call of the Presiding Officer.

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COL. GEORGE'S MEMORANDUMS AND NOTES ON AMERICAN-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCES

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COL. GEORGE'S MEMORANDUMS AND NOTES ON AMERICAN-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCES

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DOD 5200.1, 27 Sep 55

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AAF/AWPD
HAC

wtn 12/24/41.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES: H.H.C.

Subject: An estimate of the situation with regard to assisting China.

This paper was prepared last night after consultation with representatives of G-2, A-2 and ONI. It contains the latest information available.

I. Our situation - Logistically, RANGOON is the heart of China and the only port of entry thereto. The BURMA ROAD is the life line connecting RANGOON with the Chinese Armies. Both of these vital areas and the sea approaches to RANGOON can now be interdicted by land based Japanese aircraft.

There are large stocks of aviation gasoline, oil and motor vehicles located in RANGOON; very little ammunition and no maintenance equipment, spares or overhaul facilities.

It is indicated there are two RAF or Indian Air Force Squadrons located at RANGOON - one fighter and one light bomber.

The AVG with about sixty serviceable fighters is disposed at KUNMING and RANGOON. Suitable operational airdromes for approximately a group are available 150 miles north of RANGOON.

It has been officially reported that the Japs made one small bombing raid on RANGOON on December 12. The Press have reported a raid on December 22 and another on December 23 in which nine Jap bombers and one pursuit were shot down, several others damaged with a loss of three defending fighters.

II. The Enemy Situation.

The Japs are reported to have five divisions in Thailand with three [illegible] reinforced divisions have moved north along the state railway and last night were reported to

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

Chief of Staff	Deputy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A- WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
	sea										

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By authority of [illegible]
By [illegible] Date 27 Sep

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have reached the BURMA border north of CHIENGREI. Another force is reported to have moved north of BANGKOK via MYAWADI in the direction of MOULMEIN.

It is reported that the Japanese Air Force in THAILAND approximates 260 planes of all types. General Brett reports: "Japan units in large strength in BANGKOK." There are operational airdromes at CHIENGREI, LAMPANG, MNAN, and MOULMEIN in BURMA.

The Japanese Air Force, if disposed in northern THAILAND, is capable of interdicting the sea approaches to RANGOON (225 miles) and the BURMA ROAD at LASHIO (300 miles) and the rail and highways between LASHIO and RANGOON.

III. Conclusions.

1. RANGOON is in immediate serious danger of becoming untenable as a base for supplying China. Unlike England, it does not have the industrial capacity to recover from heavy bombing attacks. The sea approaches thereto are susceptible to being interdicted; its harbor, the RANGOON RIVER, mined or blocked. No naval forces are reported west of the MALAY PENINSULA.

2. The BURMA ROAD is in immediate serious danger of being bombed and may possibly be threatened by the fast moving ground force which is now reported on the BURMA-THAILAND Border (215 miles from LASHIO), the south terminus of the BURMA ROAD.

3. Neither RANGOON nor the BURMA ROAD are adequately protected against air attack. The vital importance of these establishments to the immediate security of CHINA and the critical situation which now exists demands that action be taken at once to provide reinforcements.

4. KARACHI and BOMBAY should be selected now as the principal bases for supplying China and ultimate movements for launching the offensive. RANGOON is too vulnerable to destruction or interruption of deliveries. KARACHI and BOMBAY are secure, provide shorter turn around for vessels, organized airways and ample railways connect to the east, and will provide space to echelon supply establishments in depth.

5. The BURMA-YUNNAN area must be held as one of the localities from which the offensive can be launched.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	Budget	Statistics	

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IV. Recommendations.

1. Issue instructions to immediately disperse and secure the Lease-Lend materials now in RANGOON from destruction by air attack.

2. Begin at once to divert shipments destined for China to AKYAB and CALCUTTA.

3. Organize and equip general supply bases at KARACHI and BOMBAY, with advanced depots echeloned eastward at DELHI, ALLAHABAD, CALCUTTA, and AKYAB.

4. Organize an air transport service between Indian depots and China. This is so important that it may be necessary to convert temporarily a limited number of heavy bombers to cargo carriers or draft the personnel and equipment of one of our airlines to conduct the operations.

5. Initiate construction of additional airbases in northern BURMA and INDIA.

6. Establish an American Air Force in India, initially comprising one medium bombardment group and an interceptor command of one pursuit group, aircraft warning service, and antiaircraft artillery - all with the required services.

Dept. Gen. Spaatz

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION

	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Inspr.	Budget	Stat.
						116			

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December 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Airplane Requirements for the Army Air Forces

1. The airplane requirements for the Army Air Forces for the next 3 months are indicated below:

	Heavy Bombers		Medium Bombers		Light Bombers		Pursuit	
	Groups	Planes	Groups	Planes	Groups	Planes	Groups	Planes
Philippines	2	80			1	57	2	160
(1) China	1	40					1	80
(2) Russia	1	40					1	80
(3) Australia			1	57	1	57	2	160
(4) Dutch East Indies			1	57	1	57	2	160
Hawaii	2	80					3	240
Caribbean	3	120	1	57			5	400
West Coast U. S. inc. Alaska	2	80	2	114			5	400
East Coast U. S. inc. Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland	3	120	2	114			4	320
	14	560	7	399	3	171	25	2000

Note (1)

China. Planes and combat crews to be sent as soon as logistic arrangements can be completed. Pursuit Group will be the A.V.C. now in China.

Note (2)

Russia. The groups to be used in Russia will be prepared immediately, so that they can move to bases in Eastern Siberia as soon as authority is received from the Soviet Government.

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Note (3)

Australia. These groups must be moved in by sea train, but they are essential to provide aerial protection for Townsville and Darwin, our 2 main bases.

Note (4)

Dutch East Indies. These groups are essential to protect landing fields in the Dutch East Indies against hostile air attack. The personnel and planes can be moved in by sea train.

2. It is to be noted that the above allocations of airplanes and groups utilizes the entire combat force under the 54 Group Program, excepting 4 light bombardment groups. It is believed that these 4 groups must be held for coordinated training with the Armored Forces. Our present program contemplates having all of these groups completely equipped with personnel and planes by the latter part of this month. It should be borne in mind, however, that in many cases substitute equipment is being used which should all be replaced by modern equipment not later than March 1st. The substitution of equipment is particularly applicable to the heavy groups which will not have their complete allotment of heavy bombers before the end of March. It is further to be noted that none of the above figures include attrition.

3. Additional trained personnel and airplanes will become available during the Spring so that we will form new groups of all categories in ever-increasing numbers to reach a total of about 84 groups by December 31, 1942.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

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NOTES ON STAFF CONFERENCE 12-23-41

Subject: Estimate of Fund Required for Victory Program

Present:

O.C.A.C.: L. Miller, Stratemeyer, Webste . Meyers. Loutzenheiser
Air Service: Gen. Miller, Whitten
A.S. A-3: Maj. Vanderburg, McCoy, Everest
A-4: Langmead
A-WPD: George, Hansell, Fair
A-1: Moore, Palmer

George: A decision was made this morning to follow the following plan of expansion:

1942 - a. To the 84 group program at First Aviation Strength
b. Train pilots for the victory program

1943 a. To the victory program (Groups) at first Aviation Strength

1944- a. To the victory program (groups) at Second Aviation Strength.

Meyers - Miller: Accepted 50 per cent spare engines as sufficient for training airplanes.

Anderson: The program as set up will accelerate the victory program by making pilots available for the training program.

George: Within 72 hours we must submit to the C of S a study with 3 tabs:

a.
b.
c.

to serve as a basis for Gen. Marshal to present an estimate of costs to Congress.

George: The second year (1943) will be devoted to establishing the groups in 1943.

George: The third year (1944) will be devoted to raising the strength of the groups to the Second Aviation Strength and setting up reserves.

Meyers: Funds for the airplanes necessary for the groups have been estimated and are in the mill for presentation to Congress.

George: Will the airplanes required for the group program be available in 1944.

Meyers: Yes.

George: The airplane and personnel figures of A-WPD include attrition allowances.

Stratemeyer: Wants a directive as to the number of pilots required and when.

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Langmead: Promised to advise Crumrine that an estimate is required of the facilities required (as estimated by B & GDiv. C.C.A.C.)

George - Stratemeyer: Agreed to schedule adding organizations on the basis of two month intervals.

Moore: Will compute pilot requirements for combat units and all overhead except the training center.

Anderson: Pursuit group - 80 airplanes First Aviation Objective.

Stratemeyer: Wants from Moore a statement of:

a. Number pilots per month
b. Number bombers per month
c. Number gunners per month
d. Number navigators per month
e. Number radio operators per month
f. Number other technicians per month.

included
with allowances for attrition.

George: Personnel losses will be computed on the basis of 10 per cent per month in all combat squadrons and 3 per cent in all training and transport.

Whitten: Will we plan on one base per group

George: Yes

Anderson: Agreed to present to each agency by Tuesday afternoon a schedule of activation of units by groups for 1942, 1943, 1944, which will be based upon the airplane delivery estimates of the Materiel Division.

George: When each staff section gets the bogey schedule of activating groups, the section will prepare schedules of procurement for related items:

Personnel
Base Facilities.
Service "
Etc.

From those estimates Lee Miller will compute the funds required.

These notes are not intended to be an official record of the minutes of the Meeting. They are intended to serve only as a reminder of the chief topics discussed.

E.C. Langmead

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STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF
AIR FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

The air phase of this plan conceives air operations being conducted against the Japanese Air Force, communications installations and possessions from two secure pivots--Australia and India. It provides for the step by step recovery of the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and China--from which locations an ultimate intensive air offensive against Japan proper will be launched. It does not depend upon the use of Siberian air bases, and contemplates Russia maintaining the status quo in this theater.

This concept demands reasonably secure sea and air communications between the Atlantic seaboard of the United States and India and between the Pacific seaboard of the United States and Australia. Each pivotal area must be defended, the establishments therein secured, particularly during the advance for repossession and the offensive. Initially a minimum of 40 operational airdromes will be required in Australia and 15 in India.

To meet this situation it is proposed to establish and maintain the following Air Forces:

a. Immediate Phase (Jan - Mar - 1942)

1. For Australia
   2 - HB Groups - 80 planes
   2 - MB Groups - 114 planes
   ~~3 - LB Groups - 171 planes~~
   4 - Pursuit Groups - 480 planes

2. For India
   1 - HB Group - 40 planes
   1 - Pursuit Group - 80 planes

b. Intermediate Phase (Mar - Dec - 1942)

1. For Australia
   10 - HB Groups - 400 planes
   2 - MB Groups - 114 planes
   3 - LB Groups - 171 planes
   6 - Pursuit Groups - 480 planes
   3 - L.R. Transport Groups - 117 planes

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2. For India
   3 - HB Groups - 120 planes
   2 - MB Groups - 171 planes
   4 - Pursuit Groups - 320 planes
   2 - Transport Groups - 78 planes

B. Ultimate Phase

1. For Australasia
   20-HB Groups - 800 planes
   7 - MB Groups - 399 planes
   3 - Dive or LB Groups - 171 planes
   20 - Pursuit Groups - 1600 planes
   5 - Transport Groups - 195 planes

2. For India
   10 - HB Groups - 400 planes
   10 - MB Groups - 570 planes
   5 - Dive or LB Groups - 285 planes
   5 - Transport Groups - 195 planes

3. Additional for China
   10 - HB Groups - 400 planes
   5 - MB Groups - 285 planes
   10- Pursuit Groups - 800 planes
   5 - Transport Groups - 195 planes

The complementary and supplementary arms and services, and the necessary facilities, airdromes and communications, etc. must be provided to the forces set up in each phase.

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PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET
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(Classification Stamp)

3007

at 1210 {EWT / G.M.T.} December 18, 1941

From Melbourne, Australia Filed 18:33 {EWT / GCT} December 18, 1941

Received in I. B. 12:45 {EWT / GCT} December 18, 1941 No. 40

Australian Naval circles as well as our Naval Attache still think it may be practicable to send the convoy soon to arrive in Brisbane to a Philippine port, provided the United States Navy will cooperate adequately. They are also of the opinion that the ferrying of aircraft to the Philippines is possible. They are surprised unpleasantly by two statements contained in the British Admiralty Delegation cable in which were repeated the suggestion of the Chief of the United States Naval Operations to the effect that the troops and material in the convoy may be very important for the defense of Port Darwin and vicinity. They consider this latter view as being opposed to the directions given General Barnes by General Marshall.

MERLE SMITH.

(G-2 Note: This message is an amplification of the Cable No. 39 from U.S. M/A Melbourne (I.B. No. 5, 12-17-41). It differs from the former message only in that the belief is expressed that it is possible to ferry aircraft, and that it may be possible to convoy the entire shipment, provided that the United States Navy will cooperate adequately. W.P.D. has been informally appraised of the contents of this latter message.

Paraphrased by Lt. Col. N. W. Pottigrew

Action to W.P.D., other copies informational

A-W.P.D. 9-
W.P.D. Cable
Mtl Cable
Aid to Philippines
Aid to Philippines

No. 11 (12-18-41)

Indicate distribution by check for one copy, by figure for more than one. Message order indicate recipient of particular copy by drawing circle.

State	WPD	ONI	G-2	OASW	ASWA	OCAD	BAIR	SW	G/S	USW	ACS, G-2	ACS, G-3	ACS, G-4
	x	2			x	x	x		x		x		x
CNIB	MA	FL	CIB	Air	BES	SES	WES	DES	SES	LWS	FES	SI	Armd.
x					x						x	x	
DAD		OLLA	MA Comm	JIC	RS								
	Mission			x	x								

WAR DEPARTMENT
O.C.S. 17-5

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TOTAL FORCES REQUIRED:

The size of the British and American forces will be affected by the assistance that may be furnished by French and Spanish units in North Africa. The local forces must be sufficient in strength to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy and to open the Mediterranean route. These tasks will necessitate offensive air operations against Axis bases and ports in the Mediterranean area. The combined British and U. S. forces might amount to about:

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INITIAL OR THREE MONTHS FORCE

British Proposal

ALGIERS

1 Armored Brigade

1 Brigade Group

1 Heavy and 1 Light AA Regiments (24 guns heavy -- 36 guns light)

3 Pursuit Squadrons (45 to 50 planes)

CASA BLANCA

1 American Division

2 British Divisions (Infantry)

1 British Armored Division

(Air Forces to be specified). General Arnold states that General Portal agreed to furnish total 80 fighters (45 Algiers -- 35 Casa Blanca).

Antiaircraft -- 5 heavy and 6 light regiments

(120 heavy -- 216 light)

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U. S. Proposal

Algiers -- no change.

CASA BLANCA

1 Marine Division (U.S.)

3 Infantry Divisions (1 U. S.)

2 Armored Divisions (1 U. S.)

A.A. -- 5 Heavy and 6 Light Regiments (British)

(120 heavy and 216 light guns)

Air -- (320 pursuit, 57 medium bomb., 57 light bomb., 63 observation)

(General Arnold reduced this figure to 160 U. S. Pursuit and 80 British. Observation 39 U. S. and 24 British)

Note: U. S. A.A. mobile regiments have 12 heavy (3 inch or 9-mm) -- 24 37-mm. and 24 .50 caliber guns.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Office Chief of the Air Staff
Washington, D.C.

Date 12-22-41

TO:

Major Gailey:

To note
Gen. Arnold's
penciled statement

H.L. George.

A-W.P. DIVISION

X-225-E, A.C.

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Ultimate Force

British Proposal

2 Armored Divisions

3 Infantry Divisions

A.A. 11 Heavy regiments and 12 Light regiments

(264 heavy guns - 432 Light guns)

Air - 22 fighter squadrons (356 planes) - 8 bomber squadrons

(128 planes), 3 Army - Coop squadrons (65 planes)

3 General reconnaissance squadrons (65 planes)

U. S. Proposal

Original

Hold to Oran		Hold to Tunisia
5	Inf Divs	7
2	Armored Divs	3
23	A.A. regiments	33
7	Pursuit groups	10

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Hold to Oran		Hold to Tunisia
0	Heavy Bomb groups	3
4	Medium Bomb groups	4
2	Light Bomb groups	3

Accepted in Conference

2 to 2½ Armored Divs

3 to 5 Infantry Divs

350 Heavy and 700 Light A.A. guns

800 Pursuit

105 Heavy Bomb

228 Medium Bomb

171 Light Bomb

100 Naval Patrol

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12-21-41

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ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRPLANES

(Proposed)

HEAVY BOMBERS

Period	Prod.	D.A.	British	U. S.	In Tactical Units	Available to Allies
Dec.	90	0	0	68	164*	0
Jan.	54	0	(56) 15	39	187	15
Feb.	107	0	(72) 31	76	212	31
Mar.	121	0	(67) 24	97	288	24
Apr.	134	0	(47) 40	94	353	40
May	148	10	(28) 40	98	416	50
June	166	15	30	121	496	45
July	171	2	0	169	615	2
Aug.	187	161	0	26	580	161
Sept.	214	165	0	49	571	165
Oct.	246	165	0	81	595	165
Nov.	285	163	0	122	657	163
Dec.	330	90	0	240	831*	109

*--20 groups at 2nd Aviation Strength with 15 airplanes as spares.

NOTE: Monthly deficits.

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MEDIUM BOMBERS

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Period	Prod.	D.A.	British	Russia	N.E.I.	U.S.	In Tactical Units	Not Allotted	Available to Allies
Dec.	--	0	(74) 0	0	0	0	355	0	0
Jan.	114	0	(52) 37	(12)	0	75	412	0	49
Feb.	165	0	(17) 75	(12)	0	78	469	0	87
Mar.	268	0	77	(12)	0	80	526	99	171
Apr.	272	0	80	(12)	6	83	583	91	172
May	286	0	80	(12)	9	86	640	108	200
June	355	0	80	(12)	9	89	697	165	266
July	334	0	80	0	9	92	754	153	242
Aug.	392	62	80	0	9	95	811	156	297
Sept.	480	220	80	0	9	98	868	73	382
Oct.	453	187	80	0	15	101	925	70	352
Nov.	303	115	0	0	15	104	982	69	199
Dec.	308	115	0	0	36	107	1041*	50	200

* -- 12 Groups and 1 composite squadron at 2nd Aviation Strength.

Note:
Parenthetical figures represent deficits in British allotments.

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LIGHT BOMBARDMENT

Period	Prod.	D.A.	British	Russia	N.E.I.	U.S.	In Tactical Units	Not Allotted	Available to Allies
Dec.	–	(83)	(315)	–	–	–	342	–	–
Jan.	294	(252) 0	(230) 217	28	1	48	373	0	246
Feb.	356	(497) 0	(102) 212	100	0	44	399	0	312
Mar.	380	(683) 0	(10) 224	100	5	51	430	0	329
Apr.	353	(782) 10	181	100	15	47	456	0	306
May	493	(882) 53	237	100	50	53	487	0	440
June	487	(884) 91	228	100	18	50	513	0	437
July	505	(864) 80	241	100	22	58	544	0	447
Aug.	590	(811) 171	263	100	23	54	570	0	546
Sept.	624	(724) 287	157	100	22	60	601	0	564
Oct.	551	(722) 362	91	0	22	56	627	0	495
Nov.	496	(809) 293	81	0	34	88	684	0	408
Dec. 1942	224	(767) 164	0	0	0	60	710*	0	164

* _ 12 Groups plus 2 Squadrons at 2nd Aviation Strength

Note: This table provides no general airplane reserve. It is believed that a fixed portion of planes listed as available for allies should be held in reserve status for our combat units. This table fails to meet Defense Aid commitments by 767 planes.

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PURSUIT ALLOCATION

Period	Prod.	D.A.	British	Russia	U.S.	Tactical Strength U.S.	Not. Allocated	Available to Allies
Dec.	--	(79) 0	(295) 150	100	137	975	0	250
Jan.	584	(96) 100	(264) 200	--	254	1109	0	300
Feb.	641	(328) 30	(160) 250	100	261	1243	0	380
Mar.	685	(519) 67	(156) 250	100	268	1377	0	417
Apr.	753	(726) 128	(134) 250	100	275	1511	0	478
May	804	(327) 172	(72) 250	100	282	1645	0	522
June	967	(987) 330	(31) 250	100	287	1780	0	680
July	1132	(767) 516	241	100	295	1914	0	837
Aug.	874	(491) 375	97	100	302	2048	0	574
Sept.	845	(139) 437	0	100	308	2182	0	537
Oct.	813	180	0	0	315	2316	318	498
Nov.	767	285	0	0	322	2450	160	445
Dec.	787	260	0	0	330	2585*	197	457

* -- 17 Groups at 2nd Aviation Strength plus augmentation of 7 foreign groups to 2nd Aviation Strength.

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AAF/AWPD/
HAC-nes 12/24/41

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Subject: Status of the South Pacific Ferry Route based on Report from General Emmons Dec. 19.

Runways: Canton - 2,000'
Palmyra- 3,750'
Samoa - None
Christmas - 500'
Tontouta, New Caledonia - 4,000'

Townsville, Australia; Suva, Fiji; and other fields in New Caledonia being checked and report will be made as soon as possible.

5,000' runways will be available as follows:

Christmas, Suva, and Canton	Probably by Jan. 15
Palmyra	Jan. 1 (Navy Report)
Samoa	Mar.15 (Navy Report)

January 15 is the earliest date for complete route.

Fuel:

Palmyra	38,500 gals.	Navy fuel
	100,000 "	Army fuel destined for Christmas.
Suva	100,000 "	Pan Air fuel
Nandi, Fiji	(100 miles from Suva) 20,000 gals.	
Samoa	None	

Weather
Facilities: Christmas, Suva, and Palmyra - good.

Communications: Palmyra, Christmas, Suva, and Samoa - good.

Defense Forces:

Canton - approximately 75 soldiers; artillery, engineers, air corps, medical. 2 - 75 mm. guns. 12 machine guns.

Christmas - approximately 200 soldiers; artillery, engineers, signal and medical. 410 civilian contractor's men. 2 - 155 mm. guns. Battery of 3" antiaircraft artillery guns. Battery of 12 machine guns. Organic weapons - artillery and engineers.

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The Navy is sending defense forces to Samoa and has a defense force in Palmyra. Strength and Composition unknown.

New Zealand has been requested to strengthen defenses in the Fijis.

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MEMORANDUM:

Assumption: The French will invite the United States and Great Britain jointly to occupy and defend North Africa.

The United States is prepared to embark the following forces for movement to Casablanca:

a. One Marine Division, combat loaded. Shipping is immediately available to move 2/3 of the Division on 10 days' notice. Shipping will be available for the remaining 1/3 on or about January 15.

b. Two pursuit groups, one light bombardment group, and one medium bombardment group. Units will be ready on ten days' notice after January 15th. _____ days will be required to convert the necessary commercial shipping.

c. One Infantry Division, reinforced. Units will be ready on ten days' notice. _____ days will be required to collect and convert the necessary commercial shipping.

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d. One Armored Division. Units will be ready on ten days' notice after February 15. Vessels will be available forty days after sailing of the a group above.

Except for antiaircraft, the U. S. Army is prepared to reinforce the foregoing initial contingent with air and ground forces to the extent necessary to maintain its position in North Africa against probable Axis attack. Adequate antiaircraft defense cannot be provided prior to June. The scale of the reinforcement will depend on a more detailed estimate of terrain, enemy capabilities and British plans for reinforcing their garrisons in the area.

If the above operation is ordered, shipping will not be available for other overseas movement in the Atlantic, except minor ones in the Western Atlantic, until the forces are built up to ultimate strength.

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SECRET DRAFT PROPOSAL

December 25, 1941.

Memorandum for US and UK Chiefs of Staff:

Subject: Priorities for US and UK overseas expeditions in Atlantic Ocean.

1. One of the directives issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

(a) The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

(b) The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

(1) The Azores.

(2) The Cape Verde Islands.

(3) The Canary Islands.

(4) French West Africa.

(5) French North Africa.

(6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

(7) Curacao and Aruba.

(8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

(a) To the United States, the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

(b) To the United Kingdom, the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

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2. Cont'd

(c) To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly, the occupation of French North Africa.

3. It is considered that the peaceful occupation of the following positions can be carried out without major interference with other projects which may be planned: The Azores, Diego Suarez, Curacao and Aruba.

4. Only one of the following groups of major operations can be carried on at the same time, and, after the initiation of any one of them, at least three months must elapse, before another group of operations can be executed. These projects are listed in their order of strategic ~~importance~~ desirability and practicability of the [illegible]

(a) The occupation of French North Africa.

(b) The occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, the occupation of Northeast Brazil, and the occupation of the Canary Islands.

(c) The occupation of French West Africa and the occupation of the Canary Islands.

(d) The relief of British troops in Ireland and Iceland.

5. None of the major groups of operations can be performed unless adequate shipping is immediately made available to the United States and British navies for preparation as overseas transports.

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Gen Arnold told Gen Crawford he had requested light bombers for K. Did he substitute Madams

Burma Asiatic

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Indard

4 Sm. Def
1 Armed
2 Pm
1 Sk Sp
1 Med
C & D ck
Mobile Depot
Service

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N W Africa 2 P.- + 2 Par
1 H
1 Med
1 Dept

Burma = Gen Stilwell

Far East, Chas, Major change in policy

Harriman

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PROJECT -GYMNAST

We submit below a provisional examination of the project for joint operations in northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following hypothesis:

(a) We receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance there will be only token resistance.

(b) That owing to their pre-occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefor anticipate a period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

(c) That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

Objective We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control of all North Africa could be extended.

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Base. The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of A.A. defences and air forces a single main base must be used for the whole force in North Africa.

Establishment of Base.

There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca which has a considerable garrison and coast defences. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States Marine Division is eminently suitable for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

Support to French in Tunisia.

The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco or perhaps a condition of their entry, would be a demand from the French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two A.A. Regiments and three Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through by sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance guard at Casablanca.

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Total Forces Required.

The total forces ultimately required to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy, and to open the Mediterranean route by providing air cover along the coast would amount to about -

2 Armoured Divisions
3 Infantry Divisions
23 A.A. Regiments
22 Fighter Squadrons
8 Bomber Squadrons
3 Armoured Co-operation Squadrons
3 General Reconnaissance Squadrons

These forces would be pushed in mainly through the base port at Casablanca, and their task would be to take up defensive positions on the possible ports of German entry and to be ready to move into Spanish Morocco immediately opportunity offered.

It will be essential to get sufficient forces into the Casablanca area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being driven out by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and A.A. defences.

Joint American-British Effort Necessary.

Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint effort. Initially the bulk of the forces will be British and at present the area is one of British strategic responsibility. We suggest, therefore, that

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after the American advance guard has established itself ashore at Casablanca, command should pass to the British until such time as the main United States forces arrive and assume the major responsibility within the area.

NAVAL FORCES

Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

British Convoy Escorts.

There will be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal U.K. convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a period [redacted].

American Convoy Escorts.

(a) Advance American Division. - One Marine Division embarked in 15 vessels to be detailed from units of Task Force Three.

(b) Remaining U.S. forces. - Three convoys at about one month's interval, escorted by units withdrawn from Task Force Three and Four. Successive logistic convoys require escorts withdrawn from Task Force Four.

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Timings

D.1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

(a) U.S. Forces.

The U.S. Marine Division could reach Casablanca on D.20.

(b) British Forces

The first British convoy could reach Algiers on D._____, or Casablanca on D._____. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British force, totalling 1 armoured and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another _____ weeks. Its movement would therefore be complete about D._____.

Summary of Plan.

(a) An advance guard of the U.S. Marine Division combat loaded and closely supported by United States Naval forces to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

(b) A British force consisting of:-

1 Armoured Brigade,
1 Infantry Brigade,
2 Anti-Aircraft Regiments,
3 Fighter Squadrons,

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with (a) to Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance guard.

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(c) Main body to follow (a) and (b):-

1 American Division.

2 British Divisions.

1 British Armoured Division.

Air Forces (to be specified).

(d) Base and L. of C. organisations. Air defences of the base area to be found by the British initially.

Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities.

U.S. to provide as high a proportion of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

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DISTRIBUTION U.S. COMBATANT NAVAL FORCES BY AREAS

	BB	CV	AVG	CA	CL	DD	ODD	SS	OSS
WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA									
Based									
North Atlantic - - (New England, Newfoundland, and Iceland)	5		1	5(a)	2	28	26	5(b)	20
Middle Atlantic - - (Bermuda, Hampton Roads)		3(c)			2	7(d)			4
Caribbean and South Atlantic - - - - - - (San Juan, Key West, Trinidad, Panama)					4	8	9		29(e)
Total -	5	3	1	5	8	43	35	5	53
PACIFIC AREA									
Based									
West Coast - - -	7(f)				3		22	3	6
Mid-Pacific - -	5(g)	4(h)		12	7(i)	54(j)		15	
FAR EASTERN AREA - -				1	1		13	23	6
GRAND TOTAL	17	7	1	18	19	97	70	46	65

(a) Two returning from Capetown.
(b) Three in training to proceed to Pacific Area.
(c) One (HORNET) in training.
(d) Three returning from Capetown.
(e) Twelve operating from Panama in Atlantic and Pacific.
(f) Enroute six (6). Three from Hawaiian Area and three from Atlantic.
(g) Non-effective (5) Five.
(h) One enroute from Atlantic.
(i) Three non-effective.
(j) Two damaged, nine enroute from Atlantic.

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Memorandum to A-3.

1. It is desired that you submit a plan for the following force to be made available for employment as a carrier Task Force, by the date designated. This unit to be fully equipped and ready for combat operations.

Feb 1, 1942

1 Parent Group
2 Interceptor Squadrons
1 Fast Bomb Sq
1 Light Bomb Sq.
2 Sqs Light Aircraft Warning

A-2
Airdromes
Sit on Fact Sheet

Necessary services, including
Air base units, medical depts,
etc.
Necessary supplies for 30 days
operations

April 1, 1942
2 additional Pursuit Groups
2 " Interceptor Control Squadrons
1 " Medium Bomb Group
2 " Signal Light Aircraft Warning

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It has will pursuit air-
planes come from to
provide 2 Groups of pursuit,
with 50% reserve, for
the N.W. Africa. This totals
240 airplanes.

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12-7

HEAVY BOMBER - PRODUCTION

	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
U. S./B-24 C & D	6	25	40	50	60	75	90
U. S./B-17 L	35	45	55	60	65	70	75
Br./LB-30	31	-	-	-	-	-	-
	72	70	95	110	125	145	165

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LIGHT BOMBERS - PRODUCTION

	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
US/A-20B	2	10	26	48	88	127	148
DA/Br/A-20C	88	84	135	135	65	-	-
DA/Br/A-20(Hudson)	125	75	100	42	-	-	-
DA/Br/A-30(Martin)	-	-	-	-	-	60	60
Br/DB-7B(Douglas)	55	55	-	-	-	-	-
Br/187(Martin)	55	59	60	60	59	-	-
Br/A-31(Vultee DB)	2	15	33	58	85	114	145
Br/ 340(Brewster DB)	2	11	21	41	58	81	91
Dutch/ 340(Brewster DB)	0	1	0	5	5	11	18
Dutch/A-20C	-	-	-	-	20	28	-
	330	310	375	389	380	421	462

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MEDIUM BOMBERS - PRODUCTION

	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
U.S/B-25 B&C	25	45	50	62	82	83	91
U.S./B-26	50	54	100	115	115	115	115
Br./B-25	12	24	40	65	114	130	130
Dutch/B-25	-	-	-	-	6	9	9
	87	123	190	242	317	337	345

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PURSUIT TWO ENGINE - PRODUCTION

	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
US/P-38M	-	50	75	75	75	100	100
Br/P-38	12	20	39	54	78	104	125
	12	70	114	129	153	204	225

NO DIVERSIONS OF THIS TYPE.

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PURSUIT SINGLE ENGINE - PRODUCTION

	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
US/P-39D	13	69	150	86	35	10	-
US/P-40E	141	174	18	-	-	-	-
US/P-40F	-	3	5	15	25	50	110
US/P-47B	1	3	5	15	30	44	100
DA/Br/P-39D	-	-	-	64	145	138	88
DA/Br/P-40E	-	-	238	306	301	270	203
DA/China/P-43A	17	28	28	28	24	-	-
DA/China/P-66	39	39	32	-	-	-	-
Br/P-39D	103	89	88	88	-	-	-
Br/P-40E	66	-	-	-	-	-	-
Br/P-51	35	55	65	84	84	61	74
	415	460	629	686	644	573	655

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AWPD

12/24/41

AAF/AWPD
HAC-aea

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Facilities Available for Northern Ferry Route based on Information up to Dec. 8.

Northwest River

Runways - Three runways of frozen ground and compacted snow believed serviceable. Estimated size NE-6000'x250', NW-5000'x250', NS-6500'x250'. These runways not the same as area intended for permanent construction next spring.

Equipment - One hangar standard for Liberators under construction. Estimated completion Jan. (doubtful)?? One Nose Hangar for 2 Liberators under construction. Estimated completion Jan. 15th.

Facilities - 500,000 gals. 100 Octane gasoline in storage. Refueling facilities. Facilities available for minor repairs.

Personnel - Approx. 60 officers and men of R.C.A.F. forming ground crew for service. Approx. 200 civilian laborers.

Communications - At the present time under R.C.A.F. operation there is reported to be five -- Type 3 transmitters, five type MRO receivers. There is also a 100 Watt medium frequency beacon in operation on 357 KC. There is no HF/DF and none contemplated by R.C.A.F. If Northwest River is to be used as an alternate to Gander, there will be considerable additional equipment installed. Date of Completion of range, bearings and frequency will be available by December 12th.

Northwest River maintains an aircraft watch on 6240 KC with 3203.5 KC as an alternate. Northwest River maintains point to point communication with Gander on 8365 DC, Montreal to Northwest River on 6380 KC day and 4126 KC night

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Weather Service - Northwest River weather is available from Eastern Air Command R.C.A.F. and from R.A.F.F.C. Montreal on request. Aircraft in flight will only be able to pick up weather broadcast by using R.C.A.F. spot weather code.

Narsarsuak (Julianehaab) - from report of Capt. C. J. Forney dated Oct. 12, 1941.

Runways - One E and S (prevailing wind) to be available Oct. 20th, 3500' x 150' steel plank. Other runways not contemplated until 1942. Location in fjord surrounded by high land. Approaches difficult.

Equipment - Only outdoor storage available. Believed to be portable heater equipment and equipment for minor aircraft maintenance. Hangars and revetments to be constructed 1942.

Facilities - Minimum of 20,000 gal. 100 Octane gasoline in drums. Two tank trucks.

Snow Handling - Two snow plows available.

Personnel - Housing is provided for 29 officers and 664 men with construction in process for 2,000 men.

Communications - 197 portable transmitter provides unreliable point to point communication with Gander Lake and with Holsteinborg and Angmagsalik, and Danish station at Julianehaab. This should be available air to ground. 200 watt transmitter for D.F. and aircraft administrative is being installed at Simiutak Island 50 miles from airfield at mouth of fjord. Estimated 30% complete. 200W transmitter for main base at airfield has arrived and is being installed. 3 KW transmitter on order.

Weather Service - Meteorological detachment provides local weather, Net work, including Holsteinborg and Danish reporting stations, provides other Greenland weather. Reliability of communications in this net not known but believed doubtful.

Sondes Stromfjord (Holsteinborg) From report of Capt. Bernt Balchen dated Nov. 14, 1941.

Runways - One strip 5000' x 150' has been scraped with bull dozer. Character of surface not accurately known. Direction approximately E&W with prevailing wind in fjord. Approaches apparently fair. Temporary runway available for use about January 20.

Flying Conditions - Conditions have been described as excellent on 30 out of 37 days. Small snow fall experienced.

Equipment - Tractor and dozer available for levelling snow. All equipment portable. Heaters available, fueling from drums.

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Facilities - 20,000 gals.100 Octane gasoline in drums. Facilities for emergency repairs only.

Personnel - 2 officers and 30 enlisted men. Eight portable type buildings.

Communications - Contact maintained to Main Base (Narsarsuak) with 400 W 10 channel transmitters. 300 W 4 channel also in equipment but believed not yet installed. 100W Radio Range to be installed. Point to point and air-ground communications should be available.

Weather Service - Meteorological detachment to provide local weather. Communications with Main Base should provide weather through Greenland network. Communication has also been established with Crystal network for weather to the west.

Angmagsalik

This detachment has not been contacted for any report.

Landing - may be found possible on fjord ice.

Facilities - Detachment was provided with 3000 gals. 100 Octane gasoline, tractor and dozer. Adequate housing and supplies.

Communications - A Danish radio (characteristics unknown) has maintained communication at this base. Air Corps detachment provided with 200 W Transmitter.

Fort Chimo

Landing - Apparently no landing facilities will be available in immediate vicinity of camp. Landings may be possible on ice of a lake about 8 miles distant across river.

Facilities - 3000 gals 100 Octane gasoline available. Most of this is at camp site necessitating transportation across country. Tractor available but must cross river to reach landing lake. Heaters and elementary facilities available.

Housing - Consists of 3 portable type buildings, adequate supplies. Some housing available at Hudson Bay Port, Fort Chimo.

Communications - 200W transmitter operating. Range contemplated.

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Frobisher Bay

Landing - Latest report advises against attempt to land on prospective landing field site. Also salt ice conditions considered very unreliable.

Landing probably possible on lake on mainland 10 miles south.

Facilities and Housing - Similar to Fort Chimo.

Communications - 200W transmitter operating. Range contemplated.

Padloaping Island Cumberland Peninsula

Landing - Landing considered feasible on salt ice of large protected harbor. Camp is adjacent to shore to provide immediate ground facilities.

Facilities - 3000 gals. 100 Octane gasoline available stored adjacent to landing area. Tractor available with dozer to smooth ice surface. Heaters and elementary aviation facilities available.

Housing - Consists of 3 portable type buildings, adequate supplies.

Communications - 200W transmitter operating. Range contemplated.

Iceland -

No change.

Distances -

Northwest River to Narsarsuak	725 miles
Northwest River to Sondes Stromfjord	1,000 miles
Narsarsuak to Reykjavik	800 miles
Sondes Stromfjord to Reykjavik	860 miles

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HEAVY BOMBER AUGMENTATION

Period	Production U.S.Army	Group Strength	Airplanes in Tactical Units	Reserve	Attrition	Surplus
1943						
Jan.	274	24	~~1022~~ 1173	0	83	0
Feb.	336	24 + 4	~~1256~~ 1339	0	102	0
Mar.	474	24 + 7	~~1606~~ 1685	0	125	0
Apr.	486	24	~~1632~~ 1975	287	160	0
May	472	26 + 10	~~1768~~ 2251	436	163	0
June	525	30	2040 2579	512	177	0
July	582	35 + 5	~~2880~~ 2964	548	204	0
Aug.	591	40	~~2780~~ 3173	561	238	0
Sept.	625	44 + 0	2992 3426	642	272	0
Oct.	650	48	3264 3937	721	299	0
Nov.	700	52 + 0	3536 4072	823	326	0
Dec.	750	56	3808 4060	948	353	0
1944						
Jan.	775	60 + 8	4080 4272	1072	381	0
Feb.	800	65	4420 4504	1124	408	0
Mar.	825	70 + 0	4760 4761	1167	442	0
Apr.	850	71	4828	1473	476	0
May	900	71	4828	1473	482	418
June	1000	71	4828	1473	482	518
July		Constant thereafter				
Aug.						
Sept.						
Oct.						
Nov.						
Dec.						

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LIGHT BOMBER AUGMENTATION

Period	Production U.S. Army	Group Strength	Airplane Strength	Reserve	Attrition	Available to Allies
1943						
Jan.	82	6	342	0	34	48
Feb.	145	6	342	0	34	111
Mar.	239	6	342	75	34	130
Apr.	211	9	513	81	34	0
May	207	11	627	123	51	0
June	219	13	741	166	62	0
July	228	15	855	206	74	0
Aug.	237	17	969	244	85	0
Sept.	250	19	1083	283	97	0
Oct.	250	21	1197	321	108	0
Nov.	250	24	1368	337	120	0
Dec.	250	26	1482	336	137	0
1944						
Jan.	250	26	1542	378	148	0
Feb.	250	26	1622	394	154	0
Mar.	250	26	1680	424	162	0
Apr.	250	26	1761	425	168	0
May	250	26	1761	440	176	59
June	250	26	1761	440	176	74
July	250	26	1761	440	176	74
Aug.			Constant thereafter.			
Sept.						
Oct.						
Nov.						
Dec.						

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MEDIUM BOMBER ALLOCATION

Period	Production U.S.Army	Group Strength	Airplane Strength	Reserve	Attrition	Available to Allies
1943						
Jan.	165	12	1041	41	104	0
Feb.	180	12	1041	117	104	0
Mar.	210	12	1041	223	104	0
Apr.	230	12	1041	260	104	89
May	250	12	1041	260	104	146
June	250	12	1041	260	104	146
July	Constant thereafter					
Aug.						
Sept.						
Oct.						
Nov.						
Dec.						

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PURSUIT AUGMENTATION

Period	Production U.S. Army	Group Strength	Airplane Strength	Reserve	Attrition	Available to Allies
1943 Jan.	589	24	3120	78	186	0
Feb.	849	24	3120	615	312	0
Mar.	919	28	3640	702	312	0
Apr.	980	32	4160	798	364	0
May	1195	36	4680	1057	416	0
June	1242	40	5200	1311	468	0
July	1100	44	5720	1371	520	0
Aug.	1037	47	6110	1446	572	0
Sept.	990	49	6370	1565	611	0
Oct.	990	51	6630	1658	637	0
Nov.	990	53	6890	1735	653	0
Dec.	990	54	7020	1755	689	151
1944 Jan.	990	54	7020	1755	702	288
Feb.	990	54	7020	1755	702	288
Mar.		Constant thereafter.				
Apr.						
May						
June						
July						
Aug.						
Sept.						
Oct.						
Nov.						
Dec.						

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Lt Col George

C.R.11.

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ANNEX "O"

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Agenda for Staff Meeting 12-27-41

(1) A-4l wants to an ounce the fact that the critical shipping situation practically demands that we modify our list of equipment going with aviation units on over-seas shipments. We are attempting to determine priority of shipping for equipment that must accompany troops and that which can go by smaller boats and further divide out those that can possibly be eliminated to save shipping space.

(2) AWPD--Readiness of air units for movement to Gymanist.

(3) Civilian Budget Committee attempting to work up a Statistical Method that will show graphically through the lack of balance between the plane, personnel, training and construction programs.

(4) Major Doolittle has reported to assist in coordinating the inter-relation of the whole system.

(5) Communications section--What division should it be under in the Air Staff.

(6) Question of memorandums and letter to GHQ instead of Buck Slips-A-3.

(7) All divisions to check on minutes of previous meetings and give progress report of items assigned to them for action.

(8) A-4 needs to know the plans for release to British and any others of Lend-Lease airplanes, particularly in order to determine what can be released in the way of armaments. All decisions with respect to the return of the flow of Lend-Lease equipment to normal channels should be furnished A-4.

(9) General Cousins--Plans for a central planning agency.

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To North Ireland

1 Interpln Comm Hq.
3 Permit Gps (I) each less 1 Sy.
3 Det. Control Sydns.

To Fiji

1 Sqn Pers (I)
1 Det HW & 557th Bn HW.
2 Decax } about 200 men
1 IC Det }

To "X"

3 Pers Gps (I) plus 3 Sydns (I)
3 Interp/ Control Sydns
557th Sig Bn, HW. (less dets)
6 Decax
2 IC Details

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Most Secret

12-28-41

FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

Forces now in Far East	Due in Far East January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between Jan. 15 and Feb. 1.	Tentatively planned or under order for Far East
18 Pursuit	1 Gp. B/H 35	1 Gp. B/H 35 plus	4 Pur. Gp. (320)
52 Dive Bomb.	1 Gp. Pur. 73	10 B-17, B-24	2 B/H Gp. (70)
48 Pilots, Pursuit	B/L A-24 52	[redacted] P-40	2 B/M Gp. (114)
12 B-17		67	1 B/L Gp. (57)
			plus reserves.

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFORE

UNITED STATES

Forces Now in the Far East	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East	
(a) Naval 2 Cruisers 1 Destroyers 2, Submarines 12 Patrol ~~Planes~~ Bombers	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None	(a)
(b) Army Philippines 40,000 ~~partially equipped motorized troops~~ as of December 22, 1941. Australia 2 Regts. Field Artillery Service Troops	(b) Army Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	(b) Army None	(b) Army Supplies & Gasoline	(b)
(c) Air Philippines Few ~~observation~~ planes Australia ~~40~~ 18 Pursuit planes ~~26~~ 12 Dive bombers 48 Pilots 12 B-17	(c) Air 55 Pursuit planes with Flight Crews	(c) Air 200 Pursuit planes Service Personnel	(c) Air 80 Heavy bombers 200 Pursuit planes by end of March	(c)

1 Sq B/A 35 1 Sq B/A 35 4 Pur Gp (320)
1 Sq Pur 73 B-17, B-24 2 B/M " (90)
1 Sq B/A T-24 10 2 B/M " (114)
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103 P-40 1 B/L " (69)

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFORE

UNITED STATES

Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East	Planned Future Reinforcements
(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval (b) Army (c) Air Plans not Complete
(b) Army Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	(b) Army None	(b) Army Supplies & Gasoline	
(c) Air 55 Pursuit planes with Flight Crews	(c) Air 200 Pursuit planes Service Personnel	(c) Air 80 Heavy bombers 200 Pursuit planes by end of March	

1 Sq B/A 35 — 1 Sq B/A 35 — 4 Pur Gp (320)
1 Sq Pur 93 — 10 B-17, B-24 — 2 B/M " (90) — Plus reserves
52 B/L A-20 — [illegible] — 2 B/M " (114)

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8.

B. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the Southwest Pacific Area. The present strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.

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EFFECTIVE STRENGTH as X

15 January 1942

~~EFFECTIVE~~

TYPE	UNITS	AIRPLANES First Line	Reserve
~~Heavy Bombers~~	1 ~~Group~~	~~0~~ 35	~~7~~
Pursuit	1 Group	73	0

1 February 1942

~~Heavy Bombers~~	2 ~~1~~ Groups	~~40~~ 80	~~1~~
Pursuit	~~0~~ 1 Groups	80	103

15 February 1942

Heavy Bombers	2 Groups	80 -	0
Light Bombers	1 Group	57	52 (A-24)
Pursuit	~~3~~ Groups *	~~320~~	113 -
	(1 Group Unprovided)		

After Feb 15, Total Force

Heavy Bombers	2 Groups	80	?
Medium Bombers	2 Groups	114	?
Light Bombers	1 Group	57	?
Pursuit	4 Groups	320	?

* Not provided for in Troop Basis

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SUPPORTING MEA UAVS FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

(The Far East area and adjacent regions)

Note by American-British Planning Staff.

Directive.

1. Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Joint Planning Committee.

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for insuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements.

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the Southwest Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, expected to be available in the Southwest Pacific area on

(a) 15 January, 1942.
(b) 1 February, 1942.

on the following alternative assumptions:

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.

(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.

(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold.

Recommendation.

2. ~~Our present policy regarding the Southwest Pacific is:~~ The general policy, therefore, should be

a. To reinforce ~~forces in~~ the Far East up to ~~a minimum~~ a maximum defensive strength as quickly as practicable, ~~relying, insofar as the United States is concerned, primarily on air reinforcements.~~

b. To oppose enemy penetration into the Netherlands East Indies.

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3 a. To hold the Malay Barrier as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area and to dispose forces in as great depth as possible, for the purpose of checking further Japanese advances.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China.

c. To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and and to and within the Far East Area.

d. To [redacted] reestablish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines Garrison.

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Present Policy. (Cont'd)

c. To defend Burma and to keep open the Burma Road to China.

d. To protect the lines of communication (1) from the United States to Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines and (2) the Indian Ocean routes to Australia, Netherlands East Indies and Malaya.

e. To establish and protect bases in Australia.

f. To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements.

Concept of Operations.

3. The present strength of forces in the Pacific and Far East, combined with the requirements of other theaters, limit the initial effort to a strategic defensive. ~~The most urgent needs are in connection with aircraft, ammunition, and the improvement and defense of bases, especially air bases.~~

4. As additional forces become available it will ultimately become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defense they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive.

4. The Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia should be reinforced by air, land and naval forces as speedily and effectively as is permitted by the requirements for the overall conduct of the war in order to:

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Forces and Reinforcements

54. The estimated strength of forces initially in the area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent, are shown in the attached table. Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard to the essential requirements of other theaters.

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a. Establish and hold an effective front against the Japanese movement southward.

b. Deny to the enemy use of the resources of the Netherlands East Indies.

c. Secure and develop base areas for use in an ultimate offensive.

Requirements elsewhere for both forces and shipping make it necessary initially to hold ground reinforcements for Australia to a minimum, but Australia should be reinforced when troops and transports can be spared. Meanwhile, Australian forces should defend the bases and installations established there.

Forces and Reinforcements.

5. The estimated strength of forces initially in the area and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached table.

General Conclusions.

6. The detailed disposition of reinforcements as they arrive in the area must be a matter for the local commanders but we consider that such decisions should be based on the following general principles:

a. Our initial reinforcements should be predominantly air forces and should be projected as far forward as is consistent with the maintenance of secure lines of communication and supply.

b. Java by reason of its central position is essential to the defense of the Malay barrier and to the security of the lines of communication forward.

Recommendations.

7. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific area is solved:

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Recommendations (Cont'd)

a. Under the assumption that the Philippines and Singapore both hold, the reinforcements available up to 1 February 1942 as shown on the attached table should go forward as now arranged subject to the ~~judgment~~ direction of ~~local~~ commanders. to whom assigned,

b. Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not, the U. S. reinforcements available up to 1 February 1942 be used to defend Borneo and the Malay Barrier considered as a whole, being allocated for this purpose by the senior U. S. Army Commander in the theater of operation in consultation with British and Dutch commanders. Under this assumption the disposition of British reinforcements is unaffected.

c. Under the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold, the reinforcements available up to 1 February 1942 be used for the defense of Burma, Australia and the Netherlands East Indies.

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFORE

~~GREAT~~ BRITAIN COMMONWEALTH

Forces Now in the Far East	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East
(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval
2 Cruisers 8 Destroyers.	5 additional escort vessels	2 Submarines	None
(b) Army	(b) Army (to Malaya)	(b) Army (to Malaya)	(b) Army (Malaya - February)
2 Ind. Divs) 1 Aus. Div) Malaya	1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div 1 AA Regt. (light) 1 AA Regt. (heavy) 1 Antitank Regt.	1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind. Div. 1 Sq. Light Tanks	2 AA Regts (light) 1 AA Regt (heavy)
(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air
Malaya 2 Bomber Sqns. 2 Bomber Recce Sqns. 6 Fighter Sqns. 2 T.B. Sqns. 1 G.R. Flying Boat Sqn. Burma ½ Bomber Sqn. ½ Fighter Sqn.	4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricans) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	None	None

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFORE

~~GREAT~~ BRITAIN COMMONWEALTH

Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East	Planned Future Reinforcements
(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval
5 additional escort vessels	2 Submarines	None	None
(b) Army (to Malaya)	(b) Army (to Malaya)	(b) Army (Malaya - February)	(b) Army (to Malaya)
1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div 1 AA Regt. (light) 1 AA Regt. (heavy) 1 Antitank Regt.	1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind. Div. 1 Sq. Light Tanks	2 AA Regts (light) 1 AA Regt (heavy)	1 Brig. Gp. 14 Ind. Div. 1 Div. Br. (less 1 Brig. Gp.) 1 Armd.Brig.(light tank) To Java, Kiangsu, Sumatra 2 Australian Divisions from Palestine To Burma 1 Ind.Div. (less 1 Brig.Gp.) 1 Brig.Gp. 17th Ind. Div. 1 Div. (5th or 34th Ind)
(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air
4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricans) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	None	None	2 Bomber Sqns. 5 Fighter Sqns. (Towards Requirements of 8 Bomber Sqns and 8 fighter Sqns.)

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFORE

AUSTRALIA

Forces ~~now~~ initially in the Far East

(a) Naval

2 Heavy Cruisers
2 Light Cruisers
4 Destroyers

(b) Army

Empire Forces

1 Div. (less Brig) Malaya
1 Brig. in Australia

Home Defense Forces

5 Divisions (Infantry)
2 Divisions (Cavalry)
1 Division (Armored)
(Not as yet equipped)

(c) Air

160 First line planes } Dec-7
300 - 400 Training planes
15,000 Air officers and men
40,000 In Training

DUTCH

Forces Now in the Far East

(a) Naval

4 Cruisers
7 Destroyers
15 Submarines
2 - 3 Submarines (Expected)
(Later)

(b) Army

3 Div's. Java
7 Bn's Sumatra
4 Bn's Borneo
1 Bn Celebes
1 Bn Timor
1 Bn Moluccas

(c) Air

6 Bomber Sqns.
4 Fighter Sqns.
108 Navy Aircraft
40 Patrol Planes } Dec. 7

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

Forces Now in the Far East	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East
(a) Naval 2 Cruisers Destroyers 27 Submarines 12 Patrol Planes	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None
(b) Army Philippines 40,000 partially equipped mostly native troops as of December 22, 1941. Australia 2 Regts. Field Artillery Service Troops	(b) Army Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	(b) Army None	(b) Army Supplies & Gasoline
(c) Air Philippines Few observation planes Australia ~~18 40~~ Pursuit planes ~~32 24~~ Dive bombers ~~48 Pilots~~ 11 B-17	(c) Air 55 Pursuit planes ~~with Flight Crews~~ 23 Bombers (H)	(c) Air ~~200 Pursuit planes Service Personnel~~ 69 Pursuit 57 Bombers (H)	(c) Air 80 Heavy bombers 200 Pursuit planes ~~by~~ by end of March 4 Pur Gp (32) 2 B/H Gp (70) 2 P/M Gp (114) 1 B/L Gp (57)

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East	Planned Future Reinforcements
(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval
(b) Army Small Arms Ammunition Artillery Ammunition AA Ammunition Gasoline	(b) Army None	(b) Army Supplies & Gasoline	(b) Army Plans not Complete
(c) Air 55 Pursuit planes ~~with Flight Crews~~ 23 Bombers (H)	(c) Air ~~200 Pursuit planes Service Personnel~~ 69 Pursuit 57 Bombers (H)	(c) Air 80 Heavy bombers 200 Pursuit planes by end of March 4 Pur Sqs (320) 2 B/H Sqs (70) 2 B/M Sqs (114) 1 B/L Sq (50)	(c) Air [Plus certain reserves]

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFORM GREAT BRITAIN

Forces Now in the Far East	Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East
(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval	(a) Naval
2 Cruisers 3 Destroyers	5 additional escort vessels	2 Submarines	None
(b) Army	(b) Army (to Malaya)	(b) Army (to Malaya)	(b) Army (Malaya - Petru
2 Ind. Divs) 1 Aus. Div) Malaya	1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div 1 AA Regt. (light) 1 AA Regt. (heavy) 1 Antitank Regt.	1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind. Div. 1 Sq. Light Tanks	2 AA Regts (light) 1 AA Regt (heavy)
(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air	(c) Air
Malaya 2 Bomber Sqns. 2 Bomber Recce Sqns. 6 Fighter Sqns. 2 T.B. Sqns. 1 G.R. Flying Boat Sqn. Burma ½ Bomber Sqn. ½ Fighter Sqn.	4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricans) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	None	None

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

GREAT BRITAIN

Due in Far East By January 15, 1942.	Due in Far East Between January 15 and February 1.	Tentatively Planned or Under Order for Far East	Planned Future Reinforcements
(a) Naval 5 additional escort vessels	(a) Naval 2 Submarines	(a) Naval None	(a) Naval None
(b) Army (to Malaya) 1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div 1 AA Regt. (light) 1 AA Regt. (heavy) 1 Antitank Regt.	(b) Army (to Malaya) 1 Brig. Gp, 17 Ind. Div. 1 Brig. Gp, 18 Br. Div. Drafts for 9 and 11 Ind. Div. 1 Sq. Light Tanks	(b) Army (Malaya - February) 2 AA Regts (light) 1 AA Regt (heavy)	(b) Army (to Malaya) 1 Brig. Gp. 14 Ind. Div. 1 Div. Br. (less 1 Brig. Gp.) 1 Armd.Brig.(light tank) To Java, Kiangsu, Sumatra 2 Australian Divisions from Palestine To Burma 1 Ind.Div. (less 1 Brig.Gp.) 1 Brig.Gp. 17th Ind. Div. 1 Div. (5th or 34th Ind)
(c) Air 4 PBY's 1 Fighter Sq. (51 Hurricans) 1 Bomber Sq. (Blenheims) 1 Bomber Recce (Hudsons)	(c) Air None	(c) Air None	(c) Air 2 Bomber Sqns. 5 Fighter Sqns. (Towards Requirements of 8 Bomber Sqns and 8 fighter Sqns.)

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

AUSTRALIA

Forces now in the Far East

(a) Naval

2 Heavy Cruisers
2 Light Cruisers
4 Destroyers

(b) Army

Empire Forces

1 Div. (less Brig) Malaya
1 Brig. in Australia

Home Defense Forces

5 Divisions (Infantry)
2 Divisions (Cavalry)
1 Division (Armored)
(Not as yet equipped)

(c) Air

160 First line planes
300 - 400 Training planes
15,000 Air officers and men
40,000 In Training

DUTCH

Forces Now in the Far East

(a) Naval

4 Cruisers
7 Destroyers
15 Submarines
2 - 3 Submarines (Expected)
(Later)

(b) Army

3 Div's. Java
7 Bn's Sumatra
4 Bn's Borneo
1 Bn Celebes
1 Bn Timor
1 Bn Moluccas

(c) Air

6 Bomber Sqns.
4 Fighter Sqns.
108 Navy Aircraft
40 Patrol Planes

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18 Pur.

52 B/L

[redacted]

12 B/H

[redacted] B/H (23)

[redacted] Pur. (55)

[redacted] (35)

[redacted] B/H (10)

Pur. (67)

45 B/H

To make total of:

4 Gp. Pur. (320)

2 Gps. B/H (70)

2 Gps. B/L (114)

1 Gps. B/L (57)

Plus Resrves

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FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR

UNITED STATES

Forces now in Far East	Due in Far East January 15, 1942	Due in Far East between Jan. 15 and Feb. 1.	Tentatively planned or under order for Far East
18 Pursuit	1 Gp. B/H 35	1 Gp. B/H 35 plus 10 B-17, B-24	4 Pur. Gp. (320)
52 Dive Bomb.	1 Gp. Pur. 73	65 P-40	2 B/H Gp. (70)
48 Pilots, Pursuit	B/L A-24 52		2 B/M Gp. (114)
12 B-17			1 B/L Gp. (57)
			plus reserves.

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Now in Far East	Due in Far East 1-15-42	Due in Far East between 1-15-42 & 2-1-42	Tentatively Scheduled or Under Orders for Far East
18 Pursuit	55 Pursuit	67 Pursuit	4 Pur Sqs. (320 planes)
52 B/L	23 B/M	57 B/M	2 B/M Sqs (72 planes)
~~52~~ B/M			2 B/M Sqs (112 planes)
11			1 B/L Sq (57 planes)
			[Plus certain reserves]

12
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

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September 8, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Release of Airplanes and Related Equipment for Defense Aid.

P.R.C

I. Discussion.
1. Our National policy dictates -

a. All possible aid, short of war, to those nations opposing the Axis powers.

b. The preservation of the integrity of the United States and its possessions.

2. a. The possibility of an Axis victory, between now and June 30, 1942 should be considered as a possibility, if we assume that the United States is not a direct participant.

b. The utilization by the United States, of all aircraft produced between now and June 30, 1942, will not provide the minimum requirements of the Army Air Forces essential to defense of the United States and i s possessions, particularly in heavy bombers. (Tabs - B,E,F)

c. Diversions of aircraft to the nations opposing the Axis beyond that recommended in II below, must be taken with cognizance of the risk to the security of the United States, in event of an Axis victory.

d. The aircraft requirements of the Army Air Forces for defense of the United States and its possessions have been determined by a previous study made by the Air Staff, entitled A-WPD/1.

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II. Action recommended.

1. That the following, in substance, be recommended to the President:

a. (1) The Anti-Axis Pool shall be given all aircraft produced under Defense Aid; all British contract production; all other foreign contract production (constituting over 30% of the August output of Army type combat airplanes); plus 15% of combat type airplanes produced for the Army Air Forces.

(2) The above distribution would result in diverting to the Anti-Axis Pool, 66% of the total tactical aircraft to be produced (exclusive of Navy contracts) between now and June 30, 1942, as follows:

Total estimated Production	Anti-Axis Pool	Army Air Forces
14802	9708	5094
100%	66%	34%

b. After equipment has been provided for the minimum Army Air Forces considered necessary to guarantee the integrity of the United States and its possessions (Tab-B), thirty per cent (30%) of all aircraft and related equipment produced for the Army Air Forces, (exclusive of training types), plus all aircraft produced under Defense Aid, shall be distributed to those nations opposing the Axis.

c. The following percentages, that might be applied in distributing aircraft and related equipment, are not submitted as a recommendation, but merely to afford a means of visualizing a distribution by such ratios. (Tab 1)

Great Britain	50%
U. S. S. R.	30%
China	10%
Others	10%

d. Make available to the nations opposing the Axis, and to South American republics fifteen per cent (15%) of all training facilities of the Army Air Forces.

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TAB 1

TAB 1

SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION OF AIRCRAFT AND ESTIMATED COSTS

1. Distribution of Aircraft

Types of Aircraft	Est. Army Production	15% of Est. Army Production	Estimated Defense Aid Production	Estimated British Contracts	Estimated Other Contracts	Total DEFENSE AID	On Hand In Army A. F. 6-30-42 Incl. Inventory 7-31-41	BRITISH SHARE 50% of Col. 3 & 4 plus Col. 5	USSR SHARE 30% of Col. 3 and 4
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
H/Bombers	626	94	5	139	-	238	603	188	30
M/Bombers	917	138	10	757	36	941	910	831	45
Dive and L/Bombers	463	69	1119	2116	78	3382	504	2710	356
Pursuit	3058	459	1609	2577	120	4765	3077	3611	620
Observation	389	58	317	7	-	382	-	194	112
TOTALS	5453	818	3060	5596	234 (a)	9708	5094	7534	1163

2. Estimates of Costs: (in millions of dollars)(b)

	Est. Cost of Airplane Complete			
H/Bombers	$387,787	$ 39	$ 19	$ 12
M/Bombers	267,055	40	20	12
Dive and /Bombers	128,000	152	76	46
Pursuit	122,332 - 2/3 of Planes 72,036 - 1/3 of Planes	126	63	38
Observation	24,767	9	5	3
TOTALS		$366	$183	$111

NOTES: (a) These airplanes not allocated under Cols. 9 to 12.
(b) Costs based on Cols. 3 and 4 - not including British and Foreign contracts.

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SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION OF AIRCRAFT AND ESTIMATED COSTS

...craft

...on	15% of Est. Army Production	Estimated Defense Aid Production	Estimated British Contracts	Estimated Other Contracts	Total DEFENSE AID	On Hand In Army A. F. 6-30-42 Incl. Inventory 7-31-41	BRITISH SHARE 50% of Col. 3 & 4 plus Col. 5	USSR SHARE 30% of Col. 3 and 4	CHINA SHARE 10% of Col. 3 and 4	OTHERS SHARE 10% of Col. 3 and 4
	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	94	5	139	-	238	603	188	30	10	10
	138	10	757	36	941	910	831	45	15	14
	69	1119	2116	78	3382	504	2710	356	119	119
	459	1609	2577	120	4765	3077	3611	620	207	207
	58	317	7	-	382	-	194	112	38	38
	818	3060	5596	234 (a)	9708	5094	7534	1163	389	388

...(in millions of dollars)(b)

...ost of Airplane Complete

...7,787	$ 39	$ 19	$ 12	$ 4	$ 4
...7,055	40	20	12	4	4
...3,000	152	76	46	15	15
...2,332 - 2/3 of Planes ...2,036 - 1/3 of Planes	126	63	38	12	12
...4,767	9	5	3	1	1
	$366	$183	$111	$35	$36

...nes not allocated under Cols. 9 to 12.
...on Cols. 3 and 4 - not including British and Foreign contracts.

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INDEX TO TABS

TAB 1 — Estimated Production of Aircraft and Recommended Distribution - Including Estimated Defense Aid Costs - Summary.

TAB A — The Military Situation as it Affects the Western Hemisphere.

TAB B — Minimum Requirements for the Defense of the United States and its Possessions.

TAB C — Possible Activation of Army Air Force Groups - a chart.

TAB D — Estimated United States Production of Army Type Airplanes Compared to Hemisphere Defense Requirements - a chart.

TAB E — Diversion to Defense Aid of Critical Types of Airplanes with resultant situations.

TAB F — Immediate requirements for Hemisphere Defense by Groups and their proposed locations, together with dates upon which they can be available under (1) using all aircraft produced for the Army Air Forces and (2) Army aircraft production with 15% deducted for Defense Aid.

TAB G — Cost Estimates of Bombs.

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TAB A

TAB
A

THE MILITARY SITUATION AS IT AFFECTS HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

A discussion outlining the necessity of creating adequate forces for the defense of the United States and its possessions.

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THE MILITARY SITUATION AS IT AFFECTS HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

1. Axis military potential in ground and air forces exceeds that of either Britain or Russia both in numbers and effectiveness at the present time.

2. In Russia the Axis powers, while undoubtedly taking heavy losses, are progressing in the campaign. The Russian Army has not been defeated, is still intact, and is offering strong resistance. However, important industrial and agricultural areas have been occupied by Axis forces and vital political and communication conters are under serious threat. Axis losses in Russia have not yet exceeded current capacity for replacement. The campaign may end in an Axis victory; a stabilization on a defensive line; or a negotiated peace favorable to the Axis. Such a peace might involve cooperation withAxis powers as has been the case with Vichy France. A Russian defeat, though not certain, is highly probable. A Russian victory is remote in the extreme.

3. Axis productive capacity is being increased by the output of French air and armament plants, and if success is attained in Russia, some use can be made of Russian facilities and raw materials, probably within a year.

4. As soon as Germany has completed offensive action in Russia, even though Russia is not wholly subjugated, British shipping may again expect heavy losses, and British industrial areas will again be subject to heavy air attack.

5. An all-out attack on Britain is then highly probable. Whether or not Britain can withstand the attack is problematical. Reports indicate that British defenses are weak, that forces are inadequate and that armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition are lacking. Britain's appeals for help are the best index as to the seriousness of the situation. In their representations to the United States, they have practically admitted that without armed intervention on the part of the United States, they cannot defeat the Axis powers.

6. The Axis powers occupy and control an extensive centrally located position, affording ample room for disposing their air forces within easy bombing range of vital areas in the British Isles.

7. Britain lacks both ground and air space in the British Isles and is reaching the saturation point for the proper disposition of her air forces. Her position with reference to Axis critical areas requires greater flying distance per mission than is required by Axis air forces based in occupied territory.

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8. Germany has a highly developed air-borne assault force which, because of its size and flexibility, may be a determining factor in the Battle of Britain.

9. British man power is approaching its limit, with a maximum of some 60 divisions against 300 for the Axis. The British Navy is not able to give adequate protection for Britain's sea-borne traffic and at the same time fulfill its defensive missions.

10. A review of Britain's strategic plans for continuation of the war present little other than a continuation of defensive action. There is the hope that negative measures and the Axis' past and present war effort will result in a weakening of the Axis war and economic machinery to an extent which will permit the final reduction of Germany with forces which otherwise could not provide even a remote possibility of success.

11. The situation relative to United States' forces is such that we are not in a position to give decisive military support to Britain or Russia at the present time. This situation will continue until such time as our forces receive adequate equipment and have had time to train in its use. Mobilization of our forces on the present scale without proper equipment has resulted in an attitude of futility among the citizen soldiers which has directly affected Army and civilian morale.

12. In the Pacific, the situation is tense. Axis success in Europe will probably encourage Japan to further expansion which may require military action by the United States.

13. In any planning or preparation, the United States must consider the imminent possibility of having to face an Axis dominated world alone.

14. Britain's classic blunder of misplaced reliance in an ally is a lesson which the United States cannot ignore.

15. It is, therefore, concluded that:

a. Victory on the part of Great Britain and her Allies cannot be visualized for the immediate future;

b. That an Axis victory is a possibility;

c. That victory by the Axis poses a threat to the Western Hemisphere which demands that the United States be ready to meet such an eventuality;

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d. That it is impossible to say definitely when a threat against the Western Hemisphere will develop. National security demands that the United States be prepared for such a threat.

e. That United States interests in the Western Hemisphere may be seriously threatened within the year following collapse of resistance to the Axis in Europe.

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TAB B

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS

TABULATION AND DISCUSSION
OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

1. Basic Consideration.

a. The minimum Air Force considered as essential for the defense of the security and integrity of the Western Hemisphere and United States possession is 27 bombardment groups and 33 pursuit groups.

b. The only type of bombardment airplane that fully meets all of the requirements for the Hemisphere Defense and defense of our possessions is the long-range bomber. It will be noted, however, that as an expedient, medium bombers have been substituted for heavy bombers in certain areas. While this substitution does effect the efficiency of Hemisphere Defense, it is essential due to the lack of available heavy bombers. In there areas, medium bombers do possess a certain degree of effectiveness.

c. There are certain vital and strategic areas, however, where medium bombers cannot be substituted for the long-range type without seriously affecting the air defense of these areas. Those locations, together with a number of heavy groups necessary at each, are tabulated below:

Location	Number of Groups
Philippine Islands	2
Hawaii	2
Panama	1
United States (East Coast)	1
Alaska	1
Puerto Rico	1
United States (West Coast)	1
Brazil	2
	11

It will be observed that the locations given above are highly strategic areas, and the defense of the United States proper and its possessions is vitally dependent upon maintaining thereat Air Forces capable of conducting operations at the maximum of efficiency. The bombardment airplanes located at each of the areas indicated cover vital and sensitive spots, the security of which is essential for the integrity of this Nation and its possessions. The forces indicated above, constitute the minimum forces considered essential for the protection of these areas. To go below that minimum might well be disastrous.

d. In the Philippines it is only the long-range bombardment airplane that possesses sufficient radius of action to cover the northeastern approaches to the China Sea, thereby constituting a continuing threat to

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Japanese operations in the direction of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay barrier. The vital strategic triangle, Hawaii-Alaska-West Coast, can only be closed by long-range bombardment aircraft. Medium range bombardment aircraft would fail to efficiently cover this area.

e. Aircraft carriers and "flying deckers" (merchant ships equipped with flying-off decks for aircraft) constitute a practical method for delivering aircraft attacks against vital and sensitive objectives on, or close to, our sea-coasts. Such objectives exist on both coasts such as the Wright Company, the Pratt and Whitney Company, the Hamilton Propeller Company and the Boeing, Douglas and Consolidated Companies. A few well placed bombs, on these installations, would seriously retard our entire aircraft production. Such a possibility must be prevented.

f. The northeastern section, and the West Coast, of the United States contain many concentrated industries vital to our aircraft protection. The long-range bomber permits continuing far-reaching reconnaissance of the sea approaches thereto and makes possible the attach of carriers of flying deckers before they can arrive close enough to our shores to launch aircraft attack against such objectives.

g. The extent of the Caribbean Defense Zone demands long-range bombardment aircraft. The importance of this area to our national defense makes mandatory that no threat be permitted to develop that might expose the Panama Canal and its facilities to air attack. Only the long-range bombardment airplane fully meets the air defense requirements in this area.

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3. Tabulation of Aircraft.

a. Breakdown by type and purpose.

Purpose	Types	Groups	Planes in Groups	25% Depot Reserve	Total
Hemisphere Defense	B-17, 24) or 29)	23	1084	391	1955
		(8	544	138	682) Note (1)
U.S. Possessions in Asia	B-17, 24) or 29)	4	272	68	340
	Bombardment Totals		1356	459	2295
Support of Ground Forces	Dive	8	395	96	491
	Light Bombers	5	285	71	356
Hemisphere Defense	Pursuit	31	4030	1008	5038
U.S. Possessions in Asia	Pursuit	2	260	65	325
	Pursuit Totals		4290	1073	5363
Support of Ground Forces	Observation (108 Sq)		1521	380	1901
	Photo	2	114	28	142
Air Transport for Air Infantry & Parat	Transport	16	1024	259	1283

Training Planes

Training and Maintaining replacements for Hemisphere and overseas possessions and to train and maintain personnel for offensive in Europe.	Bombardment trainers	3894
	Transport Trainers	74
	Observation Trainers	448
	Primary Training Planes	11115
	Basic Training Planes	11486
	Advance Training Planes (one engine)	3853
	Advance Training Planes (two engine)	7484
		37051

(1) These figures not included in totals. See discussion in par. 3b (8) below.

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b. Grand totals.

Types		
Heavy Bomber	8095	
Medium Bombers	(*)	
Dive & Light Bombers	937	
Pursuit	5563	
Photo	142	
Observation	1901	
Combat		10738
Transport		1128?
Training		27051
Grand Total		49071

*Medium Bombardment - See discussion in Paragraph 3-a below.

3. Requirements as to types.

a. Discussions

(1) As of late 1943 and continuing as long as the Axis Powers are engaged in wars in Europe, Asia, and Africa, and if this country is employing the utmost national effort to develop Air Forces to effectively intervene and win the war in Europe, security in the Western Hemisphere can be guaranteed by an Air Force comprising some one thousand five hundred sixty four B-17 or B-24 type, and four thousand and thirty pursuit type tactical operating airplanes. An Air Force of this composition would be stationed approximately as indicated hereinafter.

(2) Security in the Western Hemisphere under these conditions will be due in a large measure to the following two factors:

(a) The Axis Powers could not invade the Western Hemisphere until approximately six months after their victory in the European Theater.

(b) During those six months the manufacturing and training facilities that will have been developed to build and to maintain the required American Expeditionary Air Force in the

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in the European Theater will have expended the fifteen hundred and sixty four bombardment and four thousand and thirty pursuit airplanes to a force adequate for its defensive mission.

b. Conclusion.

With particular reference to a policy to be established in 1941 as to the distribution of military airplanes, it is therefore concluded that if the Hemisphere is to be defended against any eventuality, the airplanes set up in paragraph 3 above must be retained in the Western Hemisphere until the actual monthly output of our manufacturing and training facilities exceed the replacements required by that force. The date when such "excess" airplanes or personnel will be available do ends on the date that the "all out" manufacturing and training efforts are initiated. If such an effort were initiated in September 1941, and if there are no losses in our Air Forces due to war attrition, the date when "excess" airplanes and personnel will appear is sometime in 1944. The detailed breakdown of the air lanes which must be retained in the Western Hemisphere is as indicated below.

c. Heavy Bombardment.

(1) Twenty-three groups of the B-17 or B-24 type airplanes (fifteen hundred and sixty-four tactical operating airplanes plus twenty-five percent for operating reserve equals a total of nineteen fifty-five airplanes would be required.) Four groups would be required for the Philippines and Asia, totaling 340 airplanes.

(2) Eight groups of B-17 or B-24 type to be replaced by the first of the B-29 type airplanes that are manufactured in quantity (five hundred forty-four tactical operating airplanes plus a twenty-five percent operating reserve equals a total of six hundred and eighty-two airplanes) are required in the Western Hemisphere immediately as a reserve to attack any major movements of hostile forces toward this Hemisphere or to "bomb them out" if a small hostile unit succeeds in establishing a base. This eight group reserve force is to be eliminated when the twenty-three group force has been built up and the monthly output rate of airplanes and trained personnel exceeds two hundred B-29 type airplanes and crews per month. The operational training units

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which will be in the Western Hemisphere at that time together with that output rate during the six months interval between the collapse of the European Theater and the major attack on the Western Hemisphere combine to remove the necessity for retaining a reserve force in the Western Hemisphere.

d. Medium Bombardment.

No medium bombardment as a type is required for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. However, medium bombers must be retained as substitutes for heavys in at least equal numbers until the required number of heavys are on hand and in service. The balance of the available medium bombers will probably all be required for training unless it is possible to manufacture the two-engined trainers in the numbers indicated above.

e. Light Bombardment.

Five groups each of the dive bomber and light bomber types respectively are required for assignment of one group of each type to the five Air Support Commands for the necessary training in connection with the ground forces to be developed either to intervene in the European Theater or to defend the Western Hemisphere.

f. Pursuit.

Thirty-one groups of pursuit airplanes stationed as indicated below are required for the defense of the areas and installations at the points indicated.

No reserve in pursuit is set up because of the high monthly output rate of pursuit airplanes and the expectation that personnel training will be coordinated with airplane deliveries.

g. Observation and Photographic Aviation.

108 Observation squadrons and two Photo (Mapping) Groups are required for assignment to all of the Corps and Armies set up for the augmented force of the United States. A large portion of the total aviation requirements is held in the Western Hemisphere both for the training of the ground and air units concerned and for the vast amount of target towing that will be required by the expanding ground (anti-aircraft) and air (pursuit) units.

h. Transport Aviation.

Sixteen transport groups of twenty-eight to thirty passenger capacity will be required in the Western Hemisphere. This number of transport airplanes will serve the Air Forces involved and will provide carrying

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capacity for approximately one-eighteenth of all of the parachute troops and air-borne division personnel set up as the ultimate expansion plans of the ground forces of the United States Army.

4. Training Airplanes.

The number of training airplanes tabulated above is required to man and to provide the necessary replacements for the Army Air Forces designed to provide security in the Western Hemisphere, maintain a strategic defensive in the Far East and participate in an air offensive in the European Theater. If the primary training planes indicated can be made available by May 1942, and the other type training planes provided at appropriate subsequent intervals, all requirements in trained pilots and related personnel can be met by November 1942. If the date on which the numbers of primary training planes can be delivered, must be postponed, the date of meeting personnel requirements will be postponed accordingly. If the numbers of training planes indicated below are not made available, the total number of pilots and related trained personnel will be reduced accordingly and the personnel requirements of the ultimate American Air Force now under consideration may never be met.

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4. Discussion of Bombardment Air Bases from Strategical and Tactical Standpoint.

a. General.

It will be observed that, of the aircraft set up above, only 2295 bombardment airplanes and 5363 pursuit airplanes, or a total of 27 bombardment groups and 33 pursuit groups respectively, are set up for the initial Air Force mission, if we are forced to Hemisphere defense operations. However, it must be recognized that the aircraft set up for the support of the ground forces are of vital importance if the latter are to be trained for the mission of conducting modern warfare. This applies equally to transport aircraft which must be used both for the expeditious movement of vital Air Force supplies to its combat units and for the transportation and training of air infantry and parachute troops. The large number of training planes listed are essential if the United States is to train the personnel required for the aircraft tabulated above, and in addition, for a total of 854 bombardment airplanes and 4387 pursuit planes calculated as necessary for active participation of the Army Air Forces in offensive operations for the defeat of potential enemies of the United States. A discussion as to offensive operations has not been entered into due to the fact that the airplanes tabulated are primarily for Hemisphere defense, with the exception that the training planes required contemplate the training of personnel for both Hemisphere Defense and potential offensive operations.

b. Northeastern Sector.

Three Bombardment Groups, with a total of only 195 airplanes, exclusive of the 25% depot reserve, are to be provided in Newfoundland, the New England Area and the Norfolk Area. These Groups are dispersed over a coastline of 800 miles in length and in theory are mutually supporting. In practice, however, these 3 Groups should only be considered as the bare minimum that could be expected to operate against any invading force or even to perform search-attacks against hostile naval craft, carriers and flying deckers.

c. Caribbean Area.

One Heavy Bombardment Group each is contemplated for location at Puerto Rico and British Guiana. These 2 Groups (the outpost forces for the defense of the Canal) are at stations 70[illegible] miles apart. This is an extensive area for such a small force to cover and the minimum effectiveness can be anticipated. The total airplanes involved, exclusive of the reserve, are 204.

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d. Panama.

Two Heavy Bombardment Groups at Panama not only must "back up" the Groups defending the Caribbean, but must be prepared for operations over the Pacific. Here, only 136 bombers are set-up the defense of an area of the most vital importance to the United States.

e. Brazil.

Three Heavy Bombardment Groups located at Belem, Natal and Rio de Janeiro, with a total of 204 airplanes, are set up to protect a coastline of nearly 2,000 miles. This assuredly is a meager force considering the possibility that Brazil may be considered the entry point for Axis offensive operations.

f. West Coast of South America.

One Heavy Bombardment Group is set up for location in Chile and the other in Peru. While the threat to the West Coast of South America does not appear at this time to be vital, it cannot be dismissed from consideration. Two Heavy Bombardment Groups of 136 operating airplanes is an extremely small force even for this purpose.

g. Mexico.

One Heavy Bombardment Group of 68 operating airplanes is set up for Mexico with location at Acapulco. This Group provides a connecting link between the Panama Canal and continental United States, serving to reinforce either in the event of hostile operations from the West. The Central American Coast, over which this Group would operate, is well over 1500 miles in length.

h. United States Pacific Coast.

On the United States Pacific Coast, Three Heavy Bombardment Groups, with a total of 204 operating airplanes, are contemplated for Southern California, San Francisco and Seattle Areas. The vital importance of the West Coast is such that this force can be considered the barest possible minimum that could be considered.

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i. Alaska.

Two Heavy Bombardment Groups are proposed for Alaska, some 1800 miles from Seattle. A foothold in Alaska by a hostile force would provide operating bases for hostile air and naval craft which would well defeat any attempts to bring pressure upon Asiatic enemies, particularly Japan. The importance of Alaska to Hemisphere Defense and as a base for possible future offensive against Japan indicate that minimum security at the expense of only 136 operating bombardment airplanes is very small price to pay.

j. North Atlantic Area.

One Heavy Bombardment Group is contemplated for Greenland and Iceland, respectively. In the event of success of the Axis powers in Europe, Groups located at these bases would provide outposts of resistance, requiring their reduction before an attack could be made against the United States through the North Atlantic. The importance of setting up Groups at these locations is clear and unmistakable.

k. Hawaii.

The most vital outpost from the standpoint of Hemisphere Defense to the West is Hawaii. Three Heavy Bombardment Groups or a total of 204 operating airplanes are contemplated for base in Hawaii. In the event of an Axis victory, it is possible that a strong diversion, in the nature of attempted landings in the Hawaiian Islands might be attempted with a view to holding the fleet in the Pacific. A strong bombardment force could make Hawaii secure. Three Heavy Bombardment Groups, however, can be considered as the barest minimum and in the face of a major attack by large forces, it is questionable that this force would be adequate. Therefore, under no circumstances could the Hawaiian bombardment force be reduced without gravely endangering the security of the Pacific Coast.

l. Philippine Islands.

Four Heavy Bombardment Groups have been set up for maintenance of a strategical defensive in Asia and for the protection of American interests in the Philippines. Initially, four Groups would be based in the Philippines and later, depending upon the situation obtaining in that area, two of these groups might be based at other localities where secure airdromes and supplies were available or could be made available. Any threat against the Western Hemisphere would hardly be conducted were a strong American bombardment force present in Asia, capable of destroying Japanese shipping within its radius of action. Therefore, it is to the interest of the United States to establish and endeavor to maintain this force of only 272 operating bombardment airplanes.

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m. Tabulation of Bombardment Force Required for Hemisphere Defense and Overseas Possessions.

Operating Base	Groups	Total Planes	25% Reserve
Continental United States	5	340	85
New England Area	(1)	(68)	(17)
Norfolk Area	(1)	(68)	(17)
Southern California	(1)	(68)	(17)
San Francisco Bay	(1)	(68)	(17)
Seattle, Washington Area	(1)	(68)	(17)
Greenland	1	68	17
Newfoundland	1	68	17
Puerto Rico	1	68	17
British Guiana, Georgetown	1	68	17
Brazil	3	204	51
Belem	(1)	(68)	(17)
Natal	(1)	(68)	(17)
Rio de Janeiro	(1)	(68)	(17)
Chile, Antofagasta	1	68	17
Peru, Lima	1	68	17
Mexico, Acapulco	1	68	17
Panama	2	136	34
Hawaii	3	204	51
Alaska	2	136	34
Iceland	1	68	17
Philippine Islands	4	272	68
Total	27	1836	459

4. Discussion of Pursuit Requirements from Strategic and Tactical Standpoint.

It will be observed that a total of 33 Pursuit Groups with 5363 pursuit airplanes have been set up for a pursuit defense comparable to that contemplated for bombardment as discussed in the preceding paragraph. This pursuit force, which involves only 4290 operating airplanes including operational training units, is designed to cover the continental United States, Northern Atlantic bases (Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland), Caribbean Area, Bermuda, South America, Alaska, Hawaii and the Philippines. A discussion is not necessary to indicate

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that this spread as exceedingly thin defensive pursuit layer over an area involving half of the world. The following tabulation will indicate the extent of the dispersion of these pursuit units. In the event of an Axis victory, it is far more difficult to move pursuit units to possible threatened areas than any other type of aircraft and consequently, it is essential that they be located where attacks may be anticipated prior to the threat, otherwise it may be too late.

Pursuit Aviation Required.

a.	Continental United States	12	Groups	@	130	planes each
b.	Iceland	1	"	"	"	"
c.	Newfoundland, Greenland and Labrador	2	"	"	"	"
d.	Bermuda	½	"	"	"	"
e.	Bahamas and Jamaica	½	"	"	"	"
f.	Puerto Rico	1	"	"	"	"
g.	Antigua					
h.	Saint Lucia					
i.	Trinidad	1½	"	"	"	"
j.	British Guiana					
k.	Other Latin-American and United States Bases	6	"	"	"	"
l.	Panama	2	"	"	"	"
m.	Hawaii	3	"	"	"	"
n.	Alaska	1½	"	"	"	"
o.	Philippines	2	"	"	"	"
	TOTAL	33	Groups,	4290	Airplanes	
	25% Depot Reserve			1073	"	
	TOTAL				5363	Airplanes

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TAB C

POSSIBLE ACTIVATION OF ARMY AIR FORCE GROUPS
(Chart inclosed in mailing tube appended)

TAB
C

A chart including tabulations and showing:

a. Number of groups of bombardment and pursuit that can be activated utilizing all aircraft to be produced for the Army Air Forces.

b. Tables showing the number of aircraft available and to be produced (less attrition) from July 31, 1941 to June 30, 1942.

c. Tables showing total combat airplanes to be produced from July 30, 1941 to June 30, 1942.

d. Tables showing total pilot requirements for airplanes to be produced for the Army Air Forces and emphasizing that all aircraft to be produced for the Army Air Forces can be manned.

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Tab - D

ESTIMATED UNITED STATES PRODUCTION OF ARMY TYPE AIRPLANES
COMPARED TO HEMISPHERE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

- August 1, 1941, to June 30, 1942 -

TAB
D

(A chart appended in mailing tube)

Graph and tabulations pertaining to

Heavy Bombardment
Medium Bombardment
Pursuit
Light Bombardment
Training

Outlining total estimated production and Hemisphere Defense requirements.

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TAB E

TABULATIONS PERTAINING TO DIVERSION TO DEFENSE AID
OF CRITICAL TYPES OF AIRPLANES

Heavy Bombardment - Tab E-1
Medium Bombardment - Tab E-2
Pursuit - Tab E-3
Light & Dive Bomb. - Tab E-4

TAB
E

Outlining the following data:

(1) Total production of airplanes exclusive of Navy contracts to June 30, 1942.

(2) Numbers of airplanes that would be diverted under three percentage ratios.

(3) Situation obtaining under each diversion ratio.

(4) Groups available to and required by Army Air Forces under each diversion ratio.

(5) Percentage of production for Army Air Forces and Defense Aid under each diversion ratio.

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Tab E-1

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HEAVY BOMBARDMENT AIRPLANES

Airplanes Produced For	AAF On Hand 7-31-41	Total Production by 6-30-42	AAF Airplanes Available for Defense Aid is Diverted at Rates Noted			Situation Under 15% Diversion		Situation Under 30% Diversion		Situation Under 45% Diversion	
			15%	30%	45%	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid
Army Air Forces	98	626	94	188	282	603	94	509	188	415	282
Defense Aid		5					5		5		5
British Contracts		139					139		139		139
Other Foreign Contracts		0									
TOTAL AIRPLANES	98	770				603	238	509	332	415	426
Groups Available Under Conditions Noted						8		7		6	
Groups Required						11		11		11	
Distribution of Airplanes Produced to June 30, 1942 under Conditions Noted						532	238	438	332	344	426
Distribution of Airplanes by Percentages Under Conditions Noted						69.09%	30.91%	56.88%	43.12%	44.68%	55.32%

NOTES:
Total figures include estimated attrition of 3%.

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Tab E-2

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MEDIUM BOMBARDMENT AIRPLANES

Airplanes Produced for	AAF On hand 7-31-41	Total Production by 6-30-42	AAF airplanes available for Defense Aid is diverted at rates noted			Situation under 15% Diversion		Situation under 30% Diversion		Situation under 45% Diversion	
			15%	30%	45%	On hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Defense Aid	On hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Defense Aid	O/H AAF 6/30	Diverted for Def. Aid
Army Air Forces	182	917	138	275	413	910	138	773	275	635	413
Defense Aid		10					10		10		10
British Contracts		757					757		757		757
Other Foreign Contracts		36					36		36		36
TOTAL AIRPLANES	182	1720				910	941	773	1078	635	1216
Groups available under conditions noted						10		9		7	
Groups required						16		16		16	
		Distribution of airplanes produced to June 30, 1942 under conditions noted.				779	941	642	1078	504	1216
		Distribution of airplanes by percentages under conditions noted.				45.29%	54.71%	37.33%	62.67%	29.30%	70.70%

NOTES: Total figures include estimated attrition of 3%

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Tab E-3 SECRET

PURSUIT

Airplanes Produced For	AAF On Hand 7-31-41	Total Production by 6-30-42	AAF Airplanes Available for Defense Aid is Diverted at Rates Noted			Situation Under 15% Diversion		Situation Under 30% Diversion		Situation Under 45% Diversion	
			15%	30%	45%	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid
Army Air Forces	668	3058	459	917	1376	3077	459	2619	917	2160	1376
Defense Aid		1609					1609		1609		1609
British Contracts		2577					2577		2577		2577
Other Foreign Contracts		120					120		120		120
TOTAL AIRPLANES	668	7364				3077	4765	2619	5223	2160	5682
Groups Available Under Conditions Noted						23		20		16	
Groups Required						27		27		27	
Distribution of Airplanes Produced to June 30, 1942 under Conditions Noted						2599	4765	2141	5223	1682	5682
Distribution of Airplanes by Percentages Under Conditions Noted						35.29%	64.71%	29.07%	70.93%	22.84%	77.16%

NOTE:
Total figures include estimated attrition of 3%.

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Tab E-4

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BOMBARDMENT - LIGHT AND DIVE

Airplanes Produced For	AAF On Hand 7-31-41	Total Production by 6-30-42	AAF Airplanes Available for Defense Aid is Diverted at Rates Noted			Situation Under 15% Diversion		Situation Under 30% Diversion		Situation Under 45% Diversion	
			15%	30%	45%	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid	On Hand AAF by 6-30-42	Diverted for Def. Aid
Army Air Forces	154	463	69	139	208	504	69	434	139	365	208
Defense Aid		1119					1119		1119		1119
British		2116					2116		2116		2116
Other Foreign Contracts		78					78		78		78
TOTAL AIRPLANES	154	3776				504	3382	434	3452	365	3521
Groups Available Under Conditions Noted						8		7		6	
Groups Required						10		10		10	
Distribution of Airplanes Produced to June 30, 1942 under Conditions Noted						394	3382	324	3452	255	3521
Distribution of Airplanes by Percentages Under Conditions Noted						10.43%	89.57%	8.58%	91.42%	6.75%	93.25%

NOTE:
Total figures include estimated attrition of 3%.

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TAB F-1

IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS FOR HEMISPHERE DEFENSE - TO JUNE 30, 1942

HEAVY BOMBERS

6

Location	Required Number of Gps	Airplanes Required (1)	Availability Based on AAF Production (By Groups)	Availability Based on Diverting 15% of AI Prod to Def. Aid
Philippine Islands	2	136	1 October 1941 1 January 1942	1 October 1941 1 January 1942
Hawaii	2	136	1 January 1942 1 February 1942	1 February 1942 1 March 1942
Panama	1	68	1 March 1942	1 March 1942
U.S. - East Coast (2)	1	68	1 April 1942	1 April 1942
Alaska	1	68	1 April 1942	1 May 1942
Puerto Rico	1	68	1 May 1942	1 June 1942
U.S. - West Coast	1	68	1 May 1942	(1 Short)
Brazil	2	136	1 June 1942 (2 Short)	(2 Short)
TOTALS	11	748	10 (2 Short) (3)	8 (3 Short)

NOTES: (1) Does not include 25% Depot Reserve.
(2) To be moved to Newfoundland in an emergency.
(3) Must be substituted with medium bombers.

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TAB F-2

IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS FOR HEMISPHERE DEFENSE - TO JUNE 30, 1942

MEDIUM BOMBERS - AS SUBSTITUTES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS

Location	Required Number of Gps	Airplanes Required (1)	Availability Based on AAF Production (By Groups)	Availability Based on Diverting 15% of AF Prod. to Def. Aid
U.S. - East Coast	2	170	2 October 1941	2 October 1941
U.S. - West Coast	2	170	1 October 1941 1 December 1941	1 October 1941 1 January 1942
Alaska	1	85	1 January 1942	1 March 1942
Newfoundland	2	170	1 March 1942 1 June 1942	1 March 1942 (1 Short)
Hawaii	1	85	1 April 1942	1 April 1942
Panama	1	85	1 April 1942	1 May 1942
Brazil	2	170	2 May 1942	1 May 1942 1 June 1942
Caribbean Area	1	85	1 June 1942	(1 Short)
S. America - West Coast	2	170	(2 Short)	(2 Short)
Mexico	1	85	(1 Short)	(1 Short)
Philippines	2	170	M/B Not Suitable	-
TOTALS	17	1445	12 (5 Short)	10 (7 Short)

NOTE: (1) Does not include 25% Depot Reserve.

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TAB F-3

IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS FOR HEMISPHERE DEFENSE - TO JUNE 30, 1942

PURSUIT
(Fighters & Interceptors)

Location	Required Number of Ops	Airplanes Required (1)	Availability Based on AAF Production (By Groups)	Availability Based on Diverting 15% of AF Prod. to Def. Aid
Philippine Islands	2	260	2 October 1941	2 October 1941
Hawaii	2	260	2 October 1941	2 October 1941
Panama	2	260	2 October 1941	2 October 1941
Alaska	1	130	1 October 1941	1 October 1941
Iceland	1	130	1 November 1941	1 November 1941
Puerto Rico	1	130	1 December 1941	1 December 1941
Newfoundland	1	130	1 December 1941	1 December 1941
Trinidad (or other Caribbean Area)	1	130	1 December 1941	1 January 1942
Greenland	1	130	1 January 1942	1 January 1942
Continental United States	12	1560	4 January 1942 3 March 1942 1 April 1942 3 May 1942 1 June 1942	3 February 1942 2 March 1942 2 April 1942 2 May 1942 2 June 1942 (1 Short)
Brazil	3	390	1 June 1942 (2 Short)	(3 Short)
TOTALS	27	3510	25 (2 Short)	23 (4 Short)

NOTE: (1) Does not include 25% Depot Reserve.

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TAB G

COST ESTIMATES OF AIRCRAFT AND BOMBS

Tab G-1 Tabulations outlining the estimated costs of the aircraft diverted from Army Air Forces production and Lease Lend production.

Tab G-2 Tabulations of bombs for the Army Air Forces required for 85% of the production retained, and for the proportionate amount of aircraft diverted to aid of the USSR.

TAB G

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TAB G-1

BOMB DATA

Requirements in bombs for the Army Air Forces and those which can be made available to the USSR, based upon the USSR receiving 35% of the airplanes purchased for Defense Aid and of the 15% of the Army Air Force airplanes recommended to be diverted.

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REQUIREMENT FOR BOMBS - HEAVY & MEDIUM BOMBARDMENT ON MISSION BASIS:

From Minutes, etc. of 5 May 1941:			For Defense Aid Russia - Etc
1000#	-	16%	15%
500#	-	23%	25%
300#	-	24%	30%
100#	-	9%	30
		72%	100%
(2000#	-	8%	
Incend.	-	20%	
		100%	

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TAB G-2

OUR REQUIREMENTS IN BOMBS (on June 30, 1942) OF THE FOUR SIZES INDICATED. (Use normal Bomb loading)

Use revised percentage of missions for Russians. (1000#—15%
" total of 10 missions for Russians. (500#—25%
(300#—30%
(100#—30%

Type Airplane	Bomb Size	No. Msns w/ea. size	No. B. p/msn	No. B. for life ea. A/P	No. A/P on 6/30/42	Total Bombs for our A/P 1000#	500#	300#	100#
B-17	(1000#	1.5	2	3	30	90			
	(500#	2.5	4	10			300		
	(300#	3	8	24				720	
	(100#	3	20	60					1800
B-24	(1000#	1.5	2	3	None				
	(500#	2.5	4	10					
	(300#	3.0	8	24					
	(100#	3.0	20	60					
B-25	(1000#	1.5	2	3	None				
	(500#	2.5	4	10					
	(300#	3.0	6	18					
	(100#	3.0	12	36					
B-26	(1000#	1.5	2	3	45	135			
	(500#	2.5	4	10			450		
	(300#	3.0	8	24				1080	
	(100#	3.0	20	60					2700
						225	750	1800	4500

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BOMB COSTS

Weight	Cost per bomb	Total value of items for transfer to Russia
1,000# bomb	$306.80	$ 69,030.00
500# "	177.00	132,750.00
300# "	103.69	186,642.00
100# "	61.21	275,445.00
		$ 663,867.00

Note:

As of 9-8-41 the G-4 Division of the General Staff has been directed by the Chief of Staff to provide:

27,000* ----- 100# bombs
3,000 ----- 500# bombs

*3,000 as of Aug. 31st and 6,000 per month Sept.-Oct.

Recommendation: (1) Inasmuch as the Air Corps is faced with critical shortages in the heaviest caliber bombs (1,000 lbs. and up) until the end of calendar 1942, it is recommended that the Russians be provided 500 lbs. bombs (450) in lieu of the 1,000 lbs. bombs (225) requested.

(2) In the absence of intervening conflict involving the Army Air Corps, it is believed that bombs can be provided for the airplanes set up for diversion by June, 1942.

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AIRPLANES

A TACTICAL DEFENSE FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF 3,000 ADDITIONAL AIRPLANES OVER AND ABOVE THOSE ON HA

FISCAL YEAR 1941), NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT THE WPD PROGRAM (2700) LESS RESERVE REQUIREMENTS.

WAR DEPARTMENT
E OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PRINTED MATTER

145.81-28
31 May 1941

P.R.C.

145.81-24

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PROCUREMENT OF 3,000 ADDITIONAL AIRPLANES OVER AND ABOVE THOSE ON HAND OR AUTHORIZED FOR PROCUREMENT (INCLUDING

DED TO IMPLEMENT THE WPD PROGRAM (2700) LESS RESERVE REQUIREMENTS.

PRINTED MATTER

PENALTY
PAY

ENVELOPE NO. 3
DRAWER 2.

MICROFILMED

45.81-28
31 May 41

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A tactical defense for the procurement of 3,000 additional airplanes over and a
procurement (including Fiscal Year 1941), needed to implement the WPD Progra

TYPES	A	B	C	D	E	
	Number of Units	Number of airplanes needed to equip units operating	Maintenance quota @ 20%	B + C = Number needed	On hand consider under pr	
					Suitable on hand or under procurement prior to F.Y. 1941	
Pursuit (Int.)	12 Gps.	960	192	1,152	710	
Pursuit (Ftr.)	5 Gps.	210	42	252	79	
Bomber (H)	5 Gps.	190	38	228	0	
Bomber (M)	15 Gps.	750	150	900	561	*200 66
Bomber (L) Army Reconnaissance	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	198	186	

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May 31, 1940
~~May 28, 1940~~

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ional airplanes over and above those on hand or authorized for
implement the WPD Program (2700), less Reserve requirements. ***

D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
B + C = Number needed	On hand considered as suitable or under procurement			Shortage to be procured D - G	Prototype	Cost per airplane complete including GFE, Signal and Ordnance in thousands of dollars	Total cost of each type in millions of dollars	Cost each complete including Signal and Ordnance but less spare parts and engines. (In thousands of Dollars)	Total cost in thousands of Dollars at the price given in column L
	Suitable on hand or under procurement prior to F.Y. 1941	Fiscal Year 1941	E + F						
1,152	710	37	747	405	P-46	62.0	25.1	60.0	24,300
252	79		79	173	P-38	154.5	26.7	150.0	25,950
228	0	6	6	222	B-17D	382.5	84.9	400.0	88,800
900	561	*200 B-17 66 B-25	827	**** 73	B-25	166.0	12.1	400.0	29,200#
198	186		186	12	A-20	151.0	1.8	150.0	1,800

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TYPES	Number of Units	Number of airplanes needed equip units operating	Maintenance quota @ 20%	B & C = Number needed	Suitable on hand or under procurement prior to F.Y. 1941	Fiscal Year 1941
Pursuit (Int.)	12 Gps.	960	192	1,152	710	3
Pursuit (Ftr.)	5 Gps.	210	42	252	79	
Bomber (H)	5 Gps.	190	38	228	0	
Bomber (M)	15 Gps.	750	150	900	561	*200 B-1 66 B-2
Bomber (L)) Army Reconnaissance)	3 Gps.	165	33	198	186	
C & D		364	73	437	710	
Transport - Materiel Division	8 Sqdns.	96	19	115	83	
Amphibian		40	8	48	30	1
Transport for Wings	15 Sqdns.	180	40	220	0	
Primary (PT)		1,750	0	1,750	950	80
Basic (BT)		1,600	0	1,600	801	80
Advance (SE)		1,450	0	1,450	293	3
Advance (TE)		620	0	620	0	
AT-1, 2 per Squadron, Base, etc.	302	604	121	725	0	60
Miscellaneous Combat		664	133	797	Sufficient	
Totals						

* These airplanes will be used to rearm certain Bombardment Units included in the Current
** No spare engines or spare parts are included in this figure.
*** The most modern types of airplanes that can be procured at this time are estimated for.
**** As many of these as can be procured with money available should be B-17D type.
\# These airplanes all to be B-17D type.

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	under procurement								
	Suitable on hand or under procurement prior to F.Y. 1941	Fiscal Year 1941	E & F	Shortage to be procured D -	Prototype	Cost per airplane complete including GFE, Signal and Ordnance in thousands of dollars	Total cost of each type in millions of dollars	Cost each complete including Signal and Ordnance but less spare parts and engines. (In thousands of Dollars	Total cost in thousands of Dollars at the price given in column L
52	710	37	747	405	P-46	62.0	25.1	60.0	24,300
52	79		79	173	P-38	154.5	26.7	150.0	25,950
28	0	6	6	222	B-17D	382.5	84.9	400.0	88,800
00	561	*200 B-17 66 B-25	827	**** 73	B-25	166.0	12.1	400.0	29,200#
98	186		186	12	A-20	151.0	1.8	150.0	1,800
37	710		710	0					
15	83	6	89	26		166.5	4.3	120.0	3,120
48	30	14	44	4		234.0	.9	270.0	1,080
20	0		0	220		166.5	36.6	120.0	26,400
50	950	800	1,750	0					
00	801	800	1,601	0					
50	293	37	330	1,120		29.7	33.3	30.0	33,600
20	0	0	0	620		100.0	62.	100.0	62,000
25	0	600	600	125		29.7	3.7	30.0	3,750
97	Sufficient	0	Sufficient	0					
				3,000			291.4**		300,000

e included in the Current Expansion Program.

e time are estimated for.
d be B-17D type.

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Envelope 3.

Drawer 2

Chart - Tactical defense for procurement of 3,000 additional airplanes

dated 5-31-41

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Col. R. O. Williams
Spec. Plans. AAS.
Rm 5E-107K

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INDEX

P.R.C.

MISSION OF TORCH.

ALLIED AFRICAN AIR FORCES.

ESTIMATED AIR FORCE REQUIRED FOR NORTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVES.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES -- GERMAN-ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

RANGES TO GERMAN STRATEGIC TARGETS FROM TUNISIA, SICILY AND SARDINIA (MAP).

EXISTING AND POTENTIAL AIR BASES IN CORSICA & SARDINIA (MAP).

DEFENSES - STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR (MAP).

CLIMATOLOGY OF BOMBING OPERATIONS FROM NORTHEAST SPAIN ON WESTERN HALF OF GERMANY.

AIRPORT DIRECTORY - NORTH AFRICA.

THE WEATHER FACTOR IN BOMBING GERMANY FROM ENGLISH BASES.

ESTIMATE OF THE RUSSIAN SUPPLY SITUATION.

PORTS AND RAILWAYS - FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

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At the earliest possible date the operation will be conducted with a view to accomplishing as rapidly as possible the following objectives.

1. The establishment of lodgements which are mutually supporting in the Agidir, Marrakech, Casablanca, Rabat and Fez area in French Morocco and in the Mostaganem, Mascara and Oran area in Algeria.

2. In order to acquire complete control of the area including French Morocco, Spanish Morocco (if the situation requires) and Western Algeria, the rapid exploitation of those areas and to facilitate the extension of effective ground and air operations toward the east.

3. Operations combining air, ground and sea with a view to insure the complete control by the United Nations of the entire North African area from Tunisia to Rio de Oro, inclusive, and to facilitate the operations by air against the enemies installations and forces in the Mediterranean Area.



MISSION OF TORCH

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ALLIED AFRICAN AIR FORCES



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NA

Capitulation

285

43 114 211

Ftr 640

Obs 118 12
+Rec

Trans 156

453 1686

Total HQ 166
HQ 547
Ftr 1647
Obs 230
Tr. 156
3139

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12th AF

Roughly 1433 airplanes in VA

British 8th Army	1237
" 1st "	154
12th AF	1433
Total	3119

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DAILY POSITION OF TWELF AIR FORCE

NOVEMBER 20, 1942

U N I T	TYPE	GROUND ECHELON	AIR ECHELON
		TRAINING	
321st Bomb Gp. (M)	B-25C	Walterboro, S.C.	Walterboro, S.C.
27th Bomb Gp. (L)	A-20B	Camp Kilmer	Harding Fld, La.
		STAGING	
320th Bomb Gp. (M)	B-26B	Ar. U.K. 10/2	Ft. Wayne
		ENROUTE	
310th Bomb Gp. (M)	B-25C	Due in Africa	Started 9/18
47th Bomb Gp. (L)	A-20B	Det. Ar. Africa	Started 9/19
319th Bomb Gp. (M)	B-26B	Ar. U.K. 10/2	Started 9/21
68th Obs.Gp.(A-20Sqs)	A-20B	Det. Ar. U.K.	Started 11/8
17th Bomb Gp. (M)	B-26B	Camp Kilmer	Started 11/18
	ARRIVED IN	U.K. OR BEYOND	
15th Bomb Sq. (L)	DB-7	Ar. U.K. 5/14	Ar. U.K. 5/14
31st Ftr. Gp.	Spit.	Ar. U.K. 6/9	Ar. U.K. 6/9-7/12
52nd Ftr. Gp.	Spit.	Ar. U.K. 8/17	Ar. U.K. 7/12
97th Bomb Gp. (H)	B-17E	Ar. U.K. 6/9	Ar. U.K. 7/2-7/28
1st Ftr. Gp.	P-38F	Ar. U.K. 6/9	Ar. U.K. 7/9-7/29
60th T.C. Gp.	C-47/53	Ar. U.K. 7/25	Ar. U.K. 7/6-7/30
301st Bomb Gp. (H)	B-17F	Ar. U.K. 8/18	Ar. U.K. 7/29-8/17
14th Ftr.Gp. less1sq	P-38F	Ar. U.K. 8/18	Ar. U.K. 8/1-8/24
64th T.C. Gp.	C-47/53	Ar. U.K. 8/18	Ar. U.K. 8/16-8/27
5th Ph.Rcn.Sq.	F-4	Ar. U.K. 7/13	Ar. U.K. 8/16-8/27
306th Bomb Gp. (H)	B-17F	Ar. U.K. 9/6	Ar. U.K. 9/7-9/12
350th Ftr. Gp.	P-400	Due in Africa	Activ. in U.K.
15th Map. Sq.	B-17F	Ar. U.K. 9/10	Ar. U.K. 9/30
12th Ph.Rcn.Sq.	F-4	Due in Africa	Ar. U.K. 10/2
82nd Ftr. Gp.	P-38F/G	Ar. U.K. 10/2	Ar. U.K. 10/2
81st Ftr. Gp.	P-400	Det. Ar.U.K. 10/2	Ar. U.K. 10/2
68th Obs.Gp.(P-39Sqs)	P-39	Ar. U.K. 10/2	Ar. U.K. 10/2
91st Bomb Gp.	B-17F	Ar. U.K. 9/10	Ar. U.K. 9/30-10/21
62nd T.C. Gp.	C-47/53	Ar. U.K. 9/6	Ar. U.K. 9/24-10/30
33rd Ftr. Gp.	P-40F	Det. Ar. Africa	Ar. Africa 10/9

LOCATION OF FINAL TYPE AIRCRAFT					
POSITION	BOMBERS (H)	(M)	(L)	Ftr.	Troop Car.
Training Area	0	36	0	0	0
Enr.S.A.orP.O.E.	3	0	2	21	0
Staging Area	40	65	0	0	0
P.O.E.	-	-	0	54	-
ENROUTE:					
By Boat -	-	-	0	62	-
By Air via U.K.					
Presque Isle	10#	0	1	0	0
Goose	0	5	1	0	0
Gander	1	0	0	0	0
Narsarssuak	6	28	7	1#	0
Iceland	1	2	4	0	0
By Air-Direct					
Morrison	0	8	0	0	0
Puerto Rico	0	14	1#	0	0
Departed	0	27	0	0	0
Ascension	0	0	1	0	0
Takoradi	0	0	32	0	0
Ar. in UK, not yet departed	145	68	43	227*	17
Ar. in Africa	16	10	0	207	142
	222	263	92	572	159

* Including 26 F-4s
\# Including 1 damaged

AIRCRAFT DIVISION - AFROM

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A/c planned for Caribbean

West

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A/C Flown for Crew

Date		Case	Type	A/C	PIC		

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Air Force Requirements

1. Requirements for Eastern Continental Air Command

a. For 1st phase (D Day + D+6 inclusive)

No. of Squadrons	No. A/C	Mission
5 Fighter	90	Fighter Defense of Atlantic Coast
1 Army Cooperation	12	Army support
1 " Bomb	12	
1 Composite	24	Army support, Anti-Submarine Patrol, Air-Sea Rescue
1/3 Photographic Unit	6	Reconnaissance

b. Added requirements for 2nd phase (D+7 to D+30 inclusive)

6 Fighter	144	Fighter support of Ground Forces, Air Defense of Communications Zone Areas
2 Night Fighter	24	
1 Army Cooperation	12	Army support
1 " Bomb	12	
2 Med Bomb	24	Strategic bombardment, Anti-Submarine Patrol
1 Gen Reconnaissance	18	Anti-Submarine Patrol
1 Torpedo Bomb	12	
1 Flying Boat	9	

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(Operational)

Total A/c (Br) in CAMs area here

Type	No A/c	
M Bomb	105	
Torpedo bomb	88	
L Bomb	305	✓
[illegible]	190	✓
H Bomb	24	✓
M3 Fighter	63	✓
Obsn [illegible]	14	✓
Flying [illegible]	4	✓
	793 - A/c	

Total A/c (operational) in Western area not incl. A&F

Type	No A/c
Bomb	67
Fighters	224
Obsn	7
Transport	36.

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8TH AF

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DAILY POSITION OF ~~SECRET~~ EIGHTH AIR FORCE

~~NOVEMBER 20, 1942~~

UNIT	TYPE	GROUND ECHELON	AIR ECHELON
		TRAINING	
322nd Bomb Gp. (M)	B-26B	Ft. Dix	Lakeland, Fla.
56th Ftr. Gp.	P-47	Bridgeport, Conn.	Bridgeport, Conn.
		STAGING	
13th Ph.Rcn.Sq.	F-5	Ft. Dix	Ft. Dix
78th Ftr. Gp.	P-38F	Ft. Dix	Ft. Dix
		ENROUTE	
315th T.C.Gp. (-2sq)	C-47/53	Ft. Dix	Started 10/29
		IN THEATRE	
92nd Bomb Gp. (H)	B-17F	Ar. 8/18	Ar. 8/16 - 8/27
93rd Bomb Gp. (H)	B-24D	Ar. 9/6	Ar. 9/5 - 9/12
4th Ftr. Gp.	Spit.	To go later	(From Eagle Sqs)
67th Obs. Gp.	P-51/A-20B	Ar. 9/10	Ar. 10/2
44th Bomb Gp.(-1sq)	B-24D	Ar. 9/10	Ar. 9/30 - 10/9
303rd Bomb Gp. (H)	B-17F	Ar. 9/10	Ar. 10/21 - 10/26
305th Bomb Gp. (H)	B-17F	Ar. 9/10	Ar. 10/26 - 10/31

LOCATION OF FINAL POSITION	TYPE AIRCRAFT BOMBERS (H)	(M)	(L)	Ftrs.	Troop Car.
Training Area	0	12	0	0	0
Enr.S.A.orP.O.E.	34	0	0	3	0
Staging Area	10	0	0	0	0
P.O.E.	-	-	0	100*	0
ENROUTE:					
By Air -					
Presque Isle	2#	0	0	0	1
Goose	0	0	0	0	4
Gander	2	0	0	0	0
Narsarssuak	1	0	0	0	21
Arrived	174	0	0	0	0
	223	12	0	103	26

Including 1 damaged
* Including 13 F-5As

AIRCRAFT DIVISION - AFROM

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	Unit	Type A/c
Oct	310th (121)	B25
	311th (121)	B26
	312th (121)	B25
	313th (121)	B26
Nov	312th	B26
Dec	312th (121)	B26
Jan	312th	B26
Mar	310th	B25
	312th	B26
	D	B26
Mar	E	B26
June	E	B26
Aug	E	B26

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

ESTIMATED AIR FORCE REQUIRED

FOR

NORTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVES

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1. Determine the Air Forces required to guard Spanish Morocco.

2. Determine the Air Forces required to distribute along the rest of Africa.

3. Determine the Air Forces required to mount Sicily.

4. Determine Anti-Submarine Force.

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REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST [redacted]

1. Mission.

a. To contain German threat against and from Spain.

b. To clear and keep clear the Mediterranean and sea areas adjacent thereto. (To include submarines)

c. To support the United Nations surface forces in offensive operations against Sicily.

2. Situation.

It is assumed that present operations have been successful in driving the Axis Forces entirely out of Northwest Africa and the Middle East. It is also assumed that Axis shipping is active in the transportation of oil across the Black Sea and through the Bosporus, the Agean Sea and the Corinth Canal.

3. Air Operations.

Under these circumstances, air operations for this theater include:

a. Air operations in support of Spain.

b. Anti-submarine operations.

c. Air cover for shipping.

d. Air attacks against Axis shipping and ports.

e. Anti-air force operations.

f. Direct support of our surface forces.

g. Air attacks against Italian Industry [redacted]

4. Aircraft Requirements (Bombardment only).

a. Support of Spain.

Two (2) Heavy Bomb Groups.
Three (3) Medium Bomb Groups.

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b. Anti-submarine Operations.

One and one-half (1½) Heavy Bomb Groups.

c. Air cover for shipping.

None.

d. Air attacks against Axis shipping and ports.

Two (2) Heavy Bomb Groups.

Two (2) Medium Bomb Groups.

e. Anti-air force operations.

Two (2) Heavy Bomb Groups.

Seven (7) Medium Bomb Groups.

f. Air support of our surface forces.

No additional requirements over e above.

g. Air attacks against Italian industry. [redacted]

Duplicate use of forces already listed plus an additional force of three (3) Heavy Bomb Groups.

Total Forces Required.

Heavy Bomb Groups -- Ten and one-half (10½), (504 a/c)

Medium Bomb Groups -- Twelve (12), (768 a/c)

5. It is estimated that two (2) Heavy Groups and three (3) Medium Groups should remain in Northwest Africa whether this operation is attempted or not. Therefore, this operation will require a diversion from United Kingdom of eight and one-half (8½) Heavy Groups and nine (9) Medium Groups. This diversion will prohibit the planned air offensive against Germany proper from United Kingdom next spring and summer.

6. The above is based upon the effectiveness of the United States Air Forces and precision bombing. If British forces are substituted, it will be necessary to multiply the forces required by four.

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Air Support Requirements (Groups)

	Obsn	LB	DB	TC	Photo Rec
1. Morocco	1	1	1	–	–
2. Secure NA Coast	–	–	–	–	–
3. Sicily (Assault Gp)	2	3	3	4	½
4. Keep in Sicily	½		1		
Total	3	4	4	4	½

The above requirement exceeds availability to 8 + 12th AF by: 1 obs Gp
2 L Bomb Gps
2 D Bomb Gps

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TACTICAL GROUPS AVAILABLE FOR COMMITMENT IN THE MONTH INDICATED

November 25, 1942.

Bombardment	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May
99th (H)					
2nd (H)					
308th (H)					
100th (H)					
94th (H)(S.R.)					
95th (H)					
351st (H)					
379th (H)					
380th (H)					
381st (H)					
384th (H)					
385th (H)	2	4	6	9	12
323rd (M)					
344th (M)					
345th (M)(S.R.)					
386th (M)(S.R.)					
387th (M)	1	1	4	4	5
80th (D)					
311th (D)					
312th (D)(S.R.)		1	3	3	3
Fighter Groups					
80th (S.R.)					
58th					
20th					
55th (TE)(3-31)					
348th					
353rd (4-30)					
352nd (5-31)					
354th (5-31)					
355th (5-31)		2	4	6	9
Troop Carrier Groups					
61st					
63rd					
317th					
313th					
314th					
375th	2	3	4	5	6
Totals	5	11	21	27	35

Horizontal figures are accumulative.

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STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SPANISH AIR FORCE

As of October 2, 1942

	Fighters	Bomber	Reconn.	Other	Total
Metropolitan Spain	215	128	12	6	361
Balearics	18	20	3	-	41
Spanish Morocco	24	-	39	7	70
Canaries, etc.	28	12	-	3	43
Totals	285	160	54	16	515

rtugal Air Force totals 90 planes.

5

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MOROCCAN FORCE - Spanish resisting but not pro-German.

~~No~~ Heavies

1 Medium - ~~Algiers~~ Oran

2 Dives - French Morocco

1 Obs. Gp.

1 Ftr. Gp.

DEFENSE -- 1 Gp Ftr (less 1 Sq) - Oran

1 Sq. Ftr. - Casablanca

1 Gp. Ftr. - Algiers

1 Gp. Medium

1 Gp. Ftr. - Bougie
Phillipville
Bone

~~1 Gp. Ftr. Bert.~~

3 Gp. Ftr. - Tunis

1 Sq. Photo Rec.

2 Gps. Anti-submarine Patrols.

2 Transport Groups

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SPANISH - GERMAN COOP.

Attack Spanish Morocco with Task Force supported by Oran and Algiers Units.

3 Groups	Ftrs.	225
2 "	Med.	114
2 "	Dive	114
1 "	Obs.	72
		525
		80
78 Reserve		57
322 "		662

LEFT:
- 1 Ftr Group
- 3 Medium
- 4 Heavy
- 1 Photo Rec. Sq.
- 2 Lt. B.
- 1 Photo Map Flight
- 1½ Transport Gps.

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Power Stat.	2 H. Gp.	
Aqueduct Naval Targets	2 M. Gp.	
Docks	1 H. Gp. 2 Med. Gp.	
Oil Refineries Alumina Auto Tanks Aircraft Plants	3 H. Gp.	-- Preview
Railroads	1 Med. Gp.	

Counter Air Force and assault:

2 Lts.
2 Mediums
3 Dive
2 Obs

(4 Fr 6 spec)

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Malta	Tunisia	
	1	
12 SEF	15	27
4 TEF	8	12
2 GR	2 GR/T3	4
	4 L3	4
	25 M9/H6	25
	4 Tr.	4
		1368

18 per squadron - 14/16 operable.

North 255 A/c Malta

25/3 Sq 456 A/c Tunis

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INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

GERMAN-ITALIAN AIR FORCE

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G-2 ESTIMATE - GERMAN

	Italy	Other Med.	Total	
LRB	588	12	600	
BR	36	12	48	
Dive		40	40	
SEF	108	60	168	198
TEF		30	30	
AC	12		12	
Coastal	-	-	-	
	744	154	898	

	West Frt.	Cent. Gm.	
LRB	144	66	210
BR	60	12	72
Dive	-	-	-
SEF	126	-	126
TEF	148	-	148
AC	-	24	24
Coastal	30	15	45
	508	117	625

Possible A/P German

LRB	810	
BR	110	
Dive	40	
SEF	294	472
TEF	178	
AC	36	
Coastal	45	
	1513	

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G-2 ESTIMATE - ITALIAN

	ITALY	S/S	OTHER	TOTAL
LRB	35	45	50	130
BR	30	35	-	65
D/T	10	95	35	140
AC		35	75	110
Coastal	70	80	40	190
	145	290	200	
Ftr.	125	175	350	650
	270	465	550	1285

Total G & I 8/3

LRB	940	
BR	175	
D	180	
SEF	944	1122
TEF	178	
AC	146	
Coastal	235	
	2698	

BRITISH ESTIMATE -

GERMAN

	S/S	OTHER	TOTAL	
LRB	345	120	465	
BR	18	33	51	
D	39		39	
SE	135	9	144	206
TE	32	30	62	
AC	9		9	
Coastal	9		9	
			779	

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TOTAL POSSIBLE

	G	G&I	
LRB	675	805	
BR	123	188	
D	39	179	
SE	270	920	)
			) 1130
TE	210	210	)
A/C	33	143	
C	54	244	
	1404	2689	

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

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GERMAN AIR POWER

October, 1942	Operational	Non Oper.	Total
Long Range Bombers	1330	90	1420
Bomber Recon.	370	30	400
Dive Bombers	370	20	390
Ground Attack	120	50	170
S.E. Fighters	1070	90	1160
T.E. Fighters	480	30	510
Army Coop.	340	40	380
Coastal	130	30	160
	4210	380	4590

November 14th	Operational
Long Range Bombers	1425
Bomber Recon.	370
Dive Bombers	445
Ground Attack	
S.E. Fighters	1195
T.E. Fighters	540
Army Coop.	400
Coastal	145
	4520

November 14th	Greece and Crete	Sicily, Sard. & Tunis.	N. A.
Long Range Bombers	120	345	0
Bomber Recon.	16	33	12
Dive Bombers	0	39	54
S.E. Fighters	9	135	192
T.E. Fighters	30	32	12
Army Coop.	0	9	9
Coastal	9	0	0
	186	593	279
Transports	320	55	55

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Fighters Total planes - 1356 113 Squadrons

FW 190
FW 198 Exp. Not many.
ME 109 F 1/2
ME 109 F 4
ME 109 F New Dornier
ME 109 A Now - Several Squadrons.

Twin Engine Total planes - 780 65 Squadrons

JU 88 C
ME 110
FW 187 2 x 1700 H.P.
FW 187 2 x 1220 to 1400 H.P.

Fighter Bombers radius 160 to 220

FW 190 A3
ME 109 E
ME 109 F
ME 110 480 radius
ME210

Dive Bombers

Hs 129 radius 120
JU 87 " 200 to 600
JU 88 " 360 to 880
DO 217

Medium Bombers

Do 217 E 1 400 to 800 radius
HE 111 H 800 to 1000 radius
JU 88 A 4 280 to 440 radius
JU 88 A 6 600 to 880 radius also for D.B.

Heavy

FW 200 K	1080 M.	440 lbs.	440 M.	11000 lbs.
HE 177	1600 M.	1000 lbs.	1200 M.	2200 lbs.
	or 440 M.	15500 lbs.		

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

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

EXISTING AND POTENTIAL AIR BASES IN CORSICA AND SARDINIA

Corsica is not topographically suited to the rapid development of landing fields. There are very few clear, level areas which are near suitable transportation facilities. Furthermore, the proximity of Corsica to Italy makes it highly vulnerable to aerial attack and maintenance and supply of any bases established would be difficult. No potential sites have been selected.

Sardinia has many areas available for landplane base development and a good transportation network as well as a good harbor at Cagliari. The valley NW. of Cagliari presents the best possibilities for development.

In making selections of possible sites for landplane bases, basic assumptions were as follows:

1. Accommodations necessary for at least 1,000 planes.
2. Existing facilities to be improved and used insofar as possible.
3. All planes to be dispersed with an allowance of 10 to 20 acres per plane. Use of natural coverage for dispersion.
4. Capacity of each field not to exceed 50 planes.
5. Each field to be at least a square mile in area.
6. Surfaced runways will be necessary for heavy bombardment aircraft.
7. Elevation not to exceed 1,000'.
8. Natural drainage sufficient to accommodate medium weight ships without hard surfacing.
9. Minimum of earth movement to be involved.
10. To be adjacent or near a good railroad or highway with connections to existing port facilities.
11. To be located primarily on the southwest end of the island.
12. To be located reasonably close to populated areas.
13. Hard surfacing of fields to be kept to a minimum with heavy bombardment aircraft based primarily in North Africa.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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CLIMATOLOGY OF BOMBING OPERATIONS FROM NORTHEAST SPAIN ON WESTERN HALF OF GERMANY

JBH/1TRG

10/21/42

For purposes of this study take-off airdromes were considered to be in the vicinity of Barcelona; targets in the western half of Germany; and landing anywhere in northeast Spain as shown on the attached map.

Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c cover operations from northeast Spain on the western half of Germany when conditions over the target area are greater than 3000 feet, greater than 8000, and less than 3/10 cloudiness (less than 3/10 of sky covered). In every case the above operations are compared with operations on the same targets from United Kingdom.

Averages in tables 5a, 5b, and 5c are for ceiling greater than 1000 feet visibility greater than 2-1/2 miles at take-off; ceiling greater than 3000, greater than 8000, and less than 3/10 cloudiness at the targets respectively; and ceiling greater than 1000 feet visibility greater than 2-1/2 miles at landing.

Table 5a

Take-off >1000 >2-1/2; Target >3000; Landing >1000 >2-1/2

Northeast Spain on Western Half of Germany

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
Day operations	20	19	25	23	27	29	29	28	27	27	19	22	295

United Kingdom on Western Half of Germany

Day operations	10	13	19	21	26	26	26	26	24	24	10	12	237

Northeast Spain on Western Half of Germany

Night operations	20	20	25	26	28	26	29	27	24	27	21	24	297

United Kingdom on Western Half of Germany

Night operations	10	12	17	19	23	24	26	22	18	20	7	10	208

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Table 5b

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
Take-off > 1000 > 2-1/2; Target > 8000; Landing > 1000 > 2-1/2													
Day operations — Northeast Spain on Western Half of Germany	19	18	23	20	25	27	27	27	26	21	17	17	267
Day operations — United Kingdom on Western Half of Germany	9	13	19	20	24	25	25	25	23	20	10	9	222
Night operations — Northeast Spain on Western Half of Germany	16	19	24	24	27	25	28	27	23	21	17	16	267
Night operations — United Kingdom on Western Half of Germany	9	11	16	18	21	24	25	21	17	16	6	7	191

Table 5c

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
Take-off > 1000 > 2-1/2; Target < 3/10 Cloudiness; Landing > 1000 > 2-1/2													
Day operations — Northeast Spain on Western Half of Germany	3	6	9	5	12	14	11	11	10	4	4	4	93
Day operations — United Kingdom on Western Half of Germany	2	4	7	5	11	12	10	11	8	4	2	2	78
Night operations — Northeast Spain on Western Half of Germany	4	6	9	9	15	15	15	13	9	6	5	5	111
Night operations — United Kingdom on Western Half of Germany	2	4	6	7	12	14	13	11	7	5	2	2	85

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

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AIRPORT DIRECTORY

NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA
CANARY ISLANDS
IFNI
LIBYA
MOROCCO
RIO DE ORO
SPANISH MOROCCO
TANGIER
TUNISIA

PREPARED BY
AIR MOVEMENTS SECTION, AFDIS
U. S. ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDITION OF
JULY 7, 1942

Perforated correction sheets are attached at end of this Directory. All personnel are requested to complete these sheets and forward them promptly.

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SPANISH MOROCCO

NAME	TYPE	POSITION	ALT.	LOCATION	DIMENSIONS	DESCRIPTION	FA
		o '	FEET		FEET		
El Borch		35 40 N 5 42 W (town)	.....	SE of Tangier, where the Tetouan Rd. leaves the Tangier Zone.	.....	Runways not yet finished (Mar. 42)	Under constructi well advanced.
El Herraiz		35 08 N 3 51 W	.....	3 mi. WSW of Herraiz, 9 ½ mi. SE of Alhucemas.	3270 N/S x 1620 E/W	Firm, sandy, grass-covered.	Fuel, telephone,
Ketama		34 45 N 4 40 W (approx)	.....	.....	.....	.....	This field has b possibility but
Larache (Aduamara)		35 04 N 6 05 W	33	10 mi. SSE of Larache, 8 mi. from coast.	3450 x 2100	Grass on sandy soil. All-year.	Fuel (on advance telegraph, radio boundary and flo repairs, barrack port facilities, inscribed "LARAC In town: hotel.
Melilla (Nador-Tauima)		35 12 N 2 55 W	....	10 mi. S of Melilla and on E side of RR and highway.	4500 x 3500	Level, sod.	Fuel, telephone, station, hangars boundary markers
Tetouan		35 36 N 5 20 W	32	About 2 ½ mi. NE of Tetouan RR. station.	3000 x 2100. Runway: 2380 NE/SW.	Level, marshy in wet weather. Runway: baked earth.	Fuel, radio, D/F boundary lights, hospital, RR, ci landing "T". Re underground asse planes.
Z. El Jemis		35 36 N 5 28 E (town)	.....	N of road from Tangier to Tetouan.	.....	.....	Supplies stored

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SPANISH MOROCCO

POSITION	ALT.	LOCATION	DIMENSIONS	DESCRIPTION	FACILITIES
o '	FEET		FEET		
35 40 N 5 42 W (town)	.....	SE of Tangier, where the Tetouan Rd. leaves the Tangier Zone.	.....	Runways not yet finished (Mar. 42)	Under construction, Mar. 42; fairly well advanced.
35 08 N 3 51 W	.....	3 mi. WSW of Herraiz, 9 ½ mi. SE of Alhucemas.	3270 N/S x 1620 E/W	Firm, sandy, grass-covered.	Fuel, telephone, hangar.
34 45 N 4 40 W (approx)	.....	.....	.....	.....	This field has been reported as a possibility but not confirmed.
35 04 N 6 05 W	33	10 mi. SSE of Larache, 8 mi. from coast.	3450 x 2100	Grass on sandy soil. All-year.	Fuel (on advance notice), telephone, telegraph, radio, weather station, boundary and flood lights, 3 hangars, repairs, barracks, water, highway, RR, port facilities, landing "T", circle inscribed "LARACHE", boundary marks. In town: hotel.
35 12 N 2 55 W	....	10 mi. S of Melilla and on E side of RR and highway.	4500 x 3500	Level, sod.	Fuel, telephone, telegraph, radio, meteo. station, hangars, repairs, barracks, boundary markers.
35 36 N 5 20 W	32	About 2 ½ mi. NE of Tetouan RR. station.	3000 x 2100. Runway: 2380 NE/SW.	Level, marshy in wet weather. Runway: baked earth.	Fuel, radio, D/F, telephone, telegraph, boundary lights, 7 hangars, barracks, hospital, RR, circle, corner markers, landing "T". Reported as having an underground assembly plant for Italian planes.
35 36 N 5 28 E (town)	.....	N of road from Tangier to Tetouan.	.....	.....	Supplies stored here.

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NAME	TYPE	POSITION	ALT.	LOCATION	DIMENSIONS	DESCRIPTION	R
		o '	FEET		FEET		
Tangier		35 44N 5 54 W	50	6 mi. SW of Tangier, 4 mi. SE of Cape Spartel, in valley along highway to Larache.	Two areas: NE half Bou-Ghalf, 1980 N/S x 1530 E/W. SW half, Souabel 2625 E/W x 1500 N/S Runways: 1000 x 130 NE x SW; 1590 x 130 ENE/WSW.	Sandy, soft in wet weather. Runways: each about 2/3 paved with concrete, asphalt and gravel.	Fuel, radio, D boundary and 2 hangars (90 transportation corner and bou In town: teleg port facilitie

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TANGIER ZONE

POSITION	ALT.	LOCATION	DIMENSIONS	DESCRIPTION	FACILITIES
o '	FEET		FEET		
35 44N 5 54 W	50	6 mi. SW of Tangier, 4 mi. SE of Cape Spartel, in valley along highway to Larache.	Two areas: NE half Bou-Ghalf, 1980 N/S x 1530 E/W. SW half, Souabel 2625 E/W x 1500 N/S Runways: 1000 x 130 NE x SW; 1590 x 130 ENE/WSW.	Sandy, soft in wet weather. Runways: each about 2/3 paved with concrete, asphalt and gravel.	Fuel, radio, D/F, telephone, weather, boundary and flood lights, beacon, 2 hangars (90' x 100'), repairs, transportation, 2 white center circles, corner and boundary markers, highway. In town: telegraph, hotels, RR, highway, port facilities.

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PREFACE

NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria is a French possession in northwest Africa bordered on the north by the Mediterranean Sea. There are three distinct divisions in Algeria, mountainous, table, and plains area. The Atlas Mountains reach an elevation of 7,000 feet and extend across the north. In the south, the mountains separate Algeria from the Sahara. The table lands are arid and covered with salt lakes and swamps. This portion has an average elevation of 3,000 feet. The plains area is on the coast and extends inland from 50 to 100 miles. This area is very fertile and has many valleys entering from the hills.

Air transportation is not well developed, there being only two lines. One route follows the coastline from Tangier to Agadir. The other runs through the interior from Oran to Gao in French West Africa. It is doubtful if these airlines operate now. Railroad transportation is advancing and much construction was completed in 1941. The railroads provide adequate means of transportation to and from the major cities. The main lines run along the coastal or plains area where the larger cities are located. An excellent road system exists, most of which is all-weather. There is a motor bus system which connects the larger cities of the interior as well as the coastal cities. Algeria has some very important seaports, mainly Algiers, Oran, and Bone. Algiers is the most important, being a center of various supplies.

The climate varies considerably in different parts, depending on elevation or configuration of the country. It is generally healthy except in the marsh country. The Sahara often has excessive heat. On the coast the temperature is mild, rarely freezing, even in winter. Humidity is sometimes great along the coast, and occasionally in summer there are periods of great heat, lasting three or four days. Rainfall is light even in winter.

CANARY ISLANDS

The Canary Islands are a Spanish possession which lie 69 miles off the Atlantic coast of Rio de Oro. There are seven principal islands and six minor uninhabited islands. The islands are volcanic and fertile. The surface of the island is formed chiefly of lofty dome-shaped heights, long ridges, and deep volcanic cauldrons. The coast is generally rocky, with many cliffs, occasional beaches, and bays. The highest elevation on the islands is 12,192 feet. Much of the land is unredeemed and the forests are much neglected.

Air transportation was advancing rapidly before the war, but now most airline operation has been suspended. The three remaining companies operating are: Shaw Savill Line, Royal Mail Line, and the Blue Star Line. The German, Deutsche Lufthansa Line operated from the mainline to South America, but operations were canceled. A Spanish line now operates the same route, probably the Germany company in disguise. There is a railroad 12 miles long on the Island of Tenerife. There is a considerable amount of roads for motor traffic. The islands are in a very important position for sea travel. The principal ports are Puerto De La Luz and Santa Cruz. Refueling of ships is one of the main activities of these two ports.

The islands lie near the northern limit of the trade-wind belt. During the summer the winds are almost always northeast trade winds. The high mountains cause variation in the winds and weather. March to May are generally the cloudiest months. Thunder storms are rare although they do occur two or three times a year. Icing probably would occur from 8,000 to 15,000 feet on real cloudy days, but the possibility of considerable icing is remote. Visibility is usually good, except at times along the coast in the early months of the year. The islands sometimes suffer very severely from lack of rain. Water is very scarce on most of the islands.

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TANGIER

Tangier, an international zone, is located on the southern side of Straits of Gibraltar, and on the extreme northwestern tip of Africa. The coast is low and sandy with a few cliffs.

There is a short railroad running from Tangier to Arzila. Roads in the zone are being improved and about 65 miles of good road exist. Tangier is the leading seaport. Telephone and telegraph lines reach major cities and Tangier is connected with Europe by cable.

Often there is fog due to marshy surroundings. In summer winds are generally moderate, and westerly. Easterly winds prevail in winter. Murky weather and overcasts occur at times.

SPANISH MOROCCO

Spanish Morocco is located on the northwestern tip of Africa and south of Gibraltar, and bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea. The country is mountainous with fertile plains and valleys. Along the coast the mountains attain an elevation of 3,000 to 7,000 feet. The shore is rocky and there are few large cities along the coast.

There are airline connections with Spain and the Canary Islands. It is doubtful that regular operations still exist due to the war. Railroads are poorly developed and maintained. Motor transportation is becoming a major means of transport, with a considerable number of good roads. Cueta is one of the principal harbors and has a very important location, as it is on the south side of the Straits of Gibraltar. There are no navigable rivers in Spanish Morocco. Telephone and telegraph lines connect major cities.

In summer winds are generally westerly and moderate, skies being usually clear. Easterly winds prevail in winter. The winds bring rains but usually drop it at the mountains along the northern coast of Spanish Morocco. Murky weather and overcasts occur at times. Flying conditions are generally fair.

MOROCCO

The Atlas Mountains form the backbone of Morocco. The coast is generally bare, with cliffs here and there. However, most of the coast is sandy plains with rocks. The mountain area is very fertile and dotted with many cities. The coastal plain area is 35 to 48 miles wide and is flat, bordered with dunes and marshes. Mountains reach an elevation of 11,000 feet.

There is daily air service from Toulouse to Casablanca and weekly service from Casablanca to Dakar. Airlines operate chiefly along the coastal plain area, and are being rapidly developed to the interior. Railroads connect all major cities and motor traffic is expanding rapidly as new roads are being constructed. Telegraph and telephone systems exist and connect all important cities. Many seaports exist, the best being Casablanca which is well equipped.

In summer winds are westerly, but in winter they vary from westerly, southwesterly, and northwesterly. Fogs occur at times along the coast, but generally lift around noon. Flying conditions are generally good, except for the high mountains.

RIO DE ORO

Rio de Oro is a Spanish possession in northwest Africa. The western border being the Atlantic Ocean. The coast presents the appearance of a vast plateau the surface of which is leveled by the sands of the desert.

Transportation is very limited, there being only trails and some very minor roads. No railroads exist and there is some sea travel. Camel caravans are the main means of transportation. There is very little sea transportation except a small service to Spain.

Intense heat and extreme dryness are prominent in Rio de Oro. Winds are strongest in spring and summer months. Fogs are frequent, as well as summer haze.

TUNISIA

Tunisia is French territory which lies on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea in North Africa. It is divided into three distinct sections: the Tell, Steppes, and the desert. The Tell is the area around the coast and it is very fertile. The east coast is flat and marshy.

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The Steppes are high plateaus in the interior, the highest being over 5,000 feet; they are sparsely inhabited. The southern part is mainly desert and has many salt flats and lakes, and sand dunes. The desert land is low and rarely rises to 500 feet above sea level. There are many small oases, many of them not more than a well.

Transportation is advancing rapidly. At present the airlines follow the coastline and connect only the major cities. There is over 1,200 miles of railroad in Tunisia. The railroads were constructed primarily for the transporting of raw material and natural resources to the coast. The railroads and roads form a network to all of the more important cities. The roads are generally poorly constructed but will stand motor traffic. In many parts the land is hard and flat, making a good road.

Tunisia has hot dry summers and mild winters during which most of the rain falls. The cold season starts in late November or December, lasting through February or March. On the coast it is usually sunny with cool northwesterly winds. The hot season starts in mid-June and continues through September. Strong winds are not uncommon in the winter. Fog is rare on the plains though not infrequent in the Steppes or mountains. Along the coast in early morning some fog is likely. The northern part has more rainfall than the other sections.

IFNI

Ifni is a Spanish possession in northwest Africa bordered by the Atlantic Ocean on the west, and north of Rio de Oro. The shore of Ifni is rocky and has no bays or inlets to speak of. The coast is bare and gradually slopes up to the plains. The Atlas mountains extend across the southeastern boundary of Ifni.

There is no transportation to speak of except pack animals. There are no good roads, but many trails wind through the country.

The climate is generally warm but subject to ocean winds. Fog occurs at times along the coast, but lifts around noon. Flying conditions are generally good.

LIBYA

Italian Libya lies in North Africa and is bordered on the north by the Mediterranean Sea. The coastal area is thickly populated and is the most important. Practically all of Libya is desert land except in the south where there are some mountains. The desert is sandy waste land with a few oases here and there. Most of the desert is a level plain with sand dunes and practically no rivers.

Air transportation is mainly between Rome, Tripoli, and Benghazi. Railroads of Libya are short and the principal means of transportation is caravan. There are very few good motor roads. A steamship service operates between Europe and Libya and along the coastline. Tripoli and Benghazi are the main seaports.

Libya has hot dry summers and mild winters. In the desert, wind storms are not uncommon. Sand storms cause poor visibility and make flying dangerous. Little rain falls in Libya, even in winter.

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SUMMARY

The airport data given herein is a consolidation of information available at Headquarters Army Air Forces. This information has been obtained chiefly from the reports of Military Attachés, the R. A. F., the Ferrying Command, and military personnel stationed or traveling in the area.

The landing fields and airports are listed by country, as follows:

Algeria (page 1).
Canary Islands (page 13).
French Morocco (page 15).
Ifni (page 25).
Libya (page 27).
Rio De Oro (page 35).
Spanish Morocco (page 37).
Tangier (page 39).
Tunisia (page 41).

Summarized, the data are as follows:

ALGERIA.—172 emergency landing fields; 2 military airports. No civil airports. The military airports are: **Algiers** (**Maison Blanche**) and **Oran,** both having large storage space. The major emergency fields are **Blida** (large storage space), **Colomb Bechar** (moderate storage space), **Setif Ain Arnat** (large storage space), and **Sidi Bel Abbes** (2 small hangars).

CANARY ISLANDS.—10 emergency landing fields. No military or civil airports. Best emergency fields are: **Las Palmas** (**Gando**) **Gran Canaria** (has parking and other facilities), **Los Rodeo** (**La Laguna**) **Tenerife** (limited facilities), and **Tefia** (concrete runway under construction).

FRENCH MOROCCO.—145 emergency landing fields; 8 military airports. No civil airports. Military airports are **Agadir** (**Ben Sergas**) (full facilities), **Casablanca** (**Gazes**) (suitable for heavy planes and has facilities), **Fez** (**Fes**) (moderate storage space), **Marrakech** (used by heavy bombers and has large storage space), **Meknes** (used by twin-engined bombers 1941), **Port Lyautey** (**Kenitra**) (concrete runways suitable for 50-ton planes), **Rabat, Sale** (**Rabat-Sale**) (new). Good emergency fields at **Arbaoua** (all season), **Ber Rechid** (can be enlarged to accommodate heavy bombers), **Goulimine** (all season), **Kasba Tadla** (suitable for B–19's and has storage space), **Mediouna** (formerly French Air Force station), **Mogador,** and **Oudjda** (storage space).

IFNI.—No emergency landing fields or civil airports; one military airport. There is a military airport at **Sidi Ifni,** good for all types of aircraft, facilities are limited, has antiaircraft guns.

LIBYA.—159 emergency fields; 1 military airport. No civil airports. The military airport is **Tripoli** (**Castel Benito**) (field reported to accommodate 50 to 75 planes). Bombers have been known to operate from the following emergency fields: **Arid** (**Gasr El**), **Benina, Bir Dufan, Castelverde** (**Gasr Garabulli**), **Crum El Chel, Derna** (**El Ftaiah**), **Gambut, Giof El Matar, Hon, Mekili, Sidi Ahmed El Magrun, Soluk,** and **Zuara.**

RIO DE ORO.—21 emergency fields. There are no military or civil airports. Spanish Ju–52's reported at **El Ayoun, Hagunia, Jelousa** (**Yelva**), and **Tantane.** Field with full facilities but probably unsuitable for fast planes at **Cabo Juby.** Large airport in preparation (1938) at **Tichele.**

SPANISH MOROCCO.—Three emergency fields; one military airport. No civil airports. The military airport is **Melusa** (construction well advanced March 1942). The emergency fields are **Larache** (**Auamara**) (has facilities), **Tetouan** (**Rio Martin**) (Under construction 1941), and **Melilla** (**Nador Tauima**).

TANGIER.—No emergency fields or civil airports; one military airport. The military airport is **Tangier** (full facilities, ferro-concrete runways, field soft in wet weather).

TUNISIA.—80 emergency fields; 2 military airports. No civil airports. Military airports are: **Sidi Ahmed** (**Bizerte**) (concrete runways, grass wet and muddy in winter, several hangars), and **Tunis** (**El Aouina**) (moderate storage space, full facilities); bomber, fighter, reconnaissance planes reported here; antiaircraft guns reported. Best emergency fields are **Bon Ficha** (south) (all season), **Fort Saint** (all season runway,

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limited facilities), **Gafsa, Remada** (facilities) and **Sfax. Gabes** and **Kairouan** do not have complete equipment but have strategic value. There are some 50 operational landing fields with dimensions of 3,300 by 3,300 feet or larger, which can be used by all types of aircraft by day or night. There are 12 operational landing fields with dimensions of 2,600 by 2,600 feet and 3,300 by 3,300 feet, suitable for all types of aircraft by day. There are some 13 additional fields smaller than 2,600 by 2,600 feet.

The following are explanatory notes on the manner of presenting the information:

NAME.—Under this heading is given the name of the nearest town or city of any significance. This name is followed by the name of the airport in parentheses if different from the name of the city or town. For towns at which there are several airports, the name of the town is repeated in parentheses for the airport known by the town name in order to distinguish it from the other airports. In cases where the name of the airport transcends the name of the town in importance, the airport name appears first.

TYPE.—Under this heading will be found a single letter having the following meaning.

M—Military airports of reasonable size and having at least the more important facilities.

C—Civil airports (private and commercial) of reasonable size and having at least the more important facilities.

E—Emergency fields (military or civil) either of small size or having few facilities or both.

FACILITIES.—Under this heading is given a brief listing of facilities known to exist. No details are given although in many cases more detailed information is available.

The Index is a straight alphabetical listing by both town name and airport name of all fields.

It is to be understood that in a directory of this character all detailed information cannot be included although on the majority of the fields the information presented here represents all that is available at this time. For many of the fields there are available sketches or photographs or both.

Caution in the use of this directory is advised inasmuch as some of the information used is not of recent date and there may be fields in existence of which this office has no knowledge. Perforated correction sheets will be found in the back of this directory. These sheets are to be completed by military personnel stationed in or traveling in the area.

New editions will be issued from time to time as more or better information becomes available.

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INDEX

City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Abadla	Algeria	1
Abiar (*see* El Abiar)	Libya	29
Aboid Sidi Cheikh (*see* El Aboid Sidi Cheikh)	Algeria	1
Abolemme Laouni	Algeria	1
Abu (*see* Amud)	Libya	27
Achir (*see* El Achir)	Algeria	4
Adem	Libya	27
Adrar	Algeria	1
Affreville	Algeria	1
Aflou	Algeria	1
Agadir (Ben Sergas)	Fr. Morocco	15
Agadir Tissint	Fr. Morocco	15
Adgz	Fr. Morocco	15
Agedavia (*see* Jedabya)	Libya	31
Ageila (*see* El Ageila)	Libya	29
Ahmar	Libya	27
Ain Aicha	Fr. Morocco	15
Ain Beida	Algeria	1
Ain Beida	Fr. Morocco	15
Ain Defali	Fr. Morocco	15
Ain Doua (*see* Oweinat)	Libya	32
Ain El Hadjadj (East)	Algeria	1
Ain El Hadjadj (West)	Algeria	1
Ain Guettara	Algeria	1
Ain Guettara	Fr. Morocco	15
Ain Kbira	Algeria	1
Ain Kercha	Algeria	1
Ain Oussera	Algeria	1
Ain Sefra	Algeria	1
Ain Temouchent	Algeria	1
Aioun (El)	Fr. Morocco	17
Aioun du Draa (El)	Fr. Morocco	17
Ait Ani	Fr. Morocco	15
Ait Baha	Fr. Morocco	15
Ait Maklouf	Fr. Morocco	15
Ait-Saadane	Fr. Morocco	15
Akka (Aqqa)	Fr. Morocco	15
Alemsid	Fr. Morocco	15
Alemud	Fr. Morocco	15
Algiers (Hussein Dey)	Algeria	1
Algiers (Maison Blanche)	Algeria	1
Allelick (*see* Bone)	Algeria	2
Almis De Guigou	Fr. Morocco	15
Alnif	Fr. Morocco	15
Amamoukene	Algeria	1
Amar	Tunisia	41
Amellago	Fr. Morocco	15
Amguid	Algeria	1
Amrenene El Kasbah	Algeria	1
Amseat	Libya	27
Amseat (Capuzzo) North	Libya	27

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Amzel (Anzel)	Fr. Morocco	15
Amud (Abu)	Libya	27
Annoceur	Fr. Morocco	15
Anzel (*see* Amzel)	Fr. Morocco	15
Aouareb (El) (Fondouk El Aouareb) (*see* El Aouareb)	Tunisia	41
Aoudour (*see* Kaoulech)	Fr. Morocco	18
Aou Hofrite	Rio de Oro	35
Aouina (El) (*see* Tunis)	Tunisia	44
Aoulef Cherfa	Algeria	1
Apollinia	Libya	27
Apollinia (Marso Susa)	Libya	27
Aqqa (*see* Akka)	Fr. Morocco	15
Arae Philaenorum (Ras Lanuf)	Libya	27
Arak	Algeria	2
Araneb (Umm-El)	Libya	27
Arbaoua	Fr. Morocco	16
Ar Biu Sfeca	Libya	27
Arguineguin	Canary Islands	13
Aricha (*see* El Aricha)	Algeria	4
Arico	Canary Islands	13
Arid, Gasr El	Libya	27
Arinaga	Canary Islands	13
Arouenit	Rio De Oro	35
Aroussa (*see* El Aroussa)	Tunisia	41
Arrecife	Canary Islands	13
Asabaa (*see* El Asabba)	Libya	30
Assa	Fr. Morocco	16
Assaka	Fr. Morocco	16
Assoul	Fr. Morocco	16
Auamara (*see* Larache)	Spanish Morocco	37
Auenet Uennin	Libya	27
Aujila	Libya	27
Aureora	Fr. Morocco	16
Ayoun (El)	Rio De Oro	35
Azeiz, Sidi	Libya	27
Azib (see El Azib)	Tunisia	42
Azilal	Fr. Morocco	16
Azizia (*see* El Azizia)	Libya	30
Azrou	Fr. Morocco	16
Bandama Hierro	Canary Islands	13
Barche (Barce El Merg)	Libya	27
Bardi	Libya	27
Bardia (Menastir)	Libya	27
Bat du Tizouline (*see* R'Bat Dutizouline)	Fr. Morocco	21
Bathan (*see* El Bathan)	Tunisia	42
Batna	Algeria	2
Bechater	Tunisia	41
Bedeau	Algeria	2
Ben Gardane	Tunisia	41
Benghazi (Berca)	Libya	27
Benghazi (Berca South)	Libya	28
Ben Guerir	Fr. Morocco	16
Beni Abbes	Algeria	2
Beni Malek (Bou Malek) (*see* Ouezzane)	Fr. Morocco	20
Benina	Libya	28
Benina Airport	Libya	28

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Beni Ounif	Algeria	2
Beni Sergas (see Agadir)	Fr. Morocco	15
Beni Tadgit	Fr. Morocco	16
Beni Ulid	Libya	28
Berca (see Benghazi)	Libya	27
Berca South (see Benghazi)	Libya	28
Berges	Algeria	2
Berguent	Fr. Morocco	16
Ber Rechid No. 1	Fr. Morocco	16
Ber Rechid No. 2	Fr. Morocco	16
Ber Rechid No. 3	Fr. Morocco	16
Berrouag (Ksar Berrouag)	Fr. Morocco	16
Bersis (Got)	Libya	28
B. Hakeim	Libya	28
Bidon 5	Algeria	2
Bir Afidal	Rio De Oro	35
Bir Aisilian	Libya	28
Bir Deroua	Rio De Oro	35
Bir Dufan	Libya	28
Bir El Baheira	Libya	28
Bir El Bebira	Libya	28
Bir El Behera	Libya	28
Bir El Chleta	Libya	28
Bir El Chor	Libya	28
Bir El Churgla	Libya	28
Bir El Dacar	Libya	28
Bir El Gheddahia	Libya	28
Bir El Ghnem	Libya	28
Bir El Gobi	Libya	28
Bir El Merduma	Libya	28
Bir El Mestuta	Libya	29
Bir El Tmimi	Libya	29
Bir El Tmimi (Satellite)	Libya	29
Bir El Uaar	Libya	29
Bir El Ziden	Libya	29
Bir Guennieche	Tunisia	41
Bir Kasassa	Tunisia	41
Bir Sidi Mohamed	Rio De Oro	35
Bisher	Libya	29
Biskra	Algeria	2
Bizerte (see Sidi Ahmed)	Tunisia	44
Blida	Algeria	2
Boghari	Algeria	2
Bone (Allelick)	Algeria	2
Bone (Duzerville)	Algeria	2
Bordj-le-Boeuf (Kecira)	Tunisia	41
Bordj Touaz	Tunisia	41
Bou Arada (Northeast)	Tunisia	41
Bou Arada (West)	Tunisia	41
Bou Arfa	Fr. Morocco	16
Bou Bernous (1)	Algeria	2
Bou Bernous (2)	Algeria	2
Bou Denib	Fr. Morocco	16
Bou Draa De L'Oudches	Fr. Morocco	16
Bou Ficha (North)	Tunisia	41
Bou Ficha (South)	Tunisia	41

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0610

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Bougie	Algeria	2
Bou Gouffat	Rio De Oro	35
Bou Guedra	Fr. Morocco	16
Bou Izakarn	Fr. Morocco	16
Bou Ktoub	Algeria	3
Boulhaut (*see* Camp Boulhaut)	Fr. Morocco	17
Bou Malek (Beni Malek) (*see* Ouezzane)	Fr. Morocco	20
Bou Malne (Bou Malem)	Fr. Morocco	17
Bou Mellouk (East)	Tunisia	41
Bou Mellouk (West)	Tunisia	41
Bou Mia	Fr. Morocco	17
Bou Rached	Fr. Morocco	17
Boured	Fr. Morocco	17
Boukika (Morengo)	Algeria	3
Bou Saada	Algeria	3
Bouskoura	Fr. Morocco	17
Brach Bir Rab	Libya	29
Brak	Libya	29
Brak North	Libya	29
B. Shegga	Libya	29
Buerat-El-Hsun	Libya	29
Bu Ngem	Libya	29
Bzema	Libya	29
Cabo Juby	Rio De Oro	35
Cabraum	Libya	29
Camp Berteaux	Fr. Morocco	17
Camp Boulhaut (Boulhaut)	Fr. Morocco	17
Camp Christian (Christian)	Fr. Morocco	17
Canrobert	Algeria	3
Cap Ghir (Cap Guir)	Fr. Morocco	17
Capuzzo (*see* Amseat North)	Libya	27
Carcura	Libya	29
Casablanca	Fr. Morocco	17
Casablanca (Gazes)	Fr. Morocco	17
Casablanca (*see* Rabat)	Fr. Morocco	20
Castel Benito (*see* Tripoli)	Libya	33
Castelverde (Gasr Garabulli)	Libya	29
Chaouat	Tunisia	41
Chateau du Rhumel	Algeria	3
Chebir (*see* Uan-El)	Libya	29
Chemaia	Fr. Morocco	17
Chenochane	Algeria	3
Chichaoua	Fr. Morocco	17
Christian (*see* Camp Christian)	Fr. Morocco	20
Cirene	Libya	29
Colomb Bechar	Algeria	3
Constantine (Oued Hamimine)	Algeria	3
Crampel	Algeria	3
Creteville	Tunisia	41
Crum El Chel	Libya	29
Dar Djdida (*see* Imi M'Tanout)	Fr. Morocco	18
Dar Ould Zidouh	Fr. Morocco	17
Depienne	Tunisia	41
Derg	Libya	29
Derkaoua	Fr. Morocco	17
Derna	Libya	29

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526.

0611

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Derna (El Ftaiah No. 1)	Libya	29
Derna (El Ftaiah No. 2)	Libya	29
Dider	Algeria	3
Djafou	Algeria	3
Djanet	Algeria	3
Djebel Sidi Kralif	Tunisia	41
Djebel Taragha Sud	Tunisia	41
Djebel Teioualt	Algeria	3
Djebel Teragha Nord	Tunisia	41
Djedeida	Tunisia	41
Djelfa	Algeria	3
Djem (*see* El Djem)	Tunisia	42
Djenien Bou Rezg	Algeria	3
Djidjelli	Algeria	3
Duzerville (*see* Bone)	Algeria	2
El Abiar	Libya	29
El Aboid Sidi Cheikh	Algeria	4
El Achir	Algeria	4
El Ageila	Libya	29
El Aioun	Fr. Morocco	17
El Aioun du Draa	Fr. Morocco	17
El Aouareb (Fondouk El Aouareb)	Tunisia	41
El Aouina (*see* Tunis)	Tunisia	41
El Aricha	Algeria	4
El Aroussa	Tunisia	41
El Asabaa	Libya	30
El Ayoun	Rio De Oro	35
El Azib	Tunisia	42
El Azizia	Libya	30
El Bathan	Tunisia	42
El Djem	Tunisia	42
El Erg	Libya	30
El Faidia	Libya	30
El Ftaiah No. 1 (*see* Derne)	Libya	29
El Ftaiah No. 2 (*see* Derne)	Libya	29
El Gaf El Garbi	Libya	30
El Garat	Libya	30
El Gatrum	Libya	30
El Gazala (North)	Libya	30
El Gazala (South)	Libya	30
El Gezira	Libya	30
El Gheria (Esc-Scherghia)	Libya	30
El Giof (*see* Kufra)	Libya	31
El Gobi	Libya	30
El Golea	Algeria	3
El Graf	Libya	30
El Hadjiri	Tunisia	42
El Hajeb	Fr. Morocco	17
El Hamma	Tunisia	42
El Hania	Libya	30
El Hank	Algeria	4
El Haseiat	Libya	30
El Kalaa (*see* Kelaa)	Fr. Morocco	18
El Machina	Libya	30
El Mradia	Tunisia	42
El Msed Dela Sgeuia Field	Rio De Oro	35

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0612

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
El Nidradia	Tunisia	42
El Oued	Algeria	4
El Oued (Tiksebt)	Algeria	4
El Upffana	Libya	30
Enjil (Engil)	Fr. Morocco	17
En Nofilla (*see* Nofilla)	Libya	32
Erfoud	Fr. Morocco	17
Erg (*see* El Erg)	Libya	30
Esc Scegga (*see* Scegga)	Libya	32
Esc Schegheilif (*see* Schegheilif)	Libya	32
Esc Scherghia (*see* El Gheria)	Libya	30
Es Safsaf (*see* Safsaf)	Libya	32
Es Sultan (*see* Sultan)	Libya	33
Faidia (*see* El Faidia)	Libya	30
Fedala	Fr. Morocco	18
Feriana	Tunisia	42
Ferme des Rosiers	Fr. Morocco	18
Fes (*see* Fez)	Fr. Morocco	18
Fes (Ras El Ma)	Fr. Morocco	18
Fez (Fes)	Fr. Morocco	18
Fezzou	Fr. Morocco	18
Fleurus	Algeria	4
Fondouk El Aouareb (*see* El Aouareb)	Tunisia	41
Fontaine Chaude	Algeria	4
Fort Flatters	Algeria	4
Fort Gardel	Algeria	4
Fort Lallemand	Algeria	4
Fort Laperrine (Tamanrasset)	Algeria	10
Fort Miribel	Algeria	4
Fort Polignac	Algeria	4
Fort Saint	Tunisia	42
Forum Zguid	Fr. Morocco	18
Foum el Hassane (Icht)	Fr. Morocco	18
Foum Tatouine	Tunisia	42
Foum Tatouine (Northwest)	Tunisia	42
Freha	Algeria	5
Ftaiah (El) No. 1 (*see* Derne)	Libya	29
Ftaiah (El) No. 2 (*see* Derne)	Libya	29
Gabes	Tunisia	42
Gabes West	Tunisia	42
Gabr (*see* Salen)	Libya	32
Gadames	Libya	30
Gadd-El-Ahmar	Libya	30
Gaf El Garbi (*see* El Gaf El Garbi)	Libya	30
Gafsa	Tunisia	42
Gambut	Libya	30
Gando (*see* Las Palmos)	Canary Islands	13
Garat (*see* El Garat)	Libya	30
Gasr Bu (*see* Hadi)	Libya	31
Gasr Garabulli (*see* Castelverde)	Libya	29
Gatrum (*see* El Gatrum)	Libya	30
Gazala North (*see* El Gazala North)	Libya	30
Gazala South (*see* El Gazala South)	Libya	30
Gazes (*see* Casablanca)	Fr. Morocco	17
Geryville	Algeria	5
Gezira (*see* El Gezira)	Libya	30

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0613

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City or airport	*Country of islands*	*Page*
Ghardaia (Noumerate)	Algeria	5
Ghardaia (Touzouz)	Algeria	5
Ghat	Libya	30
Gheria (Ese Scherghia) (*see* El Gheria)	Libya	30
Ghirza	Libya	30
Giarabub (*see* Jarabub)	Libya	31
Giof (El) (*see* Kufra)	Libya	31
Goif El Matar	Libya	30
Gobi (*see* El Gobi)	Libya	30
Golea (*see* El Golea)	Algeria	4
Got Bersis (*see* Bersis)	Libya	28
Got Es Sultan (*see* Sultan)	Libya	35
Goubellat	Tunisia	42
Goulimine	Fr. Morocco	18
Gourd Amara	Algeria	5
Graf (*see* El Graf)	Libya	30
Grombalia	Tunisia	42
Gr. Es Sahabi	Libya	31
Ground No. 1	Libya	31
Ground No. 2	Libya	31
Ground No. 3	Libya	31
Ground No. 5	Libya	31
Ground No. 7	Libya	31
Ground No. 8	Libya	31
Goereif	Fr. Morocco	18
Guerzim	Algeria	5
Hadi (Gasr Bu)	Libya	31
Hadjiri (*see* El Hadjiri)	Tunisia	43
Hadjit (*see* El Hadjit)	Fr. Morocco	17
Hagunia	Rio De Oro	35
Hamma (*see* El Hamma)	Libya	30
Hammada Chammar	Algeria	5
Hania (*see* El Hania)	Libya	30
Hank (*see* El Hank)	Algeria	4
Hasbine	Tunisia	42
Haseiat (*see* El Haseiat)	Libya	30
Hassan Imilit	Rio De Oro	35
Hassi Bonneville	Algeria	5
Hassi Bourala	Algeria	5
Hassi Djerifia	Rio De Oro	35
Hassi Dora	Rio De Oro	35
Hassi El Abiod	Algeria	5
Hassi El Kherma	Fr. Morocco	18
Hassi Mdakane	Algeria	5
Hassi Merriem	Algeria	5
Hassi Quenzga	Fr. Morocco	18
Hassi Rhenami	Algeria	5
Hassi Tilemsi	Algeria	5
Hassi Touareg	Algeria	5
Hassi Zegdou	Fr. Morocco	18
Homs	Libya	31
Hon	Libya	31
Houmt Souk	Tunisia	42
Hussein Dey (*see* Algiers)	Algeria	1
Icht (*see* Foum el Hassane)	Fr. Morocco	18
Iffefes	Fr. Morocco	18

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0614

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Ifrane	Fr. Morocco	18
Igherm	Fr. Morocco	18
Igli	Algeria	5
Igoudar	Fr. Morocco	18
Illerene	Algeria	5
Imi M'Tanout (Dar Djida)	Fr. Morocco	18
Imintanout	Fr. Morocco	18
In Affelaleh	Algeria	5
In Eker	Algeria	6
In Guezzam	Algeria	6
Inifel	Algeria	6
In Salah	Algeria	6
In Takoula	Algeria	6
Jarabub (Giarabub)	Libya	31
Jedabya (Agedavia)	Libya	31
J. El Matar	Libya	31
Jeloua (Yelva)	Rio De Oro	35
Juan Grande	Canary Islands	13
Kahal Morrot	Algeria	6
Kairouan	Tunisia	42
Kalaa Djerda	Tunisia	42
Kalaa (El) (*see* Kelaa)	Fr. Morocco	18
Kaoulech (Aoudour)	Fr. Morocco	18
Kasba Tadla	Fr. Morocco	18
Kebili	Tunisia	42
Kecira (*see* Bordj-le-Bouef)	Tunisia	41
Kela des M'Gouna	Fr. Morocco	19
Kelaa (El Kalaa)	Fr. Morocco	18
Kenitra (*see* Port Lyautey)	Fr. Morocco	20
Khemisset	Fr. Morocco	19
Khenifra	Fr. Morocco	19
Kilometer 220	Algeria	6
Kilometer 252	Algeria	6
Korba Station East	Tunisia	42
Korba Station South	Tunisia	43
Kouif Marsatt	Algeria	6
Kourigha	Fr. Morocco	19
Krofallah	Algeria	6
Krour Essaf	Tunisia	43
Kufra (El Giof)	Libya	31
Ksabi (Tagaost)	Fr. Morocco	19
Ksar Berrouag (*see* Berrouag)	Fr. Morocco	16
Ksar Es Souk	Fr. Morocco	19
La Aguerra	Rio De Oro	35
La Champenoise	Tunisia	43
La Fauconniere	Tunisia	43
Laghouat	Algeria	6
La Guelta	Rio De Oro	35
La Laguna (*see* Los Rodeo)	Canary Islands	13
La Meskiana	Algeria	6
Larache (Auamara)	Spanish Morocco	37
Las Palmas (Gando)	Canary Islands	13
Lekef	Tunisia	43
Le Krib	Tunisia	43
Levasseur	Algeria	6
Li Di Savoia (*see* Tert)	Libya	33

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0615

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

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Los Rodeo (La Laguna)	Canary Islands	13
Lourmel	Algeria	6
Machina (*see* El Machina)	Libya	30
Mahjez	Algeria	6
Maison Blanche (*see* Algiers)	Algeria	1
Maisonette	Tunisia	43
Maisonnette 23	Tunisia	43
Maknassy	Tunisia	43
Marada	Libya	31
Marawa	Libya	31
Marchand	Fr. Morocco	19
Mareth	Tunisia	43
Marrakech	Fr. Morocco	19
Marsa Drega	Libya	31
Marso Susa (*see* Apollonia)	Libya	27
Martuba	Libya	31
Mascara	Algeria	6
Maspalomas	Canary Islands	13
Mateur	Tunisia	43
Mazagan	Fr. Morocco	19
Mecheria	Algeria	6
Mechra Ben Abbou	Fr. Morocco	19
Medenine	Tunisia	43
Medenine-S	Tunisia	43
Mediouna	Fr. Morocco	19
Megheinine	Fr. Morocco	19
Mekili	Libya	32
Meknes	Fr. Morocco	19
Melilla (Nador Tauima)	Spanish Morocco	37
Mellaha (*see* Tripoli)	Libya	34
Mellal	Fr. Morocco	19
Melusa	Spanish Morocco	37
Menastir (*see* Bardia)	Libya	27
Menouarar	Algeria	7
Menzel Temime	Tunisia	43
Merdum (Uadi El)	Libya	32
Meremdha	Algeria	7
Meridja	Algeria	7
Metlaoui	Tunisia	43
Mezzouna	Tunisia	43
M'Hammid	Fr. Morocco	19
Misurata Marina	Libya	32
Misuratea West	Libya	32
Mizda	Libya	32
Mizel (*see* M'Zizel)	Fr. Morocco	19
Mogador	Fr. Morocco	19
Mokrid	Algeria	7
Morengo (*see* Bourkika)	Algeria	3
Morsott	Algeria	7
Mostaganem (Noisey Les Baines)	Algeria	7
Mouzaiaville	Algeria	7
Mradia (El Mradia)	Tunisia	42
Msed Dela Sgeuia Field (*see* El Msed Dela Sgeuia Field)	Rio De Oro	35
M'Sila	Algeria	7
M'Soun	Fr. Morocco	19
Murzuck (Murzuk)	Libya	32

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Murzuk No. 2	Libya	32
M'Zizel (Mizel)	Fr. Morocco	19
Nador Tauima (*see* Melilla)	Spanish Morocco	37
Nalut	Libya	32
Namus (Uau-En)	Libya	32
Nazaregh (*see* Said)	Algeria	9
Negrine	Algeria	7
Nekob (Nkob)	Fr. Morocco	20
Nidradia (*see* El Nidradia)	Tunisia	42
Nkob (*see* Nekob)	Fr. Morocco	20
Nofilla (En)	Libya	32
Noisy Les Baines (*see* Mostaganem)	Algeria	7
Notfia	Fr. Morocco	20
Noumerate (*see* Ghardaia)	Algeria	5
Oggaz	Algeria	7
Ohanet	Algeria	7
Oran	Algeria	7
Orleansville	Algeria	7
Ouallen	Algeria	7
Ouargla	Algeria	7
Ouarzazte (Taourit Ouarzazat)	Fr. Morocco	20
Oudika	Algeria	8
Oudjda	Fr. Morocco	20
Oudjda (Old)	Fr. Morocco	20
Oued (*see* El Oued)	Algeria	4
Oued el Abid (Souk El Had)	Fr. Morocco	20
Oued (Tiksebt) (*see* El Oued)	Algeria	4
Oued Hamimine (*see* Constantine)	Algeria	3
Oued Sbita	Algeria	8
Oued-Zem	Fr. Morocco	20
Ouenzga	Tunisia	43
Ouezzane (Bou Malek) (Beni Malek)	Fr. Morocco	20
Oulad Moussa	Algeria	8
Oulad Okba (*see* Rabat)	Fr. Morocco	20
Ould Zidou	Fr. Morocco	20
Ouled Allal	Fr. Morocco	20
Ouled Djellal	Algeria	8
Ouled Said	Algeria	8
Oundna	Tunisia	43
Outat El Hadj	Fr. Morocco	20
Oweinat (Ain Doua)	Libya	32
Pavillier	Tunisia	43
Perregeaux	Algeria	8
Petit	Algeria	8
Petit Jean	Fr. Morocco	20
Phillipeville	Algeria	8
Pisida	Libya	32
Pisida Rasegh	Libya	32
Plateau Des Lacs	Fr. Morocco	20
Pont Du Fahs-S. W	Tunisia	43
Pont Du Fahst-S	Tunisia	43
Port Lyautey (Kenitra)	Fr. Morocco	20
Rabat	Fr. Morocco	20
Rabat (Casablanca)	Fr. Morocco	20
Rabat (Oulad Okba)	Fr. Morocco	20
Rabat-Sale (*see* Sale-New)	Fr. Morocco	21

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0617

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Rabat (Sale) Old	Fr. Morocco	21
Ras El Ma (*see* Fes)	Fr. Morocco	18
Ras Lanuf (*see* Arae Philaenorum)	Libya	27
R'Bat Dutizouline (Bat du Tizouline)	Fr. Morocco	21
Rebiana	Libya	32
Red el Abiod	Algeria	8
Reg	Algeria	8
Reg Aftout	Algeria	8
Reggan (1)	Algeria	8
Reggan (2)	Algeria	8
Remada	Tunisia	43
Relizane (East)	Algeria	8
Relizane (South)	Algeria	8
Relizane (West)	Algeria	8
Rhorb el Ethel	Algeria	8
Rich	Fr. Morocco	8
Rio Martin (*see* Tetouan)	Spanish Morocco	37
Saaba (Uadi)	Libya	32
Sabratha (Sorman)	Libya	32
Safi	Fr. Morocco	21
Saf Saf (*see* Tlemcen)	Algeria	11
Safsaf (Es)	Libya	32
Saharis	Algeria	8
Sahib Touil	Algeria	9
Said (Nazaregh)	Algeria	9
Saidia	Fr. Morocco	21
St. Denis Du Sig	Algeria	9
Sainte Marie Du	Tunisia	43
Sale (*see* Rabat-Old)	Fr. Morocco	21
Sale (Rabat-Sale-New)	Fr. Morocco	21
Salen (Gabr)	Libya	32
Saunnu (Saunno)	Libya	32
Sbeitla	Tunisia	43
Seegga (Esc)	Libya	32
Schegheilif (Esc)	Libya	32
Scuieref	Libya	33
Sebha	Libya	33
Sebkra du Krenig	Algeria	9
Sedada	Libya	33
Setif Ain Arnat	Algeria	9
Sfax	Tunisia	43
Sidi Ahmed (Bizerte)	Tunisia	44
Sidi Ahmed El Magrun	Libya	33
Sidi Aissa	Algeria	9
Sidi Bel Abbes	Algeria	9
Sidi fni	Ifni	25
Sidi Mansour	Tunisia	44
Sidi Mohammed Er Rehal (Sidi Rahal)	Fr. Morocco	21
Sidi Nasr Allah	Tunisia	44
Sidi Rahal (*see* Mohammed Er Rehal)	Fr. Morocco	21
Sidi Randa	Tunisia	44
Sidi Yahiai	Fr. Morocco	21
Sinauen	Libya	33
Sirte	Libya	33
Slonta	Libya	33
Smara	Rio De Oro	35

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0618

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Socna	Libya	33
Soluk	Libya	33
Sorman (*see* Sabratha)	Libya	32
Souk Ahras	Algeria	9
Souk El Arba	Tunisia	44
Souk El Had (*see* Oued el Abid)	Fr. Morocco	20
Souk El Khemis	Tunisia	44
Souk El Tileta Des Beni Oulid	Fr. Morocco	21
Sultan (Es)	Libya	33
Sultan (Got Es)	Libya	33
Tabelbala	Algeria	9
Tabelbalet	Algeria	9
Tadighoust	Fr. Morocco	21
Tadjentourt	Algeria	9
Tadla	Fr. Morocco	21
Tafaraoui	Algeria	9
Tafassasset (1)	Algeria	9
Tafassasset (2)	Algeria	9
Tagaost (*see* Ksabi)	Fr. Morocco	19
Taghbalt (Tarhbalt)	Fr. Morocco	19
Taghit	Algeria	9
Tagmout (Tiougrar)	Fr. Morocco	21
Tagoudit (Tagounit)	Fr. Morocco	21
Tagrifet	Libya	33
Tagnehzimt	Rio De Oro	35
Taklit	Algeria	10
Takouazet	Algeria	10
Talsint	Fr. Morocco	21
Tamanar	Fr. Morocco	21
Tamanrasset (Fort Laperrine)	Algeria	10
Tamet (Uadi)	Libya	33
Tanant	Fr. Morocco	21
Tanger	Fr. Morocco	21
Tangier	Tangier	39
Tantane	Rio De Oro	35
Taouz	Fr. Morocco	22
Taourirt Ouarzazat (*see* Ouarzazte)	Fr. Morocco	20
Tarat	Algeria	10
Tarhbalt (*see* Taghbalt)	Fr. Morocco	21
Taroudant	Fr. Morocco	22
Taskempt	Fr. Morocco	22
Taskent	Fr. Morocco	22
Tatta	Fr. Morocco	22
Taourga	Libya	33
Taza	Fr. Morocco	22
Tazenakht	Fr. Morocco	22
Tazzarine	Fr. Morocco	22
Tebessa Djebel el Dir	Algeria	10
Teboursouk	Tunisia	44
Tefia	Canary Islands	13
Tegerhi	Libya	33
Telergma	Algeria	10
Terrain A	Algeria	10
Terrain B	Algeria	10
Terrain C	Algeria	10
Terrain D	Algeria	10

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Tert (Li Di Savoia)	Libya	33
Tesnou Tin Aeroret	Algeria	10
Tetouan (Rio Martin)	Spanish Morocco	37
Tetuan	Fr. Morocco	22
Tezga (Tirga)	Fr. Morocco	22
Thibar	Tunisia	44
Thimhadit (*see* Timhadit)	Fr. Morocco	22
Tiaret	Algeria	10
Tichele	Rio De Oro	35
Tiflet	Fr. Morocco	22
Tiksebt (*see* El Oued)	Algeria	4
Tilremt	Algeria	10
Timhadit (Thimhadit)	Fr. Morocco	22
Timmoudi	Algeria	10
Timimoun	Algeria	10
Tindouf	Algeria	10
Tinfouchi (1)	Algeria	10
Tinfouchi (2)	Algeria	10
Tinghir (*see* Tinrhir)	Fr. Morocco	22
Tinjdad	Fr. Morocco	22
Tin Mizoukine	Algeria	11
Tinrhir (Tinghir)	Fr. Morocco	22
Tin Zaouaten	Algeria	11
Tiougrar (*see* Tagmout)	Fr. Morocco	21
Tirga (*see* Tezga)	Fr. Morocco	22
Titaf	Algeria	11
Tizi N'Isly	Fr. Morocco	22
Tiznit	Fr. Morocco	22
Tizi N'Takekht	Fr. Morocco	22
Tizi N'Takka	Fr. Morocco	23
Tlemcen (Saf Saf)	Algeria	11
Tobruck	Libya	33
Tobruck No. 2	Libya	33
Tolmeta	Libya	33
Touggourt	Algeria	11
Touzouz (*see* Ghardaia)	Algeria	5
Tozeur	Tunisia	44
Tripoli (Castel Benito)	Libya	33
Tripoli (Mellaha)	Libya	34
Tunis (El Aouina)	Tunisia	44
Uadi El Merdum (*see* Merdum)	Libya	32
Uadi Saaba (*see* Saaba)	Libya	32
Uadi Tamet (*see* Tamet)	Libya	32
Uan-El Chebir (*see* Chebir)	Libya	29
Uau-En Namus (*see* Namus)	Libya	32
Ubari	Libya	34
Uenzerfch	Libya	34
Um El Abid	Libya	34
Umm-El Araneb (*see* Araneb)	Libya	27
Upffana (*see* El Upffana)	Libya	30
Villa Cisneros	Rio De Oro	35
Wadi El Orfeli	Libya	34
Yelva (*see* Jeloua)	Rio De Oro	35
Za El Faida	Libya	34
Zagora	Fr. Morocco	23
Zair	Fr. Morocco	23

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8620

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City or airport	*Country or islands*	*Page*
Zanpough	Tunisia	44
Zanzur	Libya	34
Zarzir	Algeria	11
Zarzis	Tunisia	44
Zella	Libya	34
Zerhumra	Algeria	11
Zliten	Libya	34
Zoukrata	Tunisia	44
Zt. Msus	Libya	34
Zuara	Libya	34
Zuetina	Libya	34
Zuila	Libya	34
Zuila No. 2	Libya	34

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ALGERIA

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Abadla	E	31 01 N. 2 45 W.	1,992	1 mi. E. of Abadla; 61 mi. SW. of Colomb Bechar.	1,344′ x 1,809′ x 1,148′ x 1,804′.		
Abolemme Laouni	E	29 45 N. 5 37 E.	1,804	Beside the Temanrosset. In Guezzam Rd., 150 mi. S. of Tamenrosset.	2,622′ x 2,490′	Sandy soil	Water.
Adrar	E	27 53 N. 00 17 W.	9,282	3 mi. NE. of Adrar.	2,296′ x 3,280′ x 2,952′ x 3,608′.		Hangars; repair facilities.
Affreville	E	36 14 N. 2 14 E.	915	2½ mi. S. of Affreville on N. side of Oued Cheleff.	2,600′ x 1,460′	Slightly clayey. (rarely used).	No hangars; minor repairs in Affreville, fuel available on prior request; telephone on field; telegraph, hotels, doctors, hospital in town.
Aflou	E	34 26 N. 2 07 E.	4,592	1 mi. E. of village; to the S. of Aflou-Laghouat Rd.	1,312′ x 1,673′	Good; heavy after rains.	Telephone, telegraph, and hotel in village.
Ain Belda	E	35 48 N. 7 22 E.	2,950	60 mi. SE. of Constantine	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Ain El Hadjadj (West).	E	28 00 N. 2 40 E.	2,395	58 mi. N. of In Salah on top of cliff, adjoining to W. of El Galea, In Salah Rd.	2,295′ x 2,295′	Flat, pebbly	Water in winter only.
Ain El Hadjadj (East).	E	26 47 N. 7 12 E.			1,638′ x 1,638′		
Ain Guettara	E	28 07 N. 3 10 E.	2,659	1 mi. NW. of Guettara, 87 mi. NNE. of In Salah.	1,968 x 1,638′	Pebbly; all weather	
Ain Kbira	E	26 50 N. 3 22 W.		On S. side Colomb Bechar Chegga Rd.	1,638′ x 1,638′	Good	Unknown.
Ain Kercha		35 45 N. 7 45 E.					
Ain Oussera	E	35 27 N. 2 58 E.	2,296	3 mi. SE. of Ain Oussera. About 13½ mi. E. of Alger-Laghouat Rd. 114 mi. S. of Algiers.	1,378′ x 1,476′	Good; semihard; all weather.	No hangars; fuel; telephone and telegraph in town; water.
Ain Sefra	E	32 48 N. 00 29 W.	3,510	5 mi. E. of Ain Sefra near N. side of narrow gage railway on S. side of Sefra-Asla Rd.	3,280′ x 3,116′	Firm, hard, all-weather.	1 hangar; telephone, telegraph; meteorological station; hotels and doctor in town.
Ain Temouchent	E	35 20 N. 1 09 W.	787	1.2 mi. N. of city on W. side of road to Oran; 39 mi. SW. of Oran.	1,476′ x 1,640′	Good; slightly pebbly	1 hangar; minor repairs, fuel, telephone; telegraph and hotels in city.
Algiers (Hussein Dey).	E	36 46 N. 3 07 E.	3	20 mi. SE. of Algiers on coast; railway on southern boundary.	1,738′ x 1,230′	Serviceable all seasons	1 hangar, repairs, fuel, telephone, telegraph, hotels in town.
Algiers (Maison Blanche).	M	36 41 N. 3 13 E.	72	1½ mi. SSE. of Maison Blanche; 11 mi. SE. of Algiers.	6,000′ x 9,000′; runway; NE.-SW. 5,550 x 165′.	Grass covered; soft from November to April. A stone and rubble runway about 3,900′ x 120′ NE./SW. starting from outside SW. boundary.	7 hangars (4 military); repairs, fuel, telephone, radio; hotels in Algiers; officers quarters in clubhouse; barracks.
Amamoukene	E	24 07 N. 8 33 E.	1,968	On Fort Gardel-Djado Rd.; 103 mi. SSE. of Fort Gardel.	1,968′ x 1,638	Good surface	
Amguid	E	26 24 N. 5 19 E.		3 mi. SW. of fort; 144 mi. SW. of Fort Flattery.	3,690′ x 3,270′	Firm, sandy; all-weather.	1 portable hangar; meteorological station; water; W/T.
Amrenene El Kasbah.	E	22 04 N. 00 26 E.	1,056	38 mi. W. of Bilon 5 airport	1,968′ x 1,311′	Pebbly surface	
Aoulef Cherfa	E	27 05 N. 1 06 E.	1,056	9 mi. N. of Aoulef el Arab Fort.	4,920′ x 4,590′	Firm, undulating, all weather.	Workshops available, fuel, W/T and D/F, limited water supply.

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0622

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Arak	E	25 20 N. 3 40 E.	1,804	3 mi. SW. of fort on road from In Salah to In Eker and In Guezzam.	3,270′ x 2,940′	Sandy	Fuel; W/T; water.
Batna	E	35 32 N. 6 10 E.	3,364	1 mi. SW. of Batna on race course.	2,130′ x 819′	Sandy	1 hangar; fuel (delivered to field on prior request), telephone and telegraph in town; D/F; hotels, hospital in Batna.
Bedeau	E	34 29 N. 00 48 W.	3,790	1 mi. E. of Bedeau on S. side Road No. 13.	2,622′ x 1,950′	Firm; slopes to SW	1 hangar; fuel, telephone and telegraph and hotels in town.
Beni Abbes	E	30 07 N. 2 09 W.	1,617	1 mi. E. of fort; 106 mi. S. of Colomb Bechar.	2,940′ x 1,950′	Firm, undulating, sandy.	Hangar; fuel, telephone, meteorological station, military doctor and native infirmary.
Beni Ounif	E	32 02 N. 1 15 W.	2,700	2 mi. E. of Beni Ounif	2,622′ x 1,968′	Firm, hard sand with pebbles.	No hangars; telephone; water.
Berges	E	23 30 N. 1 04 E.	1,148	3¼ mi. E. of Trans-Sahara Rd. from Colomb Bechar-Gao Rd., 231 mi. SSE. of Regan.	1,968′ x 1,968′	Sandy; gravelly.	
Bidon 5	E	22 16 N. 1 06 E.	1,148	2 landing grounds, 1 on each side of Colomb Bechar-Gao Rd., 738 mi. NW. of Gao.	(a) 1,968′ x 1,968′, (b) 1,968′ x 1,968′.	Hard, sandy	Rotating beacon; some water.
Biskra	E	34 50 N. 5 44 E.	410	4½ mi. S. of Biskra	2,952′ x 1,968′	Firm and grassy	1 hangar; workshop, fuel, telephone in clubhouse; meteorological station; hospital and doctor in town.
Blida	E	36 30 N. 2 48 E.	558	2½ mi. NW. of Blida, 24 mi. SW. of Algiers.	3,936′ x 3,690′	Alluvial soil, good	7 hangars; 1 civil and 6 military; minor repairs; fuel, telephone, telegraph in Blida; meteorological station; hotels and military hospital in Blida; W/T (mobile).
Boghari	E	35 50 N. 2 45 E.	1,968	3 mi. S. of Boghari; 62½ mi. SW. of Algiers.	2,622′ x 2,295′	Firm gravel surface; unserviceable after heavy rains for 3 days.	Fuel, telephone, and telegraph in town; hotel.
Bone (Allelick)	E	36 51 N. 7 45 E.		On race course 2¼ mi. S. of Bone between railroad line and Oued Seybouse.	2,700′ x 1,650′	Flat, grassy; heavy in winter after rains.	Hangars; minor repairs, fuel, telephone, telegraph, hotels, club in Bone. This field was to have been replaced in May 1939; may be obsolete by now.
Bone (Duzerville)	E	36 48 N. 7 47 E.		3¾ mi. S. of Bone	2,100′ x 2,100′		
Bougie	E	36 44 N. 5 02 E.	66	2¾ mi. SW. of Bougie; On S. side of Oued Srir Canal.	2,280′ x 1,968′	Flat, grassy surface; muddy in winter.	1 hangar 66′ x 49′; workshop; fuel; telephone and telegraph in Bougie; W/T; hotels and doctor in town.
Bou Bernous (1)	E	27 12 N. 2 54 W.	928	1¼ mi. E. of Bou Bernous Military Post.	2,622′ x 2,622′	Hard, black, pebbly	Portable hangars; W/T; water.
Bou Bernous (2)	E	27 13 N. 2 59 W.	928	300′ N. of Bou Bernous	1,476′ x 819′		Water.

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0623

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Bou Ktoub	E	34 01 N. 00 06 E.	3,346	1¼ mi. SE. of Bou Ktoub on road from Bou Ktoub to Geryville.	1,311′ x 1,311′	Hard	No hangars; fuel; telephone and telegraph in town; hotel.
Bourkika (Morengo)	E	36 30 N. 2 26 E.	262	1¼ mi. ESE. of Morengo; 2 mi. W. of Bourkika.	1,314′ x 1,212′	Heavy after prolonged rains.	1 hangar; telephone.
Bou Saada	E	35 20 N. 4 11 E.	1,476	7½ mi. N. of Bou Saada. In angle formed by Algiers-Bou Saada-Setif Rds.	1,312′ x 1,148′	Pebbly with sparse vegetation.	No hangars; fuel; telephone and telegraph in town; hotels and doctor in town.
Canrobert	E	35 52 N. 7 07 E.	2,854	2¼ mi. SW. of Canrobert	2,262′ x 1,869′	Level grass; serviceable all seasons.	1 hangar; minor repairs; fuel on request; telephone and telegraph in town; no accommodations for personnel.
Chateau du Rhumel	E	36 09 N. 6 10 E.		30 mi. WSW. of Constantine.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Chenochane	E	26 04 N. 4 15 W.		W. of road from Colomb Bechar to Chegga.		Pebbly	Water.
Colomb Bechar	E	31 36 N. 2 12 W.	2,572	¾ mi. SW. of town	4,260′ x 2,610′	Firm, rolling; hard and undulating; all-weather.	4 hangars (90′ x 65′), repairs; fuel, telephone, and telegraph on field at post; radio, hotels, doctor and hospital in city.
Constantine (Oued Hamimine)	E	36 17 N. 6 41 E.	1,935	6 mi. SE. of Constantine	2,622′ x 1,950′	Hard in summer; muddy after rains.	3 hangars; work shops; fuel, telephone nearby; telegraph in Constantine, D/F; weather service; first aid on field; club to S.; hotels in Constantine.
Crampel	E	34 25 N. 00 48 W.	3,790	600′ N. of Crampel; 5 mi. S. of Bedeau.	1,572′ x 1,311′	Hard	1 hangar; water.
Dider	E	25 12 N. 8 24 E.		1½ mi. E. of Fort Polignac-Djanet Rd.; 87½ mi. NW. of Djanet.	1,968′ x 1,968′	Very good	Unknown.
Djafou	E	30 51 N. 3 34 E.	1,410	45 mi. ENE. of El Golea, within 2½ mi of junction of roads from El Golea to Ouarghlo and El Golea to Chardain on El Golea side.		Pebbly sand	Water.
Djanet	E	24 27 N. 9 30 E.	3,588	7 mi. S. of Djanet	2,952′ x 2,622′	Hard, sandy surface	No hangars; fuel, doctor, and infirmary in town; weather service; water.
Djebel Teioualt	E	36 06 N. 6 22 E.		Exact location of field unknown. Djebel Teioualt Mountain is 22 mi. SSW. of Constantine.	3,300′ x 3,300′		None.
Djelfa	E	34 41 N. 3 17 E.	3,770	3¾ mi. NE. of Djelfa	2,610′ x 2,490′		No hangars; fuel; weather reports; telephone and telegraph in town; hotel.
Djenien Bou Rezg	E	32 21 N. 00 49 W.		W. of village; 24 mi. SW. of Ain Sefra.	1,638′ x 984′	Firm	Telephone; water.
Djidjelli	E	36 49 N. 5 47 E.	10	On coast 1 mi. W. of town; 37 mi. E. of Bougie.	3,750′ x 1,962′	Sandy, firm, little muddy.	Hangar (66′ x 72′); minor repairs; fuel, telephone and telegraph in town.

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0624

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
El Aboid Sidi Cheikh.	E	32 54 N. 00 32 E.	2,965	1¼ mi. NW. of El Aboid Sidi Cheikh; 61 mi. SSW. of first class road terminus at Geryville.	1,638′ x 1,638′.	Flat, hard surface	No hangar; minor repairs; telephone; weather service; water.
El Achir	E	36 03 N. 4 39 E.		2½ mi. ESE. of town; 2 landing grounds; an arrow on roof of Bouche farm indicates which landing ground is to be used.	(a) 2,280′ x 1,620′, (b) 2,940′ x 2,280′.	Firm, well drained	No hangars; telephone and telegraph at Bordj-Bou-Arreridj; minor repairs at Bouche farm; hotels at B. B. Arreridj.
El Aricha	E	34 13 N. 1 16 W.	3,772	½ mi. NW. of fort; 4 mi. NW. of El Aricha; 109 mi. SSW. of Oran.	2,295′ x 1,200′	Pebbly; all weather	Unknown.
El Golea	E	30 34 N. 2 52 E.	1,305	½ mi. W. of El Golea	3,507′ x 2,289′	Level and sandy; serviceable all seasons but soft on NW. side.	Small, portable hangar, fuel, meteorological station, rotating beacon, telephone, W/T, military doctor and infirmary.
El Hank	E	25 37 N. 5 36 W.	1,410	29 mi. NE. of Chegga on W. side of road from Colomba Bechar to Chegga.	1,962′ x 1,962′	Firm, sandy, gravelly	Unknown.
El Oued	E	33 07 N. 6 47 E.	266	2 mi. SSW. of Guemar; 1¾ mi. SW. of Tarzout; 9½ mi. NNW. of El Oued.	1,860′ x 1,638′	Sandy	Telephone at Guemar; weather service at El Oued.
El Oued (Tiksebt)	E	33 22 N. 6 51 E.	262	¾ mi. NW. of El Oued	2,100′ x 2,100′		Telephone; W/T; water.
Fleurus	E	35 43 N. 00 22 W.	295	3 mi. NE of Leurand; 12 mi. E. of Oran.	1,470′ x 1,170′		Water.
Fontaine Chaude	E	35 43 N. 6 20 E.	2,706	10 mi. WNW. of Ain Yagout; 14 mi. SSW. of Constantine.	1,635′ x 1,503′		No hangars; repairs in Batna; telephone and telegraph; fuel; water; hotel in Batna.
Fort Flatters	E	28 09 N. 6 44 E.	1,148	2¼ mi. NNE. of Fort Flatters.	2,289′ x 1,962′	Hard clay; unserviceable after rains.	5 portable hangars; fuel; weather service, W/T; guest room at military post.
Fort Gardel	E	24 48 N. 8 25 E.		1½ mi. S. of Fort Gardel on road from Fort Saint to Djado.	1,800′ x 1,536′	Good, firm soil	No facilities.
Fort Lallemand	E	31 17 N. 6 18 E.	449	1 mi. NW. of Fort Lallemand; 78 mi. SE. of Ouargla on W. side of road (Ouargla-Fort Flatters).	1,962′ x 1,962′	Flat, sandy soil, all-weather.	W/T, weather reports.
Fort Miribel	E	29 28 N. 2 59 E.	1,607	2½ mi. NNW. of Miribel; 59 mi. S. of El Golea on E. side of El Golea-In Salah Rd.	1,635′ x 1,635′	Good, pebbly surface	Water.
Fort Polignac	E	26 28 N. 8 25 E.	1,960	2 mi. SW. of Fort Polignac.	1,962′ x 1,800′	Good, serviceable all seasons.	Radio, weather service, accommodations in city, water.

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Freha	E	36 45 N. 4 18 E.	492	¾ mi. SW. of Freha; 4½ mi. W. of Azarga; 50 mi. E. of Algiers.	2,624′ x 984′	Clay	Minor repairs at Azarga; fuel, telephone and telegraph at Freha; hotels at Freha and at Azarga.
Geryville	E	33 39 N. 1 01 E.	4,297	3½ mi. S. of Geryville on E. side of track going S.	2,616′ x 2,616′	Clay surface, hard during dry season, snowfall frequent.	No hangars; fuel on prior request; telephone and telegraph; hotel and first aid in Geryville.
Ghardaia (Noumerate).	E	32 22 N. 3 48 E.	1,640	10 mi. SE. of Ghardaia, ½ mi. W. of Noumerate.	1,962′ x 1,635′	Hard, sandy; NW. part of field a little wet.	Fuel; weather service at Ghardaia; telephone and telegraph.
Ghardaia (Touzouz).	E	32 30 N. 3 37 E.	1,640	2½ mi. NW. of Ghardaia	1,470′ x 900′	Soft, becoming very soft during rains.	Telephone at Ghardaia; water; meteorological station.
Gourd Amara	E	29 22 N. 6 20 E.	820	119 mi. N. of Fort Flatters on road from Ouargla to Fort Flatters.	1,962′ x 1,635′	Firm and pebbly, slightly undulating.	Unknown.
Guerzim	E	29 37 N. 1 39 W.	1,374	½ mi. E. of Guerzim; 150 mi. SSE. of Colomb Bechar and 2½ mi. E. of Trans-Sahara Rd.	1,308′ x 1,308′	Springy, fine black pebbles.	Water at Guerzim.
Hammada Chammar	E	28 21 N. 00 28 W.	935	W. of Trans-Sahara Rd; 34 mi. NNW. of Adrar.	1,962′ x 1,962′	Firm, springy and pebbly.	Water from wells, 3¾ mi. SE.
Hassi Bonneville	E	27 55 N. 2 51 W.	705	9 mi. NE. of Bonneville on E. of road from Chegga to Colomb Bechar.	1,962′ x 1,635′	Springy; sandy mixed with fine grey pebbles.	Water.
Hassi Bourala	E	24 40 N. 8 26 E.		9 mi. S. of Fort Gardel on Amguid-I'Janet Rd.			Water from wells.
Hassi El Abiod	E	31 50 N. 3 39 E.	1,476	3¾ mi. NE. of Hassi El Abiod Fort; 50 mi. S. of Ghardaia.	1,635′ x 1,143′	Sandy, gravelly	Water at Fort.
Hassi Mdakane	E	28 25 N. 2 17 W.	1,082	½ mi. E. of road from Colomb Bechar, to Chegga; 114 mi. S. of Colomb Bechar.	1,143′ x 588′	Sandy, springy, mixed with gravel or pebbles.	Water from wells.
Hassi Merriem	E	28 10 N. 2 33 W	771	½ mi. N. of wells at Hassi Merriem on E. side of Colomb Bechar-Chegga Rd.	961′ x 816′	Part of dried lake, light color.	Water.
Hassi Rhenami	E	31 50 N. 5 55 E.	561	¾ mi. SE. of wells on E. side of Ouargla-Fort Flatters Rd; 42 mi. ESE. of Ouargla.	1,749′ x 1,308′	Sandy and pebbly	Water.
Hassi Tilemsi	E	28 43 N. 0 46 W.	1,476	3 mi. SE. of Hassi Tilemsi; E. of Trans-Sahara Rd; 217 mi. SSE. of Colomb-Bechar.	1,635′ x 1,308′	Sandy and pebbly	Water.
Hassi Touareg	E	30 32 N. 6 20 E.	656	3¼ mi. W. of Hassi Touareg; 117 mi. SSE. of Ouargla, on the Ouargla-Fort Flatter Rd.	3,270′ x 2,295′	Sandy and pebbly	Water.
Igli	E	30 27 N. 2 16 W	1,673	660 ft. E. of Igli Military Post.	1,143′ x 1,308′	Hard, pebbly surface	W/T, telephone, water.
Illerene	E	26 46 N. 8 43 E.		25 mi. NE. of Fort Polignac on E. side of Fort Saint-Djado Rd.	2,943′ x 1,308′	Good	Unknown.
In Affelaleh	E	23 31 N. 9 20 E.		106 mi. SE. of Fort Gardee on the Fort Saint-Fort Gardee-Djado Rd.			Water.

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0626

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° '	*Feet*				
In Eker	E	24 00 N. 5 00 E.	3,280	1½ mi. E. of In Eker Fort on E. side of In Salah-In Guezzam Rd.	1,620' x 1,280'		Water at Fort.
In Guezzam	E	19 33 N. 5 41 E.	1,348	¼ mi. NW. of In Guezzam Fort.	2,484' x 2,027'	Firm sand and pebbly.	No hangars, fuel, water available; weather reports, W/T.
Inifel	E	29 48 N. 3 44 E.	1,050	½ mi. SW. of Inifel; 77 mi. SE. of El Galea.	2,616' x 1,410'	Hard, sandy, all weather.	Water at Fort.
In Salah	E	27 11 N. 2 26 E.	918	2½ mi. W. of In Salah. (S. of road, In Salah-Aoulef.)	1,962' x 1,962'	Sandy and firm (isolated).	Portable hangar; minor repairs; fuel, weather reports, W/T.
In Takoula	E	26 25 N. 3 18 E.	1,115	69 mi. SE. of In Salah and 1¼ mi. E. of In Salah-In Eker-In Guezzam Rd.	1,962' x 1,470'	Hard, all weather.	Water
Kahal Morrot	E	26 29 N. 3 53 W.	1,246	W. of Colomb Bechar-Chegga Rd.; 150 mi. NE. of Chegga.	1,635' x 1,635'	Sandy, pebbles; N. corner soft.	Water at Chemochate, 44 mi. to SW.
Kilometer 200	E	29 20 N. 7 40 E.	1,148	100 mi. NE. from Fort Flatters to W. of road from Fort Saint.	1,962' x 1,308'	Firm, slightly undulating.	Unknown.
Kilometer 252	E	28 31 N. 8 51 E.	.....	W. of road from Fort Saint to Fort Polegnac; 144 mi. NNE. of Fort Polegnac.	1,635' x 1,635'	Good	No water
Kouif Marsatt	E	35 33 N. 8 21 E.	3,041	3¾ mi. NNE. of Kouif Morsatt; 7½ mi. E. of Tebessa.	2,376' x 2,400'	Level; springy; all weather.	1 hangar; repair facilities in town; fuel; telephone and telegraph in town, water.
Krolfallah	E	34 32 N. 00 13 E.	3,772	¼ mi. W. of town; 28 mi. SSE. of Saida.	2,745' x 1,569'	Hard, high plateau characteristics, serviceable all season.	Fuel, telephone and telegraph in Saida.
Laghouat	E	33 47 N. 2 52 E.	2,463	½ mi. NW. of Laghouat	2,616' x 2,289'	Sandy, all weather, bad winds.	2 hangars (65' x 98') repair facilities; fuel, meteorological station at Laghouat; water.
La Meskiana	E	35 41 N. 7 39 E.	.....	31 mi. NW. of Tebissa	3,300' x 3,300'		Unknown.
Levasseur	E	35 52 N. 6 12 E.	.....	20 mi. N. of Batna, 5 mi. W. of Levasseur.			
Lourmel	E	35 31 N. 00 39 W.	202	1¼ mi. SE. of Lourmel; 50 mi. SW. of Oran.	2,295' x 1,869'	Good, flat	1 hangar; fuel, water, telephone. **Caution:** Avoid landing in the SSE. section of field in winter.
Mahjez	E	29 27 N. 4 26 W.	1,673	62 mi. W. of Tobelbala. To W. of road from Tobelbala to Ain ben Till.	2,940' x 2,940'	Unserviceable in rainy season.	Unknown.
Mascara	E	35 22 N. 00 06 E.	1,650	2¼ mi. SW. of Mascara; 47 mi. SE. of Oran.	1,962' x 1,962'	Sandy clay, covered with grass, all weather.	2 hangars (metal, 65' x 98' and 65' x 65'), minor repairs, fuel, telephone and telegraph in town, hotels and doctor in Mascara, first aid on field.
Mecheria	E	33 31 N. 00 15 W	3,608	2¼ mi. SE. of Mecheria; 71 mi. WSW. of Geryville.	2,616' x 2,616'	Fine sand; all weather.	Minor repairs, fuel on prior request, telephone and telegraph in Mecheria, water.

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0627

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	Feet				
Menouarar	E	31 06 N. 2 14 W.	2,080	5 mi. S. of Menouarar; ½ mi. W. of Trans-Sahara Rd.; 31 mi. S. of Colomb Bechar.	1,308′ x 1,308′	Pebbly, springy	Telephone at fort.
Mereradia	E	29 28 N. 4 51 W.	1,804	SE. of Tabelbala-Ain ben Tili Rd.; 75 mi. W. of Tabelbala.	1,962′ x 1,962′	Hard and sandy	Unknown.
Meridja	E	31 24 N. 2 37 W.	240	2½ mi. NNW. from Meridja. Field is 44 mi. W. of Colomb-Bechar.	1,146′ x 1,146′	Hard surface	Telephone.
Mokrid	E	25 39 N. 4 41 W.	1,617	To W. of Tabelbala-Chegga Rd.; 84 mi. NNE. of Chegga.	1,308′ x 981′	Hard, black, pebbly	Unknown.
Morsott	E	35 40 N. 8 01 E.		85 mi. S. of Bone; 42 mi. S. of Souk Abras.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Mostaganem (Noisy Les Baines).	E	35 45 N. 00 02 E.	66	5 mi. S. of Noisy Les Baines on W. side of Mostaganem-Perregaux Rd.	2,100′ N./S. x 1,500′ E./W.	Hard, flat, all weather	2 hangars (40′ x 40′), minor repairs, fuel, telephone, buffet at aerodrome, hotels and first aid in town, water.
Mouzaiaville	E	36 29 N. 2 41 E.	260	1 mi. NNW. of town; 32 mi. SW. of Algiers.	1,716′ x 1,148′	Level and dry, grass covered	1 hangar; minor repairs, fuel; telephone and water at nearby farm; telegraph, hotels in town.
M'Sila	E	35 43 N. 4 31 E.	1,476	2 mi. NW. of M'Sila; 2½ mi. W. of road Bou Arreridj-Bou Saada; 113 mi. SE. of Algiers.	1,410′ x 1,215′	Good	Telephone in town, water hole 2 mi.
Negrine	E	34 29 N. 7 36 E.	1,115	1¼ mi. N. of Negrine; 88 mi. SSW. of Tebessa.	1,308′ x 1,308′	Sandy, firm	None (this field is seldom used account being isolated) water.
Oggaz	E	35 33 N. 00 15 W.	260	4¼ mi. WNW. of St. Denis du Sig; 30 mi. SE. of Oran.			Believed to have been obsolete in 1937 but reconditioned and enlarged for use by service aircraft during the war.
Ohanet	E	28 40 N. 8 51 E.	1,378	125 mi. SW. of Fort Saint on Fort Saint-Fort Polignac road.	1,470′ x 1,470′		Unknown.
Oran	M	35 37 N. 00 36 W.	295	5¼ mi. SSE. of Oran; 1¼ mi. SE. of La Senia.	5,886′ x 3,270′; runways ENE./WSW. 1,500′ x 120′; strip, 900′ wide.	Springy sand, flat, grass covered, slippery in parts after rain, soft patch on W.	4 double and 4 small hangars, minor repairs, fuel, telephone and telegraph, W/T, hotels in city, quarters and extensive barracks on field.
Orleansville	E	36 12 N. 1 21 E.	492	3 mi. N. of Orleansville at terminus of rural road; 106 mi. WSW. of Algiers.	2,100′ x 1,770′	Sandy, all weather	1 hangar, 50′ x 65′; minor repairs in town; fuel; telephone and telegraph, W/T at fort, meteorological station, hotels.
Ouallen	E	24 35 N. 1 15 E.	1,152	5 mi. SE. of Ouallen Fort; 36 mi. E. of Trans-Sahara Rd.	1,962′ x 1,962′	Fine gravel and sand	Radio; weather service at fort; water.
Ouargla	E	31 59 N. 5 20 E.	426	2 mi. NNE. of town which is at crossing of Touggourt-Djafou and Ghardaia-Fort Flatters Rds.	2,943′ x 2,859′	Firm, heavy after rains; serviceable all year.	2 hangars (portable), minor repairs in town; fuel; weather service; telephone; radio; hotels; military doctor and local infirmary.

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0628

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Oudika	E	30 05 N. 4 08 W.	.....	2½ mi. NE. of Oudika; 119 mi. W. of Beni-Abbes.	1,962′ x 1,962′	Sandy soil mixed with pebbles.	Water, telephone.
Oued Sbita	E	25 48 N. 5 01 W.	1,017	56 mi. NE. of Chegga on Chegga-Tabelbala Rd.	1,635′ x 1,635′	Hard sand and fine pebbles.	Unknown.
Oulad Moussa	E	25 54 N. 4 55 W.	1,066	63 mi. NE. of Chegga; to the N. of Chegga-Tabelbala Rd.	981′ x 654′	Black pebbly soil.	Unknown.
Ouled Djellal	E	34 27 N. 5 01 E.	643	2¼ mi. NW. of Ouled Djellel, 50 mi. SW. of Biskra.	1,968′ x 1,638′	Good	Unknown.
Ouled Said	E	28 21 N. 1 24 W.	1,312	5 mi. SW. of Ouled-Said; 40 mi. SW. of Hurri Tilemel, the nearest point on the Colomb Bechar Rd.	1,639′ x 984′	Hard and stony	Water at Ouled Said.
Perregeaux	E	35 38 N. 00 02 E.	85	4 mi. N. by W. of Perregeaux; 47 mi. SE. of Oran.	2,118′ x 1,741′	Good but marshy after heavy rains.	1 hangar; minor repairs, fuel, telephone, water.
Petit	E	36 27 N. 7 31 E.	.....	35 mi. SSW. of Bone	3,300′ x 3,300′	.....	Unknown.
Philippeville	E	36 51 N. 6 58 E.	40	2½ mi. SE. of Philippeville (on coast); 47 mi. W. of Bone.	3,000′ x 3,300′	Good but heavy after rains.	1 hangar (98′ x 60′), repairs, fuel, telephone, and telegraph, W/T, meteorological station, hotel.
Reg	E	21 12 N. 5 34 E.	1,926	E. of road from In Guezzam to In Salah; 120 mi. N. of In Guezzam.	.....	.....	Unknown.
Reg Aftout	E	26 50 N. 3 39 W.	1,148	On N. side of Tabelbala-Chegga Rd.; 180 mi. NE. of Chegga.	1,635′ x 1,635′	Fine, black, pebbly, and very hard sand.	Unknown.
Red el Abiod	E	26 44 N. 3 10 W.	.....	SE. of Tabelbala-Chegga Rd.; 141 mi. NE. of Chegga.	1,635′ x 1,635′	Fine sand, pebbly	Unknown.
Reggan (1)	E	26 43 N. 00 10 E.	876	900′ E. of Fort Reggan and on compound belonging to Compagnie Generale Trans. Saharienne.	2,787′ x 2,625′	Firm, covered with sand.	Minor repairs, fuel, weather service, radio, water.
Reggan (2)	E	26 41 N. 00 11 E.	876	1½ mi. SE. from Reggan Fort.	2,940′ x 2,625′	Firm, covered with sand and yellow pebbles.	2 portable hangars, minor repairs, weather service, W/T, water.
Rhorb el Ethel	E	28 30 N. 6 15 W.	1,824	103 mi. WSW. of Tabelbala; N. of road from Tabelbala to Ain ben Tili.	2,616′ x 2,616′	Fine, pebbly, hard sand	Water.
Relizane (West)	E	35 41 N. 00 29 E.	.....	5 mi. SW. of Relizane on S. side of road to Mascara.	2,940′ x 1,650′	.....	Small workshops, water.
Relizane (East)	E	35 46 N. 00 39 E.	.....	1½ mi. ENE. of Relizane; S. side of road to Inkermen.	.....	Very large; entire plain suitable for landing.	In July 1940 this was being developed as an operational aerodrome; there then existed a control tower, petrol dumps, and other buildings near the road.
Relizane (South)	E	35 43 N. 00 35 E.	57 below sea level	¾ mi. S. of Relizane on W. side of road to Sidi Mohammed Ben Aouda; 62 mi. E. of Oran.	1,950′ x 1,770′	Good; well drained; grass covered in winter.	1 hangar (99′ x 98′), minor repairs, fuel, telephone, water.
Saharis	E	35 13 N. 1 52 E.	3,018	25 mi. W. of Chellala Reibell; 35 mi. SE. of Tiaret.	Field-2,920′ x 2,616′; Runways-NE./SW. 2,624′, E/W. 2,493′, SE. 525′, N./S. 2,427′.	Chalky, serviceable at all times.	Fuel, telephone at Grieb farm immediately north of field, telegraph at Reibell or Tiaret, farm may accommodate from 8-10 tourists.

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0629

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Sahib Touil	E	29 41 N. 2 56 W.	1,410	30 mi. NE. of Tabelbala. Immediately to the W. of Tabelbala-Beni Abbes Rd.		Soft sand and pebbly	
Said (Nazareth)	E	34 53 N. 00 09 E.	2,427	About 4 mi. N. of Saida between road and R. R. to Oran; 1¼ mi. N. of Nazareth Illmois.	2,289′ x 1,653′	All weather; hard limestone.	2 hangars, minor repairs, fuel, telephone and telegraph in Saida, hotels, medical care in Saida.
St. Denis Du Sig	E	35 34 N. 00 14 W.				Good	Unknown.
Sebkra du Krenig	E	26 35 N. 2 57 E.	918	N. of Sebkra du Krenig. Salt Lakes on W. side of In Guezzam. In Salah Road, 50 mi. SE. of In Salah.	2,289′ x 2,289′	Flat, sandy	Unknown.
Setif Ain Arnat	E	36 10 N. 5 19 E.	3,346	4 mi. W. of Setif, 44 mi. SSE. of Bougie on S. side Algiers-Constantine R. R.	3,000′ x 3,000′	Clay, hard, well drained, grass covered, all weather.	12 hangars (Standard) and 3 Bessoneaux hangars, repairs available, fuel, telephone, meteorological station.
Sidi Aissa	E	35 53 N. 3 47 E.	2,158	¼ mi. NE. of Sidi Aissa 80 mi. SE. of Algiers.	1,760′ x 780′ (irregular shaped).	Sandy, all weather	Minor repairs at Sidi Aissa, fuel (on prior request), telephone and telegraph, hotels, water.
Sidi Bel Abbes	E	35 10 N. 00 35 W.	1,590	2¼ mi. SE. of Sidi Bel Abbes; 37 mi. SSE. of Oran.	2,124′ x 1,308′	Well drained, sandy, all weather.	2 metal hangars (82′ x 98′ each), workshop for repairing all types available, telephone and telegraph, hotels and doctor in town.
Souk Ahras	E	36 16 N. 7 56 E.	2,230	2 mi. SW. of Souk Ahras; 44 mi. SE. of Bone.	2,289′ x 1,635′, L-shaped.	Fallow land, springy and well drained.	1 hangar, minor repairs in town, telephone, water available.
Tabelbala	E	29 24 N. 3 15 W.	1,656	N. of Tabelbala Fort at junction of Tabelbala-Ain-ben Tili and Chegga Rds.	1,635′ x 1,635′	Sandy, gravel and pebbles.	1 portable hangar, fuel, telephone, radio, doctor, native infirmary, water.
Tabelbalet	E	27 20 N. 6 47 E.		56 mi. S. of Fort Flatters W. of Fort Flatters-Fort Polignac Rd.	1,962′ x 1,962′	Very good surface	Unknown.
Tadjentourt	E	27 52 N. 8 37 E.	1,476	W. of Fort Saint-Fort Gardel Rd; 231 mi. SW. of Fort Saint.	2,460′ x 2,460′	Very good	Unknown.
Tafaraoui	E	35 29 N. 00 32 W. (village)		16 mi. SSE. of Oran	2 runways and taxi tracks.		Barracks of stone and cement; little known of present facilities; French Air Force School here at one time.
Tafassasset (1)	E	23 03 N. 9 18 E.		On Fort Gardel-Djado Rd; 143 mi. SE. of Fort Gardel.		Good natural drainage.	Unknown.
Tafassasset (2)	E	22 36 N. 9 38 E.		On Fort Gardel-Djado Rd; 178 mi. SE. of Fort Gardel.		Good	Unknown.
Taghit	E	30 55 N. 2 04 W.	2,165	2½ mi. W. of Taghit, to W. of Colomb-Bechar-Beni Abbes Rd.	2,289′ x 1,962′	Fine, pebbly, springy, black in color.	Telephone, water.

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0630

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Taklit	E	25 51 N. 3 39 E.	1,476	On both sides of road from In Salah to In Guezzam, 118 mi. SE. of In Salah.	1,562′ x 1,625′	Part of field lying E. of road unserviceable after heavy rain.	None.
Tahouazet	E	28 28 N. 8 05 E.		On E. side of road from Fort Flatters to Ohanet; 156 mi. WSW. of Ohanet.	2,289′ x 1,804′	Good	Unknown.
(Fort Laperrine) Tamanrasset	E	22 47 N. 5 29 E.	4,477	2,190′ N. of Tamanrasset Fort; field on NE. side of road from In Salah to In Guezzam; 225 mi. N. of In Guezzam.	1,608′ x 1,470′	Good, firm sandy surface.	Minor repairs, weather service, W/T, water, hotel, telephone.
Tarat	E	26 07 N. 9 19 E.	716	E. of Fort Saint-Fort Gardel Rd.; 106 mi. NE. of Fort Gardel.	1,562′ x 1,902′		Water near field.
Tebessa Djebel ed Dir.	E	35 25 N. 8 07 E.	2,657	1½ mi. N. of Tebessa; 105 mi. S. of Bone.	2,700′ x 2,700′	Clay covered with small tufts of vegetation; all weather.	Minor repairs at Tebessa; fuel, telephone and telegraph, hotels in Tebessa, hospital in Tebessa, water 1 mi. SE. of field at Bertrand farm.
Telergma	E	36 06 N. 6 25 E.	2,460	2¼ mi. SE. of Telergma on S. side of R. R.; 25 mi. SW. of Constantine.	2,700′ x 2,700′	Hard, flat surface with vegetation.	1 hangar 49′ x 98′; fuel (on prior request); telephone, telegraph, water.
Terrain A	E	30 10 N. 2 37 W.	2,100	25 mi. NW. of Beni Abbes	2,616′ x 2,289′	Flat, hard, and stony	Unknown.
Terrain B	E	30 16 N. 3 18 W.	2,308	68½ mi. NW. of Beni Abbes.	2,289′ x 2,289′	Hard and stony, somewhat furrowed.	Unknown.
Terrain C	E	30 17 N. 3 49 W.	2,168	97 mi. WNW. of Beni Abbes.	2,289′ x 1,902′	Flat, sandy, and springy.	Unknown.
Terrain D	E	29 41 N. 3 32 W.	2,329	87 mi. SW. of Beni Abbes; 25 mi. NW. of Tabelbala.	2,940′ x 2,460′	Hard, pebbly, undulating.	Unknown.
Tesnou Tin Acoret	E	21 40 N. 4 42 E.	3,149	4¼ mi. SE. of Tesnou, on S. side of In Salah-In Guezzam Rd.	1,902′ x 1,470′	Good	Unknown.
Tiaret	E	35 23 N. 1 23 E.	3,116	4 mi. NE. of Tiaret; 115 mi. SE. of Oran.	3,270′ x 1,800′	Flat, clay	1 hangar, minor repairs, fuel, telephone at nearby farm; telegraph, hotel in town. **Caution:** Drainage pool SE. sector of field.
Tilremt	E	33 09 N. 3 21 E.	2,418	½ mi. NE. of Tilremt Fort NE. of Saghoust-Gardaia Rds.	2,616′ x 1,962′	Pebbly, sandy	Telephone, water.
Timmoudi	E	29 18 N. 1 09 W.	1,213	6 mi. S. of Timmoudi, on the Colomb Bechar-Adrar Rd.	3,270′ x 1,962′	Spongy, covered with black pebbles.	Water at Ksar (2,610′ to E.).
Timimoun	E	29 15 N. 00 15 E.	1,017	3 mi. ESE. of Timimoun on S. side of track to El Golea; 187 mi. WSW. of El Golea.	2,616′ x 2,616′	Firm, undulating, all weather.	2 portable hangars, fuel, meteorological station, water.
Tindouf	E	27 43 N. 8 11 W.	1,640	3 mi. N. of Tindouf	3,270′ x 2,460′	Very firm, all weather.	Hangars, repairs, fuel, doctor, native infirmary, guest rooms at military post, water.
Tinfouchi (1)	E	28 52 N. 5 46 W.	1,818	2½ mi. NE. of Tinfouchi on side of Tabelbala-Ain ben Tili Rd.	1,800′ x 1,308′	Fine, sandy and pebbly.	Water.
Tinfouchi (2)	E	28 45 N. 5 45 W.	1,480	6½ mi. SE. of Tinfouchi. On E. side of Tabelbala-Ain ben Tili Rd.	1,470′ x 1,143′	Fine, sandy, pebbles	Water.

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0631

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ALGERIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Tin Mizoulline	E	27 06 N. 8 41 E.		E. of Fort Saint-Fort Gardel Rd; 156 mi. NNE. of Fort Gardel.	1,800′ x 1,430′	Hard	None.
Tin Zaouaten	E	19 37 N. 2 59 E.		2½ mi. E. of fort (5 mi. S. of town.	3,000′ x 2,622′	All weather	Water. (This field is on the border between French Soudan (Fr. W. Africa) and Algeria. May be in either country).
Titaf	E	27 29 N. 00 03 W.		9 mi. NE. of Titaf; E. of Trans-Sahara Rd.	1,635′ x 1,635′	Pebbly	Unknown.
Touggourt	E	33 05 N. 06 03 E.	223	1¼ mi. SSW. of Touggourt, 123 mi. SE. of Biskra.	2,700′ x 2,700′	Good crisp surface of sand and magnesia.	1 hangar, telephone and telegraph and meteorological station in town, radio, water.
Tlemcen (Saf Saf)	E	34 56 N. 1 15 W.	1,968	1 mi. S. of Saf Saf; 6 mi. NE. of Tlemcen; 39 mi. SW. of Oran.	1,635′ x 1,308′	Rough, possibly under cultivation, no rocks.	1 hangar, 62′ x 52′, minor repairs at Tlemcen, fuel obtained on prior request, telephone, hotels in town, water.
Zarzir	E	21 59 N. 5 40 E.	2,516	E. of road from In Salah to In Guezzam; 172 mi. N. of In Guezzam.	2,100′ x 1,962′	Sandy and pebbly	Water in underground tanks.
Zerhumra	E	29 55 N. 2 32 W.	1,509	4 mi. SW. of Zerhumra; 24 mi. SW. of Pont Abbes.	2,616′ x 1,635′	Pebbly, sandy	Water.

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0632

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CANARY ISLANDS

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Arguineguin, Gran Canaria.	E	27 47 N. 15 40 W.	.....	N. of village, 3,600′ from beach.	3,000′ x 900′.....	Cleared and levelled..	None.
Arico, Tenerife.....	E	28 10 N. 16 30 W.	.....	Town of Arico Vieja is on E. side of Tenerife, 2½ mi. SSW. of Santa Cruz.	.....	Not in good state.....	Emergency landing ground not occupied recently.
Arinaga, Gran Canaria.	E	27 52 N. 15 24 W.	.....	NW. of Arinaga Bay, about 3,000′ from beach.	3,000′ x 900′.....	Cleared and levelled..	None.
Arrecife, Lanzarote.	E	28 57 N. 13 35 W.	.....	About 3 mi. W. by S. of Arrecife on E. side of island.	2,625′ x 2,295′.....	Fairly good, being improved.	Fuel. Emergency field.
Bandama Hierro	E	27 45 N. 18 00 W.	.....	Near village of Bandama	.....	.....	
Juan Grande, Gran Canaria.	E	27 49 N. 15 28 W.	.....	Immediately SE. of Juan Grande village.	1,200′ x 3,500′.....	Cleared and levelled..	None.
Las Palmas (Gando), Gran Canaria.	E	27 57 N. 15 22 W.	45	12 mi. SSE. of Las Palmas.	Outer markers: 2,850′ x 1,800′. Inner markers: 1,500′x 1,410′.	Level sand and gravel. Concrete apron by hangar.	Wind cone, circle, markings. Boundary and obstruction lights. Hangar, minor repairs, fuel. Weather reports, D/F, telephone.
Los Rodeo (La Laguna), Tenerife.	E	28 29 N. 16 21 W.	2,000	2 mi. W. of La Laguna, 6 mi. NW. of Santa Cruz.	5,100′ x 2,400′ (approx.)	Level hard soil, grass-covered.	Corner markings, white "T," hangar, radio, minor repairs; telephone and telegraph in town, hotels.
Maspalomas, Gran Canaria.	E	27 45 N. 15 36 W.	.....	On W. side of road running N. from Maspalomas lighthouse, about 2,100′ from beach.	4,500′ x 1,200′.....	Cleared and levelled..	None.
Tefia, Fuertavera	E	28 33 N. 14 00 W.	.....	About 2½ miles NNE. of Tefia, 9¾ mi. NW. of Puerto Cabras.	6000′ x 6,000′ Concrete runway under construction.	Hard earth.....	Two hangars. Under construction.

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FRENCH MOROCCO

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
Agadir (Ben Sergas).	M	° ′ 30 23 N. 9 34 W.	*Feet* 115	About 17 mi. SE. of Cape Ghir, 4 mi. ESE. of town, 2 mi. inland.	N./S. 1,080′ x E./W. 3,020′, whole field available.	Good, hard, covered with coarse grass and thorn bush, all weather, N. end marshy in winter.	Circle, wind cone, landing T, boundary and corner markers, illuminated T, boundary and floodlights, electric power, hangars, telephone, telegraph, radio, D/F, fuel, repairs, weather station, cars, steamer service, hotels.
Agadir Tissint	E	29 55 N. 7 29 W.		1¼ mi. NNW. of military post, 126 mi. SE. of Agadir.	4,920′ x 2,300′	Slopes steeply on ENE. and W.	Shelter, radio, hangar.
Agdz	E	30 41 N. 6 28 W.	3,100	½ mi. WSW. of town, 26 mi. SE. of Ouarzazat.	1,800′ x 1,650′	Hard, sandy, reported dangerous.	Fuel, radio, D/F, telephone, roads, water, accommodations limited, circle.
Ain Aicha	E	34 29 N. 4 40 W.		2 mi. NNE. of Camp St. Julien, on S. side of Oued Ouerzha, 43½ mi. NNW. of Taza.	2,400′ x 1,470′		Telephone, rail.
Ain Beida	E	33 58 N. 4 57 W.	2,030	7 mi. SE. of Fes, W. of Fes-Sefrou Rd.	2 runways, 1,000′		
Ain Defali	E	34 36 N. 5 33 W.	450	15 mi. S. of Quezzane, 50 mi. ESE. of Larache.	1,980′ x 1,800′		
Ain Guettara	F	33 54 N. 3 23 W.	2,300	½ mi. SE. of town, 40 mi. ESE. of Taza.	2,100′ x 2,070′		Railway.
Ait Ani	E	31 47 N. 5 28 W.	6,560	74 mi. SE. of Kasba Tadla	2,280′ x 1,500′	Firm, level	Telephone at post.
Ait Baha	F	29 09 N. 9 14 W.	1,968	2½ mi. W. of post, 37 mi. SE. of Agadir.	1,968′ x 1,476′	Hard, level, earth	Telephone, radio, track, repairs, electric power, guest rooms at post, doctor, water, auto fuel.
Ait Maklouf	E	33 26 N. 4 20 W. (village)		58 mi. SE. of Fes, in Middle Atlas Mts.	1,650′ x 600′		
Ait-Saadane	E	30 51 N. 5 16 W.	2,624	126 mi. SW. of Midelt, near NE. boundary of military post.	2,230′ x 810′	Flat, sandy, unsuitable for heavy aircraft.	Fuel, telephone, radio, circle.
Akka (Aqqa)	E	29 23 N. 8 10 W.	2,132	Just S. of military post, W. of Oued Aqqa, 39 mi. ESE. of Agadir.	2,295′ x 1,650′	Sandy, E. side best.	Fuel, water, hangar, telephone, radio.
Alemsid	E	32 33 N. 5 35 W. (fort)	1,980	27 mi. SSE. of Khenifra	1,650′ x 1,650′		Fuel.
Almis De Guigou	E	33 23 N. 4 50 W. (village)	4,849	30 mi. S. of Sefrou	2,640′ x 2,640′		Hangars, telephone.
Alnif	E	31 06 N. 5 09 W.	4,264	NNE. of post, 112 mi. SW. of Midelt.	2 strips, 1,620′ x 302′, 990′ x 330′.	Hard, pebbly	Circle, fuel, telephone, radio.
Amellago	E	30 59 N. 5 09 W.	492	52 mi. SW. of Midelt on N. side of Oued Gheris and Mellago military post.	1,131′ x 810′ E./W.	Poor, sloping N./S., hollow on S. side, hard, rocky.	Telephone, radio, circle, water, accommodations.
Amzei (Anzel)	E	30 46 N. 7 17 W.	4,929	½ mi. NNW. of town, 13 mi. NNW. of Tazenakht.	1,470′ x 1,140′	Sandy, hard	Telephone, telegraph, circle, road.
Annoceur	E	33 40 N. 4 52 W. (village)	3,280	Village is 11¼ mi. S. of Sefrou, 28 mi. SSE. of Fes.	2,310′ x 1,320′		Hangars.

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0634

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	Feet				
Arbaoua	E	34 55 N. 5 56 W.	426	Just NW. of town, near Spanish Morocco frontier, 18 mi. WNW. of Ouezzane.	1,470′ x 1,311′	Soft, sandy, usable all year.	Hangar, water, telephone, circle, boundary markings, weather information, repairs, fuel, hotel, road, rail, telegraph.
Assa	E	28 26 N. 9 22 W.	2,370	3½ mi. NNW. of town, in valley of Oued Assa.	ENE./WSW. 3,420′, NW./SE. 2,940′, N./S. 1,800′.	Firm, gravel	Fuel, radio, telephone.
Assaka	E	32 52 N. 4 33 W.	4,658	NE. of camp, 22 mi. N. of Midelt.	2,300′ x 2,130′	Firm, all season	1 hangar, fuel, telephone, minor repairs.
Assoul	E	31 57 N. 5 14 W.	5,610	2 mi. NW. of town, 1¼ mi. N. of the Oued Gheris, 75 mi. SE. of Kasba Tadla.	1,800′ x 1,470′		Telephone.
Aureora	E	28 47 N. 10 18 W.	197	3¼ mi. S. of military post, 90 mi. SW. of Tiznit.	2,620′ x 2,300′		Radio.
Azilal	E	31 59 N. 6 35 W.	4,756	1½ mi. ENE. of military post, just SE. of fort, 88 mi. NE. of Marrakech.	1,800′ x 1,470′	Grassy, clay	Boundary markings, fuel, telephone, weather station, road.
Azrou	E	33 25 N. 5 14 W.	4,600	1 mi. WSW. of city, 38 mi. from Meknes.	1,470′ x 810′	Firm, grass-covered, not practical for heavy ships.	Circle, windsleeve and T, telegraph, telephone, minor repairs, fuel, hotel, good road, railway, water, doctor.
Ben Guerir	E	32 14 N. 7 59 W.	460	½ mi. SW. of village	2,625′ x 820′	Unusable in present condition.	Abandoned.
Beni Tadjit	E	32 17 N. 3 29 W.		1 mi. SSW. of town, 24 mi. N. of Bou Denib, 76 mi. ESE. of Midelt.	1,500′ x 900′		Telephone.
Berguent	E	34 00 N. 2 04 W.		3 mi. SW. of town, 34 mi. SW. of Oujda.			Telephone.
Ber Rechid No. 1	E	33 17 N. 7 35 W.	492	NNE. side of town, which is 22 mi. S. of Casablanca.	2,130′ x 1,470′	Sod, hard, soft after heavy rains.	Telephone, railway, water.
Ber Rechid No. 2	E	33 17 N. 7 36 W.		1 mi. NW. of town	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Ber Rechid No. 3	E	33 15 N. 7 36 W. (approx.)	1,000 (est.)	Just SW. of town, 20 mi. S. of Casablanca.	3,600′ N./S. x 3,000′ E./W. (est.).	Grassy surface, can be enlarged to accommodate heavy bombers.	Improvements for military operations projected (January 1942).
Berrouag (Ksar Berrouag).	E	32 17 N. 6 32 W.	1,470	Just NE. of town, 27 mi. SSW. of Kasba Tadla.			
Bou Arfa	E	32 32 N. 1 58 W. (approx.)		2 mi. S. of town, 160 mi. SE. of Midelt.			Telephone.
Bou Denib	E	31 57 N. 3 36 W.	2,952	½ mi. N. of town, 82 mi. SE. of Midelt.	2,760′ x 1,305′	Firm, dangerous after rain, flat, dry, pebbly.	2 hangars, fuel, water, telephone, radio, weather station, repairs.
Bou Draa De L'Oudches.	E	32 34 N. 5 13 W. (fort)	5,740	Fort is 37½ mi. SE. of Khenifra.	1,680′ x 1,320′		
Bou Guedra	E	32 18 N. 8 57 W. (rough est.)		½ mi. E. of town, which is 15 mi. E. of Safi.	6,558′ x 984′	Hard, flat	Telephone, telegraph, electricity, water scarce, railroad.
Bou Izakarn	E	29 11 N. 9 43 W.	984	1¼ mi. SW. of village, 37 mi. S. of Tiznit.	E./W. 2,700′, N./S. 1,170.	Hard, uneven	Telephone, radio, circle, corner markings, road.

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Bou Malne (Bou Malem).	E	30 24 N. 5 59 W.	5,152	S. side of military post, 97 mi. SE. of Kasba Tadla.	2,460′ x 2,130′	Hard, dangerous, steep drop on W. boundary, stony.	Hangar, telephone, radio, roads.
Bou Mia	E	32 44 N. 5 66 W.		½ mi. NE. of town, 21 mi. NW. of Midelt.	1,320′ x 960′		Road.
Bou Rached	E	33 54 N. 3 36 W. (fort)	1,960	27½ mi. SSW. of Guercif	1,650′ x 1,320′		
Boured	E	34 44 N. 4 06 W.		E. side of Oued Boured, 37½ mi. N. of Taza.			
Bouskoura	E	33 28 N. 7 40 W.		1¾ mi. NNE. of town, 8 mi. S. of Casablanca, to E. of Marrakech Rd.			Railway, road.
Camp Berteaux	E	34 33 N. 3 02 W. (fort)		30 mi. NNE. of Guercif			Telephone.
Camp Boulhaut (Boulhaut).	E	33 26 N. 7 07 W.	984	½ mi. SE. of village, 30 mi. E. of Casablanca.	2,953′ x 1,969′	Rocky, covered with small scrub, slopes abruptly on W.	Abandoned. Road, telephone, telegraph, hotel, mechanic.
Camp Christian (Christian).	E	33 15 N. 6 34 W	2,656	3 mi. SSW. of camp, 55 mi. SSE. of Rabat, 68 mi. ESE. of Casablanca.	2,297′ x 1,481′	Poor, may be under cultivation.	Fuel, telephone, road.
Cap Ghir (Cap Guir).	E	30 39 N. 9 52 W.	1,312	2 mi. NE. of town, 20 mi. NNW. of Agadir.	1,481′ x 1,318′	Very poor, firm, soft in winter.	Road, water, autos, telephone.
Casablanca	E	33 32 N. 7 34 W. (approx.)		9 mi. SW. of town	More than 6,555′	Sod over soil mixed with gravel, hard as concrete.	Highways, scarcity of water.
Casablanca (Gazes).	M	33 34 N. 7 40 W.	187	3½ mi. SW. of city	5,100′ x 2,624′ NE./SW., 2 way; being extended NW./SE.; 4 or 5 runways.	Suitable for heavy planes, good, some soil, well drained.	Complete workshops, fuel, hangars, radio, D/F, beacon, weather station; search, boundary, and floodlights; illuminated T, circle, boundary markings, telephone, telegraph, rail, motor, hotels, shipping.
Chemaia	E	32 05 N. 8 46 W.	1,280	Just E. of town	1,476′ x 1,476′		Telephone.
Chichaoua	E	31 32 N. 8 46 W.		W. side of town, 48 mi. W. of Marakech.	1,320′ x 810′		Telephone.
Dar Ould Zidouh	E	32 18 N. 6 54 W.	1,246	½ mi. S. of town, ¼ mi. S. of military post, 35 mi. WSW. of Kasba Tadla.	2,130′ x 984′	Firm, stony, always serviceable.	Fuel, telephone, telegraph and markers.
Derkaoua	E	31 17 N. 4 06 W.	2,624	W. of military post, 13 mi. SE. of Erfoud.	3,450′ x 2,625′		
El Aioun	E	34 35 N. 2 30 W.	1,635	35 mi. W. of Oujda	1,260′ x 840′		Telephone, road, railway.
El Aioun du Draa	E	28 36 N. 10 35 W.	1,312	Near military post	1,650′ x 1,470′		Radio.
El Hajeb	E	33 38 N. 5 21 W.	3,936	4 mi. SSE. of town, on W. side of road to Ifrane, 22½ mi. SE. of Meknes.	2,622′ x 1,968′		Telegraph, telephone.
Enjil (Eagil)	E	33 11 N. 4 33 W. (village)	5,346	36 mi. NNE. of Midelt	3,300′ x 1,500′		Hangars, fuel, telephone.
Erfoud	E	31 27 N. 41 14 W.		½ mi. SSW. of town, 89 mi. SSE. of Midelt.	2,970′ x 1,140′	Very dusty, only light aircraft.	2 hangars, telephone at post, radio.

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0636

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Fedala	E	33 43 N. 7 25 W. (approx.)	.....	Approx. 15 mi. NE. of Casablanca.	Small private planes only.	.....	Fuel at town.
Ferme des Rosiers	E	33 23 N. 7 45 W.	492	1 mi. NNE. of farm, 7 mi. SW. of Bouskoura, 11½ mi. SSW. of Casablanca.	3,606′ x 2,952′	.....	Telephone at the farm.
Fes (Ras El Ma)	E	34 02 N. 5 05 W. (approx.)	.....	About 6¼ mi. W. of Fes, N. of Ras El Ma station.	Large	.....	No installations, was used by French Air Force.
Fez (Fes)	M	34 02 N. 4 59 W.	1,355	2 mi. S. of town, E. of Dar Debibagh.	N./S. 3,936′, E./W. 3,936′	Soil, firm, well-drained, all season, flat.	5 hangars, fuel, repairs, telephone, radio, D/F, telegraph, highways, water, hotels, lighting, railroad.
Fezzou	E	30 57 N. 4 53 W.	2,152	Just SSE. of military post, 112 mi. SW. of Midelt.	1,968′ x 1,638′, 1,212′ x 558′.	.....	Fuel, telephone, radio.
Foum el Hassane (Icht).	E	29 02 N. 8 52 W.	1,968	2 mi. SW. of town, 95 mi. SSE. of Agadir.	1,638′ x 1,146′	.....	Telephone, meteorological station.
Forum Zguid	E	30 04 N. 6 32 W.	1,968	2 mi. SE. of military post, 58½ mi. S. of Ouarzazat.	1,800′ x 1,638′	Pebbly, sandy	Telephone, radio, roads, circle.
Goulimine	E	28 57 N. 10 04 W.	2,624	About 2¼ mi. NNE. of town, 48 mi. SSW. of Tiznit.	3,279′ x 1,950′	Hard, thin grass, all season, firm.	Telephone, radio, fuel, water, weather station, truck, circle, corner markings, accommodations.
Guercif	E	34 14 N. 3 23 W.	1,378	2 mi. W. of town, 30 mi. E. of Taza.	2,295′ x 1,704′	Sandy soil, all season.	Hangar, fuel, telephone, telegraph, well water.
Hassi El Kherma	E	29 40 N. 8 18 W.	328	3 mi. WSW. of Imitek, 1¼ mi. S. of military post, 33 mi. SE. of Agadir.	Runways: 2,460′ x 654′; 1,804′ x 654′.	.....	Telephone at post.
Hassi Quenzga	E	34 42 N. 3 16 W.	.....	Town is 3 mi. N. of Guercif.	1,800′ x 1,140′	.....	
Hassi Zegdou	E	29 49 N. 4 43 W.	.....	E. side of military post, NE. of wells.	1,638′ x 1,638′	.....	
Iffefes	E	32 04 N. 6 15 W.	4,000	1¼ mi. NE. of post of Himah, 37 mi. S. of Kasba Tadla.	1,638′ x 492′	Bumpy ground, landing possible only N./S. direction.	
Ifrane	E	33 30 N. 5 08 W.	5,412	2½ mi. SW. of town, 36 mi. SE. of Meknes.	1,638′ x 1,638′	Hard	Hangar, fuel, telephone, road, boundary markers, telegraph, hotel.
Igherm	E	30 07 N. 8 25 W.	5,904	2½ mi. N. of town, 75 mi. ESE. of Agadir.	1,638′ x 1,311′	Rises on SW	Fuel, telephone, radio.
Igoudar	E	30 36 N. 8 27 W.	1,476	1 mi. S. of town, 64 mi. SW. of Marrakech.	2,952′ x 1,968′	Hard ground, dangerous.	Telephone, roads, water.
Imintanout	E	31 29 N. 8 56 W. (approx.)	1,049	11 mi. S. of Tamanar rd., 36 mi. from Agadir.	1,641′ x 1,311′	Hard, flat, pebbly	Circle, boundary markings, water, telegraph, roads.
Imi M'Tanout (Dar Djedida).	E	31 18 N. 8 32 W.	1,837	8 mi. N. of town, 58 mi. WSW. of Marrakech.	2,295′ x 2,130′	Sandy soil, dangerous.	Telephone, circle, fuel, water, roads.
Kaoulech (Aoudour).	E	34 49 N. 5 11 W.	820	E. of town, in bend of Oued Aoudour.	1,320′ x 480′	.....	
Kasba Tadla	E	32 36 N. 6 15 W.	1,640	¾ mi. N. of town, which is SE. of Casablanca.	2,953′ x 1,969′, can be enlarged.	Good, all season, suitable for B-19 operation.	5 hangars, telephone, telegraph, electric power, highway, water, radio, former military aerodrome.
Kelaa (El Kalaa)	E	32 04 N. 7 23 W.	1,400	1¾ mi. NNE. of town, 108 mi. S. of Casablanca.	1,950′ x 1,625′, can be easily enlarged.	Hard, unserviceable in rainy weather, flat.	Water scarce, telegraph, telephone, highway, radio.

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0637

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Kelaa des M'Gouna	E	31 14 N. 6 08 W.	4,756	1¼ mi. SW. of military post, E. side of town, 115 mi. SE. of Marrakech.	2,790′ x 1,638′	Stony, hard	Fuel, telephone, radio, road, circle.
Khemisset	E	33 50 N. 6 05 W.	1,502	½ mi. W. of town, left bank of Oued Beth, 45 mi. ESE. of Rabat.	1,311′ x 1,218′	Good, firm turf, all season.	Fuel, telephone, railway, road.
Khenifra	E	32 56 N. 5 40 W.	2,952	½ mi. NNE. of town, 66 mi. S. of Meknes.	1,800′ x 1,146′	Firm	Hangar, fuel, telephone, roads.
Kourigha	E	32 52 N. 6 55 W.	2,132	Just SW. of town, 45 mi. SE. of Casablanca.	3,280′ x 2,620′, can be easily enlarged.	Stony, dat	Circle, wind indicator, telephone, telegraph, electric power, railroad, highway, accommodations for 1,000.
Ksabi (Tagaost)	E	28 57 N. 10 09 W.	984	Just NE. of town, 6 mi. W. of Goulimine.	2,610′ x 2,190′		
ksar Es Souk	E	31 57 N. 4 24 W.	2,952	1¼ mi. NW. of town, E. of road to Midelt.	2,460′ x 2,460′	Flat, dry, pebbly, dangerous (improved March 1942).	Service for bombers, 2 hangars, telephone, radio, fuel.
Marchand	E	33 17 N. 6-58 W. (town, approx.)	2,000-2,500 (est.)	60 mi. E. of Casablanca			Paved road.
Marrakech	M	31 37 N. 8 02 W.	1,509	2¾ mi. WSW. of town	4,920 x 1,312′, can be easily enlarged, 4 runways.	Firm, all season	Used by heavy bombers, 15 hangars, fuel, repairs, highway, telephone, radio, barracks, lighting.
Mazagan	E	33 14 N. 8 31 W.	88	1½ mi. SSW. of town	Circular, 1,968′ diameter.	Fairly good	Road, hangar, telephone, telegraph. Abandoned.
Mechra Ben Abtou	E	32 35 N. 7 49 W.	1,312	5 mi. S. of town, E. side of Casablanca-Marrakech Rd., 70 mi. SW. of Casablanca.	3,936′ x 1,311′		Electric power line.
Mediouna	E	33 27 N. 7 32 W. (approx.)	.....	5½ mi. SW. of town, 15 mi. SSE. of Casablanca.	Irregular, 4,920′ x 1,818′ N./S. and 3,608′ E./W., take-off area.	Sod, all season	Former French Air Force station, hangars, barracks, water, highway, telephone, electric power, radio, fuel.
Meghelnine	E	31 09 N. 3 36 W.	3,116	3 mi. N. of post, 118 mi. SSE. of Midelt.	2,130′ x 1,500′		
Meknes	M	33 53 N. 5 32 W.	1,790	1½ mi. SE. of town on E. bank of Oued Fekrane.	5,904′ x 3,608′	Sod, hard except in rains, all season, stony.	Telephone, telegraph, radio, water, electric power, hangars, fuel, lighting, radio, barracks, used by twin-engined bombers 1941.
Mellal	E	30 53 N. 5 42 W.	3,280	½ mi. NE. of post, 74 mi. S. of Ouarzazat.	1,470′ x 1,140′	Hard, dangerous	Telephone at post.
M'Hammid	E	29 34 N. 5 51 W.	1,804	1 mi. NW. of old military post, 160 mi. SE. of Ouarzazat.	1,860′ x 1,260′	Hard, furrowed, dangerous, sand dunes.	Telephone, water, circle, radio, hotel, road.
Mogador	E	31 31 N. 9 46 W.	20	¼ mi. E. of town	3,500′ x 1,470′	Good, firm sand, soft after rains.	Hangar, fuel, telephone, circle, wind sleeve, boundary and corner markings, minor repairs, hotel, roads, auto, telegraph, water.
M'Soun	E	34 16 N. 3 43 W. (approx.)	1,640	½ mi. E. of town, 17 mi. NE. of Taza.	990′ x 900′		Telephone.
M'Zizel (Mizel)	E	32 24 N. 4 44 W.	4,920	½ mi. S. of town, 32 mi. S. of Midelt.	2,625′ x 1,640′, irregular.	All season, all type planes, firm.	Telephone, water, circle, wind cone.

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0638

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Nekob (Nkob)	E	30 53 N. 5 52 W	3,280	Just NW. of military post, 10 mi. W. of Meflid, 64 mi. NE. of Ouarzazat.	2,400′ x 1,800′	Hard, dangerous, pebbly.	Telephone, circle, road.
Notfia	E	28 42 N. 10 42 W.	492	3 mi. NE. of town, 94 mi. SW. of Tiznit.	1,470′ x 1,476′		
Ouarzazte (Taourirt Ouarzazat).	E	30 56 N. 6 54 W.	3,008	1¼ mi. N. of town, 85 mi. SE. of Marrakech.	2,295′ x 1,968′	Hard, pebbly, all season.	Hangar, fuel, telephone, radio, workshop, road, circle, wind sleeve, telegraph.
Oudjda (Old)	E	34 39 N. 1 55 W.	1,883	Just S. of town, in angle formed by Oujda-Berguent and Oujda-Sidi Yaya Rds.	1,968′ x 1,638′	Sod, sandy gravel, all year, good.	3 hangars, fuel, telephone, minor repairs, radio, railway, electric power, barracks for 2,000, telegraph.
Oudjda	E	34 47 N. 1 54 W. (approx.)	1,640	7½ mi. N. of town	6,560′ N./S., 2,940′ E./W.	Sod, clay, and gravel, all season.	Water, radio, telegraph, telephone, railway, highway, lighting, 5 hangars, electric power, fuel.
Oued el Abid (Souk El Had).	E	32 07 N. 6 24 W.	2,460	5 mi. SW. of Ouaoulcert, ¾ mi. N. of town, 35 mi. S. of Kasba Tadla.	1,320′ x 1,320′		
Oued-Zem	E	32 52 N. 6 36 W.	1,968	1¼ mi. WNW. of town, 80 mi. SE. of Casablanca.	2,790′ x 2,790′	Probably bad and under cultivation.	Water scarce, road. Abandoned.
Ouezzane (Bou Malek) (Beni Malek).	E	34 47 N. 5 38 W.	820	3 mi. W. of town, 60 mi. SE. of Tangier.	2,632′ x 1,476′, longest run N./S.	Turf, unserviceable after rain.	Hangars, fuel, telephone, radio, minor repairs, landing T, wind sleeve, hotel, water, telegraph.
Ould Zidou	E	32 29 N. 6 54 W. (approx.)	13	¼ mi. SSW. of village, which lies on Marrakech-Kasba Tadla Rd. about 93 mi. ENE. of Marrakech.	Diamond-shaped, 1,968′ x 2,296′, can be enlarged.	Flat, hard, could be used by heavy planes.	Telephone, no hangars, fuel, or markings, water scarce.
Ouled Allal	E	35 09 N. 5 30 W.	120	2½ mi. NE. of Ouled Allal, 40½ mi. ESE. of Larache.			
Outat El Hadj	E	32 22 N. 3 40 W. (approx.)		27 mi. NNE. of Missour	1,440′ x 990′		
Petit Jean	E	34 14 N. 5 43 W.		1 mi. NW. of town	5,904′ x 1,312′	Sod, hard, except after rains.	2 small hangars. Abandoned.
Plateau Des Lacs	E	32 13 N. 5 34 W.		1¼ mi. W. of Lake Isly	2,580′ x 2,620′		
Port Lyautey (Kenitra).	M	34 15 N. 6 35 W.	10	2½ mi. NNW. of town, on W. bank of river.	2 runways under construction (January 1942), N./S. 6,558′ x 81′ and E./W. 6,558′ x 81′.	Good, slippery after rains. Runways concrete, suitable for 30-ton planes.	2 hangars, repairs, fuel, weather reports, wind cone, landing T, telephone, telegraph, radio, road, rail, shipping, hotels.
Rabat	M	34 00 N. 6 50 W.	226	1¼ mi. S. of town	N./S. 3,600′, E./W. 3,150′.	Short, uneven turf, very sandy in N, all season, soft after heavy rain in S and E.	Circle, boundary markers, illuminated landing T, floodlights, boundary and obstruction lights, radio, telephone, telegraph, fuel, minor repairs, weather reports, motor, railroad, hotels.
Rabat (Casablanca).	E	33 45 N. 7 10 W. (rough est.)		Halfway between Rabat and Casablanca, E. of road.			Recently built aerodrome (March 1942).
Rabat (Oulad Okba).	E	34 02 N. 6 45 W. (approx.)		5½ mi. E. of town, S. of Rabat-Meknes Rd.	3,300′ x 3,300′	Good.	No hangars.

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0639

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Rabat (Sale) Old	E	34 00 N. 6 50 W. (approx.)	100 (est.)	5 mi. N. of Sale		Good, firm, sandy, grass, all weather, would take medium bomber.	Marked.
R'Bat Dutizoufine (Bat du Tizouline).	E	30 39 N. 6 07 W.	2,624	¼ mi. S. of old military post, 52 mi. SE. of Ouarzazat.	1,575′ x 918′	Hard, stony	Circle, lighting, road.
Rich	E	32 17 N. 4 31 W.	4,458	2½ mi. NNW. of town, 30 mi. SE. of Midelt.	2,625′ x 2,130′	Firm, heavy after rain.	2 hangars, fuel, telephone, radio.
Safi	E	32 18 N. 9 13 W.		1¼ mi. E. of town	1,477′ x 1,312′	Cleared, leveled	Hangar, minor repairs, fuel, telephone, railroad, road, shipping, hotel, circle, wind sleeve.
Saidia	E	35 05 N. 2 13 W. (village)	13	Village is 1½ mi. W. of Port Say, 33 mi. NNW. of Oudja; field is ¾ mi. S. of center of town.	Irregular, 1,640′ NE.-SW. x 984′ NW.-SE.		Small hangar, telephone; radio, electric power. At present abandoned (March 1942).
Sale (Rabat-Sale) (New)	M	34 03 N. 6 47 W.		3 mi. ENE. of Sale	9,840′ x 9,840′	Firm, sod, well-drained. Runways: concrete (under constr. 1940) temporary gravel.	3 hangars, fuel, telephone, telegraph, roads, barracks, port, railway, radio (being installed January 1942).
Sidi Mohammed Er Rehal (Sidi Rahal).	E	32 48 N. 7 47 W.	820	E. of Marrakech-Casablanca Rd., on W. border of Cavalier Dubois farm, 1¼ mi. W. of railway, 17 mi. SSW. of Settat.	1,320′ x 1,140′	May be under cultivation.	Telephone at Sidi Rehal farm.
Sidi Yahiai	E	34 18 N. 6 18 W.		Just SE. of town, 15½ mi. NE. of Port Lyauty.	6,000′ x 4,500′	Good, all season	Railway, telephone.
Souk El Tileta Des Beni Oulid.	E	34 36 N. 4 25 W.		44 mi. NE. of Fes; Oued Ouergha passes N. side of field.	1,650′ x 750′		
Tadighoust	E	31 19 N. 4 58 W.	4,264	¼ mi. S. of military post, E. of Oued Gheris, 64 mi. SW. of Midelt.	1,476′ x 1,149′		Telephone, radio.
Tadla	E	32 50 N. 6 30 W. (approx.)				Good	
Taghbalt (Tarhbalt).	E	30 39 N. 5 23 W.	2,788	1¼ mi. NW. of military post, 15½ mi. SW. of Ait Saadane.	1,800′ x 1,476′	Sandy, firm	Circle, beacon, telephone, road, water, accommodations.
Tagmout (Tiougrar).	E	29 58 N. 8 14 W.	5,280	½ mi. ESE. of military post, 50 mi. ESE. of Agadir.	2,460′ x 1,311′		Radio.
Tagoudit (Tagounit).	E	29 60 N. 5 12 W.	2,112	½ mi. SE. of military post	2,297′ x 1,968′	Hard, dangerous	Telephone, radio, circle, beacon, telegraph.
Talsint	E	32 32 N. 3 28 W.		Village is 47 mi. SE. of Missour, 74 mi. SE. of Midelt.			Telephone.
Tamanar	E	30 58 N. 9 44 W.	1,052	7½ mi. SSW. of town, 33 mi. NW. of Agadir.	1,640′ x 1,310′	Clay, hard, stony, liable to flood after rain.	Circle, boundary markings, fuel at Agadir.
Tanant	E	31 52 N. 6 57 W.	2,952	1¼ mi. N. of town, 64 mi. NE. of Marrakech.	2,295′ x 1,311′	Grassy, firm, bad after rain.	Hangar, radio, telephone, fuel, circle, T.
Tanger	E	35 44 N. 5 55 W.	49	6 mi. SW. of town	2,624′ x 1,312′	Marshy in S. part	Wind sleeve, landing T, corner markers, beacon and floodlights, hangars, autos, hotels (1935).

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0640

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Taouz	E	31 00 N. 4 00 W.	1,968	Just N. of military post, 124 mi. SSE. of Midelt.	1,641′ x 1,380′	Sandy, very supple	Fuel, telephone, radio, circle, beacon, telegraph.
Taroudant	E	30 29 N. 8 52 W.	853	1¼ mi. NE. of town, 44 mi. E. of Agadir.	1,641′ x 1,311′	Firm, stony	Fuel, telephone, road.
Taskempt	E	30 55 N. 9 01 W.	4,920	1½ mi. S. of Taskempt, E. of road Imi N'Tanout-Agadir, 50 mi. NE. of Agadir.	1,440′ x 1,245′	Very poor	Water.
Taskent	E	30 43 N. 9 03 W.	4,244	Just ESE. of town	1,050′ x 460′	Firm	Circle, beacon, water.
Tatta	E	29 45 N. 7 59 W.	4,920	NNW. of military post, on W. side of Oued Tata, 115 mi. ESE. of Agadir.	3,600′ x 1,650′	Sandy soil	Huts, fuel, telephone, radio, wind sleeve.
Taza	E	34 14 N. 4 00 W.	1,574	½ mi. SE. of town, 56 mi. NE. of Fes.	1,968′ NE./SW., 650′ NW./SE.	Sod, clayey sand, well drained, heavy after prolonged rains.	Hangars, workshops, fuel, telephone, radio, meteorological station, highway.
Tazenakht	E	30 35 N. 7 13 W.	4,920	2 mi. SW. of town, 88 mi. SSE. of Marrakech.	1,968′ x 984′	Hard, stony, dangerous.	Circle, beacon, telephone, road, accommodations limited.
Tazzarine	E	30 46 N. 5 35 W.	3,000	1¼ mi. SSW. of military post.	1,641′ x 1,476′	Hard, stony, dangerous.	Telephone, radio, road, circle, beacon, water.
Tetuan	E	35 40 N. 5 25 W.	33	1½ mi. NE. of town	2,297′ x 1,135′	Flat, firm, marshy after rains.	Corner markings, landing T, 3 hangars, repairs, weather, telephone, telegraph, auto, hotels (1935).
Tezga (Tirga)	E	32 01 N. 5 10 W.	5,576	1 mi. NW. of town, on W. bank of Oued Sidi Mohand ou Youssef, 5 mi. NW. of confluence with Oued Gheris, 48 mi. SSW. of Midelt.	2,460′ x 810′		Telephone at military post.
Tiflet	E	33 54 N. 6 19 W.	1,345	Just SW. of town, 31 mi. ESE. of Rabat.	1,800′ x 1,380′	Level, grass, numerous rocks.	No markings, fuel, water, minor repairs, telephone. Unused for 3 or 4 years (February 1942).
Timhadit (Thimhadit).	E	33 15 N. 5 04 W.	6,232	1½ mi. N. of military post, 16¼ mi. SSE. of Azrou.	1,641′ x 1,311′	Hard, dangerous	Telephone, fuel, T, road.
Tinjdad	E	31 31 N. 5 04 W.	3,280	½ mi. S. of military post	2,625′ x 1,641′	Sandy	Fuel, water, huts (possibly hangars), telephone, radio.
Tinrhir (Tinghir).	E	31 30 N. 5 31 W.	4,198	Nearly 2 mi. SSE. of military post, 92 mi. SSW. of Midelt.	1,641′ x 1,149′	Bad, dangerous, rocky, undulating.	Telephone, radio at post, circle, corner markings, guest room.
Tizi N'Isly	E	32 23 N. 5 49 W.	4,592	1¼ mi. S. of town, 63 mi. SW. of Midelt.	2,688′ x 1,377′		Hangars, water, telephone, boundary markers, guest room.
Tiznit	E	29 42 N. 9 44 W.	722	Just W. of Tiznit, 42 mi. SW. of Agadir.	2,295′ x 1,965′	Hard, dangerous, all season.	Circle, wind cone, boundary markers, fuel, workshop, hangar, telephone, radio, weather station, telegraph, cars, hotels.
Tizi N'Tadekht	E	31 05 N. 6 28 W.	4,264	2½ mi. WSW. of town, 100 mi. ESE. of Marrakech.	2,460′ x 1,800′	Hard, dangerous, rocky soil, takes all types of aircraft.	Circle, boundary markings, telephone, road, guest rooms at post.

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FRENCH MOROCCO—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Tizi N'Takka	E	32 52 N. 5 13 W.	5,904	1¼ mi. E. of town, 30 mi. WSW. of Midelt.	2,952′ x 2,790′	Fairly hard	Hangars, telephone, circle, wind sleeve, corner markings, road, no water.
Zagora	E	30 18 N. 5 51 W.	2,460	½ mi. WSW. of military post, ½ mi. from Oued Dra.	2,130′ x 1,470′	Sandy soil	Hangar, fuel, telephone at post.
Zair	E	29 35 N. 5 51 W.	2,296	1 mi. SE. of town	2,624′ x 1,148′		

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IFNI

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
Sidi Ifni	M	° ′ 29 24 N. 10 08 W.	*Feet* 100	On small hill, adjacent to military post, by sea, ½ mi. S. of Oued Ifni (which has lighthouse), 30 mi. SW. of Agadir.	2,300′ x 2,310′. May be reduced to 2,460′ x 1,200′. 2 runways.	Good all types of aircraft.	Hangar, fuel, radio, track to Agadir, water, barracks, circle, boundary, A. A. guns.

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LIBYA

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Adem	E	31 51 N. 23 55 E. (approx.)		W. of El Adem, 15 mi. SW. of Tobruch.	3,300′ x 300′		Not in use, portions destroyed by bombings.
Ahmar	E	30 31 N. 19 56 E. (approx.)		23 mi. SW. of Jedabya			
Amseat	C	31 35 N. 25 03 E.	656	12 mi. S. of Bardia, 8 mi. W. of Salum (Egypt); adjoins Fort Capuzzo.	2,465′ x 2,298′	Rectangular, firm clay.	Underground fuel storage, minor repairs, telephone, weather reports, radio at Fort Capuzzo, no hangars, lighting.
Amseat (Capuzzo) North.	E	31 38 N. 25 02 E.		4 mi. N. of Fort Capuzzo, and W. of road to Bardia.	3,600′ x 3,600′ approx.		
Amud (Abu)	E	31 56 N. 24 11 E.		S. of coastal road, 16 mi. SE. of Tobruck.	3,000′ x 3,000′		Corner markings, W./T. Machine gun post W. of NW. corner of field reported.
Apollonia (Marso Susa)	E	32 53 N. 21 58 E.		S. of Apollonia, 41 mi. NW. of Derna.	3,600′ x 1,200′—irregular shape.		Servicing, fuel, enemy aircraft have been located here.
Apollonia	E	32 55 N. 21 56 E.	Sea level	1½ mi. SW. of Apollonia, 7 mi. NE. of Cyrene on coast of Mediterranean Sea at terminus of Cyrine—Apollonia Rd.		Soft (take-off possible only E. and W.).	Reported to have fuel and oil, repairs, and a double hangar.
Arae Philaenorum (Ras Lanuf).	E	30 30 N. 18 33 E. (approx.)		42 mi. WNW. of El Agheila, 98 mi. SW. of Jedabya.	4,500′ x 3,900′; rectangular.	Usable by all type of aircraft.	
Araneb (Umm-El)	E	26 10 N. 14 47 E. (approx.)		4 mi. NE. of village, 23 mi. W. of Zuila Airport.			
Ar Biu Sfeia	E	32 18 N. 21 52 E.	3,280	37 mi. S. of Apollonia.			
Arid, Gasr El	E	31 45 N. 24 33 E.		½ mi. S. of village, 31 mi. W. of Bardia.	3,000′ x 3,000′		Used by Junkers 87's in September 1941.
Anenet Uennin	E	28 28 N. 12 40 E.		160 mi. W. of El Gaf El Garbi.			
Aujila	E	29 08 N. 21 13 E.	114	On road to Merada, 124 mi. W. of Merada.			
Azeiz, Sidi	E	31 40 N. 24 53 E.		12¾ mi. WSW. of Bardia.	3,000′ x 3,000′		Enemy aircraft have been located here.
Barche (Barce El Merg).	E	32 30 N. 20 42 E.		56 mi. NE. of Ben Ghazi, on road to Cyrene, 1 mi. N. of Barche.	3,000′ x 2,400′; rectangular.		2 hangars, W./T., fuel, enemy aircraft located here.
Bardi	E	31 44 N. 25 05 E.	Sea level				
Bardia (Menastir).	E	31 47 N. 24 59 E.		6½ mi. WNW. of Bardia, N. of main road.	4,200′ x 3,000′		Used by enemy aircraft as an advanced station for operations against Egypt; blast shelters on W. and NW.
Benghazi (Berca)	E	32 05 N. 20 03 E.	56	2 mi. SE. of harbor, 1½ mi. SE. of Benghazi.	2,250′ x 3,296′ (1,948′ x 2,250′ usable) to be extended to 4,596′ x 2,300′.	Dry, good clay, fair drainage.	Wind T, obstruction lights, flood lights, control tower, 4 hangars, complete repair facilities, fuel and oil, personnel accommodations, meteorological information, telephone at field; telegraph in town; radio, quarters, transportation to town.

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LIBYA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Benghazi (Berca South).	E	32 04 N. 20 03 E.		1½ mi. SE. of Berca Airport on W. side of main road.			Bomb dump and 4 heavy antiaircraft batteries located to N. of field.
Benina	E	32 07 N. 20 17 E.		2 mi. NNE. of Benina Airport.			Enemy bombers and fighter-type planes located at this field.
Benina (Benina Airport)	E	32 05 N. 20 16 E.	Sea level	On Benghazi - Benina Rd., NE. of Benina, 30 mi. ESE. of Benghazi.	5,100′ x 4,500′		10 hangars, partly destroyed, fuel, W/T.
Beni Ulid	E	31 44 N. 14 01 E. (approx.)					
Bersis (Got)	E	32 26 N. 20 27 E.		3 mi. WSW. of Bersis, 34 mi. NE. of Benghazi.			Is being used as a base by Italian fighter group (August 1941.)
B. Hakeim	E	31 34 N. 23 27 E.	Sea level	In the village of B. Hakeim, 47 mi. SW. of Tobruk.	3,300′ x 3,300′		Drinking water. 1 hangar. Squadron moved here early November 1941.
Bir Aisilan	E	32 00 N. 21 12 E. (approx.)		67 mi. E. of Benghazi.			
Bir Dufan	E	31 57 N. 14 35 E.		47 mi. SE. of Misurata.	3,300′ x 3,300′, approx		Enemy bombers have operated from here.
Bir El Baheira	E	31 49 N. 24 45 E.		1 mi. NE. of Bir El Baheira, N. of escarpment Hastag El Baheira, 20 mi. WNW. of Bardia and 2 mi. S. of road.	4,500′ x 2,700′		3-gun light A. A. battery near SE. corner.
Bir El Behera	E	32 12 N. 12 29 E.		53 mi. SW. of Castel Benito.			Used by Italian Air Force.
Bir El Chleta	E	31 48 N. 24 24 E. (approx.)		25 mi. SE. of El Adem.			This airport has been attacked by R. A. F.
Bir El Chor	E	30 02 N. 12 56 E.		80 mi. due W. of Escarpment Sculeef.			
Bir El Churgla	E	31 38 N. 15 07 E.		W. side of main road, 39 mi. WNW. of Buerat El Hsun.	3,000′ N./S.		On the coastal route.
Bir El Dacar	E	25 39 N. 22 44 E. (approx.)		105 mi. NW. of Kufra.			
Bir El Beblra	E	31 43 N. 14 38 E.		37½ mi. NW. of El Gheddahia Airport, reported on W. side of road.	N. side 2,100′, E. side 1,500′, S. side 1,350′, W. side 2,250′.		
Bir El Gheddahia	E	31 23 N. 15 07 E.		7½ mi. NW. of village, 34 mi. W. of Buerat El Hsun.			
Bir El Ghnem	E	32 19 N. 12 34 E.		1 mi. NW. of Oasis, 43 mi. SW. Castel Benito.	900′ x 600′		
Bir El Gobi	E	31 32 N. 24 02 E. (approx.)		Dubya Track, 24 mi. SSE. of El Adem.			
Bir El Merduma	E	30 26 N. 18 22 E. (approx.)		About 50 mi. NW. of El Agheila.			Enemy aircraft have operated from here.

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LIBYA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	Feet				
Bir El Mcntuta	E	25 32 N. 14 52 E.		47 mi. SE. of Murzuk			
Bir El Tmimi	E	32 19 N. 23 04 E. (approx.)		W. of Gulf of Bomba, 20 mi. WNW. of El Gazala.	3,900′ x 2,400′	Good	Enemy aircraft located here.
Bir El Tmimi (Satellite)	E	32 19 N. 23 04 E.		¼ mi. N. of W. corner of main airport.	2,100′ x 810′		
Bir El Uair	E	31 58 N. 15 30 E.		1 mi. S. of Wells, 45 mi. NE. of Mizda Airport			
Bir El Ziden	E	31 02 N. 15 37 E.		SE. of Oasis, 62 mi. SW. of Sirte.	810′ x 390′		Marked.
Bisher	E						
Brach Bir Reb	E						
Brak	E	27 33 N. 14 16 E.		Immediately N. of town			Mentioned in operations.
Brak North	E	27 49 N. 14 16 E.		8½ mi. N. of Brak			
B. Shegga		30 32 N. 24 56 E.	Sea level	19 mi. SW. of Sollum			
Bucrat-El-Hsun	E	31 24 N. 15 43 E.		NW. of Oasis and fort.	Rectangular 3,600′ x 2,100′.		Fair facilities including fuel and W/T.
Bu Ngem	E	30 31 N. 15 23 E.		On W. side of main road from Hun, 83 mi. WSW. of Sirte.	1,960′ x 870′		German Air Force aircraft located here.
Bzema	E	24 55 N. 22 02 E. (approx.)		95 mi. WNW. of Kufra Airport.			
Cabraum	E						
Carcura		31 38 N. 20 00 E.	Sea level	On E. side of Carcura on coast, 43 mi. SSW. of Benghazi.			
Castelverde (Gasr Garabulli)	E	32 43 N. 13 16 E.		6½ mi. SW. of Gasr Garabulli, 26 mi. ESE. of Tripoli.			Some facilities including fuel and W/T, enemy bombers have operated here.
Chebir (Uan-El)	E	25 20 N. 16 41 E.		1 mi. NNW. of village, 110 mi. ESE. of Zuila.			
Cirene	E	32 48 N. 21 49 E.	Sea level	NW. side of road 6 mi. from Mediterranean Sea.			
Crum El Chel	E	32 05 N. 23 54 E. (approx.)		5 mi. W. of Tobruk			Enemy bomber and fighter groups located here.
Derg	E	30 09 N. 10 26 E. (town)		55 mi. E. of Gadames			
Derna	E	32 36 N. 22 44 E.		¼ mi. S. of end of Derna mole, lighthouse is 20 mi. E. of airport.	900′ x 900′		Probably not in use.
Derna (El Ftaish) No. 1	E	32 41 N. 22 41 E.		1½ mi. SSE. of the aerodrome of Derna.	3,600′ x 3,450′		Operational landing field, has been attacked many times by R. A. F.
Derna (El Ftaish) No. 2	E	32 42 N. 22 40 E.		E. side of main Tobruk road, 4 mi. SSE. of Derna Harbor.	2,400′ x 2,400′ (L-shaped) 1,350′ x 2,400′.	Usable in wet weather.	Enemy aircraft including German Junkers 87's have been located here in numbers.
El Abiar	E	32 11 N. 20 36 E.		32 mi. E. by N. of Benghazi.			Not in use August 1941.
El Ageila	E	30 14 N. 19 12 E.	Sea level	On gulf, 138 mi. SW. of Benghazi, on road 1½ mi. SW. of town.	2,700′ x 2,250′ NE./SW.		Radio, W/T, fuel and hangar.

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LIBYA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
El Asabaa	E	32 04 N. 12 56 E.		4 mi. ENE. of El Asabaa well, 60 mi. SW. of Tripoli.			
El Azizia	E	32 32 N. 13 01 E. (town)		28 mi. SW. of Tripoli	1,116′ x 591′		Italian Air Force units reported here.
El Erg	E	29 02 N. 21 32 E.	Sea level	142 mi. from Marada, 84 mi. SSE. of Gr-Es-Sahabi.	2,910′ x 810′		Water and W/T.
El Faidia	E	32 41 N. 21 55 E. (town)		10½ mi. SSE. of Cyrene, SE. of El Faidia.			Reported to have some buildings.
El Gaf El Garbi	E	28 18 N. 15 20 E.		65 mi. SSW. of Hon			
El Garat	E	32 13 N. 13 59 E.		34 mi. SSW. of Homs			
El Gatrum	E	24 59 N. 14 42 E.		5 mi. NE. of village			This field has been mentioned in operations as probable destination of some S 79's.
El Gazala (North)	E	32 10 N. 23 20 E.		2 mi. N. of main road, 1 mi. E. of prominent inlet from sea, 38 mi. NW. of Tobruk.	3,600′ x 3,000′ N./S., E./W.		Enemy aircraft have been located here in numbers, 19 U-shaped blast shelters around E. and S. sides.
El Gazala (South)	E	32 08 N. 23 25 E.		S. of main road, 5 mi. ESE. of El Garala aerodrome.			Enemy aircraft have been located here, 37 U-shaped blast wall shelters around field.
El Gezira	E	25 39 N. 21 06 E.		21½ mi. SW. of El Gezira well, 173 mi. WNW. of Kufra.			
El Gheria (Esc-Scherghia).	E	30 24 N. 13 34 E.		1 mi. W. of village, 118 mi. SW. of El Ghedahia.			
El Gobi	E	31 34 N. 23 56 E.		3¾ mi. NW. of El Gobi Aerodrome			
El Graf	E						
El Hania	E	32 50 N. 21 31 E.	Sea level	On Mediterranean coast, 20 mi. W. of Cirene, SE. of village.			Some facilities reported, fuel.
El Haseiat	E	30 32 N. 20 32 E.	Sea level	32 mi. SE. of Jelabya	Irregular shape, 2,850′ x 1,650′.		Probably not in regular use.
El Machina	M	30 42 N. 16 28 E.		34 mi. SW. of Sirte			Operational areodrome used by German Air Force.
El Upffana	E	28 20 N. 12 15 E.		190 mi. W. of El Gaf El Garbi.			
Gadames	E	30 08 N. 9 32 E.		1 mi. ESE. of Gadames fort, 56 mi. W. of Derg.	2,970′ x 2,400′ irregular in shape.	Reported to be hard.	1 hangar, fuel and W/T.
Gadd-El-Ahmar	E	31 56 N. 22 50 E.	Sea level	On S. side of city, 32 mi. from nearest coastal point.			
Gambut	E	31 52 N. 24 29 E.		34 mi. ESE. of Tobruk, just S. of the Fort of Gambut.	4,050′ x 3,750′ with extensions for dispersal of aircraft.		Advance base of Italian Air Force (fighters and dive bombers, antiaircraft batteries on W. side).
Ghat	E	24 56 N. 10 10 E.		½ mi. S. of Ghat	4,050′ x 2,970′ E./W.	Soft after heavy rain.	Hangar, fuel, enemy aircraft have been located here.
Ghirza	E	30 52 N. 14 28 E.		51 mi. SW. of El Ghedahia.			

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LIBYA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Giof El Matar	E	30 36 N. 20 47 E.		34 mi. ESE. of Jedabya, said to be S. of Sanmier Age.			Enemy bombers have been located here.
Gr. Es Sahabi	E	30 02 N. 20 46 E.	Sea level	52 mi. SE. of Benghazi			Radio.
Ground No. 1	E	28 26 N. 21 45 E.		43 mi. SE. of Jalo			
Ground No. 2	E	27 52 N. 21 57 E.		81 mi. SE. of Jalo			
Ground No. 3	E	27 20 N. 22 08 E.		40 mi. SSE. of Ground No. 2.			
Ground No. 5	E	26 13 N. 22 31 E.		79 mi. SSE. of Ground No. 3.			
Ground No. 7	E	25 05 N. 22 57 E.		40 mi. SSE. of Bir El Docar.			
Ground No. 8	E	24 39 N. 23 07 E.		33 mi. NW. of Kufra	2,610′ x 2,610′		
Hadi (Gasr Bu)	E	31 05 N. 16 41 E.		11 mi. SSE. of Sirte	1,140′ x 465′ (possibly larger).		
Homs	E	32 37 N. 14 17 E.		2 mi. SSE. of town, on W. or landward side of main road.	2,640′ x 2,010′ (trapezoidal).		Fair facilities with hangar 110′ x 65′, and fuel.
Hon	E	29 07 N. 15 56 E.		E. of town, 11 mi. ENE. of Socna.	2,250′ x 2,250′, may have been lengthened.		Headquarters of Saharan Battalion. Enemy aircraft bombers have operated from here. 2 hangars, repairs, fuel, and W/T.
Jarabub (Giarabub).	E	29 46 N. 24 28 E.	Sea level	18 mi. W. of Egyptian frontier, 120 mi. SW. of Sollum.	1,200′ x 3,300′		2 small hangars, fuel, W/T.
Jedabya (Agedavia).	E	30 45 N. 20 12 E. (approx.)	Sea level	W. of town	3,000′ x 1,800′ (possibly larger).		Large hangar, W/T, fuel, enemy aircraft located here. Lighthouse 14 mi. NW.
J. El Matar	E	30 35 N. 20 46 E.	Sea level	Adjoins village			
Kufra (El Giof)	E	24 12 N. 32 20 E. (approx.)		Near El Toj	3,600′ x 3,600′		A desert aerodrome with hangars and fair facilities including fuel, W/T. Enemy aircraft located here.
Marada	E	29 13 N. 19 14 E. (approx.)		70 mi. S. of Agheila	Irregular shaped, 900′ x 1,200′.		Has been used, but reported unserviceable in July and August 1941.
Marawa	E	32 29 N. 21 22 E.	1,640	3½ mi. NW. of town, 30 mi. E. of Barce	3,150′ x 2,550′, rectangular.		
Marsa Drega	E	30 24 N. 19 33 E.	Sea level	Adjacent to town, NE. side of road and R. R.			Radio.
Martuba	E	32 35 N. 22 46 E. (town)	1,233	SE. of road 14 mi. SE. of Derna.			There are 2 new landing fields being located nearby, with telegraph and fuel. One is 6 mi. SE. of town, the other is 4½ mi. S. of town; enemy aircraft are known to have operated from Martuba in large numbers; there is a third field in the vicinity.

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0648

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LIBYA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Mekili	E	32 48 N. 22 36 E.	1,640 (approx.)	3 mi. SSW. of Fort, 47 mi. SSW of Derna, Marshland 8.5 mi. South.	2,520' x 1,650' L-shaped (may be larger now).		Enemy bombers have operated from here.
Mersum (Uadi El)	E	31 43 N. 14 29 E.		56 mi. SSW. of Misurata			
Misurata Marina	E	32 21 N. 15 13 E.		1 mi. S. of town, 7 mi. SE. of Misurata.	2,640' x 1,650'		1 hangar, W/T, German Air Force units have been located here.
Misurata West	E	32 22 N. 15 06 E. (town)		25 mi. N. of Tauorga, 8 mi. W. of Misurata Marina.	6,300'		
Mizda	E	31 26 N. 12 58 E.		1 mi. SE. of Mizda, 60 mi. W. of Sebenneck.	1,950' x 1,950'		1 hangar.
Murzuck (Murzuk)	E	25 55 N. 13 56 E.		2 mi. E. of military post.			Hangar, fuel, W/T, enemy aircraft have operated here.
Murzuk No. 2	E	25 54 N. 13 53 E.		1½ mi. SW. of military post.			
Nalut	E	31 49 N. 10 58 E. (town)		4 mi. SSW. of town	2,640' x 1,650'		Fuel and W/T.
Namus (Uau-En)	E	24 56 N. 17 47 E.		310 mi. E. of El Gatrun and 118 mi. ESE. of Vah El Chebir.			
Nofilia (En)	E	30 49 N. 17 59 E.		8 mi. ENE. of village, 87 mi. ESE. of Sirte.	Rectangular in shape, 2,700' x 2,550'.		Some facilities, including fuel and W/T; enemy aircraft have operated from here.
Owelnat (Ain Dona).	E	21 48 N. 24 50 E. (approx.)		SW. of village on Egyptian border.	Said to be large enough for bombers.	Kept in good condition.	Last fuel stop to East Africa.
Pilida	E	33 03 N. 11 46 E.		2½ mi. SE. of town, 24 mi. WNW. of Zuara.	2,640' x 2,310'		
Pilida Rasegh	E	31 48 N. 24 10 E.		15 mi. ESE. of El Adem	Small	Rough	Apparently not used (seaplane anchorage also, in harbor); sea rescue squadron located here.
Rebiana	E	24 15 N. 22 00 E.		1½ mi. ENE. of town wells, 83 mi. W. of Kufra.			
Sasba (Uadi)	E	31 42 N. 14 10 E.		72 mi. SW. of Misurata			
Sabratha (Sorman).	E	32 46 N. 12 33 E.		1¼ mi. NW. of Sorman, N. of main road.	2,640' x 2,640'		W/T; Enemy fighter planes have been based here.
Safsaf (Es)	E	32 48 N. 21 51 E.		5 mi. SE. of Cyrene on S. side of main road.	2,160' x 2,760' (approx.)	Reported to be usable in wet weather.	
Salsa (Gabr)	E	31 27 N. 24 24 E.		24 mi. ESE. of Bir El Gobi.			Bombed out by R. A. F. October 1941.
Sauanu (Sauano)	E	31 03 N. 20 50 E.		56 mi. SE. of Soluk, adjacent to village, 84 mi. SE. of Benghazi.			
Scegga (Esc)	E	30 51 N. 24 58 E.		2½ mi. W. of Egyptian border, reported NW. of Fort Maddelena.		Gravel in good condition.	Boundary markers.
Schegheilif (Esc)	E	31 58 N. 24 09 E. (village)		14 mi. SE. of Tobruk	3,000' x 3,450'		This field has been bombed by R. A. F.

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LIBYA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Scutieref	E	30 01 N. 14 17 E.		1 mi. NNE. of village			Fuel and W/T.
Sebha	E	27 09 N. 14 27 E.		5 mi. SSE. of Sebha, 80 mi. NNE. of Murzuk.			Hangar, fuel, W/T.
Sedada	E	31 50 N. 14 40 E.		6 mi. SW. of Misurata.			
Sidi Ahmed El Magrun.	E	31 28 N. 20 09 E.	Sea level	1½ mi. ENE. of village, W. of main road.			W/T, fuel. Enemy aircraft, including bombers, have been operating from here.
Sinauen	E	30 02 N. 19 55 E. (village)		W. of village, 62½ mi. SSW. of Nalut.	1,650′ x 1,650′		
Sirte	E	31 12 N. 16 36 E.		On S. side of road 2 mi. S. of Gulf of Sidra, adjoins city on S.	3,282′ x 1,968′, usable area marked.	Rectangular, hard sand, level.	2 hangars, minor repairs, fuel and oil, quarters, telegraph in town, radio, weather reports, meteorological station, bad wind and sand storms.
Slonta	E	32 35 N. 21 43 E.		19 mi. ENE. of Marsa, 25 mi. SW. of Apollonia.	2,250′ x 1,200′ (approx.)		Clearly marked.
Socna	E	29 04 N. 15 47 E.		12½ mi. WSW. of Hon			
Soluk	E	31 38 N. 20 15 E.		W. of town, 35 mi. SSE. of Benghazi.	3,300′ x 3,300′ (approx.)	Good surface, level	1 hangar reported; enemy aircraft, bomber and fighter groups have been located here.
Sultan (Es)	E	30 07 N. 17 08 E.		31 mi. SE. of Sirte			
Sultan (Got Es)	E	32 05 N. 20 33 E.		30 mi. E. of Benghazi			
Tagrifet	E	29 12 N. 17 21 E.		1½ mi. NNE. of village, 85 mi. NE. of Hon.			
Tamet (Uadi)	E	31 12 N. 16 11 E.		S. of main road, 24 mi. W. of Sirte.	3,450′ x 2,550′		W/T and facilities; enemy aircraft have operated from here.
Tauorga	E	32 01 N 15 04 E.		E. of main road, 26 mi. SE. of Misurata.	2,700′ x 2,550′		Enemy aircraft have operated from here.
Tegerhi	E	24 23 N 14 29 E.		2 mi. NNE. of village, 44 mi. SSW. of El Gatrun.			W/T, fuel and some facilities.
Tert (Li Di Savoia).	E	32 46 N. 22 03 E.	3,280	On Tert-Derna Rd., 9 mi. NW. of V formation of 2 roads.			
Tobruck	E	32 05 N. 23 59 E.	72	Adjacent and E. of port on Bay of Tobruck.	2,955′ x 2,232′	Irregular, flat, slope to E., dry and hard.	Wind T, hangars, minor repairs, fuel and oil, barracks, telephone, telegraph in town, radio, meteorological information, control tower.
Tobruck No. 2	E	32 03 N. 23 58 E.		3 mi. S. of town	3,300′ x 3,300′		4 new blast shelters, 4-gun heavy antiaircraft batteries to S.
Tolmeta	E	32 40 N. 20 52 E.	Sea level	In village along coastal lowlands.			
Tripoli (Castel Benito).	E	32 39 N. 13 20 E.	233	16 mi. S. of Tripoli, 3 mi. SW. of Castel Benito.	Rectangular, 10,500′ x 5,280′.	Soil, level, natural drainage.	Hangars, major repairs, fuel and oil, servicing, quarters, radio, weather reports, W/T, field reported to accommodate 50 to 75 planes.

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0650

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LIBYA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Tripoli (Mellaha)	E	32 54 N. 13 17 E.	Slightly below sea level	6 mi. E. and ½ mi. from coast, R. R. alongside of field.	Irregular, 5,280′ x 2,640′ (approx.).	Flat, grassy, in good condition.	Wind socks, floodlight, hangars, major repairs, fuel and oil, quarters, transportation, telephone W/T, radio, customs, meteorological information.
Ubari	E	26 37 N. 12 46 E.	.....	2 mi. NNW. of village, 86 mi. WNW. of Murzuk.	.....	.....	
Uenzerich	E	27 30 N. 13 28 E.	.....	112 mi. NW. of Murzuk aerodrome.	.....	.....	
Um El Abid	E	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Wadi El Orfeli	E	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Za El Faida	E	32 42 N. 21 54 E.	3,280	NW. side of Solanta-Za El Faida Rd. 12 mi. S. of Mediterranean Sea; lighthouse 21 mi. NE. of field.	.....	.....	
Zanzur	E	32 49 N. 13 00 E. (village)	.....	Village is 11 mi. WSW. of Tripoli.	.....	.....	Used by transport and air corps from Sicily in October 1941.
Zella	E	28 52 N. 17 25 E.	.....	9½ mi. NW. of Zella on S. side of road to Hon.	1,425′ x 855′, irregular shape.	.....	Circle and corner markers, landing T.
Zliten	E	32 26 N. 14 39 E. (approx.)	.....	6 mi. ESE. of village, S. of main road.	2,250′ x 1,950′ (approx.).	Uneven	W/T, markers.
Zt. Msus	E	31 34 N. 20 15 E.	Sea level	At terminus of Solûk-Zt. Msus Rd.	.....	.....	
Zuara	E	32 55 N. 12 06 E.	.....	1½ mi. SE. of town S. of main road.	2,700′ x 2,700′	.....	Hangars, W/T; enemy aircraft fighters and bombers located here.
Zuetina	E	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Zuila	E	26 09 N. 15 10 E.	.....	3 mi. ESE. of Zuila, 78 mi. NE. of Murzuk aerodrome.	.....	.....	
Zuila No. 2	E	26 13 N. 14 58 E.	.....	9½ mi. WNW. of Zuila.	.....	.....	Enemy aircraft located here.

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RIO DE ORO

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Aou Hofrite	E	23 03 N. 14 38 W. (village)					
Arouenit	E	22 10 N. 13 10 W.		200 mi. ESE. of Villa Cisneros.			
Bir Afidal	E						
Bir Deroua	E						
Bir Sidi Mohamed	E	23 00 N. 13 40 W.					
Bou Gouffat	E	22 20 N. 15 30 W. (approx.)					
Cabo Juby	E	27 57 N. 12 55 W	10	At fort, about ½ mi. SW. of cape, on coast, about 55 mi. ESE. of Fuesteventura.	3,135′ NNE./SSW, 1,705′ ESE./WNW.	Firm, flat sand, covered with thin grass, probably unsuitable for fast planes.	Circle, corner markings, windsleeve, 2 hangars, landing T, beacons, boundary floodlights, repairs, fuel, telegraph, telephone, radio, D/F, weather station, steamer.
El Ayoun	E	26 33 N. 13 02 W.					Spanish JU 52's reported at this place.
El Msed Dela Sgeuia Field	E						
Hagunia	E	27 34 N. 12 51 W. (quest.)					Spanish JU 52's reported here, July 1941.
Hassan Imilit	E						
Hassi Djerifla	E	25 25 N. 14 20 W. (approx.)					
Hassi Dora	E						
Jeloua (Yelva)	E	21 55 N. 15 33 W.					Spanish JU 52's reported here July 1941.
La Aguerra	E	20 50 N. 17 07 W.		On Aguerguer peninsula, at extreme SW. corner of Rio de Oro.	2,745′ x 1,680′		
La Guelta	E						
Smara	E	26 41 N. 11 31 W.					
Taguehzimt	E	24 05 N. 15 30 W.					
Tantane	E	28 27 N. 11 05 W.					Spanish JU 52's reported here July 1941.
Tichele	E	21 36 N. 14 53 W.		20 mi. from S. boundary of Rio de Oro, 135 mi. from coast			"Large aerodrome" in preparation, 1938.
Villa Cisneros	E	23 42 N. 15 56 W.	20	5 mi. NE. of Durnford Pt., on Ed Djala-Sahria peninsula.	4,575′ x 4,245′	Firm, hard, sand, level, soft after rains.	Corner markers, landing T, hangar, repairs, fuel, telephone, telegraph, radio, weather station; flood, boundary and obstruction lights. Shipping.

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SPANISH MOROCCO

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Larache (Auamara)	E	35 04 N. 6 05 W.	33	10 mi. SSE. of Larache, 8 mi. from coast.	NW./SE. 2,955′ x NE./SW. 1,320′.	Grass on sandy soil, all year.	Circle, corner and boundary markings, boundary lights, revolving floodlights, 3 hangars, radio, repairs, fuel, telephone, telegraph, weather station, rail, road, shipping, water, hotel.
Melilla (Nador Tauima)	E	35 12 N. 2 55 W.		3,000′ x 2,700′, taxi track; no runway.			
Melusa	M					Runways not yet finished (March 1942).	Under construction, March 1942; fairly well advanced.
Tetouan (Rio Martin)	E	35 36 N. 5 20 W.		2½ mi. NE.	1 runway, 3,000′ x 2,100′.	Level, marshy in wet weather.	Radio, fuel, hangars, telegraph. Under construction 1941, night landing facilities.

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TANGIER

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Tangier	M	35 44 N. 5 54 W.	70	5 mi. SW. of town, 4 mi. SE. of Cape Spartel.	Two areas: Souahel (SW.) E./W. 2,625' x 1,500', and Bou Ghalf (NE.) N./S. 1,980' x 1,530'. Runways: ENE./WSW. 2,700' x 132', NE./SW. 1,800' x 132'.	Field sandy, soft in wet weather, runways ferro-concrete.	Hangars, repairs, fuel, telephone and telegraph, radio, D/F, boundary and flood lights, beacon, weather, motor, rail, accommodations.

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TUNISIA

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Amar	E	34 35 N. 9 28 E.		8 mi. NW. of Maknassy	3,300′ x 3,000′		
Bechater	E	37 18 N. 9 44 E.		12 mi. W. of Bizerte	3,300′ x 3,000′		
Ben Gardane	E	33 09 N. 11 12 E.	55	1¼ mi. SE. of city, S. of Olive Groves and Gardens.	2,787′ x 2,622′	Sandy soil, hard (field poorly kept).	Circle, corner markings, portable hangars, repairs, gas and oil (not aviation gas) available on 1 hour notice, weather service. Telephone and telegraph in town.
Bir Guenniche	E	37 09 N. 9 57 E.		10 mi. SE. of Bizerte, SE. of Lac de Bizerte.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Bir Kasassa	E	36 44 N. 10 13 E. (R. R. station)		7 mi. ESE. of Tunis	2,700′ x 2,700′		
Bordj-le-Boeuf (Kecira).	E	32 15 N. 10 24 E.		Adjoins Bordj-le-Boeuf, 83 mi. SSW. of Medenine.	2,700′ x 2,700′	Serviceable all seasons	Telephone and W/T.
Bordj Touaz	E	33 37 N. 10 02 E.		20 mi. SW. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Bou Arada (Northeast).	E	36 22 N. 9 40 E. (approx.)		41 mi. SW. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Bou Arada (West)	E	36 21 N. 9 35 E. (approx.)		45 mi. SW. of Tunis	2,100′ x 2,100′	Firm stony surface (usable all seasons).	2 small hangars, telephone.
Bou Ficha (South)	E	36 19 N. 10 30 E.	23	3 mi. NE. of town, 3 mi. from R. R.	2,624′ x 1,968′	Stony (usable all seasons).	Corner markers, wind cone, 2 metal hangars 98′ x 66′, repairs in Tunis, fuel and oil; telephone and telegraph in town.
Bou Ficha (North)	E	36 19 N. 10 30 E.		34 mi. ESE. of Tunis, NE. of Bou Ficha South Airport.	3,300′ x 3,300′	Usable all seasons	Corner markers, wind cone, telephone and telegraph in town, 2 hangars 66′ x 98′, fuel and oil.
Bou Mellouk (East).	E	36 27 N. 10 10 E.		24 mi. S. of Tunis	2,700′ x 2,700′		
Bou Mellouk (West).	E	36 27 N. 10 06 E.		24 mi. SW. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Chaouat	E	36 53 N. 9 56 E.		12 mi. WNW. of Tunis			
Creteville	E	36 39 N. 10 19 E.		11 mi. SE. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Depienne	E	36 27 N. 10 01 E.		25 mi. SSW. of Tunis	2,700′ x 2,700′		
Djebel Sidi Kralif	E	35 08 N. 9 43 E.		48 mi. SSW. of Kairouan	3,300′ x 3,300′		Road from Sfax.
Djebel Taragha Sud.	E	34 02 N. 9 57 E.		13 mi. NW. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Djebel Teragha Nord.	E	34 04 N. 9 52 E.		18 mi. NW. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Djedeida	E	36 50 N. 9 56 E.		2 mi. from town, on N. side of road to Tebourba.	3,900′ x 3,900′		
El Aouareb (Fondouk El Aouareb).	E	35 34 N. 9 45 E.		21 mi. WSW. of Kairovan.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
El Aroussa	E	36 22 N. 9 27 E.		50 mi. WSW. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		

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TUNISIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
El Azib	E	37 12 N. 9 57 E.		7 mi. SE. of Bizerte, near E. side of Lake of Bizerte.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
El Bathaa	E	36 48 N. 9 51 E.		19 mi. W. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
El Djem	E	35 17 N. 10 42 E.		38 mi. N. of Sfax	2,700′ x 2,700′		
El Hadjiri	E	34 13 N. 9 41 E.		28 mi. NW. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
El Hamma	E	33 53 N. 9 47 E.		20 mi. W. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
El Mradia	E	34 25 N. 9 59 E.		10 mi. SE. of Mezzouna, 50 mi. WSW. of Sfax.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
El Nidradia	E	34 25 N. 5 59 E.		10 mi. SE. of Mezzouna, 50 mi. WSW. of Sfax.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Feriana	E	34 56 N. 8 34 E.		37 mi. NNW. of Gabes, 125 mi. NW. of Sfax.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Fort Saint	E	30 15 N. 9 33 E.	1,148	1 mi. NE. of junction of Tunisian, Algerian and Tripolitan frontiers. 1 mi. from border of Fort Saint.	2,624′ x 2,132′	Flat and soft. Runway plaster covered with flint (usable all seasons).	Corner markers, wind cone fuel and oil; radio at military post.
Foum Tatouine	E	32 57 N. 10 28 E.	820	2½ mi. NW. of town, 65 mi. SSE. of Gabes.	3,147′ x 1,968′	Sandy, soft (muddy after rains), flat.	Circle, corner markings fuel and oil; telephone and telegraph in town.
Foum Tatouine (Northwest).	E	33 09 N. 10 26 E.		Near old airdrome and NW. of it.	2,700′ x 2,700′		
Gabes	E	33 52 N. 10 06 E.	16	½ mi. S. of town on W. side of road.	3,300′ x 3,300′	Sandy but firm, marshy after rains.	Corner markers, wind cone, hangar 66′ x 98′, fuel and oil, telephone and telegraph, radio, weather reports, minor repairs.
Gabes West	E	33 54 N. 10 00 E.		5 mi. W. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Gafsa	E	34 23 N. 8 49 E.	902	1,640′ S. of R. R. station. 1¼ mi. N. of town.	3,300′ x 3,300′	Small sand dunes (usable all year).	Circle, corner markers, wind cone, shelter for 3 planes, minor repairs; fuel and oil, telephone and telegraph in town, weather reports.
Goubellat	E	36 32 N. 9 39 E.		34 mi. WSW. of Tunis			
Grombalia	E	36 36 N. 10 30 E. (town)		17 mi. ESE. of Tunis	2,700′ x 2,700′		
Hasbine	E	36 38 N. 10 04 E.		6¼ mi. SW. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Houmt Souk	E	33 53 N. 10 48 E.	6½	On island of Djerba, 3 mi. NW. of the town of Djerba.	2,130′ x 1,968′	Hard, sandy soil	Fuel and oil, telephone and telegraph in Houmt Souk.
Kairouan	E	35 41 N. 10 04 E.	190	1.2 mi. NW. of town, 33 mi. WSW. of Sousse.	3,300′ x 3,300′	Firm, clay (soft after rain).	Circle, corner markers, wind cone, hangar 66′ x 98′, fuel and oil; telephone and telegraph in town, weather reports.
Kalaa Djerda	E	35 39 N. 8 35 E.		84 mi. W. of Kairouan	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Kebili	E	33 41 N. 8 58 E.		67 mi. SW. of Gabes	2,100′ x 2,100′		
Korba Station East.	E	36 38 N. 10 49 E.		E. of R. R. station	3,300′ x 3,300′		

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TUNISIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Korba Station South.	E	36 38 N. 10 49 E.		E. of R. R. Station	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Krour Essaf	E	35 25 N. 10 59 E.		35 mi. SE. of Sousse	3,300′ x 3,300′		
La Champenoise	E	35 01 N. 10 34 E.		22 mi. NNW. of Sfax	2,700′ x 2,700′		
La Fauconniere	E	35 00 N. 10 12 E.		40 mi. WNW. of Sfax	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Le Kef	E	36 10 N. 8 42 E.		92 mi. WSW. of Tunis			
Le Krib	E	36 18 N. 9 09 E. (village)		65 mi. SSW. of Tunis, 5.5 mi. N. of R. R. station.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Maisonette	E	34 36 N. 9 47 E.		55 mi. SW. of Sfax	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Maisonnette 23	E	34 28 N. 9 05 E.		W. of Zannouck village, 15 mi. ENE. of Gabes.	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Maknassy	E	33 19 N. 10 45 E.		45 mi. E. of Medenine	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Mareth	E	33 37 N. 10 17 E.		21 mi. SE. of Gabes	2,700′ x 2,700′		
Mateur	E	37 02 N. 9 40 E.		20 mi. SSW. of Bizerte	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Medenine	E	33 20 N. 10 30 E.	328	0.9 mi. SE. of town, 45 mi. S. of Gabes.	3,280′ x 2,296′		Radio at military base.
Medenine—S	E	33 17 N. 10 32 E.		5 mi. SE. of town	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Menzel Temime	E	36 50 N. 10 59 E.		¾ mi. NE. of Menzel Temime, 44 mi. E. of Tunis.			
Metlaoui	E	34 19 N. 8 24 E. (town)		23 mi. WSW. of Gafsa	2,100′ x 2,100′		
Mezzouna	E	34 34 N. 9 51 E.		54 mi. SW. of Sfax	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Ouenzga	E			Near Camp Berteaux; SW. of Ouenzga.			
Oundna	E	36 37 N. 10 09 E.		10 mi. SE. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Pavillier	E	35 25 N. 9 51 E.		20 mi. SW. of Kairouan	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Pont Du Fahs—S. W.	E	36 22 N. 9 52 E. (approx.)		35 mi. SSW. of Tunis			
Pont du Fahst—S.	E	36 20 N. 9 54 E.		22 mi. SSW. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Remada	E	32 17 N. 10 23 E.	820	1.2 mi. SW. of border of Remada.	2,624′ x 2,624′	Very hard and stony (usable all seasons).	Corner markers, wind cone, telephone on military post, W/T, portable hangar for 2 ships, repairs fuel and oil, weather reports.
Sainte Marie Du	E	36 24 N. 10 18 E.		26 mi. SSE. of Tunis			
Sbeitla	E	35 13 N. 9 07 E.		65 mi. SW. of Kairouan	2,700′ x 2,700′		
Sfax	E	34 48 N. 10 45 E.	3	1¼ mi. NW. of town, E. of the coast.	1,968′ x 984′	Sandy, hard, and smooth.	Corner markers, wind cone, telegraph; telephone in town; W/T, fuel and oil.

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TUNISIA—Continued

Name	Type	Position	Altitude	Location	Dimensions	Surface	Facilities
		° ′	*Feet*				
Sidi Ahmed (Bizerte)	M	37 14 N. 9 46 E.	16	4.8 mi. WSW. of Bizerte, on N. shore of Lake Bizerte.	4,109′ x 3,444′, concrete runways 3,900′ NW./SE.	Grass, very wet and muddy in winter.	Several hangars, fuel and oil (forbidden zone).
Sidi Mansour	E	34 15 N. 9 34 E.	.....	40 mi. NW. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Sidi Nasr Allah	E	35 21 N. 9 49 E.	.....	27 mi. SW. of Kairouan	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Sidi Randa	E	34 13 N. 9 34 E.	.....	34 mi. NW. of Gabes	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Souk El Arba	E	36 29 N. 8 47 E.	475	SSE. of village	3,280′ x 3,280′		Note.—Reported on Mar. 15, 1942, to have been ploughed up, being no longer usable.
Souk El Khemis	E	36 36 N. 8 58 E.	.....	69 mi. SW. of Tunis	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Teboursouk	E	36 27 N. 9 15 E.	.....	53 mi. WSW. of Tunis	2,100′ x 2,100′		
Thibar	E	36 25 N. 9 06 E.	.....	66 mi. SW. of Tunis	2,310′ x 2,100′		
Tozeur	E	33 55 N. 8 10 E.	263	1¼ mi. NE. of town, 48 mi. SW. of Cafsa.	2,622′ x 2,622′	Grass, sandy soil, poor	Circle, corner markers, wind cone, telegraph, portable hangar for 2 ships, fuel and oil, weather reports.
Tunis (El Aouina)	M	36 50 N. 10 15 E.	6	5¼ mi. NE. of Tunis on N. bank of Lake El Bahira.	3,114′ x 2,952′	Flat, sandy, and hard	Corner markers, wind T illuminated, 3 military and 2 civil hangars, repairs, fuel and oil, quarters for personnel, transportation to town, telephone, telegraph, radio, boundary lights, landing floodlight. Reported to have anti-aircraft batteries at various points on the airport. Air squadrons located here including bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance types.
Zannough	E	34 28 N. 9 03 E.	.....	15½ mi. NE. of Gafsa	3,300′ x 3,300′		
Zarzis	E	33 27 N. 11 05 E.	10	3 mi. SSW. of Zarzis, E. of sea, 64 mi. ESE. of Gabes.	1,998′ x 2,132′	Firm sandy soil	Circle telephone, fuel and oil, meteorological service.
Zoukrata	E	34 08 N. 9 44 E.	.....	22 mi. NW. of Gabes			

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CORRECTION AND/OR ADDITION REPORT

NORTH AFRICA

(Report all fields omitted from this directory, including any under construction. Report also corrective information on fields included in this directory. Detach this sheet and mail to "Air Movements Section, AFDIS, Headquarters Army Air Forces, War Department, Washington, D. C.")

TO: Air Movements Section, AFDIS.

FROM:

The following corrections, additions and/or recommendations are suggested for this Airport Directory:

Name and Rank

Date and Place

(If more space is required use reverse side)

7/7/42

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
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ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TANGIER
TETOUAN
CAMP BERTEAUX
KAOUKI
HASSI QUENZGA
BOURED
SOUK
SIDI YAHIAIA
AIN AICHA
FEZ TAZA
M'SOUN
BERGUENT
AIN GUETTARA
BOU RACHED
TIFLET
OUTAT OUL HADJ
AZROU
TIMHADIT
AIT MAKLOUF
OUDJDA
SAF SAF
TLEMCEN
SAIDA
ORLEANSVILLE
RELIZANE (EAST)
RELIZANE (WEST)
MOSTAGANEM
ST. DENIS DU
PERREGEAUX
LO
FLEURUS
MASCARA
BOGHARI
SIDI BEL ABBES
TIARET
OGGAZ
SAHARIS
AIN OUSSERA
BOU SAADA
BATNA
M'SILA
EL ACHIR
LEVASSEUR
MOUZAIAVILLE
BOURKIKA
BLIDA
BLANCHE
DEY
FREHA
SIDI AISSA
BOUGIE
CHATEAU DU RHUMEL
DJIDJELLI
CONSTANTINE
TELERGMA
PHILIPPEVILLE
LA MESKIANA
CANROBERT
BONE (DUZERVILLE)
BONE (ALLELICK)
PETIT
SOUK AHRAS
AIN KERCHA
KALAA
DJERDA
PAVILLIER
KAIROUAN
DJEBEL SIDI KRALIF
KROUR ESSAF
EL DJEM
SIDI NASR ALLAH
INSERT SEE
MORSOTT
MARSATT
AIN BEIDA
LA FOUCONNIERE
SFAX
OFERIANA
MRADIA
EL HADJIRI
DJEBEL TARAGHA NORD
MAISONNETTE 23
GABES
DEL HAMMA
BORDJ TOUAZ
MARETH
MAKNASSY
ZARZIS
KEBILI
SIDI MANSOUR
METLAOUI
TOZEUR
GAFSA
TEBESSA
NEGRINE
FONTAINE CHAUDE
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OULED DJELLAL
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EL NIDRADIA
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EL OUED (TIKSEBT)
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FORT LALLEMAND
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REMADA
KERCIRA
EL ASABAA
FOUM TATAOUINE
AMAR
EL AZIZIA
TRIPOLI
CASTELVERD
MIZDA
BIR DUFAN
SEDADA
BIR EL BEBIRA
GHIRZA
MERDUM
SAABA
BENI ULID
ZUARA
ZANZUR
GARDANES
EL HAMMA
DJEBEL
COLOMB BECHAR
BENI OUNIF
MERIDJA
SOUK AHRAS
BOU BENIB
ENJIL (ENGIL)
BOU DRAA DE L'OUDCHES
BOU MIA
SOUK AHRAS
TADIGHOUST
AIT ERFOUD
DERKAOUA
AIN AICHA
OMEGHEININE
MENOUARAR
TAGHIT
IGLI
TERRAIN A
TERRAIN B
TERRAIN C
TERRAIN D
GUERZIM
ZERHUMRA
SAHIB TOUIL
TABELBALA
OUDIKA
MAHJEZ
MEREMDHA
TIMIMOUN
HASSI MDAKANE
HASSI TILEMSI
HAMMADA CHAMMAR
TIMMOUDI
FORT MIRIBEL
INIFEL
GOURD AMARA
KILOMETER 200
OHANET
EL UPFFANA
AUENET UENNIN
HASSI MERRIEM
OULED SAID
HASSI BONNEVILLE
FOUCHI (1)
FOUCHI (2)
BOU BERNOUS
AIN EL HADJADJ
TAMOUZZETT
SIDI CHEIKH
OMECHERIA
EL ARICHA
CRAMPEL
OKROLFALLAH
BEDEAU
BOU KTOUB
GERYVILLE
AIN SEFRA
ZENIMA
ZERHOUNI
TIZI N'ISLY
TIZI NTAKKAT
TIZI NTIFRANE
CHRISTIAN
ADLA
TEZGA
TINGHIR
AZILAL
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FEZZOU
TAZZARINE
AGOUDIM
HAMMID
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

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

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

Routing Slip Date 11-25-42

TO: _____ Bldg. Pentagon
(Office or Symbol)

Attn: Col. Williams Room 3E1078

Coord. Invest. Nec.Action

Infor. Recomd. Sig.

File Confer

Remarks:

Furnished herewith for your use is Copy #52 of a weather study entitled "The Weather Factor in Bombing Germany from English Bases". This is in response to your verbal request of November 24, 1942.

Request that the attached mail routing slip be signed acknowledging receipt.

The study for bombing operations from England using the 8000 ft. limit conditions is not immediately available, but believe that it can be furnished you some time today along with the additional study that you requested of bombing over Germany using operating bases in northern Italy.

From: Name: L. P. Dahl, Colonel, A. C. Phone 74681

Office AFTSW Bldg. Maritime Rm. 908
(Name or Symbol)

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192

THE WEATHER FACTOR IN BOMBING OPERATIONS

ON GERMANY FROM BASES IN ENGLAND

This study presents data on weather factors as they would, on the average, affect air bombardment of Germany from bases in England. For this purpose the take-off airdromes are considered to be in the vicinity of Upper Heyford; targets in the vicinity of Aachen, Hannover, Nurnberg in Germany, and final landing in Britain at whatever airdromes happen to be open.

Figures 2 to 5 show the number of nights and days on which weather conditions will permit bombardment operations from England to Germany under the following set of limitations:

NIGHT OPERATIONS

Target - Ceiling more than 3,000 feet.

Take-off ceiling more than 2000 feet: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 mi.
Landing " " "

Take-off ceiling above 1000 feet: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 mi.
Landing " "

Take-off ceiling more than 500 feet: Visibility greater than 1/2 mi.
Landing " 1000 " 2-1/2

DAY OPERATIONS

Target - Ceiling more than 3,000 feet.

Take-off ceiling more than 2,000 feet: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 mi.
Landing " "

Take-off ceiling more than 1,000 ft: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 mi.
Landing " "

Take-off ceiling more than 500 feet: Visibility greater than 1/2 mi.
Landing " 1000 " " 2-1/2 "

NIGHT OPERATIONS

Target - No restrictions

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192

Take-off ceiling above 2000 feet: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 miles
Landing " "

Take-off ceiling above 1000 feet: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 miles
Landing " "

Take-off ceiling above 500 feet: Visibility greater than 1/2 mile
Landing " 1000 " " 2-1/2 "

DAY OPERATION

Target No restrictions

Take-off ceiling above 2000 feet: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 miles
Landing " "

Take-off ceiling above 1000 feet: Visibility greater than 2-1/2 miles
Landing " "

Take-off ceiling above 500 feet: Visibility greater than 1/2 mile
Landing " 1000 " " 2-1/2 "

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

FIG. 1

IRRC-SR-1757

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NIGHT TARGET RESTRICTED: CEILING ABOVE 3000 FT.

VICINITY OF UPPER HEYFORD (ENGLAND)

TAKE-OFF CEILING MORE THAN 2000 FT. VISIBILITY MORE THAN 2½ MI.
LANDING " " " 2000 FT. " " " 2½ MI.



TOTAL NUMBER OF NIGHTS PER YEAR, 155

TAKE-OFF CEILING MORE THAN 1000 FT. VISIBILITY MORE THAN 2½ MI.
LANDING " " " 1000 FT. " " " 2½ MI.



TOTAL NUMBER OF NIGHTS PER YEAR, 208

TAKE-OFF CEILING MORE THAN 500 FT. VISIBILITY MORE THAN ½ MI.
LANDING " " " 1000 FT. " " " 2½ MI.



TOTAL NUMBER OF NIGHTS PER YEAR, 242

FIG. 3

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NIGHT TARGET RESTRICTED: CEILING ABOVE 3000 FT.

VICINITY OF UPPER HEYFORD (ENGLAND)







FIG. 2

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DAY TARGET RESTRICTION: CEILING ABOVE 3000 FT.

VICINITY OF UPPER HEYFORD (ENGLAND)







FIG. 3

WRC-SR-1759

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NIGHT

NO RESTRICTIONS AT TARGET

VICINITY OF UPPER HEYFORD (ENGLAND)







FIG. 4

WBG-SR-1760

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DAY

NO RESTRICTIONS AT TARGET

VICINITY OF UPPER HEYFORD (ENGLAND)







FIG. 5

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

FIG. 6

WRC-SR-1762

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192

able operating days will occur in sequences of from 2 to 5 consecutive days. The coastal areas will be relatively more favorable for high altitude bombing in summer than the inland regions.

Summary of Results:

(1) A statistical investigation shows that terminal weather conditions are the controlling factor while route conditions are a relatively unimportant factor in successful bombing operations. The restrictions imposed at the terminals and over the targets serve to govern conditions along the routes.

(2) It is to be noted that with the lower ceiling and visibility restrictions the number of operating days is considerably in excess of that with higher ceiling and visibility restrictions. The restriction of ceiling at the target, however, does not appreciably change the operating frequency. The difference between the number of cases for ceiling above 3,000 feet and no ceiling restrictions at the target amounts to not more than about 2 cases per month for the higher limits at the terminals (2000 feet; 2 1/2 miles) and to a maximum of five cases in midwinter for the lower limits at the terminals (500 feet; 1/2 mile;1000 feet; 2 1/2 miles).

(3) During the summer season, night operations are somewhat restricted due to short duration of hours of darkness. At latitude 52° in midsummer there is only 4 hours 45 minutes of darkness available (see Fig. 6). During winter, autumn and spring, the differences between the number of possible operations by day and night are negligible.

(4) The data presented in the figures are averages; it is expected that deviations from these means will occur during individual months. For example, in any 3 out of 4 years on the average, any summer month may ex-

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192

perience 2 to 5 fewer operating days than is indicated by the mean. In winter, 3 to 4 fewer days may be encountered. Thus for night operations during May with take-off and landing restrictions of 1000 feet and 2 1/2 miles and target restrictions of 3000 feet, it is to be expected that in 3 out of 4 months of May there will be in excess of 20 to 21 favorable operating nights. It is to be remarked, however, that any individual months in a given year may deviate widely from the mean for that month. Some measure of the monthly variabilities is given in table 3 which presents the best and worst years for bombing operations out of the 7 year series investigated.

Table III - Showing the number of days of possible bombing operations against Germany during the best and worst years examined.

NIGHT - Take-off > 2000 > 2 1/2
Landing > 2000 > 2 1/2
Target > 3000

Average number of nights:

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
Worst year	4	5	10	14	19	18	16	19	15	10	4	3	137
Best year	6	12	21	26	18	21	21	23	18	18	3	5	192

Take-off > 1000 > 2 1/2
Landing > 1000 > 2 1/2
Target > 3000

Worst year	4	6	13	18	26	21	23	22	20	12	7	4	176
Best year	19	16	19	22	26	27	28	19	27	18	13	11	245

Take-off > 500 > 1/2
Landing > 1000 > 2 1/2
Target > 3000

Worst year	8	9	15	22	26	23	23	23	22	14	7	5	197
Best year	14	19	26	25	28	28	29	29	28	26	19	15	286

DAY - Take-off > 2000 > 2 1/2
Landing > 2000 > 2 1/2
Target > 3000

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192

Average number of days:

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
Worst year	3	1	7	15	15	23	21	22	17	8	3	5	140
Best year	5	7	17	17	23	13	27	23	18	12	4	8	174

Take-off	> 1000	> 2 1/2
Landing	> 1000	> 2 1/2
Target	> 3000	

Worst year	4	2	10	21	21	25	23	23	22	15	5	5	176
Best year	14	12	21	20	25	28	31	29	20	19	12	13	234

Take-off	> 500	> 1/2
Landing	> 1000	> 2 1/2
Target	> 3000	

Worst year	5	6	14	24	21	25	25	23	23	16	8	7	197
Best year	21	16	22	21	27	29	24	30	25	19	15	19	268

Critique of Data:

The results presented in the figures and tables were obtained through a statistical analysis of 7 years of meteorological data, as well as detailed examination of 5 years of synoptic charts. General terminal conditions in Southern England, conditions en route and over the target areas were considered, approximating to a considerable extent the view point a forecaster on the spot would take in making flight forecasts. The figures obtained by both approaches were in remarkably close agreement.

Sequences of Favorable Operating Days:

It has been shown that weather conditions favorable or unfavorable for air operations tend to occur in sequences. In Table 4 are presented data showing the frequencies of sequences of varying lengths (expressed in number of consecutive days of favorable flying weather). In general the data show that there are rather long sequences of favorable operating days during

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192

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197

Sequences of days	Number of Sequences: Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1-2	4	5	3	6	5	0	5	2	3	3	3	3
3-5	0	5	0	4	1	1	1	5	1	5	1	6
6-10			0	6	0	4	0	5	0	1	0	7
11-15							0	5		0	1	0
16-20								0	1	0	2	

	4	1	2	4	4	1	5	6	3	6	5	2
	0	7	1	6	1	5	1	0	0	4	0	1
	0	3	0	1	0	7	1	1	0	2	0	1
							0	1	0	1	0	1

Example: During October there are on the average 1.0 occurrences of sequences of 3 to 5 favorable days.

	Take-off	Landing	Target
	>1000	>1000	>3000
	>2 1/2	>2 1/2	

Sequences of days	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1-2	5	1	4	5	4	2	3	5	2	1	1	4
3-5	0	9	0	6	1	4	2	0	0	7	1	1
6-10	0	1	0	2	0	7	0	6	1	4	0	7
11-15							0	2	0	6	0	1
16-20								0	1	0	2	
21-30									0	1		

	1	6	2	1	2	3	4	3	4	3	5	0
	1	1	1	0	7	1	1	1	3	0	4	0
	1	4	0	7	1	1	1	3	1	3	0	2
	0	2	0	2							0	1
	0	2	0	1								

Example: During March there are on the average 1.4 occurrences of sequences of 3 to 5 favorable days.

	Take-off	Landing	Target
	>500	>1000	>3000
	>1/2	>2 1/2	

Sequences of days	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1-2	4	5	4	0	2	9	3	0	1	4	1	4
3-5	1	4	1	0	1	5	1	5	0	7	0	7
6-10	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	9	1	4	0	2
11-15			0	5	0	2	0	5	0	2	0	1
16-20		0	1				0	1	0	4		
21-30				0	1						0	1
30							0	1	0	1	0	1

	1	3	1	5	3	3	6	5	1	3	2	
	1	5	0	7	1	3	0	4	1	1	5	
	0	9	1	0	0	6	0	4	0	4	0	7
	0	2	0	9	1	0	0	6	0	4	0	4
	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	4				
							0	1				
									0	1	0	2

Example: During April there are on the average 1.5 occurrences of sequences of 3 to 5 favorable days.

Table 5 shows the average frequency by months of sequences of favorable days and nights taken together, i.e., day-night-day, etc. These data show essentially the same characteristics as those of Table 4 except that, as would be expected, the sequences are shorter.

TABLE V - Frequencies of days and nights of favorable bombing weather taken together:

	Take-off	Landing	Target
	>2000	>2000	>3000
	>2 1/2	>2 1/2	

Sequences of Days & Nights	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1-2	3	0	3	2	4	1	5	3	5	0	4	2
3-5	0	2		0	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	0
6-10				0	5		0	7	0	1	0	4
11-15							0	1		0	1	

	6	0	4	4	4	4	4	0	3	0	3	1
	8	2	0	0	4		0	5				
	0	6	0	2		0	1					
		0	1		0	1		0	1			

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192

TABLE V -- (Cont'd.)

Take-off	≥ 1000	≥ 2 1/2	
Landing	≥ 1000	≥ 2 1/2	
Target	≥ 3000		

Sequences of Days and Nights	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1-2	4.0	4.4	4.4	4.4	3.3	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.4
3-5	0.5	0.2	1.1	2.0	1.2	1.4	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.4	0.1	
6-10			1.0	0.5	1.2	0.2	0.7	1.0	0.4	0.2		
11-15					0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1		0.1	
16-20					0.2							

Take-off	≥ 500	≥ 1/2	
Landing	≥ 1000	≥ 2 1/2	
Target	≥ 3000		

1-2	4.1	5.0	3.4	3.0	2.4	2.0	3.0	3.0	2.4	4.0	5.0	5.0
3-5	1.0	0.4	1.2	1.4	1.1	1.4	2.1	1.4	2.0	1.4	0.7	0.8
6-10	0.1	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.3	0.5	0.4	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1
11-15			0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.4		0.1	
16-20					0.1		0.1					
21-30					0.1		0.1	0.1				

The effect of large scale operations:

In the planning of mass take-off and landings of large numbers of aircraft, it is necessary to consider the weather factor as it affects simultaneous favorable conditions at several airdromes. For this purpose, data were compiled for simultaneous favorable conditions at Upper Heyford, Birmingham, Cranwell, and Kew for 10 years of aerological observations. In Table 6 the average number of days that all four airdromes were open under various conditions are shown compared with the average number of days that at least Upper Heyford was open. These figures clearly indicate the marked reduction of the number of operating days when it is necessary to use several somewhat dispersed groups of airdromes for take-off and landings. In general the more closely together the airdromes are grouped the greater will be the simultaneous number of operating days.

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TABLE VI – Average number of days four airdromes of Upper Heyford, Birmingham, Cranwell and Kew are open, compared with number of days Upper Heyford is open:

NIGHT – Take-off > 2000 > 2 1/2

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Four Airdromes	2	2	5	11	16	18	19	21	14	5	3	3
Upper Heyford	13	15	20	23	24	23	25	26	23	20	11	12
				> 1000				> 2 1/2				
Four Airdromes	5	5	8	15	19	23	26	26	18	8	6	6
Upper Heyford	18	20	24	26	28	28	29	28	26	25	15	16
				> 500				> 2 1/2				
Four Airdromes	19	18	25	26	26	27	28	26	24	23	19	17
Upper Heyford	28	25	29	29	30	29	31	30	29	29	25	24
				Landing > 2000				> 2 1/2				
Four Airdromes	4	3	3	4	6	8	9	7	4	7	4	5
Upper Heyford	12	11	13	12	16	16	18	15	13	15	8	10
				> 1000				> 2 1/2				
Four Airdromes	8	5	6	6	8	13	13	10	5	9	6	8
Upper Heyford	16	14	16	16	18	20	22	17	14	17	11	14

Differences in the monthly figures of operating days for landing and take-off for the same ceiling and visibility restrictions are indicated in Table VI. This difference is due to the fact that the take off occurs during the early evening and the landing in the early morning. Low ceilings and particularly low visibilities occur more frequently in the early morning hours. In addition, the lower figures are due in part to the fact that the low visibilities in the early morning tends to occur simultaneously.

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192

THE WEATHER FACTOR IN BOMBING OPERATIONS
ON BRITAIN FROM GERMAN-HELD BASES

In Table 7 are presented data concerning the number of German raids over Britain (consisting of 50 planes or more) for a one-year period from August, 1940 to July, 1941.

TABLE 7 - Total number of German raids over Britain consisting of 50 planes or more during the year August, 1940 - July, 1941.

Month	1941 Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	1940 Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year
Number of day-light raids	1	1	5	1	4	9	1	2	20	24	9	0	77
Number of night raids	14	10	18	19	19	8	1	5	24	29	26	16	189
Total Day and night raids	15	11	23	20	23	17	2	7	44	53	35	16	266

With the great number of alternate airports available, adverse weather influences would only rarely lead to cancellation of flights. In summer practically month-round operations could be maintained by the Germans; in winter probably two-thirds of the time would present favorable bombing weather. The principal advantage of the Germans thus lies in the greater dispersal of their airdromes.

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A COMPARISON OF THE WEATHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING BOMBING OPERATIONS FROM ENGLAND AND EGYPT AGAINST GERMANY.

1. Table 8 (below) gives the average number of operating days against Germany under the following limitations:

	Take-off) Landing)		ceiling visib.		1,000 feet 2-1/2 miles		Target - ceiling		3,000 feet			
Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Annual
					England to Germany							
10	13	19	21	26	26	26	26	24	24	10	12	237
					Egypt to Germany							
21	19	22	21	25	25	25	25	24	25	18	23	273

The figures do not show a great divergence except during the winter when Egypt is considerably better as an operating base that England. Visibility is the governing factor for operations from Egypt.

2. Table 9 (below) gives the average number of operating days against Germany under the following limitations:

	Take-off) Landing)		ceiling visib.		1,000 feet 2-1/2 miles		Target - ceiling unlimited less than 3/10 of sky covered with clouds.					
Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Annual
					England to Germany							
2	4	7	5	12	13	10	11	8	4	2	2	80
					Egypt to Germany							
3	5	8	5	12	13	9	10	8	4	4	4	85

The figures do not indicate much difference in operating days from either terminal. This is probably because the cloudiness over the target is the determining factor.

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TAB O

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ESTIMATE OF THE RUSSIAN SUPPLY SITUATION

1. In the fall of 1941 Russia asked for approximately 460,000 tons of lend lease material from the U.S., of which over 60% was food and raw materials, to be delivered during 1942.

2. With regard to raw material, Russia has not the capacity for fabrication of very much of it.

3. The food request is given priority A and it is felt certain that Russia would have collapsed during 1942 without it.

4. Russia including Siberia is supplied by three routes, Murmansk - Archangel to Moscow, Bender Shar - Tehran - Caspean to the Western Russian front, Vladivostok - trans-Siberian to Western Russia and a fourth unimportant route open only three months of the year via the Bering strait, Arctic Ocean and south up the Lena River.

a. The supply route via Murmansk has had sinkings as high as 60% of convoys and as low as 30%.

b. The supply route via Bender Shar in Iran has suffered some losses but is still capable of carrying more than the R.R. from Bender Shar to the Caspean can handle.

c. The route via Vladivostok is the most important as supplies are carried in Russian bottom, more of which are being turned over to Russia by the U.S. daily, thence 7,000 miles over the trans-Siberian R.R. to the German front. If Japan declares war on Russia, this route will be closed and Russia will starve.

5. If any of the three main supply routes is closed, it is believed that Russia will collapse that much sooner in 1943. If all can be counted on to carry present supplies, it is believed Russia can stay in during 1943.

6. Any idea of opening up a new supply route thru the Dardanelles is highly questionable as unless Turkey comes in, and unless the Germans are driven west of the Crimea on the Black Sea and 200 miles west of the Volga, any supplies delivered at the port of Batum would run into the bottle neck of the Caspean and Turksib R.R.

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7. Russia has more than she can do to carry the Caucasian oil across the Caspean and over the Turkish R.R. now and unless the use of the Volga is here next summer, she cannot be counted on to make any offensive.

8. If a route was cleared thru the Mediterranean, the Aegean and Turkey permitted the use of the Dardanelles, the Axis submarines in the Black Sea would take their toll.

9. If a route is cleared thru the Mediterranean to Haifa or Beirut, then the only increase to Russian supply routes would be a motor road over the desert to Bagdad and thence via the mountain road to Tehran where it would hit the Bender Shapur, Bender Shah R.R. If Turkey is cooperating, the R.R., Beirut to Bagdad could be used to connect with the poor mountain motor road to Tehran.

10. Germany has intended all along to win the war with submarines and the more routes we have, the greater the load of protection against sinkings as long as her submarine production holds out.

a. She could have taken Murmansk and Archangel by a push from Finland but she can do more damage by sinking ships plying the northern ferry route.

11. It is doubtful that Russia will beat Germany by air offensive as she knows better how to fight a defensive war with her back to supplies. When she gets out in the open, she is less effective. The Russian push from Moscow last winter was actually an orderly German retreat to better winter quarters.

12. An Allied push into the Mediterranean, will undoubtedly draw Axis troops away from the Russian front, but it is unlikely that her supply problem will be alleviated in 1943 thereby.

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PORTS AND RAILWAYS

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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA



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

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

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SUBJECT: Study on German Air Force as a Whole.

2. AFABI AFDAS 1942
8/12

1. Report made to the first R & R covers and discusses the location of enemy heavy bombers in detail. The only ones located where it can be said that they are not engaged are 110 in Central Germany. Neither the British figures nor G-2 estimates admit the existence of any large unallocated German airforce.

2. The information on crack German Air Force units is rather scanty. A-2 has no sufficient source of information to secure data. G-2 has no information on the same. British information on the subject is set out below, but the information given may not point to any particularly valuable conclusions.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Study of Axis Capabilities.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDAS	AFABI (Att:Current Intel Section)	1942 8/5	AFDAS LSK:cmc 1. A study is directed of Axis air capabilities of opposing Allied landing forces against Northwest Africa, in which study an answer to the following questions should be made: a. German, Italian and French combat aircraft strength available to oppose. b. The time in which the strength can be brought into action at the point of landing. c. The routes by which the German and Italian aircraft can move to North Africa. d. The airports in North Africa from which they can operate. e. The logistics of the situation. f. Availability of air-borne Axis troops, and anti-aircraft defenses for fields which Axis may establish in North Africa. 2. Your reply will be submitted to, and coordinated with, study being made by Colonel Cabell, Advisory Council. L.S.K. AFDAS
2	AFABI	Colonel Cabell Advisory Council	8/12	AFABI EPS:mep 1. The report referred in item 1 above is attached. E.P.S. C/A-2 Att: Report-above subject

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AFABI
EPS:mep

AFABI Colonel Cabell Advisory Council 8/12

1. The report referred in item 1 above is attached.

E.P.S.
C/A-2

Att: Report-above subject

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FROM
EISENHOWER 1400222
LONDON
(4011)

NO. 1127, August 13, 1942

We are convinced that early and effective air operations in Torch require the formation in this theater of a Torch Air Force as a unit complete with the necessary command and service echelons. In the formation of the Air Force we must have maximum utilization of units now undergoing initial combat training in this theater. Any other solution would compel direct entry into combat of hastily formed air units and would exclude from a critical and major effort the benefit of the very thorough training and organization that has been conducted here. Present air plan, in which Generals Patton, Spaatz and Doolittle all concur, is, therefore, to form the nucleus of the Torch Air Force from the 8th Air Force--to be supplemented as necessary direct from the United States.

In planning for the transfer from this theater to Torch of a well rounded air contingent, it is considered desirable to allow the three medium groups, now understood to be ready for embarkation, to come on to this theater, where an intensive and concentrated schedule will be carried on to bring their state of training to a satisfactory level. The air echelon of the light bombardment group which will use this base area as a point of departure should also proceed to this theater for final training at the earliest possible date.

With this conception of the most feasible method of providing a satisfactory United States Air Force for Torch, as well as for resuming at the earliest possible date the development of the 8th Air Force, the immediately succeeding paragraphs give desired priorities in the shipping to this theater of additional air units.

To balance Torch forces in United Kingdom the following is recommended: No change in shipments of August air units now scheduled except that fighter or bomber groups regardless of state of training should be substituted for observation group now scheduled, and the troop carriers groups which were deferred by your 3114 (CM-OUT-2501, see page 34 OUT LOG) and our 1026 (CM-IN-3667), (see page 78 IN LOG). For OPD reference your 3063 (CM-OUT-2023, see page 28 OUT LOG)

Based on an initial Torch Air Force in United Kingdom of 2 heavy bombardment groups, 2 P-38 and 2 Spitfire fighter groups, 3 medium bombardment groups, 1 transport group and 1 light bombardment group the following air units not now available in the United Kingdom or afloat enroute must be included in August and early September shipments: 3 medium bombardment groups; 1 air force headquarters and headquarters squadron; 1 each headquarters and headquarters squadron for fighter command, bomber command, service command; 3 signal companies, aviation; 3 signal companies, service groups; 2 signal construction battalions; 2 air depot groups in addition to those now installed and to remain here; 1 engineer section, AFSC, special. It will add immeasurable to success of air operations if medium and light groups can be indoctrinated, processed and initiated to combat from this area. It is possible that limited number of trained key personnel for new fighter, bomber and service commands can be furnished from established commands here.

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In respect to Ground Forces for Torch the present conception of the operation limits to 2 regiments the participating ground units which will proceed to the theater from the United Kingdom. Therefore, under this conception no shipment of additional ground units to the United Kingdom is required for the purpose of rounding out a balanced Torch Force.

For rounding out 8th Air Force in the United Kingdom the following air units are recommended for United Kingdom by September: 5 heavy bombardment groups; headquarters squadron service group; 1 ordnance company, AB; 3 service squadrons; 3 quartermaster companies, truck; 3 quartermaster companies, MS; 2 quartermaster company service groups; 2 signal company service groups; 3 medical dispensaries of ten men each; 3 finance detachments of ten men each; 2 decontamination detachments of five men; 1 headquarters bombardment wing, heavy; 1 signal company wing; 1 air support communications squadron; 1 troop carrier group; 1 quartermaster company, class 3, aviation; 3 military police companies.

For rounding out ground forces remaining in the United Kingdom it is desired that shipment of all antiaircraft artillery units now scheduled be continued.

While the presence in the United Kingdom of the 45th Division would be desirable it is considered that shipping situation will preclude its movement to this theater for the present. I do not recommend the relief of British forces in Iceland at the expense of 5440 shipping in August. Report of units to be held in the United States will be furnished later.

ACTION: OPD
Information: SGS

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Study on German Air Force as a Whole.

AFABI
ZOH/mb

2. Continued

Fighters:

JG-52. Was on the Russian Front last year - now stationed in the Central Mediterranean. Uses ME-109F.

This unit was brought to its high pitch of efficiency by the training and leadership of Molders, a crack German ace now deceased.

JG-51. Russia last year, and still there. Also uses ME-109F.

This unit likewise brought to its state of efficiency by Molders who also served with it.

JG-26. Stationed in the Pas de Calais area. Use FW-190. There are now approximately 200 FW-190's in use in France.

The fact that this unit is placed on the British Channel, where it may meet as many as 600 British fighters in one day of sorties, is sufficient proof that it is an outstanding German unit. Its presence in this location being mainly defensive would not point to any particular development.

Bombers:

KG-100. This group used extensively in the Battle of Britain as target finders. Flies HE-111. One unit now thought to be in Russia and one in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as one stafel in France.

If these units now dispersed were to be all located in one area, this would probably point to the fact that a major undertaking was in the offing.

KG-40. A half of this group are in Trondheim and half in Bordeaux. Flies FW-200 Condors with reconnaissance range of approximately 2,500 miles. These planes generally do the trip, Bordeaux, Iceland, Jan Mayen Islands, Trondheim.

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Study on German Air Forces as a Whole.

AFABI
MOH/mb

2. Continued.

This unit has been located at the same place for some time during routine long range patrol. Its location in the same place at this time does not point to any special trend.

KG-26. Stationed in Norway, mainly anti-shipping. Flies HE-111's.

This is an excellent outfit. Its presence in Norway points to a determined effort on the part of the Germans to interdict the convoy route to Murmansk.

If this unit disappears or is located elsewhere, the move would point to the fact that the Germans anticipate the necessity of attacking a convoy or naval concentration at some other point.

JU-88. There are many good units flying JU-88 bombers, so that it is hard to call any particular one a crack unit. The British estimate that there are approximately 400 of these planes on the Russian Front. Approximately 100 in France.

E.P.S.
C/A-2.

c/c to:
Gen. Stratemeyer
Col. Blessley
Col. Cabell

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SUBJECT: Study on German Air Force as a Whole.

AFDAS
LSK:cmc

1. AFDAS AFABI 1942 8/5

In addition to the details contained in R&R sent you this date, Subj:"Study of Axis Capabilities", (SECRET), which directs a study with particular reference to the North African Theater, General Arnold directs that study be given to the German Air Force as a whole, with particular reference to answers to the following questions:

a. How many heavy bombers are there in the GAF; in what theaters are they engaged; and what are those not engaged in active operations doing at this time?

b. What are all other German air units, not engaged in active theaters, doing at this time?

c. Which are the "Crack GAF Units"? What makes these particular units outstanding? Is any special type operation indicated when it is known that those units are being operated by the enemy?

/s/ L.S.K.
L.S.K.
AFDAS

Copies to Gen. Stratemeyer,
Col. Blessley, Plans Div.

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CSWD
August 13, 1942
1828 Z

URGENT

From: London
To : AGWAR

No Number, August 13, 1942

British Chiefs of Staff have just returned to me their comments on the outlined plan submitted to them two days ago. This message for General Handy, Operations Division, with request that it be brought promptly to the attention of the Chief of Staff. The British have now secured sufficient statistical data on the availability of Naval airplane carriers and escorting craft to assert that simultaneous operations at two principal ports inside and at Casablanca cannot repeat not be adequately supported. The U S Naval Staff Mission now in London definitely concurs in this statement. Naval authorities say that no matter to what date in nineteen forty two the attack might be postponed all three points cannot be assaulted simultaneously. This information definitely alters original conception of plan and forces adoption of an alternative.

In view of the basic mission prescribed by the combined Chiefs of Staff, it is obvious that initial attacks must be extended to the most easterly point permitted by possibilities of air coverage. Even from such a position it will require the utmost exertion and ready acceptance of hazards in order to gain Tunis before it can be reinforced. If Axis forces ever beat us to that place, their later capabilities for building up strength will far exceed our own and will reduce the campaign to another futile and costly defensive venture. Assuming accuracy of Naval statement this situation clearly calls for deferment of the Casablanca attack.

I am fully alive to the added risks thus incurred, particularly in the delay in building up in the western end of the theater a striking force for the protection of communications against possible interference by Spanish land troops and coast artillery. Also I realize that any delay in securing land communications makes us more vulnerable to air attack. But these risks must be accepted if we are to have the best chance of executing the assigned missionbark if simultaneous attack is impossible it seems obvious that there is no point in holding

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up the inside attack beyond the date that proper preparations for its execution can be completed. To the contrary, we now have, in addition to all other reasons previously cited, the added consideration that Naval limitations will retard progress in building up of necessary forces, since escorting vessels used originally will have the duty also of protecting later convoys. Also from mid October onward the Axis capabilities for effective opposition will rapidly increase because of ability to withdraw troops from Russia.

Under these conditions and in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of security while still holding to the main object of the expedition, I propose to act as follows: to make the inside attack about as outlined in former communications except that forces at Oran will be under U S Command and comprise a small expedition coming directly from the U S. Date to be as soon after October seventh as possible. The actual date would be fixed by the time required to prepare the American expedition as outlined below and transfer it to the Gibraltar area. Immediately after the initial attack to concentrate on the development of air fields and the building up of U S Air Forces around Oran to cover the critical point on our line of communications and to support an early advance toward Casablanca. Most of the fighting equipment of the Eighth Air Force would be flown to these fields. In the meantime the Algiers Force would push rapidly Eastward. After initial assault to have the next convoy from the United States, largely composed of armored units, follow rapidly into oran and from there strike toward the rear to open up communications and seize Casablanca, or alternatively a part of the convoy could, if the political situation had developed favorably, go directly into Casablanca. This would permit working on the line of communication from both ends. In this connection, it must be noted what Casablanca can in no case be of supporting value to forces in Mediterranean until the line of communications to the front has been opened.

It is my hope that ways and means will be found to reduce the time interval between the initial attack and the arrival of the next convoy from the U S. Supplementing all the above, it is my intention to have the remaining U S Forces in Great Britain initiate immediately training, organization and replacement programs to fit them for employment as reserves on short notice. However, the stark necessity of later sending more U S troops to the U K makes it unwise to take out of this country more U S troops than are necessary. We will merely become involved in double shipping problems.

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From information furnished us by the War Department, it appears possible that others might be shipped from the U S, in late September, a force of approximately the following: one amphibiously trained division plus one regimental combat team reinforced by one composite light armored force of about one regiment, together with auxiliary troops and including part of the Ground Echelons required for the American Torch Air Force. Three Infantry regiments and the armored regiment to be coshrb loaded. This expedition is much smaller than that initially set up for Casablanca operation and we therefore hope that the November seventh date originally estimated can be set up at least to October fifteenth to twentieth. Request earliest practicable answer to this possibility since it affects determination of time of whole attack and overall plan for the operation. When is earliest date such force could reach Gibraltar? Assuming that the above described force sailed from U S in late September what would be earliest date that the next convoy of approximately one armored division and usual auxiliaries could sail? Possibilities of Naval escort must be incluede in estimate.

The above plan does not contemplate use in assault Echelon of U S Infantry now in Great Britain except for two regimental combat teams to lead British attack at Algiers. This is because the expedition, due to Naval reasons and possibilities of coordination, must sail from one spot. The remainder of the First U S Division would enter the theater at earliest possible date.

The planning staffs are still working on complicated problems involved in changes in the late August and September shipments. However, it seems obvious that we should not repeat not count on the fifty four forty movement of the Forty Fifth Division at this time, and our later telegram on this subject will so recommend.

Please explain to the Chief of Staff that General Patton, General Clark, the U S Naval advisers and my own Planning Staff all agree that the modified plan, as above outlined, represents the maximum degree of security, coupled with reasonable opportunity for attaining prescribed objectives, that can be developed out of the means and assets now in prospect. I am sending by pouch mail today a copy of the original rough plan and of comments of British Chiefs of Staff. Further details on this modified plan will follow shortly but hope Chief of Staff will ap-

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prove in principle on light of conditions described. The British are pressing for earliest possible attack inside the Mediterranean and I repeat that since Casablanca aafair must be deferred in view of Naval picture presented to me by U S dash U K authorities, I desire to make the attack as early as the American force described above can reach here.

Eisenhower

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URGENT

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Brief and Comments on Cable No. 1186, August 15, 1942 signed "Eisenhower".

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS GES/hd
1	AFCAS	Advisory Council (Col.Cabbell)	1942 8-18	1. General Arnold glanced at the enclosed papers and stated that it was too late now to use them but to hold them for use at a later date if called for. G.E.S. AFCAS
Incl: Data re above subj.				

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071,AF, Rev.8/14/41

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Air AG 381 Plans (11)

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FROM London

TO AGWAR

No. 1186 6/15/42

1. Eisenhower, Patton and Clark concur in the following information:

2. Tentative and unofficial estimates are that East of Gibraltar, the covering Force will consist one British carrier from which will operate 20 fighters and 20 torpedo planes, and

3. At Algiers, for direct support there are sixty six British carrier borne fighters, eighteen torpedo planes, possibly 13 additional planes from one old carrier.

4. Hazard factors to the Operation.

a. Insufficiency of carrier borne air support.

(1) French have in N.W. Africa 500 combat airplanes including fighters superior in performance to our carrier borne fighters. Total carrier borne fighter strength (counting on 100 U. S. fighters from Ranger and auxiliary) will be 166, only 20-30 will be with Naval covering force to the Eastward. All carrier borne fighters will be at disadvantage in fighting against land based planes.

(2) Determined and unified French resistance against initial landing at either port will seriously interfere and possibly prevent landing.

b. Undesirability of Gibraltar as erection point for fighter aircraft.

(1) Only available port.
(2) Gibraltar must be set up for erection and fly away of at least 30 land based fighters per day.
(3) Vulnerable to attack from Spain.
(4) If attacked by Spain, erection of fighters impossible.

c. Adverse weather will weaken or deny air support to landing operations.

d. The character of resistance of French Army.

(1) 14 Divisions, poorly equipped but under professional leadership.

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(2) French forces could hamper operations so as to make impossible the seizure of North African shore before Axis reinforcements arrived.

e. Attitude of Spanish Army.

(1) Unknown to date.
(2) If unfavorable, Gibraltar as a landing field is lost, as is use of Straits until effective allied counter action is taken.
(3) The accomplishment of effective allied counter action is extremely doubtful.

f. The possibility of German Air Forces operating against us from Spain.

(1) Full aquiescence of Spain necessary for accomplishment.
(2) No gasoline, bombs and lubricants at Spanish air fields.
(3) Movement of bombs, gasoline, Ground echelons are not easy and are time consuming.
(4) Facts bearing upon case -
(a) Germany already has available large numbers of airdromes in Sicily.
(b) Could, but has not occupied Spain to date, although the advantages from doing so have long existed.
(c) Conclusion: Germany does not consider this an easy operation.

g. Other factors influencing conclusions given below.

(1) Malta convoy not attacked by air until approximately S. of Sardinia, being menaced only by submarines west of Sardinia.
(2) Assumption that allied losses in past 10 days were heavy.

h. Conclusions:

(1) Torch has 50/50 chance of success if (a) Spain stays neutral, (b) and French offer token resistance or are divided by internal dissension, and therefore offer negligible resistance.

(2) Opinion
(a) Spain will stay initially neutral if profound secrecy is maintained.
(b) Considerable resistance to be expected from French in certain sections - Oran to Casablanca and near Tunis.
(c) Least resistance around Algiers.

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d. Chances of effecting landing better than even.

e. Chances of overall success, considerably less than even considering:
   (1) Difficulty of building air bases
   (2) Low port capacities.
   (3) Poor character of long communication line from Casablanca to Oran.
   (4) Uncertainty of French attitude.
   (5) Possibility of Spain's entry into War with attendant most serious results.

General Comment:

1. Generals Eisenhower, Patton and Clark are "viewing with alarm" the situation with respect to Torch. Note that no reference was made to the concurrence of any air officer.

2. It is possible that this cable was sent with the view of persuading U. S. to take initiative in abandoning Torch.

3. This cablegram is evidently based on British estimates of enemy strengths which are considerably lower than our G-2 estimates.

4. This cablegram states that there are no aviation gasoline at Spanish airdromes. Our G-2 says there is a strong possibility that Germany has the airdromes well stocked.

5. Our G-2 lists as probable the use of Spanish bases by German air and submarine forces.

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Aug 15, 1942
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U R G E N T

From: London
To: Agwar

No. 1186 Aug 15, 1942

The views expressed in this cable are the unanimous opinions of myself, General Patton and General Clark. For General Marshall reur number three three one eight. Tentative and unofficial details of contemplated British Carrier Borne air support are as follows: In the covering force east of Gibraltar, one carrier with twenty fighters and twenty torpedo planes; at Algiers in direct support, sixty six fighters and eighteen torpedo planes. In addition to above one old carrier with thirteen planes may possible be available.

The following are the particular factors that bear directly upon the degree of hazard inherent in this operation: (A) the sufficiency of carrier Borne air support during initial stages. The operational strength of the French Air Force in Africa is about five hundred planes. Neither the bombers or the fighters are of the most modern type, but the fighters are superior in performance to the Naval types on carriers. Consequently, if the French make determined and unified resistance to the initial landing, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their air against either of the major ports, they can seriously interfere with, if not prevent, a landing at that point. The total Carrier Borne fighter strength (counting on one hundred U S fighters on Ranger and auxiliary) will apparently be about one hundred sixtysix planes in actual support of the landings. Only twenty to thirty will be with the Naval covering forces to the eastward. These fighters will be under the usual handicaps of Carrier Based Aircraft when operating against Land Based Planes.

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U R G E N T

(B) efficiency of Gibraltar as an erection point for Fighter Aircraft to be used after landing fields have been secured. Since Gibraltar is the only port available to the allies in that region, the rapid transfer of Fighter Craft to captured Airdromes will be largely dependent upon our ability to setup at Gibraltar a reasonable number for immediate operations and a flow thereafter of at least thirty planes per day. The vulnerability of Gibraltar, especially to interference by Spanish Forces, is obvious. If the Spaniards should take hostile action against us immediately upon the beginning of landing operations, it would be practically impossible to secure any land based Fighter Craft for use in Northern Africa for a period of some days.

(C)another critical factor affecting the air will be the state of the weather. It is planned to transfer by flying to captured Airdromes in North Africa the American Units now in Great Britain except the Spitfire Groups. These last will necessarily be shipped and set up at Gibraltar or on captured Airdromes. A spell of bad weather would so weaken the anticipated air support in the early stages of the operation as to constitute another definite hazard to success.

(D) The character of resistance of the French Army. In the region now are some fourteen French Divisions rather poorly equipped but presumably with a fair degree of training and with the benefit of professional leadership. If this army should act as a unit in contesting the invasion, it could, in view of the slowness with which allied forces can be accumulated at the two main ports, so delay and hamper operations that the real object of the expedition could not be achieved, namely the seizing control of the north shore of Africa before it can be substantially reinforced by the Axis.

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U R G E N T

From: London Page 3
To: Agwar

No. 1186 Aug 15, 1942

(E) The attitude of Spanish Army. While there have been no indications to date that the Spaniards would take sides in the war as result of this particular operation, this contingency must be looked on as a possibility, particularly if Germany should make a definite move toward entering Spain. In any event, Spains entry would instantly entail the loss of Gibraltar as a landing field and would prevent our use of the Straits of Gibraltar until effective action could be taken by the allies. In view of available resources, it would appear doubtful that such effective action is within our capabilities.

(F) The possibility that the German Air Forces now in western Europe may rapidly enter Spain and operate against our line of communications. This would not be an easy operation for the Germans except with the full acquiescence and support of Spain. Gasoline, bombs and lubricants do not exist at the Spanish air fields and the transfer to the country of Ground and Maintenance Crews and supplies would require considerable time. Certain facts that bear upon the likelihood of such enemy action are; first, that Germany already has excellent landing fields in Sicily, from which their long range aircraft can operate without going to the trouble of establishing new bases. Secondly, the advantages to Germany of occupying the Iberian Peninsula in force have always existed. The fact that Germany has made no noticeable move in this direction, even under the conditions lately existing when substantial portions of British Naval Strength have been inside the Mediterranean, is at least some evidence that the enemy does not consider this any easy operation.

(G) Other factors that we have considered in arriving at the conclusion given below are the experiences of the recent Malta Convoy and the assumption that Allied Naval

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U R G E N T

From: London
To: Agwar

No. 1186 Aug 15, 1942

losses within the past ten days have been considerable. The Malta Convoy did not come under air attack until it was practically south of Sardinia and its difficulties west of that point were from submarine action.

Based on all the above, We consider that the operation has more than fair chances of success provided Spain stays absolutely neutral and the French Forces either offer only token resistance or are so badly divided by internal dissension and by Allied political maneuvering that effective resistance will be negligible. It is our opinion that Spain will stay neutral, at least during the early stages of the operation, provided we are successful in maintaining profound secrecy in connection with our intentions. She has done so in the past when similar large convoys passed through the Straits. We believe, on the other hand, that we will encounter very considerable resistance from certain sections of the French Forces. We believe the area in which the French will be most favorable to us is around Algiers with the areas in which we will probably encounter resistance those between Orin and Casablanca and near Tunis.

We believe that the chances of effecting initial landings are better than even but that the changes of overall success in the operation, including the capture of Tunis before it can be reinforced by the Axis, are considerably less than fifty percent. This takes into account the Great difficulty surrounding the building up of a land based air force, the low capacity of ports and consequent slowness in building up of land forces, the very poor character of the long line of communications from Casablanca to Oran and finally the uncertainty of the French attitude.

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U R G E N T

From: Lordon
To: Agwar

No. 1188 Aug 15, 1942

Further eventualities which might involve a change in Spanish attitude as well as increasing Naval and shipping difficulties and consequent slowing up in our reinforcements, are difficult to evaluate. Any sign of failure at this stage and a delay of reinforcements to arrive might be seized upon by the Axis as a reason for coming into Spain, and if Spain should then enter the war the results would be most serious.

Eisenhower

Note: No. 3318 (CM-OUT-4272, 8/14/42)OPD.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS
CG AAF
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Prepared by Gen Kuter but not signed on his advice

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Air Force Voice Crying in Strategic Wilderness.

1. Discussion.

1. All major premises of the Army Air Forces have been vindicated, substantiated, and endorsed in the acid test of the current war.

a. In 1921 - 1923, the Air Forces (General Mitchell) contended that battleships were vulnerable to bombs. (Renown, Repulse, Haruna, Bismark, et al.)

b. In 1932 the Air Forces (General Dargue) contended that Army bombers could find and hit ships at sea. (Coral Sea, Midway, Murmansk, North Africa, et al.)

c. In 1935 the Air Forces (Air Corps Tactical School) contended that ground forces could not function when the enemy controlled the air. (Current axiom.)

d. In 1936 the Air Forces (Air Corps Tactical School) contended that 130 Jap bombers would render our Naval forces in the Pacific inferior to the hostile forces. (Pearl Harbor.)

e. In 1937, the Air Forces (Air Corps Tactical School) contended that sea power could not be employed until air superiority was established. (Norway, Crete, Mediterranean, Midway, et al.)

2. The individuals who were basically responsible for the air strategy and strategic thinking in the foregoing (Fairchild, George, Hansell, Kuter, Walker) were assembled in July, 1941, and Air Staff personnel and facilities were placed at their disposal and they devoted some six weeks of intensive effort in the preparation of the plan to win this war. That plan (A-WPD-1) was incorporated in the "Victory Program" and represents the air portion of the Bolero plan. Within the "Victory Program", A-WPD-1 was approved by the War Department General Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President.

3. The air plan to win the war is completely abandoned in turning to Torch and the South Pacific.

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II. Recommended action.

The Secretary of War directs that you use all of your influence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the President to assure that:

a. The air portion of the Bolero plan (A-WPD-1 brought up to date and kept current) be followed with tenacity, vigor and determination.

b. An American Supreme Command and Staff be established with undisputed control of all United Nations Forces.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Strategic Decision

1. Discussion

a. The complexities and side issues of this war have obscured the sound and simple principles of successful war from the United Nations. Hitler has applied these principles. His military achievements prove their soundness.

b. Hitler has set specific successive objectives and has attained every one in the sequence essential to his continued course toward what still appears to be an eventual victory. He is today risking defeat in Egypt and also accepting occasional heavy bombing without being distracted from his immediate specific wheat-and-oil objectives. In contrast we have set an objective in Bolero, but we are abandoning it even before the force to implement it is created. Moreover, in undertaking Torch, we have abandoned our objective for a side-show leading away from the enemy rather than toward him. As a diversion, Torch may divert Americans, but not Nazis.

c. Hitler has taken the offensive and relinquished it only twice. His offensive against Russia was postponed by weather. His air offensive against England was dropped due to an intelligence error and may be resumed when his present and more valuable objective has been attained. Meanwhile we have sought only fields for defensive action. Our present round-the-world defensive may assure eventual defeat in detail. Bolero offered the only practicable offensive plan for American air action and Sledgehammer offered the only possible early offensive action for air and ground units. We are now considering reducing Bolero to ineffectiveness and, coincidentally, prohibiting successful accomplishment of Sledgehammer.

d. Hitler's mass is employed offensively against the objective. Our mass is dispersed throughout every continent on the globe. It has reached a state now where as soon as our air units are trained and are able to move or as soon as the first boat becomes available we send them off on a new venture.

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5. Hitler employs movement and maneuver to get to his objective while we are moving and maneuvering in almost every other direction.

6. The element of surprise has been with Hitler on every occasion. However, even his surprises have been tactical rather than strategic. This war is too big and too clearly cut out to warrant strategic surprise on our part. The Bolero plan provides us adequate room for tactical surprise. It is believed that the employment of a hundred B-17's against the Krupp plant at Essen would create a real tactical, if not strategic, surprise.

7. Hitler's security is the easy security of the winner. On the other hand, our round-the-world defensive assures no security anyplace in the world nor does it enable us to build up sufficient strength for a major victory in any theatre.

8. Hitler has found cooperation by the Italians to be unreliable and has abandoned it. He leans heavily on British naval, air, and to lesser extent, ground cooperation. Within his own establishment, Hitler obtains cooperation by soundly unified task force command. Our progress toward such ends is not encouraging.

9. Hitler considers economy of force so carefully that, even with the greatest military establishment in history, he undertakes only one major effort at a time. Meanwhile we are considering further dispersion and dilution of our still nascent strength and endeavoring to carry on offensives in several theatres.

II. Action Recommended.

That we use all of our influence toward:

a. The immediate establishment of an American Commander in Chief and Staff with unquestioned command of all United Nation facilities regardless of theatres and zones of responsibilities.

b. Firm and simple adherence to the Bolero plan or any augmentation or improvement thereof which will press to the heart of the Nazis war making will or ability.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE AND PLAN FOR INTENSIVE COUNTER AIR FORCE ACTION

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

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

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AFAEP
GHG/ch/6724
wtn 13 Mar 44

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FRED SMITH:

Subject: Plan for the Destruction of German Fighters in Operational Units.

1. Attached is the plan for the destruction of German fighters in operational units which you discussed while in Washington.

2. Due to the highly successful February air battle and the destruction of large numbers of German fighters in operational units, the number and location of enemy fighters may now vary considerably from that envisaged in the plan as prepared.

3. The basic principle, however, of planning the day fighters to the ground by pre-dawn attacks so that they can be destroyed in daylight may still be operationally practicable. Your analysis of the current situation will determine the desirability of submitting the plan for study.

JOE L. [illegible]
Colonel, G. S. C.
Chief, Operational Plans Division

Incl:
Staff study w/incls

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A PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTENSIVE COUNTER AIR FORCE ACTION BY AIR ATTACK ON GERMAN-OCCUPIED AIRFIELDS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES, NORTHERN FRANCE AND NORTHWESTERN GERMANY

I STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To devise a feasible plan for reduction of the operational strength of the German Air Force in preparation for invasion of the European continent, and to increase the effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive by reduction of enemy air opposition.

II ASSUMPTIONS

That the disposition of the German Air Force fighters in northwestern Europe will remain generally as indicated on attached maps "A" and "B", insofar as the proportion of their strength within range of our air attacks is concerned.

III FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Though large numbers of enemy aircraft have been destroyed in the air, and despite the fact that the Allies have a substantial air superiority in Europe, the operational strength of the German Air Force is still sufficient to inflict considerable losses upon our formations. That we have not, as yet, destroyed the enemy's effective, front line air strength is due to the fact that aerial combat on the part of our strategic bombers and their escorting fighters is primarily of a defensive nature, and to the obvious German effort at conservation of air strength. Enemy fighters avoid battle unless they have reasonable prospects for success in attacking those of our bomber formations which appear to be heading toward vital targets.

2. Latest available information indicates that more than 50% of all Axis fighters in Europe, and more than 70% of Axis fighters on the Western and Mediterranean Fronts, are disposed in northern and northwestern Germany, France, and the Low Countries.

IV DISCUSSION

1. So far as enemy air opposition to an invasion of the European continent and to our strategic bombing is concerned, the German fighter

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strength is the measure of German air strength. Destruction of the German fighter strength would virtually eliminate the Luftwaffe as a threat to our operations. Destruction of even a substantial portion of the enemy fighters would necessitate a redisposition of the remainder, with a consequent weakening in overall strength.

4. If attrition in the air has not adequately reduced the enemy's operational fighter strength, it follows that this might best be achieved by some other means, viz., direct attack upon his airdromes in a manner which would make possible the destruction of the aircraft based on them. For several months we have made day bombing attacks on enemy airdromes in Europe, using B-26 medium bombers. Because the enemy usually has adequate warning of the approaching bombers, his operational aircraft are often flown out of the vicinity with the result that our efforts are devoted to almost empty airdromes. That the Germans consider these attacks ineffective is indicated by the fact that interceptions rarely are made, in keeping with the current policy of conserving their fighter strength.

Purpose and Scope of the Plan

5. A prerequisite to successful airdrome attacks is striking while the enemy aircraft are immobilized on the ground. The plan described below is designed toward that end for the destruction, by air attack on airdromes, of the German day-fighter strength based in northern France, northwestern Germany, and the Low Countries.

6. The success of the plan is predicated upon the employment of the maximum possible number of all types of operational aircraft of the Allied Air Forces in the United Kingdom, including short range fighters, e. g., Spitfires, in a sustained effort over a period of several successive days and nights.

7. Final details of organization and execution of the plan necessarily must be accomplished in the theater of operations, utilizing current information for selection of targets, and determination of available forces to be used against them.

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Selection of Targets

6. Analysis of enemy fighter disposition on the continent between Denmark and the Brest peninsula indicated that a large proportion of the day fighters are based within 100 miles of the coast, within striking distance of all types of Allied operational aircraft. (See map, Tab "A")

7. It is especially noteworthy that approximately half the enemy fighters in the area usually are based on comparatively few airfields. A successful attack on these airfields would effect a substantial reduction in the number of German fighters in the area, and would make for success of attacks on the remainder of the airfields on the night immediately following, and for subsequent attacks on night fighter bases.

8. The most suitable targets for attack would be those airfields on which the largest numbers of aircraft are concentrated. The use of "Y" service and late afternoon aerial photo reconnaissance will furnish reliable information for the selection of targets for the evening, night and morning.

Allied Aircraft to be employed

9. To insure that each target attacked would be thoroughly bombed and the maximum number of enemy aircraft destroyed on each airfield, our attacking forces would be divided among not more than ten targets, according to the area and number of airfields in each. It is conservatively estimated that the numbers of aircraft listed below may be available in the United Kingdom for execution of the plan:

	No.	Range
Heavy Bombers - Night	750	500
Heavy Bombers - Day		
Medium Bombers - Night,		
Medium Bombers - Day)	50	150
Light Bombers	100	
Fighters and Fighter Bombers	1000	500

10. Aircraft allocated to the attack of one airfield would operate independently of those attacking other airfields. Nevertheless, attacks should be coordinated and made simultaneously on all targets to dissipate opposition by the enemy.

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Plan of Attack

11. As previously mentioned, targets would be selected from information obtained from "U" service and late afternoon photo reconnaissance to determine those airdromes on which the largest number of enemy aircraft might be attacked.

12. RAF heavy night bombers would attack about an hour before dawn or first light, allowing the minimum practicable period of darkness for withdrawal, reformation their formations among the airdromes in accordance with the size and importance of each. Pathfinders would be used to drop flares. Their objective would be to light the targets sufficiently to permit visual bombing. Because few of these airdromes are defended with heavy caliber guns, bombing altitudes could be 7500 to 8000 feet. Success would be further assured by the fact that the role of enemy night fighters would be shifting farther to the rear, impeding further penetration. The British bombers would carry the largest number of bombs possible, their purpose being to create the maximum of havoc and confusion, and to immobilize aircraft on the ground.

13. At daybreak, Mosquitoes, or other aircraft similarly suited for low altitude attacks would drop flares and would anti-personnel bombs of the delayed, anti-[illegible] type on runways, taxi-strips, and in front of revetment areas. The purpose of this attack would be to further prevent or, at least, to delay for several hours, any withdrawal of aircraft from the airdromes.

14. An hour after daybreak, or as soon as light is adequate, all available U. S. heavy bombers would attack the airdromes with the largest number of bombs that could be carried, probably 500 or 1000 lb. fragmentation cluster, and 250 or 300 pound demolition bombs. They should attempt to blanket dispersal areas with systematic bomb patterns. The heavy bombers would be followed by all available B-26's and British medium bombers, carrying bomb loads of the same sort. During this period, top cover in the form of offensive sweeps would be provided by P-47's, or other suitable fighters available, in event of air opposition arriving from other areas.

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Close escort of heavy and medium day bombers would be provided by Spitfires and P-51's at a strength of at least one escort fighter per bomber. A maximum of fighter-bomber attacks would follow the attack by the medium bombers.

15. Throughout the period of daylight attacks, patrols of low-altitude fighters would be maintained about each airdrome, out of range of automatic weapon fire, to attack and destroy any aircraft which might be able to take off to withdraw from the area or to oppose our aircraft. Low altitude fighters, going in at a minimum altitude to avoid radar, and ahead of the day bombers whose higher approach inevitably would be detected, should find good hunting among any enemy aircraft able to take off to intercept the bombers.

16. Photo reconnaissance of each airdrome target would be made immediately after the attacks, and flash damage assessment made. If damage to enemy aircraft was not complete on a given airdrome, it should be attacked again on the following day.

Attack on Night Fighter Airdromes

17. Following the series of attacks on the day fighter dromes, a similar plan might well be applied to enemy night fighter bases in the same areas. (See Map, Tab "B")

18. Night fighters, of course, might be expected to be airborne at any time Allied night bombers are over Europe. Immobilizing them on the ground could hardly be accomplished by night bombing. A progress of night-bombing missions, designed to lure into the air the largest possible number of enemy night fighters during the late night hours, should result in immobilizing these enemy aircraft at dawn, when they are on the ground for refueling and rearming. They might then be profitably attacked by our day forces.

V CONCLUSIONS

1. That destruction of Germany's operational air strength can best be accomplished by some method which will permit destruction of large numbers of aircraft on the ground.

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4. That a combination of night and day air attacks on German fighter airdromes, within striking distance of our short range, as well as long range, aircraft bases in the United Kingdom is feasible, and would offer a most effective method of destroying Germany's operational air strength.

VI RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this paper be forwarded to General Eisenhower for his consideration.

2 Incls:
Incl 1. Tab "A" - Map of German Day Fighter Disposition in Western Europe
Incl 2. Tab "B" - Map of German Night Fighter Disposition in Western Europe

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

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

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

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To devise a feasible plan for reduction of the operational strength of the German Air Force in preparation for invasion of the European continent, and to increase the effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive by reduction of enemy air opposition.

II ASSUMPTIONS

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III FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Though large numbers of enemy aircraft have been destroyed in the air, and despite the fact that the Allies have a substantial air superiority in Europe, the operational strength of the German Air Force is still sufficient to inflict considerable losses upon our formations. That we have not, as yet, destroyed the enemy's effective, front line air strength is due to the fact that aerial combat on the part of our strategic bombers and their escorting fighters is primarily of a defensive nature, and to the obvious German effort at conservation of air strength. Enemy fighters avoid battle unless they have reasonable prospects for success in attacking those of our bomber formations which appear to be heading toward vital targets.

2. Latest available information indicates that more than 50% of all Axis fighters in Europe, and more than 70% of Axis fighters on the Western and Mediterranean Fronts, are disposed in northern and northwestern Germany, France, and the Low Countries.

IV DISCUSSION

1. So far as enemy air opposition to an invasion of the European continent and to our strategic bombing is concerned, the German fighter

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strength is the measure of German air strength. Destruction of the German fighter strength would virtually eliminate the Luftwaffe as a threat to our operations. Destruction of even a substantial portion of the enemy fighters would necessitate a redisposition of the remainder, with a consequent reduction in overall strength.

2. If attrition in the air has not adequately reduced the enemy's operational fighter strength, it follows that this might best be achieved by some other means, viz., direct attack upon his aircraft in a manner which would make possible the destruction of the aircraft based on them. For several months we have done by bombing attacks on enemy airdromes in Europe, using [illegible] medium bombers. Because the enemy usually has had ample warning of the approaching bombers, his operational aircraft are often flown out of the vicinity with the result that our efforts are devoted to blasting empty airdromes. That the Germans consider these attacks ineffective is indicated by the fact that their interceptions rarely are made, in keeping with the evident policy of conserving their fighter strength.

Purpose and Scope of the Plan

3. A prerequisite to successful airdrome attacks is striking while the enemy aircraft are immobilized on the ground. The plan described below is designed toward that end for the destruction, by air attack on airdromes, of the German day-fighter strength based in northern France, northwestern Germany, and the Low Countries.

4. The success of the plan is predicated upon the employment of the maximum possible number of all types of operational aircraft of the Allied Air Forces in the United Kingdom, including short range fighters, e. g., Spitfires, in a sustained effort over a period of several successive days and nights.

5. Final details of organization and execution of the plan necessarily must be accomplished in the theater of operations, utilizing current information for selection of targets, and determination of available forces to be used against them.

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Selection of Targets

6. Analysis of enemy fighter disposition on the continent between Denmark and the Brest peninsula indicated that a large proportion of the day fighters are based within 100 miles of the coast, within striking distance of all types of Allied operational aircraft. (See Map, Tab "A")

7. It is especially noteworthy that approximately half the enemy fighters in the area usually are based on approximately a dozen airdromes. A successful attack on these airdromes would afford a substantial reduction in the number of German fighters in the area, and would make for success of attacks on the remainder of the airdromes on days and nights immediately following, and for subsequent attacks on night fighter bases.

8. The most suitable targets for attack would be those airdromes on which the largest numbers of aircraft are concentrated. The use of "Y" service and late afternoon aerial photo reconnaissance should furnish reliable information for the selection of targets for the ensuing night and morning.

Allied Aircraft to be Employed

9. To insure that each target attacked would be thoroughly bombed and the maximum number of enemy aircraft destroyed on each airdrome, our attacking forces would be divided among not more than ten targets, according to the area and number of aircraft on each. It is conservatively estimated that the numbers of aircraft listed following would be available in the United Kingdom for execution of the plan:

	RAF	USAAF
Heavy Bombers - Night	750	
Heavy Bombers - Day		500
Medium Bombers - Night)		
Medium Bombers - Day)	50	180
Light Bombers	100	
Fighters and Fighter Bombers	1000	500

10. Aircraft allocated to the attack of one airdrome would operate independently of those attacking other airdromes. Nevertheless, attacks should be coordinated and made simultaneously on all targets to dissipate opposition by the enemy.

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Plan of Attack

11. As previously mentioned, targets would be selected from information obtained from "Y" service and late afternoon photo reconnaissance to determine those airdromes on which the largest number of enemy aircraft might be attacked.

12. Our heavy night bombers would attack about an hour before dawn or first light, allowing the optimum practicable period of darkness for withdrawal, proceeding [illegible] from the airdromes in accordance with the size and importance of each. Pathfinders would be used to drop flares. Their objective would be to light the target area briefly, to permit visual bombing. Targets for our night bombers are defended with heavy calibre AA., bombing altitudes would be 8,000 to 9,000 feet. Success would be further assured by the fact that the bulk of enemy night fighters would be waiting further to the rear, expecting deeper penetration. The British bombers would carry the largest number of incendiaries possible, their purpose being to create the maximum of blaze and confusion, and to immobilize aircraft on the ground.

13. [illegible] Mosquitoes, or other aircraft suitably modified for low altitude attack would drop large and small anti-personnel bombs of the delayed, anti-handling type on runways, taxi-strips, and in front of revetment areas. The purpose of this attack would be to further prevent or, at least, to delay for several hours, any withdrawal of aircraft from the airdromes.

14. An hour after daybreak, or as soon as light is adequate, all available U. S. heavy bombers would attack the airdromes with the largest number of bombs that could be carried, consisting loads of 120 lb. fragmentation cluster, and 250 or 300 pound demolition bombs. They should attempt to blanket dispersal areas with systematic bomb patterns. Our heavy bombers, would be followed by all available B-26's and British medium bombers, carrying bomb loads of the same sort. During this period, top cover in the form of offensive sweeps would be provided by P-47's, or other suitable fighters available, in event of air opposition arriving from other areas.

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Close escort of heavy and medium day bombers would be provided by Spitfires and P-51's at a strength of at least one escort fighter per bomber. A maximum of fighter-bomber attacks would follow the attack by the medium bombers.

15. Throughout the period of daylight attacks, patrols of low- ltitude fighters would be maintained about each airdrome, out of range of automatic weapon fire, to attack and destroy any aircraft which might be able to take off to withdraw from the area or to oppose our aircraft. Low altitude fighters, going in at a minimum altitude to avoid radar, and ahead of the day bombers whose higher approach inevitably would be detected, should find good hunting among any enemy aircraft able to take off to intercept the bombers.

16. Photo reconnaissance of each airdrome target would be made immediately after the attacks, and flash damage assessment made. If damage to enemy aircraft was not complete on a given airdrome, it should be attacked again on the following day.

Attack on Night Fighter Airdromes

17. Following the series of attacks on the day fighter drome, a similar plan might well be applied to enemy night fighter bases in the same areas. (See Map, Tab "B")

18. Night fighters, of course, might be expected to be airborne at any time Allied night bombers are over Europe. Immobilizing them on the ground could hardly be accomplished by night bombing. A program of night-bombing missions, designed to lure into the air the largest possible number of enemy night fighters during the late night hours, should result in immobilizing these enemy aircraft at dawn, when they are on the ground for refueling and rearming. They might then be profitably attacked by our day forces.

V CONCLUSIONS

1. That destruction of Germany's operational air strength can best be accomplished by some method which will permit destruction of large numbers of aircraft on the ground.

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2. That a combination of night and day air attacks on German fighter airdromes, within striking distance of our short range, as well as long range, aircraft bases in the United Kingdom is feasible, and would offer a most effective method of destroying Germany's operational air strength.

VI RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this paper be forwarded to General Spaatz for his consideration.

2 Incls:
Incl 1. Tab "A" - Map of German Day Fighter Disposition in Western Europe
Incl 2. Tab "B" - Map of German Night Fighter Disposition in Western Europe

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EFFECTS OF ATTACKS ON GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND RESERVE STRENGTH OF GERMAN AIR FORCE

ATTACKS ON GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND INSTALLATIONS

1. Attached are lists of aircraft factories, important aircraft component works, and storage and repair depots attacked to date by United States heavy bombers, together with estimated monthly production of aircraft at times of attacks and brief statements of results.

2. Attacks on assembly plants and components works concentrated on single-engine fighter production, although two recent attacks were made on twin-engine production at Augsburg and Brunswick and one attack was made on the aircraft components works at Halberstadt which serves the JU 88 and JU 188 assembly plant at Bernburg.

3. The success of these attacks is shown by a sharp reduction in single-engine fighter production from a high of 810 during July to 600 during November (the latest available estimate). At the beginning of the series of attacks on assembly plants in July, however, production had been expanding rapidly, and it is believed that the enemy planned single-engine production at the rate of about 1000 per month by December. Total production of this type of aircraft would probably have been 1100 planes greater from August through November had the attacks not taken place. No assessments of the effect on production of more recent attacks have been made, but further reductions may be expected. Total production of operational aircraft reflects largely the changes in single-engine fighter production, reaching a high of 1640 in June and July and falling to the November figure of 1455. The recent drop in total production from October to November of 45 aircraft per month, in the absence of continued

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attacks on fighter production, may be an indication of the indirect effects on this industry of allied bombings of enemy industrial targets. The charts attached show production of operational aircraft by types of planes, and production of single-engine planes compared with scheduled production.

4. It must be emphasized that the industry has already shown remarkable powers of recuperation and in spite of its failure to increase production in November, substantial expansion of output may be expected unless attacks on assembly plants are continued.

RESERVE STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

1. Immediate Reserves. The excess of plane strength over establishment strength has sometimes been referred to as the immediate reserve. These reserves amount to approximately 38 single-engine fighter planes on the Western Front and 45 single and twin-engine fighter planes in Southern Germany. Plane strength and establishment strength are practically the same for other types of units in these areas and for all types of units on other fronts. Actual plane strength of operational aircraft, then, equals establishment strength of 4773 plus immediate reserves of 83, a total of 4856.

2. Non-operational Aircraft. Planes in the non-operational category amounting to 667 cannot properly be considered reserves. These units have been withdrawn for rest, refitting or overhaul. Normally, aircraft remain in the non-operational status for 6 to 8 weeks before being returned to operation. At present, the number of planes in this category is higher than usual, and the excess over the normal level may be considered a reserve (about 70% of non-operational planes are long range bombers, of

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which over one half are believed r ady for return to operations). With the present size of the German Air Force, it is expected that from 300 to 400 planes will always be found in the non-operational status.

3. Stored Reserves refer to operational type aircraft kept at storage depots and factory aerodromes, available to replace aircraft of German Air Force units. Early in 1940, stored reserves amounted to 4000 aircraft, and constituted a real backlog of strength. Subsequent operations, however, drastically reduced these reserves, until at the present time the category listed as stored reserves constitutes little more than the normal flow of aircraft from production to operational units. The number of aircraft in this reserve has recently varied little from month to month and is currently estimated at 850. Since a certain minimum number of planes must be kept in this pipeline if front line strength is to be maintained, it is doubtful that this reserve except under emergency conditions could be allowed to fall below 500.

(a) The number of each type of aircraft included in these reserves is estimated as follows:

Long Range Bombers and Long Range Reconnaissance	300
Dive Bombers	50
Single-engine fighters	275
Twin-engine fighters	125
Other Types	100
	850

(b) Estimated allocations of reserves are:

Mediterranean Area	150
Western Front	250
Eastern Front	250
Central Pool	200
	850

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(c) The greater part of reserves for the Mediterranean Area are held at Munchen/Neubiberg (single-engine fighter types) but some stocks are also held at transit airfields and repair bases in the area (Vicenza and Osoppo and Belgrade/Semlin).

(d) The principal parks now supplying aircraft to the Western Front are Lippstadt and Anklam (single-engine fighter types), Guteraloh (JU 88's and other types), Werl (ME 110's), Romilly - sur - Seine (mainly long range bomber and twin-engine fighter types).

4. Aircraft with Reserve Training Units (RTU's) number not more than 600 planes. Occasionally these units are used for operations, but their operational efficiency is not generally above training school stsndards. It is estimated, however, that about 1 0 of these aircraft on the Western Front are likely to be used when necessary for combat purposes.

5. Operational types of training planes amounting to 800-1000 planes are not generally available for operational purposes, although a very small portion of these could probably be used under certain conditions (perhaps on the Eastern European Front) if necessary.

6. Recapitulation: Strength of German Air Force (as of 14 January 1944)

Establishment Operational Strength		4773		
Immediate Reserves				
Single-Engine Fighters, Western Front	38			
Single-Engine Fighters and Twin-Engine Fighters, South Germany	45	83		
Actual Operational strength				4856
Non-Operational Aircraft				667
Total Available Strength				5523
Stored Reserves			850	
RTU's			600	
Operational Types of Training Planes			1000	2450
				7973
Transports				1375
Total				9348

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AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND COMPONENTS PLANTS ATTACKED

DATE	TARGET	ESTIMATED MONTHLY PRODUCTION-TIME OF ATTACK	RESULTS
17/4/43	Bremen	80 FW 190's	Severe damage; plant evacuated. No longer in production.
28/7	Kassel	35 FW 190's Also components plant	Not successful.
28/7	Oschersleben	55 FW 190's	Number of buildings suffered direct hits.
29/7	Warnemunde	50 FW 190's Also components	Severe damage.
30/7	Kassel	35 Fw 190's	Not very successful.
13/8	Wiener Neustandter	230 ME 109	Successful
17/8	Regensburg	210 ME 109	Very severe.
1/10	Wiener Neustadter	200 ME 109	Excellent.
9/10	Marienburg	110 FW	Destroyed
9/10	Anklam	Components FW 190	Severe damage.
2/11	Wiener Neustadter	150 ME 109's	Major degree of destruction
19/12	Augsburg	40 ME 410's	Unobserved.
7/1/44 8/1/44	Reggio Emelia	40 fighters	Good results.
9/1/44	Mirabor	Components for Wiener Neustadter	Several hits.
11/1/44	Oschersleben	90 FW 190's	Believed destroyed.
11/1/44	Halberstadt	Components - JU 88 & 188 for Bernburg	40% destroyed.
11/1/44	Brunswick	55 ME 110	Severe damage.
16/1/44	Klagenfurt	Components ME 109's	Successful mission.

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REPAIR AND STORAGE DEPOTS ATTACKED

DATE		TARGET	RESULTS
5/4/43	Antwerp	Erla Machinewerk	Assembly shop razed.
15/5/43	Meaulte	Repair and storage	Heavy damage - especially to small assembly plant.
4/7 16/9	Nantes	Assembly plant and repair depot - bombers and sea-planes.	Main factory totally destroyed. Extensive damage assembly plant and machine shop.
14/7 24/8	Villacoublay	Important fighter repair depot.	Main machine and assembly shop and storage hangar severely damaged. Extensive damage to installations.
14/7 16/8	Le Bourget	Storage and repair depot.	On second attack, large percentage of hangars and buildings destroyed or severely damaged.
3/9 15/9	Romilly Sur Seine	Important repair depot.	Destruction of 2 large hangars and a flying personnel building. Another large storage hangar severely damaged. Extensive damage.
26/9	Reims	JU Assembly & Repair	Hanger and workshop damaged.
5/1	Bordeaux	Repair and Assembly	Believed good.

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GERMAN FIGHTER ASSEMBLY PLANTS
LOCATION AND ESTIMATED PRODUCTION NOVEMBER THROUGH JANUARY

Single Engine Fighter Assembly Plants

ME 109 Plants	November*	December**	January***
Erla, Leipsig	200	200	200
Regensburg	150	150	175
Wiener Neustadt	50	50	50
Total ME 109	400	400	425
FW 190 Plants			
Arado, Tutow	35	40	45
Fieseler, Kassel	25	35	40
Ago, Oschersleben	90	100	40
Focke-Wulf, Sorau	50	50	50
Total FW 190	200	225	175
Total Single Engine Production	600	625	600

Twin Engine Fighter Assembly Plants

ME 110	November*	December**	January***
Brunswick	55	55	25
Gotha	75	75	75
Unidentified	20	20	20
ME 410			
Augsburg	40	40	30
Budapest	20	20	20
JU 88			
Bernburg	65	65	40
HS 219			
Schwechat	5	5	5
	280	280	215

* Estimates by British Air Ministry
** Preliminary estimates
*** Tentative estimates based on preliminary reports of bomb damage to fighter plants during month and assuming no attacks during last 10 days of month.

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

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SLE ENGINE FIGHTER PRODUCTION MONTHLY



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INE FIGHTER PRODUCTION MONTHLY



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

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AN OPERATIONAL A/C
ONTHLY PRODUCTION



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SIONAL A/C
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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING SLIP

TO: General Kuter DATE 2/3/44

OFFICE OR SYMBOL	BUILDING
ATTENTION	ROOM

FOR:

	COORDINATION		INVESTIGATION		NECESSARY ACTION
	INFORMATION		RECOMMENDATION		SIGNATURE
	FILE		CONFERENCE	x	

REMARKS: It is our understanding that General Arnold does not wish to needle Gen. Spaatz as he did Eaker in the latter days of his regime in UK, especially in view of the fact that Gen. Spaatz has stated that he will attack aircraft factories as first priority targets.

The attached staff study encompasses the whole subject of destruction of the GAF, but touches only lightly on the destruction of production. Its essence is the desirability of an active offensive against GAF fighters on the ground, and a plan for such an offensive.

It is suggested that the study be forwarded to Gen. Spaatz with the attached letter of transmittal prepared for your signature.

FROM:

NAME		OFFICE OR SYMBOL
PHONE	BUILDING	ROOM

3-218, AF

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AFRSP
wtn 3 Feb 1944
CHG/vk/6724

SUBJECT: Destruction of the German Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England.

1. The inclosed study which was prepared in this Headquarters contains an interesting plan for counter air force operations. Officers recently returned from your theatre participated in its preparation.

2. These papers are forwarded in the belief that they may be of some use to your planners.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

L. C. CHIDLAW,
Brig. General, U.S. Army,
Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Plans

1 Incl
Staff Study

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DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE
AND PLAN FOR INTENSIVE COUNTER AIR FORCE ACTION

I STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To devise a feasible plan for reduction of the operational strength of the German Air Force in preparation for invasion of the European continent, and to increase the effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive by reduction of German Air opposition.

II ASSUMPTIONS

1. That production of German aircraft will continue to exceed operational losses of the German Air Force unless some intensive offensive action is taken by the Allies.

2. That the disposition of the German Air Force will remain essentially as at present except for a relative increase in strength in southern Germany and Italy to combat our bombers based in Italy.

III DISCUSSION

1. The final details of organization and execution of any plan for neutralizing the effectiveness of the German Air Force necessarily must be made in the theater of operations. This paper is prepared for the purpose of examining various factors pertinent to the problem, and to present in brief one possible solution for further study.

2. Despite some attacks made on German aircraft production, and the substantial numbers of enemy fighters destroyed in aerial combat, the German air strength has shown increasing numerical strength over the past several months, especially in fighters. Latest available information on numerical strength of Allied and Axis operational aircraft on the Western Mediterranean Fronts, shows a ratio of approximately 2.5 to 1 in favor of the Allies. With German air strength increasing, it would seem obvious that such strength could be most economically neutralized by effort directly against it before it can increase to an inordinate degree.

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Such an effort would serve the dual purpose of reducing air opposition to an invasion and to missions of the Combined Bomber Offensive.

3. Targets for aerial attack against the enemy air strength fall logically into three categories:

a. Production, i.e., factories and assembly plants producing finished aircraft and component parts.

b. Reserves, i.e., reserve aircraft in repair, modification, and storage points.

c. Operational aircraft on the ground and in the air.

4. Production

a. Tab "A" offers a general analysis of the effectiveness of our bombing of German aircraft factories and assembly plants. Though no assessment is made of more recent attacks, the sharp decline of production indicated, as a result of our bombings in the late summer and fall of 1943, is illustrative of the high degree of effectiveness of the limited number of missions directed against the German aircraft industry.

b. That the number of such missions has been limited is illustrated by the fact that of 67 Combined Bomber Offensive targets directly related to the German air strength, only 14 had been attacked through November, 1943. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the same period attacks were made on 38 other targets, (of which 27 were airdromes) directly related to German air strength but not among those designated for the Combined Bomber Offensive.

c. In view of the above data, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that a concerted bombing of the German aircraft industry would achieve most impressive and gratifying results. All known Axis aircraft production facilities in Europe are within range of Allied heavy bombers based in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area. Considering the known recuperative ability of the enemy, such action would seem urgently necessary as a most potent factor in hastening the conclusion of the war in Europe.

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5. Reserves

Stored reserves of the German Air Force, in the usual sense of the term, are inconsiderable. Combat attrition and bombing of production facilities, while they have not nullified the strength of the enemy in the air, have forced him to assume a defensive role, and have virtually eliminated his effective reserves. Approximately 850 aircraft are estimated to be currently in the normal flow from production to operational units. There is no available information indicative that these aircraft are concentrated in pools which, in themselves, would present good targets.

6. Operational Aircraft

a. Latest available information indicates that: (1) 52.9% of all Axis aircraft in Europe are on the Western Front and the Central and Western Mediterranean; (2) 71.1% of all Axis fighters in Europe are in these areas; (3) 51.3% of all Axis fighters, and 75.3% of all Axis fighters in these areas, are disposed in northern and northwestern Germany, France and the Low Countries. (See Tab "B"). With the rest of the German Air Force effectively contained in the east, it is reasonable to assume that destruction of Germany's fighter strength in the west would virtually accomplish the destruction of her capability for offering effective aerial opposition to an invasion or to our strategic bombing in Europe.

b. Tab "B" shows 645 fighters, or 87.6% of all Axis fighters, to be disposed on the Mediterranean Front. Because these aircraft are scattered over an area from France to Bulgaria and the Aegean, and because ranges, terrain and dispositions dictate tactics different from those which would be employed on the Western Front, they are not considered within the scope of this paper. It is estimated that approximately one-third of them are based in Italy within striking distance of our short range aircraft.

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c. Analysis of the disposition of German fighters available for defense against an invasion, and not opposing strategic bombing, disclose definite possibilities for direct attack.

(1) The main force of single engine fighters on the Western Front is disposed from 40 to 100 miles from the coast between Denmark and the Brest peninsula. Behind these, distribution of the twin-engine day fighters forms a semi-circle, with Leipzig as a center, extending from the Bremen area down to Frankfurt and Stuttgart, and around to Vienna. This distribution is indicative of an intention to use the single engine day fighters to harrass our bomber missions and to have them available as a counter air force against an invasion, with the twin engine day fighters so distributed that they can join the attack on our day bombers from a minimum distance after the withdrawal of their escort. The twin-engine rocket aircraft have proved easy prey for our fighters whenever they could be forced to engage in combat. Night fighters are based throughout northern and northwestern Germany, the Low Countries, and northeastern France. (See Tabs "C" and "D"). (It should be noted that dispositions indicated are illustrative only for the date indicated, and are not intended to evince exact data for execution of a plan of attack).

(2) This distribution puts the great bulk of the German single-engine fighters within striking distance of even the short range Allied aircraft (e.g., Spitfires) based in the United Kingdom.

d. Many German aircraft have been destroyed by our aircraft engaged on missions of the Combined Bomber Offensive. Enemy losses in aerial combat, however, have not been sufficient to effect any substantial reduction in front line German air strength. This may be accounted for

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by three facts: that aerial combat on the part of our strategic bombers and their escorting fighters is primarily of a defensive nature; that enemy fighters avoid battle unless they have reasonable prospects for success in attacking those of our bomber formations which appear to be heading toward vital targets; and that our attacks on the German aircraft industry, while effective, have not yet been extensive enough to cause the enemy's production-wastage ratio to remain definitely in our favor.

e. It follows, then, that reduction of the enemy's present operational air strength can best be achieved by some means other than aerial combat, viz., direct attack upon his airdromes in a manner which will make possible the destruction of the aircraft based on them. For several months we have been making day time attacks on enemy day fighter airdromes in Europe, using our B-26 medium bombers. The day fighters are rarely found on the ground, except for the few which are not operational. Aircraft on the ground have ample warning of the approach of the B-26's, which attack from an altitude of 11,000 to 12,000 feet with heavy fighter escort, with the result that the German airplanes get off the ground, and stay in the air or withdraw to an airdrome which they consider beyond reach of the B-26's. That the Germans consider these attacks ineffective is indicated by the fact that interceptions rarely are made, in keeping with their evident present policy of conserving their fighter strength.

7. a. A prerequisite to successful airdrome attacks is striking while the enemy aircraft are immobilized on the ground. Day fighters are on the ground at night, and night fighters during the day. Day fighters are not normally equipped for night flying. Furthermore, at night the day fighter pilots usually are at some distance from their aircraft, unavailable to fly them away in event of a night bombing attack, even if they are qualified to do so. Therefore, night attacks on day fighter airdromes, which will immobilize the aircraft thereon for several hours, would make it unlikely that many aircraft could escape subjection to day bombing attacks made early on the following morning.

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b. Tab "E" is a proposed plan for coordinated airdrome attacks for accomplishing the destruction of the German fighter strength facing England. Its success is predicated upon the employment of the maximum available number of aircraft over a period of several successive days and nights, utilizing both British and American aircraft.

c. The essential elements of the proposed plan for air attack on enemy day fighter airdromes are:

(1) Attacks by heavy night bombers of the Royal Air Force to immobilize aircraft on the ground.

(2) Dawn or pre-dawn attacks by Mosquitoes or similar light bombers, dropping "jacks" and delayed action, anti-handling, anti-personnel bombs, to further immobilizing of aircraft on the ground.

(3) Precision pattern bombing attack by heavy and medium day bombers of the AAF to destroy aircraft.

(4) Employment of fighters to escort day bombers and to harrass and destroy any enemy aircraft which are able to take to the air for withdrawal or interception of our day bombers.

(5) Bombing and strafing attacks by fighter bombers and fighters against aircraft on the ground.

d. The prospects for success of attacks on enemy fighter airdromes in northwestern Germany, the Low Countries, and northern France, are increased by the fact that about half the single engine fighters in this region usually are concentrated on approximately a dozen airdromes.

8. For attacking aircraft on enemy airdromes in Italy a plan, similar to that for the Western Front, could be used, utilizing Allied aircraft based in southern Italy.

9. a. The practicality of attacking airdromes in southern Germany, southern France, and the Balkans is questionable because of the long ranges

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involved. Such ranges would not permit the use of short range fighters in support of the bombers, and would make difficult the protection and coordination of effort of numerous groups of aircraft simultaneously attacking different airdromes, even though enemy fighter defense might be split. Furthermore, the enemy might concentrate his fighters on but a small proportion of our aircraft, causing prohibitive losses to the Allies. This argument is based on the presumed improbability of immobilizing all or even a majority of the aircraft on distant enemy airdromes. Perhaps the strongest argument against attacking enemy airdromes at great distance, with a primary purpose of destroying aircraft, arises from the difficulty of selecting the most profitable targets.

b. Destruction of a large proportion of the enemy aircraft within short range striking distance of our bases would force a redistribution of the German air strength on a reduced scale. This would accomplish in itself the reduction of enemy air opposition at any given point.

10. With the Allies' present numerical superiority in aircraft over the Axis in Europe, and in view of Germany's obvious intention to expand her fighter force to the maximum possible, it would appear that Germany's operational aircraft could be destroyed most economically by concerted offensive action at the earliest possible date. Repetition of such effort immediately prior to the mounting of an invasion, after the enemy has redistributed his already weakened air bastions, coupled with destruction of Germany's aircraft production in the interim, should achieve the degree of Allied air superiority prerequisite to the success of the invasion, and desired for more economical strategic bombing of Axis targets.

IV CONCLUSIONS

1. That an "all out" effort to destroy the German Air Force should be made at the earliest possible time.

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3. That production of German aircraft must be stopped by increasing the tempo of Combined Bomber Offensive Missions against aircraft factories and assembly plants.

3. That destruction of German fighters in the air has not reduced the German fighter strength to a satisfactory level.

4. That destruction of Germany's operational air strength must be accomplished by some method which will permit destruction of large numbers of aircraft on the ground.

5. That a combination of night and day air attacks on German airdromes is possible from the United Kingdom against airdromes within striking distance of our short range as well as long range aircraft, and would offer the most effective method of destroying Germany's operational aircraft.

6. That redistribution of the decreased numerical strength of the German Air Force, resulting from attacks on aircraft on airdromes at short range, would accomplish the desired reduction in the enemy's effective air strength.

7. That an "all out" effort against the enemy's operational air strength should be made as soon as possible and repeated immediately prior to the mounting of an invasion of continental Europe.

V RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this paper and attached plan of attack be forwarded to General Spaatz for his consideration.

5 Incls: (With original only)

Incl 1. Tab "A" - Analysis of Attacks on German Aircraft Production
Incl 2. Tab "B" - Analysis of Disposition of Axis Fighters in Europe
Incl 3. Tab "C" - Map of German Key-Fighter Disposition in Western Europe
Incl 4. Tab "D" - Map of German Night-Fighter Disposition in Western Europe
Incl 5. Tab "E" - Plan of Attacking German Airdromes in Western Europe

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TAB "B"

ANALYSIS OF DISPOSITION OF AXIS

FIGHTERS IN EUROPE

1. $\frac{2119 + 589}{3120}$ = 52.9% of all Axis aircraft in Europe are on Western Front, Control and Western Mediterranean."(1)

2. $\frac{1592 + 471}{2901}$ = 71.1% of all Axis fighters in Europe are on Western Front, Control and Western Mediterranean."(2)

3. $\frac{655 + 836}{2901}$ = 51.3% of all Axis fighters in Europe are in northern and northwestern Germany, France and the Low Countries."(3)

4. $\frac{655 + 836}{1592 + 471}$ = 72.2% of all Axis fighters on Western Front, central and Western Mediterranean, are in northern and northwestern Germany, France and Low Countries. "(4)

* (1), (2), (3), (4) See attached statistical summary - Axis Air Order of Battle - Europe - as of 15 January 1944, for source figures. SC-AS-42 (Air) 21 Jan 1944

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

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

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

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

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

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

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TAB "I"

A PROPOSED PLAN FOR AIR ATTACK ON GERMAN OCCUPIED AIRDROMES IN NORTHERN FRANCE, NORTHWESTERN GERMANY AND THE LOW COUNTRIES

I Purpose and Scope of the Plan

1. This plan is designed for the destruction, by air attack on airdromes, of the German day-fighter strength based in northern France, northwestern Germany, and the Low Countries.

2. The success of the plan is predicated upon the employment of the maximum possible number of all types of operational aircraft of the Allied Air Forces in the United Kingdom, including short range fighters, e.g., Spitfires, in sustained effort over a period of several successive days and nights.

3. Final details of organization and execution of the plan necessarily must be accomplished in the theater of operations, utilizing current information for selection of targets and determination of available forces to be used against them.

II Selection of Targets

1. Analysis of enemy fighter disposition on the continent between Denmark and the Brest peninsula indicates that a large proportion of the day fighters are based within 100 miles of the coast within striking distance of all types of Allied operational aircraft.

2. It is especially noteworthy that approximately half the enemy fighters in the area usually are based on approximately a dozen airdromes (See Tab "C"). A successful attack on these airdromes would afford a substantial reduction in the number of German fighters in the area, and would make for success of attacks on the remainder of the airdromes on days and nights immediately following, and for subsequent attacks on night fighter bases.

3. The most suitable targets for attack would be those airdromes on which the largest numbers of aircraft are concentrated. The use of

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"Y" service and late afternoon aerial photo reconnaissance should furnish reliable information for the selection of targets for the ensuing night and morning.

III Allied Aircraft to be Employed

1. To assure that each target attacked would be thoroughly bombed and the maximum number of enemy aircraft destroyed on each airdrome, our attacking forces would be divided among not more than ten targets, according to the area and number of aircraft on each. It is conservatively estimated that the numbers of aircraft listed following would be available in the United Kingdom for execution of the plan:

	RAF	USAAF
Heavy Bombers - Night	750	
Heavy Bombers - Day		500
Medium Bombers- Night)	50	
Medium Bombers- Day)		180
Light Bombers	100	
Fighters and Ftr Bombers	1000	500

2. Aircraft allocated to the attack of one airdrome would operate independently of those attacking other airdromes. Nevertheless, attacks should be coordinated and made simultaneously on all targets to dissipate opposition by the enemy.

IV Plan of Attack

1. As previously mentioned, targets would be selected from information obtained from "Y" service and late afternoon photo reconnaissance to determine those airdromes on which the largest number of enemy aircraft might be attacked.

2. RAF Heavy night bombers would attack about an hour before dawn or first light, allowing the minimum practicable period of darkness for withdrawal, proportioning their forces among the airdromes in accordance with the size and importance of each. Pathfinders would be used to drop flares. Their objective would be to light the targets sufficiently to permit visual bombing. Because few of these airdromes are

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defended with heavy caliber flak, bombing altitudes would be 7500 to 8000 feet. Success would be further assured by the fact that the bulk of enemy night fighters would be waiting farther to the rear, expecting deeper penetration. The British bombers would carry the largest number of bombs possible, their purpose being to create the maximum of havoc and confusion.

3. At daybreak, Mosquitoes, or other aircraft similarly suited for low altitude attacks would drop jacks and small anti-personnel bombs of the delayed anti-handling type on runways, taxi-strips, and in front of revetment areas. The purpose of this attack would be to further prevent or, at least, to delay for several hours, any withdrawal of aircraft from the airdromes.

4. An hour after daybreak, or as soon as light is adequate, all available U. S. heavy bombers would attack the airdromes with the largest number of bombs that could be carried, combining loads of 120 lb. fragmentation cluster, and 250 or 500 pound demolition bombs. They should attempt to blanket dispersal areas with systematic bomb patters. Our heavy bombers would be followed by all available B-26's and British medium bombers, carrying bomb loads of the same sort. During this period, top cover in the form of offensive sweeps would be provided by P-47's, or other suitable fighters available, in event of air opposition arriving from other areas. Close escort of heavy and medium day bombers would be provided by Spitfires and P-51's at a strength of at least one escort fighter per bomber. A maximum of fighter-bomber attacks would follow the attack by the medium bombers.

5. Throughout the period of daylight attacks, patrols of low-altitude fighters would be maintained about each airdrome, out of range of automatic weapon fire, to attack and destroy any aircraft which might be able to take off to withdraw from the area or to oppose our

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aircraft. Low altitude fighters, going in at a minimum altitude to avoid radar, and ahead of the day bombers whose higher approach inevitably would be detected, should find good hunting among any enemy aircraft able to take off to intercept the bombers.

6. Photo reconnaissance of each airdrome target would be made immediately after the attacks, and flash damage assessment made. If damage to enemy aircraft was not complete on a given airdrome, it should be attacked again on the following day.

V Attack of Night Fighter Airdromes

1 1. Following the series of attacks on the day fighter drones, a similar plan might well be applied to enemy night fighter bases in the same areas. (See Tab "C")

2. Night fighters, of course, might be expected to be airborne at any time Allied night bombers are over Europe. Immobilizing them on the ground could hardly be accomplished by night bombing. A program of night bombing missions, designed to lure into the air the largest possible number of enemy night fighters during the late night hours, should result in immobilizing these enemy aircraft at dawn, when they are on the ground for refueling and rearming. They might then be profitably attacked by our day forces.

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BRITISH PROPOSALS



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NSC Memo, 11/24/05

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E.O. 13526, 27 Sep 2009

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AFAEP
OAO/ch/6724
4th 13 Mar 44

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FRED SMITH:

Subject: Plan for the Destruction of German Fighters in Operational Units.

1. Attached is the plan for the destruction of German fighters in operational units which you discussed while in Washington.

2. Due to the highly successful February air battle and the destruction of large numbers of German fighters in operational units, the number and location of enemy fighters may now vary considerably from that envisaged in the plan as prepared.

3. The basic principle, however, of pinning the day fighters to the ground by pre-dawn attacks so that they can be destroyed in daylight may still be operationally practicable. Your analysis of the current situation will determine the desirability of submitting the plan for study.

Incl:
Staff study w/Incls

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Colonel, G. S. C.
Chief, Operational Plans Division

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES

Washington

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR FOR AIR:

Subject: British Proposals for New Agreement Covering the Trans Atlantic Services of Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines, Inc.

1. The offices of Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, The Commanding General, Air Transport Command and Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, all concur in comments after examining the papers relative to the above subject.

2. It is agreed that unfavorable precedents, as contained in the British proposal, should not be established. The unfavorable proposals with the recommended substitutes are:

a. (1) Proposed: Rigid definition of frequencies of service and routes, see paragraph 1 and 2, Appendix A and paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, Appendix B.

(2) Substitute: Flexibility in the routes and frequencies of service; see paragraph 4, Appendix C.

b. (1) Proposed: Enumeration of ports of call in non-British territory on each route. Paragraphs 1 and 2, Appendix A; paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, Appendix B.

(2) Substitute: Power to direct such changes of service as might be deemed necessary, without renewed diplomatic negotiations.

c. (1) Proposed: Provisions for withdrawal of permissions at any time on a six months notice. See paragraph 3 (iv) Appendix A and paragraph 4 (iv) Appendix B.

(2) Substitute: Terminations of permissions not to be effective until at least six months after entrance into effect of the final peace treaties with Germany, Italy and Japan, to which the United States is a party.

d. (1) Proposed: Concession, in principle, of reciprocity in very broad and vague terms. See paragraph 5 Appendix A; paragraph 6, Appendix B.

(2) Substitute: Limitation of the provisions of clause five, American Export proposal and clause six, Pan American Proposal, to Trans-Atlantic operations; if this is not practicable, eliminate both clauses completely from the proposals.

Incls:
Appendix A -Am Ex Airlines
Appendix B -PAA, proposal
Appendix C -Memo frm C/AS
Appendix D -Ltr to Sec War
w/cpy #12244
Appendix E -Cpy ltr to Chm CAB

NOTE: Incls already in file with previous correspondence.

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OPERATIONS DIVISION

OPD 580.8 (15 Dec 43)

SUBJECT: British Proposals for New Agreements Covering the Trans-Atlantic Services of Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines, Inc.

19 December 1943

X CG, AAF
(Att: Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans)

X Information

1. Reference is made to the Disposition Form dated 17 December 1943 by which the Acting Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans requested the comments of the Operations Division upon the British proposals for new agreements covering the wartime Trans-Atlantic Services of Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines, Inc.

2. The Operations Division concurs in the comments on the British proposals expressed by the Commanding General, Air Transport Command, in his memorandum, 15 December 1943, to the Chief of Air Staff, Army Air Forces. (Attached to the file submitted with the Disposition Form of 17 December 1943.)

3. Subsequent to the receipt of the Disposition Form of 17 December 1943, a conference was held at the State Department on 18 December 1943 to discuss the reply which should be made to these British proposals. Representatives attended from the State Department, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Bureau of Budget, the Navy Department, Operations Division, Army Air Forces, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air.

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It was agreed at this conference that the State Department would prepare a draft of a reply to the British which will take into account the objections made to these proposals by the Commanding General, Air Transport Command. This draft will be circulated by the State Department to the interested governmental agencies represented at the conference prior to dispatch to the British.

4. Your file, with inclosures, is returned herewith as requested.

J. E. HULL,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incl.
File on subject attached
to D/F of 17 Dec 43 fr
CG, AAF to OPD.

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TO: Chief of the Air Staff

FROM: AC/AS, Plans

COMMENT NO. 2
ACC/vk/6724

1. In accordance with the directive in paragraph 2, comment No. 1, the consolidated comments of OPD, ATC and this division are submitted for approval.

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Operational Plans Div.

Attached
Memo for Asst Sec of State
w/incls

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AC/AS, Plans
ACC/vk/6724

wtn 6 Jan 44

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: British Proposals for New Agreement Covering the Trans Atlantic Services of Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines, Inc.

1. The offices of Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, The Commanding General Air Transport Command and Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, all concur in comments after examining the papers relative to the above subject.

2. It is agreed that unfavorable precedents, as contained in the British proposal, should not be established. The unfavorable proposals with the recommended substitutes are:

a. (1) Proposed: A rigid definition of frequencies of service and routes, see paragraph 1 and 2, Appendix A and paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, Appendix B.

(2) Substitute: Flexibility in the routes and frequencies of service; see paragraph 4, App C.

b. (1) Proposed: Enumeration of ports of call in non-British territory on each route. Paragraphs 1 and 2, App. A; paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 App B.

(2) Substitute: Power to direct such changes of service as might be deemed necessary, without renewed diplomatic negotiations.

c. (1) Proposed: Provisions for withdrawal of permissions at any time on a six months notice. See paragraph 3 (iv) App. A and paragraph 4 (iv) App. B.

(2) Substitute: Terminations of permissions not to be effective until at least six months after entrance into effect of the final peace treaties with Germany, Italy and Japan, to which the United States is a party.

d. (1) Proposed: Concession, in principle, of reciprocity in very broad and vague terms. See paragraph 5 App. A; Paragraph 6, App. B.

(2) Substitute: Limitation of the provisions of clause five, American Export proposal and clause

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six, Pan American Proposal, to Trans-Atlantic operations; if this is not practicable, eliminate both clauses completely from the proposals.

Appendix

App A - American Export Airlines, Inc. Proposals

App B - Pan American Airways, Proposal

App C - Memo from Chief of Air Staff from Col. George A. Brownell

App D - Letter to Sec War fr Asst Sec State w/ cpy despatch No. 12844 from American Embassy, London

App E - Copy ltr to Chm CAB from Sec State Long.

3 Incls
Incl 1 - Memo for C/AS
fm AFC 12-18-43 w/incls
D.F. fr OPD
D.F. from Plans to OPD

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17 Dec 1943

British Proposals for New Agreements

x COMMENT

AC/AS, Plans
CMF/vk/6724

1. It is desired that OPD furnish comments on the inclosed British proposals and return the file together with comments to the AC/AS, Plans.

2. In view of the State Department's proposed meeting on the subject in the immediate future, it is desired that this matter will be acted on as promptly as possible.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

JOHN DEUTCHMEISTER
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Asst Chief of
Air Staff Plans

Incls
Memo for C/AS
15 Dec 43 w/incls

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15 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Subject: British Proposals for New Agreements Covering the Trans-Atlantic Services of Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines, Inc.

1. The papers relative to the above subject accompanying the Memorandum for the Chief of the Air Staff from Colonel George A. Brownell, A.D., Exec., Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, dated 11 December 1943, have been received and examined.

2. The Air Transport Command agrees with the comments on the proposed British Agreements, which were contained in Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long's letter to the Civil Aeronautics Board.

3. The two companies in question operate trans-Atlantic services under contract to the Navy and therefore the particular agreements under discussion will be of greater concern to the Navy Department than to the Command. However, the Air Transport Command would not like to see the establishment of the unfavorable precedents which are contained in the British proposal, namely:

a. Rigid definitions as to frequencies of service and routes over which services are operated primarily for the purpose of facilitating the prosecution of the war.

b. Enumeration of ports of call in non-British territory on each route.

c. Provisions for the withdrawal of the permissions at any time on six months' notice, which might adversely affect the military interests of the United States should the withdrawal take place before the termination of military operations by the United States or the substantial completion of the evacuation of United States forces.

d. Concession, in principle, of reciprocity in the very broad and vague terms of clause five of the American Export proposal and clause six in the Pan American proposal.

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4. In general it is felt that military considerations require a maximum of flexibility in the routes and frequencies of services, and that the United States Government should have the power to direct such changes in the services as might be deemed necessary, without renewed diplomatic negotiations.

5. It is considered desirable that the proposed and all similar agreements should not be subject to termination for at least six months after the entrance into effect of the final treaties of peace with Germany, Italy and Japan to which the United States is a party.

6. It is suggested that the scope of the reciprocity principle contained in clause five of the American Export proposal and clause six of the Pan American proposal be narrowed to trans-Atlantic operations, if it should not be practicable to insist on the complete elimination of these clauses.

For the Commanding General:

JAMES H. DOUGLAS, JR.
Colonel, G.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff

Incl
12/11/43 Memo to Chief of Air Staff fr Col. George A. Brownell, 12/3/43 ltr to Sec War fr Asst Sec State, w/cpy despatch No. 12244, 11/15/43 fr Am Emb, London, and cpy ltr to Chm, CAB, fr Asst Sec State Long

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR

11 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

1. The attached letter from the Office of the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, dated December 3, regarding Pan American and American Export routes between American and British territories has been referred to this Office by the Secretary of War for action.

2. It will be appreciated if you will obtain the views of the appropriate division of the Air Staff and of the Air Transport Command on the subjects referred to in the State Department's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and then have the papers returned to this office.

3. You will notice that the State Department expects to hold a meeting on the subject within the next few days. An officer from this Office will attend this meeting, and it is believed that it would also be desirable to have there a representative of the Air Transport Command and perhaps also of the Air Staff. Please advise what officers you wish to attend the meeting.

4. It is requested that the papers be returned to this Office through the Operations Division of the General Staff, so that they may add any comments which they wish to make.

For the Assistant Secretary of War for Air:

GEORGE A BROWNELL
Colonel, Air Corps
Executive Officer

Incl
12/3/43 ltr to Sec War
fr Asst Sec State, w/cpy
despatch No. 12244, 11/15/43
fr Am Emb, London, and copy
ltr to Chm, CAB, fr Asst Sec
State Long

C O P Y

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In reply refer to
IN 811.79640/1800

Dec 3 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have sent today to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, together with a copy of airmail despatch No. 12244 of November 15, 1943, from our Embassy in London, on the subject of the British proposal for a new form of agreement covering the wartime trans-Atlantic air services of Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines between American and British territories.

You will note from the last paragraph of my letter to Mr. Pogue that this Department is anxious that the War Department study the problems immediately so that within the next ten days or two weeks all the interested agencies of this Government may meet to discuss the British proposals and to draft a suitable reply to the British Government.

A similar letter is being sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

s/
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated above

The Honorable
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

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In reply refer to
IN 811.79640/1800

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Pogue:

I am enclosing a copy of airmail despatch No. 12244 of November 15, 1943, from our Embassy in London, which details a British proposal for a new form of agreement covering the wartime trans-atlantic air services of Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines between American and British territories.

Both of the British proposals contain a number of points to which the Department has, at least, tentative objections. Some of these points are as follows:

(a) Fixed routes are mentioned, which would appear to make for very rigid operations, while still not eliminating the necessity of applying to the British for amended permits to add or subtract ports of call.

(b) Also with respect to routes, both proposals contain errors of omission. For example, Belem is omitted as a port of call on Export's westbound winter route, while Dakar is omitted from Pan American's clockwise and counter-clockwise service. In addition, the Department understands that during the winter months some of Export's flights are operated east-bound from Bermuda directly to Foynes, whereas the proposal notes that all of these operations are from New York to Foynes via Bermuda and Port Lyautey.

(c) The

The Honorable
L. Welch Pogue, Chairman,
Civil Aeronautics Board.

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(c) The proposals fail to define "the period of present hostilities." While the Department realizes that there are objections to the expression "for the period of the war" it is, nonetheless, tentatively of the opinion that perhaps a broader interpretation of the termination clause would be desirable. If the termination of the agreements is to be on six months' notice, the notice to be given immediately after the period of present hostilities, it is conceivable that this Government will be faced with so many termination activities in this limited period that they cannot all be solved simultaneously.

(d) It appears from the proposals that the British are undertaking to grant permission to our carriers for service via certain foreign points, only a minority of which are British possessions. The Department's tentative view is that an undesirable precedent might be established if this Government were to accede to this proposal. While it has been the policy of this Government to inform the British of changes in routes, this has been a courtesy procedure only and did not involve requests for British permission except in so far as British territories and possessions were concerned.

(e) Clause 5 in the Export proposal, and Clause 6 in the Pan American proposal are very broad in nature. While this Government might agree in principle, the Department hesitates to go on record in what might involve operations, for example, in the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or similar key possessions, without prior consultation with our military authorities and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The foregoing are some of the points which the Department feels might well be clarified, and it is suggested that the Board undertake an immediate study of this problem. In view of the interest which the defense services have in this matter, the Department is forwarding to the War and Navy Departments a copy of this letter

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together with the subject despatch. These Departments are also being asked to study the problem immediately so that within the next ten days or two weeks all the interested agencies of this Government may meet to discuss the proposals with a view to drafting a suitable reply to be transmitted to the British Government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

(Stamped) Breckinridge Long

Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

From London, England,
November 15, 1943.

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BY AIR POUCH

London, November 15, 1943

No. 12244

Subject: British Porposal for New Form of Agreements Covering the War-Time Trans-Atlantic Air Services of Pan American Airways and American Export Air Lines Between American and British Territories.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copies of two informal communications from the Foreign Office (both dated November 13, 1943) enclosing drafts of agreements covering the Trans-Atlantic Air Lines during the period of hostilities. The Foreign Office desires that the present specific arrangements covering the various routes in use be superceded by the general agreements proposed in the enclosed drafts.

The proposed agreements provide for summer services over the Northern route and winter services over the Southern route "for the period of the present hostilities." In paragraph 4, each contains a provision that the arrangements are to be "subject to termination at six months' notice." The Foreign Office states that it was felt that the expression "for the period of the war" is not sufficiently precise. It is not clear, however, whether the insertion of the phrase "subject to termination at six months' notice" does not make it possible for the permission granted in the agreements to be revoked before the termination of hostilities.

The agreement porposed to cover the services of Pan American Airways contains a provision that "the rights gra ted to Pan American Airways under the permit issued on the 22nd February, 1937 are not in any way prejudiced by the grant of these temporary permissions but are temporarily subsumed with these permissions."

Both agreements assume that the necessary permissions for the operation of the air services in question have been obtained by the United States Government from the Governments of Canada and Eire, and express the hope that the United States Government will grant similar facilites to British Air services in territories for which its permission is required.

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The Embassy has acknowledged the receipt of these communications and has informed the Foreign Office that they have been transmitted to the Department of State for its consideration.

Respectfully yours,
for the Ambassador:

W. J. Gallman
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

1/ Copies of two informal communications from the Foreign Office, both dated November 13, 1943 and numbered W 14342/5246/802, together with drafts of agreements covering the Trans-Atlantic Air Services of Pan American Airways and American Export Air Lines during the period of hostilities.

JCB/pb

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Enclosu no 1/ to despatch
No. 122 of November 15,
1943, from the Embassy at
London, England.

No. W.14342/5246/802

Dear Gallman,

You will remember that in your letter of 29th May, which I am sorry to see I have never acknowledged, you asked whether the British authorities had any objection to American Export Airlines engaging in regular air transport to and from Botwood in the course of their flights between New York and Foynes. We have since agreed orally to the winter operations proposed in your official Note No. 3025 of 9th October.

The Newfoundland Government have informed the United States Consul General at St. John's, in reply to his enquiries, that permission would be granted for aircraft of American Export Airlines to take off from, land on, or fly over Newfoundland for the purpose of the North Atlantic air service in the year ending 31st December, 1943. Apart from this the existing arrangements for American Export Airlines summer and winter routes are covered by a series of letters and notes exchanged with your Embassy, namely, Shantz's letter to Labouchere of the 26th February, 194[illegible], our note No. W 4838/2121/802 of the 11th April, 1942, Mr. Matthew's note No. 1/19 of the 22nd May, 1942, our note No. W 9461/2121/802 of the 1st August, 1942, Mr. Matthews' note No. 2112 of the 5th October, 1942 and our note No. W 14211/2121/802 of the 29th October, 1942.

We think it would be convenient if this correspondence were superseded by the enclosed single document setting out the position and containing the permission you requested in your letter to me of 29th May, and in your Note No. 3025 of 9th October.

You will see that this document contains a provision that permission may be withdrawn at any time upon six months' notice. The reason for this is that we feel that the expression "For the period of the war", which formerly governed the duration of the permission is not sufficiently precise.

We have also omitted references to specific reciprocities as being unsuitable in a wartime arrangement between Allies such as this. We hope you will be able to confirm that your Government agree with the general statment in the last paragraph of the document.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) J.H. Le Rougetel

Mr. Waldemar J. Gallman,
United States Embassy,
1 Grosvenor Square,

(J. H. Le Rougetel

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 12244 of November 15, 1943, from the Embassy at London, England.

COPY
W 14342/5246/802)

American Export Air Lines
North Atlantic Routes

1. At the request of the United States Government and in order to assist in the effective prosecution of the war, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Newfoundland in so far as they are concerned, agree to the operation by American Export Airlines during the summer season and for the period of present hostilities of an air service between New York, Botwood, Foynes and Port Lyautey for the carriage of passengers, goods and mail between these places with a frequency of two round trips a week.

Southern Route

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in so far as they are concerned, also agree to the operation by American Export Airlines during the winter season and for the period of the present hostilities of an air service eastbound between New York, Bermuda, Port Lyautey and Foynes and westbound between Foynes, Port Lyautey, Dakar, Bathurst, Port of Spain, Bermuda and New York with a frequency of two round trips per week. His Majesty's Government further agree that Government Officials and individuals and cargo, in so far as this is necessitated by reason of their connexion with the prosecution of the war, may be landed and taken on at Bermuda, Bathurst and Port of Spain. They also agree that when space is available individuals whose travel is looked upon by the appropriate authorities of the United States as urgently necessary, may be landed and taken on at those places.

3. These permissions are granted on the understanding that

(i) The aircraft of American Export Airlines conform with all Civil Defence Regulations which may be imposed by the Newfoundland Government during the present emergency period, and with the Air Navigation Regulations in force in other British territories on the above routes and for which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are responsible.

(ii) The aircraft of American Export Airlines conform with existing arrangements for contraband, censorship and passenger control of such modifications of them as my from time to time be made.

(iii) The permissions are subject to review in the event of the territories over which the services operate becoming the scene of active warfare.

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(iv) The permissions may be withdrawn at any time on 6 months notice.

4. It is understood that the United States Government have also sought the necessary permissions from His Majesty's Government in Canada who are concerned not only in respect of Canada but also/

also in respect of Botwood airport because, for the duration of the war, they exercise operational control there, and from the Eire Government.

5. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are confident that the United States Government will be willing to grant similar facilities in territories for which their permission is required for British air services needed to assist in the effective prosecution of the war.

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Enclosure No. 1/ to despatch
No. 122 of November 16,
1943, from the Embassy at
London, England.

No. W 14342/5246/802

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

13th November, 1943.

Dear Gailman,

I must apologise for not having answered before your letter of 27th May about Pan American Airways' summer schedule on the North Atlantic route. I understand that Pan American Airways subsequently notified the Air Ministry that there would, after all, be no shuttle service between New York and Botwood and that this service has in fact consisted of five trips a fortnight between New York and Foynes via Shediac and Botwood.

Pan American airways of course hold a permit dated 22nd February, 1937, which authorises them to operate an air service into, through and away from the United Kingdom, Newfoundland and Bermuda for a period of fifteen years from 1st June, 1936, the number of round trips being limited to two per week unless otherwise agreed. This permit has not been varied to meet the new circumstances, except that the Newfoundland Government have informed the United States Consul-General at St. John's, in reply to his enquiries, that permission would be granted for aircraft of Pan American Airways to take off from, land on, or fly over Newfoundland for the purpose of the North Atlantic air service for the year ending 31st December, 1943. It seems best to cover the existing war-time arrangements separately in the enclosed document.

The situation in respect of Pan American Airways' Southern route also needs clearing up. In our note No. W 2095/199/802 of the 8th March 1941 to Mr. Winant we conveyed the terms of our permission in so far as British territories were concerned for a Pan-American service running east-bound from New York to Lisbon via Bermuda, and west-bound from Lisbon to New York, via Belama, Port of Spain and San Juan, the permission being provisional and subject to review at the end of the war and landing rights at Trinidad being only valid until 1st May, 1942. No permit exists covering Pan American Airways' landings at Trinidad on this service since 1st May, 1942. Pan American Airways also operate a separate circular service in this area taking in Monrovia, Natal and Belem for which equally no permit exists. The enclosed document also covers these five services.

You will see that we have included a provision that the arrangements are subject to termination at six months' notice, the reason being that we feel that expressions such as "for the period of the war" are not sufficiently precise.

We have also omitted references to specific reciprocities as being unsuitable in a war-time arrangement between Allies su

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such as this. We hope you will be able to confirm that your government agree with the general statement in the last paragraph of the document.

Yours sincerely
(signed) J.H. Le Rougetal

Mr. Waldemar J. Gallman,
United States Embassy,
1 Grosvenor Square, W.1.

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COPY

Enclosure No. 1/ to despatch No. 12244 of November 15, 1943 from the Embassy at London, England.

(W 14342/ /802)

Pan-American Airways

North Atlantic Route

1. At the request of the United States Government and in order to assist in the effective prosecution of the war, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Newfoundland, in so far as they are concerned, agree to the operation by Pan American Airways during the summer season and for the period of the present hostilities of an air service between New York and Foynes via Shediac and Botwood with a frequency of five round trips per fortnight, for the carriage of passengers, goods and mail.

Southern Route

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in so far as they are concerned, also agree to the operation by Pan American Airways during the winter season and for the period of the present hostilities, of an air service on the route.

New York - Bermuda - Horta - Lisbon-Shannon (Roynes) Lisbon-Dakar - Natal - Belem - Port of Spain - San Juan (Puerto Rico) - Bermuda - New York.

New York - Bermuda - Horta - Lisbon - Shannon - Lisbon-Dakar - Natal - Fisherman's Lake (Monrovia) - Bolama-Dakar - Lisbon - Dakar - Bolama - Fisherman's Lake - Natal - Belem - Port of Spain - San Juan - Bermuda - New York.

with frequencies of three round trips per fortnight and one round trip per fortnight respectively for the carriage of passengers, goods and mail between these places.

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in so far as they are concerned, further agree to the operation by Pan American Airways throughout the year and for the period of the present hostilities of an air service on the alternative routes:-

(a) New York - Bermuda - Horta - Lisbon - Bolama - Monrovia-Natal - Belem - Port of Spain - San Juan - Bermuda-New York.

(b) New York - Bermuda - San Juan - Port of Spain - Belem - Natal - Monrovia - Bolama - Lisbon - Horta - Bermuda - New York.

for the carriage of passengers, goods and mail between these places.

4. The above permissions are granted on the understanding that

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SUBJECT	FROM	TO	DATE
1. Approved troop Basis for Air Forces, European Theatre of Operations (Less IBC)	CRL	OC&R	11-30
2. Air Forces Troop Basis for ETO (Less IBC)	OC&R	Plans	12-3

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SECRET

SUBJECT: Air Forces Troop Basis for ETO (less IBC).

TO: AC/AS, Plans

DATE 3 Dec 43

FROM: AC/AS, OC&R, Commitments Division
Theatre Commitment & Implementation Branch

COMMENT NO. 1
ABM:tep 5009

1. Enclosed is one copy of the second edition War Department Flow Chart for AAF, ETO, 18 November 1943.

2. The following changes are to be added to this chart:

a. One (1) Air Depot Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, T/O 1-852, 1 July 42 is to be activated in the theatre in March 1944 instead of being shipped from this country.

b. The following units are to be added and will be activated in the theatre in the month indicated:

Unit	Month of Activation
1 Ordnance Amm Co (Avn)	January 1944
1 QM Truck Co (Avn)	December 1943

c. Suitable units have been or are being shipped from this country in lieu of the following units which are presently scheduled for activation in the month indicated. Action has been taken to delete these units from scheduled activations:

Unit	Month of Activation
769th Chemical Depot Co (Avn)	January 1944
1225th QM Co Service Group	January 1944
880th Signal Depot Co (Avn)	March 1944
1148th Signal Co Service Group	January 1944
348th Signal Co Troop Carrier Wing	April 1944
301st Fighter Wing Hq&Hq Sq	February 1944

3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.

J. W. BAYLOR,
Colonel, Air Corps.

Incl
1 cpy chart
described above

Distribution:
1 Cpy to Programs Division
1 Cpy to Allocations
2 Cpys to MM&D
1 Cpy to Requirements
1 Cpy to Air Communications
2 Cpys to Training
2 Cpys to Operations

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Approved Troop Basis for Air Forces, European Theatre of Operations (less ISC

AC/AS, OC&R (Troop Commitment & Implementation Branch)

AC/AS, Plans

30 Nov 43 1
CRL/jw/6724

Forwarded as a matter pertaining to your office.

JOS L. LOUPSENHEISER
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Operational Plans Div.

Incl:
Memo for B.Gen.
McClelland.
(with original only)

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AFACO/P-2

19 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GENERAL McCLELLAND

1. Reference is made to the Approved Troop Basis for Air Forces, European Theatre of Operations (less Iceland Base Command), which has recently reached this office.

2. Numerous organizations are called for which do not follow standard Tables of Organization and were not contemplated on the overall troop basis.

For example:

1. Signal Battalion Bomber Command
2. Signal Company Bomb Division
3. Signal Company Air Force
4. Signal Company Air Force (SP)
5. Signal Battalion Air Warning MARU
6. Signal Battalion Air Warning RARU

Although the last two units do not at present come within the scope of this office, they employ communications systems, which by AF 20-23 we are charged with coordinating.

3. The first four units in Par. 2 have been formed and placed on the troop basis without reference to this office. This practice has resulted in filler personnel being shipped to U.K. at the expense of units which may have been destined for other theatres. Organizations Branch informs this office that the result of this shipment has caused them to be able to designate only four units out of thirty-eight required for overseas shipment.

4. It is probable that Plans has been at fault in that we have not kept up to date on current and/or proposed plans. In defense, it should be stated that, although the accusation is in general, true; we have attempted to keep up with these plans but on numerous occasions have not known that they were being formulated until too late. Further, the one

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referred to here was investigated in U.K. and no one knew of it until the Committee returned to this country. A similar situation exists at present, in that two officers are visiting Honolulu in an attempt to coordinate requirements for JCS-488.

5. This is presented in an attempt to point out that although the Air Communications Officer is charged with planning and implimenting communications; he is not represented when he is committed to accomplish certain operations.

S. A. MUNDELL
Col, AC

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AIR SEA RESCUE

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SECRET INCOMING MESSAGE

From: London

Number: W 62619 CS-IN 4667

Re: Air Sea Rescue Incidents for August.

FILED: London Secret Cable file for September.

P.R.C.

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Secret Outgoing Message

From: London

Number: WAR 49543

CM-OUT: 49543

Re: Spotters organization

FILED: London File, 12 June, under CM-OUT #49543

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AIR SEA RESCUE CABLES

DATE	CY-IN or OUT #	CABLE #	ORIGIN OR DESTINATION	BRIEF
5/20	39247	W 39247	London	Requesting information
5/24	17985	W 62541	London	Result of current air sea rescue search
6/10	7736	W 63389	London	Analysis of air sea rescue incidents for May

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SECRET

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England

To: War Department

Nr: U-63389 9 June 1944

U-63389 to Arnold signed Spaatz reur WAR 41035 May 24. Terms defined in our U-62541 May 23.

Analysis of air sea rescue incidents for May given below.

8th Air Force: B-17: 19 incidents, 16 successful, 2 unsuccessful, 1 no survivor.

B-24: 8 incidents, 5 successful, 3 no survivors.

P-38: 5 incidents, 1 successful, 2 unsuccessful, 2 no survivors.

P-47: 7 incidents, 6 successful, 1 no survivors.

P-51: 5 incidents, 2 successful, 3 no survivors.

9th Air Force: A-20: 2 incidents, 2 successful.

B-26: 4 incidents, 1 successful, 2 unsuccessful, 1 no survivors.

P-38: 3 incidents, 3 survivors.

P-47: 14 incidents, 9 successful, 1 unsuccessful, 3 no survivors, 1 broadcast.

CM-IN-7736 (10 June 44)

File
Air Sea

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RESTRICTED
ARMY

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECRET

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England

Nr: U-63389 9 June 1944 Page 2

May most successful month to date for air sea rescue operations. All 98 fighter pilots saved through new 8th Air Force Air Sea Rescue Spotters Organization as were crew members from 18 of the heavy bombers.

End

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO : OPD

CM-IN-7736 (10 June 44) 03337 hle

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AAF
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ACTION COPY

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

To: War Department

No: U 62541 23 May 1944

To Arnold signed Spaatz cite U 62541 reur WAR 39247 May 21.

Results of current air sea rescue search operations considered satisfactory. Analysis of incidents for 60 day period 1 March to 30 April given below. Terms as used in analysis are "incident" any aircraft known or believed to have gone down in sea; "successful" all or part of crews rescued and brought ashore safely; "unsuccessful" search made without results; "no survivors" search craft reached scene of incident and found dinghy empty or occupants dead; "broadcast" incident too close to enemy shore for search, broadcast made on international distress frequency; "no search" information insufficient to initiate search.

8th Air Force:

B-17: 36 incidents, 17 successful, 9 unsuccessful, 6 no survivors, 4 broadcast.

B-24: 18 incidents, 11 successful, 5 unsuccessful, 2 no survivors.

P-38: 11 incidents, 6 successful, 2 unsuccessful, 2 no survivors, 1 broadcast.

CM-IN-17985 (24 May 44)

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From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe
LOndon, England

No: U 62541 23 May 1944

P-47: 13 incidents, 6 successful, 4 unsuccessful, 1 no survivors, 1 broadcast, 1 no search.

P-51: 24 incidents, 5 successful, 4 unsuccessful, 12 no survivors, 3 broadcast.

9th Air Force:

B-26: 8 incidents, 2 successful, 3 unsuccessful, 3 no survivors.

A-20: 5 incidents, 2 successful, 2 unsuccessful, 1 no survivors.

Horsha Glider: 1 incident, successful

P-51 : 12 incidents, 4 successful, 4 unsuccessful, 3 no survivors, 1 broadcast.

Complete study of air sea rescue organization in this Theater being prepared and will be forwarded upon completion. Request advice as to what is desired in normal reports referred to in reference message above.

No Sig

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD

CM-IN-17985 (24 May 44) 0837Z bjm

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AC/AS Plans AFAEB
Operational Plans Div
European Br Col Thomson
5834

May 20, 1944

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Number: WAR 39247

From Arnold to Spaatz.

Air sea rescue information regarding operations requested particularly whether functioning properly to protect AAF personnel. Normal reports have not been received here.

No Sig
AF 2216

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF
INFORMATION: OPD

CM-OUT-39247 (20 May 44) 1728Z mlc

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AC/AS, Plans
EWT/jw/5834
wtn 6 Sept 44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

Subject: Air Sea Rescue Search Operations.

1. General Marshall has previously asked General Arnold about the success of Air Sea Rescue Search Operations. A cable was received this morning from General Spaatz analyzing the Air Sea Rescue incidents for August. A tabulation is given below:

Eighth Air Force	Incidents	Successful	Unsuccessful	No Survivors	Broadcast
B-17	14	7	2	1	4
B-24	9	7	-	-	2
P-38	1	1	-	-	-
P-47	2	1	-	1	-
P-51	18	6	-	4	8
Ninth Air Force					
A-20	-	-	-	-	-
B-26	3	1	1	1	-
C-47	1	1	-	-	-
P-38	1	-	-	1	-
P-47	1	-	1	-	-
P-51	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	50	24	4	8	14
% August	-	48%	8%	16%	28%
% Mar - Apr	-	42%	26%	33%	8%

2. For comparison the percentages for March and April in which there were 128 incidents are appended. The increase in the "broadcast incidents" i.e., incidents that were too close to the enemy coast for action should be noticed. The cable closes with the statement "At least five of the broadcast incidents are believed to have been rescued by Danish fishing vessels just off the enemy coast". Reference CM-IN 4687, 6 September 1944.

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L. S. KUTER
Major General, U.S.A.
Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Plans

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AFAEP
[illegible]/mc/5834
10 Jun 44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

Subject: Air Sea Rescue Search Operations

1. General Marshall has previously asked General Arnold about the success of Air Sea Rescue Search Operations. A cable was received this morning from General Spaatz analyzing the Air Sea Rescue Incidents for May, a tabulation of which is given below:

Eighth Air Force:	Incidents	Success	Unsuccess	No Survivors	Broadcast
B-17	19	16	2	1	-
B-24	8	5	-	3	-
P-38	5	1	2	2	-
P-47	7	6	-	1	-
P-51	5	2	-	3	-
Ninth Air Force:					
A-20	2	2	-	-	-
B-26	4	1	2	1	-
P-38	3	3	-	-	-
P-47	14	9	1	3	1
TOTALS May	67	45	7	14	1
TOTALS Mar-Apr	128	54	33	30	10
% May	-	67%	10%	21%	1%
% Mar-Apr	-	42%	26%	23%	8%

2. This cable closes with a statement:

"May was the most successful month to date for Air Sea Rescue Operations. All 98 fighter pilots saved were through the efforts of the new Eighth Air Force Air Sea Rescue Spotters Organization, as were crew members from 18 of the heavy bombers."

3. It should be noted that whereas 42% of the incidents in March and April were successful, this was increased to 67% during May.

L. S. KUTER
Major General, USA
Asst Chief of Air Staff, Plans

Reference: CM-IN 7736, 10 Jun 44
AFAEP

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

Subject: Air Sea Rescue Search Operations.

1. Several days ago General Marshall asked General Arnold about success of Air Sea Rescue Search operations. This Headquarters cabled General Spaatz for information and received his answer today, this cable being inclosed. This cable states that "Results of current air sea rescue search operations are considered satisfactory", following is the summary of air sea rescue operations for the 60 day period from 1 March to 30 April.

L. S. KUTER
Major General, USA
Asst. Chief of Air Staff,
Plans.

4 Incls.
1-Out #39247
2-IN #17985
3-Chart ASR
4-Cy cable 5/24

See Cables file

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AIR SEA RESCUE

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

		Incidents	Success	Unsuccess	No. Surviv.	Broadcast
	B-17	36	17	9	6	4
	B-24	18	11	5	2	-
	P-38	11	6	2	2	1
1 no search	P-47	*13	6	4	1	1
	P-51	24	5	4	12	3
TOTAL 8th		102	45	24	23	9

NINTH AIR FORCE

B-26	8	2	3	3	-
A-20	5	2	2	1	-
Glider	1	1	-	-	-
P-51	12	4	4	3	1
TOTAL 9th	26	9	9	7	1
TOTAL	128	54	33	30	10
%	-	42%	26%	23%	8%

*1 a/c "no search"

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24 MAY 1944

AFAEF Operational Plans Division Col. Thomson 5834
European Branch

SECRET ROUTINE

CG USSTAF
LONDON ENGLAND

AIR SEA RESCUE CABLE YOUR HQ UNIT SIX TWO FIVE FOUR ONE OF TWENTY
THREE MAY ANSWERED OUR IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS PARIS FROM ARNOLD TO
SPAATS PARIS AWAIT YOUR PROMISED STUDY TO SUGGEST NORMAL REPORT BE
MONTHLY CABLE SUMMARIZING ASR OPERATIONS WITH PERIODIC LETTERS

JOE L. LOUTZENHISER
Colonel, GSC

SECRET

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145.81-34
160.1 1944

TO BE RETURNED TO
HISTORICAL DIVISION
A.G.P.O.

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P.R.C.

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2930-20

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HEADQUARTERS AAF

ROUTING SLIP

TO →	OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL IN TURN	DATE FORWARDED
1.	Gen Houtzenheiser	
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

FOR → FOLLOWING ACTION(S) AS CHECKED

	COORDINATION		NOTE AND RETURN		INFORMATION
	NECESSARY ACTION		RECOMMENDATION		FILE
	SEE ME PHONE ME		APPROVAL		SIGNATURE

COMMENT

Add to papers you are holding pending Mr Hopkins reaction to Gen Arnold's "get tough" proposal.

I will endeavor to bring that item to the Chief's attention again today

Inform Gen Jamison

FROM →	OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL	PHONE

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[redacted]

Subject: Aviation Gas for the USSR

AC/AS, Plans, Logistical Plans Division, 5 October 1944

To: General Kuter, AC/AS, Plans

1. Action has been initiated to transfer to the USSR title to the surplus aviation gasoline shipped into the USSR for the FRANTIC operation. This totals approximately 35,000 tons and will be credited against a future commitment.

2. The Air Forces representative on the MAC (Air) will be guided by the general policy of confining allocations to the quantities stated within the limitations of the Protocol. P.R.C.

3. Attention is invited to the discussion, following, of the aviation fuel commitment to the USSR.

Facts Bearing on This Discussion

4. Paragraph 2, basic communication, fails to state the full commitment under the Protocol. The Fourth Russian Protocol commits the United States to the following minimum deliveries during the period 1 July 1944 - 30 June 1945:

100,000 tons of 100 octane gasoline ex U. S.
300,000 tons of alkylates ex U. S.
240,000 tons of 100 octane gasoline ex Abadan
60,000 tons of alkylates ex Abadan

The above commitment is MINIMUM, the President's directive specifically stating that these quantities will be increased if the world situation eases up.

5. The U. S. reserves the right, in the Protocol, to:

a. Substitute aviation gasoline for alkylates on a ton for tons (ratio) basis.

b. Substitute shipments from Abadan of either gasoline or alkylates for commitments from U. S.

6. Conversion factors used in this discussion for the purpose of computations are:

a. 9 barrels of gasoline or alkylates is equivalent to 1 ton.

b. 1 barrel of alkylate is equivalent to 2½ barrels of gasoline.

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Subject: Aviation Gas for the USSR [redacted]

7. Computations which follow reduce shipments and commitments to tons of aviation gasoline (a ton of alkylates being equivalent to 2½ tons of aviation gasoline), in order to provide a common denominator for reviewing the present status.

Commitment in TONS OF AVIGAS

100,000 tons of avigas ex U. S.	=	100,000 tons
300,000 tons of alkylates ex U. S.	=	750,000 tons
240,000 tons of avigas ex Abadan	=	240,000 tons
60,000 tons of alkylates ex Abadan	=	150,000 tons
TOTAL commitment in tons of avigas:		1,240,000 tons

Shipments First Four Months

2,506,000 bbls of avigas	=	278,444 tons
1,029,800 bbls of alkylates (x 2½)	=	286,055 tons
TOTAL in tons of avigas:		564,499 tons
PLUS - assignment of FRANTIC surplus avigas as now in USSR or enroute thereto		35,000 tons
TOTAL tons of avigas first four months:		599,499 tons

Recapitulation

Total tons of avigas first four months	599,499 tons
Commitment first four months (1/3 of 1,240,000 tons of avigas)	413,333 tons
OVERAGE (delivery over commitment)	186,166 tons

After delivery of 35,000 tons of surplus FRANTIC gasoline, the overage in tons of fuel delivered, over the amount committed, represents only a seven week supply.

8. It is advisable to get ahead of monthly commitments during the good shipping weather of the summer and fall months.

9. It is advisable to exercise our privilege under the Protocol of substituting shipments of finished gasoline or alkylates (particularly the latter) from Abadan, for commitments from the U. S., for these reasons:

a. The Siberian ports of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, as well as the Sea of Okhotsk, are frozen over for a minimum of four months during the winter. This is the principal route for deliveries from the U. S.

b. All fuel storage facilities at Murmansk and Archangel (the alternate route for deliveries from U. S.) have been bombed out, necessitating discharge direct from tanker to tank car trains. This factor, plus the shallow draft of those harbors, limits the capacity of these two ports to three small tankers a month (8,000 ton vessels).

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[redacted]

Subject: Aviation Gas for the USSR

c. The tanker fleet lend-leased to the USSR for carrying aviation fuel ex U. S. is limited and is actually inadequate. This situation is aggravated by the damage to the vessels which ensues from traveling in, and being frozen into, the North Pacific waters. It would be further aggravated if a Presidential directive increased the quantities over the present Protocol commitment.

d. Alkylates at Abadan, not shipped to the USSR, must be converted at Abadan. This requires shipment of base stocks ex U. S. in U. S. tankers. And relay shipment, after conversion, from Abadan to CBI.

However, if all available alkylates at Abadan are shipped to the USSR, replacement to the British for assignment to CBI is made in the U. S. Finished product replacement is made, and since the bulk of CBI gas is for U. S. forces including B-29 operation, a better grade of fuel might reasonably be expected. Further, the gasoline replaced to the British in the U. S. is transported to CBI in British tankers.

Thus substitution of shipments from Abadan to the USSR for commitments from the U. S. actually provides a vital shipping saving to the U. S.

e. General Connolly has an efficient organization now. It appears advisable to keep it functioning at top efficiency by utilizing its entire capacity. Particularly with the possibility of Russian participation in the war against Japan (after the defeat of Germany) or Russia granting us the use of bases in the Maritime Provinces, either or both of which would require full use of the Persian Gulf - Trans Siberian rail route to Vladivostok.

f. The FEA is vigorously opposed to the British assuming delivery to the USSR of any of the aviation products committed under the Protocol, since this would be on a cash basis, and the subsequent replacement to the British (by the U. S.) would be on a Lend-Lease basis.

g. Abadan to USSR (Baku) is an all-weather land route, and is the shortest and quickest means of meeting the committed deliveries.

h. Every ton of alkylates delivered overland from Abadan saves two and one-half tons of critical water shipping space.

10. When the FRANTIC operation was initiated, a project was put under way to supply the Persian Gulf Command with 150 metre-gauge tank cars, in order to increase the lift from Abadan to USSR to meet the added requirement.

After the first sixty tank cars had been shipped, the FRANTIC operation was terminated, and OPD suspended the movement of the remaining ninety cars.

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Subject: Aviation Gas for the USSR

Since it will be to the advantage of the U. S. to increase the shipments from Abadan to USSR, and since this will require expansion of the facilities of the Persian Gulf Command, it appears that the movement of these tank cars should be reinstated.

Recommendations

11.

a. That OFD re-examine the suspension of shipment of metre-gauge tank cars to the Persian Gulf Command, and initiate shipment of ninety tank cars as expeditiously as possible.

b. That no issue be made at this time of the present status of deliveries of aviation fuel under the Protocol (i.e., seven weeks ahead of schedule).

G. C. JOHNSON
Brig. General, U. S. A.
Chief, Logistical Plans Division

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Aviation Gasoline for the USSR

AFAEP
16 Oct 44

(Attention: Col C.P.Smith, G-4, Med Theater) RSB/mc/72700

1. Pursuant to a telephone conversation between Colonel Bonnevalle, this office, and Colonel Smith, there is attached hereto a copy of a study made by the AC/AS, Plans, Logistical Plans Division, relative to the shipments of aviation gasoline for the USSR under the Fourth Protocol.

2. Inasmuch as this study points out the fact that the additional tanker cars which will be used for transporting gasoline in Iran will reduce the tankerage space required for shipping gasoline or alkylates from the U.S. to the USSR, there is no objection on the part of this office to the shipment of the additional 90 tank cars in question, although the PRAETIC Operation, for which these cars were originally slated to be shipped to the PCC, is now suspended. However, this matter is referred to your office for final decision.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

L. S. KUTER
Major General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

1 Incl
Logistical study

JOE L. LOUTHAN
Brig General, U.S.A.
Chief, Operational Plans Division

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

16 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HUTH, ASSIST ANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, A-4, A-5:

SUBJECT: Aviation Gas for the USSR

1. Supplementing memorandum dated 9 October, subject as above, additional reasons for CPD reinstating shipment of ninety (90) tank cars to the Persian Gulf Command are:

a. The majority of the fuel moved from Abadan to USSR at present is in drums and five-gallon tins. Utilization of the additional tank cars will greatly relieve the drumming and tinning requirements.

b. Shipment in drums and tins monopolizes part of the limited number of box cars presently available for transport of all freight through the Persian Gulf corridor. Utilization of MTC's will release a large number of box cars for carrying other freight.

c. The locomotive power on the Persian Gulf railroad is greater than the limited rolling stock now available can absorb. The additional tank cars will utilize most of this excess available locomotive capacity.

G. C. JAMISON
Brig. General, U. S. A.
Chief, Logistical Plans Division

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SEP 27 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KUTER: (Through: Colonel Olds)

Subject: Aviation Gas for the USSR

1. CM-IN 15232 dated 16 September 1944 indicates that out of 31,500 tons of aviation gas shipped by the Persian Gulf Command to the FRANTIC bases during the months May to August 1944, only 2,950,383 gallons (approximately 7,920 long tons) were received at FRANTIC as of the 13th of September 1944. This leaves a balance of 23,500 long tons of FRANTIC aviation gas in the hands of the Soviets. In addition, the full FRANTIC allocation for September (12,000 long tons) is in the process of being shipped into the USSR. Thus, over 35,000 long tons of aviation gas shipped into the USSR for the FRANTIC operation is still held by the Soviets.

2. The Fourth Protocol commits us to shipping into the USSR for the period 1 July 1944 to 30 June 1945 a total of 300,000 long tons of aviation gas, at the minimum rate of 25,000 long tons per month.

3. A meeting is being held this morning at General York's office attended by representatives of the Army Navy Petroleum Board (Colonel Howze) and the Army Service Forces, to discuss the allocation of aviation gasoline to the Soviets. It is my "hunch" that an effort will be made at this meeting to have all of the surplus aviation gasoline shipped into the USSR for the FRANTIC operation turned over to the Soviets, over and above Protocol commitments. The foregoing statement is based on conversations with Colonel Howze, who declared that he is under almost continuous pressure from General York (the latter supported by Mr. Hopkins) to increase aviation gas allocations to the USSR.

4. In view of the worldwide acute shortage of aviation fuel, this matter is being brought to your attention with the thought that you might wish to discuss this matter at a high level. A word passed down to the Protocol committee that they should be less prodigal in this matter might have some good results.

Sept 27 - Approved
To Gen Jamison for
guidance

[redacted]

R. W. Bonnevalle

R. W. BONNEVALLE
Colonel, Air Corps

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AFAEP-40
ENV/1a/71172
mtn 14 Oct 44

16 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HUTCH, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, PLANS:

SUBJECT: Aviation Gas for the USSR

1. Supplementing memorandum dated 9 October, subject as above, additional reasons for AFD reinstating shipment of ninety (90) tank cars to the Persian Gulf Command are:

a. The majority of the fuel moved from Abadan to USSR at present is in drums and five-gallon tins. Utilization of the additional tank cars will greatly relieve the drumming and tinning requirements.

b. Shipment in drums and tins monopolizes part of the limited number of box cars presently available for transport of all freight through the Persian Gulf corridor. Utilization of MTO's will release a large number of box cars for carrying other freight.

c. The locomotive power on the Persian Gulf railroad is greater than the limited rolling stock now available can absorb. The additional tank cars will utilize most of this excess available locomotive capacity.

G. C. JAMISON
Brig. General, U. S. A.
Chief, Logistical Plans Division

OFFICE SYMBOL	1 AEP-40	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION				[redacted]		

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27 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL JAMISON:

1. Colonel Bonnevalle has been handling a matter pertaining to possible allocation of aviation gasoline to the Soviets and tank cars to General Connally for use in delivering FRANTIC project gasoline to the Russians.

2. Our action on this matter, in direct contrast to John York & Company's generosity, should follow the general line of informing Deane that our attitude is that FRANTIC has been scaled down and therefore aviation gasoline and all other items pertaining to the support of FRANTIC should be promptly and vigorously scaled down in precisely the proportion of the reduction in the FRANTIC operation.

3. If anything, we should lean on the tough side. The Russians have failed to grant small favors, or to cooperate after the offer of extensive bounty.

L. S. KUTER,
Major General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans.

Cy to:
General Giles

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[redacted]

AC/AS, Materiel & Services
Aviation Petroleum Branch
(DBS-5) 77774

14 September 1944

Commanding General
Persian Gulf Command
Teheran, Iran

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Commanding General
U.S. Military Mission USSR
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Caserta, Italy

AAF
INFO
DBS/5
AEP

Number WARX 30515

To Connolly for Sweet information Spaatz Eaker Deane and Walsh from Arnold and Soviet Protocol Committee York reference your 19275 dated 10 September and our 29359 dated 12 September.

Present allocation from Abadan to Russia is 25,000 tons of avgas per month consisting of 20,000 finished fuel 5,000 blending agents this volume represents present protocol agreement. Russia has requested additional 12,000 tons per month finished fuel based on assumption that ATLANTIC requirements are to be cancelled. This assumption not definitely established and being checked by US authorities here. US authorities have agreed to replace from US sources 25,000 tons per month delivered

CM-OUT- 30515 (14 Sep 44)

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[redacted]

Number WARX 30515 Page 2

to Russia from Abadan. In view present unclarified situtation suggest additional volumnsfor Russia up to total of 37,000 tons in September be moved from Abadan. If FRANTIC requirements are not cancelled necessary adjustments will be made here in future allocations to Russia.

Allocations of avgas from US sources of production are controlled by Aviation Petroleum Products Allocation Committee Washington and from British sources by Aviation Petroleum Products London Allocation Committee. US committee makes allocations about the 20th of each month for the succeeding month. Critical supply situation avgas makes it impossible for US Committee to project allocations except on a month to month basis. London Committee allocates from British sources on a quarterly basis. This is possible due to the fact that all requirements not available from British sources are supplied from US sources. Efforts being made here to properly coordinate all future information furnished you on this question to eliminate present confusion.

End
1786

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF

INFORMATION: ASF
OPD
Navy
MAB (General York)

CM-OUT-30515 (14 Sep 44) 2140Z ngs

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AC/AS, Materiel & Services
Aviation Petroleum Branch
(DBS-5) 77774

14 September 1944

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Commanding General
U.S. Military Mission USSR
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
Persian Gulf Command
Teheran, Iran

AAF
INFO
DBS-5
[redacted]

Number WARX 30514

To Spaatz for Knerr information Baker Deane Walsh and Connolly from Arnold reference H 62130 dated 10 September.

Understanding this headquarters from message 27[illegible]8 B dated 27 August from Caserta reporting results of conference is that Knerr advised PGC stop all shipments to ESCom which we assume included avgas no direct action has been taken by this headquarters to cancel Abadan allocation. Our WARX 88057 dated 28 August to Spaatz and WARX 88417 dated 31 August to Deane authorized closing frantic operations. In view of existing stocks avgas at frantic bases from deliveries in previous months and current status operations unable understand the need for 3500 tons avgas from Abadan September. Believe all allocations from

CM-OUT-30514 (14 Sep 44)

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Number WARX 30514 Page 2

Abadan for frantic should be immediately cancelled. Several agencies here including Russian protocol committee are vitally concerned with this matter. Please immediately clarify and advise APPLAC and US your final answer.

End

1787

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
MAB (General York)

CM-OUT-30514 (14 Sep 44) 2139Z ngs

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[redacted]PRIORITY

From: CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran

To: War Department
CG, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

No. P19539 16 September 1944

P19539 to Spaatz for Knerr info to Marshall for OPD, AGWAR for ANPB, Arnold, Deane and Walsh from Sweet ref Hq Air Force England message H62130 of 10 September.

Shipment of aviation gasoline to Russia is subject. FRANTIC allocations have been combined with aid to Russia allocations for shipment in common pool from which FRANTIC draws according to needs up to limit of allocation. Following amounts given in long tons have been thus turned over to Russians from FRANTIC.

May	6,500
June	6,500
July	6,500
August	12,000

Making total of 31,500 long tons prior to September, all of which has been shipped into Russia. Walsh advises total of 2,950,383 gallons (approx 7,920 long tons) received by FRANTIC as of 13 September. Balance due FRANTIC is approx 23,500 long tons. September allocation to FRANTIC was 12,000 long tons. Deane subsequently advised on 31 August that FRANTIC requirements for September and subsequent months had been canceled. British PAIForce advised on 6 September that the entire 12,000 tons would be shipped to

CM-IN-15232 (16 Sep 44)

[redacted] ASC ASSIST ABI AEP INFO DBS/5 ACTION AAF

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From: CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran

No. P19539 16 September 1944

Russia and reallocated as follows: For FRANTIC 3500, for Russia 8500. Since Walsh had previously confirmed fact that additional gasoline is not needed by FRANTIC and Deane's instructions to us recancellation of shipments had not been modified by either Washington or your Headquarters we advised the British that the FRANTIC requirement no longer existed, (OPD and ANPB note that PGC did not receive any instructions through US Army sources as to increase in Russia allocation) In the absence of further instructions PGC is proceeding to receive and ship total amount of 12,000 tons on the presumption that if not needed by FRANTIC it will be turned over to the Russians. PGC now has on order 150 rail tank cars which will be required if the 12,000 long tons per month is shipped either to FRANTIC or the Russians and if this commitment is canceled in its entirety and future Russian allocations do not exceed 25,000 tons per month including alkylate, the additional rail tank cars will not be needed by PGC. Therefore essential that we be kept informed of proposed plans for the shipment of aviation gasoline to Russia for all purposes.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO : ASF
OPD

CM-IN-15232 (16 Sep 44) 19367 mcs

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[redacted]

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England

To: War Department
CG, USSTAF Eastern Echelon, London, England
CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran

Nr: H 62208 16 September 1944

To Walsh info Arnold attn Aviation Petroleum Branch info Sweet info Deane from Knerr sgd Spaatz H 62208 rourad T 684 September 12. Copy sent to Walsh.

Until further notice your message received that no further aviation gasoline or oil will be required. We have cancelled your September allocation of 3500 tons aviation gasoline. No further allocations will be obtained until you advise need. Remember it may take 2 months from time you request allocation until supplies arrive at your bases. As regards aircraft engine oil no further supplies will be arranged until you advise. Disposition has been made of oil now at or en route to Persian Gulf Command.

End.

AAF
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ACTION: CG AAF

INFO : ASF
OPD

CM-IN-15473 (17 Sep 44) 02342 mlm

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[redacted]

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England

To: War Department
CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran
Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy
Headquarters, Eastern Command, USSTAF, Europe

Nr: H 62218 17 September 1944

To Arnold info Sweet, Walsh, Deane and Baker from Knerr H 62218 sgd Spaatz reurad WARX 30514.

All allocations of avgas for FRANTIC have been cancelled. Applac and all others concerned have already been notified. See our H 62208 dated 16 September present annum.

End

FOOTNOTE: Ref is CM-IN-15473 (17 Sep 44) CGAAF

ACTION: CGAAF

INFO : ASF
OPD

CM-IN-16535 (18 Sep 44) 0833Z jb

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AEP
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PRIORITY

From: CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran.

To: War Department.
Headquarters, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
London, England.
US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

Nr: PX 19880 25 September 1944

PX 19880 to Arnold from Connolly info Spaatz and Deane reurad WARX 30515 dated 14th September 44.

Russian AVGAS. To date no further word has been received concerning October commitments AVGAS to Russia. Baghdad Petroleum Advisory Committee put forth tentative figure 25,333 tons 130 grade and 5,000 tons Alkylate. Firm figure necessary for our October target plan meeting with British and Russians to be here 28th September 0630 hours Washington time.

End

AAF
ACTION
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MSC
AEP
DMA
AMS
ABI

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO: ASF
OPD
Navy
MAD

CM-IN-[illegible]3677 (25 Sep 44) 1728Z ngs

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[redacted]

AC/AS, MMS Air Services Div.
DBS-5 Aviation Petroleum Br.
Col H.W. Howze/77774

27 September 1944

Commanding General
Persian Gulf Command
Teheran Iran

Commanding General
US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London England

Commanding General
US Military Mission to USSR
Moscow Russia

Number WARX 38127

To Connolly from Arnold information Spaatz and Deane

Tank cars for your command 60 have been shipped, 50 in August 10 in September, decision pending on shipment of balance of 90. We estimate present cars plus 60 referred to above will increase your shipping capacity to 32000 long tons per month. Reference our 2664 dated 6 March and your FX 19880 dated 25 September. Quantity programed for shipment October should be up to 32000 long tons of avgas and alkylate. Definite future program will be established later. Quantities the Russians actually retain from shipments made to ESCOM from FRANTIC allocations of May through September will be considered by MAB in making future allocations.

AAF

INFO

AF 3858

End

DBS/5

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF
INFORMATION: ASF Plans
OPD
MAB

A.E.P.

OM-OUT 38127 (28 Sept 44) 2137Z khc

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PRIORITY

From: CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran

To: War Department

No: P 20962 19 October 1944

To Arnold info AGWAR for ANPB from Booth signed Connolly P 20962.

Will require information in regard to aviation gasoline figure estsblished for November shipment to USSR not later than 25 October for the November target plan conference with Soviets and British also for meeting of the Railway Tank Car Allocation Subcommittee of the Baghdad Petroleum Advisory Committee. Your WARX 38127 arrived too late for last target plan conference and no information of conclusive plan for future you mentioned is being prepared has been received here. No figure for November from British as there was no meeting of Baghdad Petroleum Advisory Committee in October. Only information we have refer to cured PX 20097 of 29 September PAIFORCE proposed following target from War Office London: November 130 grade avgas, 32000 tons. ALKYLATE to be given at future date but ALKYLATE figure for October of 5858 tons has been further increased today by 1555 tons and we are planning priority shipment in accordance with your 73269 of 31 July.

End.

ACTION: ASF

INFO : CG AAF
OPD

CM-IN-18096 (19 Oct 44) 1451Z mcs

[redacted]

AAF
INFO
DBS/5
DTR
AEP
DMA
ABI

Copy No. 30

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ITALIAN BASES FOR STRATEGIC AIR FORCE

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ITALIAN BASES FOR STRATEGIC AIR FORCE

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SUBJECT	FROM	TO	DATE
Report - Italian Bases	--	--	--
Plan for Movement of the XII Bomber Command from the Tunis Area to Sardinia	Hq XII Bomber Command	--	--
Plan for Movement of Expanded Northwest African Strategic Air Force to the Italian Theater	NWA Strategic Air Force	--	--

P.R.C.

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DOD DIR 5200.9, 27 Sep 80

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

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2/4/44

Transfer of B-25G Squadron.

AC/AS, Plans, Operational Plans Division. 4 Feb 44

AC/AS, Plans, Logistical Plans Division. 1

WMB/hmh/74055

1. The Army Air Forces have one squadron equipped with B-25G airplanes operating with the RAF (in Middle East) doing anti-surface vessel patrols. This squadron is based at Gambut. General Royce stated that this squadron does not know the proper use of this type airplane and recommends that this squadron be taken out of Middle East and sent to Italy.

2. This matter was not discussed with General Baker.

3. It is requested that Operational Plans study this problem and take whatever action is indicated.

W. M. BURGOYNE
Major, Air Corps

TO: AC/AS, Plans, Logistical Plans Division DATE

FROM: AC/AS, Plans, Operational Plans Division. Comment No. 2
ACC/ch/6724

1. In message from General Baker, CM-IN 16493, 24 Feb 44 (cable MAAF 458 22 Feb) it is stated that this squadron is being returned to its group.

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief, Operational Plans Division

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S E C R E T
Auth: CG, NASAF
Date: 18 Sept 43
Per:

HEADQUARTERS
NORTHWEST AFRICAN STRATEGIC AIR FORCE
APO 520

F-EPW-art

370.5

18 September, 1943

PLAN FOR MOVEMENT OF EXPANDED NORTHWEST AFRICAN STRATEGIC AIR FORCE TO THE ITALIAN THEATER

1. The following studies have already been made on the operation of the Northwest African Strategic Air Force to the Italian Theater:

a. Plan for movement of XII Bomber Command to Sardinia, 11 September, 1943.

b. Plan for movement of XII Bomber Command to Italy, 15 September, 1943.

c. List of Italian ports by classes.

2. Considering the proposed expansion of this Air Force it is desireable to have Air Force Headquarters and the bulk of the units located in Italy for easier control and communication. If Italy becomes saturated, it would be possible to operate several additional Wings from Sardinia. The airdromes selected in Italy are south of Bologna in an area where better than average weather prevails during the winter months. The present force, including five (5) B-24 Groups and all nine (9) RAF Squadrons, can be moved into the Foggia-Bovine district by December 1st in accordance with NAAF OPS Memo No. 33, 13 September, 1943. As more territory becomes occupied, airfields prepared, and supplies established, the present units will move into the area between Rome and Bologna except for the B-24 units which will remain at Foggia until additional airfields are prepared. As more airfields become ready the additional heavy bombardment Wings from the United States can be accomodated in this district. Additional units can also be accomodated in the Foggia district after it is vacated by the forward movement. The airfield construction program will consist largely in improving existing facilities. After all of Italy is occupied the Medium Groups will be required farther forward and additional Heavy Groups can be moved into the airfields vacated. The following definite plan for setting up the expanded Air Force in Italy is recommended. This plan is based on the following assumptions:

a. The need for continuous operations against the enemy of all units of the Strategic Air Force until all of Italy is occupied.

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b. The need for inaugurating an intensive air offensive against targets in Germany at the earliest possible moment.

c. That airdromes to be occupied will require repair and improvement.

d. That necessary Service Command troops, Aviation Engineers, and initial supplies will precede the movement of our combat units to Italy.

e. That ground troops will furnish necessary security and anti-aircraft protection to airfields and other installations of the Strategic Air Force.

f. That water movement of units from North Africa to Italy will be largely by LCT (Landing Craft Tank).

g. That a limited number of air transports will be available to move the air echelons of present units of this Air Force.

h. That additional Heavy Bomb Groups will be sent direct from the United States to Italy, the ground and service personnel preceding the air echelon whenever possible.

i. That the air echelons of Heavy Bomb Groups from the Eighth Air Force will be sent to Italy to operate under Strategic Air Force for limited periods.

j. That large ground offensive efforts will not be sustained through ports required for the movement and supply of the Strategic Air Force.

3. Service Command troops are required in proportion greater than provided in Army Air Force Regulations No. 65-1. The additional troops are necessary to service the air echelons of units preceding ground echelons, and air echelons of the Eighth Air Force units. Additional depot personnel is required to set up adequate depot service at the earliest possible moment. Service Command troops should be in place ready to receive supplies before supplies start arriving.

4. SUPPLY: Units moving in must have the required 10 day supply; related Service Squadrons must have 30 day supply for unit served. Depots must be set up with 60 day supply within 30 days after arrival of units served.

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5. MOVEMENT; Initial: The present units of the Strategic Air Force will move to Italy in accordance with the following plan for movement of the XII Bomber Command from the Tunis area to Italy. The plan is in accordance with NAAF OPS Memo No. 33, 13 September, 1943:

a.	b. Type & No. of Unit	c. Number of Personnel	d. No of M/T	e. No of M/C	f. Dead Wt Tons Equipment	g. Present Location	h. Departure Date	i. New Location	j. Arrival Date
1	Hq XII B.C.	340	60		32	Tunis	13 Oct	Foggia	16 Oct
2.	146 Sig Co	232	31	2	21	Tunis	13 Oct	Foggia	16 Oct
3	Hq 47th Wg	245	20		14	Hammanet	16 Oct	Lucera	19 Oct
4	331 Sig Co	95	16		2	Hammanet	16 Oct	Lucera	19 Oct
5	Hq 42nd Wg	245	20		14	Ariana	16 Oct	Foggia	19 Oct
6	324 Sig Co	95	16		2	Ariana	16 Oct	Foggia	19 Oct
7	325 Ftr Gp	550	100		130	Mateur	17 Oct	Foggia#8	20 Oct
8	82 Ftr Gp	640	100		120	Grombalia	18 Oct	Foggia#3	21 Oct
9	14 Ftr Gp	640	100		120	St Marie du Zit	19 Oct	Cerignola(5 me)	22 Oct
10	1 Ftr Gp	640	100		120	Mateur	20 Oct	Cerignola(5 me)	23 Oct
11	1051 MP Co	77	7	6	10	Tunis	20 Oct	Foggia	23 Oct
12	321 Bm Gp	822	140		211	Soliman	21 Oct	Foggia#12	24 Oct
13	310 Bm Gp	822	140		211	Memzel Temine	22 Oct	Foggia#10	25 Oct
14	17 Bm Gp	822	140		211	Djedeida	23 Oct	Foggia#1	26 Oct
15	319 Bm Gp	822	140		211	Djedeida	24 Oct	Foggia#2	27 Oct
16	320 Bm Gp	822	140		211	El Bathan	25 Oct	Gino Lise	28 Oct
17	Hq 5th Wg	179	20		14	Depienne	1 Nov	Cerignola	4 Nov
18	317 Sig Co	91	20		14	Depienne	1 Nov	Cerignola	4 Nov
19	2 Bm Gp	770	155		255	Massicault	3 Nov	Foggia#3	8 Nov
20	97 Bm Gp	770	155		255	Depienne	4 Nov	2mS,Trinitapoli	7 Nov
21	99 Bm Gp	770	155		255	Oudna	5 Nov	8mW, Andria	8 Nov
22	301 Bm Gp	770	155		255	Oudna	6 Nov	5mSE,Andria	9 Nov
23	Hq 2 Bm Wg					Enfidaville	7 Nov	Terlizzi	10 Nov
24	98 Bm Gp	1205	155		255	Hergla	7 Nov	Between Corate and Trani	10 Nov
25	376 Bm Gp	1205	155		255	Enfidaville	8 Nov	1mS,Terlizzi	11 Nov
26	93 Bm Gp					Hergla	9 Nov	Nocattaro,S.	12 Nov
27	389 Bm Gp					Hergla	10 Nov	Botonto,W.	13 Nov
28	44 Bm Gp					Enfidaville	11 Nov	Bihrito	14 Nov

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MOVEMENT; Initial - CONT'D:

a.	b. Type & No. of Unit	c. Number of Personnel	d. No. of M/T	e. No. of M/C	f. Dead Wt T. of Equip	g. Present Location	h. Departure Date	i. New Location	j. Arrival Date
29	240 Wg		280			Kairouan	12 Nov	1mW, Grumo	15 Nov
30	231 Wg		280			Kairouan	13 Nov	5mESE, Altamura	16 Nov
31	236 Wg		280			Kairouan	14 Nov	4mS, Santerano en Calle	17 Nov
32	330 Wg		145			Kairouan	15 Nov	6mNNE, Gioia del Calle	18 Nov
33	331 Wg		181			Kairouan	16 Nov	1mE, Sammiche de Bari	19 Nov

6. MOVEMENT; Subsequent: The movement subsequent to the occupation of Italian territory up to Bologna will be as follows: (D-Day will be the day Bologna is cleared).

Date	Unit	From	To	Longest run in yards
D-	Hq NASAF	Foggia	Rome	
D-	Hq 5th Wg	Cerignola	Rome	
D+1	2 Bm Gp	Foggia #8	Guidonia	2300
D+2	97 Bm Gp	Trinitapoli	Ciampino, N.	3000
D+3	99 Bm Gp	Andria, W.,	Ciampino, S.,	3000
D+4	301 Bm Gp	Andria, E.,	Roma Contecelle	1500*
D+5	14 Ftr Gp	Cerignola, E.,	Roma Littorio	1500
D+	Hq 47th Wg	Lucera	Viterbo	
D+1	310 Bm Gp	Foggia #10	Tarquina	1800
D+2	321 Bm Gp	Foggia #12	Orvieto	1500*
D+3	82nd Ftr Gp	Foggia #3	Viterbo	1500
D+5	Hq 42 Wg	Foggia	Grosetto	
D+6	17 Bm Gp	Foggia #1	Grosetto	1900
D+7	319 Bm Gp	Foggia #2	Grosetto	1900
D+8	320 Bm Gp	Ginolisa	Foligno	2200
D+9	325 Ftr Gp	Boggia #8	Pistoia San Magello	1300
D+9	1 Ftr Gp	Cerignola, E.,	Peretola	1300
D+10	Hq 2 Bm Wg	Terlizzi	Foggia	

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MOVEMENT; Subsequent - CONT'D:

Date	Unit	From	To	Longest Run in Yards
D+11	98 Bm Gp	Corate-Trani	Foggia #1	2000**
D+12	376 Bm Gp	Terlizzi, S.,	Foggia #2	2000**
D+13	93 Bm Gp	Nocattaro, S.,	Foggia #10	2000**
D+14	389 Bm Gp	Botonto, W.,	Foggia #12	2000**
D+15	44 Bm Gp	Bihrito	Gino Iiza	
D+16	Hq 205 Gp	Grumo	Florence	
D+17	240 Wg	Grumo, W.,	Iesi	
D+18	231 Wg	Altamuro, E.,	Lucca-Tassignand	2000**
D+19	236 Wg	Santero en CalleS	Pontedera	2000**
D+20	230 Wg	Gioia del Calle,N	Pisa San Guisto	2000**
D+21	331 Wg	Samechedi Barie	Fand	2000**
D+30	Hq B-17 Wg#1	USA	Perugia	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) A	USA	Siena Magliano	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) B	USA	Castiglion del Lago	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) C	USA	Perugia	2000**
"	Hq B-17 Wg#2	USA	Rome	
"	Bm Gp (H) D	USA	Rieti	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) E	USA	Aguila	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) F	USA	Rome Mariciano	2000**
"	Hq B-17 Wg #3	USA	Frosinone	
"	Bm Gp (H) G	USA	Frosinone	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) H	USA	Cisterna Littoria	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) I	USA	Frosinone District	2000**
D+30	Hq B-17 Wg#4	USA	Pisa	
D+50	Bm Gp (H) J	USA	Pisa (District)	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) K	USA	Pisa (District)	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) L	USA	Pisa (District)	2000**
"	Hq B-17 Wg#5	USA	Grosetto	
"	Bm Gp (H) M	USA	Grosetto	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) N	USA	Viterbo District	2000**
"	Bm Gp (H) O	USA	Viterbo District	2000**
D+20	Ftr Gp A	USA	Centocelle	1500**
"	Ftr Gp B	USA	Stigmigliano	1500**
"	Ftr Gp C	USA	Albinia	1500**
D+50	Ftr Gp D	USA	Ravenna	1500**
"	Ftr Gp E	USA	Sarzana	1500**
"	Ftr Gp F	USA	Pisa Albarola	

* - Fields marked with an asterisk must be extended.

** - Fields marked with a double asterisk must either be built or greatly improved.

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For the Commanding General:

Earle E. Partridge

EARLE E. PARTRIDGE,
Brigadier General, U.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

3 Incls:
#1-Plan for Movement of XII Bomber Command to Sardinia.
#2-Plan for Movement of XII Bomber Command to Italy.
#3-List of Italian Ports by classes.

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HEADQUARTERS, XII BOMBER COMMAND
APO 520

Enclosure
US ARMY

11 September 1943.

PLAN FOR MOVEMENT OF THE XII BOMBER COMMAND FROM THE TUNIS AREA TO SARDINIA.

1. General - The plan herewith submitted is based upon the following assumptions:

a. The need for continous operation against the enemy of all units of the XII Bomber Command.

b. The need for moving the short range units of this Command as far forward as possible at the earliest possible date so as to be within effective range of profitable targets.

c. The need for securing bases from which Germany can be effectively bombed by this Command at the earliest possible moment.

d. There are no usable supplies for this Command in Sardinia.

e. The airdromes to be occupied will require repair and improvement.

f. The water movement of the ground echelons of the units of this Command will be by L.C.T. (Landing Craft Tanks), from Bizerte to Cagliari or in some cases Olbia.

g. The necessary Service Command Troops, initial supplies and required aviation Engineers will precede the movement of combat troops to Sardinia.

h. A limited number of air transports will be available to move the air echelons of the units of this Command.

i. That none of the Wellington Squadrons now in the Strategic Air Force will accompany the XII Bomber Command on the initial move. When sufficient airfields have been prepared it is desired that the movement of the Wellington Squadrons follow the movement of units covered in this plan.

2. Ground Troops

a. Ground troops will effect landings on D day in sufficient force and with sufficient mobility to occupy and secure the entire Island by D plus 5.

b. That the ground troops furnish necessary security to airfields and other installations of the XII Bomber Command and provide necessary anti-aircraft defense for all installations as fast as they are occupied.

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3. Air Service Command Troops - Initial Landing Cagliari.

a. D plus 3 - Advance echelon four (4) Service Squadrons, advance echelon of Air Depot Group, two (2) Battalions, Aviation Engineers, two (2) Truck Companies and one (1) Ordnance Company, Ammunition.

b. D plus 5 - Remainder of four (4) Service Squadrons, remainder of Air Depot Group.

c. D plus 8 - Six (6) Ordnance Companies, Air Base, six (6) Ordnance Companies, Airdrome Service, five (5) additional Service Squadrons, four (4) additional Truck Companies.

d. D plus 11 - Two (2) Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies (A), two (2) Ammunition Companies, two (2) Aviation Engineers Battalion.

NOTE: Additional Service Troops in proportion to maintain the ratio for the combat troops prescribed in Army Air Force Regulations 65-1 will be sent to Sardinia as required.

4. The following table of supplies for units of this Air Force is furnished for the purpose of necessary compilation:

Estimated Consumption - Gas - Oil - Bombs for Seven Day Period Intensive Operation.

Units	Gas-tons	Oil-tons	Bombs-tons	Ammun.-tons	Total-tons.
6 Bomb Gp (H)	4500	240	2460	180	7380
3 Bomb Gp (B-26)	1350	75	600	36	2061
2 Bomb Gp (B-25)	860	46	400	24	1330
3 Ftr Gp (P-38)	1500	90	300	39	1929
9 Well. Sqdns.	1485	90	1350	23	2948
1 Ftr Gp (P-40)	400	23	60	13	496
Total	10,095	564	5,170	315	16,144

Following are estimates on tonnage for Tech Supply and rations:
(Ten day period)

Unit	Tech. Supply - tons	Rations-tons	Oxygen
6 Bomb Gps (H)	240	720	
5 Bomb Gps (M)	325	567	
3 Ftr Gps (P-38)	120	265	
9 Well. Squads.	100	(British)	
1 Ftr. Gp (P-40)	40	90	
Total	825	1,642	3,000 bottles

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5. Location of XII Bomber Command Units.

a. Headquarters, XII Bomber Command — Cagliari
Headquarters, B-24 Wing — Decimomannu
Headquarters, 5th Wing — Elmas
Headquarters, 42nd Wing — Olbia
Headquarters, 47th Wing — Ottana
Headquarters, II A.S.A.C. — Cagliari

b.

Unit	Type Aircraft	Location	Longest Run in yds.
17th Bomb Group (M)	B-26	Venafiorita	2000 yds.
319th Bomb Group (M)	B-26	Alghero	1700 yds.
320th Bomb Group (M)	B-26	Chilivani	2500 yds.
2nd Bomb Group (H)	B-17	Pabillonis	1800 yds.
97th Bomb Group (H)	B-17	Oristano	1800 yds.
99th Bomb Group (H)	B-17	Senorbi	1300 yds.
301st Bomb Group (H)	B-17	Elmas	1650 yds.
98th Bomb Group (H)	B-24	Villacidro	1950 yds.
376th Bomb Group (H)	B-24	Decimomannu	2500 yds.
310th Bomb Group (M)	B-25	Villis	1600 yds.
321st Bomb Group (M)	B-25	Ottana #2	1400 yds.
325th Fighter Gp (S.E.)	P-40	Fauste Noce	1300 yds.
14th Fighter Gp (T.E.)	P-38	Monserrato	1700 yds.
82nd Fighter Gp (T.E.)	P-38	Ottano #1	1400 yds.
1st Fighter Gp (T. .)	P-38	Borore	(1300 yds.) (Must be extended)

6. Movement Schedule, Air:

Serial No.	date	Unit	No & Type A/C	No. Pilots	No. Off & El
1	D plus 12	Air Echelon 325 Ftr Gp.	20 C-47		260
"	D plus 13	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-40	80	
2	D plus 13	Air Echelon 82 Ftr Gp	20 C-47		260
"	D plus 14	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-38	80	
3	D plus 14	Air Echelon 14 Ftr Gp	20 C-47		260
"	D plus 15	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-38	80	
4.	D plus 15	Air Echelon 1 Ftr Gp	20 C-47		260
"	D plus 16	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-38	80	
5	D plus 16	Air Echelon 321 B. G. (M)	20 C-47		260
"	D plus 17	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-25		640

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Serial No.	Date	Unit	No & type A/C	No Pilots	No of Off & EM
6	D plus 17	Air Echelon 310 B.G. (M)	20 C-47		640
"	D plus 18	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-25		640
7	D plus 18	Air Echelon 17 B.G. (M)	20 C-47		240
"	D plus 19	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-26		700
8	D plus 19	Air Echelon 319 B.G. (M)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 20	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-26		700
9	D plus 20	Air Echelon 320 B.G. (M)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 21	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-26		700
10	D plus 21	Air Echelon 2 B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 22	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
11	D plus 22	Air Echelon 97 B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 23	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
12	D plus 23	Air Echelon 99 B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 24	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
13	D plus 24	Air Echelon 301 B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 25	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
14	D plus 25	Air Echelon 98 B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 26	Combat Ech. " " " "	40 B-24		480
15	D plus 26	Air Echelon 376 B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
"	D plus 27	Combat Ech. " " " "	40 B-24		480

7. Water Movement :

Serial #1-Ground Echelon 325th Fighter Group, 140 Officers and Enlisted Men. Organizational Equipment, 100 vehicles including trailers, 411 short tons, 2694 ship tons. 70 additional 1½ ton trucks are required to move this unit to the port of embarkation. D plus 14 move to port of embarkation. D plus 15 embark on LCT's. D plus 17 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #2 - Ground Echelon 82nd Fighter Group, personnel and equipment same as per serial #1. D plus 15 move to port of embarkation. D plus 16 embark. D plus 18 disembark and arrive at new station.

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Serial #3 - Ground Echelon 14th Fighter Group, personnel and equipment same as per Serial #1. D plus 16 move to port of embarkation. D plus 17 embark. D plus 19 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #4 - Ground Echelon 1st Fighter Group, personnel and equipment same as per Serial #1. D plus 17 move to port of embarkation. D plus 18 embark. D plus 20 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #5 - Ground Echelon 321st Bombardment Group (M), 822 officers and enlisted men. Organizational equipment, 140 vehicles, including trailers, 716 short tons, 4481 ship tons. 100 additional trucks required to move this organization to the port of embarkation. D plus 18 move to port of embarkation. D plus 19 embark. D plus 21 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #6 - Ground Echelon 310th Bombardment Group (M), personnel and equipment same as per Serial #5. D plus 19 move to port of embarkation. D plus 20 embark. D plus 22 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #7 - Ground Echelon 17th Bombardment Group (M), 780 Officers and enlisted men. Organizational equipment. 140 vehicles including trailers. 816 short tons, 4481 ship tons. 100 additional trucks required to move unit to port of embarkation. D plus 20 move to port of embarkation. D plus 21 embark. D plus 23 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #8 - Ground Echelon 319th Bombardment Group (M), personnel and equipment same as per Serial #7. D plus 21 move to port of embarkation. D plus 22 embark. D plus 24 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #9 - Ground Echelon 320th Bombardment Group (M), personnel and equipment same as per Serial #7. D plus 22 move to port of embarkation. D plus 23 embark. D plus 25 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #10 - Ground Echelon 2nd Bombardment Group (H), 770 Officers and enlisted men. Organizational equipment. 155 vehicles, 790 short tons, 4125 ship tons. 140 additional 2½ ton trucks required to move this unit to port of embarkation. D plus 24 move to port of embarkation. D plus 25 embark. D plus 27 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #11 - Ground Echelon 97th Bombardment Group (H), personnel and equipment same as per Serial #10. D plus 25 move to port of embarkation D plus 26 embark. D plus 28 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #12 - Ground Echelon 99th Bombardment Group (H), personnel and equipment same as per Serial #10. D plus 26 move to port of embarkation. D plus 27 embark. D plus 29 disembark and arrive at new station.

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Serial #13 - Ground Echelon 301st Bombardment Group (H), personnel and equipment same as per serial #10. D plus 27 move to port of embarkation. D plus 28 embark. D plus 30 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #14 - Ground Echelon for 98th Bombardment Group (H), 1010 officers and enlisted men. Organizational equipment, 150 vehicles including trailers - 790 short tons, 4125 ship tons. 140 additional trucks required to move this unit to port of embarkation. D plus 28 move to port of embarkation. D plus 29 embark. D plus 31 disembark and arrive at new station.

Serial #15 - Ground Echelon 376th Bombardment Group (H), personnel and equipment same as serial #14. D plus 29 move to port of embarkation. D plus 30 embark. D plus 32 disembark and arrive at new station.

8. Movement of Headquarters, Air:

Serial #1 - D plus 5, Air Echelon, Headquarters, XII Bomber Command, 6 C-47's, 20 officers, 40 enlisted men.

Serial #2 - D plus 5, Air Echelon, Headquarters, 47th Wing, 3 C-47's 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

Serial #3 - D plus 8, Air Echelon, Headquarters 42nd Wing, 3 C-47's 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

Serial #4 - D plus 10, Air Echelon, Headquarters, 5th Wing, 3 C-47's, 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

Serial #5 - D plus 12, Air Echelon, Headquarters, B-24 Wing, 3 C-47's, 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

9. Later Movement of Headquarters Ground Echelon:

Serial #1 - D plus 15, Ground Echelon, XII Bomber Command Headquarters, 150 officers, 290 enlisted men, 60 vehicles - 104 short tons, 535 ship tons.

Serial #2 - D plus 15, Ground Echelon, Headquarters, 47th Wing, 44 officers, 171 enlisted men. 77 short tons, 435 ship tons.

Serial #3 - D plus 17, Ground Echelon, Headquarters, 42nd Wing, personnel and equipment same as in serial #2.

Serial #4 - D plus 19, Ground Echelon, Headquarters, 5th Wing, personnel and equipment same as per serial #2.

Serial #5 - D plus 21, Ground Echelon, Headquarters, B-24 Wing, personnel and equipment same as per serial #2.

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NOTE: It is desired that the extra trucks required for each unit to move to the port of embarkation be moved with the unit to its new location. Such trucks as are required for use in the new theater should be retained there by the Service Command. Surplus trucks can be returned by returning L.C.T.'s.

For the Commanding General:

EE

E. P. PARTRIDGE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

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S E C R E T
AUTH: CG, XII B. C.
DATE: 15 SEPT, 1943
PER

HEADQUARTERS, XII BOMBER COMMAND
APO 520 US ARMY

370.5

15 September, 1943.

PLAN FOR MOVEMENT OF THE XII BOMBER COMMAND FROM THE TUNIS AREA TO ITALY

1. GENERAL: The plan herewith submitted is based upon the following assumptions:

a. The need for continous operation against the Enemy of all units of the XII Bomber Command.

b. The need for moving the short range units of this Command as far forward as possible at the earliest possible date so as to be within effective range of profitable targets.

c. The need for securing bases from which Germany can be effectively bombed by this Command at the earliest possible movement.

d. There are no usable supplies for this Command in Italy.

e. The airdromes to be occupied will require repair and improvement.

f. The water movement of the ground echelons of the units of this Command will be by L. C. T. (Landing Craft Tanks), from Bizerte to Naples or in some cases Barletta or Bari.

g. The necessary Service Command Troops, initial supplies and required aviation Engineers will precede the movement of combat troops to Italy.

h. A limited number of air transports will be available to move the air echelons of the units of this Command.

i. That the Wellington Squadrons now in the Strategic Air Force will accompany the XII Bomber Command on this move. When sufficient airfields have been prepared it is desired that the movement of the Wellington Squadrons follow the movement of units covered in this plan.

2. GROUND TROOPS:

a. Ground troops will secure the area to be occupied by the XII Bomber Command prior to October 1, 1943.

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b. That the ground troops furnish necessary security to airfields and other installations of the AII Bomber Command and provide necessary anti-aircraft defense for all installations as fast as they are occupied.

3. Air Service Command Troops - Initial Landing Naples:

a. October 1 - Advance Echelon four (4) Service Squadrons, advance echelon of Air Depot Group, two (2) Battalions, Aviation Engineers, two (2) Truck Companies and one (1) Ordnance Company, Ammunition.

b. October 3 - Remainder of four (4) Service Squadrons, remainder of Air Depot Group.

c. October 5 - Six (6) Ordnance Companies, Air Base, six (6) Ordnance Companies, Airdrome Service, five (5) additional Service Squadrons, four (4) additional Truck Companies.

d. October 7 - Two (2) Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies (4), two (2) Ammunition Companies, two (2) Aviation Engineers Battalions.

NOTE: Additional Service Troops in proportion to maintain the ratio for the combat troops prescribed in Army Air Force Regulations 65-1 will be sent to Italy as required.

4. The following table of supplies for units of this Air Force is furnished for the purpose of necessary compilation:

Estimated Consumption - Gas - Oil - Bombs for Seven Day Period Intensive Operation:

UNITS	Gas-tons	Oil-tons	Bombs-tons	Ammun-tons	Total tons
6 Bomb Gps (H)	4500	240	2460	180	7380
3 Bomb Gps B-26	1350	75	600	36	2061
2 Bomb Gps (B-25)	860	46	400	24	1330
3 Ftr Gps (P-38)	1500	90	300	39	1929
9 Well Sqdns	1485	90	1350	23	2948
1 Ftr Gp (P-40)	400	23	60	13	496
TOTAL	10,095	564	5,170	315	16,144

Following are estimates on tonnage for Tech Supply and Rations (Ten Day Period)

Unit	Tech Supply -tons	Rations-tons	Oxygen
6 Bomb Gps (H)	240	720	
5 Bomb Gps (M)	325	567	
3 Ftr Gps (P-38)	120	265	
9 Well Sqdns	100	(British	
1 Ftr. Gp (P-40)	40	90	
TOTAL	825	1.642	3,000 Bottles

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5. Movement of Headquarters, Air Echelon

Serial #1 - Oct. 10 Air Echelon, Headquarters, XII Bomber Command, 6 C-47's, 20 officers, 40 enlisted men.

Serial #2 - Oct. 12 Air Echelon, Headquarters, 47th Wing, 3 C-47's, 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

Serial #3 - Oct. 12 Air Echelon, Headquarters, 42nd Wing, 3 C-47's, 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

Serial #4 - Nov. 10 Air Echelon, Headquarters, 5th Wing, 3 C-47's, 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

Serial #5 - Nov. 10 Air Echelon, Headquarters, B-24 Wing, 3 C-47's, 10 officers, 20 enlisted men.

6. Movement Schedule, Air: Units

Serial No.	Date	Unit	No & Type A/C	No. Pilots	No. Off. & EM
1	Oct. 15	Air Echelon 325th Ftr Gp	20 C-47		260
1	Oct. 16	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-40	80	
2	Oct. 16	Air Echelon 82nd Ftr Gp	20 C-47		260
2	Oct. 17	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-38	80	
3	Oct. 17	Air Echelon 14th Ftr Gp	20 C-47		260
3	Oct. 18	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-38	80	
4	Oct. 18	Air Echelon 1st Ftr Gp	20 C-47		260
4	Oct. 19	Combat Ech. " " "	80 P-38	80	
5	Oct. 19	Air Echelon 321st B.G. (M)	20 C-47		260
5	Oct. 20	Combat Ech. " " "	70 B-25		640
6	Oct. 20	Air Echelon 310th B. G. (M)	20 C-47		240
6	Oct. 21	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-25		640
7	Oct. 21	Air Echelon 17th B.G. (M)	20 C-47		240
7	Oct. 22	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-26		700
8	Oct. 22	Air Echelon 319th B. G. (M)	20 C-47		200
8	Oct. 23	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-26		700
9	Oct. 23	Air Echelon 320th B. G. (M)	20 C-47		200
9	Oct. 24	Combat Ech. " " " "	70 B-26		700

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Serial No.	Date	Units	No & Type A/C	No. Pilots	No. Off & EM
10	Nov. 15	Air Echelon 2nd B. G. (H)	20 C-47		200
10	Nov. 16	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
11	Nov. 16	Air Echelon 97th B. G. (H)	20 C-47		200
11	Nov. 17	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
12	Nov. 17	Air Echelon 99th B. G. (H)	20 C-47		200
12	Nov. 18	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
13	Nov. 18	Air Echelon 301st B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
13	Nov. 19	Combat Ech. " " " "	56 B-17		672
14	Nov. 19	Air Echelon 98th B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
14	Nov. 20	Combat Ech. " " " "	40 B-24		480
15	Nov. 20	Air Echelon 376th B.G. (H)	20 C-47		200
15	Nov. 21	Combat Ech. " " " "	40 B-24		480

7. Water Movement

The following information is required by Operation Memorandum #33, 13 September, Headquarters NAAF.

a. Serial	b Type & No. of Unit	c No. of Personal	d No. of M/T	e No. of A/C	f Dead wt tons Equip.	g Present Location	h Depart. Date	i New Location	j Arrival Date
1	Hq. 12 B.C.	340	60		32	Tunis	Oct 13	Foggia	Oct 16
2	146 Sig Co	232	31	2	21	Tunis	Oct 13	Foggia	Oct 16
3	Hq 47 Wing	245	20		14	Hammamet	Oct 16	Lucera	Oct 19
4	331 Sig Co	95	16		2	Hammamet	Oct 16	Lucera	Oct 19
5	Hq 42 Wing	245	20		14	Ariana	Oct 16	Foggia	Oct 19
6	324 Sig Co	95	16		2	Ariana	Oct 16	Foggia	Oct 19
7	325 Ftr Gp	550	100		130	Mateur	Oct 17	Foggia #8	Oct 20
8	82 Ftr Gp	640	100		120	Grombalia	Oct 18	Foggia #3	Oct 21
9	14 Ftr Gp	640	100		120	St Marie D'Z	Oct 19	5mE, Cerignola	Oct 22
10	1 Ftr Gp	640	100		120	Mateur	Oct 20	5mE, Cerignola	Oct 23
11	1051 M.P. Co.	77	7	6	10	Tunis	Oct 20	Foggia	Oct 23
12	321 B.G.	822	140		211	Soliman	Oct 21	Foggia #12	Oct 24
13	310 B.G.	822	140		211	Menzel Temime	Oct 22	Foggia #10	Oct 25
14	17th B.G.	822	140		211	Djedeida	Oct 23	Foggia #1	Oct 26
15	319th B.G.	822	140		211	Djedeida	Oct 24	Foggia #2	Oct 27
16	320 B.G.	822	140		211	El Bathan	Oct 25	Gino Lise	Oct 28
17	Hq 5th Wing	179	20		14	Depienne	Nov 1	Cerignola	Nov 4
18	317 Sig Co	91	16		2	Depienne	Nov 2	Cerignola	Nov 5
19	2 B.G.	770	155		255	Massicault	Nov 3	Foggia #8	Nov 8

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a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
20	97 B. G.	770	155		255	Depienne	Nov 4	2 mS, Trinitapoli	Nov 7
21	99 B. G.	770	155		255	Oudna	Nov 5	8 mE, Andria	Nov 8
22	301 B. G.	770	155		255	Oudna	Nov 6	5 m SE Andria	Nov 9
23	98 B. G.	1205	155		255	Benghasi	Nov 7	Between Corato and Trani	Nov 10
24	376 B. G.	1205	155		255	Benghasi	Nov 8	1 mS, Terlizzi	Nov 11
25	240 Wing		280			Benghasi	Nov 10	1 mE, Gruno	Nov 15
26	231 Wing		280			Kairouan	Nov 12	5 m ES of Altamura	Nov 16
27	236 Wing		280			Kairouan	Nov 13	4 mS, Santerano en Calle	Nov 17
28	330 Wing		145			Kairouan	Nov 14	6mNE Viola del Calle	Nov 18
29	331 Wing		181			Kairouan	Nov 15	1 mE, Gumiche di Bari	Nov 19

The Engineer, NAAF advises that necessary work can be performed on Air Fields listed in time to meet the above schedule for occupancy.

For the Commanding General:

EARL S. PARTRIDGE,
Brigadier General, G. S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

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ITALIAN PORTS

1st CLASS

	Port	Estimated Daily Capacity in tons	Size of ships accomodated	Additional Remarks
1.	GENOA	20,000	Any merchant vessel	20 lge jetties, 28,600 ft. quayside berths for 130 vessels 174 electric cranes.
2.	VENICE & PORTO MARGHERA	18,000	Any merchant vessel	Quayside depths 25-33 ft. limited accomodations for largest vessels.
3.	TRIESTE	17,900	Any merchant vessel	Extensive docking & warehouse facilities dock area.
4.	NAPLES	16,000	Any merchant vessel	Heavily bombed but alternate berths probably still permit maximum capacity.
5.	LEGHORN	8,000	Any merchant vessel	Normally 18 or 19 berths for large ships rail & crane served. Bombed but capacity not substantially reduced. Perhaps 13 berths at present.
6.	BARI	3,000	Any merchant vessel	Quays are rail served. Turnover of Italian merchant shipping has been rapid.
7.	BRINDISI	substantial	550 feet.	No daily capacity figures available but rapid turnover of Italian shipping.
8.	SPEZIA	2,000	Vessels up to 28 feet draft at quays; larger vessels lightered off in harbor first.	Principally naval port, using naval facilities capacity may be substantially increased.

2nd CLASS

1.	ANCONA	?	25 ft. draft.	Important as only good harbor on East coast between Venice & Bari.

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	Port	Estimated Daily Capacity	Size of ships Accomodated	Additional Remarks
2.	CIVITAVECCHIA	3,200	450 ft. length	Bombed but much of facilities apparently restored.
3.	FIUME	?	450 ft. length	Ample facilities for handling of troops.
4.	TARANTO	800	Any merchant vessel	Primarily naval base increasing use for commercial shipping.
5.	SAVONA	4,300	Any merchant vessel	17 vessels may be accomodated.
		3rd CLASS		
1.	BAGNOLI	1,000	449 feet length	
2.	BARLETTA	1,100	350 feet length	
3.	CASTEL AMARE DI STABIA	1,500	449 feet length	
4.	CROTONE	1,300	330 feet length	
5.	GALLIPOLI	1,000	420 feet length	
6.	PIOMBINO	700	250 ft. length 17 ft. draft.	
7.	POLA	?	?	Apparently only Naval use.
8.	PORTO FERRAJO (ELBA)	700	300 ft. length (?)	Iron ore port, not on mainland.
9.	POZZUOLI	700	300 ft. length	
10.	REGGIO DI CALABRIA	1,100 normal negligible at present	450 ft. length	Train ferry terminus heavily bombed; no longer used as port for merchant shipping.
11.	SALERNO	1,000	300 ft. length	
12.	SAN GIOVANNI	negligible		Important only as train ferry terminus.
13.	TORRE ANNUNCIATA	800	450 ft. length	
14.	TORRE DEL GRECO	800	250 ft. length	

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Port	Estimated Daily Capacity	Size of ships Accomodated	Additional Remarks
	SARDINIAN PORTS		
	1st CLASS		
1. CAGLIARI	3,400 normal 600 present	650 ft. length 27 ft. draft	Bombing has almost neutralized port facilities.
	2nd CLASS		
1. OLBIA & GOLFO ARANCI	2,000	450 ft. length	Heavily bombed but two ports (only 8 miles apart) potentially have the capacity given.
	3rd CLASS		
1. LA MADDALENA	800	Any vessel can anchor	Unloading principally from lighters.
2. PORTO TORRES	500	375 ft. length	
3. SAN ANTIOCO	1,000	450 ft. length 26 ft. draft.	

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CORSICAN PORTS

2nd CLASS

	Port	Estimated Daily Capacity	Size of ships accomodated	Additional Remarks
1.	BASTIA	1,400	27 ft. draft	

3rd CLASS

1.	AJACCIO	2,300(?)	26 ft. draft.	Source of estimate of daily capacity not known, on basis of use, figure seems high.

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SICILIAN PORTS

Port	Estimated Daily Capacity	Size of ships Accomodated	Additional Remarks
1.		**1st CLASS**	
1. PALERMO	3,500 normal 700/1000 present	580 ft. length 30 ft. draft.	Pre-bombing accomodations for 42 ships. Harbor has at least seven ships sunk &5damaged. Capacity probably reduced by 70% to 80%.
		2nd CLASS	
1. CATANIA	2,500	650 ft. length	Accomodations for 30 vessels prior to bombing; extent of damage to harbor facilities not known, as destruction still in progress.
2. MESSINA	3,200	26 ft. draft	Sole Sicilian terminus train ferry. Heavily bobed and destruction continues.
3. SYRACUSE	1,600	450 ft. length 24 ft. draft.	Accomodations for for 15 ships; revised figures since Allied occupation not available.
		3rd CLASS	
1. AUGUSTA	300	350 ft. length	Almost unlimited anchorage.
2. PORTO EMPEDOCLE	800	490 ft. length 26 ft. draft	
3. MARSALA	800	less than 18' draft.	Heavily bombed. Capacity undoubtedly reduced.
4. MILAZZO	800	20 ft. draft 450 ft. length	
5. TRAPANI	1500 normal negligible at present	26 ft. draft 490 ft. length	Heavily bombed & much demolition of facilities.

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Hudsons

310
321
320
319
17

Fighter

82
325
14
1

B-17

97
99
301
2

B-24

98
376

Wellingtons

330
331

Halifax or Liberator

340
231
236

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ITALY 1:250,000

BENEVENTO



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

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FOGGIA

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ARMY/AIR

SHEET 37 ITALY 1:250,000

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BARI

1:250,000

2nd. EDITION.
ARMY/AIR

AF-728.



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BARI

2nd. EDITION.
ARMY/AIR

AF-728.

SHEET 38



Magnetic North at centre of sheet is 2° 28 West of True North.

CONVERSION TABLE

Metres	Feet
4,500	15,000
	14,000
4,000	13,000
	12,000
	11,000
3,000	10,000
	9,000
	8,000
2,000	7,000
	6,000
	5,000

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
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AVELLINO
Montefalcone
Airola
Solopaca
Vitulano
Cerreto
Guardia
Pietrelcina
Paduli
Ariano Irpino
Montecalvo
Castelfranco
Bonito
Flumeri
Mirabella
Prigento
Montemiletto
Montefalcione
Serino
Solofra
Montoro
Nola
Baiano
Mercogliano
Monteforte
Sperone
Roccarainola
Cicciano
Tufo
Forino
Lauro
Taurasi
Fontanarosa
Grottaminarda
Castelfranco
Montemarano
Torella
Bisaccia
Lapio
Sirignano
Quindici
Moschiano
Taurano
Cervinara
Rotondi
Arpaia
Arienzo
Tocco
Pietrastornina
Montefredane
Mugnano
Monteforte
Avella
Baiano
Sirignano
Quadrelle
Visciano
Saviano
Castel San Giorgio
Roccapiemonte
Nocera
Pagani
Angri
Scafati
Sarno
Palma
Nocera Inferiore
Nocera Superiore
Cava
Vietri
Salerno
Amalfi
Positano
Sorrento
Castellammare
Torre Annunziata
Pompei
Torre del Greco
Portici
Ercolano
Resina
Napoli
Vesuvio
Somma
Ottaviano
Terzigno
Boscotrecase
Boscoreale
Torre Annunziata
Gragnano
Lettere
Agerola
Pimonte
Castellammare
Vico Equense
Meta
Piano di Sorrento
Sant'Agnello
Massa Lubrense
Capri
Ischia
Procida
Pozzuoli
Bacoli
Miseno
Cuma
Arco Felice
Monte Nuovo
Averno
Lago Lucrino
Baia
Capo Miseno
Golfo di Napoli
Golfo di Pozzuoli
Golfo di Salerno
Golfo di Castellammare
Golfo di Sorrento
Golfo di Gaeta
Golfo di Policastro
Golfo di Sapri
Golfo di Taranto
Golfo di Manfredonia
Golfo di Gargano
Golfo di Vieste
Golfo di Termoli
Golfo di Ortona
Golfo di Pescara
Golfo di Vasto
Golfo di Gaeta
Golfo di Formia
Golfo di Gaeta
Golfo di Terracina

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42 Oct 19

320 Oct 28

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

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

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

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

Geographical Section, General Staff, No. 4230.
Published by War Office 1941.
2nd. Edition 1943.

L.M.T. 1 hr. 0 mins. ahead of G.M.T.

REFERENCE

- Railway, normal gauge, double track with station
- " " single
- " " under construction
- " narrow gauge, Tramway and Funicular
- National Highways (Autostrade) 8 metres wide, Metalled.
- Main Roads (Strade Statali) with route numbers. Generally 6 metres wide or over. Metalled. — 2-way M.T.
- Other Main Roads (Strade di Grande Comunicazione) Generally 5 metres wide or over. Metalled. — Mostly 2-way M.T.
- Secondary Roads. 3-5 metres wide. Generally metalled. — 1-way M.T.
- Other Roads and Cart Tracks. Generally unmetalled.
- Mule Tracks
- Paths
- Boundaries, State
- " Province
- Trigonometrical points. Heights in metres — △ 220 or 220
- Gradient Percentage shown on main roads thus — 0 to 4, 4 to 7, over 7

- Rivers, Water Mill
- Canals
- Irrigation Canals
- Salt Lakes
- Lakes
- Areas liable to floods
- Marshes
- Aqueducts
- Springs, Wells, Fountains
- Fords
- Sand, Sand Dunes
- Dry River Beds
- Church or Chapel
- Lighthouse
- Woods

GRID CONVERGENCE VALUES AT SHEET CORNERS

At the West / East edge of this Sheet the Magnetic North is 3° 17′ / 2° 58′ West of True North (1943)

Annual change 7′ East.

Carta D'Italia Del To... Sheet 36. E...
Road classification de...
Layers are based on G...

EXAMPLE OF A G... POINT: ...
East
Take West side of square ... road figure opposite this li... North or South margin or ... (see Text).
Estimate tenths reckoned ...
E...
REFE...
Unit: metre. Square ...
Nearest similar referen...

Scale 1:250,000
1 Inch = 3·95 Miles. 1 Centimetre = 2·5 Kilometres

Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20 25
Kilometres 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 10 20 30 40
Nautical Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20

REFER TO THIS MAP AS –
ITALY 1:250,000 ARMY/AIR SHEET 36 BENEVENTO

A.F. 726

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
15° E. of Greenwich
CAMPAGNA
MELFI
Barile
Rionero
Ascoli Satriano
Cerignola
Trinitapoli
Margherita di Savoia
Canosa di Puglia
Andria
Corato
Ruvo di Puglia
Bitonto
Bari
Molfetta
Giovinazzo
Terlizzi
Bisceglie
Trani
Barletta
Canne della Battaglia
Cannae
Zapponeta
Manfredonia
Monte Gargano
Vieste
Rodi Garganico
Peschici
Foggia
Lucera
Troia
Orsara di Puglia
Bovino
Deliceto
Ascoli Satriano
Candela
Rocchetta Sant'Antonio
Ascoli Satriano
Melfi
Venosa
Lavello
Montemilone
Palazzo San Gervasio
Genzano di Lucania
Irsina
Matera
Gravina in Puglia
Altamura
Cassano delle Murge
Acquaviva delle Fonti
Gioia del Colle
Noci
Alberobello
Locorotondo
Cisternino
Ostuni
Fasano
Monopoli
Polignano a Mare
Mola di Bari
Conversano
Castellana Grotte
Putignano
Turi
Sammichele di Bari
Rutigliano
Triggiano
Capurso
Cellamare
Adelfia
Noicattaro
Mola di Bari
Polignano a Mare
Monopoli
Fasano
Ostuni
Cisternino
Locorotondo
Alberobello
Martina Franca
Grottaglie
Francavilla Fontana
Ceglie Messapica
Oria
Manduria
Sava
Torricella
Maruggio
Avetrana
Lizzano
Pulsano
Leporano
Taranto
Massafra
Mottola
Palagiano
Castellaneta
Ginosa
Laterza
Gravina in Puglia
Spinazzola
Minervino Murge
Andria
Canosa di Puglia
Cerignola
Trinitapoli
Margherita di Savoia
Zapponeta
Manfredonia
Monte Gargano
Vieste
Rodi Garganico
Peschici
Foggia
Lucera
Troia
Orsara di Puglia
Bovino
Deliceto
Ascoli Satriano
Candela
Rocchetta Sant'Antonio

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
Spinazzola
Venosa
Palazzo S. Gervasio
Genzano
Acerenza
Irsina
Forenza
Oppido Lucano
Tolve
Montocchio
Grassano
Gravina
Murgia Serraficaia
Murgia Lamapera
Murgia Parisi Vecchio
M. Parevisa
M. Maranno
M. Serico
M. Formosillo
M. Pisconi
M. Solario
M. Torretto
M. Molinare
M. Vernutoli
M. Irsi
M. Maddalena
M. Caruso
M. Cuschiarone
M. Marziano
M. Taurio
M. Montanuto
M. Anadicitti
M. Nappone
M. Pellicciari
M. Zingariello
M. Pallocca
M. Cappella
M. Pallone
M. Cecuzzo
M. Zalvino
M. Pellicciara
M. Pellicciaro
M. Pellicciarri
M. Pellicciarro
M. Pellicciarro
M. Pellicciarro

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

Revised and Photolithographed by O.S. 1943

Geographical Section, General Staff, No. 4230.
Published by War Office 1941.
2nd Edition 1943.

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

REFERENCE

Railways: normal gauge, double track with station; single; under construction; narrow gauge. Tramways and Funicular.
National Highways (Autostrade) 8 metres wide, Metalled.
Main Roads (Strade Statali) with route numbers. Generally 6 metres wide or over, Metalled.
Other Main Roads (Strade di Grande Comunicazione). Generally 5 metres wide or over, Metalled.
Secondary Roads, 3-5 metres wide. Generally metalled.
Other Roads and Cart Tracks. Generally unmetalled.
Mule Tracks.
Paths.
Boundaries: State; Province.
Trigonometrical Points. Heights in metres.
Gradient Percentage shown on main roads thus

Rivers
Tunnel
Canals
Irrigation Canals
Salt Lakes
Lakes
Areas liable to floods
Marshes
Aqueducts
Springs, Wells, Fountains
Fords
Sand, Sand Dunes
Dry River Beds
Church or Chapel
Lighthouse
Woods

Woods information is doubtful. Limits of Woods are not as far as is known, well defined on the ground.

GRID CONVERGENCE VALUES AT SHEET CORNERS

T.N.
Magnetic North
True North

At the West / East edge of this Sheet the Magnetic North is 2°30' / 2°16' West of True North (1943).
Annual change 7' East.

Scale 1:250,000
1 Inch = 3·95 Miles. 1 Centimetre = 2·5 Kilometres

40 Miles
60 Kilometres
35 Nautical Miles

Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20 25
Kilometres 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20
Nautical Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20

Carta D'Italia, Del Touring, Sheet 38
Road classification diers... Layers are based on G...
EXAMPLE OF A G... POINT
East
Take West edge of square... read figure opposite this ... North or South margin or ... line itself.
Estimate tenths easte...
REF...
Unit: metre. Squa...
Nearest similar refer...

REFER TO THIS MAP AS :-
ITALY 1:250,000 ARMY/AIR SHEET 38 - BARI.

...ion Section R.E. June 1943. Job N°17.

AF - 728

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Molfetta
Bitonto
Palo del Colle
Ruvo di Puglia
Terlizzi
Corato
Andria
Barletta
Trani
Bisceglie
Molfetta
Giovinazzo
Polignano a Mare
Conversano
Monópoli
Castellana
Noci
Alberobello
Locorotondo
Fasano
Ostuni
Martina Franca
Carovigno
Francavilla Fontana
Oria
Manduria
Mesagne
Brindisi
Tuturano
Torre Guaceto
Torre Canne
Torre Pozzella
Torre Santa Sabina
Torre Egnazia
Torre S. Vito
Torre Canne
Torre Pozzella
Torre Santa Sabina
Torre Egnazia
Torre S. Vito
Torre Guaceto
Torre di Ognina
Torre di Greco
Torre di Ognina
Torre di Greco
Torre di Ognina
Torre di Greco

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

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FIRENZE
(FLORENCE)
SOUTHER
TRES
VENÉZIA
E. of Greenwich.
4° 30' W. (1942)
4° W. (1942)
Faenza
Forlì
Cesena
Rimini
Cesenático
Milano Mar.
Cérvia
Ronco
Savio
Marecchia
Foglia
Pesaro
Marino
Fossombrone
Urbino
Sestino
Borgo Pace
Città di Castello
Pergola
Fabriano
Gubbio
Arezzo
Sansepolcro
Anghiari
Subbiano
Bibbiena
Poppi
Arno
Pratovecchio
Stia
Firenze
Florence
Pontassieve
Reggello
Figline Valdarno
Incisa in Valdarno
Rignano sull'Arno
Impruneta
Bagno a Ripoli
Greve
Dicomano
Londa
Vicchio
Borgo S. Lorenzo
Scarperia
Firenzuola
Marradi
Palazzuolo
Casaglia
Modigliana
Predappio Nuova
Meldola
Bertinoro
Savignano sul Rubicone
Roncofreddo
Santarcangelo di Romagna
Verucchio
Mercato Saraceno
Sarsina
S. Sofia
Galeata
Civitella di Romagna
Premilcuore
Castrocaro Terra del Sole
Forlimpopoli
Castiglione di Cervia
Casola Valsenio
Brisighella
Castel del Rio
Monterenzio
Casalfiumanese
Loiano
Castel Bolognese
Solarolo
Villafranca
Campiano
S. Giorgio
Cattolica
Gabicce Mare
Tavoleto
Calbordolo
Carrara
Montefeltro
Saltara
Mondavio
Acqualagna
Cagli
Apecchio
Cantiano
Sassoferrato
Pietralunga
Città di Castello
Monterchi
Citerna
Pistrino
S. Giustino
Tevere
Arno
Terranuova Bracciolini
Montevarchi
Castiglion Fibocchi
Cavriglia
S. Giovanni Valdarno
Loro Ciuffenna
Talla
Rassina
Chiusi della Verna
Pieve S. Stefano
Marcatello
Angelo in Vado
Piobbico
Serra
Monte Cucco
Monte Nerone
Monte Catria
Monte Petrano
Monte Acuto
Monte Maggio
Monte Fumaiolo
Monte Comero
Monte Penna
Monte Fiorito
Monte Castellaccio
Monte Carpegna
Monte Fotogno
Monte Tassi
Monte Cavallo

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SOUTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM
N.E. 42/10
4° W. (1942)
3° 30' W. (1942)
13 E.
14 E.
Pesaro
Fano
Senigallia
Ancona
Iesi
Fabriano
Macerata
Porto d. Potenza Pic
Portocivitanova
Caserta
Caiazzo
Avignano
Cantalupo n. Sannio
Montecarotto
Agugliano
Chiaravalle
Filottrano
Recanati
Cingoli
Apiro
Staffolo
Cupramontana
Maiolati
Arcevia
Cerreto d'Esi
Matelica
S. Severino Marche
Tolentino
Pollenza
Treia
Morrovalle
Montegranaro
Mogliano
Porto S. Giorgio
Civitanova Marche
Potenza Picena
Montecassiano
Osimo
Loreto
Sirolo
Camerata Picena
Pinocchio
Montemarciano
Marina di Montemarciano
S. Angelo
Corinaldo
Ostra
Mondavio
Mondolfo
Costanzo
Carrara
Saltara
Calibano
Rondello
Cesano
Metauro
Foglia
Musone
Esino
S. Maria Nuova
Sforzacosta
Corridonia
Urbisaglia
Sarnano
Amandola
Montefortino
Force
Arquata del Tronto
Ascoli Piceno
Acquasanta Terme
Montemonaco
Montalto delle Marche
Monte Vettore
Monte Sibillini
Monte Porche
Monte Priora
Monte Bove
Monte Vettoretto
Monte Rotondo
Monte Argentella
Monte Pizzo Tre Vescovi
Monte Pizzo di Sevo
Monte Pizzo Meta
Monte Pizzo Tre Fratelli
Monte Pizzo Tre Confini
Monte Pizzo Tre Termini
Monte Pizzo Tre Valli
Monte Pizzo Tre Colli
Monte Pizzo Tre Monti
Monte Pizzo Tre Fiumi
Monte Pizzo Tre Laghi
Monte Pizzo Tre Boschi
Monte Pizzo Tre Prati
Monte Pizzo Tre Rocce
Monte Pizzo Tre Cime
Monte Pizzo Tre Punte
Monte Pizzo Tre Picchi
Monte Pizzo Tre Vette
Monte Pizzo Tre Creste
Monte Pizzo Tre Gole
Monte Pizzo Tre Valloni
Monte Pizzo Tre Canaloni
Monte Pizzo Tre Pendii
Monte Pizzo Tre Versanti
Monte Pizzo Tre Fianchi
Monte Pizzo Tre Dorsi
Monte Pizzo Tre Costoni
Monte Pizzo Tre Speroni
Monte Pizzo Tre Contrafforti
Monte Pizzo Tre Sperone
Monte Pizzo Tre Cresta
Monte Pizzo Tre Crinale
Monte Pizzo Tre Spalla
Monte Pizzo Tre Fianco
Monte Pizzo Tre Dorso
Monte Pizzo Tre Costone

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

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
Lake Trasimeno
Lake Bolsena
Lake Orbetello
Lake Bracciano
Roma
Civitavécchia
Tarquinia
Viterbo
Orvieto
Terni
Albinia
Port Ercole
Montalto di Castro
Città d. Vaticano
Fregene
Marta
Fiora
Ombrone
Ulpagna
Nera
Tevere
Volsini Mts
Cimini Mts
Sabatini Mts
Lago di Vico
Lago di Vico
Lago di Vico

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

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

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

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SOUTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM 2nd Edition. N.E.40/14



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

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

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Gaeta
Gulf of Naples
Napoli
Vesúvio
Ischia
Procida
Capri
Sorrento
Amalfi
Gulf of Salerno
Salerno
Caserta
Benevento
Avellino
Aversa
Lago d. Patria
Resina
Torre Annunziata
Castellammare di Stabia
Cava d. Tirreni
Campanella Pt.
Capri Carena Pt.
Imperatore Pt.
Orso Pt.
Piccolo Chan.
Aurunci Mts
Lattari Mts.
Matese Mts.
Sannio Mts
Volturno
Garigliano
Liri
S. Maria Capua Vetere
Maddaloni
Pignataro Maggiore
Teano
Marzano Appio
Piedimonte d'Alife
Venafro
Isernia
Montaquila
Castelpizzuto
Boiano
Campobasso
Campolieto
Riccia
Cercemaggiore
Sassinoro
Morcone
Circello
Guardiaregia
Prata Sannita
Capriati a Volturno
Pozzilli
Castel S. Vincenzo
Forli d. Sannio
Civitanova d. Sannio
Fossalto
Torella d. Sannio
Toro
Gambatesa
Vinchiaturo
Cusano Mutri
Faicchio
Cerreto Sannita
Guardia Sanframondi
Solopaca
Torrecuso
Paduli
Pietrelcina
Buonalbergo
Pesco Sannita
Casalduni
Pragneto Cupole
Bonito
Montesarchio
S. Agata d. Goti
S. Leucio d. Sannio
S. Giorgio d. Sannio
Roccabascerana
S. Angelo a Cupolo
Pietrastornina
Prátola Serra
Baiano
Nola
Atripalda
Monteforte Irpino
Volturara Irpina
Solofra
Palma Campania
Somma Vesuviano
Ottaviano
S. Giuseppe Vesuviano
Sarno
Nocera Inf.
Cava d. Tirreni
Fisciano
S. Cipriano Picentino
Vietri s. Mare
Maiori
Pontecagnano
Battipaglia
Agropoli
Casalnuovo d. Napoli
Marigliano
Afragola
Cancello
Caivano
Marcianise
Grazzanise
Spaccanise
Caiazzo
Faicchio
Avignano
S. Salvatore Telesino
Raviscanina
Presenzano
Vairano Catenano
Venafro
Prata Sannita
Capriati a Volturno
Castelpizzuto
Cantalupo n. Sannio
Macchiagodena
Baranello
Jelsi
S. Elia d. Pianisi
S. Marco in Cataldo
S. Bartolomeo in Galdo
S. Croce d. Sannio
Colle Sannita
Castelvetere in Val Fortore
Colletorto
Ceprano
Isoletta
Roccasecca
Arce
Arpino
Isola d. Liri
Sora
Aquino
Cassino
Pontecorvo
Esperia
Ausonia
Castelforte
Minturno
Formia
Porto Salvo
Sessa Aurunca
Roccamonfina
Carinola
Castel Volturno
Villa Literno
Albanova
Montalbano
Mignano
Cervaro
Pastena
Vallecorsa
Funchi
Itri
Castellonorato
Monte Cesima
Monte Maggiore
Monte Santa Croce
Monte Petrella
Monte Monna Casale
Monte Cila
Monte Mutria
Monte Miletto
Monte Mauro
Monte Cavallo
Monte Terminio
Monte Tuoro
Monte Cervialto
Monte Polveracchio
Monte Accellica
Monte Raparo
Monte Alpi
Monte Sirino
Monte Pollino
Monte Coppolo
Monte Cocuzzo
Monte Sellaro
Monte Cocuzzo della Neve
Monte Gariglione
Monte Botte Donato
Monte Scuro
Monte Curcio
Monte Reventino
Monte Cocuzzo

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S. Severo
Foggia #10
Foggia #3
Foggia #1
Foggia #12
Foggia #2
Foggia
Gino Lisa
Foggia #8
Trinitapoli
Trinitapoli S. Ferdinando d. Puglia
Cerignola
Andria (W)
Andria (E)
Gulf of Manfredonia
Manfredonia
Zapponeta
Barletta
Margherita di Savoia
Corato
Canosa di Puglia
Minervino Murge
Spinazzola
Palazzo S. Gervasio
Venosa
Melfi
Rionero in Vulture
Lavello
Montemilone
Rocchetta Scalo
Rocchetta S. Antonio
Candela
Accadia
Bovino
Castelluccio d. Sauri
Orsara di Puglia
Troia
Lucera
Biccari
Volturino
Riccia
Campolieto
Colletorto
Casalnuovo Monterotaro
Pietra Montecorvino
Motta Montecorvino
Castelvetere in Val Fortore
Alberona
S. Bartolomeo in Galdo
Roseto Valfortore
Montefalcone di Valle Fortore
Faeto
S. Marco d. Cavoti
Colle Sannita
Sircello
S. Croce di Sannio
Ordona
Orta Nova
Stornara
Stornarella
Ascoli Satriano
Deliceto
Panni
Savignano d. Puglia
Buonalbergo
Pietrelcina
Paduli
Ariano Irpino
Monteleone di Puglia
Montecalvo Irpino
Benevento
Bonito
S. Giorgio d. Sannio
Leucio Sannio
S. Sossio Baronia
Grottaminarda
Vallata
Mirabella Eclano
Bisaccia
Aquilonia
Andretta
Guardia Lombardi
Paternopoli
Prata Serra
Calitri
Nusco
Lioni
Volturara Irpina
Monteforte Irpino
Avellino
Atripalda
Salza
Montella
Fisciano
S. Cipriano Picentino
Montecorvino Rovella
Oliveto Citra
Salerno
Pontecagnano
Campagna
Eboli
Battipaglia
Serre
Altavilla Silentino
Albanella
Roccadaspide
Capaccio
Agropoli
Cicerale
Piaggine
Celle di Bulgheria
Sicignano d. Alburni
Auletta
Polla
Castelcivita
S. Angelo a Fasanella
S. Arsenio
Tegiano
Sala Consilina
Marsico Nuovo
Marsico Vetere
Viggiano
Brienza
Sasso di Castalda
Calvello
Laurenzana
Abriola
Anzi
Pietrapertosa
Accettura
S. Mauro Forte
Stigliano
Corleto Perticara
Guardia Perticara
Armento
Aliano
Grassano
Tricarico
Grottole
Albano di Lucania
Garaguso
Salandra
Irsina
Oppido Lucano
Pietrapaola
Bradano
Tolve
S. Chirico Nuovo
Acerenza
Pescopagano
Ruvo del Monte
Muro Lucano
Bella
Avigliano
Ruoti
Colliano
Picerno
Potenza
Pignola
Brindisi di Montagna
Trivigno
Satriano di Lucania
Vietri di Potenza
Palomonte
S. Gregorio Magno
Oliveto Citra
Celabritto
Forenza
Ripacandida
Atella
Moschito
Genzano di Lucania
Ranzi
Poggiorsini
Andretta
Guardia Lombardi
Aquilonia
Rocchetta Scalo
Minervino Murge
Lavello
Montemilone
Venosa
Spinazzola
Palazzo S. Gervasio
Rionero in Vulture
Ripacandida
Atella
Forenza
Genzano di Lucania
Ranzi
Poggiorsini
Acerenza
Oppido Lucano
Pietrapaola
Bradano
Irsina
Tolve
S. Chirico Nuovo
Grassano
Tricarico
Grottole
Albano di Lucania
Garaguso
Salandra
Pietrapertosa
Accettura
S. Mauro Forte
Stigliano
Corleto Perticara
Guardia Perticara
Armento
Aliano
Laurenzana
Calvello
Brienza
Sasso di Castalda
Abriola
Anzi
Satriano di Lucania
Trivigno
Pignola
Brindisi di Montagna
Albano di Lucania
Vietri di Potenza
Auletta
Polla
Sicignano d. Alburni
Castelcivita
S. Angelo a Fasanella
S. Arsenio
Tegiano
Sala Consilina
Marsico Nuovo
Marsico Vetere
Viggiano
Roccadaspide
Capaccio
Albanella
Altavilla Silentino
Serre
Sele
Calore
Tanagro
Agropoli
Cicerale
Piaggine
Celle di Bulgheria
Palomonte
S. Gregorio Magno
Oliveto Citra
Celabritto
Muro Lucano
Bella
Avigliano
Ruoti
Colliano
Picerno
Potenza
Pignola
Brindisi di Montagna
Trivigno
Satri

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

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

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

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
Anzio
Nettuno
Lago Paola
Terracina
Sperlonga
Gaeta
Formia
Minturno
Esperia
Ausonia
Vallecorsa
Sonnino
Fondi
Tre Paola
S. Felice Circeo
Castellonorato
Garigliano
Mte Orlando
Mte Petrella
1533
Mte Leuca
Mte Redentore
Mte Fammera
Mte Cacume
Mte Calvo
Mte Cicerale
Mte Ruazzo
Mte Cefalone
Mte Cerasuolo
Mte Cerasuolo
Mte Cerasuolo

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
Foggia
Gino Lisa
Foggia
Trinitapoli
Cerignola
Andria
Benevento
Avellino
Salerno
Cava
Vietri
Amalfi
Orso Pt
Gulf of Salerno
Battipaglia
Eboli
Potenza
Melfi
Venosa
Spinazzola
Lavello
Montemilone
Minervino Murge
Bisaccia
Accadia
Candela
Rocchetta Scalo
Ascoli Satriano
Ordona
Stornara
Orsara di Puglia
Castelluccio d. Sauri
Bovino
Deliceto
Savignano d. Puglia
Montecalvo Irpino
Ariano Irpino
Monteleone d. Puglia
Vallata
Mirabella Eclano
Grottaminarda
S. Sossio Baronia
Bonito
Paduli
Torrecuso
Pietrelcina
Buonalbergo
Casalduni
Guardia Sanframondi
Pietrastornina
Prata Serra
Paternopoli
Guardia Lombardi
Andretta
Calitri
Lioni
Nusco
Volturara Irpina
Monteforte Irpino
Sarno
Solofra
Montella
Fisciano
S. Cipriano Picentino
Montecorvino Rovella
Olivieto Citra
Colliano
Muro Lucano
Bella
Calabritto
Pescopagano
Ruvo d. Monte
Rionero in Vulture
Atella
Lacapandida
Maschito
Palazzo S. Gervasio
Forenza
Banzi
Genzano d. Lucania
Oppido Lucano
Pietrapaola
Accettura
Tricarico
Tolve
S. Chirico Nuovo
Albano d. Lucania
Brindisi d. Montagna
Pignola
Abriola
Anzi
Pietrapertosa
Laurenzana
Calvello
Satrigno
Sasso d. Castalda
Brienza
Polla
Auletta
Sicignano d. Alburni
Castelcivita
Albanella
Altavilla Silentino
Roccadaspide
Capaccio
Agropoli
Cicerale
Magliano Vetere
Piaggine
S. Arsenio
S. Angelo a Fasanella
Tegiano
Sala Consilina
Marsico Nuovo
Marsico Vetere
Viggiano
Tramutola
Grumento Nova
Armento
Gallicchio
Spinoso
Moliterno
Montesano s. Marcellano
Sanza
Casalbuono
Rofrano
Alfano
Vallo d. Lucania
Stio
Rutino
Castellabate
Licosa Pt.
Salento
Ortodonico
Casal Velino
Pisciotta
Palinuro
C. Palinuro
Gulf
Camerota
Celle d. Bulgheria
Sapri
Torre Orsaia
Vibonati
Casaletto Spartano
Tortorella
Lagonegro
Rivello
Latronico
Castelsaraceno
Chiaromonte
Pandella
Cropani
Castelluccio Inf.
Tiaccheno
Lauria
Infreschi Pt
Gulf of Policastro
E. of Greenwich
16°
1° 04' L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)
Mts
Picentini Mts.
Cervaro
Carapelle
Ofanto
Bradano
Sele
Calore
Tanagro
15°E
16°E
41°
1591
1786
1809
1425
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1836
1899
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2005
1898
1525
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1105
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1700
1443
1460
1432
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1225
1483
1584
1207
1234
1761
1001
1120
1080
1002
1649
1510
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1467
1733
1725
1716
1300
1286
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1164
1231
1125
1100
1350
1030
1025
1071
1236
1322
1228
1000
952
911
749
673
632
571
506
439
313
412
385
899
562
634
621
851
951
1018
1007
1151
1015
981
992
1042
1427
1082
1318
635
355
370
1223
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

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

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FRENCH AIR FORCE

AFRICA

NORTH AFRICA

P.R.C.

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2924-72

MICROFILMED

NORTH AFRICA

P.R.C.



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STATE DEPT. LETTER
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

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING SLIP

TO: Col Lee DATE

OFFICE OR SYMBOL	BUILDING
ATTENTION:	ROOM 3E 128

FOR:

	COORDINATION		INVESTIGATION		NEC. ACTION
✓	INFORMATION		RECOMMENDATION		SIGNATURE
	FILE		CONFERENCE		

REMARKS:

PRO

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

FROM:

NAME	OFFICE OR SYMBOL
D J Bloomquist Maj USAF	
PHONE / BUILDING / ROOM	

3-218, AF

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING SLIP

TO: Col. Taylor DATE 1-18-44

OFFICE OR SYMBOL	BUILDING
ATTENTION:	ROOM

FOR:

	COORDINATION		INVESTIGATION		NEC. ACTION
✓	INFORMATION		RECOMMENDATION		SIGNATURE
✓✓	FILE		CONFERENCE		

REMARKS:

Maj
Col Bonnalie AAF
Col Carlson "
Col Sexton "
cc Gen Giles AAF

FROM:

NAME		OFFICE OR SYMBOL
PHONE	BUILDING	ROOM

3-218, AF

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SUBJECT	TO	FROM	DATE
First Detach of French Student pilots	Training	Plans	6/7/43
Training of French Student Pilots and Gunners in the United States			
Reorganization of the French Air Forces in North Africa	CG AAF	Gen Hull	5/27/43
Aircraft for the Fighting French Airline (Syria-Madagascar)	Col Cunning ham	Gen Arn.	6/17/43
Aircraft & Equip requested for the French Naval Air Force	Capt Parrish	French Naval Mission	7 July 43
Status Report on French Air Forces	(Report)		8 Aug
French Air Force	Memo for Maj Wildman	Col Dall	13 Aug
Memo for Munitions Assignment Committee - Air. Requirements of French Air Force	Munitions Assign Commitee	Air	9/9/43
French Air Rearmament Program w/pilots and air Crews for (R&R) the French, 2 comments w/3 incls. (Ltr fm Gen Spaatz w/incl and 2 tabs.)	Col Loutzen-heiser	Gen Kuter	21 Sep
Airplanes in NWAAF		Stat Control Div	10/17
Pilots and Air Crews for the French	General Arnold	Gen Kuter	9-14/43
CCS French Air Force Rearmament Plan	(Report)		
Summary of US Army Air Forces Rec for aircraft Allocations to the French Air Forces	[redacted]		
Airplanes in NWAAF	--	Stat Control	31 Oct
French Air Force in NA	--		14 Nov
Airplanes in NWAAF	--	" "	
Cables)			

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SUBJECT	TO	FROM	DATE
Needs of the Air Arm of the French Army	Asst Chief AS Operational	Col Ballard	1/2/43
Needs of the Air Arm of the French Army	Asst Chief Operational Plans	Col Ballard	
Request of French Air Force for 600 Airplanes	CG AAF	Gen Anderson	1/8/43
Availability of P-40 and A-31 type Aircraft for the French	CG AAF	Gen Anderson	2/13/43
Assignment of Aircraft to the French Air Force in Africa	AC/AS Plans	Gen Stratemeyer	2/8/43
" " " " "	Gen Marshall	Gen Bethouart	2/6/43
Assignment of Aircraft to Fr Air Force in Africa		Gen Anderson	2/16/43
Transition Training and Reorganization French AAF	Asst GAS A-3	Brig Anderson	3/1/43
Training of French Pilots	Reply to Gen Bethouart's memo	Gen Anderson	3/13/43
Transition Training & Reorganization French Africa Air F	CG AAF Thru Deputy Chief Air Staff Operational Plans	Asst Chief AS Operational Pl	?
Transition Training & Reorganization French Africa Air F	Asst CAS A-4	Gen Anderson	3/5/43
Equp for the French Air Force	Asst Chief of Staff Operation Div Gen Staff	Col. Ballard	3/3/43
Reorganization of French Air Force in NA	AC/AS Plans	Gen Handy	3/7/43
French North Africa Draft Requisition	ACAS Plans		
Reorganization of the French Air Forces in North Africa		Gen Anderson	5/2/43
Training Students for French Air Force	Col Kyle	Col Dubose	2/15/42

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3E-131

FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

TYPE & MODEL	REPORTED BY MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES As of 26 Mar 1944					AIRPLANES NOT REPORTED BY MAAF As of 15 Mar 44	TOTAL AIR-PLANES
	Number of Squadrons	Airplanes In Squadrons		Airplanes Out-side Sqds.			
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	Depot	Training		
MEDIUM BOMBER							
B-26	1	10	4	-	-	-	14
LIGHT BOMBER							
A-24	-	5	1	-	2	65	73
A-35	-	-	-	-	14	40	54
TORPEDO BOMBER							
Latecoere	1	7	9	-	-	-	16
S.E.FIGHTER							
P-39	3	38	27	-	-	-	65
P-40	1	13	12	1	-	-	26
Hurricane	1	15	5	-	9	-	29
Spitfire	3	28	16	-	2	-	46
NAVAL RECONN.							
Walrus	1	8	7	-	-	-	15
PHOTOGRAPHIC							
F-4,5A	1	4	-	-	-	-	4
TRANSPORT, 2-Eng							
Caudron	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
C-60	-	-	-	-	-	5	5
UTILITY							
UC-78	-	-	-	-	-	53	53
TOTAL	12	128	82	1	27	163	401

SECRET
Auth: CG,AAF
Date: 28 July 1943
Initials: JOK

SC-AS-21
Statistical Control Division
Management Control
10 April 1944 (2E)

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7

FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

As of 5 December 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES IN DEPOT AND TRAINING	TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable		
Medium Bomber					
B-26 B	1 *	-	-	13	13
Light Bomber					
A-35 A	1 *	-	-	7	7
A-35 B	-	-	-	23	23
A-24 B	-	-	-	2	2
Torpedo Bomber					
Latcoere	1	5	5	-	10
S.E. Fighter					
Hurricane IIC	1	7	6	-	13
Spitfire	3	35	9	2	46
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	18	10	1	29
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	41	29	2	72
Naval Reconn.					
Walrus	1	3	6	-	9
Photographic Reconn.					
F-4 A	1	1	2	-	3
F-5 A	-	1	-	-	1
TOTAL	13	111	67	50	228

* Training Squadrons

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Statistical Control Division
Management Control
22 December 1943

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Col. Taylor (for file)

JE-1078

4

FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

As of 21 November 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES IN DEPOT	TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable		
Light Bomber					
A-35B	-	-	-	3	3
Torpedo Bomber					
Latcoere	1	6	4	-	10
S.S. Fighter					
Hurricane IIC	1	10	2	-	12
Spitfire	3	40	7	1	48
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	19	9	2	30
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	46	24	6	76
Naval Reconn.					
Walrus	1	7	8	-	15
Photographic Reconn.					
F-4A	1	-	3	-	3
Utility					
UC-78	-	-	-	2	2
TOTAL	11	128	57	14	199

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6 December 1943

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

As of 14 November 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES		AIRPLANES IN DEPOT	TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable		
Light Bomber					
A-35B	-	-	-	5	5
Torpedo Bomber					
Latcoere	½	6	4	-	10
S.S. Fighter					
Hurricane IIC	1	7	5	-	12
Spitfire	3	41	6	1	48
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	18	10	2	30
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	43	27	3	73
Naval Reconn.					
Walrus	½	8	6	-	14
Photographic Reconn.					
F-5A	1	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	10	123	58	11	192

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Statistical Control Division
Management Control
30 November 1943

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FRENCH AIR FORCE

AIRPLANES IN NORTHWEST AFRICA AIR FORCE

As of 31 October 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS			Airplanes in Depot	TOTAL
	Serviceable	Serviceable in 48 Hours	Serviceable Over 48 Hours		
LIGHT BOMBER					
A-35A & B	-	-	-	4	4
TORPEDO BOMBER					
Latecoere	8	-	2	-	10
S.S. FIGHTER					
Hurricane IIC	10	2	-	-	12
Spitfire	41	3	5	-	49
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	21	-	7	1	29
Airacobra (P-39N)	40	7	23	-	70
NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE					
Walrus	6	3	4	-	13
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONN.					
F-5A	1	1	-	-	2
UTILITY					
UC-78	-	-	-	1	1
TOTAL	127	16	41	6	190

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FRENCH AIR FORCE

AIRPLANES IN NORTHWEST AFRICA AIR FORCE

As of 7 November 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS			AIRPLANES IN DEPOT	TOTAL
	Serviceable	Serviceable in 48 hours	Serviceable Over 48 hours		
LIGHT BOMBER					
A-35B	-	-	-	5	5
TORPEDO BOMBER					
Latcoere	6	1	3	-	10
S.S. FIGHTER					
Hurricane IIC	9	-	3	-	12
Spitfire	40	3	3	-	46
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	13	6	9	1	29
Airacobra (P-39N)	33	12	27	2	74
NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE					
Walrus	9	-	5	-	14
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONN.					
F-5A	-	-	1	-	1
UTILITY					
UC-78	-	-	-	1	1
TOTAL	110	22	51	9	192

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15 November 1943

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FRENCH AIR FORCE

AIRPLANES IN NORTHWEST AFRICA AIR FORCE

As of 17 October 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	SERVICEABLE	SERVICEABLE		IN DEPOT	TOTAL
		In 48 Hours	Over 48 Hours		
BOMBER LIGHT					
A-35B	-	-	-	7	7*
BOMBER TORPEDO					
Latcoere	8	-	2	-	10
FIGHTER, S.S.					
Harricane IIC	1	-	1	-	2
Spitfire	37	8	2	-	47
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	18	6	4	-	28
Airacobra (P-39N)	36	8	29	-	73
NAVAL RECONN.					
Walrus	5	1	-	-	6
PHOTO RECONN.					
F-5A	2	-	-	-	2
UTILITY					
UC-78	-	-	-	4	4*
TOTAL	107	23	38	11	179

* These reductions in the number of airplanes indicate that other airplanes of these models are not reported by the North African Air Force. The theater has been requested to send a report on these airplanes.

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

Reported by Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

As of 27 February 1944

Type and Model	Number of Squadrons	Airplanes in Squadrons		Airplanes Outside Squadrons		Total Airplanes
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	Depot	Training	
Light Bomber						
A-24	-	-	-	24	-	24
A-35	-	-	-	-	10	10
Torpedo Bomber						
Latecoere	1	8	7	-	-	15
S.E. Fighter						
P-39	3	36	18	16	-	70
P-40	1	18	7	-	-	25
Hurricane	1	7	11	-	-	18
Spitfire	3	39	11	-	-	50
Naval Reconn.						
Walrus	1	7	8	-	-	15
Photographic						
F-4,5A	1	2	2	-	-	4
TOTAL	11	117	64	40	10	231

Note: One squadron of B-26's not reported this week.

U.S. Types Not Reported By Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

As of 15 January 1944

Type and Model	Airplanes In Squadrons	Airplanes Outside Squadrons			Total
		Depot	Training	Misc. Uses	
Light Bomber					
A-24	-	-	31	1	32
A-35	-	25	25	-	50
Transport, 2-Eng.					
C-60	4	-	-	1	5
Utility					
UC-78	-	2	39	14	55
TOTAL	4	27	95	16	142

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14 March 1944 (2E)

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14 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL L. S. KUTER

Subject: Background of the French Naval Air Arm in North Africa

1. On 13 January the Operational Plans Section received a copy of a cable to the Mediterranean Theater Commander written by General Jamison which stated substantially as follows:

> Admiral Fenard, Chief of the French Naval Mission in Washington, submitted a requisition for 153 planes for the French Naval Air Arm in North Africa. The Admiral is informed that there was no approved project and General Saville now in Washington, stated that the Joint Allied Commission had attempted to secure such a plan in Algiers without success. The added burden of this request for which no provision had been made was too heavy at this time and the Mediterranean Theater Commander was requested to furnish recommendation regarding the final disposition of the case.

2. For your reference, it may be useful to have certain background material as to the French Naval Air Arm. The problem of rearming the French and more particularly the French Air Forces, has been full of difficult military and political problems. The greatest problem has been to find in North Africa adequate and loyal leadership. In this regard, the French Army with such general as Giraud, Juin and Koeltz has been exceedingly fortunate.

On the other hand the French Air Force for a long period under General Mendegal and now under Bouscat cannot be said to enjoy the same quality of command. In the case of the Navy Admiral Cunningham was hard put to find a qualified admiral and the choice of Le Monnier was weak at best. The relatively small naval French Air Arm has been conspicuous in lack of even weak leadership.

This situation has been naturally reflected in attitude towards the Allies and in morale. It is excellent in the case of the Army and descends to its lowest point in the Naval Air Arm. These are the men who bombed Gibraltar after Mers el Kebir and were further accused of shooting down Dutch and Scandinavian sailors escaping from North Africa in small boats. This group was rated in G2 and French estimates as strongly anti-British, if not anti-Allied. They have been difficult to deal with, exacting in their demands.

In the question of the allocation of aircraft to the French, it has been our policy to consider Tactical, but not Strategic employment. The case may be properly pleaded, that since there is a

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large French Army, integrated and of high military value, it is entitled to its own national air support. In the case of the French Navy, its employment is somewhat scattered and auxiliary in character. It does not contain a carrier force.

The case, therefore, of the French Naval Air Arm is based largely, as Admiral Fenard put it, on psychological rather than military grounds. Even such a case is weak as the group is small and has not enjoyed a high rating in French popularity.

3. It is recommended that whenever a request is made to the AAF for French Rearmament, the maker shall be referred directly to the Joint Allied Commission in Algiers, which is set up for the handling of such questions.

Further, that if AAF are asked for policy as to releases to the French Naval Air Arm, we should view the request with great reserve; if such request is at the expense of the overall requirements, that it be disapproved.

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Colonel, C.A.C.
Chief of Operational Plans Div.

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

3 E 131

Reported by Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

As of 5 March 1944

Type and Model	Number of Squadrons	Airplanes in Squadrons		Airplanes Outside Squadrons		Total Airplanes
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	Depot	Training	
Light Bomber						
A-24	-	-	-	18	-	18
A-35	-	-	-	-	9	9
Torpedo Bomber						
Latecoere	1	6	9	-	-	15
S.E. Fighter						
P-39	3	40	21	16	-	77
P-40	1	15	9	1	-	25
Hurricane	1	13	7	-	-	20
Spitfire	3	38	11	-	-	49
Naval Reconn.						
Walrus	1	8	7	-	-	15
Photographic						
F-4,5A	1	3	1	-	-	4
Transport, 2E						
Cauldron	-	-	1	-	-	1
Total	11	123	66	35	9	233

Note: One squadron of B-26's not reported this week.

U.S. Types Not reported By Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

As of 15 January 1944

Type and Model	Airplanes in Squadrons	Airplanes Outside Squadrons			Total
		Depot	Training	Misc. Uses	
Light Bomber					
A-24	-	-	31	1	32
A-35	-	25	25	-	50
Transport, 2 Eng.					
C-60	4	-	-	1	5
Utility					
UC-78	-	2	39	14	55
Total	4	27	95	16	142

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Office of Management Control
18 March 1944 (25)

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Background of the French Naval Air Arm in North Africa

IN TURN Advisory Council
Combined Subjects, AC/AS, Plans
xxxxx Logistics Division, AC/AS, Plans — 17 Jan 44

From: AC/AS, Plans (Operational Plans Division) — 1
JH/ewm 6114

To note.

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Colonel, G S.C.
Chief, Operational Plans Div

Incl: Memo dtd 14 Jan 44 to
Gen Kuter

From: Logistical Plans, AC/AS Plans.
To: AC/AS Plans (Operational Plans Div.)

Enclosure withdrawn and filed
in accordance with General Kuter's instructions.

Incl w/d

W. E. Jamison
Brig Gen U.S.A.
Chief Logistical Plans Div

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French Aircrew Program

Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Att: General Vandenberg) 20 Jan 44
FROM: AC/AS, Plans 1

AC/AS, Training Major Crege/ee/6031

1. 132 French pilot students per month enter pilot training in the U.S. Based on 40% elimination rate, this intake would produce 79 pilots per month. In accordance with Chart 8 of French Rearmament Program these pilots were to be broken down as follows:

25 B-26 pilots
7 Transport pilots
47 Fighter pilots

It is probable that the elimination rate will be higher than originally anticipated. In the first class to enter single engine advanced training, only 10 out of approximately 40 entering the class were qualified for P-40 transition. French quota for P-40 transition is included as part of directed U.S. requirement.

2. There exists an acute shortage of P-40 airplanes for transition training of U.S. pilots to meet replacement requirements. Any French given P-40 transition will further reduce the number of Americans who can be given this training.

3. Information is requested as to whether French students are to be given priority over U.S. students for P-40 transition to total of 47 students per class.

ROBERT L. WALSH
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

TO: Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Att: General Vandenberg) DATE

FROM: AC/AS, Plans COMMENT NO. 2
RMP/vk/72700

1. ACAS Plans is of the opinion that French students should be given priority over U.S. students for P-40 transition training not to exceed 47 per month, when necessary to meet the quota of 47 per month.

J.H.L. LOFTUS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief, Operational Plans Division

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

as of 6 February 1944

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES		TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	IN DEPOT	IN TRAINING	
Medium Bomber						
B-26B	1	13	-	-	-	13
Light Bomber						
A-35 A,B	-	-	-	-	19	19
A-24 B	-	-	-	18	-	18
Torpedo Bomber						
Latecoere	1	6	9	-	-	15
S.S. Fighter						
Hurricane IIC	1	10	4	-	-	14
Spitfire	3	44	7	-	-	51
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	14	12	-	-	26
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	39	14	12	-	65
Naval Reconn.						
Walrus	1	9	8	-	-	17
Photographic Reconn.						
F-4 A, 5A	1	-	4	-	-	4
Total	12	135	58	30	19	242

Note: The above table includes only airplanes under Mediterranean Allied Air Force

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Date: 28 July 1943
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19 February 1944 (2)

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

As of 23 January 1944

Type and Model	Number Of Squadrons	Airplanes In Squadrons		Airplanes		Total
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	In Depot	In Training	
Medium Bomber						
B-26 B	1	13	-	-	-	13
Light Bomber						
A-35 A,	-	-	-	-	18	18
A-24 B	-	-	-	19	-	19
Torpedo Bomber						
Latecoere	1	3	12	-	-	15
S.E. Fighter						
Hurricane IIC	1	6	5	-	-	11
Spitfire	3	39	10	-	-	49
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	13	13	-	-	26
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	48	14	10	-	72
Naval Recons.						
Walrus	1	10	6	-	-	16
Photographic Recons.						
F-4, 5 A	1	1	3	-	-	4
Transports						
C-60	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	12	133	63	30	18	244

Note: The above table includes only airplanes under Mediterranean Allied Air Force control.

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Management Control
2 February 1944 (2K)

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA
As of 30 January 1944

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES		TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	IN DEPOT	IN TRAINING	
Medium Bomber						
B-26 B	1	13	-	-	-	13
Light Bomber						
A-35 A,B	-	-	-	-	18	18
A-24 B	-	-	-	18	-	18
Torpedo Bomber						
Latecoere	1	2	13	-	-	15
S.S. Fighter						
Hurricane IIC	1	5	7	-	-	12
Spitfire	3	41	8	-	-	49
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	15	11	-	-	26
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	43	15	12	-	70
Naval Reconn.						
Walrus	1	11	5	-	-	16
Photographic Reconn.						
F-4 A, 5A	1	-	4	-	-	4
Total	12	130	63	30	18	241

Note: The above table includes only airplanes under Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

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ENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

As of 9 January 1944

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES		TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	IN DEPOT	IN TRAINING	
Medium Bomber						
B-26 B	1	13	-	-	-	13
Light Bomber						
A-35 A	-	-	-	-	4	4
A-35 B	-	-	-	1	20	21
A-24 B	-	-	-	-	25	25
Torpedo Bomber						
Lateooere	1	5	11	-	-	16
S.E. Fighter						
Hurricane IIC	1	9	2	-	-	11
Spitfire	3	32	13	-	-	45
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	16	11	-	-	27
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	43	23	9	-	75
Naval Recomn.						
Walrus	1	9	6	-	-	15
Photographic Recomn.						
F-4 A	1	-	2	-	-	2
F-5 A	-	2	-	-	-	2
Transports						
C-60	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	12	129	68	11	49	257

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Note: Airplanes under NAAF control.

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

As of 12 December 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES IN DEPOT AND TRAINING	TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable		
Medium Bomber					
B-26 B	1*	-	-	13	13
Light Bomber					
A-35 A	1*	-	-	7	7
A-35 B	-	-	-	23	23
A-24 B	-	-	-	2	2
Torpedo Bomber					
Latecoere	1	5	5	-	10
S.E. Fighter					
Hurricane IIC	1	7	5	-	12
Spitfire	3	37	5	-	42
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	17	11	-	28
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	47	19	5	71
Naval Reconn.					
Walrus	1	8	7	-	15
Photographic Reconn.					
F-4 A	1	1	2	-	3
F-5 A	-	1	-	-	1
TOTAL	13	123	54	50	227

* Training Squadrons

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

As of 19 December 1943

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES		TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	IN DEPOT	IN TRAINING	
Medium Bomber						
B-26 B	1	7	6	-	-	13
Light Bomber						
A-35 A	-	-	-	-	7	7
A-35 B	-	-	-	1	22	23
A-24 B	-	-	-	10	-	10
Torpedo Bomber						
Latecoere	1	5	5	-	-	10
Sea. Fighter						
Hurricane IIC	1	11	2	-	-	13
Spitfire	3	32	10	-	-	42
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	16	12	-	-	28
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	51	19	6	-	76
Naval Reconn.						
Walrus	1	7	8	-	-	15
Photographic Reconn.						
F-4 A	1	3	-	-	-	3
F-5 A	-	1	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	12	133	62	17	29	241

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Date: 28 July 1943
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Management Control
5 January 1944

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FRENCH AIR FORCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

As of 2 January 1944

TYPE AND MODEL	NUMBER OF SQUADRONS	AIRPLANES IN SQUADRONS		AIRPLANES		TOTAL
		Serviceable	Unserviceable	IN DEPOT	IN TRAINING	
Medium Bomber						
B-26 B	1	7	6	-	-	13
Light Bomber						
A-36 A	-	-	-	-	5	5
A-35 B	-	-	-	1	20	21
A-24 B	-	-	-	3	-	3
Torpedo Bomber						
Latecoere	1	6	8	-	-	14
S.E.Fighter						
Hurricane IIC	1	8	3	-	-	11
Spitfire	3	37	4	-	-	41
Kittyhawk (P-40L)	1	16	10	-	-	26
Airacobra (P-39N)	3	68	18	9	-	77
Naval Reconn.						
Walrus	1	7	8	-	-	15
Photographic Reconn.						
F-4 A	1	-	3	-	-	3
F-5A	-	1	-	-	-	1
Transports						
C-60	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	12	137	80	14	25	231

SECRET

Auth: CG,AAF
Date: 28 July 1943
Initials: JCW

SC-AS-21

Statistical Control Division
Management Control

Copy No.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: French Air Rearmament Program.

TO: Colonel Loutzenheiser

DATE: 21 SEP 1943

FROM: AC/AS, Plans

COMMENT NO. 1

WMB/hmh/71172

1. Attached hereto is a complete file of the plan for equipping the French Air Force as informally submitted by General Spaatz to General Arnold together with General Arnold's reply to General Spaatz.

2. While this plan has not been approved by General Eisenhower, it will in all probability be formally submitted through General Eisenhower's headquarters to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval and finally to the Army Air Forces and Munitions Assignments Board for implementation.

3. This is submitted to your office in order that you may be kept fully posted with the most recent information available on this subject and for any action you may deem necessary.

for L. S. KUTER
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Incls: (Cy)
Ltr to Gen Spaatz fm Gen Arnold. R&R, subj: Pilots and Air Crews for the French, 2 comments, w/3 incls. (Ltr frm Gen Spaatz w/incl and 2 tabs.)

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3-1109 A.F.

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French Air Rearmament Program.

Colonel Loutzenheiser

AC/AS, Plans

21 SEP 194[illegible] 1

WHB/hmh/71172

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AFAEP - LF
WMB/hmh/71172
Wtn 9-17-43

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Lieut. General Carl Spaatz
Headquarters North African Air Forces
Office of the Commanding General
APO 650

Dear Tooey:

I have gone over your basic outline plan for the flow of aircraft, formation of units, training of air crews, and flow of equipment. In general, the plan is doable and I am prepared to recommend to the CCS that it be approved.

With reference to the airplane allocations, the CCS have already approved the tentative allocations for the first half of 1944 which in general will be about one half of the full year's commitments to the beneficiary nations. I can recommend the following to the CCS and MAB to supplement our tentative commitments for the first half of 1944.

a. Increase the first 6 months commitment of P-39's to 90. This will be a tentative allocation and I would prefer to make a commitment for a maximum of 90 or the replacement of actual losses, whichever is smaller.

b. Increase the allocation of A-25's to 36 in the first 6 months of 1944 which will complete the commitment for this type.

c. Allocate 12 Link trainers.

d. If necessary allocate 16 B-26's to the Commanding General, 12th Air Force for the French Air Force to replace these turned over by Eisenhower. In your formal request bring out the fact that you either do or do not require an allocation over and above those Eisenhower has received as attrition airplanes for the 12th Air Force.

e. I am not in a position to recommend an allocation of F-5's to the French in 1943 or in the first half of 1944. Any F-5's that the French get will have to come out of the 12th Air Forces' allocation of attrition airplanes. I can recommend an allocation for photo reconnaissance of an equivalent number of B-26's in lieu of F-5's if you want them, i.e., 8 in 1943 and 25 in 1944.

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C O P Y

f. Allocate B-26's for the one B-26 flight for photo reconnaissance i.e., 7 in 1943 and 9 in 1944.

All the equipment for the combat and complementary service groups set forth in your schedule can be shipped and we will include it in the Army Supply Program as part of the Air Forces program.

The procurement of the signal equipment that you have requested will impose a strain on our over-burdened production facilities but as the quantities are small, I believe that we can meet the total requirments although delivery may not be quite on the schedule that you request. When your request, for the Air Defense and Communications units, is formally forwarded through Eisenhower show the relationship of these units to the 12th Air Support Command.

Our training establishment is being pushed to the limit and every Frenchman we train means just one less for the AAF so that your training program, for personnel to be trained in the U. S., should be kept to a minimum.

As far as maintaining French Units is concerned a general policy of placing the responsibilities for the supply of spare parts, spare engines, etc., on the U. S. AAF Service Command has been adopted and I am inclosing a copy of the A. C. letter which sets up this plan.

If you can get the French request modified to the extent noted in subparagraph g of paragraph 2 above and have the Joint Air Commission formally submit it through Eisenhower to the CCS, I am prepared to give it my backing.

With my very best regards,

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD
General, U. S. Army
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incls.
Proposed French Air Rearmament Program
dtd 8-28-43.
AG Ltr (Cy) AG 452 (9 Jun 43) OB-S-D-M
dtd 6-23-43.

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AFAEP LP
WSB/hmh/71172
Wtn 9-14-43

Subject: Pilots and Air Crews for the French.

To: General Arnold — 14 Sept 1943

From: General Kuter — Comment No. 2
WSB/hmh/71172

1. Attached as Tab "A" is a schedule of 1943 deliveries to the French Air Force and tentative allocations for first and second six-months periods of 1944.

2. Attached as Tab "B" is a comparison of the requests set forth by periods and the tentative schedule of allocations.

3. The program proposed by General Spaatz can be met, insofar as airplanes are concerned, by the following changes;

a. Increase the 1944 allocation of P-39/63 by 90. (45 in first 6 months, and 45 in second 6 months or by a commitment to replace actual losses.)

b. Deliver the tentative 1944 allocation of A-35's in the first 6 months.

c. Allocate 12 link trainers at once.

d. Allocate 16 B-26's to Twelfth Air Force for French Air Force to replace those turned over by theatre command, if he so desires. (This point is vague in memo.)

e. Advise General Spaatz that no P-5's can be provided for French in 1943 (a few might be provided in 1944) but that an equivalent number of B-26's can be made available, i.e. 8 in 1943 and 25 in 1944.

f. Allocate B-26's as requested for Photo Reconnaissance, i.e., 7 in 1943 and 9 in 1944.

4. The shipment of equipment for all the complimentary services (except signal equipment (see paragraph 5) can be supplied, from Air Force stocks or from procurement that can be initiated, without unduly interfering with the Air Force program.

5. Procurement of the signal equipment will impose a strain on facilities already overburdened, but it is believed that amounts requested, which are small in quantity, may be procured over a period of time although delivery may not meet the requested schedule.

6. The training program requested will mean a reduction in Air Forces expectancies of an equal number of personnel available to the Air Forces, by type of trainee. The training program is relatively small, i.e. pilots are requested at the rate of 94 a month and all other types of trainees total 64 per month. While the Army Air Forces is committed to training a certain number of French Air Force personnel, this number should be kept at the minimum.

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Subject: Pilots and Air Crews for the French

To: General Arnold

14 Sept 43

From: General Kuter

Comment No. 2
KHH/hmh/71172

CONTINUED

7. The Mediterranean Air Command has not as yet defined the role that the French Air Force is to play in the way. The aircraft that have been allocated, and this program that has been submitted is without the benefit of a definition of the mission the French Air Force is to fulfil. It is suggested that the primary mission of the reconstituted French Air Force should be the garrisoning of North Africa from 0° to 11° N latitude and for Sardinia and Corsica.

8. The problem of amalgamating the French Army Air Force with the French Navy Air Force is one that can be solved only by the French. A solution (in time) may be forced by continued refusal to allocate USAAF airplanes to the French Navy. The United States Navy is not likely to offer much to the French in the way of aircraft.

9. A letter to General Spaatz will be prepared for your signature when the necessary decisions, reference paragraphs 5 and 7 above, are furnished.

L. S. KUTER
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

1st Incls. n/c
2nd Incls. Tab A.
3rd Incls. Tab B.

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Subject: Pilots and Air Crews for the French

General Kuter 9/9/43

General Arnold 1

When we get all the data mentioned herein, set up the number of airplanes that the Fr nch are to get and submit to me.

/s/
H.H.A.

Incl: Ltr to Gen. Ar old fm Gen. Spaatz
dtd 8/26/43 w/chart on Fr. Demands */
Proposed Fr.Air Rearmament Prgm 8-28-43.

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HEADQUARTERS NORTHWEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES
Office of the Commanding General
APO 650

26 August 1943

General H. H. Arnold
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
Washington, D. C.

Dear Hap:

I have just sent off a couple of cables on the subject of pilots and air crews for the French and on the immediate equipment of a French squadron of B-26's. Your letter of August 10 on the same subject was received a few days ago.

Tedder and I have set up a Joint Air Commission to deal with French air rearmament questions here. Saville is Chairman and represents our interests, and the Air Ministry has sent out a Group Captain to look out for their interests. This Commission acts as an agency of the Mediterranean Air Command, and has been working for a couple of weeks trying to reconcile the several conflicting interests - French, British, and American, as well as the desire to fight vs. the desire to build and maintain a fighting force.

As a result, we have prepared a basic outline plan for the flow of aircraft, formation of units, training of air crews, and flow of equipment. This plan is in the nature of a detailed proposal for your approval. It has been agreed to by the French here and concurred in by Tedder who is trying to get the Air Ministry to carry out their part of the program. He hasn't heard from the Air Ministry yet, but tells me he thinks there is a good chance of getting them to agree with it.

The man-power situation here for the French Air Force is quite critical. I don't see how they can take more medium or fighter-bomber units than is shown in the program. When man-power in France becomes available, the picture will of course change radically.

Pending your approval of the outline plan, I am going ahead where I can, but I am not able to go very fast, so hope you will be able to give me your OK as soon as possible. If you accept the plan, I will have the Joint Air Commission submit it formally through Eisenhower.

One of the main points for consideration is the inadequacy of P-39 allocations to meet attrition of their P-39 group through 1944. Only 90 are allotted now, and it will take 90 more of 90 P-63's to keep them going. Another is the provision of enough F-5's or other types to complete the French Photo Reconnaissance Squadron. Bouscat is apparently most anxious to have this unit completed. We must know where we stand with respect to aircraft or we cannot arrive at any definite program with the French.

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If you approve the outline plan, I consider it vital that the French units be included in our latest revision of the "273 Group Program." Unless this is done, I forsee great confusion and difficulty in replacements, spares and other equipment and supplies necessary to sustain their units. They should be sustained on the same basis as our own units.

I am having the Commission make a detailed study of fourth echelon maintenance requirements, and will send you the information on that when I get their report. A quick survey indicates that the French will not require any complete TB/A equipment for Air Depot and similar units, but will require a number of special tools, spares, etc., which are peculiar to our equipment. As I said in the cable, they can take care of themselves pretty well in North Africa with their fixed depots, and we will just have to take their fourth echelon maintenance outside North Africa as an overload on our units until we get to France. If we start to bog down, we can ship items back to North Africa for repair in their fixed shops. In any case, the bill will be kept as small as practicable, as I know much of that materiel is still pretty critical in the United States.

My very best regards.

Sincerely

/s/ TOOEY

Carl Spaatz
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

2 Incls.
1 French Demands
2 Outline Plan (7 charts)

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COMMANDEMENT DE L'AV[illegible]N FRANCAISE

ETAT -- MAJOR

3eme Bureau

ALGER, le 23 Aout 1943

No 3720 /3
E.M.C.A.F.

PLAN D'ARMEMENT DE L'AVIATION FRANCAISE

(mis au point par le Comite d'etudes)

(constitue a la conference du 8 Aout)

SQUADRONS	AVIONS Existants	AVIONS Prevus	To SEPTEMBRE	To AVRIL	To 1° JUILLET	Station nement initial	Avions fournis par
CHASSE							
R. M. Wing (1)							
I/3	16 SPITFIRE					N A	B R
I/7		16 SPITFIRE				N A	B R
II/7	16 SPITFIRE					N A	B R
AISACE	16 SPITFIRE					U K	B R
ILE DE FRANCE	16 SPITFIRE					U K	B R
I/2		16 SPITFIRE				U K	B R
B.M. GRUPP (1)							
III/6	25 P.39	25 P.63				NA	U S
I/4	25 P.39	25 P.63				N A	U S
I/5	25 P.39	25 P.63				N A	U S
B.M. GRUPP (1)							
II/5	25 P.40	25 P.47				N A	U S
II/3		25 P.47				N A	U S
III/3		25 P.47				N A	U S
B.M. GRUPP (1)							
IV/3		25 P.47				N A	U S
I/9		25 P.47				N A	U S
II/9		25 P.47				N A	U S
		TOTAUX	10	12	16		

(1) B.M. forms suivant les possibilites qu'aura le commandement allie de grouper les squadro francais.

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SQUADRONS	A S Existants	A S Prevus	1° SEPTEMBRE	1°AVRIL	1°JUILLET	Stationnement initial	Avions fournis par
RECONNAISSANCE							
II/33	P.38					N A	U S
	TOTAUX		1	1	1		
BOMBARDEMENT LEGER							
LORRAINE	A.20					U K	B R
	TOTAUX		1	1	1		
BOMBARDEMENT MOYEN							
E.M. GRUPP (1)							
I/22		16 B.26				N A	U S
I/19		16 B.26				NA	U S
II/52		16 B.26				N A	U S
E.M. GRUPP (1)							
I/32	19 A.35	16 B.26				N A	U S
II/63			(A 36)				
BRETAGNE		16 B.26				N A	U S
		16 B.26				MOYEN ORIENT	U S
			(A 35)				
	TOTAUX		1	3-	6		
BOMBARDEMENT LOURD							
I/25		HALIFAX				U K	B R
II/25		HALIFAX				U K	B R
	TOTAUX		2	2	2		

(1) E.M. forme suivant les possibilités qu'aura le Commandement allié de grouper les squadrons français.

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SQUADRONS	AVIONS Existants	Prevus	1°SEPTEMBRE	1° AVRIL	1° JUILLET	Stationnement initial	Avions fournis par
TRANSPORT							
I/15		C.60				N A	U S
II/15		C.60				N A	U S
	TOTAUX				2		
POLICE & SECURITE							
ARTOIS	ANSON	A.35				A.E.F.	
P.S.1	Glenn M.	A.35				A.O.F.	
P.S.2	Glenn M.	A-35				A.O.F.	
PICARDIE		A-35				MOYEN ORIENT	
	TOTAUX		4	4	4		

APPROUVE par le General BOUSCAT

Chef d'Etat-Major General de l'Armee de l'Air

Signe: BOUSCAT

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- Armement
- 1er Bureau

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28 August 1943

PROPOSED FRENCH AIR REARMAMENT PROGRAM

1. The enclosed charts attempt to establish a basis for French Air Rearmament, although it is recognized that changes will be inevitable.

2. Charts show total requirements for French Air Force and do not show net shortage over shipments already made.

3. Charts do not show French Navy air requirements, which will be forwarded later, after reconciliation.

4. Aircraft to meet North African local air crew training requirements for the period until U.S. trained crews are available are not included in these charts. It is known the French will require 100 A-24's for this purpose. Requirements for other types are being computed and will be forwarded later for inclusion in the program.

5. Proposed dates of shipment of aircraft and equipment have not yet been coordinated with French and AFHQ. This will follow informal approval of the program by C.G., AAF (and by CAS for British part only).

6. Lists of tools and special equipment for 4th Echelon maintenance by French are in process of preparation, and will be forwarded separately for inclusion in overall program.

7. French units equipped with U.S. equipment must be included in our "target" program for equipment and supply if units are to be maintained without serious impairment of the combat capability of U. S. units in this theater.

8. French Air Force parachute troops and Antiaircraft Artillery units are not included in this program. Details are being coordinated locally and requests will be submitted through regular ground force Rearmament channels.

9. The French request they be furnished twelve (12) Link Trainers, complete with spares, as soon as possible. These are required for the conduct of local training during the interim period and thereafter. Request cable reply to this request.

10. This program when approved is to supersede all previous conflicting requests.

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S Q U A D R O N P R O G R A M - THRU 1944

Aircraft		N O W					JANUARY 1, 1944					APRIL 1, 1944					JULY 1, 1944					Grand Total
	Type	B R UK	B R NA	Total	US NA	Grand Total	B R UK	B R NA	Total	US NA	Grand Total	B R UK	B R NA	Total	US NA	Grand Total	B R UK	B R NA	Total	US NA	
Single Engine Fighters	Spit	3	3	6	-	6	3	3	6	-	6	4	3	7	-	7	4	3	7	-	7
	P-39	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	3	3
	P-40	-	-	-	1	1	(Converted to P-47 Squadron January 1, 1944)														
	P-47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	6	6
	Total	3	3	6	4	10	3	3	6	4	10	4	3	7	5	12	4	3	7	9	16
Medium & Dive Bomber	A-35	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	2	(Converted to B-26 on 7/1/44)				
	B-26	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	6	6
	Total	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	4	4	-	-	-	5	5	-	-	-	6	6
Recce		-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1
Transport	C-60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Light Bombers	British	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	1
Heavy Bombers	British	2	0	2	-	2	2	-	2	-	2	2	-	2	-	2	2	-	2	-	2
Totals		6	3	9	8	17	6	3	9	9	18	7	3	10	11	21	7	3	10	18	28
Program Increase										1	1	1	-	1	2	3	-	-	-	7	7

INCL. 2 - Proposed Program
(10 Charts)

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SQUADRON PROGRAM - NOW

	ON HAND						REQUIRED						INCREASE (Additional Required)					
	BE		US	Total		Grand Total	BR		US	Total		Grand Total	BR		US	Total		Grand Total
	UK	NA	NA	UK	NA		UK	NA	NA	UK	NA		UK	NA	NA	UK	NA	
S.E.F.	2 Spit	2½ Spit	4 (3 P-39) (1 P-40)	2	6½	8½	3	3	4 (3 P-39) (1 P-40)	3	7	10	1	½	0	1	½	1½
Dive Bomber	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Light Bomber	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medium Bomber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1
Heavy Bomber	2	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recce.	0	0	½	0	½	½	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	½	0	½	½
Transport	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	5	2½	6½	5	9	14	6	3	8	6	11	17	1	½	1½	1	2	3
"Security" *						4						4						0

*Security Squadrons are aerial police - stationed in provinces to quell native disorders. They will use available French aircraft, P-35's available from conversion, and A-24's if necessary. No equipment provided by U. S. for these units.

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CHART 2 (of 10)

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U. S. FIGHTER PICTURE

	1943				1944													
	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	
Sq. P-39 "A"	25	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	75	P-39
P-39 "B"	25	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	75	P-39
P-39 "C"	25	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	75	P-39
P-40 ("D"	25	5	5	5	(Converted to P-47 below)												15	P-40
P-47 ("D"					25	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	80	
P-47 "E"							25	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	65	
P-47 "F"											25	5	5	5	5	5	50	
P-47 "G"											25	5	5	5	5	5	50	345
P-47 "H"											25	5	5	5	5	5	50	
P-47 "I"											25	5	5	5	5	5	50	
Total	100	20	20	20	40	20	20	45	25	25	125	45	45	45	45	45		
Total P-39	75	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	225	
Total P-40	25	5	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	
Total P-47	-	-	-	-	25	5	5	30	10	10	110	30	30	30	30	30	345	

25 Initial equipment - already furnished

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A-35 PICTURE

	1943										1944						
	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
SQUADRON "E"	24	3	3	3½	3	3	3	3	3	3	CONVERT TO B-26						51½
SQUADRON "F"	24	3	3	3½	3	3	3	3	3	3	CONVERT TO B-26						51½
TOTAL MONTHS	48	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6							103
TOTAL YEARS			67					36									103
TOTAL FROM U. S.			67					36									103

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CHART 4 (of 10)

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B-26 PICTURE

	1943				1944												
					1st Period			2nd Period			3rd Period						
	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
SQUADRON "A"	13	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	43
SQUADRON "B"					13	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	35
SQUADRON "C"								13	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	29
SQUADRON "D"											13	2	2	2	2	2	23
SQUADRON "E"		(ORIGINALLY EQUIPPED A-35's)									13	2	2	2	2	2	23
SQUADRON "F"		(ORIGINALLY EQUIPPED A-35's)									13	2	2	2	2	2	23
TOTAL	13	2	2	2	15	4	4	17	6	6	45	12	12	12	12	12	176
TOTAL BY PERIODS		19			23			29						105			176
TOTAL BY YEARS		19									157						176
FROM U.S.		16									157						173
FROM N.A.		3															3

NOTE: See CHART 7 for additional B-26 requirements

CHART 5 (of 10)

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TRANSPORT PICTURE - C-60

	1943									1944						
	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
SQUADRON "A"											16	1	2	2	1	2	24
SQUADRON "B"											16	1	2	2	1	2	24
TOTAL MONTH											32	2	4	4	2	4	48
TOTAL YEAR														48			48
TOTAL FROM U.S.														50			
TOTAL FROM N.A.														(2 OVER)			

CHART 6 (of 10)

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PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE UNIT EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

F - 5 and B-26 P I C T U R E

	1943				1944												
					1st Period			2nd Period			3rd Period			4th Period			
	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
SQDN. HQ. UNIT	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
FLIGHT "A" Aircraft - F-5	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	15
FLIGHT "B" Aircraft - F-5	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	13
FLIGHT "C" Aircraft - B-26	4	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	1	12
TOTAL	9	2	2	2	6	3	1	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	1	3	40
TOTAL F-5	5	1	1	1	5	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	28
TOTAL B-26	4	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	1	12

NOTES: 1. T/B/A equipment for complete Squadron should be shipped as early as practicable.

2. It is preferable that entire Squadron be equipped with F-5's - but this is thought to be impracticable.

3. Allocation of B-26's on CHART 5 (? - 9) should be increased by 7 in 1943 and 12 in 1944.

4. Allocation and flow of F-5's should be set up and included in commitments.

CHART 7 (of 10)

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AIR CREWS REPLACEMENT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

CATEGORY	No. per month	REPLACEMENT FOR SQS	TYPE	RATE	TRAINING: FLYING SCHOOL COURSE	TRAINING: TECHNICAL COURSE	R.T.U. TRAINING	REMARKS
								All Pilots are Officers or Cadets
Single Engine Fighter	15	3	P-39	20o/o	S.E. Pilot		P-39 or P-63	
	30	6	P-47	20o/o	S.E. Pilot		P-47	
	9	3	Spits	20o/o	S.E. Pilot		P-40, P-47, P-51	
S.E. Pilots "Security"	6	4	Misc. S.E.	60/o	S.E. Pilot		NONE	
2-Engine Ftr. Pilots	2	2/3	P-38	20o/o	2 Engine Pilot		P-38	No Special recce trn.
2-Engine Trans. Pilots	7	2	C-60	10o/o	2 Engine Pilot		NONE	
2-Engine Bomb. Pilots	25	6 1/3	B-26	15o/o	2 Engine Pilot		B-26	
OTHER AIR CREW	13	6 1/3	B-26	15o/o	Navigator-Bomber		No Crew training	Officer or Cadet
B-26 Crews	13	6 1/3	B-26	15o/o	Tail Gunner-Armorer		No Crew training	
	13	6 1/3	B-26	15o/o	Turret Gunner		No Crew training	
	13	6 1/3	B-26	15o/o	Radio Operator - Waist Gunner		No Crew training	
	3	2	C-60	10o/o	Navigator		No Crew training	Officer or Cadet
Transport Crews	3	2	C-60	10o/o	Radio Operator		No Crew training	
"Security" Crews	6	4	Misc. SE	60/o	Armorer		No Crew training	

SUMMARY		OUTPUT
OFFICERS OR CADETS	(Pilots - 1 Engine	60
	(Pilots - 2 Engine	34
	(Pilots - Total	94
	(Navigator-Bombardiers	13
	(Navigators	3
ENLISTED MEN - AIR CREW MEMBERS	(Radio Operators	3
	(Armorers	6
	(Gunners - (Armorer	13
	(Radio Operator	13
	(Engineer	13

INPUT

It is impossible to determine here the number of students who must enter school to produce the output required. It is advisable to start all officers and cadets in flying training, and use wash-outs to meet navigator requirements; the excess wash-outs being returned to N.A. The INPUT should be established at once and N.A. notified.

CHART 8 (of 10)

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AUXILLIARY COMBAT UNITS

UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	NOW	JAN 1 1944	APRIL 1 1944	JULY 1, 1944	OCT 1 1944	TOTAL
Hq. & Hq. Sq., Ftr. Op. -SE	1-12	73	1		1	1		3
Hq. & Hq. Sq., Bmb.Op.-MED	1-112	80			1	1		2
Communication Sq., Air Supt.	1-347	118	1			1		2
Ftr. Control Sq.	1-47*	342					1	1
Sig. AW Bn.	11-400*	976					1	1
Sig. Bn, Air Support	11-335	509					1	1
Hq. & Hq. Sq., Air Def. Wing	1-550-1	241				1		1
Sig. Co., Wing	11-247	89					1	1

*-See Special T/O's Attached

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AIRCRAFT WARNING BATALION - T/O 11-400

Hq. & PLOTTING COMPANY

	Column	Aggregate
1 Bn. Headquarters	A	43
1 Bn. Increment (Med)	Q	10
1 Co. Headquarters	B	19
1 Co. Increment (Med)	R	13
3 Mess Teams	P	9
2 Plotting Platoons	E	52
2 Filter Platoons	L	38
1 Comm. Platoon consisting of:		
2 Message Center Teams	H	14
2 Wire Teams	J	14
3 Teleprinter Teams	K	12
22 Radio Teams	I	88
	Aggregate Strength	312

Basic equipment this Company includes 2 complete transportable information center equipment, 6 SCR 299's, 7 SCR 188's, 10 Motorola or link transmitter - reciever - antenna - power unit sets, and 3 teleprinters.

LIGHT WARNING COMPANY

1 Co. Headquarters	B	19
1 Co. Increment	R	13
1 Mess Team	P	3
1 Wire Team	J	7
3 Light Warning Platoons	U (62)	186
3 Radar Maintenance Teams	G (8)	24
	Aggregate Strength	252

Basic equipment of this Company includes 12 SCR 602's and 12 Motorola or Link point-to-point Radio sets.

GROUND OBSERVER COMPANY

1 Co Headquarters	B	19
1 Co. Increment	R	13
1 Wire Team	J	7

SECRET

INCL L to
CHART 9
Page 1

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MOST SECRET

		Column	Aggregate
GROUND OBSERVER COMPANY (cont'd)			
3 Ground Observer Platoons each consisting of:			
9 Ground Observer Teams	M	(27)	81
9 Mess Teams	P	(27)	81
2 Radio Teams	I	(8)	24
	Aggregate Strength		225

Basic equipment of this Company includes 27 Walkie Talkies and 6 Motorola or Link Sets.

REPORTING COMPANY			
1 Co. Headquarters	B		19
1 Co. Increment	R		13
1 Radar Maint. Team	G		8
3 Reporting Platoons	C		147
	Aggregate Strength		187

Basic equipment of this Company includes 3 SCR 527's and 3 Motorola or Link point-to-point Radio Sets.

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INCL. 1 to
CHART 9

SECRET

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MOST SECRET

Composition of Fighter Control Squadron - T/O 1-47

	Column	Aggregate
1 Fighter Control Squadron	"A to I" incl	246
Plus additional teams as follows:		
1 Control Section	E	115
2 Control Teams	L	6
2 CCI Control Teams	M	12
1 Section Headquarters	F	21
4 Radio Relay Teams	P	40
1 Direction Finding	G	30
2 DF Teams	N	31
1 Security Section	H	31
1 Mess Sergeant	(line 59,col.4)	1
6 Mess Teams	K	12
18 Radio Link Teams	O	54
	Total Aggregate	342

Basic equipment for this Fighter Control Squadron consists of:

2 SCR 572

8 SCR 573

8 SCR 574

8 SCR 575

18 Motorola or Link VHF - FM Transmitter - Receiver Antenna - Power Unit Sets for Point-to-point.

INCL. 2 to
CHART 9

PAGE 1

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SERVICE UNIT EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

UNIT	T/O	REQUIREMENT NOW	JAN 1	APRIL 1	JULY 1	OCT 1	TOTAL
Hq & Hq. Sq. - Service Group	1-413	1	-	1	1	-	3
Service Squadrons	1-412	2	1	1	2	-	6
Q.M. Truck Co. - AVN.	10-57	2	1	1	2	-	6
Q.M. Co. - Service Group	10-437	1	-	1	1	-	3
Ord. Co. - Supply & Maint. AVN	9-417	2	1	1	2	-	6
Sig. Co. Service Group	11-237	Note 1 1	-	1	1	-	3
Hq. & Serv. Co., Engr. AVN Bn.	5-416	-	-	-	-	1	1
Engineer Co. - AVN	5-417	-	1	-	-	2	3
M.P. Company	19-217	-	1	-	1	1	3
Med. Supply Platoon		1	-	1	1	-	3
Ord. Co. - Air Base	9-167	Note1	-	-	-	-	-
Q.M. Co. - Medium Maint. AVN	10-487	Note 2	-	-	-	-	-

NOTES: 1. - Asked for by cable . . . Equipment has arrived and should be deducted from equipment required for 2 Cos., Ord., Supply, and Maintenance (T/O 9-417).

2. - Asked for by cable . . . Equipment not required if T/O 9-417 units are furnished.

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FRENCH AIR FORCE

AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES AND ALLOCATIONS

	Deliveries (to date) 1943								Allocations 1943											First 6 Months 1944							Second 6 1944 (ta			
TYPE	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	TOTAL	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	TOTAL	J	F	M	A	M	J	TOTAL	J	F	M	A
B-26	-	-	-	-	-	-	16*	16*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16*	14	13	13	14	13	13	80	14	13	13	14
A-35	-	26	4	-	37	-	-	67	-	15	15	15	7	-	-	-	-	-	67	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	3	3	3	3
A-24															25	25	25	25	100											
P-39-63	30	60	-	-	-	-	-	90	30	30	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90	8	7	8	7	8	7	45	8	7	8	7
P-40							25*	25*											25*											
P-47																				29	29	28	29	29	28	172	29	29	28	29
C-60						2		2						2	2	2			6	9	8	8	9	8	8	50	9	8	8	9
C-78	15		30		15			60	15	15	15	15							60	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	3	3	3	3
L-4					30			30					30						30											
					Total			290											394							383				

Deliveries through September actual.

* Delivered by theatre commander from his stocks in theatre. (Assume attrition will be met from theatre allocation.)

WMB/hb
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TAB A

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FRENCH AIR FORCE

AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES AND ALLOCATIONS

s (to date) 9 4 3				Allocations 1 9 4 3											First 6 Months 1 9 4 4							Second 6 Months 1944 (tentative)							1944 TOTAL
J	A	S	TOTAL	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	TOTAL	J	F	M	A	M	J	TOTAL	J	F	M	A	M	J	TOTAL	
-	-	16*	168	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		16*	14	13	13	14	13	13	80	14	13	13	14	13	13	80	160
37	-	-	67	-	15	15	15	7	-	-	-	-	-	67	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	36
										25	25	25	25	100															
-	-	-	90	30	30	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90	8	7	8	7	8	7	45	8	7	8	7	8	7	45	90
		25*	25*											25*															
															29	29	28	29	29	28	172	29	29	28	29	29	28	172	344
														6	9	8	8	9	8	8	50	9	8	8	9	8	8	50	100
	2		2						2	2	2																		
														60	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	36
15			60	15	15	15	15																						
30			30					30						30															
tal			290											394							383							383	766

Deliveries through September actual.

* Delivered by theatre commander from his stocks in theatre. (Assume attrition will be met from theatre allocation.)

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	1943		Last 6 Mos - 1944		2nd 6 Mo
	New French Request From U. S.	Deliveries Actual & Projected	New French Request From U. S.	MAC Air Allocation	French Requ From U. S.
P-39 (3 Sqds now)	120	90	90	45	90
P-40 (1 Sqd now)	40	25*	Requipped with P-47	-	-
P-47 (1 Sqd (Jan 1944) (1 Sqd (Apr 1944) (4 Sqds(Jul 1944)	-	-	95	172	280
A-35 (2 Sqs now)	67	67	36	18	Reqquipped B-26
B-26 (1 Sq now) (1 Sq Jan 1944) (1 Sq Apr 1944) (3 Sqds Jul 1944)	19	16**	52	80	105
C-60 (2 Sqds Jul 1944)					48
Photo-Reconn. (Flight A & Hq. 5 (F-5's) Sept 1943 (Flight B - 4 (F-5's Jan 1944	8	-	14	-	11
(Flight C - 4 (B-26's) Sept 1943)	7	-	5	-	4
Training					
TOTAL	100 / 361	100 / 298	292	315	538

* Furnished by theatre commander assume attrition for 1943 will be from N.A.A.F. Airplanes.
** Furnished by theatre commander assume attrition for 1943 will be from N.A.A.F. Airplanes. (Indefinite as to whether General Spaatz wishes replacement of the 16 B-26's by MAC Air action).

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	1943		1st 6 Mos - 1944		2nd 6 Mos - 1944	
	New French Request From U. S.	Deliveries Actual & Projected	New French Request From U. S.	MAC Air Allocation	French Request From U. S.	MAC Air Allocation (tentative)
	120	90	90	45	90	45
	40	25*	Requipped with P-47	-	-	-
944)						
944)	-	-	95	172	280	172
944)						
	67	67	36	18	Reqquipped with B-26	18
)						
)						
)	19	16**	52	80	105	80
944)						
944)					48	50
Hq. 5 (F-5's) Sept 1943)						
4 (F-5's)	8	-	14	-	11	-
Jan 1944)						
4 (B-26's))	7	-	5	-	4	-
Sept 1943))						
TOTAL	100 / 361	100 / 298	292	315	538	365

y theatre commander assume attrition for 1943 will be from N.A.A.F. Airplanes.
y theatre commander assume attrition for 1943 will be from N.A.A.F. Airplanes.
as to whether General Spaatz wishes replacement of the 16 B-26's by MAC Air action).

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24 "B"

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AC/AS, Plans
PMH/jw/6722

wtn. 9/9/43

MEMORANDUM FOR MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT COMMITTEE - AIR

Subject: Requirements of French Air Force.

1. A cable has been received from General Spaatz requesting that complete equipment for one communication squadron, air support (T/O 1-547) be shipped at the earliest possible date to French Air Force.

2. General Spaatz further advised that this equipment was required for early employment in connection with French ground forces and had the approval of the Joint Rearmament Committee.

3. It is requested that your Committee take the necessary action to comply with said request and that AC/AS, Plans be notified of the action taken.

L. S. [illegible]
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

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Requirements of French Air Force.

MM&D, AC/AS
(Supply Division).
AC/AS, Plans

9/9/43
PMR/jw/6722 1

1. Reference cable CM-IN 5442, 7 September 1943, information copy of which has been supplied your division, General Spaatz requests that complete spares and necessary special tools be included with the shipment of 100 A-24's allocated for the French Air Force.

2. It is requested that your division take the necessary action to assure compliance with said request, and that AC/AS, Plans be notified of the action taken.

L. S. KUTER
Brigadier General, USA

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Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans 9 SEPTEMBER 1943

AFAEP Hq AAF Lt.Col.Hamilton 5722

SECRET PRIORITY

CG TWELFTH AIR FORCE
ALGIERS

INITIALED HAS BEEN ACTION TO SHIP COMPLETE SPARES AND TOOLS
WITH AFHSM TWO YOUR FOR FRENCH PARTY FOR SPAATZ FROM ARNOLD
AFAEP SIGNED MARSHALL REPEAD WILLIAM NINE THREE THREE FIVE
COMMA SEVENTH SEPTEMBER PAREN ALSO TO SUPPLY UNIT EQUIPMENT
TABLE SLANT OPTION ONE DASH FIVE FOUR SEVEN FOR ONE COMMUNICATION
SQUADRON AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE

CONCURRENCES:

OPD_____

OPD

D. S. BLOSSON
Major, A. C.

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AC/AS, Plans
CMT/jw/5834

wtn. 9/7/43

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT COMMITTEE - AIR:

Subject: Requirements for the French Air Force.

1. On August 31st a Memorandum was sent to you on the above subject requesting that your Committee take the necessary action to:

a. Ship 100 A-24's as requested.

b. Ship the OEL equipment for one B-26 Squadron at the earliest possible date.

2. On the same day that this Memorandum was sent your Committee, a cable was sent to the Theater requesting the information as to whether complete OEL equipment for the B-26 Squadron was required or if certain OEL items were available in sufficient quantities in the Theater. Reply has been received, CM-IN 3841, 5 September 1943, stating that complete OEL equipment for one B-26 Squadron was required at the earliest possible date. This request had the concurrences of the Joint Rearmament Committee.

3. This information is being passed on to you in connection with the implementation of the request.

L. S. KUTER
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

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AC/AS, Plans
CMT/jw/5834

wtn. 8/31/43

MEMORANDUM FOR MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT COMMITTEE - AIR:

Subject: Requirements of French Air Force.

1. A cable has been received from General Spaatz requesting for the French Air Force:

(a) 100 A-24's for training, to be shipped as convenient but not to interfere with shipment of material for combat and service units.

(b) OEL for 1 B-26 Squadron, to be shipped as early as possible.

2. Informal inquiry of SOS&K indicates that the 100 A-24's can be made available at the rate of 25 per month beginning with September production and that shipping will be available at the appropriate times.

3. The cable further states that a revised French Air rearmament program is now in process of preparation and will be forwarded when completed. It is now anticipated that the request will include:

(a) Equipment for 3 Service Group, complete with normally attached units. One of these has already been requested. It is estimated that the second will be requested for April 1944 and the third in July 1944.

(b) OEL equipment for 6 Bombardment Squadrons (Medium). One of these is needed at earliest possible date as General Spaatz has (from the 12th Air Force) loaned or advanced to the French on 1944 commitments, the airplanes to equip one B-26 Squadron (16 B-26's).

4. The cable carried the concurrence of General Eisenhower and Air Marshall Tedder.

5. It is desired that the Munitions Assignment Committee (Air) take the necessary action to:

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(a) Ship the 100 A-24's as requested.
(b) Ship the OEL for 1 B-26 Squadron at the earliest possible date.

6. It is further desired that the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans be notified of the action taken.

L. S. KUTER
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

Prepared by
CPD - Hubbard
G+R - Snader, Fowler, Kelly, Crayford
Mil Aid - Rinehart

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W/ DEPARTMENT--OFFICIAL BUSINESS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans — Date: 31 AUGUST 1943

Hq. AAF, AFAEP — Telephone: Col. Taylor 5884

Classification: S E C R E T — Precedence: Priority (Deferred - Priority - Urgent)

To:

CG TWELFTH AIR FORCE
ALGIERS

ALLOCATION OF PROJECT TWO SIX FIVE ROGER FOR THIRTY SEVEN BAKER DASH TWENTY SIX AIRCRAFT WILL MORE THAN REPLACE THE SIXTEEN BAKER DASH TWENTY SIXS TURNED OVER TO THE FRENCH PAREN TO SPAATZ FROM ARNOLD RE YOUR WILLIAM EIGHT SIX ONE SEVEN OF TWENTY NINTH AUGUST PAREN AFTER DEDUCTING THOSE TRANSFERRED TO THE FRENCH YOU WILL STILL HAVE ON HAND CONSIDERABLY MORE BAKER DASH TWO SIXS THAN YOUR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SIX PERIOD ACTION HAS BEEN STARTED TO FURNISH THE ONE HUNDRED AFIRM DASH TWENTY FOURS AND THE OEL EQUIPMENT FOR ONE BAKER DASH TWO SIX SQUADRON PERIOD IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE AFIRM DASH TWENTY FOURS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT THE RATE OF TWENTY FIVE PER MONTH BEGINNING WITH SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION PERIOD INFORMATION IS DESIRED AS TO WHETHER COMPLETE OEL EQUIPMENT FOR THE BAKER DASH TWENTY SIX SQUADRONS IS REQUIRED OR IF CERTAIN OEL ITEMS ARE AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES IN THE THEATRE

DISTRIBUTION:

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Content and classification authenticated by

D. S. BLOSSOM
Major, A. C.

CONCURRENCES:

OPD Hubbard OCAR Wayland MMAD [illegible] DEP. C/AS Vandenberg

September 3, 1942

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13 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR F. S. WILLMAN:

Re: French Air Force

1. There is submitted herewith certain information covered under the three general headings:

a. Training
b. Aircraft allottments
c. Miscellaneous information

2. The inclosed data considers only delivery of aircraft from the United States and does not consider:

a. French aircraft already on hand, consisting mostly of Dewoitine 520's, Loire 130's, Latecoere 278's, and Glenn Martin 167's, many of which are obsolete and for which there are few repair parts available.

b. Aircraft assigned by the British of which there are some squadrons operated by the French.

c. United States aircraft already in the theatre which General Eisenhower may assign to the French Air Force.

3. A request has been received from General Bethouart, Chief of the French Military Mission, dated August 3rd, (included in Tab C) for the training of additional French Pilots, gunners, armorers, and radio operators. This matter is under study and no reply has been made as yet.

4. The matter of the request for airplanes for the French Navy was referred by cable to General Eisenhower for his remarks. He replied on August 8th that their request was based, not on present strategical or tactical requirements, but rather on present and future availability of personnel. General Eisenhower asked that no action be taken on their request until further advised by him as he was in the midst of negotiations with French Naval and Army Air authorities. General Arnold replied on August 11th stating that no requests from the French Navy would be considered without General Eisenhower's endorsement. General Arnold's cable also set forth the estimated build-up of the French Air Force as indicated in Tab B.

5. It is understood that Colonel Langmeade has with him full information on the proposed build-up of the French Air Force.

CURTIS B. DALL
Lt. Colonel, A. C.
AC/AS, Plans

Incl:
Tabs A, B, & C.

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French Training in United States

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans
Attention of Lt. Colonel Dall
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training

11 August 1943

1
GAB/gel/6031

TAB A

1. Pilots

a. The Army Air Forces agreed to train 100 French student pilots per month, to a total of 500, from primary through advanced (60% Single Engine, 40% Twin Engine), followed by 3 months RTU (60% Single Engine, 20% Twin Engine. The other 20% will not receive RTU as they are to be used as transport pilots.) This training is conducted at the following stations:

Elementary - Alabama Institute of Aeronautics, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.
Basic - Army Air Forces Basic Flying School, Gunter Field, Alabama.
Advanced SE - Army Air Forces Advanced Flying School, Craig Field, Ala.
Advanced TE - Army Air Forces Advanced Flying School, Turner Field, Albany, Ga.

b. 1st detachment of 108 entered primary training 2 July 1943;
2nd detachment of 102 entered primary training 30 July 1943
To date a total of .. 210 have entered pilot training, of which 17 have been eliminated.

c. Eliminated noncommissioned men are to receive flexible gunnery, followed by radio for 50% and armament for 50%.

d. Eliminated officers are to receive other courses, in accordance with their aptitude and facilities available.

2. Gunners

a. The Army Air Forces agreed to train 20 flexible gunnery students per month, to a total of 200, followed by armament for 100 and radio for 100.

b. Flexible Gunnery - given at Tyndall Field, Florida:

	No. of Students	Entered	Completed or to Complete
1st detachment -	20	19 April 1943	27 May 1943
2nd detachment -	20	2 May 1943	12 June 1943
3rd detachment -	19	7 June 1943	19 July 1943
4th detachment -	20*	28 June 1943	7 Aug. 1943
5th detachment -	21	26 July 1943	4 Sept. 1943
Total	100 (to date)		

c. Bombardment Armament Course - given at Lowry Field, Col.

	No.	Entered	To Complete
From 1st & 2nd detachments of gunners	20	21 June 1943	14 Aug. 1943
From 3rd detachment of gunners	9	26 July 1943	20 Sept.1943
From 4th detachment of gunners	8	16 Aug. 1943	9 Oct. 1943
Total (to date)....	37		

*1 killed during training

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d. Radio Operator Mechanics Course - given at Scott Field, Ill.

	No.	Entered	To Complete
From 1st & 2nd detachments of gunners	20	17 June 1943	21 Oct. 1943
From 3rd detachment of gunners	10	24 July 1943	27 Nov. 1943
From 4th detachment of gunners	11	16 Aug. 1943	9 Oct. 1943
Total to date	41		

3. Mechanics

a. The Army Air Forces agreed to train 200 mechanics in the airplane and engine course, followed by factory courses. Arrival date in the United States is unknown.

ROBERT W. HARPER,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training.

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Buildup of the French Air Forces.

Colonel Taylor — 12 Aug 1943

Major Burgoyne — 1

WMB/hmh/74055

1. In December, 1942, General Spaatz turned over 25 P-40's to the French to operate under the direction of General Giraud. It is assumed that the attrition of this squadron furnished by General Spaatz will be made available from sources at his disposal in the theater.

2. In December, 1942, the French made a request on the Combined Chiefs of Staff for aircraft as follows:

		Total
7	Fighter squadrons @ 38 planes	266
9	Bomber squadrons @ 20 planes	180
3	Recon. squadrons @ 20 planes	60
		506

TAB B

3. In answer to this request the following commitments were approved by the M.A.C. - M.A.B. on Air Force recommendation:

1	Group single engine fighters	90	P-39
1	Group Dive Bombers	67	A-35
1	Group Utility Transports	60	UC-78
	Total	217	

4. The status as of this date is that all the above aircraft have either been delivered or are enroute.

5. On June 9, the French submitted a request for aircraft as follows:

152	Fighters, P-40 or P-51's.
60	Medium Bombers, B-26, B-25 or A-25G
40	Reconnaissance, of which 20 will be the same type as the medium bombers with full photographic equipment and 20 to be P-38's with photographic equipment
50	Transports, any twin engine cargo plane, type C-46 or C-47.
302	Total

6. In connection with the above, the recent Courtney - McCain-Arnold Proposal tentatively approved the following alternative to the above request:

80	B-26
172	P-47
50	C-60
Total 302	to be delivered out of U. S. production in the first half of 1944.

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Buildup of the French Air Forces.

Colonel Taylor 12 Aug 1943

Major Burgoyne 1
WMB/hmh/71172

CONTINUED

7. General Giraud made a request on the President while he was here for C-60 and C-47 airplanes. The Munitions Assignments Committee approved an allocation of the following in response to this request:

6 C-60's to be delivered 2 in August, 2 in September, 2 in October.

8. The French Navy have requested aircraft as follows:

9 Seaplanes -- Sunderland type
16 Long Range Planes -- Wellington type
20 Amphibious planes -- Walrus type

These airplanes are to be delivered by the U. K.

105 North American B-25's for the purpose of organizing 3 survey flotillas.
110 P-40's for the purpose of organizing 2 flotillas.
21 DC-3 transports.
7 Mail airplanes -- North American B-25.
10 Liaison Airplanes (5 passenger minimum capacity)

9. The C.C.S. forwarded their decision on the above matter to the M.A.B. for guidance. The decision was to the effect that no land based aircraft would be furnished the French Navy in view of the shortages now existing in those types of airplanes and the necessity for providing land based aircraft to the French Army. Further, that the 10 Liaison aircraft would be provided as soon as possible.

10. Ten L-2's have been assigned for delivery in September, 1943.

W. M. BURGOYNE
Major, Air Corps

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"B" Estimated Program

Estimated Status as of 31 Dec 43		Estimated Delivery 1st 6 mos.1944 UNIT EQUIPMENT and reserves	ATTRITION	Estimated Delivery 2nd 6 mos.1944 UNIT EQUIPMENT and reserves	ATTRITION	Estimated Status as of 31 Dec 44
Heavy Bomb.	None	None	None	None		None
Med. Bomb.	None	80 B-26	None	80 B-26		8 Sqdn B-26 @16
Light Bomb.	2 Sqdn A-35 @24		18 A-35			2 Sqdn A-35 @24
Fighter	3 Sqdn P-39 @25		45 P-39			3 Sqdn P-39 @25
Fighter	P-47 None	172 P-47		172 P-47		6 Sqdn P-47 @25
Fighter	1 Sqdn P-40 (Lafay)	None	None	None		1 Sqdn P-40 (Lafay
Trans-ports (M)	None	50 C-60		50 C-60		4 Sqdn C-60 @12
Trans-ports (L)	4 Sqdn UC-78 @13		18 C-78			4 Sqdn UC-78 @13

1. No committments or aircraft from the United States have been made to the French that are not already delivered or enroute with the exeption of six C-60's and ten L-2's.

2. The following table is an informal estimate of what the build-up of the French Air Force (U.S. equipped) may be at the end of 1944. This estimate is based on the following:

a. Aircraft already delivered or enroute.
b. That the tentative proposal of the Courtney-McCair-Arnold meeting considering delivery of 302 aircraft will be carried out.
c. That this proposed delivery (b. above) will be approximately duplicated in the last six months of 1944.
d. A reasonable flow of attrition aircraft will be provided.
e. That General Eisenhower will provide the necessary attrition aircraft for the P-40 Squadron (Lafayette) which are activated and equipped within the theatre.

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FRENCH MILITARY MISSION
Washington, D. C.

No. 259/A

August 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL H. A. KELLY, CHIEF SECTION FOR FRANCE,
Foreign Liaison Branch,
Military Intelligence Division G-2.

Subject: Increase in the number of French Student Pilots and Gunners to be trained in U. S. Army Schools for the French Air Forces.

It is our desire that you kindly submit the following requests to the proper authorities in the War Department.

I. Pilot training course.

a) Increase of the number of French Student Pilots to be trained in the United States, from the present number of 100 per month to 150 per month, the total number of detachments being left undetermined.

b) Training of 250 young pilots already having an average of 10 flying hours as pilots; these men to be admitted to the flying course at the rate of 50 per month (1).

As a fact, this request would increase the number of Student Pilots to be trained in the United States from 100 per month to 200 per month for a period of 5 months, this number being afterwards reduced to 150 per month.

(1) After discussion the matter with General R.W. Harper, we admit that, due to the difference in French and American methods of training, and also to the fact that these officers have had no flying opportunities since June 1940, they should start their training in primary schools.

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C O P Y

We readily understand that both, the schedule already in operation and the numerous commitments of the pilots training department, might not allow such increase in the training of French pilots as is now requested by the French Air Force.

Consequently, could the above requests not be met, it is suggested that, at least, the number of 100 Student Pilots per month, as admitted at the present time for training in the United States, be extended to an indefinite number of months. The first 500 Student Pilots will all be in training by the end of October 1943.

II.- Gunner, radio-mechanic and armorer training course.

a) Increase of the number of French Gunners to be trained in the United States from the present number of 20 per month to 75 per month; following completion of the gunner course, each detachment to be divided as follows: 25 attend the radio-mechanics course, and 50 the armorer course.

The Foreign Training Branch, U. S. AAF, has agreed to having those pilots eliminated as such, trained as gunners. If we expect a normal elimination of 25%, the total number of French Pilots to be trained would amount to about 100 per month. To be trained after completion of the Gunner Course: 1/3 as radio-mechanics, and 2/3 as armorers.

MARIE EMILE BETHOUART, Major General
Chief of the French Military Mission

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COPY

FRENCH NAVAL MISSION
IN THE
UNTTED STATES

Washington, 7 July 1943

No. 1005 /MN 4

MEMORANDUM NO. 58

From: The French Naval Mission
To: Captain Parrish

SUBJECT: Aircraft and equipment requested for the French Naval Air Force.

References: (a) Letter No. 29.F.M.A. 1/M of January 20, 1943 from Admiral MICHELIER, Commanding French Naval Air and Sea Forces in NORTH AFRICA.

(b) Letter No. 142 F.M. 4/48 C.A. of April 30, 1943 from Vice-Admiral, Commanding 4th Naval District ALGIERS, enclosing revised Chapter 1 B.

Enclosures: (A) One copy of the revised Chapter
(B) List of aircraft requested

1.- By reference (a), the French Navy forwarded the first general list of its material requirements and which, in particular, listed the aircraft material to be requested from the Allies. This list was approved by General EISENHOWER by dispatch A. 18714 of 26 February 1943, which was transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for action.

2.- Since January 20th, a more precise estimate of our requirements has been established and, in addition, seaplanes have been furnished by the UNITED KINGDOM.

This resulted in the revision of Chapter 1 B which is enclosed herewith as enclosure (A). This revised Chapter was approved 25 June 1943 by General EISENHOWER, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in North Africa.

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3.- Chapter 1 B Comprises:

(a) a list of material requested from the United Kingdom and upon which delivery is being made.
(b) a list of material to be requested from the United States.

4.- List (b) includes, in addition to a few utility planes, aircraft necessary to equip the following for use in North Africa:

- three scouting flotillas
- two fighter flotillas

(°French unit)

Two scouting flotillas and one fighter flotillas will be based west of the Meridian line, located 25 miles to the east of Oran, in a zone coming under American command; one scouting flotilla and one fighter flotilla will be based east of this line, in a zone coming under British command.

5.- According to Supply Policy C.C.S. 194/1, the United States would have to provide only those planes which are to be based west of this North-South line, that is:

2 scouting flotillas instead of 3
1 fighter flotilla instead of 2

But it should be noted that-

(a) a scouting flotilla composed of 20 WALRUS's is already based at ARZEW in the American zone, although these planes were furnished by the United Kingdom.

(b) according to Chapter 1 B, all the **seaplanes** needed for the French Naval Air Force will be furnished by the United Kingdom, while all the **landplanes** would be furnished by the United States no matter where in North Africa they are to be based.

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Considering the very small number of French naval aircraft in North Africa, this plan offers the following important advantages:

- it affords the necessary homogeneity which facilitates the supplying of spare parts and maintenance material.
- it permits an equitable distribution by the United States and the United Kingdom, relative to French naval rearmament.

Accordingly, the following are the landplane requirements of the French Naval Air Force:

A. PLANES

6.- Enclosure (B), attached hereto, is a list of aircraft requested totaling 253 landplanes of different types, 113 of which are required in 1st priority and 140 in 2nd priority.

7.- The particular types of aircraft, mentionned in Column 1 of Enclosure (B), are not imperative, but it is desired that the planes delivered to the French Naval Air Force be of the same models as those now in service in the American Air Force in North Africa.

8.- The planes should be delivered, ready to take off, i.e. - each should have on board equipment and armament corresponding to its intended use. (See column 6 of Enclosure (B)).

B. SPARE PARTS

9. Necessary spare parts should be furnished in quantities according to standard American practice and regulations.

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10.- Maintenance supplies, to be delivered at the same time, should be the same as for the American Naval Air Force. Allowances should be calculated to assure operation and normal maintenance for a period of three months.

D. TOOLS

11.- There should be delivered with each plane, individual tool kits for the crew (including mechanics, radiomen, gunners).

12.- Special tools for overhauling, repairing, assembling and dissembling the planes, are requested for each squadron, (or groups) as follows:

6 sets for bombers (North American B-25C)
4 sets for pursuit (Curtiss P-40)
2 sets for transports (Douglas DC-3)
2 sets for liaison (Lockhead JO-2)

E. FLYING SUITS

13.- The delivery of 600 Complete suits, regulation American equipment, are likewise requested (including head gear, goggles, gloves, life jackets, lined shoes, ear phones, inhalators, etc..).

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(s)
Vice Admiral R. A. Fenard
Chief of the French Naval Mission in the United States

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7 July 1943

ENCLOSURE (A)

to Memorandum No.

(Ref. letter No. 142 EM 4/48 CA
of April 30)

NAVAL AIRCRAFT

(Part B of Chapter I, letter 24 E.M. 4/9 of March 5, 1943)

I. Material to be delivered by the United Kingdom:

9 seaplanes, Sunderland type
16 long range planes, Wellington Type
20 amphibious planes, Walrus Type

2. Material requested from the U.S.A.:

a) Bombers - North American B-25C : 105
for the purpose of organizing
three survey flotillas based on:

1. - Northern Morocco
1. - East of Algiers
1. - West of Algiers

b) Fighter planes - P-40 Curtiss : 110
in order to organize two
flotillas:

1 - based in East of Algeria
1 - based in West of Algeria

c) Transport - Douglas DC-3 : 21

d) Mail - North American B-25C : 7

e) Liaison - Aircraft with 5 passengers minimum
capacity : 10

NOTE: All the above planes are to be delivered with replacement parts.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO MEMORANDUM No.--

TYPE	Number of planes requested		Number of Squadrons to outfit		PLANNED USE	TO BE BASED			
						West of Line N.S. 25 miles East Oran		East of Line N.S 25 miles East Oran	
	1st Prior.	2nd Prior.	1st Prior.	2nd Prior.		1st Prior.	2nd Prior.	1st Prior.	2nd Prior.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
					I. SCOUT BOMBING AND FIGHTING TYPES				
North American B-25C	35	70	2	4	Scouting, protection of convoys, anti-submarine, bombing of enemy naval units.	35	35		35
Curtiss P-40	55	55	2	2	Defenses of bases and ports against enemy fighter and bombers.	55			55
					II. UTILITY TYPES				
North American B-25C	4	3	2	1	Radio communication over great distances.	4	3		
Douglas DC-3	14	7	1	1	Transport of personnel and material.	14	7		
Lockheed J8-2	5	5	1	1	Liasion of Command.	5	5		
TOTAL	113	140							

1st Priority = Immediate Delivery
2nd Priority - Delivery before 1 January 1944

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August 13, 1943

COLONEL HOPKINS:

Re: French Military Mission letter #250/A, 3 Aug. '43.

1. The answer to this request involves:

   a. The number of aircraft the French will have in which these crews can be used.

   b. The ability of our training facilities to absorb this added enrollment.

   c. Whether or not the added enrollment will curtail our own training of U. S. personnel.

   d. If it does reduce training of U. S. personnel, will such reduction interfere with our trained personnel requirements in these catagories (in other words will we face a shortage).

2. General Eisenhower has a Committee working with the French Gov. in Africa which recommends to the Munitions Assignment Board what aircraft should be given the French. Possibly the same committee should recommend the number and type of French personnel that we should train - to coordinate the personnel and the equipment. It is believed that this request should be referred to General Eisenhower for his comments. He should be advised as to what the compliance with this request would do to our own training program.

3. It may be that this whole subject will be discussed at 'Quadrant' and perhaps no definite answer should be given to General Bethouart until after its conclusion.

CHARLES DALE,
Lt. Colonel, A.C.

for

CHARLES M. TAYLOR
Colonel, G. S. C.

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French Air Force

Vaupghel left out in final arrangements by Weidenburner

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Copy #1

By Authority of the Commanding General Army Air Forces

11-8-43 JOW

Date Initials

FRENCH AIR FORCE

STATUS - As of August 4, 1943

Organization	Model	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Total
Coastal Air Force	Latecore (Torpedo Bomber)	6	4	10
	Spitfire	17	4	21
	P-40L	21	8	29
	Walrus (Naval Reconn.)	3	1	4
Photo Reconnaissance Wing	F-4	1	-	1
	F-4A	1	1	2
Training Command	P-39N	23	17	40
Air Service Command	P-39N	-	10	10
TOTAL		72	45	117

Available information indicates that the following airplanes are in North Africa, scheduled to be delivered to the French:

P-39 - Approx. 30
A-35 - Approx. 30 with another 28 en route

OPERATIONS

Very meager information on operations conducted by these airplanes is available in current reports. What information is available indicates that the airplanes of the Coastal Air Force & Photo Reconnaissance Wing are being used for the following operations:

Latecore	Anti-Shipping & Anti-Submarine Patrols
Spitfires and P-40	Shipping protection
Walrus	Search for missing aircraft
F-4 & F-4A	Photographic missions

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HEADQUARTERS NORTHWEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES

FRENCH LIAISON SECTION

REAR ECHELON

APO 650

STATUS REPORT

ON

FRENCH AIR FORCES

AUGUST 1943

1. ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH AIR FORCES.
2. ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCES.
3. RESUME OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.
4. NEW ORGANIZATION FOR FRENCH SQUADRONS.

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ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH AIR FORCES

UNIT	CONTROL	OLD EQUIPMENT			LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED		
		TYPE	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVAILABLE(+)			TYPE	ESTABLISHMENT	AVAILABLE
FIGHTERS									
I/2	AIR MAROC	DEWOITINE (520)	26	19	MEKNES				
I/3	N.A.C.A.F.				BÔNE		SPITFIRE	16	13
I/4	AIR MAROC				MEDIOUNA		AEROCOBRA	25	11
I/5	AIR MAROC				MEDIOUNA		AEROCOBRA	15	10
II/3	G.A.M. 8	DEWOITINE (520)	23	19	AIEUR-EL-AIN	HURRICANE			
II/5	N.A.C.A.F.				LA SEBALA		P-40	30	20
II/7	N.A.C.A.F.				BÔNE		SPITFIRE	23	19
II/9	AIR MAROC	DEWOITINE (52 0)			MEKNES				
III/6	N.A.C.A.F.				MARSSET		AEROCOBRA	30	15
BOMBERS									
I/19	G.A.M. 26	DOUGLAS (DB-7)	9	6	SIDI-BEL-ABBES				
I/32	AIR MAROC				MEKNES		VULTEE A-35	16	15
I/63	G.A.M. AOF	GLENN-MARTIN	11	7	BAMAKO				
II/61	G.A.M. 8	DOUGLAS (DB-7)	8	5	SOUK				
II/62	AIR MAROC	GLENN-MARTIN	7	5	MEKNES	VULTEE A-35			

(+) AS ON JULY 31, 1943

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ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH AIR FORCES

	OLD EQUIPMENT			LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED			PILOTS OR CREWS AVAILABLE
	TYPE	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVAILABLE(*)			TYPE	ESTABLISHMENT	AVAILABLE(*)	
ICC	DEWOITINE (520)	28	19	MEKNES					18
.F.				BONE		SPITFIRE	16	13	38
ICC				MEDIOUNA		AEROCOBRA	25	11	35
ICC				MEDIOUNA		AEROCOBRA	15	10	35
8	DEWOITINE (520)	23	19	ALEUR-EL-AIN	HURRICANE				35
.F.				LA SEBALA		P-40	30	20	35
A.F.				BONE		SPITFIRE	23	19	39
ICC	DEWOITINE (52 0)			MEKNES					
.F.				LA PASSET		AEROCOBRA	30	15	30
26	DOUGLAS (DB-7)	9	6	SIDI-BEL-ABBES					22
OC				MEKNES		VULTEE A-35	16	15	20
AOF	GLENN-MARTIN	11	7	BAMAKO					28
8	DOUGLAS (DB-7)	8	5	SOUK					8
OC	GLENN-MARTIN	7	5	MEKNES	VULTEE A-35				

(*) AS ON JULY 31, 1943

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UNIT	CONTROL	OLD EQUIPMENT TYPE	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVAILABLE (*)	LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED TYPE	ESTABLISHMENT	A
RECONNAISSANCE									
I/22	AIR MAROC	LEO 45	9	4	RABAT				
II/33	N.A.F.R.W.				SOUK AND LA MARSA		LOCKHEED (P-38)	3	
II/52	G.A.M. 26	DOUGLAS (DB-7)	9	5	NOISY-LES-BAINS				
POLICE AND SECURITY									
	AIR A.O.F.	GLENN-MARTIN	5		THIES				
	AIR A.O.F.	GLENN-MARTIN	4		BAMAKO				
	AIR A.O.F.	GLENN-MARTIN	5		OUAKAM				
TRANSPORT									
I/15	G.T. 15	B. 160	I	0	RABAT				
		FARMAN 222	3	I					
I/23	G.T. 15				KOURIBGA		GESSNA 78	6	
		I SIMOUN	I	I					
I/36	G.T. 15	5 AMIOT 143	5	4	MOUZAIAVILLE				
		I B. 120	I	0					
		2 P. 650	2	0					
II/15	G.T. 15	2 P. 29	2	0	BLIDA				
		3 SIMOUN	3	2					
		6 GOELAND	6	3					
II/63	G.A.M. AOF	P. 63	3	I	THIES				

NOTE : A.O.F. = FRENCH WEST AFRICA

(*) AS ON JULY 31, 19

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ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH AIR FORCES

	OLD EQUIPMENT			LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED			PILOTS OR CREWS AVAILABLE
	TYPE	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVAILABLE(*)			TYPE	ESTABLISHMENT	AVAILABLE(*)	
ROC	LEO 45	9	4	RABAT					15
R.W.				SOUK AND LA MARSA		LOCKHEED (P-38)	3	3	15
26	DOUGLAS (DB-7)	9	5	NOISY-LES-BAINS					38
TY									
O.F.	GLENN-MARTIN	5		THIES					
O.F.	GLENN-MARTIN	4		BAMAKO					
O.F.	GLENN-MARTIN	5		OUAKAM					
5	B. 160	I	0	RABAT					13
	FARMAN 222	3	I						
5				KOURIBGA		GESSNA 78	6	6	11
	I SIMOUN	I	I						
5	5 AMIOT 143	5	4	MOUZAIAVILLE					14
	I B. 120	I	0						
	2 P. 650	2	0						
	2 P. 29	2	0	BLIDA					21
5	3 SIMOUN	3	2						
	6 GOELAND	6	3						
AOF	P. 63	3	I	THIES					10

: A.O.F. = FRENCH WEST AFRICA

(*) AS ON JULY 31, 1943

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ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCES

AS ON JULY 31 1943

UNIT	CONTROL	OLD EQUIPMENT			LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED			PILOTS OR CREWS AVAILABLE	R
		TYPE	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVAILABLE			TYPE	ESTABLISHMENT	AVAILABLE		
FIGHTERS											
1.F	FRENCH	D.520	20	15	THIERSVILLE					24	Only of training
LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE											
4.E	R.A.F. WEST AFRICA	LATE 611	1	1	DAKAR	SUNDERLAND	SUNDERLAND	6	6 (in transit)	12	This un and re-f having 9
		CAMS 141	1	1	DAKAR						
ANTI-SUBMARINE											
2.F	R.A.F. WEST AFRICA	MARYLAND	6	5	DAKAR	WELLINGTON	WELLINGTON	7	7 (in transit)	24	To be re have 16
3.F	FRENCH	MARYLAND	10	5	AGADIR					9	Aircraft
RECONNAISSANCE and ANTI-SUBMARINE											
1.S.	FRENCH	LATE 298	15	6	DAKAR					12	Aircraft
		LOIRE 130	15	5							
4.S	N.A.C.A.F.	LATE 298	10	8	ARZEW	WAIRUS	WAIRUS	4	4	12	Should f aircraft
		WAIRUS	4	4							

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ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCES

AS ON JULY 31 1943

OLD EQUIPMENT			LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED			PILOTS OR CREWS AVAILABLE	REMARKS
TYPE	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVAILABLE			TYPE	ESTABLISHMENT	AVAILABLE		
D.520	20	15	THIERSVILLE					24	Only of use to keep pilots in training.
LATE 611	1	1	DAKAR	SUNDERLAND	SUNDERLAND	6	6 (in transit)	12	This unit is to be dissolved and re-formed by the I.F.E. having 9 SUNDERLANDS
CAMS 141	1	1	DAKAR						
MARYLAND	6	5	DAKAR	WELLINGTON	WELLINGTON	7	7 (in transit)	24	To be renamed 2.F.B. and to have 16 WELLINGTONS
MARYLAND	10	5	AGADIR					9	Aircraft very worn
LATE 298	15	6	DAKAR					12	Aircraft very worn
LOIRE 130	15	5							
LATE 298	10	8	ARZEW	WAIRUS	WAIRUS	4	4	12	Should finally have 20 WAIRUS aircraft
WAIRUS	4	4							

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ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCES

AS ON JULY 31 1943

UNIT	CONTROL	OLD EQUIPMENT TYPE	OLD EQUIPMENT TOTAL RECEIVED	OLD EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE	LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED TYPE	NEW A/C RECEIVED ESTABLISHMENT	NEW A/C RECEIVED AVAILABLE	PILOTS OR CREWS AVAILABLE	
SCHOOLS											
	FRENCH (training for pilots, wireless operators and flight engineers).	N.AMERICAN LIORE 45	2	2	MAROCCO					Numerous	Aircraft
		POTEZ 63	5	5							
		MORANE 230	4	0							
		MORANE 315	5	3							
		MORANE 406	2	2							
		LEO 257bis	2	1							
LIAISON											
	FRENCH	CAUDRON-GOELAND	2	2	CASABLANCA						
		CAUDRON-SILOUH	2	6	CASABLANCA						
		CESSNA C. 78	1	1	MAISON-BLANCHE						

NOTE : - FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCES have neither bomber nor transport planes.

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ORDER OF BATTLE FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCES

AS ON JULY 31 1943

CONTROL	OLD EQUIPMENT			LOCATION	TYPE PLANNED	NEW A/C RECEIVED			PILOTS OR CREWS AVAILABLE	REMARKS
	TYPE	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVAILABLE			TYPE	ESTABLISHMENT	AVAILABLE		
S										
NCH	N.AMERICAN	2	2	MAROCCO					Numerous	Aircraft very worn
	LIORE 45	5	5							
	POTEZ 63	4	0							
	MORANE 230	5	3							
	MORANE 315	2	2							
	MORANE 406	2	0							
	LEO 257bis	2	1							
N										
NCH	CAUDRON-GOELAND	2	2	CASABLANCA						
	CAUDRON-SIMOUN	2	6	CASABLANCA						
	CESSNA C. 78	1	1	MAISON-BLANCHE						

NOTE :- FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCES have neither bomber nor transport planes.

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RESUME OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The Lafayette or G.C. 2/5 flying P-40's carried 464 Sorties during July from Sidi Ahmed airfield, near Bizerta. These Sorties generally consisted in Convoy patrols and protective patrols over the Bizerta area. A period of intense activity was experienced before and in the initial stages of the Sicilian Campaign by giving air cover over the numerous convoys.

The G.C. 2/7 carried out over 400 Sorties of a similar nature as G.C. 2/5 and from the same airfield. Besides the Spitfire V B's which they had, 4 Spitfire IX's were handed over to the Squadron on a temporary basis in order to act as high flying and rapid interceptor fighter aircraft for enemy reconnaissance planes. Unfortunately in most cases when an enemy aircraft was sighted it was impossible to catch it up owing to the initial advantage of distance.

The 2/33 Groupe, who joined the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing in June for training and operational experience, carried out 45 photo reconnaissance missions over France and Italy during the month of July.

The 2/63 Groupe, a mixed transport Groupe, loaned Aircrews to Coastal Command stationed in Gambia and carried out 14 Coastal Missions in Hudsons.

The Groupe Normandie operating on the Russian front and flying I. 16 single seater fighter aircraft have been flying on numerous missions and claim thirty German aircraft destroyed, two probably destroyed and four damaged. Four of their aircraft did not return, one of whom was their Commanding Officer, Commandant Tulasne. Numerous pilots have been decorated by the Soviet authorities.

The Transport Group carried out during the month of July 40 missions (500 hours), 10 missions being done by night. These missions included the transport of wounded personnel, freight and passengers besides special liaison flights.

This Group is to be highly commended, for, with the limited equipment at its disposal, it has carried out since November 8 1942 7246 liaison flights and 201 flights with wounded (totalling 8022 hours), covering 1,100,000 miles and carrying 9,200 passengers and 79 tons of freight.

Up to date no news has been received on the operational activities of the Groupes Alsace, Ile-de-France and Lorraine stationed in England or of the Groupe Picardie (stationed in French Equatorial Africa) and Groupe Artois (stationed in Syria).

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NEW ORGANIZATION FOR FRENCH SQUADRONS

At the instigation of the RAF and AMERICAN authorities, it was suggested to FAF Hqs. that they should re-model their French Squadrons which were being re-equipped with BRITISH or AMERICAN aircraft on an RAF or USAAF basis.

Following up this suggestion FAF Hqs. decided that all French Squadrons re-arming with American aircraft will conform to the American T/BA for single engine and twin engine squadrons. In a similar way the French Squadrons re-arming with British fighter aircraft will conform to the RAF establishment for a single engine squadron.

N O T E : - During the month of JULY no planes from BRITISH or AMERICAN sources were received by the F.A.F.

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TRANSLATION

ACTUAL SITUATION OF FRENCH AIR FORCES ORDERS OF EQUIPMENT AND DELIVERIES THEREOF AS OF AUGUST 21, 1943.

DATE AND REFERENCE	DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	EQUIPMENT ALREADY DELIVERED
February 4, 1943.	Spare parts for old American Built Aircraft	Shipments partially by Air Partially by Water Shipments as needed when parts are available.
February 24, 1943.	3000 Complete sets of Clothing Signals Equipment 1 Anti-Aircraft BN Equipped with 40 MM Medical Corps Equipment	3000 Incomplete clothing sets Missing wool clothing. Individual Equipment. Medical Corps Equipment.
Directly assigned by WASHINGTON	1 Fighter Group (Four Squadrons P-39). 1 Dive Bomber Group (Four Squadrons A-35). (Equipment to Ground and Air according to T/BA 1)	Section II - Army Air Force Equipment: 90 % " III - Chemical Equipment : 95 % " IV - Engineer " :100 % " V - Medical " :100 % " VI - Ordnance " : 90 % " VII - Quartermaster Equipment - I - Organizational.....: 90 % 2 - Motor Transport.....: 50 % " VIII - Signal Equipment : 80 % Vehicles are Lacking.
Cable 5746 March 11, 1943.	2 G. M. trucks Company 50 Vehicles of various types.	2 G. M. trucks Company. 40% of Vehicles received.
Cable 9246 March 26, 1943. Cable 1028 May 7, 1943. Cable W.6635 August 6, 1943.	1 Regt. of Paratroopers less one Battalion. (Equipment common to Ground and Air. Air Force Equipment.)	Equipment common to Ground and Air. All vehicles.

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DATE AND REFERENCE	DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	EQUIPMENT ALREADY DELIVERED
Cable 5458 April 20, 1943.	- I Service Squadron - I Ordnance Company Air Base - 3 Signal Units - 3000 Collections 3000 Sets of Clothing	Equipment beginning to arrive. Vehicles not up to the T. O. Delivery of Signals Unit put off 90 days from May 31. Under going inventory.
Directly assigned by WASHINGTON. Equipment common to Ground and Air the 2nd of August. Air Force Equipment, July 28.	- 3 Fighter Squadrons S.E (Spitfire). - Photo reconnaissance Squadron (P.38).	
Cable W 7723 August 19, 1943.	- I Hq and Hq Sq. Service Group. - I Service Squadron. - I G.M. Company Service Group - 2 G.M. Truck Companies. - I Medical Supply Platoon. - 2 Ordn. Maintenance Companies.	

A careful detailed inventory of what is lacking in those of the above orders that have been received has just been completed by the French Air Force.

Future orders are now in abeyance until the rearmament plan at present being studied by Brig. General SAVILLE is definitely established.

John W. Ames

JOHN W. AMES,
Major, A.C.,
Asst Chief French Liaison Section.

August 25, 1943.

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

ON FRENCH UNITS IN NORTH AFRICA EQUIPPED OR TO BE EQUIPPED WITH BRITISH OR AMERICAN A/C DURING 1943. - AS OF 15 AUGUST 1943

UNIT	LOCATION	TYPE	TOTAL STRENGTH	NO. OF GROUND VEHICLES VEHICLES	TRAILERS	C.O.	LIAISON OFFICER	REMARKS
1/3	BONE	SPITFIRE	342	95	9	Cdt. LEGRES de la SALLE	CAPT. DEVEREUX	
2/7	BONE	SPITFIRE	348	18	8	Cdt. PAPIN	2ND LT. FORSCH	
2/5	LA SEBALA	P-40	307	21	12	Cdt. ARNAUD	CAPT. OSGOOD	
3/6	LAPASSET	P-39	310	31	9	Cdt. VIGUIE	2ND LT. FULTON	
1/4	MEDIOUNA	P-39	335	31	9	Cdt. LA MARTINIERE	LT. ROBBINS	
1/5	MEDIOUNA	P-39	300	26	7	Cdt. MONRAISE	LT. ROBBINS	
1/32	MEKNES	A-35	236	29	7	Cdt. BALUD dit BESNARD		
2/33	ARIANA	P-38 (F-4)	213	0	0	Cdt. PIECHON		

AIRPLANES ASSIGNED TO FAF, 1943

90 - P-39s - ALL RECEIVED
67 - A-35s - 33 "
60 - C-78s - 18 "

It is at present undecided as to what Units will be formed with the remaining A-35s and C-78s when these have been received from the U. S.

John W. Ames

JOHN W. AMES,
Major, A.C.,
Asst. Chief French Liaison Section.

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C O P Y

FRENCH NAVAL MISSION
IN THE
UNITED STATES

Washington, 7 July 1943

No. 1005 /MN 4

MEMORANDUM NO. 58

From: The French Naval Mission
To: Captain Parrish

SUBJECT: Aircraft and equipment requested for the French Naval Air Force.

References: (a) Letter No. 29. F.M.A. 1/M of January 20, 1943 from Admiral MICHELIER, Commanding French Naval Air and Sea Forces in NORTH AFRICA.

(b) Letter No. 142 F.M. 4/48 C.A. of April 30, 1943 from Vice-Admiral, Commanding 5th Naval District ALGIERS, enclosing revised Chapter 1 B.

Enclosures: (A) One copy of the revised Chapter
(B) List of aircraft requested

1.- By reference (a), the French Navy forwarded the first general list of its material requirements and which, in particular, listed the aircraft material to be requested from the Allies. This list was approved by General EISENHOWER by dispatch A. 18714 of 26 February 1943, which was transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for action.

2.- Since January 20th, a more precise estimate of our requirements has been established and, in addition, seaplanes have been furnished by the UNITED KINGDOM.

This resulted in the revision of Chapter 1 B which is enclosed herewith as enclosure (A). This revised Chapter was approved 25 June 1943 by General EISENHOWER, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in North Africa.

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3.- Chapter 1 B comprises:

(a) a list of material requested from the United Kingdom and upon which delivery is being made.
(b) a list of material to be requested from the United States.

4.- List (b) includes, in addition to a few utility planes, aircraft necessary to equip the following for use in North Africa:

- three scouting flotillas
- two fighter flotillas

(° French unit)

Two scouting flotillas and one fighter flotilla will be based west of the Meridian line, located 25 miles to the east of Oran, in a zone coming under American command; one scouting flotilla and one fighter flotilla will be based east of this line, in a zone coming under British command.

5.- According to Supply Policy C.C.S. 194/1, the United States would have to provide only those planes which are to be based west of this North-South line, that is:

2 scouting flotillas instead of 3
1 fighter flotilla instead of 2

But it should be noted that -

(a) a scouting flotilla composed of 20 WALRUS's is already based at ARZEW in the American zone, although these planes were furnished by the United Kingdom.

(b) according to Chapter 1 B, all the seaplanes needed for the French Naval Air Force will be furnished by the United Kingdom, while all the landplanes would be furnished by the United States no matter where in North Africa they are to be based.

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Considering the very small number of French naval aircraft in North Africa, this plan offers the following important advantages:

- it affords the necessary homogeneity which facilitates the supplying of spare parts and maintenance material.
- it permits an equitable distribution by the United States and the United Kingdom, relative to French naval rearmament.

Accordingly, the following are the landplane requirements of the French Naval Air Force:

A. PLANES

6. - Enclosure (B), attached hereto, is a list of aircraft requested totaling 253 landplanes of different types, 113 of which are required in 1st priority and 140 in 2nd priority.

7.- The particular types of aircraft, mentionned in Column 1 of Enclosure (B), are not imperative, but it is desired that the planes delivered to the French Naval Air Force be of the same models as those now in service in the American Air Force in North Africa.

8.- The planes should be delivered, ready to take off, i.e. - each should have on board equipment and armament corresponding to its intended use. (See Column 6 of Enclosure (B)).

B. SPARE PARTS

9.- Necessary spare parts should be furnished in quantities according to standard American practice and regulations.

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10.- Maintenance supplies, to be delivered at the same time, should be the same as for the American Naval Air Force. Allowances should be calculated to assure operation and normal maintenance for a period of three months.

D. TOOLS

11.- There should be delivered with each plane, individual tool kits for the crew (including mechanics, radiomen, gunners).

12.- Special tools for overhauling, repairing, assembling and dissembling the planes, are requested for each squadron, (or groups) as follows:

6 sets for bombers (North American B-25C)
4 sets for pursuit (Curtiss P-40)
2 sets for transports (Douglas DC-3)
2 sets for liaison (Lockheed JO-2)

E. FLYING SUITS

13.- The delivery of 600 Complete suits, regulation American equipment, are likewise requested (including head gear, goggles, gloves, life jackets, lined shoes, ear phones, inhalatores, etc..).

(s)
Vice Admiral H. A. Penard
Chief of the French Naval Mission in the United States

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7 July 1943

ENCLOSURE (A)

to Memorandum No.

(Ref. letter No. 142 EM 4/48 GA
of April 30)

NAVAL AIRCRAFT

(Part B of Chapter I, letter 2h S.M. 4/9 of March 5, 1943)

I. Material to be delivered by the United Kingdom:

9 seaplanes, Sunderland Type
16 long range planes, Wellington Type
20 amphibious planes, Walrus Type

2. Material requested from the U.S.A.:

a) Bombers - North American B-25C : 105
For the purpose of organizing three survey flotillas based on:

1. - Northern Morocco
1 - East of Algiers
1 - West of Algiers

b) Fighter planes - P-40 Curtiss : 110
in order to organize two flotillas:

1 - based in the East of Algeria
1 - based in the West of Algeria

c) Transport - Douglas DC-3 : 21

d) Mail - North American B-25C : 7

e) Liaison - Aircraft with 5 passengers minimum capacity : 10

NOTE: All the above planes are to be delivered with replacement parts.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO MEMORANDUM No.--

TYPE	Number of planes requested		Number of Squadrons to outfit		PLANNED USE	TO BE BASED			
						West of Line N.S. 25 miles East Oran		East of Line N.S. 25 miles East Oran	
	1st Prior.	2nd Prior.	1st Prior.	2nd Prior.		1st Prior.	2nd Prior.	1st Prior.	2nd Prior.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
					I. SCOUT BOMBING AND FIGHTING TYPES				
North American B-25C	35	70	2	4	Scouting, protection of convoys, anti-submarine, bombing of enemy naval units.	35	35		35
Curtiss P-40	55	55	2	2	Defenses of bases and ports against enemy fighters and bombers.	55			55
					II. UTILITY TYPES				
North American B-25C	4	3	2	1	Radio communication over great distances.	4	3		
Douglas DC-3	14	7	1	1	Transport of personnel and material..	14	7		
Lockheed JC-2	5	5	1	1	Liaison of Command.	5	5		
TOTAL	113	140							

1st Priority - Immediate Delivery
2nd Priority - Delivery before 1 January 1944

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FRENCH NAVAL MISSION
Washington, D. C.
20 July, 1943

I. NEEDS OF FRENCH NAVAL AVIATION.

1. The needs of the French Navy and in particular those of French Naval Aviation have been submitted to the Mixed Committee on Re-armament of Algiers and have been approved by General Eisenhower by telegram No. JMC 045 Fr., dated June 26, 1943.

2. These needs have become, on the part of the Naval Mission to the United States, the subject of memorandum No. 58 dated June 7, 1943, copy attached. They are summed up by the chart attached to this note.

II. RESOURCES OF PERSONNEL.

3. At the present time Naval Aviation has the necessary crews to mann the squadrons asked for without having to call on the personnel coming from the Reserve or right now undergoing instruction in the schools going on in Morocco and which will furnish supplementary personnel from the 1st of October 1943 or the 1st of January 1944, according to their specialties.

4. Realizing that their training was going to suffer more and more from lack of material, we have proposed to turn them over to the Coastal Command of Morocco.

III. UTILIZATION OF OUR CREWS BY THE COASTAL COMMAND OF MOROCCO.

5. By letter No. 144 FNA of the 17th of March 1943, the Vice Admiral commanding the Naval and Naval Aviation Forces in Africa proposed to Admiral Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, the utilization of our crews by the Coastal Command of Morocco.

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This letter was transmitted by Admiral Cunningham to Air Chief Marshal Tedder who transmitted it to Washington for decision with a favorable recommendation (or opinion).

6. By telegram No. 2h36, dated 17 July from the Vice Admiral commanding the Naval and Naval Aviation Forces in Africa, I have been informed that the French Naval Aviation can immediately furnish the forty-two crews trained and ready for immediate duty upon securing the granting of the forty-two Liberator or Catalina planes stationed at the coast bases in Morocco.

7. In case these forty-two crews should be utilized by the Coastal Command of Morocco, letter No. 69 EM Aero of June 7, 1943, states that we have the necessary crews to mann immediately the groups and the service planes urgently asked for an indicated in the attached chart.

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FRENCH NAVAL MISSION
Washington, D.C.

le 20 Juillet, 1943.

I. BESOINS DE L'AERONAUTIQUE NAVALE FRANCAISE

1. Les besoins de la Marine Francaise et en particulier ceux de l'Aéronautique Navale Francaise ont été soumis au Comité Mixte de Réarmement d'Alger et ont été approuvés par le Général EISENHOWER par le télégramme N° JMC 045 Fr. en dated du 26 Juin 1943.

2. Ces besoins ont fait, de la parte de la Mission Navale aux Etats-Unis, l'objet du mémorandum N° 58 en date du 7 Juillet 1943 dont copie jointe. Ils sont resumes par le tableau annexé á la présente note.

II. RESSOURCES en PERSONNEL

3. Dés maintenant, l'Aéronautique Novale a les équipages nécessaries á l'armamente des escadrilles demandées sans qu'elle ait bescin de faire appel au personnel venant de la Réserve ou actuellement en instruction dans les écoles fonctionnant au Maroc et qui vont fournir du personnel supplémentaire á partir du 1er Octobre 1943 ou du 1er Janvier 1944 suivant les spécialités.

Ces équipages, trés soigneusement sélectionnés au moment de l'Armistice, sont des équipages particuliérement bien entrainés á l'exécution des missions terrestres ou navales.

4. Constatant que leur entrainment allait de plus en plus souffrir du manque de matériel, nous avons proposé de les verser au COASTAL COMMAND du MAROC.

III. UTILISATION de nos EQUIPAGES par le COASTAL COMMAND du MAROC.

5. Par letter N° 144 F.M.A. O du 17 Mars 1943, le Vice-Admiral d'Escadre Commandant les Forces Maritimes et Aéronavales en Afrique, a proposé á l'Amiral de la Flotte CUNNINGHAM, Commandant en Chef en Méditterranée l'utilisation de nos équipages par le COASTAL COMMAND du MAROC.

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Cette lettre a été transmise par l'Amiral Cunningham à l'Air Chief Marshall TEDDER qui l'a transmise à Washington pour décision avec avis favorable.

6. Par télégramme N° 2436 en date du 17 Juillet du Vice Amiral d'Escadre Commandant les Forces Maritimes et Aéronavales en Afrique, je suis informé que l'Aéronautique Navale Française peut immédiatement fournir les 42 équipages entraînés aptes à mettre en oeuvre immédiatement, dès accord obtenu, les 42 appareils LIBERATOR ou CATALINA stationnés sur les bases cotières marocaines.

7. Dans le cas où ces 42 équipages seraient utilisés par le Coastal Command du Maroc, la lettre N° 69 EM Aéro du 7 Juin 1943 précise que nous avons les équipages nécessaires pour armer immédiatement les flottilles et les avions de servitude demandés en 1ère urgence et indiqués par le tableau joint.

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NEEDS OF FRENCH NAVAL AVIATION

Kind of planes	Number of Squadrons		Number of Planes	Observations
	A. TO BE DELIVERED AT ONCE - 1st PRIORITY			
Medium Bombers	1 group	2 squadrons	35	Planes corresponding to North American B-25C's.
Fighters	1 group	2 squadrons	55	Planes corresponding to Curtiss P-40's.
For long distance radio			4	Medium bombers (North American B-25C's)
Transports			14	Douglas DC-3
Liaison planes			5	Indefinite - type corresponding to the old Lockheed JO-2.
	B. TO BE DELIVERED AFTER January 1, 1944 - 2nd PRIORITY			
Medium Bombers	2 groups	2 squadrons	70	Planes corresponding to North American B-25C's.
Fighters	1 group	2 squadrons	55	Planes corresponding to Curtiss P-40's.
For long distance radio			3	Planes corresponding to North American B-25C's.
Transports			7	Douglas DC-3
Liaison planes			5	Indefinite - type corresponding to old Lockheed JO-2.

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OC/jw/5834

6/17/43

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL H. F. CUNNINGHAM, G.S.C., G-2 Division.

Subject: Aircraft for the Fighting French Airline (Syria - Madagascar).

1. The information contained in your Memorandum of June 11th, 1943 on the above subject has been noted and the Memorandum itself has been forwarded to the Munitions Assignment Committee for Air, for its consideration.

2. It is understood that a representative of the Fighting French Airline is now in this country and that he has informally presented his request to the Munitions Assignment Committee for Air, which has asked the Theater Commander for approval of the request before passing it on to the Munitions Assignment Board for final consideration.

3. Your personal knowledge of the merits of the request as set forth in your Memorandum have been presented to the proper members of the Committee and the board for consideration in arriving at a conclusion.

H. H. ARNOLD
General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Military Intelligence Service
Washington

June 11, 1943

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL H H ARNOLD,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces;

Subject:- Aircraft requested by Fighting French Military Airline.

1. It has come to this officer's attention that the Fighting French Airline (Syria - Africa - Madagascar) has made a request for certain transport aircraft and that the matter is under consideration at this time by the appropriate Branch of the Army Air Forces.

2. It is desired to invite attention to the useful and excellent work, in furtherance of the War Effort, which this Military Airline has done and is doing.

a. With very limited, and in some cases old, materiel, this line has maintained liaison between the various parts of the far-flung territories under control of the former French National Committee.

b. During the recent Fezzan Campaign under command of General LeClerc (in which campaign this officer participated), the aircraft of this line rendered invaluable service in transporting food, munitions and gasoline forward to the rapidly advancing columns. During this campaign, and on many occasions prior thereto, this officer was a passenger on the aircraft of the "SYRAF" Airline. May other American officers have been similarly carried by these aircraft, always with the greatest of willingness, even to the point of discharging passengers already booked in order to give priorities to American Officers.

c. To date, so far as this officer knows, there has been no loss of life or accident to personnel on this line. On one occasion, late in 1942, an old Dewoitine, 3-motor plane, with crew of three and seventeen passengers, was wrecked near Bangui, but no person in that plane was even scratched, thanks to the skill of the Pilot. One motor had gone dead; a second motor caught fire; the plane made a

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forced landing in a stretch of savannah country dotted with small trees. The wings were destroyed but the Pilot kept the body of the plane clear of all trees and nobody was hurt.

d. This officer had flown with every Pilot of the line excepting only one, and these men are all first-class. Three of them are old civil pilots of many years' experience all over the world. The other Pilots are the pupils -- and practically the equals -- of these three older men.

3. It is respectfully suggested that favorable consideration be given, if possible, to the present request for aircraft made by the "SYRAF" Line. The materiel will be expertly handled and will contribute significantly to the United Nations War Effort.

HARRY F CUNNINGHAM
Colonel, GSC,
Late Military Observer in
Central Africa.

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WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Disposition Form
OPERATIONS DIVISION

OPD 336.2 France (5-26-43)

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the French Air Forces In North Africa

May 27, 1943

X CG AAF

X See notation below

1. Your attention is invited to radio number W 1364, CM-IN 16753 on May 26th from Algiers, regarding reorganization of the French Air Forces and establishment of an Allied air mission.

2. It is desired you submit your comments and recommended reply to the above radio.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

J. E. HULL
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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W. DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSI ..SS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin HQ A.A.F, AFAEP (Service, branch, section, and symbol) Date June , 1943

Telephone 6722, Col. Whitney (Originating officer)

Classification SECRET (Restricted—Confidential—Secret) Precedence PRIORITY (Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To:

COMMANDING GENERAL
U S FORCES IN ALGIERS

I RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY FOR A REORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE USED IN COMBAT AS SOON AS THEY BECOME PROPERLY TRAINED PAREN TO EISENHOWER FOR SPAATZ FROM ARNOLD PAREN REFERENCE YOUR W ONE ~~XXX~~ THREE/SIX FOUR PD I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU PROCEED WITH TEDDER ALONG THE LINES WHICH YOU DEEM BEST TO ACHIEVE THESE RESULTS PD IF AN ALLIED MISSION IS APPOINTED IT IS PREFERABLE THAT YOU SELECT PERSONNEL FROM THOSE NOW IN YOUR THEATER

COORDINATION:
Gen. Anderson OPD Gen. Stratemeyer

DISTRIBUTION:

Content and classification authenticated by
REUBEN KYLE, Jr., Col., A.C.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 500
September 2, 1942

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AFAGP
CVWitg
6/8/43

Training of French Student Pilots and Gunners in the United States.

Major General Marie E. Bethouart
Chief of the French North African Military Mission
Room 119, Combined Chiefs of Staff Building
Washington, D. C.

1. At a conference held on June 5, 1943 between Lt. Colonel Deschepper, and Major Chemedlin of the French North African Military Mission, and Lt. Colonel Sheehan of the North African Training Command, Lt. Colonel Whitney of the Air Staff, Plans, and Major Braga of the Air Staff, Training, the question of the five hundred pilot and two hundred gunner training program for French students in the United States was discussed.

2. It was agreed that the French students eliminated during pilot training are to receive further air crew training in the United States in any one of the following Air Force courses, such further training to be dependent upon their aptitude, facilities available at the time, and upon the recommendations of their instructors:

1. Flexible Gunners
2. Bombardiers
3. Armorers
4. Radio Operators

3. We informed Colonel Deschepper, in answer to his request that training in navigation be given these men, that present facilities do not permit our undertaking such training at present.

4. Colonel Deschepper assured us that the greatest care was being exercised in the selection of the student pilots in North Africa in order that the maximum number would qualify. We believe that the elimination of many students during the period of training would be bad for the morale of the French in North Africa and seriously delay the formation of the French Air Force. Colonel Deschapper stated that in his opinion a maximum of 10% of the selected pilots would be washed out during training. If this does not prove to be the case, Colonel Deschepper further stated that he would welcome suggestions to improve the method

To
COPY Sent/Gen. Spaatz

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of selection and to adapt the French selection system to the requirements of the U. S. Air Force.

5. In regard to other courses for the 200 gunnery students, it was agreed that upon completion of their gunnery courses 100 would receive training as armorers, and 100 as radio operators.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

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First Detachment of French Student Pilots.

AC/AS, Training

AC/AS, Plans

6/7/43 1
CVW/jw/6722

Concur in paragraphs 5 and 6.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Incl:
Memo frm C.V.P.M.A.
w/1st Ind frm M.I.S.

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This first detachment will be under the command of one Captain and two Lieutenants.

Lt. Colonel [illegible]
Chief, U.S.F.V.A.
Air Section

MID 300.2 France 1st Ind.

Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C.
June 4, 1942.

To: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training, Room 4D-1082, Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia. ATTENTION: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Room 3E-1082, Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia.

Information is requested upon which to base a reply.

For the Chief of Military Intelligence Service:

/s/ W.F.Pittenbender
for
H. A. KENYON,
Lt.Col., G.S.C.
Chief, Air Section,
Foreign Liaison Branch.

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The French Military Mission
Washington

No 75/n

June 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: LT. COLONEL H.A. KENYON, CHIEF AIR SECTION,
FOREIGN LIAISON BRANCH.

Subject: First Detachment of French
Student Pilots.

A first detachment of 100 French Student Pilots is due to arrive in the United States about June 20th.

In accordance with instructions received from the French Air Force Headquarters in Algiers, this detachment will be divided into 10 groups of 10 Student Pilots each.

Each group will be under the command of an "Aspirant" or a 2nd Lieutenant, himself a student, and will include several student pilots speaking English. Three groups of 10 pilots each will comprise Cadets only.

This first detachment will consist of:

- 30 Cadet student pilots
- 70 Non-Com or private student pilots.

All of them possess:

a)- physical fitness as required for Flying personnel

b)- educational standing as follows:
- two years college for Cadets,
- High School degree for the others.

c)- a full military training

d)- a primary technical training.

In view of their educational standing, I wish to request that these students be sent directly to Primary Training Flying Schools.

Specialization of the Students will be decided upon completion of their primary training as pilots and, if possible, in accordance with the following schedule:

-50% pursuit and reconnaissance, single engine
-10% bombardment, dive
-20% bombardment, twin engine
- 20% transport.

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AFTAT-23

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

February 15, 1943.

[redacted]: Colonel L. Kyle Room 3E 1d4

Subject: Training Students for French Air Force.

1. Reference secr t message 776 Flying Training Command will be able to absorb one hundred (100) French students every four and a half weeks. These students should have some knowledge of the English language at least with respect to aeronautical terms and in addition a minimum of five French officers per hundred students should accompany these student pilots to facilitate interpretation and methods of instruction.

2. It is suggested that Colonel Beam make arrangements for checking off in Africa supposedly qualified French pilots prior to their being sent to this country for training as outlined in paragraph three.

3. It must be borne in mind that our aviation students undergo nine weeks in Pre-Flight in technical subjects which require the understanding of the English language. The Pre-Flight training given is of primary importance and a prerequisite for pilot training. Otherwise the elimination rate among this type of student, especially if he has a low educational background, will be extremely high.

4. If any of the students that are to undergo training in the Flying Training Command have had a small amount of flying time, it is recommended that a board of from three to five officers from the Flying Training Command be sent to Africa to check this type of student off before sending him to this country.

5. It is understood that there are some AT-6's that would be available for this type of work.

[redacted]
Colonel, A.C.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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Reorganization of the French Air Forces in North Africa.

X

wtn. 5/2/43
AFAEP/CVV/jw/6722

Recommended reply to radio, number W 1364, is attached.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

O. A. Anderson
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

X

Incl:
DF 5/27 w/incl.
added - rec.reply (with orig.only-cable)

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WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Disposition Form
OPERATIONS DIVISION

OPD 336.2 France (5-26-43)

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the French Air Forces
In North Africa

May 27, 1943

X CG AAF

X See notation below

1. Your attention is invited to radio number W 1364, CM-IN 16753 on May 20th from Algiers, regarding reorganization of the French Air Forces and establishment of an Allied air mission.

2. It is desired you submit your comments and recommended reply to the above radio.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

J. E. HULL
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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WA DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans — AFAEP HQ AAF — Date: 2 JUNE 1943 — Telephone: Lt.Col.Whitney 6722

Classification: SECRET — Precedence: PRIORITY

To: COMMANDING GENERAL
US ARMY FORCES
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

AS SPEEDILY AS THEY CAN BE RENDERED FIT IT IS OUR DESIRE TO REORGANIZE AND TRAIN THE FRENCH AIR FORCE AND TO USE THEM IN COMBAT PAREN TO EISENHOWER FOR SPAATZ FROM AFAEP SIGNED ARNOLD PAREN IN REPLY TO YOUR WILLIAM ONE SIX THREE FOUR PERIOD YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH TEDDER ALONG THE LINES WHICH YOU DEEM BEST TO ACHIEVE THE RESULTS SET FORTH ABOVE PERIOD IF AN ALLIED MISSION IS APPOINTED YOU ARE TO SELECT PERSONNEL FROM THOSE NOW IN YOUR THEATRE

DISTRIBUTION:

OPD

Content and classification authenticated by

G. A. STINSON
Major, Air Corps

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 990
September 3, 1942

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Subject: French North ri. Draft Requisitions Nos. 1 10. and FR-10123.

To: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans 4/27/43
#2

From: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training. GAB/gel/6031

1. It is the understading of this office that training of 500 French pilots is as follows:

100 in class of June 28, 1943
100 in class of July 31, 1943
50 each month thereafter.

They are all to receive elementary, basic and advanced training but not pre-flight, the advanced training to be given as follows: 96% of those completing basic training to receive advanced single engine training, 4% to receive advanced twin engine training: 50% of these completing advanced single engine training will receive dive bombing and 50% fighter training in the RTU's. It is the further understanding of this office that flexible gunnery training is to be given to 20 French gunners per month. However, no information as to the total number of flexible gunnery students has been received by this office.

2. Information is requested as to the disposition of eliminated students receiving pilot training.

3. Your decision is requested as to whether or not the program as outlined in the attached requisitions is approved.

ROBERT W. HARPER,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Training.

Incl. n/c

TO: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training DATE 4/30/43
Comment No. 3

FROM: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans. 320/jw/5834

1. It is suggested that the disposition of eliminated students receiving pilot training be first discussed with the French Delegation in Washington and that, with their concurrence, the eliminated students be sent, according to their qualifications, either to gunnery school or given an intensive course in English language and sent to Harrisburg for the purpose of making them liaison officers. The latter course would help to eliminate the necessity, which arose in the last war, of using the British as liaison officers between French and American forces.

2. Concur in the program as outlined in the attached requisitions, with the suggestion that more confining terms be used for "housing, individual clothing and equipment".

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incl: n/c

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Subject: French North African Draft Requisitions Nos. FR-10122 and FR-10123.

4/24/43
#1
AFDMA-4B HRP/bjh
5835

To: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training, Air Crew Division, Foreign Unit, (Major G.A.Braga) Rm 4C-1066

From: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M.M.&D., Materiel Division, Production Branch, International Section.

1. Submitted herewith are draft copies of French North African Requisitions Nos. FR-10122 and FR-10123, which have been submitted to cover the program of training 500 pilots and 200 gunners, which program shows as having been approved by General Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. It is requested that this office be advised if the program as outlined in the subject requisitions has the approval of your office.

B. E. MEYERS
Brig. General, U.S.Army
International Officer fr AA

By:

H. R. PAIGE
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Chief, International Section
Materiel Division, ACAS, M.M. &D

Incl:
RFDA Nos. FR-10122 & FR-10123
(Draft Copies)

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FR. 10,122
April 23, 1943

FORM 1

REQUISITION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

FRANCE
Requisitioner

* * * * * * *

1. Will orders placed by the United States Government for the material requisitioned herein be covered by direct cash reimbursement to the United States Government? NO

* * * * *

2.

A. Quantity and description (include mark, model, or other identifying designation):

Supplies and facilities in connection with the primary, basic, advanced and tactical training of French North African Pilots under the arrangement made with the U.S. Air Corps to produce 500 Pilots as per schedule attached.

* * * * * * * * *

B. Remarks (Justification of request, urgency, general information, etc.):

a)- This training program has been approved by General Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b)- This requisition for defense aid is filed for the purpose of covering the whole training cost, including transportation within the United States, housing, medical care, individual clothing and equipment, etc.... Pay of the trainees is not included.

c)- For further information application should be made to: Lt. Col. H.R.Paige, Chief International Section, Materiel Division, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution, War Department, Washington, D.C., Telephone RE 6700, Ext. 5385 or 6767, and/or Major Paul Chemidlin, Air Section, French Military Mission, Munitions Building, Telephone RE6700, Ext. 77076 or 79149.

* * * * * *

Additional Information

SCHEDULE FOR THE ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICAN PILOTS.

- 100 Pilots, June 25, 1943
- 100 " , July 25, 1943
- 50 " , August 25, 1943
- 50 students per month thereafter.

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FR. 10,123
April 23, 1943

FORM 1

REQUISITION FOR DEFENSE ARTICLES

FRANCE
Requisitioner

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

1. Will orders placed by the United States Government for the material requisitioned herein be covered by direct cash reimbursement to the United States Government? NO

* * * * * * * *

2.

A. Quantity and description (include mark, model, or other identifying designation):

Supplies and facilities in connection with the training of French North African aerial machine gunners under the arrangement made with the U.S. Air Corps to produce 200 gunners as per schedule attached.

* * * * * * * * * *

5. Remarks (Justification of request, urgency, general information, etc.):

a)- This training program has been approved by General Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b)- This requisition for defense aid is filed for the purpose of covering the whole training cost, including transportation within the United States, housing, medical care, individual clothing and equipment, etc..... Pay of the trainees is not included.

c)- For further information application should be made to: Lt. Col. H. R. Paige, Chief International Section, Material Division, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution, War Department, Washington, D.C. Telephone RE 6700, Ext. 5385 Or 6767, and/or Major Paul Chemidlin, Air Section, French Military Mission, Munitions Building, Telephone RE 6700, Ext. 77076 or 79149.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Additional Information

SCHEDULE FOR THE ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICAN STUDENT AERIAL MACHINE GUNNERS.

20 Student gunners per month from April 5, 1943, until the total number of 200 is reached.

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BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S, OPD

7 March 43 JKH
Date Initials

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

OPD 336.2 France (3-7-43) March 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:
(Attention: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans)

Subject: Reorganization of French Air Force in North Africa.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of March 3, to Operations Division on the above subject.

2. The present commitment of 6 Fighter Groups to the Middle East is an agreed commitment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 61/1). The Operations Division is unable to change this commitment until such a change has been approved on a CCS level.

3. The proposed "Deployment of U. S. Army Forces in 1943" now in process will show no U. S. Air Force units in the Middle East. Should this deployment be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the OPD commitments will be amended accordingly.

4. If you desire more expeditious action than is likely to be obtained from normal processing of the above proposed deployment, it is suggested that the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who may in turn submit them to the British.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. E. GAILEY,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive, OPD

EXECUTIVE
MAR 9 1943
A.G. - WAR, D.C.

60345

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March 3, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Equipment for the French Air Force.

1. To implement the agreement reached at Casablanca, relative to aid to the French in North Africa, it is requested that the necessary directives be issued to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and the Commanding General, Services of Supply, to accomplish the following:

a. Provision of full T/BA equipment for one Fighter Group (Single Engine) and one Dive Bombardment Group.

b. Movement of such equipment to appropriate port or intransit depot.

c. Allocation of adequate space, consistent with priorities set by the theater commander, on UKS 6½ and subsequent convoys.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

RICHARD H. BALLARD
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4.

COPY FOR COLONEL MAX SCHNEIDER

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Transition Training and Reorganization French African Air Force.

Asst. C. A. S., A-4

Operational Plans, Air Staff

CHT/jw/5834 1

1. Attached for your information is copy of R&R sent on March 3d to A-3, with it's Inclosures.

Incl:
R/R to A-3
3/incls.

C. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

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Transition Training and Reorganization of French Air Force.

Director of Individual Training

Operational Plans, Air Staff

CM2/iw/5834 1

1. The attached papers are referred to you for your information.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incls:
cy R/R #7
to A-3, w/incl.

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Transition Training and Reorganization French African Air Force.

Asst. C A S, A-3

Operational Plans, Air Staff

CMT/jw/5834 7

1. It is desired that you take the necessary action to implement the program set forth in Comment No. 4, monitoring this project with the appropriate agencies.

2. Attention is invited to notations in longhand, indicating the approval of the C/AS for building up and maintaining for the French Air Force, a total of 90 Fighters, 67 Dive Bombers and 60 Transports, types as indicated in Comment 4.

3. Cable 2035 (2/27/43) informed the Theatre Commander of this decision.

4. Attached is copy of Memorandum to OPD and copy of letter to Major General Bethouart.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incls:
Cable 3441 (w/24 Sig only)
cy Memo to OPD
cy Ltr to Gen. Bethouart

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces — DATE
THRU: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
FROM: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans — SYMBOL NO. 6
AAF/dms/71127

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, verbally directed that one Fighter Group and one Light Bomber Group be furnished the French in North Africa, and an equal number of American groups be withheld from shipment to the North African or Middle East Theatres.

2. The necessity to provide build up in reserves for the P-40 groups in the African areas renders it impossible to furnish the French Air Force with P-40 aircraft, since such action would result in insufficient aircraft for attrition replacements.

3. P-39 aircraft can be furnished the French Air Force at a rate of 30 per month commencing in March 1943 by deferment of the 354th Fighter Group scheduled for commitment in August.

4. The most suitable light bomber to furnish the French Air Force is the A-35 airplane.

5. Action Recommended:

a. Furnish thirty P-39 and fifteen A-35 airplanes to the French per month starting in March or April, 1943, to provide ten transition training airplanes of each type and aircraft for the equivalent of one American fighter and one American dive bomber group. After the units reach strength, provide attrition replacement aircraft only.

b. Provide necessary TBA for the two French groups.

c. Revise MAC (Air) Case 300 on a percentage basis to obtain the A-35 airplanes required.

d. Furnish the French Air Force fifteen C-78 transports in March, April, May and June, thereafter providing attrition replacements for actual losses.

e. Brief transition training of French qualified pilots be performed in theatre. Training of student pilot and student gunner replacements be conducted in the United States in the Flying Training Command and RTU's, at a rate of 100 student pilots in June and July, 50 student pilots a month thereafter, and twenty student gunners a month commencing in April.

f. Reduce the American commitment to the Middle East to three fighter groups.

(RANDOLPH P. WILLIAMS - signed)
for O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

1 Incl:
Incl #1 - n/c
Incl #2 - withdrawn

In Ink: (O.K. 25/Feb/43 by GHS)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, AFHQ(A):

Attention: Brigadier General J. H. Upston.

Subject: Reorganization of French Air Force in North Africa.

1. Due to the present Air Force agreement to make available initially to the French Air Force in North Africa, certain equipment, including the equipment for one Fighter and one Light (B) Bombardment Groups, it is recommended that the July 1, 1943 CPD commitment of 6 Fighter Groups to the Middle East Theatre be reduced to 3 Fighter Groups.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

O. A. ANDREWS
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

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Major General Marie Gille Bethouart
Chief, French Military Mission
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Bethouart,

Your memorandum of February 23rd with reference to sending to the United States for training French student pilots and crews for ferrying planes, has been received. The information and suggestions contained therein are greatly appreciated.

General Spaatz was informed by cable on February 27th substantially as follows:

That it is our understanding that the training of already capable French pilots to accomplish the transition from flying French aircraft to flying American type aircraft, with which they are unfamiliar, will be brief and can best be conducted in North Africa.

Training of student pilots as replacements can best be accomplished, however, in the United States. In this connection, our training program can accommodate 100 French student pilots in the class starting June 25, 1943, 100 additional in July, and thereafter 50 per month.

Arrangements can be made to receive 20 student aerial machine gunners in our schools, per month, commencing with the class entering training April 5th.

Each student detachment should be commanded by an English speaking officer.

It is entirely satisfactory that French citizens now in this country and desiring to serve in the French Air Force comprise a part of the above mentioned number of student pilots.

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Aircraft being furnished for the French Air Force, B-29's, B-17's and C-78's, must be shipped by boat as these types are unsuited for long over-water flights. In view of this circumstance, it will not be necessary to train French crews for ferrying these aircraft.

It is hoped that the above will give you the information which you desire.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR F(

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
THRU: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
FROM: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans

DATE

COMMENT NO. 6
RPW/dns/71127

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, verbally directed that one Fighter Group and one Light Bomber Group be furnished the French in North Africa, and an equal number of American groups be withheld from shipment to the North African or Middle East Theatres.

2. The necessity to provide build up in reserves for the P-40 groups in the African areas renders it impossible to furnish the French Air Force with P-40 aircraft, since such action would result in insufficient aircraft for attrition replacements.

3. P-39 aircraft can be furnished the French Air Force at a rate of 30 per month commencing in March 1943 by deferment of the 354th Fighter Group scheduled for commitment in August.

4. The most suitable light bomber to furnish the French Air Force is the A-35 airplane.

5. Action Recommended:

a. Furnish thirty P-39 and fifteen A-35 airplanes to the French per month starting in March or April, 1943, to provide ten transition training airplanes of each type and aircraft for the equivalent of one American fighter and one American dive bomber group. After the units reach strength, provide attrition replacement aircraft only.

b. Provide necessary TBA for the two French groups.

c. Revise MAC (Air) Case 200 on a percentage basis to obtain the A-35 airplanes required.

d. Furnish the French Air Force fifteen C-78 transports in March, April, May and June, thereafter providing attrition replacements for actual losses.

e. Brief transition training of French qualified pilots be performed in theatre. Training of student pilot and student gunner replacements be conducted in the United States in the Flying Training Command and RTU's, at a rate of 100 student pilots in June and July, 50 student pilots a month thereafter, and twenty student gunners a month commencing in April.

f. Reduce the American commitment to the Middle East to three fighter groups.

(RANDOLPH P. WILLIAMS - signed)
for O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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1 Incl:
Incl #1 - n/c
Incl #2 - withdrawn

In Ink: (O.K. 25/Feb/43)
(by GES)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION:

Attention: Brigadier General J. E. Upston.

Subject: Reorganization of French Air Force in North Africa.

1. Due to the present Air Force agreement to make available initially to the French Air Force in North Africa, certain equipment, including the equipment for one Fighter and one Light (D) Bombardment Groups, it is recommended that the July 1, 1943 OPD commitment of 6 Fighter Groups to the Middle East Theatre be reduced to 3 Fighter Groups.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

O. A. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces — DATE

THRU: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

FROM: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans — CONCUR NO. 6

AFW/ins/71127

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, verbally directed that one Fighter Group and one Light Bomber Group be furnished the French in North Africa, and an equal number of American groups be withheld from shipment to the North African or Middle East Theatres.

2. The necessity to provide build up in reserves for the P-40 groups in the African areas renders it impossible to furnish the French Air Force with P-40 aircraft, since such action would result in insufficient aircraft for attrition replacements.

3. P-39 aircraft can be furnished the French Air Force at a rate of 30 per month commencing in March 1943 by deferment of the 354th Fighter Group scheduled for commitment in August.

4. The most suitable light bomber to furnish the French Air Force is the A-35 airplane.

5. Action Recommended:

a. Furnish thirty P-39 and fifteen A-35 airplanes to the French per month starting in March or April, 1943, to provide ten transition training airplanes of each type and aircraft for the equivalent of one American fighter and one American dive bomber group. After the units reach strength, provide attrition replacement aircraft only.

b. Provide necessary TBA for the two French groups.

c. Revise MAC (Air) Case 200 on a percentage basis to obtain the A-35 airplanes required.

d. Furnish the French Air Force fifteen C-78 transports in March, April, May and June, thereafter providing attrition replacements for actual losses.

e. Brief transition training of French qualified pilots be performed in theatre. Training of student pilot and student gunner replacements be conducted in the United States in the Flying Training Command and RTU's, at a rate of 100 student pilot in June and July, 50 student pilots a month thereafter, and twenty student gunners a month commencing in April.

f. Reduce the American commitment to the Middle East to three fighter groups.

(RANDOLPH P. WILLIAMS - signed)
for O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

1 Incl:
Incl #1 - n/c
Incl #2 - withdrawn

In ink: (O.K. 25/Feb/43)
(by GCS)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION:

Attention: Brigadier General J. E. Upston.

Subject: Reorganization of French Air Force in North Africa.

1. Due to the present Air Force agreement to make available initially to the French Air Force in North Africa, certain equipment, including the equipment for one Fighter and one Light (D) Bombardment Groups, it is recommended that the July 1, 1943 OPD commitment of 6 Fighter Groups to the Middle East Theatre be reduced to 3 Fighter Groups.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

O. A. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FO

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
THRU: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
FROM: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans

DATE

CONCURRENCE NO. 6
AFOP/dns/7127

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, verbally directed that one Fighter Group and one Light Bomber Group be furnished the French in North Africa, and an equal number of American groups be withheld from shipment to the North African or Middle East Theatres.

2. The necessity to provide build up in reserves for the P-40 groups in the African areas renders it impossible to furnish the French Air Force with P-40 aircraft, since such action would result in insufficient aircraft for attrition replacements.

3. P-39 aircraft can be furnished the French Air Force at a rate of 30 per month commencing in March 1943 by deferment of the 354th Fighter Group scheduled for commitment in August.

4. The most suitable light bomber to furnish the French Air Force is the A-35 airplane.

5. Action Recommended:

a. Furnish thirty P-39 and fifteen A-35 airplanes to the French per month starting in March or April, 1943, to provide ten transition training airplanes of each type and aircraft for the equivalent of one American fighter and one American dive bomber group. After the units reach strength, provide attrition replacement aircraft only.

b. Provide necessary TBA for the two French groups.

c. Revise MAC (Air) Case 200 on a percentage basis to obtain the A-35 airplanes required.

d. Furnish the French Air Force fifteen C-78 transports in March, April, May and June, thereafter providing attrition replacements for actual losses.

e. Brief transition training of French qualified pilots be performed in theatre. Training of student pilot and student gunner replacements be conducted in the United States in the Flying Training Command and RTU's, at a rate of 100 student pilots in June and July, 50 student pilots a month thereafter, and twenty student gunners a month commencing in April.

f. Reduce the American commitment to the Middle East to three fighter groups.

(RANDOLPH P. WILLIAMS - signed)
for O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

1 Incl:
Incl #1 - n/c
Incl #2 - withdrawn

In Ink: (O.K. 25/Feb/43)
(by GCS)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION:

Attention: Brigadier General J. E. Upston.

Subject: Reorganization of French Air Force in North Africa.

1. Due to the present Air Force agreement to make available initially to the French Air Force in North Africa, certain equipment, including the equipment for one Fighter and one Light (D) Bombardment Groups, it is recommended that the July 1, 1943 CPD commitment of 6 Fighter Groups to the Middle East Theatre be reduced to 3 Fighter Groups.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

O. A. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

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Reply to Gen. Bethouart's Memorandum in regard to Training of French Pilots.

wtn 3/13/43

TO: Chief of the Air Staff DATE

FROM: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Operational Plans COMMENT NO. 6
CS/dns/71127

1. Desired coordination has been effected and basic paper is returned herewith for signature.

O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Incl: n/c

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Reply to Gen. Bethouart's Memorandum in regard to Training of French Pilots.

TO: Chief of the Air Staff — Mar 4 1943

FROM: Ass't. Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans Div — 1
GS:mnh 71127

(Copy in Plans Div Files)

TO: Director of Individual Training and
Asst Chief of Air Staff, A-3 — Mar 4 1943

FROM: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff — 2
MAL/mdg/5265

It is desired that Brigadier Generals L. S. Smith and R.W. Harper coordinate in the attached proposed reply to General Bethouart.

Incl. n/c

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.

TO: Assistant Ch of AS - A-3 — March 6, 1943

FROM: Director of Individual Training — 3
IAS:LLL 3629

1. This office concurs in the plan presented, provided that these trainees displace a similar number of U. S. Air Force trainees in that there are no extra facilities. This matter has been discussed with Colonel Williams on this basis.

L. S. SMITH
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.
Director of Ind. Training

Incl: n/c

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SECRET

Reply to Gen. Bethouart's Memorandum in regard to Training of French Pilots.

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-3

A-3 concurs.

ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Incl. n/c

Operations Plans

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Reply to Gen Bethouart's Memorandum in regard to Training of French Pilots

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TO: Operational Plans

DATE March 12, 1943

FROM: Chief of the Air Staff

COMMENT NO. 5
WEH:JT 5246

General Stratemeyer desires that you coordinate this with Colonel Cabell and OPD.

Incl.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary, Air Staff

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Reply to Gen. Bethouart's Memorandum in regard to Training of French Pilots.

Chief of the Air Staff

Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans Div.

1. Proposed reply to Memorandum for General Stratemeyer from the French Military Mission is submitted herewith for approval and signature.

G. V. [illegible],
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

2/Incls. Memo to Gen. Stratemeyer
fr. French Mil. Mission 2/23/40
(2) - Proposed reply

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Major General Oscar Carl Westcott
Chief, French Military Mission
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Westcott,

Your memorandum of February 23rd with reference to sending to the United States for training French student pilots and crews for ferrying planes has been received. The information and suggestions contained therein are greatly appreciated.

General Spaatz was informed by cable on February 27th what will be as follows:

That it is our understanding that the training of already capable French pilots to accomplish the transition from flying French aircraft to flying American type aircraft, with which they are unfamiliar, will be brief and can best be conducted in North Africa.

Training of student pilots or replacements can best be accomplished, however, in the United States. In this connection, our training program can accommodate 100 French student pilots in the class starting June 28, 1943, 100 additional in July, the number being reduced to 50 per month thereafter.

Arrangements can be made to receive 20 student aerial machine gunners in our schools, per month, commencing with the class entering training April 5th.

Each student detachment should be commanded by an English speaking officer.

No figures are being established at this time as to the total personnel to be trained as it is believed that this matter can best be determined at a later date as circumstances dictate.

P-39
A-31

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The aircraft destined for the French Air Force at this time, C-97's, C-97's and C-78's, will be shipped by boat as these types are unsuited for long over-water flights. In view of this circumstance, it will not be necessary to train crews for ferrying these aircraft.

It is hoped that the above will give you the information which you desire.

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Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

Asst. C A S, A-3

Operational Plans, Air Staff

CNT/jw/5834 7

1. For necessary action.

2. Attention is invited to pencil notations indicating the approval of the CG/AAF for building up and maintaining for the French Air Force, a total of 90 Fighters, 67 Dive Bombers and 60 Transports, types as indicated in Comment 6.

3. Cable 2985 (2/27/43) informed the Theatre Commander of this decision.

4. It will be necessary to furnish complete TOA equipment for these units.

Incl:
(with original only)

D. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

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Transition Training and Reorganization of French Air Force.

Asst. C A S, Program Planning

Operational Plans, Air Staff

1

CMT/jw/5834

1. Attached for your information is copy of R/R to A-3 on the above subject.

2. Attached also is copy of Memorandum to OPD, Subject "Reorganization of French Air Force in North Africa.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incls:
R/R to A-3 w/incl.
Memo for OPD

Distribution:

A-1
A-4
RIT
RAD (This R/R has been sent to each Division listed)
RDB
RAS
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Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

Commanding General, Army Air Forces
THRU: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans

RPW/dns/71127 6

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, verbally directed that one Fighter Group and one Light Bomber Group be furnished the French in North Africa, and an equal number of American groups be withheld from shipment to the North African or Middle East Theatres.

2. The necessity to provide build up in reserves for the P-40 groups in the African areas renders it impossible to furnish the French Air Force with P-40 aircraft, since such action would result in insufficient aircraft for attrition replacements.

3. P-39 aircraft can be furnished the French Air Force at a rate of 30 per month commencing in March 1943 by deferment of the 364th Fighter Group scheduled for commitment in August.

4. The most suitable light bomber to furnish the French Air Force is the A-35 airplane.

5. Action Recommended:

a. Furnish thirty P-39 and fifteen A-35 airplanes to the French per month starting in March or April, 1943, to provide ten transition training airplanes of each type and aircraft for the equivalent of one American fighter and one American dive bomber group. After the units reach strength, provide attrition replacement aircraft only.

b. Provide necessary TBA for the two French groups.

c. Revise MAC (Air) Case 200 on a percentage basis to obtain the A-35 airplanes required.

d. Furnish the French Air Force fifteen C-78 transports in March, April, May and June, thereafter providing attrition replacements for actual losses.

e. Brief transition training of French qualified pilots be performed in theatre. Training of student pilot and student gunner replacements be conducted in the United States in the Flying Training Command and RTU's, at a rate of 100 student pilots in June and July, 50 student pilots a month thereafter, and twenty student gunners a month commencing in April.

f. Reduce the American commitment to the Middle East to three fighter groups.

1 Incl:
Incl #1 - n/c
Incl #2 - withdrawn

O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION:

Attention: Brigadier General E. S. Ureton.

Subject: Reorganization of French Air Force in North Africa.

1. Due to the present Air Force agreement to make available initially to the French Air Force in North Africa, certain equipment, including the equipment for one Fighter and one Light (D) Bombardment Groups, it is recommended that the July 1, 1943 OPD commitment of 8 Fighter Groups to the Middle East Theatre be reduced to 5 Fighter Groups.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

O. A. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

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Transition Training and Reorganization of French Air Force.

Individual Training

Operational Plans, Air Staff

1

CMP/jw/5834

1. Attached is a copy of Comment No. 6 of an R/R on the above subject which was approved by the CG/AAF.

2. Secret outgoing cable No. 2985, February 27, 1943 to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in Algiers, furnishes additional information on this subject.

3. These papers are referred to you for appropriate action.

C. A. [illegible]
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incl:
cpy R/R #6
to CG/AAF

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Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

Commanding General, Army Air Forces
TWRD: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
Assistant C A S, Operational Plans

6
RPW/lay/71127

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces verbally directed that one Fighter Group and one Light Bomber Group be furnished the French in North Africa, and an equal number of American groups be withheld from shipment to the North African or Middle East Theatres.

2. The necessity to provide build up in reserves for the P-40 groups in the African areas renders it inadvisable to furnish the French Air Force with P-40 aircraft, since such action may result in insufficient aircraft for attrition replacements.

3. P-39 aircraft can be furnished the French Air Force at a rate of 25 per month commencing in March 1943 by deferment of allocations to observation groups in training in the U.S.

4. The most suitable light bomber to furnish the French Air Force is the A-35 airplane.

5. The following action is in accordance with the directive described in Paragraph 1 above:

a. Furnish P-39 aircraft to the French at rate of 25 per month until one group reaches strength, starting in March 1943, and provide necessary CRA to equip one group. After group strength is reached provide attrition aircraft only.

b. Allot fifteen A-35 airplanes per month to the French Air Force until one group has reached strength, after which provide attrition aircraft only. Revise MAC Case 200 on a percentage basis to obtain the A-35 airplanes required.

c. Reduce the American commitment to the Middle East by two fighter groups to compensate for build up of two French groups in North Africa.

1 Incl:
Incl #1 - n/c
Incl #2 - withdrawn

O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

SECRET

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Transition Training and Reorganization French Africa Air Force.

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans. 19 Feb. 1943.
(Attention: Colonel R. P. Williams)
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

JOH/cmc/6371

1. It is desired that a cablegram be prepared to General Spaatz and Colonel Buddy Maxwell, outlining exactly what we are prepared to furnish in order to implement the training program, and the reorganization of the French Africa Air Force under Colonel Beam.

2. General Arnold very forcibly told me that the commitment, as contained in cablegram No. 441, is firm; that this Staff must cease talking about diversion of aircraft from or taking aircraft from our present Forces in North Africa in order to satisfy French demands. He said we are not taking anything from North Africa but simply furnishing equipment to the French units instead of the American units. If a French unit is built up, an American unit need not be built up.

3. Recognizing the present unsuitability of the A-31, what can we do to furnish equipment for one fighter group and one light bomber group?

T. J. [illegible], JR.,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

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February 16, 1943.

Assignment of Aircraft to French Air Force in Africa.

X

X

AFAEP
GAS/dns/71127

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

2 Incls: #1 Proposed reply to Gen. Bethouart.
#2 Memo to Gen. Marshall fr Gen. Bethouart 2/6/43.

O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: The attached draft of letter to General Bethouart of the French Military Mission is in reply to memorandum for the Chief of Staff dated February 6, 1943, also attached, in which a previous request by memorandum of February 3, for assignment of first line combat planes to the French Air Force in Northern Africa and conversation between the Chief of Staff and Gen. Bethouart on the same subject were reviewed. In addition, the memorandum contained certain information as to the status of aviation materiel other than planes now in the possession of the French. This has been utilized by the Air Staff in its study (now in progress) of the requirements for re-equipping the French Air Force. The attached letter for the signature of the Chief of Staff acknowledges to General Bethouart the receipt of this information.

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AFAEP
JIJ./mhb/72445
wtn 2/16/43

Marie Emile Bethouart,
Major General, Chief
French Military Mission
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Bethouart:

Receipt of your memorandum of February 6, 1943, with its additional valuable information is acknowledged.

The information, furnished in your memorandum regarding the present availability of aviation equipment in North Africa, has been transmitted to the agency presently studying the question of equipping the French North African Air Force. Instructions have been issued to consider the availability of this equipment as well as the additional points covered in your memorandum.

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff.

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Assignment of Aircraft to the French Air Force in Africa 2/8/43

Assistant Chief of Air Staff; Plans

General Stratemeyer

Your attention is invited to the attached memorandum for General Marshall from Major General Marie Emile Bethouart, Chief, French Military Mission, dated February 6, 1943, reference memorandum of February 3, 1943, concerning the Shipment of War Materiel for the French Forces in North Africa. It is desired that you study this memorandum and prepare reply for General Marshall's signature. You will coordinate the action and the preparation of the reply reference the attached paper with OPD.

Keep me posted on the status of our action on, and the reply to this paper.

G.E.S.

Incl: Memo to Gen. Marshall, 2/6/43
frm Gen. Marie Emile Bethouart
re above subject.

TO: Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces Date 2/10/43

FROM: Operational Plans, Air Staff Comment No. 2
JH:mhb 72445

1. The reply, prepared for General Marshall's signature, to the attached memorandum from Major General Marie Emile Bethouart, Chief, French Military Mission, dated February 6, concerning the shipment of war material for the French forces in Africa, is attached. This reply has been coordinated with General Upston of O P D.

2. The following action has been taken to date on the question of "Assignment of aircraft to the French Air Force in Africa":

a. Memo for the C.C.S. subject "Expansion of North African Air Force" was signed by General Arnold on January 8, 1943.

b. This memorandum became C.C.S. 142

c. C.C.S. 142 was referred to a J.P.S. Sub-Committee which Sub-Committee recommended in a memorandum to General Anderson (member of J.P.S.) substantially as follows:

(1) That a French Air Force be established in North Africa without delay.

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Assignment of Aircraft to the French Air Force in Africa

2/10/43

(2) That the French Air Force be the minimum required to satisfy the political situation and for present planning purposes its ultimate strength be regarded as approximately 450 aircraft.

(3) That the allocation of aircraft to the French Air Force be gradually expanded within the limitations desired by the theater commander, as the situation warrants, and the French Air Force increases its ability to profitably employ alloted aircraft.

(4) That the British and the United States (Army and Navy) share equally in furnishing equipment.

(5) That the force be composed of Air Defense, Air Support, Transport and reconnaissance (Army and Navy) and that preponderence over the Anglo-American forces in any one class of aviation be avoided.

(6) That as a general principle the French Air Force be built up by corresponding reduction in similar Anglo-American units now commited to the theater.

(7) That the theater commander be requested to submit recommendations re the rate of expansion of the French Air Force subject to limitations contained in recommendations above.

d. C.C.S. 142 was referred to C.P.S. Sub-Committee, which Sub-Committee was asked to submit appropriate recommendations but was also advised that C.C.S. 142 had been referred to General Eisenhower for his views and recommendations, these views and recommendations to be transmitted to the Sub-Committee.

e. To date General Eisenhower's views and recommendations have not been received and therefore the Sub-Committee have not submitted their recommendations.

f. A cable was received from General Arnold in North Africa stating that it was planned to consolidate transition training and reorganization of the French Africa Air Force under Colonel Beam in Western Morocco, with one Fighter and one Light Bomber Group as the initial objective. He also stated that ample pilot and other personnel were available for all replacement requirements after transition training. General Arnold asked that a study be initiated relative to the availability of P-40 and A-31 airplanes for the French. ~~Copy of the study is attached.~~ Study is being prepared.

g. (1) A cable was received from General Spaatz signed Eisenhower stating that at a conference between General Mendizal (Civic French Air

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Force) and General Arnold it was decided that one Fighter Group and one Light Bomber Group would be equipped as soon as possible. The cable requested 50 to 100 light transports to replace French transports, and asked if transition training could be given 10 transport crews and 10 light bomber crews which could be used as ferry crews.

(2) The reply to this cable stated that the request would be considered a theater recommendation as to currently desirable strength of the French North African Air Force, and further stated that the aircraft availability problem was under study, that any allocations to the French would be at the expense of ETO, and that C.C.S. 142 had been forwarded for General Eisenhower's recommendations.

b. The French have been furnished 25 P-40 airplanes to date.

3. In view of the fact that furnishing airplanes only to the French, even in limited quantities, will not sustain French operations due to lack of required supporting equipment and further that practically all airplanes available to United States during 1943 will be required to equip and maintain existing and scheduled United States units, it is recommended that, as a general principle the French Air Force be built up by a corresponding reduction in Anglo-American units now commited to the North African theater.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

2 Incls:
Memo to Gen. Marshall
frm Gen. Marie Emile Bethouart
re above sub.

Ltr to Gen. Marie Emile Bethouart
re above subject

~~Memo to CG, AAF, re Availability of P-40 and A-31 Aircraft (Study)~~

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FRENCH MILITARY MISSION
WASHINGTON

February 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL G. MARSHALL

CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

SUBJECT: Assignment of Aircraft to the French Air Force in Africa.

REFERENCE: Memorandum of February 3, 1943, concerning the shipment of War Material for the French Forces in North Africa.

I. The above-mentioned memorandum stated the number of 1st line combat planes necessary for the reactivation of the French Air Force in Africa, and requested (Paragraph 2) that the time schedule for deliveries be established in such a way as would allow the establishment of a cohesive force ready to enter into action while delivery is in progress.

II. During the conversation between General Marshall and General Bethouart, General Marshall pointed out that:

a) he cannot, at the present time, make a definite statement concerning the very extensive program presented by the French Military Mission:

b) General Arnold's Staff are studying the question of supplying airplanes and the complete equipment necessary to the French Air Force:

c) as soon as the survey is finished, a decision will be taken, in agreement with the British representatives, as to how satisfaction might be best given to this request.

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III. From the information received from General Arnold's office, it is understood that the study being conducted now in Dayton, Ohio, will require about a month.

The French Military Mission believe that the following statement might prove useful:

a) There is still, in North Africa, enough aviation equipment materiel to make possible the activation of a certain number of French Squadrons, provided those Squadrons were supplied with the necessary planes, even without the usually accompanying ground equipment and materiel for service units.

b) The reason why the French Air Force requested that the ground equipment for those squadrons (and the equipment for service units) be supplied, is that the French materiel which is still available to this effect, is already obsolete and its maintenance would be impossible without the help of the industry of Metropolitan France.

c) The supplying, at the earliest possible time, of planes only would allow the putting into action of a few French squadrons.

As already verbally specified, the furnishing of about:

-45-50 fighter planes, would allow the activation of one French fighter squadron, with a few replacement planes:

-25-30 bombardment planes would allow, similarly, the activation of one French bombardment squadron, also with a few replacement planes.

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This token assignment, which should not present great difficulties from the point of view of material possibilities for American industry, would have a strong effect on the morale of the French Air Force in Africa.

MARIE EMILE BETHOUART
Major General, Chief
French Military Mission

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JLL;mhb
72445
2/10/43

Marie Emile Betbouart,
Major General, Chief
French Military Mission
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Bethouart:

Receipt of your memorandum of February 6, 1943 with its additional valuable information is acknowledged.

The information, furnished in your memorandum regarding the present availability of aviation equipment in North Africa, has been transmitted to the agency presently studying the question of equipping the French North African Air Force. Instructions have been issued to consider the availability of this equipment as well as the additional points covered in your memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

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Transition training and Reorganization French African Air Force.

Memorandum #2 from Plans to ... 1/26/43 — 1/28/43 #3

TO: Operational Plans
FROM: A-3 — WRB/ek/6701

1. Recommend that MAC (Air) Case #200 be amended so that existing recipients of A-35's and P-40's (excluding U.S.S.R., including A.A.F.) be reduced on a per centage basis in order to allocate fifteen (15) per month A-35's and twenty five (25) per month P-40's to the Fighting French beginning in February.

2. It is to be noted that allocations of the 15 and 25 aircraft out of the full 82,000 combat plane program (Case #200) willresult in somewhat smaller actual monthly deliveries after slippage in production estimates, etc. Consequently the figures set are somewhat higher than minimum needs.

3. It is believed firm commitments to the French should be kept to a minimum with the understanding that the theater commander will fatten them up from aircraft allocated to him as their operational entusiasm and the military situation warrant.

ROBERT W. HARPER
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl. n/c

DATE 2/6/43
COMMENT NO. 4
CMT/jw/5834

TO: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

FROM: Operational Plans.

1. Attached is the study requested in paragraph 2 of comment No. 1 above.

Incl.
1-Secret Incoming Message
2-Study for CG/AAF with
Tab A and Tab B, added.

C. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

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SUBJECT: Transition Training and Reorganization French African Air Force.

TO: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans. 1/23/43

FROM: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. #1
TJH/eva/6371

1. Forwarded to you for action in accordance with General Spaatz's note.

2. You will prepare the necessary study to determine the rate at which P-40 and A-31 aircraft can be made available for transition training and reorganization of the French Africa Air Force under Colonel Beam. (Reference cable No. 441, January 22, 1943, from Casablanca.)

T. J. HANLEY, JR.
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Incl: SECRET incoming message
referred to above -
CM-IN-10015.

DATE_____

TO: A-4, Asst. C A S

CONCURRENCE NO. 2
CNF/jw/5834

FROM: Operational Plans, Air Staff

1. Request data on the availability (production and allocation) of P-40 and A-31 aircraft referred to above.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incl: n/c
(with original only)

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A-31 (V-72)

To Dec 31, 1942 (Per RM-80D 11/30/42)

Total Deliveries – AAF	–	141
Australia	–	77
– Brazil	–	28
– Britain	–	400

OF the Total of 141 delivered to AAF

117 were in cont limits of US on 12/31/42
as follows

84 in Training units in 3AF
11 in Modification Centers
4 in Material Command - Wright Field
15 Miscellaneous

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A-36

Single engine – North American 1325 h/p
Speed: 366 mi @ 5700' @ 1325 h/p
Climb: 3.5+ min to 10,000' ceiling 30,000'
T.O.+L. ——
Range: Ferry 2890 mi – 480 gal internal 10,882 #
Tactical 1207 " – 180 " 600 # 9700 #
Market 1170 " – 180 " 1000 # 10,124
Max Bombs: 1000 #
Wt: Empty 6786 Nor Gross. 8370 #
Dimensions: Span 37'-0"
Length 32'-3"
Wing 233 ft
Armament 6 × .50 cal

Re-design of P-51. Used as an interim dive Bomber. To be used to equip Groups in first quarter of 1943. Procurement is limited to 500 articles

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A-31

Single engine - Vultee 1600 h/p
Speed: 282 @ 12,000'
Climb: 5 min to 7600' Ceiling 22,800
T.O. & L: T.O. 1870 ± 1694
Range: Ferry 1225 - 350 gal auto tanks 12,440
Tactical 1200 350 gal 100# 13,140
Max 1150 350 + 1500# 14,440
Max. Bombs 1500 #
Wt: Empty 9592 # Des. Wt. 11,038
Dimensions: Span 48'-0"
Length 40'-0"
Wing 332 ☐
Armament 6 x .50 cal.

Originally designed for French. 6 fuel tanks each operated by individual electrical pumps. If battery or generator goes out pumps go out. Altitude of wings wrong - need height. Rounded for night flying (will set automatic on pass). Landing gear weak. Chute could pull out of dive.
Plane 114 on hand in dynamic units in U.S.
Some sent to Brazil.

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A-24 A

Single engine - Douglas 1000 h/p
Speed: 246 mph @ 17,200'
Climb: 8.2 min to 10,000 ceiling 23,250'
T/O + L: T.O. 944 L ?
Range: Ferry 1280 mi @ 148 mph 260 gal [illegible] 907 # wt
Tactical [illegible] 500 # bomb 8197 #
Max Tactical 417 mi @ 152 mph 100 gal 1000 # bomb 9137 #
Max bomb: 1000 #
wt. Empty 6305
Dimensions: Span 41'-6"
Length 32'-8"
Wing 325 ☐'
Armament 1 x .30 cal
2 x .50 cal.

A-24-B 1200 h p T.O. 850'
280 # heavier empty

Limited operations only - excellent dive bomber but too slow - won't climb

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A-25

Radial

Single engine Curtiss 1700 hp

? Speed: 311 mph @ 15,000'

Climb: 4.75 min @ 10,000 ceiling 27,000'

Take off: T.O. 750 L —

Range: Ferry 2200 mi @ — 240 gal — 12,160 #

Tactical 1040 mi @ 175 mph 210 gal 500 # bomb 11,644 #

May Tactical 1020 mi @ 175 210 gal 1000 # bomb or 2000 # Torpedo 12,164 #

Max bomb 1000 # or 2000 # Torpedo

Wt: Empty 6453 # Design 11,622 #

Dimensions: Span 49'-9"

Length 36'-8"

Wing 422 ft

Armament 5 x .50 cal

Proposed that first 300 articles will be non-operational. Probably next 670 articles will not be fully operational.

Carve out as many planes.

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A-35-B

Radial

Single engine - Vultee 1700 hp

Speed: 291 mph @ 13,500 1450 hp

Climb: 10.5 min to 15,000 ceiling 23,500'

T.O & L: T.O 1950' L 1694'

Range: Ferry 2700 mi @ — 640 gal w bombs 19,900#

Tactical 1200 mi — 300 " 1000# 13,500#

Max " 1100 mi — 300 " 2000# 14,900#

Max Bomb: 2000#

Wt: Empty 10,405# Des Gross 13,387#

Dimensions: Span 48'-0"

Length 40'-0"

Wing 355 ☐

Amament - 5 to 6 + .50 cal

Re-design of A-31

First 100 articles will be non-operational.

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A-26

Twin engined - Douglas - 2000 h.p. each.
Speed 372 mph @ 17,000' - 3200 h.p.
Climb - 4.4 min. to 10,000' Ceiling 25,600
T/O + L T.O. 2025' L 2157'
Ranges: Ferry 2080 mi @ 202 mph 1030 gal 29490 #
Tactical 1470 mi @ 266 " 800 + 3000 bombs 39770 #
Max " 1417 mi @ 212 " 800 + 4000 # " 51,600 #
Max Bombs: 4000 #
Wt: Empty 21,150 Max Gross 26,700
Armament Span 70'-0"
Length 51'2"
Wing 540 ☐'
Amount 6 - .50 cal

This is replacement for A-20. It is larger, heavier, faster, more h.p. + carries heavier load. Only 63 articles of A-26 are expected during 1943.

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A-20-B

Twin-engined - Douglas - 1600HPea.

Speed 349 mph at 12,000' - 2600 hp.

Climb 6.1 min. to 12,200 Ceiling 28,600

T/O & L TO 2130' & 1910'

Range 673 mi @ 27 gal/hr 400 gal.

1000# bomb

Max bomb 2400#

Wt. empty 14,571# Max Gross 21,500#

Dimensions: Span 61'-4"

Length 48'-0"

Wing 465 ft

Armament: 3 - .30 cal

3 - .50 cal

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CMT:ewm
5834

Wtn. 2/13/43

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Availability of P-40 and A-31 Type Aircraft for the French in North Africa.

I. Statement of Problem

To determine availability of P-40 and A-31 type aircraft for the French Air Forces in North Africa.

II. Discussion

1. P-40 airplanes.

a. Allocations to theatres, training and other activities will absorb the entire production of the P-40 type aircraft up to about June or July of 1943, at which time it is contemplated that whatever surplus of aircraft exists above immediate requirements will be used for the purpose of augmenting fighter groups by adding the 4th Squadron.

b. The present allocation of replacement P-40's to the North African Theater is somewhat higher than the customary 20% per month due to an anticipated high attrition rate. (See Tab A) If the attrition rate can be kept down to 20%, this cushion will provide a surplus of P-40 aircraft above requirements as follows:

February 1943	30
March	20
April	15
May	15
June	20

c. All fighter units in Northwest Africa equipped with the P-40 type airplane are equipped with Packard powered P-40's. This includes two U.S. fighter groups, the 99th Fighter Squadron (soon to depart for this Theatre) and a French Fighter Squadron recently equipped with U.S. aircraft.

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d. It is planned that all P-40's furnished Northwest Africa in the future will be Packard-powered in order to simplify supply and maintenance problems.

e. It is anticipated that upon expiration of the present production contract for Packard-powered P-40's in April 1943 Packard-powered P-51's will be substituted in this Theatre.

2. Light Bombardment Airplanes.

a. The Army Air Forces expansion program, as revised January 19, 1943, calls for a total of 20 dive bomb groups and 10 light bomb groups by December 31, 1943. Of this total, 16 dive groups and 8 light groups are to be trained, equipped, and prepared for commitment to active theatres, the remaining groups constituting the training establishment. (See Tab B)

b. The Light and Dive Bombardment Program for 1943 employs the following type aircraft:

A-20	A-31
A-24	A-35
A-25	A-36
A-26	

(1) The number of light bombers (A-20 and A-26) available during 1943 will be barely sufficient to train, equip and supply replacements for Army Air Forces light groups. In fact, from March until July, anticipated deliveries are insufficient to supply the required attrition to groups already in active theatres.

(2) Due to its slow speed and vulnerability, the A-24 is limited to training only, with the possible exception of assignment to Hawaii or the Caribbean. By diversion from training, a limited quantity of A-24's can be made available at this time to the French Air Force.

(3) The first 300 articles of the A-25 will be non-operational and probably the next 670 articles will not be fully operational. This plane was originally a Navy plane and there are many features in the design and many articles of equipment that are not satisfactory to the Army Air Forces for the use to which they expect to put the airplane.

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(4) A-31 airplanes.

(a) The A-31 airplane was not originally designed for the Air Corps. Its design was so unsatisfactory that production was continued only to satisfy commitments to the British and Australians. The A-31 is being redesigned. The new ship will be designated the A-35. It will begin to come off the production line in March 1943.

(b) The delivery of the past production and the anticipated assignment of future production of the A-31 airplane (including A-31C and V-72) is as follows:

Countries	Prev. Del.	Anticipated Del.
Army Air Forces	144	2
Australia	77	85
Brazil	28	0
Great Britain	400	272

Note: It is anticipated that the V-72 model will be dropped from production in February 1943. The A-31 model will be dropped in March 1943 and the A-31C model in April 1943.

(c) Of the 144 received by the Army Air Forces, there are now 114 on hand located as follows:

84 in training units in the 3rd Air Force
11 in modification centers
4 in Materiel Command, Wright Field
15 in miscellaneous locations
114 TOTAL

(d) Because of the dissatisfaction in the Army Air Forces with the A-31, by the units using these airplanes in training, an offer has been made to give 100 of these used A-31's owned by the Army Air Forces to Australia, delivery to be made immediately in exchange for 100 of Australia's allocation of A-35's, delivery of which would begin about August 1943. No reply has been received as yet from Australia on this matter.

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(5) The A-35 is a re-design of the A-31 and it is anticipated that the first 100 articles will be non-operational. Operational aircraft of this type cannot be expected prior to June or July 1943.

(6) The A-36 is a re-design of the P-51 to be used as an interim dive bomber. Procurement is limited to 500 articles, all of which are set up for the two Army Air Forces dive groups now trained and awaiting commitment, one to North Africa and one to the United Kingdom, and for training and attrition replacement. Diversion of A-36 airplanes at this time to the French Air Force is inadvisable since it would delay the arrival of the first A-36 Army Air Force group in North Africa.

III. Conclusions

1. The Packard-powered P-40's are now the most suitable fighter airplanes to furnish the French Air Force.

2. These can be furnished at a rate of about 20 per month from aircraft already allocated to Northwest Africa for attrition. Such action would still allow a P-40 attrition replacement of 20% per month to the 12th Air Force.

3. After June, Packard-powered P-51's will be furnished the North African Theatre in lieu of P-40's and sixteen P-51's per month can be furnished the French Air Force for attrition (20%) by diversion of aircraft now planned to increase the Army Air Forces fighter groups to four squadrons.

4. Until August, the number of light level bombers available is not sufficient to provide attrition to Army Air Forces committed units in North Africa, and thereafter barely sufficient for the contemplated 1943 expansion program.

5. A limited quantity of A-24's can be made available to the French but these would later have to be replaced by an operational plane of a different type. Such a procedure would result in increased supply and maintenance difficulties in a distant Theatre.

6. No Army Air Force A-31's are available for the French Air Forces unless diverted from the Australians or the British, or taken

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from old aircraft in the Army Air Forces training activities in the event Australia does not accept an existing offer of these airplanes.

7. A limited number of A-35 airplanes not fully operational can be furnished the French Air Force, commencing in March 1943, for the operational training contemplated in the Eastern Morocco Area.

8. Commencing about July 1943, operational A-35 airplanes may become available for allocation to the French dive bomb group at the rate of approximately fifteen per month.

9. The early allocation of A-35 type airplanes to the French must be made at the expense of OTU aircraft, with a resultant loss of one or two months time in completing the training of the initial American A-35 group, and in securing Army Air Forces organizational experience with this new airplane. A similar period of delay will be reflected in readiness dates of succeeding A-35 units.

10. Training of French combat crews on a scale comparable with that given OTU's should be conducted in the United States in order to relieve shipping and maintenance problems. Check-offs and brief transition training can be given in the theatre.

IV. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

1. If the Army Air Forces is to furnish aircraft to equip one French Fighter Group, these aircraft be Packard-powered P-40's at the rate of twenty per month by diversion from the attrition replacements of the 12th Air Force.

2. One Army Air Force Fighter Group be transferred from North Africa to the United Kingdom if and when the new French Fighter Group is fully committed.

3. If the Army Air Forces is to furnish aircraft to equip one French Light Bombardment Group, these aircraft be A-35's at the rate of fifteen per month until group strength has been reached, after which time twelve a month should be furnished for attrition replacement.

4. All combat crew training of the French, other than check-offs or brief transition flights, be conducted in the United States.

C. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, Operational Plans.

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Tab A and B

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces
Washington

February 3, 1943

AIR
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE/STAFF, OPERATIONAL PLANS (General Anderson):

SUBJECT: P-40 Airplanes Available for French Fighter Group.

1. There are now two American Fighter Groups in Northwest Africa which are equipped with P-40's (Packard-powered engine). In addition to these, the 99th Squadron is to depart soon for this theater and will be similarly equipped.

2. Total P-40 airplanes required for American units:

Unit Equipment	Reserve	Total
175	88	263

3. P-40's available as of January 31, 1943:

a. In Theater 122

b. En Route 43
Total 165

c. Additional aircraft awaiting transportation: 158

4. Plans for future production of P-40's to be dispatched to theater:

February	50
March	100
April	55

5. With these shipments, estimated P-40 strength actually in theater, assuming five airplanes lost per squadron per month (i.e., 20%), is as follows:

Month	On hand beginning of month	Arrive during month	Lost during month	On hand end of month	Required	Available for French
Feb.	122	201	30	293	263	30
Mar.	293	50	30	313	263	50
Apr.	313	50	35	328	263	65
May	328	50	35	343	263	80
June	343	55	35	363	263	100

6. Present production schedules indicate that no Packard-powered P-40's will be produced after April, 1943. Future provisions could be made to supply fifteen P-51's per month for the French Forces in North Africa beginning with June production.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

By (signed)
MORRIS R. NELSON
Colonel, Air Corps

GORDON P. SAVILLE,
Brigadier General, U.S.Army
Director of Air Defense

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SUBJECT: Availabili[illegible] Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

To: Ass't. CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)
From: Director of Air Support

Feb. 2, 1943
#1
EJF:wm:73167

1. Pursuant to verbal request, reference study being prepared on availability of A-31 or similar type aircraft to equip one (1) group for French Air Force, pertinent data is submitted below.

2. The Army Air Forces Expansion program as revised January 9, 1943 calls for a total of twenty (20) dive bomb groups and (10) ten light bomb groups by December 31, 1943. Of this total, sixteen (16) dive groups and eight (8) light groups are to be trained, equipped and committed to active theaters, the remaining groups constituting the training establishment.

3. To accomplish provision of initial equipment and replacement for AAF light and dive units, the Materiel Command on January 1, 1943 estimated that the following aircraft would be tactically available during 1943:

	Jan	Feb	Mch	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec.
	Estimated Deliveries*											
A-20	72	43	13	13	9	9	50	90	108	126	126	126
A-26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	10	15	32
A-24	34	39	43	37	13	31	36	54	63	54	54	54
A-25	0	1	2	4	16	31	49	76	112	157	202	225
A-35	0	0	36	21	13	54	86	108	130	112	108	132
A-36	38	81	81	81	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	144	164	175	156	104	125	221	330	417	459	505	569

*On recommendation of AFAMC this data as used for planning allocations is 90% of total estimated deliveries.

4. a. Attention is invited to the fact that no deliveries of the A-31 type will be made during 1943. This type has been redesigned and brought out as the A-35 type. It should be noted that the first one hundred (100) articles of the A-35 type will be non-operational and suitable only for training purposes.

b. Unofficial information from the Material Command indicates that the A-25 type will be fully operational only with approximately the 970th article. This Directorate has been advised that to make this aircraft fully operational from the initial articles, would necessitate closing down this line for a considerable time. Accordingly, it is proposed to incorporate the desired changes in the aircraft gradually with the result that the first three hundred (300) articles will be non-operational. Succeeding articles from No. 300 to approximately No. 970 will incorporate successively the desired changes.

c. The A-36 type is being procured as an interim dive bomber. It will be used to equip groups committed during the first quarter of 1943. It is a redesigned P-51, procurement being limited to five hundred (500) articles.

d. The A-24 type is restricted to use as a training plane and to equip certain units stationed in inactive theatres.

e. The A-20 type and the A-26 type (which will eventually replace th A-20 type) are light level bombers. It should be noted that because of existing defense air commitments, the number of A-20 type aircraft available to AAF is insufficient to supply expected attrition on groups already committed. Only sixty three (63) articles of the A-26 type [illegible]

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5. Analysis of the present planned allocation of light and dive bombers shows the following distribution of estimated deliveries:

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
Initial Equip) Combat Gps)	25	80	105	55	27	59
Replacement) Aircraft)	28	39	26	42	48	21
Aircraft) Training)	51	44	42	59	29	45
Night Fighter Sqd & Misc	40	1	2	0	0	0
Total	144	164	175	156	104	125

	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Initial Equip) Combat Gps)	77	114	210	208	270	258	1488
Replacement) Aircraft)	72	91	99	156	170	218	1010
Training) Aircraft)	72	123	108	95	65	93	826
Night Fighter) Sqs & Misc.)	0	2	0	0	0	0	45
Total	221	330	417	459	505	569	3396

6. In view of the recently developed fact that the first three hundred (300) articles of the A-25 type will definitely be non-operational and probably succeeding six hundred seventy (670) articles will not be fully operational, it will be difficult to meet the dive bombardment expansion program with equipment suitable for combat operations within the time schedule allowed. On the basis of January 1 estimate of deliveries, the three hundredth A-25 will not be delivered prior to October, 1943. The situation with reference to the A-25 type makes all the more imperative that every available A-35 and A-36 type aircraft be conserved to equip and supply attrition to dive bomb groups already manned and trined or committed.

7. The number of Light bombers (A-20, A-26) available during 1943 is barely sufficient to train, equip and supply replacements to AAF light groups. From March until July of this year anticipated deliveries of these types are insufficient to even supply required attrition to groups already in active theatres.

8. The A-24 type as noted above is qualified for training and limited operational activity only. The expected deliveries of this type during 1943 are adequate to supply dive bombardment training needs. Inasmuch as it now appears that the first three hundred (300) articles of the A-25 type an the first on hundred (100) articles of the A-35 type will be of training value only, it is believed that sufficient A-24 type aircraft to equip one group of fifty seven (57) aircraft and supply attrition therefor can be made available with the least delay in the AAF program.

9. Summary

a. No light bombers (A-20, A-26) can be made available before August or September. To allocate any of the estimated deliveries of this type to purposes other than AAF would require a reduction of one (1) group in the AAF light bomb program.

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b. Allocation of A-25, A-35, or A-36 type aircraft to the French would delay training and commitment of at least one dive group by 30 to 60 days.

c. Allocation of A-24 type aircraft would reduce by the number allocated the aircraft available to dive bombardment OTU's and RTU's.

10. Recommendation:

If the decision is made to equip one group of dive bombers for the French from aircraft allocated to AAF, it is suggested as preferable that the A-24 type be used for this purpose with no more than fifteen (15) aircraft assigned per month until group strength has been reached and no more than nine (9) aircraft per month thereafter.

RALPH F. STEARLEY,
Colonel, Air Corps

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR CES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR [illegible]:

Subject: Availability of P-40 and A-31 Type Aircraft for the French in North Africa.

I. Statement of Problem

To determine availability of P-40 and A-31 type aircraft for the French Air Forces in North Africa.

II. Discussion

1. P-40 airplanes.

a. Allocations to theatres, training and other activities will absorb the entire production of the P-40 type aircraft up to about June or July of 1943, at which time it is contemplated that whatever surplus of aircraft exists above immediate requirements will be used for the purpose of augmenting fighter groups by adding the 4th Squadron.

b. The present allocation of replacement P-40's to the North African Theatre is somewhat higher than the customary 20% per month due to an anticipated high attrition rate. (See Tab A) If the attrition rate can be kept down to 20%, this cushion will provide a surplus of P-40 aircraft above requirements as follows:

February 1943	30
March	20
April	15
May	15
June	20

c. All fighter units in Northwest Africa equipped with the P-40 type airplane are equipped with Packard powered P-40's. This includes two U.S. fighter groups, the 99th Fighter Squadron (soon to depart for this Theatre) and a French Fighter Squadron recently equipped with U.S. aircraft.

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d. It is planned that all P-40's furnished Northwest Africa in the future will be Packard-powered in order to simplify supply and maintenance problems.

e. It is anticipated that upon expiration of the present production contract for Packard-powered P-40's in April 1943 Packard-powered P-51's will be substituted in this theatre.

2. Light Bombardment Airplanes.

a. The Army Air Forces expansion program, as revised January 19, 1943, calls for a total of 20 dive bomb groups and 10 light bomb groups by December 31, 1943. Of this total, 16 dive groups and 8 light groups are to be trained, equipped, and prepared for commitment to active theatres, the remaining groups constituting the training establishment. (See Tab B)

b. The Light and Dive Bombardment Program for 1943 employs the following type aircraft:

A-20	A-31
A-24	A-35
A-25	A-36
A-26	

(1) The number of light bombers (A-20 and A-26) available during 1943 will be barely sufficient to train, equip and supply replacements for Army Air Forces light groups. In fact, from March until July, anticipated deliveries are insufficient to supply the required attrition to groups already in active theatres.

(2) Due to its slow speed and vulnerability, the A-24 is limited to training only, with the possible exception of assignment to Hawaii or the Caribbean. By diversion from training, a limited quantity of A-24's can be made available at this time to the French Air Force.

(3) The first 300 articles of the A-25 will be non-operational and probably the next 670 articles will not be fully operational. This plane was originally a Navy plane and there are many features in the design and many articles of equipment that are not satisfactory to the Army Air Forces for the use to which they expect to put the airplane.

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(4) A-31 airplanes.

(a) The A-31 airplane was not originally designed for the Air Corps. Its design was so unsatisfactory that production was continued only to satisfy commitments to the British and Australians. The A-31 is being redesigned. The new ship will be designated the A-36. It will begin to come off the production line in March 1943.

(b) The delivery of the past production and the anticipated assignment of future production of the A-31 airplane (including A-31C and V-72) is as follows:

Countries	Prev. Del.	Anticipated Del.
Army Air Forces	144	2
Australia	77	85
Brazil	28	0
Great Britain	400	172

Note: It is anticipated that the V-72 model will be dropped from production in February 1943. The A-31 model will be dropped in March 1943 and the A-31C model in April 1943.

(c) Of the 141 received by the Army Air Forces, there are now 114 on hand located as follows:

84 in training units in the 3rd Air Force
11 in modification centers
4 in Materiel Command, Wright Field
15 in miscellaneous locations
114 TOTAL

(d) Because of the dissatisfaction in the Army Air Forces with the A-31, by the units using these airplanes in training, an offer has been made to give 100 of these used A-31's owned by the Army Air Forces to Australia, delivery to be made immediately in exchange for 100 of Australia's allocation of A-35's, delivery of which would begin about August 1943. No reply has been received as yet from Australia on this matter.

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(5) The A-35 is a re-design of the A-31 and it is anticipated that the first 100 articles will be non-operational. Operational aircraft of this type cannot be expected prior to June or July 1943.

(6) The A-36 is a re-design of the P-51 to be used as an interim dive bomber. Procurement is limited to 500 articles, all of which are set up for the two Army Air Forces dive groups now trained and awaiting commitment, one to North Africa and one to the United Kingdom, and for training and attrition replacement. Diversion of A-36 airplanes at this time to the French Air Force is inadvisable since it would delay the arrival of the first A-36 Army Air Force group in North Africa.

III. Conclusions

1. The Packard-powered P-40's are now the most suitable fighter airplanes to furnish the French Air Force.

2. These can be furnished at a rate of about 20 per month from aircraft already allocated to Northwest Africa for attrition. Such action would still allow a P-40 attrition replacement of 20% per month to the 12th Air Force.

3. After June, Packard-powered P-51's will be furnished the North African Theatre in lieu of P-40's and sixteen P-51's per month can be furnished the French Air Force for attrition (20%) by diversion of aircraft now planned to increase the Army Air Forces fighter groups to four squadrons.

4. Until August, the number of light level bombers available is not sufficient to provide attrition to Army Air Forces committed units in North Africa, and thereafter barely sufficient for the contemplated 1943 expansion program.

5. A limited quantity of A-24's can be made available to the French but these would later have to be replaced by an operational plane of a different type. Such a procedure would result in increased supply and maintenance difficulties in a distant Theatre.

6. No Army Air Force A-31's are available for the French Air Forces unless diverted from the Australians or the British, or taken

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from old aircraft in the Army Air Forces training activities in the event Australia does not accept an existing offer of these airplanes.

7. A limited number of A-36 airplanes not fully operational can be furnished the French Air Force, commencing in March 1943, for the operational training contemplated in the Western Morocco Area.

8. Commencing about July 1943, operational A-36 airplanes may become available for allocation to the French dive bomb group at the rate of approximately fifteen per month.

9. The early allocation of A-36 type airplanes to the French must be made at the expense of OTU aircraft, with a resultant loss of one or two months time in completing the training of the initial American A-36 group, and in securing Army Air Forces organizational experience with this new airplane. A similar period of delay will be reflected in readiness dates of succeeding A-36 units.

10. Training of French combat crews on a scale comparable with that given OTU's should be conducted in the United States in order to relieve shipping and maintenance problems. Check-offs and brief transition training can be given in the theatrs.

IV. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

1. If the Army Air Forces is to furnish aircraft to equip one French Fighter Group, these aircraft be Packard-powered P-40's at the rate of twenty per month by diversion from the attrition replacements of the 12th Air Force.

2. One Army Air Force Fighter Group be transferred from North Africa to the United Kingdom if and when the new French Fighter Group is fully committed.

3. If the Army Air Forces is to furnish aircraft to equip one French Light Bombardment Group, these aircraft be A-36's at the rate of fifteen per month until group strength has been reached, after which time twelve a month should be furnished for attrition replacement.

4. All combat crew training of the French, other than check-offs or brief transition flights, be conducted in the United States.

for Randolph Williams
O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, Operational Plans.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Availability of P-40 and A-31 Type Aircraft for the French in North Africa.

I. Statement of Problem

To determine availability of P-40 and A-31 type aircraft for the French Air Forces in North Africa.

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1. P-40 airplanes.

a. Allocations to theatres, training and other activities will absorb the entire production of the P-40 type aircraft up to about June or July of 1943, at which time it is contemplated that whatever surplus of aircraft exists above immediate requirements will be used for the purpose of augmenting fighter groups by adding the 4th Squadron.

b. The present allocation of replacement P-40's to the North African Theater is somewhat higher than the customary 20% per month due to an anticipated high attrition rate. (See Tab A) If the attrition rate can be kept down to 20%, this cushion will provide a surplus of P-40 aircraft above requirements as follows:

February 1943	30
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May	15
June	20

c. All fighter units in Northwest Africa equipped with the P-40 type airplane are equipped with Packard powered P-40's. This includes two U.S. fighter groups, the 99th Fighter Squadron (soon to depart for this Theatre) and a French Fighter Squadron recently equipped with U.S. aircraft.

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d. It is planned that all P-40's furnished Northwest Africa in the future will be Packard-powered in order to simplify supply and maintenance problems.

e. It is anticipated that upon expiration of the present production contract for Packard-powered P-40's in April 1943 Packard-powered P-51's will be substituted in this Theatre.

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a. The Army Air Forces expansion program, as revised January 19, 1943, calls for a total of 20 dive bomb groups and 10 light bomb groups by December 31, 1943. Of this total, 16 dive groups and 8 light groups are to be trained, equipped, and prepared for commitment to active theatres, the remaining groups constituting the training establishment. (See Tab B)

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2. These can be furnished at a rate of about 20 per month from aircraft already allocated to Northwest Africa for attrition. Such action would still allow a P-40 attrition replacement of 20% per month to the 12th Air Force.

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4. Until August, the number of light level bombers available is not sufficient to provide attrition to Army Air Forces committed units in North Africa, and thereafter barely sufficient for the contemplated 1943 expansion program.

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8. Commencing about July 1943, operational A-35 airplanes may become available for allocation to the French dive bomb group at the rate of approximately fifteen per month.

9. The early allocation of A-35 type airplanes to the French must be made at the expense of OTU aircraft, with a resultant loss of one or two months time in completing the training of the initial American A-35 group, and in securing Army Air Forces organizational experience with this new airplane. A similar period of delay will be reflected in readiness dates of succeeding A-35 units.

10. Training of French combat crews on a scale comparable with that given OTU's should be conducted in the United States in order to relieve shipping and maintenance problems. Check-offs and brief transition training can be given in the theatre.

IV. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

1. If the Army Air Forces is to furnish aircraft to equip one French Fighter Group, these aircraft be Packard-powered P-40's at the rate of twenty per month by diversion from the attrition replacements of the 12th Air Force.

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O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, Operational Plans.

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February 3, 1942

AIR

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONAL PLANS (General Anderson):

SUBJECT: P-40 Airplanes Available for French Fighter Group.

A

1. There are now two American Fighter Groups in Northwest Africa which are equipped with P-40's (Packard-powered engine). In addition to these, the 99th Squadron is to depart soon for this theater and will be similarly equipped.

2. Total P-40 airplanes required for American units:

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c. Additional aircraft awaiting transportation: 158

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5. With these shipments, estimated P-40 strength actually in theater, assuming five airplanes lost per squadron per month (i.e., 20%), is as follows:

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For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

GORDON P. SAVILLE,
Brigadier General, U.S.Army
Director of Air Defense

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Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

Asst CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser
Director of Air Support

Feb. [illegible], 1943

1

EJF: wm: 73167

1. Pursuant to verbal request, reference study being prepared on availability of A-31 or similar type aircraft to equip one (1) group for French Air Force, pertinent data is submitted below.

2. The Army Air Forces Expansion program as revised January 9, 1943 calls for a total of twenty (20) dive bomb groups and ten (10) light bomb groups by December 31, 1943. Of this total, sixteen (16) dive groups and eight (8) light groups are to be trained, equipped and committed to active theatres, the remaining groups constituting the training establishment.

B

3. To accomplish provision of initial equipment and replacements for AAF light and dive units, the Material Command on January 1, 1943 estimated that the following aircraft would be tactically available during 1943:

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A-26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	10	15	32
A-24	34	39	43	37	13	31	36	54	63	54	54	54
A-25	0	1	2	4	16	31	49	76	112	157	202	225
A-35	0	0	36	21	13	54	86	108	130	112	108	132
A-36	38	81	81	81	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	144	164	175	156	104	125	221	330	417	459	505	569

*On recommendation of AFAMC this data as used for planning allocations is 90% of total estimated deliveries.

4. a. Attention is invited to the fact that no deliveries of the A-31 type will be made during 1943. This type has been redesigned and brought out as the A-35 type. It should be noted that the first one hundred (100) articles of the A-35 type will be non-operational and suitable only for training purposes.

b. Unofficial information from the Material Command indicates that the A-25 type will be fully operational only with approximately the 970th article. This Directorate has been advised that to make this aircraft fully operational from the initial articles, would necessitate closing down this line for a considerable time. Accordingly, it is proposed to incorporate the desired changes in the aircraft gradually with the result that the first three hundred (300) articles will be non-operational. Succeeding articles from No. 300 to approximately No. 970 will incorporate successively the desired changes.

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SECRET

Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

Ass't CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)

Feb. 2, 1943

1 (Cont)

Director of Air Support

EJF: wm: 73167

c. The A-36 type is being procured as an interim dive bomber. It will be used to equip groups committed during the first quarter of 1943. It is a redesigned P-51, procurement being limited to five hundred (500) articles.

d. The A-24 type is restricted to use as a training plane and to equip certain units stationed in inactive theatres.

e. The A-20 type and the A-26 type (which will eventually replace the A-20 type) are light level bombers. It should be noted that because of existing defense aid commitments, the number of A-20 type aircraft available to ASF is insufficient to supply expected attrition on groups already committed. Only sixty three (63) articles of the A-26 type are expected during 1943.

5. Analysis of the present planned allocation of light and dive bombers shows the following distribution of estimated deliveries:

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
Initial Equip) Combat Gps)	25	80	105	55	27	59
Replacement) Aircraft)	28	39	26	42	48	21
Training) Aircraft)	51	44	42	59	29	45
Night Fighter) Sqs & Misc)	40	1	2	0	0	0
Total	144	164	175	156	104	125

	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Initial Equip) Combat Gps)	77	114	210	208	270	268	1488
Replacement) Aircraft)	72	91	99	156	170	218	1010
Training) Aircraft)	72	123	108	95	65	93	826
Night Fighter) Sqs & Misc.)	0	2	0	0	0	0	45
Total	221	330	417	459	505	569	3369

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Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

Ass't CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)

Feb 2, 1943

1 (Cont)

Director of Air Support

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6. In view of the recently developed fact that the first three hundred (300) articles of the A-25 type will definitely be non-operational and probably succeeding six hundred seventy (670) articles will not be fully operational, it will be difficult to meet the dive bombardment expansion program with equipment suitable for combat operations within the time schedule allowed. On the basis of January 1 estimate of deliveries, the three hundredth A-25 will not be delivered prior to October, 1943. The situation with reference to the A-25 type makes all the more imperative that every available A-35 and A-36 type aircraft be conserved to equip and supply attrition to dive bomb groups already manned and trained or committed.

7. The number of light bombers (A-20, A-26) available during 1943 is barely sufficient to train, equip and supply replacements to AAF light groups. From March until July of this year anticipated deliveries of these types are insufficient to even supply required attrition to groups already in active theatres.

8. The A-24 type as noted above is qualified for training and limited operational activity only. The expected deliveries of this type during 1943 are adequate to supply dive bombardment training needs. Inasmuch as it now appears that the first three hundred (300) articles of the A-25 type and the first one hundred (100) articles of the A-35 type will be of training value only, it is believed that sufficient A-24 type aircraft to equip one group of fifty seven (57) aircraft and supply attrition therefor can be made available with the least delay in the AAF program.

9. Summary

a. No light bombers (A-20, A-26) can be made available before August or September. To allocate any of the estimated deliveries of this type to purposes other than AAF would require a reduction of one (1) group in the AAF light bomb program.

b. Allocation of A-25, A-35, or A-36 type aircraft to the French would delay training and commitment of at least one dive group by 30 to 60 days.

c. Allocation of A-24 type aircraft would reduce by the number allocated the aircraft available to dive bombardment OTU's and RTU's.

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Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

Ass't CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)

Feb. 2, 1943

1 (Cont)

Director of Air Support

RFF: wm: 73167

10. Recommendation:

If the decision is made to equip one group of dive bombers for the French from aircraft allocated to AAF, it is suggested as preferable that the A-24 type be used for this purpose with no more than fifteen (15) aircraft assigned per month until group strength has been reached and no more than nine (9) aircraft per month thereafter.

RALPH F. STEARLEY
Colonel, Air Corps

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

2/3/42

February 3, 1942

AIR

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONAL PLANS (General Anderson):

SUBJECT: P-40 Airplanes Available for French Fighter Group.

1. There are now two American Fighter Groups in Northwest Africa which are equipped with P-40's (Packard-powered engine). In addition to these, the 99th Squadron is to depart soon for this theater and will be similarly equipped.

2. Total P-40 airplanes required for American units:

Unit Equipment	Reserve	Total
175	88	263

3. P-40's available as of January 31, 1942:

a. In Theater 122

b. En Route 43
Total 165

c. Additional aircraft awaiting transportation: 158

4. Plans for future production of P-40's to be dispatched to theater:

February	50
March	100
April	55

5. With these shipments, estimated P-40 strength actually in theater, assuming five airplanes lost per squadron per month (i.e., 20%), is as follows:

Month	On hand beginning of month	Arrive during month	Lost during month	On hand end of month	Required	Available for French
Feb.	122	201	30	293	263	30
Mar.	293	50	30	313	263	50
Apr.	313	50	35	328	263	65
May	328	50	35	343	263	80
June	343	55	35	363	263	100

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6. Present production schedules indicate that no Packard-powered P-40's will be produced after April, 1943. Future provisions could be made to supply fifteen P-51's per month for the French Forces in North Africa beginning with June production.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

CORDON P. SAVILLE,
Brigadier General, U.S.Army
Director of Air Defense

MORRIS R. NELSON
Colonel, Air Corps
Deputy Director

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

TO: Ass't CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)

FROM: Director of Air Support

DATE Feb. 2, 1943

COMMENT NO. 1

692

EJF: wm: 73167

1. Pursuant to verbal request, reference study being prepared on availability of A-31 or similar type aircraft to equip one (1) group for French Air Force, pertinent data is submitted below.

2. The Army Air Forces Expansion program as revised January 9, 1943 calls for a total of twenty (20) dive bomb groups and ten (10) light bomb groups by December 31, 1943. Of this total, sixteen (16) dive groups and eight (8) light groups are to be trained, equipped and committed to active theatres, the remaining groups constituting the training establishment.

3. To accomplish provision of initial equipment and replacements for AAF light and dive units, the Material Command on January 1, 1943 estimated that the following aircraft would be tactically available during 1943:

	Estimated Deliveries*											
	Jan	Feb	Mch	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
A-20	72	43	13	13	9	9	50	90	108	126	126	126
A-26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	10	15	32
A-24	34	39	43	37	13	31	36	54	63	54	54	54
A-25	0	1	2	4	16	31	49	76	112	157	202	225
A-35	0	0	36	21	13	54	86	108	130	112	108	132
A-36	38	81	81	81	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	144	164	175	156	104	125	221	330	417	459	505	569

*On recommendation of AFAMC this data as used for planning allocations is 90% of total estimated deliveries.

4. a. Attention is invited to the fact that no deliveries of the A-31 type will be made during 1943. This type has been redesigned and brought out as the A-35 type. It should be noted that the first one hundred (100) articles of the A-35 type will be non-operational and suitable only for training purposes.

b. Unofficial information from the Material Command indicates that the A-25 type will be fully operational only with approximately the 970th article. This Directorate has been advised that to make this aircraft fully operational from the initial articles, would necessitate closing down this line for a considerable time. Accordingly, it is proposed to incorporate the desired changes in the aircraft gradually with the result that the first three hundred (300) articles will be non-operational. Succeeding articles from No. 300 to approximately No. 970 will incorporate successively the desired changes.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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SUBJECT: Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

TO: Ass't CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)

DATE Feb. 2, 1943

FROM: Director of Air Support

COMMENT NO. 1 (Cont)

EJF: wm: 73167

c. The A-36 type is being procured as an interim dive bomber. It will be used to equip groups committed during the first quarter of 1943. It is a redesigned P-51, procurement being limited to five hundred (500) articles.

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e. The A-20 type and the A-26 type (which will eventually replace the A-20 type) are light level bombers. It should be noted that because of existing defense aid commitments, the number of A-20 type aircraft available to AAF is insufficient to supply expected attrition on groups already committed. Only sixty three (63) articles of the A-26 type are expected during 1943.

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SUBJECT: Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

TO: Ass't CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)

DATE Feb 2, 1943

FROM: Director of Air Support

COMMENT NO. 1 (Cont)

EJF: wm: 73167

6. In view of the recently developed fact that the first three hundred (300) articles of the A-25 type will definitely be non-operational and probably succeeding six hundred seventy (670) articles will not be fully operational, it will be difficult to meet the dive bombardment expansion program with equipment suitable for combat operations within the time schedule allowed. On the basis of January 1 estimate of deliveries, the three hundredth A-25 will not be delivered prior to October, 1943. The situation with reference to the A-25 type makes all the more imperative that every available A-35 and A-36 type aircraft be conserved to equip and supply attrition to dive bomb groups already manned and trained or committed.

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9. Summary

a. No light bombers (A-20, A-26) can be made available before August or September. To allocate any of the estimated deliveries of this type to purposes other than AAF would require a reduction of one (1) group in the AAF light bomb program.

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c. Allocation of A-24 type aircraft would reduce by the number allocated the aircraft available to dive bombardment OTU's and RTU's.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

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SUBJECT: Availability of Light and Dive Bomb Aircraft

TO: Ass't CAS, Operational Plans
(Attn. Col. Loutzenheiser)

DATE Feb. 2, 1943

FROM: Director of Air Support

COMMENT NO. 1 (Cont)

EJF: wm: 73167

10. Recommendation:

If the decision is made to equip one group of dive bombers for the French from aircraft allocated to AAF, it is suggested as preferable that the A-24 type be used for this purpose with no more than fifteen (15) aircraft assigned per month until group strength has been reached and no more than nine (9) aircraft per month thereafter.

RALPH F. STEARLEY
Colonel, Air Corps

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CMT/lay/5834

JAN 8 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES.

SUBJECT: Request of French Air Force for 600 Airplanes.

I. Discussion.

1. The most recent request of the French for 600 air planes is to equip

	Estimated A/P
11 Fighter Squadrons	270
10 Bombardment	120
5 Dive Bomber	60
5 Reconnaissance	(30 Bomber Type (30 Fighter Type
5 Transport	100
	610

2. There are three sources or combination of sources for these aircraft, namely the Army Air Forces, the Royal Air Forces and the U. S. Navy.

3. Any aircraft given the French from the AAF must come from units now in the theaters or from units allocated to the theaters, as all aircraft production has already been allocated.

4. Insofar as practical as pertains to the American commitments, the diversion should be made from the air units assigned to the North African Theater and in fact be a substitution of French units for AAF units rather than an augmentation of AAF units for the following reasons:

a. Present indications are that due to the Axis limitations in operational bases and logistical considerations, the current allotment of Allied combat air units to North Africa will prove adequate

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if and when they can be properly based and supplied.

b. The present number of air units in the theater has already saturated the base facilities of the area and the logistical facilities are seriously overtaxed. Lack of base and supply facilities in the North African Theater will probably be a continuing problem in the employment of the air arm.

c. Any additional units would require additional shipping to the theater, which will remain at a premium for a long time.

5. As for the proper division of the responsibility for equipping the French Air Force, it is believed that the British should share equally with the United States. This procedure should tend to improve the present relationship between the French and the British.

II. Conclusions.

1. If the U. S. Navy provided the Dive Bombers, and the RAF and AAF shared equally in providing the other types, the AAF would provide approximately 150 Fighter type, 75 Medium Bomber type, and 50 Transports. This would be approximately equal to 2 Fighter Groups, 1 Medium Bombardment Group (plus 1 Squadron) and 1 Transport Group.

a. Under such an arrangement, it would appear advisable to take the 2 Fighter Groups and the 1 Medium Bomber Group (plus 1 Squadron) out of the 12th Air Force allotment, or as an alternative from one or more of the less active theaters. As the system of supply in North Africa is largely dependent on Air Transport, there should be no diversion of Air Transports from the 12th Air Force. Due to the highly developed transportation and supply system in Great Britain, it appears logical to make the diversion from that theater.

2. If the Navy did not provide the Dive Bombers, the AAF's portion of Dive Bombers, approximately 1 Group, would have to come out of training units in the United States as the only available source.

3. If neither the Navy nor the British participated in the program, it would mean the diversion of units now present in or allocated to theaters approximately as follows:

4 Fighter Groups
3 Medium Bomb Groups (less 1 Sq)
2 Transport Groups
2 Dive Bomb Groups (less 1 Sq)

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CMT/lay/5834

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces

For the reasons stated above, it is believed that the most logical div r-sion would be:

4 Fighter Groups from the 12th Air Force
3 Medium Bomb Groups (less 1 Sq) from the 12th Air Force
2 Transport Groups from the 8th Air Force
2 Dive Bomb Groups from Training Units in U. S.

III. Recommendations.

It is recommended that:

1. The entire program of equipping a French Air Force in North Africa be a gradual development consistant with their ability to employ such a force effectively.

2. The U. S. Navy provide the necessary Dive Bombers.

3. The RAF and the AAF share equally in the provision of the other type aircraft.

4. The AAF's portion of Fighter and Bomber type aircraft be diverted from the 12th Air Force.

5. The AAF's portion of Transports be diverted from the 8th Air Force.

6. The overall implications of the organizing, equipping, and employing of a French Air Force in North Africa be the subject of a detailed study by the Combined Staff Planners.

C. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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SUBJECT: Needs the Air Arm of the French Army 1/3/43

GB:mac 71173

Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Operational Plans.

From: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4.

1. A French Military Mission request for aircraft has been received by the Munitions Assignments Board. 2,003 airplanes of all types are desired for initial equipment and reserves and thereafter 270 air planes per month to meet attrition.

2. The processing of this request through the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) at present is being deferred pending receipt of a statement from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, as to the Army Air Forces position.

Incl - n/c

RICHARD M. BALLARD,
Colonel, G. S. C.

TO: War Organization & Movement
Military Requirements
In turn
Return to A-3, Asst. C.A.S.

DATE 1/3/43
COMMENT NO. 3
CM-IN 5834

FROM: Operational Plans, Air Staff

1. On this date, Operational Plans Division, Air Staff, prepared a study for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, based on a revised request from the French for approximately 600 airplanes.

2. This study recommended that the overall implications of organizing, equipping and employing French Air Forces in the North African Theatre be the subject of a study by the Combined Staff Planners.

3. Until such study is completed, no action should be taken on this paper.

Incl: n/c

O. A. ANDERSON,
Brig. General, U.S.A.

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SUBJECT: Needs ...he Air Arm of the French Arm... 12/30/42
#1
RAG:mc 6701

AFACT AFADS AFAMP AFRON AFDMR
in turn
Return to A-2

1. The attached copy of "Translation of a Memorandum Given to Major Chemidlin by General Mendigal Concerning the Needs of the Air Arm of the French Army," is forwarded for you to note.

2. Our present understanding is that the French Military Mission will proceed in its negotiation through the C.C.S. In view of possible future action by the Army Air Forces in this matter, it is forwarded for your information.

3. Request this paper be routed to the interested agencies as quickly as possible and returned to this division.

ROBERT W. HARPER
Colonel, G. S. C.

1 Incl: Cy of Memo, desc.abv.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date Dec. 26, 1942

From French Military Mission

The following are the members of the Mission:

General Marie-Emile Bethouart
Lt. Col. Albert Jean Paul Le Bel
Lt. Col. Etienne Roland
Major Paul Chemidlin
Major Joseph Molinie

Mr. Rodolphe d'Adler
Mr. Jacques Lemaigre Dubreuil

The offices occupied are Nos. 237 - 235 - 233

(THIS NOTE WAS ATTACHED TO THE MEMORANDUM)

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION

TRANSLATION OF A MEMORANDUM GIVEN TO MAJOR CHEMIDLIN

BY GENERAL MENDIGAL

CONCERNING THE NEEDS OF THE AIR ARM OF THE FRENCH ARMY

Commander in Chief
of the Air Forces
in North Africa

General Staff

Third Bureau

Algiers
December 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR CHEMIDLIN

on the Composition of the Expeditionary Force

1. The number of air units to be maintained is limited by the number of personnel we have in Africa. The available trained personnel permits us to organize:

   7 pursuit squadrons of 38 planes each
   9 bomber squadrons of 20 planes each
   3 reconnaissance squadrons of 20 planes each

   A. The 7 pursuit squadrons will be units equipped with the best up-to-date light pursuit planes. My preference lies with the Spitfire with the possibility of adding reserve fuel belly tanks, which can be jettisoned.

   B. The 9 bomber squadrons will consistof:

      1. 3 dive bomber squadrons, equipped with planes with a minimum speed of 500 kilometers per hour, and capable of performing horizontal bombing by night and, if possible, by day.

         If such materiel does not exist, we could employ pursuit planes used as bombers capable of diving. In this case, they would have to have the qualities of the best pursuit planes. We should look into the possibilities of the addition or existence of armored plate against ground fire.

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Despite the possible modification of the materiel, these squadrons would still be bomber squadrons of 20 planes each.

I shall be glad to accept this adaptation of a good pursuit-bomber failing a dive bomber with the above-mentioned specifications.

2. 6 horizontal bomber squadrons equipped with planes carrying from 1,000 to 2,000 kilogrammes of bombs and with a range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers.

Naturally, we shall take the best plane having these specifications, but we attach much importance to the speed, armament and armour protection.

6. The three reconnaissance squadrons will be equipped with very fast bombers capable of making reconnaissance by day with isolated planes operating by surprise and capable of reinforcing the action of the horizontal bombers.

Only very high speed planes, heavily armed and armour-plated, with first-rate manoeuvrability will be acceptable.

If such planes do not exist, we shall have to make a mixed squadron.

For such a squadron, we should have:

1. 10 planes of the horizontal bombing type, which would be very fast to execute night reconnaissance and protected reconnaissance at very short range.

2. 10 one-seater pursuit planes of best quality with photographic equipment.

II. These squadrons would be arranged to form 3 "Groupements Mixtes" composed of:

2 pursuit squadrons
3 bomber squadrons
1 reconnaissance squadron.

It should be well understood that the composition of these mixed air squadrons is not rigid; the Commander of the Expeditionary Air Force will modify them according to the mission to be accomplished.

One pursuit squadron will remain outside the "Groupement".

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

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PROJECT NO. 1 a.
AIR BASES IN BRITISH POSSESSIONS - ARMY
GARRISONS AND UNITS

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SECRET

ARMY GARRISONS FOR PRINCIPAL RECENTLY ACQUIRED ATLANTIC BASES

BREAKDOWN OF GARRISONS RECOMMENDED
BY
WAR PLANS DIVISION
(With A. C. Units Approved by Chief of Staff)

I. NEWFOUNDLAND

1. St. Johns:

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Force Hqrs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	---	10	---	25	
Inf Inf (less 2 reinf Bns) (With att. Med) - - - - - - - -	7-11	57	---	1,279	
Hq & Hq Dty and sd Th, Hn, Sep, Co (AA) (with Att. Med)- - - - - - -	4-155 4-156	12	---	126	
Dty, Co (AA) 40 mm Gun, Mobile- - -	4-157	4	---	124	
Dty, Co (AA) 37 mm Gun, Mobile- - -	4-158	6	---	122	
Dty, Co (AA) Cal. .50 MG, Mobile- -	4-159	3	---	170	
Plat, Co (AA) SL, Mobile - - - - - - -	4-160	1	---	74	
Dty, Co, 155 mm Gun, Tr - - - - - - -	4-217	2	---	130	
Det, Hq, 2d Tr Co, 155 mm Gun - - - -	4-220	1	---	30	
Det, Dty, Co, CA, 155 mm Gun - - - -	4-221	---	---	32	
Co, Engrs, Combat- - - - - - - - - - -	2-172	4	---	170	
CO, AMD, Frontier- - - - - - - - - - -		8	---	240	
Total - - - - - - - - - -		113	---	2,673	
Services:					
Det Sig Serv Co- - - - - - - - - - -		---	---	---	
Airways Det (AC Services)- - - - - -		2	---	66	
Det Med, Sta Hosp- - - - - - - - - -		4	---	25	
Det Ord - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		14	40	40	
Det QMC- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		1	---	34	
Det TC- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		2	---	74	
Det Engrs- - - - - - - - - - - - - -		---	---	2	
Det Fin- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		1	---	30	
Total - - - - - - - - - -		24	5	282	
Grand Total- - - - - - - - - -		138	45	2,955	

P.R.C.

2. Argentia:

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Bn Inf (with att. Med) - - - - - - - -	7-11	31	---	825	
Plat AT Co - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	7-117	1	---	42	
Bn Sect, Gen Plat- - - - - - - - - - -	7-121	1	---	37	
Bn Sect, Trans Plat- - - - - - - - - -	7-122	1	---	37	
Hq & Hq Dty and sd Th, Hn, Sep, Co (AA) (with Att. Med)- - - - - - -	4-155 4-156	12	---	126	
Dty, Co (AA) 40 mm Gun, Mobile- - -	4-157	4	---	124	
Dty, Co (AA) 37 mm Gun, Mobile- - -	4-158	6	---	122	
Dty, Co (AA) Cal. .50 MG, Mobile- -	4-159	3	---	170	
Plat, Co (AA) SL, Mobile - - - - - - -	4-160	1	---	74	
Sub-Total - - - - - - - - - -		62	---	1,738	
Pursuit Sq (I)(25) - - - - - - - - - -		34	---	134	
Det Air Base Sq - - - - - - - - - - -		30	---	160	
Det Weather - - - - - - - - - - - - -		2	---	20	
Det Ord - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		1	---	20	
Total - - - - - - - - - -		109	---	2,173	
Services:					
Det Sig Serv Co- - - - - - - - - - -		---	---	---	
Det AMD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		---	---	---	
Det Med, Sta Hosp- - - - - - - - - -		3	15	60	
Det Ord- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		1	---	10	
Det QMC- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		4	---	56	
Det Engrs- - - - - - - - - - - - - -		---	---	---	
Det Fin- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		---	---	2	
Total - - - - - - - - - -		13	15	128	
Grand Total- - - - - - - - - -		122	15	2,264	
3. Stephenville: Sig - - - - -		1	---	15	
Airways Det (AC Services)- - - - - -		2	---	25	
Med - - - - -		1	---	2	
[illegible] - - - - - - - - -		4	---	57	
Total [illegible] - - - - - - - -		262	40	5,241	

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T'

PERMANENT GARRISONS FOR MILITARY BASES
IN BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THE ATLANTIC
Revised 4/1/41.
Replaces the table "Army Garrisons for Principal Recently Acquired Atlantic Bases" (1/29/41 & 2/14/41)

I. NEWFOUNDLAND

1. St. Johns:

	Total Peace Garrison T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Permanent Housing Off	Nurses	E.M.	Tent Camp & Cantonment Off	E.M.	Remarks
Force H'qrs	—	10	—	25						
Regt Inf (1 bn & reinf Bns) (with Att. Med)	7-11	57	—	1,299						
H'q & H'q Btry and Am Tn, Sn, Sep, CA (AA) (with Att. Med)	4-155 4-156	12	—	126						
Btry, CA (AA) 90 mm Gun, Mobile	4-17	4	—	174						
Btry, CA (AA) 37 mm Gun, Mobile	4-28	6	—	172						
Btry, CA (AA) Cal. .50 MG, Mobile	4-27	5	—	176						
Plat, CA (AA) SL, Mobile	4-18	1	—	74						
Btry, CA, 155 mm Gun, TD	4-37	5	—	180						
Sect, Sn, Am Tn CA, 155 mm Gun	4-36	1	—	30						
Sect, Btry, Sn, CA, 155 mm Gun	4-38	—	—	12						
Co, Engrs, Combat	2-175	4	—	176						
Co, MPs, Frontier		8	—	230						
Plat, Military Police	7-7	1	—	22						
Total		114	—	2,726						
Services:										
Det Air Serv Co		2	—	60						
Airways Det (A.C. Services)		2	—	52						
Det Med, Sta Hosp		14	20	100						1 single eng.Utility 100 beds
Det Ord		1	—	14						
Det QMC		2	—	70						
Det CWS		—	—	3						
Det Fin		1	—	10						
Total		22	20	282						
Grand Total		136	20	3,008	132	20	2,808	0	0	

*To be stationed at Areas No 2, 3, and 4. for NEWFOUNDLAND

*(See "Agreement for the Use and Operation of the United States Bases.")

2. Argentia:

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Bn Inf (with Att. Med)	7-15				
Plat AT Co	7-12	31	—	235	
Bn Sect, Com Plat	7-117	1	—	48	
Bn Sect, Trans Plat	7-12	1	—	17	
H'q & H'q Btry and Am Tn, CA (AA) (with Att. Med)	7-13	1	—	17	
Btry, CA (AA) 90 mm Gun, Mobile	4-156	12	—	126	
Btry, CA (AA) 37 mm Gun, Mobile	4-17	4	—	174	
Btry, CA (AA) Cal. .50 MG, Mobile	4-28	6	—	172	
Plat, CA (AA) SL, Mobile	4-27	5	—	176	
Plat, Military Police	4-18	1	—	74	
	7-7	1	—	22	
Total		63	—	1,741	
Pursuit Sq (1) (45)		34	—	185	35 Pursuit
Det Air Base Sq		10	—	160	1 single eng.utility
Det Weather		2	—	40	
Det Comm		1	—	20	
Plat, Ord Sq (Avn) (P)		1	—	23	
Total		48	—	408	
Services:					
Det Med, Sta Hosp		10	15	63	To be stationed at 100 beds
Det Ord		1	—	10	Area No. 1
Det QMC		4	—	26	
Det Fin		—	—	2	
Total		15	15	134	
Grand Total		126	15	2,333	126 15 2,333 0 0

3. Stephenville:

Services:										
Airways Det (A.C. Services)		2	—	45						
Det Air Serv Co		1	—	12	*To be stationed at Area No. 4					1 single eng Utility
Det Med		1	—	5						10 bed dispensary
Total		4	—	45	4		45			
TOTAL FOR NEWFOUNDLAND		269	35	5,386	269	35	5,386	0	0	

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II. BERMUDA

	TOTAL FRACE GARRISON				PERMANENT PERS			TEMP CAT I		
	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Off	E.M.	Remarks
Force Hqrs	---	7	---	10						
Ground Units:										
Bn Inf (less 1 Rifle Co)(w. Att. Med)	7-11 7-15	24	---	714						
Bn Sect Corps Plat	7-12	1	---	17						
Btry, CA, 155mm Gun, TD	4-37	5	---	190						
Sect, Btry, SL, 155mm Gun, TD	4-38	--	---	12						
Btry, HD & HD Gun Bn (AA) Semi-mobile	4-176	10	---	184						
2 Btries Gun, (AA) Semi-mobile	4-17 4-115	8	---	264						
Btry, 90mm Gun (AA) Semi-mobile	4-28 4-125	6	---	148						
Btry, Cal. .50 MG (AA) Mobile	4-27	5	---	176						
Btry, SL (less 1 Plat) (AA) Semi-mobile	4-18 4-115	4	---	176						
Co, ASS		2	---	86						
Plat, Military Police	7-2	1	---	50						
Total		74	---	1964						
Air Corps Units:										
Cont Gp consisting of:										
Gp Hq & Hq Sq (Hy Bomb)		23	---	166						
Bomb Sq (H)		32	---	337						
Pursuit Sq (I)		4	---	198						
Air Base Sqt (w Att Med)		14	---	317						
Det, Service		1	---	18						
Det, Communications		1	---	20						
Total		116	---	1041						
Air Corps Services:										
Det Ord Sq (Avn) (Comb)		2	---	48						
Det QMS (Avn)		1	---	32						
Ener Plat (Avn)		1	---	49						
Chaplain		1	---	---						
Total		5	---	129						
Other Services:										
Station Hosp		17	15	116						
Det MC		1	---	147						
Det MSC		1	---	32						
Det Sta Serv Co		2	---	40						
Det QMC		1	---	8						
Det Ord		1	---	34						
Total		23	15	343						
TOTAL FOR BERMUDA		225	15	2494	75	16	[illegible]	50	1961	

*TO BE STATIONED IN AREA NO. 1 AND 2

*(See "Agreement for the Use & Operation of the United States Bases.")

Note A: Units will not be [illegible] as directed by Base Commander.

B: Motor vehicles, all types, limited to 15 for [illegible] Air Corps special vehicles for [illegible] at the air field.

III. BAHAMAS

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.					
Co. Inf (Composite)		7	---	126					
Det AT Co		2	---	31					
Airways Det, AC Services		2	---	15					
Det Sta Serv Co		1	---	30					
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	---	15					
Total		14	---	228					
TOTAL FOR BAHAMAS		14	---	[illegible]	14	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

*TO BE STATIONED IN AREA IV.

1 Single Sta. [illegible]

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

	T/C	Off	Nurses	E.M.					Remarks
Co Inf (Composite)		7	---	226					
Det AM Co		1	---	32					
Airway Det, AC Services		4	---	50					
Det Sig Serv Co		--	---	14					
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	---	12					2 Steel Sgl. Tents
Total		15	---	337					22 Beds
TOTAL FOR AUTIGUA		15	---	337	15	--	337	0	0

*To be Stationed in Area No. 2

VI. SAINT LUCIA

	T/C	Off	Nurses	E.M.					Remarks
Co Inf (Composite)		7	---	226					
Det AM Co		1	---	32					
Airway Det, AC Services		4	---	50					
Det Sig Serv Co		--	---	14					2 Single Sgl. Tents
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	---	12					22 Beds
Total		15	---	337					
TOTAL FOR SAINT LUCIA		15	---	337	15	--	337	0	0

*To be Stationed in Area No. 2

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VII. TRINIDAD

Ground Units:	T/O	Total Peace Garrison Off	Nurses	E.M.	Permanent Housing Off	Nurses	E.	Tent Camp & Cantonment Off	E.M.	Remarks
Force Hqrs		10	----	45						
Regt Inf (with Att Med. & Chap.)	7-11	143	----	3,345						
Two Regts CA (AA) Mobile (with Att. Med & Chap.)	4-11	154	----	3,696						
Regt CA, 155 mm Gun, TD	4-11	84	----	1,811						
Radio Intel Co		7	----	212						
Aircraft Warning Co, Frontier		9	----	200						
Regt Engrs (C) (less 1 bn) (with Att. Med & Chap.)	5-171	32	----	738						
Co Military Police (less 1 plat less1 squad)	7-7	4	----	165						
Total		419	----	10,175						
Air Corps Units:										
Wing Hq & Hq Sq		12	----	146						(1 Single Eng.Utility 2 Two Eng.Transport
2 Group Hq & Hq Sq (Hv Bomb)		46	----	222						6 Bomb (H)
2 Bomb Sq (H)		76	----	474						16 Bomb (H)
2 Recon Sq (M)		88	----	542						16 Bomb (H)
2 Pursuit Sq (Int)		68	----	270						50 Pursuit (I)
2 Air Base Groups		76	----	1,458						12 Single Eng.
Det Weather		2	----	26						
Det Communications		2	----	40						
Total		370	----	3,378						
Air Corps Services:					* To be stationed in					
Dets Engrs:										
1 Co Engrs (Avn) (Sep)		5	----	176	Area No. 2					
Dets SM:										
1 Co (2 Sp) (AS)		4	----	168						
1 Co TK (AS)		3	----	110						
Det SM (LW)		1	----	42						
Dets SO:										
1 Sig Co (Avn)		2	----	50						
Dets Ord:										
1 Co Avn (Sep)		5	----	154						
Dets QMC:					Note: Units will be stationed between temporary and permanent stations as directed by the Commander.					
Det Sect (AS)		1	----	6						
Det Veter Co		0	----	20						
Dets Med:										
Attached		7	----	16						
Det Finance Sect (AS)		1	----	5						
Chaplains		2	----	0						
Total		31	----	750						
Other Services:										
Sig Serv Co		3	----	78						
Det Med, Sta Hosp		52	100	410						200 beds
Det QMC		15	----	234						
Det Ord		6	----	132						
Det Fin Dept		1	----	25						
Det CWS		1	----	8						
Plat Engrs Depot Co		1	---	39						
Total		79	100	1,286						
TOTAL FOR TRINIDAD		899	100	15,589	207	100	4,693	692	10,896	

VIII. BRITISH GUIANA

	T/O	Total Peace Garrison Off	Nurses	E.M.	Permanent Housing Off	Nurses	E.M.	Tent Camp & Cantonment Off	E.M.	Remarks
Co Inf (Composite)		7	----	226						
Det AS Co		2	----	32	*To be stationed in Area No. 1					
Airway Det, AC Services		4	----	80						2 Single Eng.Utility
Det Sig Serv Co		---	----	14						
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	----	15						25 beds
Total		15	----	337						
TOTAL FOR BRITISH GUIANA		15	----	337	15	-	337	0	0	

SUMMARY ALL BASES

	Off	Nurses	E.M.
NEWFOUNDLAND	369	35	5,286
BERMUDA	222	35	3,494
BAHAMAS	14	--	328
JAMAICA	80	15	1,729
ANTIGUA	15	--	337
SAINT LUCIA	15	--	337
TRINIDAD	899	100	15,589
BRITISH GUIANA	15	--	337
GRAND TOTAL	1,529	175	27,547

AGGREGATE 29,251

NOTES: 1: Hospital facilities for the entire garrison at each post will be furnished.
2: Defense Reserves
All Classes (except aircraft bombs and aviation gasoline and aircraft ammunition.)

a. To accompany garrison forces: 30 days supply
Recent--Trinidad and Newfoundland: 60 days
b. Credits to United States: None.

Concurred in G-4 [illegible] MAR 31 1941

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~~Burma~~ Bengal

Hq & Hq Sq 1st Bomb Sp

96th Bomb Sq (H)

1st AB Trp less AB Sp & 1st Mat Sq (each attached unit)

463 Ord Co Amn (Bomb) less 2 platoons

X One (1) platoon of 685th Ord Co Amn (Bmb)

726th Ord Co, Am Bn attd

Detach QM from 1st Sup Supply (Gen)

1st Signal Platoon, Am Bn

2nd Bn 21st Eng (Avn)

Co C 30th QM Regt Truck

One VI platoon Co A 55th QM Bn (Avn)

CWS Detach from 1st Chem Co Serv (Avn)

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Gd Trueland

11th Bomb Sq (H) (7th Sq) 13 planes.
35th Pur Sq (I) (8th Sq)

Spruce AB Det.

(Memo for Brig. Re Sig., Ord., C.W.S., QM set up. Why?)

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To Td Trinidad

Hq & Hq Sq 30th Bomb Wg
Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Gp.
Hq & Hq Sq 19th Bomb Gp.
22nd Bomb Sq (H) (7th Gp).
30th Bomb Sq (H) (19th Gp)
39th Pur Sq (I) (31st Gp)
40th Pur Sq (I) (31st Gp)
38th & 88th Recm Sq (L R)

5th AB Gp less AB Sq plus one mat. Sq. of 2)th AB Gp

Avn Co Eng (Avn) from 810th Bn (Colored)

Det QM. (Purchase AB Co's now) Use C.A.S.C. #252, Salt Lake
Co N 34th QM Regt Truck
Co 4 91st QM Bn (LM) less second platoon.

326th Sig Co. Wing.
36th Sig Plat AB (Craig. You need this)

453rd Ord Co (Bomb)
679th Ord Co (Pur) less one platoon
724th Ord Co. Air Base (Craig. You need this).

Detachs CWS from 2nd Chem Co. Serv. Avn.

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Bermuda

Hqr Hq Sq 3rd Pur Sq

6th Bomb Sq (H) (2nd Sq)

7th Pur Sq (I) (3rd Sq)

46th AB Sq Ken AB Sq

464th Ord Co Avn (Bomb) less 2 platoons with one platoon of 609th Ord. Co. Avn (Pur) attached

709th Ord Co Air Avn (Brazil. You'll need this)

Select CWS 2nd Chem Co Serv (Avn)

Platoon of Eng (Avn) from 710th Bom (Colored)

24th Sig Platoon Air Base (Brazil. You'll need this)

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Org

36th Pur Sq (5th Sp)

AB Detach. To be organized. (Carry ~~this~~ ~~no other letters~~ Some detachments, other courses may be needed but we dont know the ground set up)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO: AG 580 (2-25-41)M-WPD ACW/wr

MAR 5 1941

March 5, 1941.

SUBJECT: Army Garrisons for Atlantic Bases in British Possessions.

TO: The Chief of the Air Corps.

1. Reference is made to a set of revised tables of Army Garrisons for Principal Recently Acquired Atlantic Bases, recently furnished you direct from War Plans Division, General Staff.

2. It is desired that the inclosed revised page 2 (Feb. 19, 1941) be substituted for the corresponding page 2 (Jan. 29, 1941) of the set of tables referred to in paragraph 1 above and that the superseded page be destroyed by burning.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Photostat.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

WPD 4351-55

2/3/41 WPD ORJ

February 3, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS:

Subject: Army Garrisons for principal recently-acquired Atlantic Bases.

There is transmitted herewith for your information and file, copies of revised tables of army garrisons for principal recently-acquired Atlantic bases.

For the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD:

Walter H. Walker

WALTON H. WALKER,
Lt. Col., General Staff,
Executive.

1 Incl.
Table of garrisons for each of the recently-acquired Atlantic bases.

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ARMY GARRISONS FOR PRINCIPAL RECENTLY ACQUIRED ATLANTIC BASES

BREAKDOWN OF GARRISONS RECOMMENDED
BY
WAR PLANS DIVISION
(With A. C. Units Approved by Chief of Staff)

I. NEWFOUNDLAND (January 29, 1941)

1. St. Johns:

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Force Hqrs	---	10	---	25	
Regt Inf (less 2 reinf Bns) (with Att. Med)	7-11	57	---	1,299	
Hq & Hq Btry and Sv Tn, Bn, Sep, Ca (AA) (with Att. Med)	4-155 4-156	12	---	126	
Btry, Ca (AA) 90 mm Gun, Mobile	4-17	4	---	174	
Btry, Ca (AA) 37 mm Gun, Mobile	4-28	6	---	171	
Btry, Ca (AA) Cal. .50 MG, Mobile	4-27	5	---	176	
Plat, Ca (AA) SL, Mobile	4-18	1	---	74	
Btry, Ca, 155 mm Gun, TD	4-27	2	---	130	
Sect, Hq, 2d Tn Ca, 155 mm Gun	4-36	1	---	30	
Sect, Btry, 2d, Ca, 155 mm Gun	4-38	---	---	12	
Co, Engrs, Combat	2-172	4	---	176	
Co, AmS, Frontier		8	---	230	
Total		113	---	2,673	
Services:					
Det Sig Serv Co		2	---	60	
Airways Det (AC Services)		2	---	8	
Det Med, Sta Hosp		14	20	100	
Det Ord		1	---	14	
Det QMC		2	---	70	
Det CWS		---	---	2	
Det Engrs		1	---	10	
Det Fin		1	---	10	
Total		26	20	292	
Grand Total		139	20	2,965	

2. Argentia:

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Bn Inf (with Att. Med)	7-13 7-11	21	---	235	
Plat AT Co	7-117	1	---	48	
Bn Sect, Com Plat	7-12	1	---	17	
Bn Sect, Trans Plat	7-13	1	---	17	
Hq & Hq Btry and Sv Tn, Bn, Sep, Ca (AA) (with Att. Med)	4-155 4-156	12	---	126	
Btry, Ca (AA) 90 mm Gun, Mobile	4-17	4	---	174	
Btry, Ca (AA) 37 mm Gun, Mobile	4-28	6	---	171	
Btry, Ca (AA) Cal. .50 MG, Mobile	4-27	5	---	176	
Plat, Ca (AA) SL, Mobile	4-18	1	---	74	
Sub-Total		62	---	1,738	
Pursuit Sq (I)(25)		34	---	135	
Det Air Base Sp		10	---	160	
Det Weather		2	---	20	
Det Const		1	---	20	
Total		109	---	2,123	
Services:					
Det Sig Serv Co		---	---	---	
Det AAB		---	---	---	
Det Med, Sta Hosp		10	15	65	
Det Ord		1	---	10	
Det QMC		3	---	56	
Det Engrs		---	---	---	
Det Fin		---	---	2	
Total		15	15	134	
Grand Total		124	15	2,257	
3. Stephenville: Sig		1	---	15	
Airways Det (AC Services) Med		2	---	25	
		1	---	8	
		4	---	48	
		267	35	5,264	

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II. [illegible] (February 14, 1941)

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Fixed Fighter:					
Ground Units:					
[illegible]					
Hq & Hq Sqn, [illegible]					
Str, Sq, [illegible]					
Str, Sq, [illegible]					
Str, Sq & Hq Sqn Hq (Avn) [illegible]					
2 Ptrs Sqn, (Av) [illegible]					
Str, [illegible]					
Str, Cal. .50 MG (Av) Mobile					
Str, Sq (less 1 Plat)(Av) [illegible]					
Co, AM					
Total					
Air Corps Units:					
Comd & Cons Sq consisting of:					
Hq & Hq Sq (Dv Bom)					
Bomb Sq (L)					
Pursuit Sq (L)					
Air Base Det (w Att. Med.)					
Det, Weather					
Det, Communication					
Total					
Air Corps Services:					
Det Grd Co (Avn)(Cons)					
Det Sup (Avn)					
Engr Plat (Avn)					
Chaplain					
Total					
Other Services:					
Station Hosp					
Det QMC					
Det Fin					
Det Sig Serv Co					
Det CWS					
Det Ord					
Total					
TOTAL FOR BERMUDA					

III. [illegible] (January 29, 1941)

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Co, Inf (Composite)					
Det AM Co					
Airway Det, AC Services					1 Single Dw.
Det Sig Serv Co					
Det Med, Sta Hosp					25 beds
Total					
TOTAL FOR [illegible]					

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IV. JAMAICA (January 29, 1941)

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Ground Units:					
Force Hqrs		7	---	10	
Bn Inf (with Att. Med & Chap)	7-15	31	---	931	
Bn Sect Com Plat	7-12	1	---	17	
Bn Sect Trans Plat	7-13	1	---	17	
At Plat	7-117	1	---	48	
Btry CA, 155 Gun	4-37	6	---	180	
Sect Bn Am Tn	4-36	1	---	30	
Sect Btry S/L	4-18	1	---	12	
Btry CA, 37mm Gun, CA (AA) (less 2 Plats)	4-28	4	---	103	
Aircraft Warning Co, Frontier		5	---	122	
Total		57		1,470	
Air Corps Services:					
Airways Det		4		50	
Other Services:					
Sta Hosp		9	17	90	
Det Ord		1	---	14	
Det QM		5	---	70	
Det CWS		0	---	3	
Det Engr		1	---	10	
Det Fin Dept		1	---	8	
Total		17	17	196	
TOTAL FOR JAMAICA		78	17	1,715	

V. ANTIGUA (January 29, 1941)

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Co Inf (Composite)		7	---	226	
Det AM Co		2	---	32	
Airway Det, AC Services		4	---	50	
Det Sig Serv Co		---	---	14	
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	---	15	
Total		15	---	337	
TOTAL FOR ANTIGUA		15	---	337	

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VI. SAINT LUCIA

	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Co Inf (Composite)		[illegible]	---	229	
Det AW Co		2	---	32	
Airway Det, AC Services		4	---	50	
Det Sig Serv Co		---	---	14	
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	---	18	
Total		15	---	337	
TOTAL FOR SAINT LUCIA		15	---	337	

VII. TRINIDAD (January 29, 1941)

Ground Units:	T/O	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Force Hqrs		10	---	25	
Regt Inf (with Att Med. & Chap.)	7-11	123	---	3,321	
Two Regts CA (AA) Mobile (with Att. Med & Chap.)	4-11	152	---	3,696	
Regt CA, 155 mm Gun, TD	4-31	82	---	1,811	
Radio Intel Co		7	---	216	
Aircraft Warning Co, Frontier		8	---	200	
Regt Engrs (C) (less 1 Co) (with Att. Med & Chap.)	5-171	43	---	1,091	
Total		425	---	10,363	
Air Corps Units:					
Wing Hq & Hq Sq		12	---	126	
2 Group Hq & Hq Sq (Hv Bomb)		46	---	332	
2 Bomb Sq (H)		76	---	474	
2 Recon Sq (L/R)		88	---	542	
2 Pursuit Sq (Int)		68	---	370	
2 Air Base Groups		76	---	1,258	
Det Weather		2	---	36	
Det Communications		2	---	40	
Total		370	---	3,378	
Air Corps Services:					
Dets QM:					
1 Co (2 Gp) (AB)		4	---	168	
1 Co TK (AB)		3	---	116	
Det Co (LM)		1	---	45	
Dets SC:					
1 Sig Co (Wing)		2	---	50	
Dets Ord:					
1 Co Avn (Comp)		5	---	164	
Dets CWS:					
St Sect (AB)		1	---	6	
Det Decon Co		0	---	20	
Dets Med:					
Attached		7	---	16	
Det Finance Sect (AB)		1	---	5	
Chaplains		2	---	0	
Total		26	---	574	
Other Services:					
Sig Serv Co		[illegible]	---	[illegible]	
Det Med, Sta Hosp		[illegible]	---	[illegible]	
Det QM		[illegible]	---	[illegible]	
Det Ord		[illegible]	---	[illegible]	
Det Fin Det		[illegible]	---	[illegible]	
Det CWS		[illegible]	---	[illegible]	
Plot Engrs Depot Co		[illegible]	---	[illegible]	
Total		71	100	1,796	
TOTAL FOR TRINIDAD		700	1	16,601	

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VIII. BRITISH GUIANA (January 29, 1941)

	T/P	Off	Nurses	E.M.	Remarks
Co Inf (Composite)		7	---	226	
Det AW Co		2	---	32	
Airway Det, AC Services		4	---	50	
Det Sig Serv Co		---	---	14	
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	---	15	
Total		15	---	337	
TOTAL FOR BRITISH GUIANA		15	---	337	

SUMMARY ALL BASES

	Off	Nurses	E.M.	
NEWFOUNDLAND	267	38	5,264	
BERMUDA	219	36	4,439	
BAHAMAS (MAYAGUANA)	14	---	328	
JAMAICA	78	17	1,715	
ANTIGUA	15	---	337	
SAINT LUCIA	15	---	337	
TRINIDAD	900	100	15,601	
BRITISH GUIANA	15	---	337	
GRAND TOTAL	1,623	188	28,358	
AGGREGATE				30,169

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WPD 4351-25

November 15, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF AIR CORPS:

Subject: Air Corps Units and Facilities at Bases in British Possessions.

1. Photostatic Copy Number 4 of Memorandum for the Chief of Staff dated November 12, 1940, relating to Air Corps units and facilities at the eight (8) bases in British Possessions, is furnished for your information and guidance.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff:

Walter H. Walker

WALTON H. WALKER,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Executive.

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WPD 4351-25

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

WPD
SMS
JMC

November 12, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Air Corps Units and Facilities at Bases in British Possessions.

I. The problem presented.

Decision as to the Air Corps units to be included in permanent garrisons in air bases to be established in British Possessions and the extent of the Air Corps technical facilities to be provided thereat.

II. Facts bearing upon the problem.

1. The Board of Experts appointed to study Army and Navy defense establishments in certain British owned islands in the Atlantic recommends such establishments somewhat different, in certain localities, from those submitted by the Joint Planning Committee in its recommendations of August 28, 1940. Estimates for funds required, submitted in WPD 4351-1, September 18, 1940, were based on the garrisons recommended by the Joint Planning Committee.

2. The Chief of the Air Corps submits recommendations for Air Corps garrisons and facilities differing in certain respects from the recommendations of both of the agencies named above (Tab A). The recommendations of the Chief of the Air Corps and the Board of Experts are set forth in the attached summary (Tab B) of Air Corps units, peacetime garrisons.

3. War Plans Division is in general agreement with the Chief of the Air Corps. Major units of the Air Corps and facilities believed by War Plans Division to be required at each base are indicated below.

a. Trinidad. Runways and air base facilities, including quarters, for the following units:

Two Composite Groups each, consisting of --
One Bombardment Squadron,
One Pursuit Squadron,
One Reconnaissance Squadron, and
One Air Base Group.

Total (with service units) 220 Officers, and 2300 Enlisted Men.

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b. Antigua. Air field and servicing facilities, with permanent quarters for an airways detachment of 4 Officers and 50 Enlisted Men. Utilities for tent camp for an additional 370 Officers and 2900 Enlisted Men.

c. Saint Lucia. Air field and servicing facilities, with permanent quarters for an airways detachment of 4 Officers and 50 Enlisted Men. Utilities for tent camp for an additional 370 Officers and 2900 Enlisted Men.

d. Bermuda. Air field and servicing facilities, with permanent quarters for --

One Composite Group, consisting of:
One Heavy Bombardment Squadron,
One Medium Bombardment Squadron,
One Pursuit Squadron, and
One Air Base Group.

Total (with service units) 220 Officers, and 2300 Enlisted Men.

e. British Guiana. Air field and servicing facilities, with permanent quarters for an airways detachment of 4 Officers and 50 Enlisted Men. Utilities for tent camp for an additional 370 Officers and 2900 Enlisted Men.

f. Jamaica. Runways and air base facilities, including permanent quarters, and administrative, maintenance and supply establishments for --

One Wing Headquarters, and
One Composite Group, consisting of:
One Bombardment Squadron,
One Pursuit Squadron,
One Reconnaissance Squadron, and
One Air Base Group.

Total (with service units) 230 Officers, and 2500 Enlisted Men.

g. Bahamas. Runways and operating facilities for operation as a staging field, with quarters for an airways detachment of 4 Officers and 50 Enlisted Men, and camp facilities for an additional 50 Officers and men.

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4. The Air Corps units above recommended for various bases in the British possessions represent a modification of recommendations submitted under date of November 6, 1940, in WPD 4351-25, as directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff in OCS 21160-10, dated November 9, 1940.

III. Action recommended.

That the Air Corps units and facilities listed in paragraph II, 3, above, for each projected base be tentatively approved in order that the Chief of Engineers may proceed with the surveys and the preparation of designs and estimates covering the costs of construction.

J. W. ANDERSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incls.
C.of A.C. Recommendations (Tab A).
Summary of Recommendations
of C.of A.C. & Board
of Experts -- (Tab B).
Memo OCS 21160-10, 11-9-40.
Memo WPD 4351-25, 11-6-40.

fsm

NOV 13 1940
APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War
[redacted] H H ARNOLD
Deputy Chief of Staff

BY S. R. MICKELSEN
Lt. Col. G.S.C., Asst. Sec. W.D.G.S.

NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF A-B
NOTED - CHIEF OF STAFF

REC'D W.P.D. NOV 14 1940 4351-25

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OCS/21160-10

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CANADA

U N I T E D S T A T E S

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

November 22, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Action Taken at Fourth Meeting of Permanent Joint Defense Board (Canada-United States).

1. The fourth meeting of the Permanent Joint Defense Board (Canada-United States) convened at San Francisco November 12, 1940, and thence proceeded to Seattle, Victoria and Vancouver, B. C., before adjournment.

2. The only matters of importance upon which definite action was taken by the Board at the fourth session are as follows:

a. The Board recommended specific sites for the early completion of a chain of airdromes east of the Rocky Mountains connecting continental United States with Alaska. The cost of this construction will be borne by Canada.

b. The Board definitely declined to indorse, as a military requirement at this time, the construction of a highway connecting the United States and Alaska.

c. The Board re-affirmed the action taken at its previous meeting in strongly urging that no German prisoners be interned in Newfoundland.

3. Subsequently, after the adjournment of the Board, Mr. La Guardia took up, in person, with the President, on November 19, the question of the approval of the first report of the Defense Board. It is understood that the President approved the report and directed that copies be furnished the Departments concerned.

This first report had been approved previously by the Canadian Government.

S. D. EMBICK,
Major General,
Senior U. S. Army Representative.

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REFER TO FILE NO. _____

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
WASHINGTON

SECRET

By order of the Chief of Engineers

NOV 22 1940
(Date)

November 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, W.P.D.:

Subject: Estimate of Funds for Army Air Bases in British Possessions.

1. This estimate of funds for construction of air bases revises that forwarded to you with my confidential memorandum of October 8, 1940.

2. Conferences have been held with representatives of the Navy Department to avoid duplication and coordinate facilities and utilities required by both services. In general, arrangements will be made to construct joint water supply and sewerage systems wherever field conditions permit, and to interconnect power systems. At certain locations pier and berthing space for War Department purposes will be provided at Navy Department installations. Similarly, it is planned to provide hospital space for Naval personnel in certain Army hospitals.

3. This revised estimate includes funds for the acquisition and clearing of lands except at Argentia in Newfoundland, and Bermuda, where cost of lands has been included in Navy Department estimates at this time. Certain items of ultimate requirement, such as post schools and chapels, have been deferred to second priority, and are not included in this estimate.

4. An item for contingencies has been included in this estimate. This is to provide for conditions developed by the field surveys and explorations, for expansion of Air Corps facilities in Newfoundland as recommended by the Chief of the Air Corps, and unforeseen conditions which may arise from changes in Naval estimates for piers and lands.

5. The estimates for bases are:

a.	Newfoundland	$ 27,865,000
b.	Bermuda	31,819,000
c.	Bahamas	3,813,000
d.	Jamaica	39,762,000
e.	Antigua	3,835,000
f.	Saint Lucia	3,835,000
g.	Trinidad	68,945,000
h.	British Guiana	3,835,000
		$183,709,000
i.	Contingencies	16,291,000
		$200,000,000

REC'D W.P.D. NOV 25 [illegible] 4351-1

For the Chief of Engineers:

Inclosure:
Estimate (trip.)

William F. Tompkins,
Lieut. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Engineers
Breakdown of Estimates for Air Bases in British Possessions — November 19, 1940
Including Cost of Lands

	Tab	Airfield Construction (A. C. T.)	Housing	Facilities	Utilities	Storage	Harbor Defense	Aircraft Warning Service	Sub-Totals
Newfoundland	A	$ 3,200,000	$ 9,582,000	$ 4,955,000	$6,101,000	$ 525,000	$ 2,550,000	$ 952,000	$ 27,865,000
Bermuda	B	14,068,000	10,089,000	2,880,000	2,852,000	420,000	1,260,000	250,000	31,819,000
Bahamas (Mayaguana)	C	2,849,000	529,000	—	104,000	—	126,000	205,000	3,813,000
Jamaica	D	9,298,000	16,509,000	5,414,000	3,604,000	636,000	3,780,000	521,000	39,762,000
Antigua	E	2,849,000	551,000	—	104,000	—	126,000	205,000	3,835,000
St. Lucia	F	2,849,000	551,000	—	104,000	—	126,000	205,000	3,835,000
Trinidad	G	15,544,000	31,719,000	9,907,000	6,232,000	2,224,000	2,868,000	451,000	68,945,000
British Guiana	H	2,849,000	551,000	—	104,000	—	126,000	205,000	3,835,000
Sub-Totals		$53,506,000	$70,081,000	$23,156,000	$19,205,000	$3,805,000	$10,962,000	$2,994,000	$183,709,000
Contingencies: To provide for changed conditions developed by the field surveys and for expansion of the Air Corps facilities at Newfoundland proposed by the Chief of the Air Corps									$ 16,291,000
GRAND TOTAL									$200,000,000

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TAB A

[redacted]

Estimates of Costs of Military Defense Establishments

1. [redacted]

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1a)	- $ 5,059,000
b.	Facilities	" " "	- 2,715,000
c.	Utilities	" " "	- 3,490,000
d.	Storage for Ammunition and Supplies (See Incl. 3)		- 245,000

2. [redacted]

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1b)	- 4,383,000
b.	Facilities	" " "	- 2,240,000
c.	Utilities	" " "	- 2,577,000
d.	Storage for Ammunitions and Supplies (See Incl. 3)		- 240,000

3. [redacted] (Gander Lake)

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 2a)	- 70,000
b.	Utilities	" " "	- 17,000
c.	Storage for bombs (See Incl. 3)		- 40,000

4. [redacted]

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 2b)	- 70,000
b.	Utilities	" " "	- 17,000
c.	Air Corps Technical (See Incl. 5)		- 3,200,000

5. [redacted]

a.	Aircraft Warning Service (See Incl. 4)		- 952,000
b.	Harbor Defense Installation (See Incl. 6)		- 2,550,000
	GRAND TOTAL		$27,865,000

Revised 11-19-40

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

Housing	
Barracks	$2,657,000
Quarters	
Nurses	161,000
W. O.	118,000
C. O.	1,159,000
B. O.	470,000
N. C. O.	494,000
Sub-Total	($5,059,000)
Facilities	
Administration Building	207,000
Hospital	800,000
Bakery	73,000
Cold Storage & Ice Plant	84,000
Commissary	122,000
Service Club (Enlisted Men)	133,000
Post Exchange	195,000
Mess-Officers'	157,000
Laundry	130,000
Garage & Q. M. Shop	59,000
Motor Vehicle Housing	220,000
Q. M. Gas & Oil Dispensing	22,000
Gun shed & Maint. Rep. Shop	136,000
Pier shed	200,000
Fire Station & Guard House	152,000
Incinerator	25,000
Sub-Total	($2,715,000)
Utilities	
Heating System	980,000
Shops & Q. M. Utility	95,000
Electric Power Station	350,000
Water Supply	490,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.	297,000
Sewerage & Disposal	386,000
Roads	392,000
Land Acquisition	50,000
Railroad Connections	480,000
Sub-Total	($3,490,000)
Grand Total	$11,264,000

Revised 11-19-40

Incl. 1(a)
Tab. A

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

ARGENTIA (NAVAL AIR BASE)

Housing

Barracks		$1,941,000
Quarters		
Nurses		110,000
F. O.		112,000
C. O.		864,000
B. O.		240,000
N. C. O.		1,116,000
	Sub-Total	($4,383,000)

Facilities

Administration Building		171,000
Hospital		1,050,000
Bakery		64,000
Cold Storage & Ice Plant		50,000
Commissary		75,000
Service Club (Enlisted Men)		82,000
Post Exchange		103,000
Mess-Officers'		144,000
Laundry		81,000
Garage & M. E. Shop		37,000
Motor Vehicle Housing		123,000
M. E. Gas & Oil Dispensing		25,000
Gun shed and Maint. Rep. Shop		111,000
Fire Station & Guard House		82,000
Incinerator		14,000
	Sub-Total	($2,240,000)

Utilities

Heating System		80,000
Shops & M. E. Utility		50,000
Electric Power Station		320,000
Water Supply		400,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.		254,000
Sewerage and Disposal		394,000
Roads		300,000
Railroad Connections		50,000
	Sub-Total	($2,577,000)
	Grand Total	$9,050,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 1(B)
Enc. A

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

NEWFOUNDLAND AIRPORT

Housing

Barracks		$35,000
Quarters C.O.		35,000
	Sub-Total	($70,000)

Utilities

Heating System		7,000
Electric Power Station		3,000
Water Supply		4,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.		3,000
	Sub-Total	($17,000)
	Grand Total	$87,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 2(a)
Tab. A

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

STEPHENVILLE

Housing

Barracks	$35,000
Quarters	
C. O.	35,000

Utilities

Heating System	7,000
Electric Power Station	3,000
Water Supply	4,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.	3,000
Grand Total	$87,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 2(b)
Tab. A

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Storage Other Than Ammunition

NEWFOUNDLAND

St. Johns, Newfoundland (30 days)

Engineers	-	500 sq. ft.	immediately
		2500 " "	ultimately
Signal Corps	-	2500 " "	
		1000 " "	photo laboratory
Q. M. Corps	-	5766 " "	(subsistence)
		3760 " "	(other)
Medical	-	397 cu. ft.	
Ordnance	-	(other than ammunition) 1030 sq. ft.	

Total 17,000 sq. ft. @ $5.00 = $85,000

Argentia, Newfoundland (30 days)

Engineers	-	750 sq. ft.	immediately
		2500 " "	ultimately
Q.M. Corps	-	4306 " "	(subsistence)
		8064 " "	(other)
Medical	-	406 cu. ft.	

Ordnance (other than ammunition) 1060 sq. ft.

Total 24,000 sq. ft. @ $5.00 = $120,000

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Incl. 3
1 of 2

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

AND

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

Newfoundland:

3 detectors @ $250,000 (One each at St. Johns, Botwood, and at the air base in southwest Newfoundland.)	$750,000
1 Information Center	$125,000
Rental Communication Facilities St. Johns to Botwood	$ 11,000
Radio Set, including installation, for Naval Base	$ 8,000
Operating Buildings (2)	$ 40,000
S. C. Supplies and Personnel	$ 15,000
Photo Supplies	$ 3,000
Total	$952,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 4
Tab A

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AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

1. [redacted]

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
Airways Detachment	4	50	0

TECHNICAL FACILITIES FOR 1 COMPOSITE GROUP

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Command Post	$250,000
1 Warehouse (25' x 100')	52,000
Gasoline and Oil Storage (10 days' supply) (150,000 gal.)	150,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (300 KW)	60,000
Total Bombproof	$580,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000')	$1,750,000
Aprons & parking area (300' x 1200')	200,000
Night Lighting & Floodlighting	52,000
Radio Range Station	3,000
1 Maintenance Hangar (120' x 200')	250,000
Utilities (incl. tent camp site)	100,000
Fencing	39,000
Land acquisition	81,000
Wharf & roads	100,000
Revetments, protection of airplanes ($1,000 ea.)	45,000
Total non-bombproof	$2,620,000
[redacted] -- Grand Total	3,200,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 5
Tab A

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NEWFOUNDLAND

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

155 mm gun	Seacoast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage	
12	22		$2,499,000
		Cost of lands	51,000
		Total	$2,550,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 6
Tab A

SECRET

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TAB B

BERMUDA

Estimates of Costs of Military Establishments

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1) -	$10,089,000
b.	Facilities	" " " -	2,880,000
c.	Utilities	" " " -	2,852,000
d.	Storage		
	(1) 30 days supply (except ammunition) (See Incl. 3)	-	80,000
	(2) Ammunition, 10 days' fire (except bombs & fixed guns)	-	180,000
	(3) Bomb storage	-	160,000
e.	Harbor Defense Installations (including land) (Except housing, included under a) (See Incl. 5)	-	1,260,000
f.	Aircraft Warning Service & Communications (See Incl. 2)	-	250,000
g.	Air Corps Technical Installations (Incl. 4)	-	14,068,000
	Total		$31,819,000

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

BERMUDA

Housing		
Barracks		$3,830,000
Quarters		
Nurses		239,000
F. O.		546,000
C. O.		3,338,000
B. O.		410,000
M. C. O.		1,726,000
	Sub-Total	($10,089,000)
Facilities		
Administration Building		221,000
Hospital		1,560,000
Bakery		68,000
Cold Storage & Ice Plant		117,000
Commissary		110,000
Service Club (Enlisted Men)		93,000
Post Exchange		187,000
Mess-Officers'		100,000
Laundry		161,000
Garage & Q. M. Shop		32,000
Gun Shed & Maint. Rep. Shop		69,000
Fire Station & Guard House		135,000
Incinerator		27,000
	Sub-Total	($2,880,000)
Utilities		
Shops & Q. M. Utility		83,000
Electric Power Station		390,000
Water Supply		650,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.		464,000
Sewerage & Disposal		641,000
Roads		624,000
	Sub-Total	($2,852,000)
	Grand Total	**$15,821,000**

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Incl. 1
Page 1

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

AND

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

Bermuda:

1. Detector	$175,000
Information Center Facilities	$ 30,000
Radio Set, including installation	$ 10,000
Operating Buildings	$ 30,000
S. C. Supplies and Personnel	$ 5,000
Total	$250,000

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Incl. 2

Tab B

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Storage Other than Ammunition

BERMUDA

Bermuda (30 days supply)

Engineers	-	750 sq. ft.	immediately
		2560 " "	ultimately
Q.M. Corps	-	7952 " "	(subsistence)
		3976 " "	(other)
Signal Corps	-	3750 " "	
Ordnance	-	(other than ammunition) 890 sq. ft.	
Medical	-	550 cu. ft.	

Total 20,000 sq. ft. @ $4.00 = $80,000

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Incl. 3.
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AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

2. BERMUDA

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
1 Gp. Hq. & Hq. Sq. (Bomb. (H))	23	266	3
1 Bomb Sq. (H)	38	237	8
1 Bomb Sq. (M)	52	254	13
1 Pursuit Sq. (Int.)	34	185	25
1 Air Base Group	38	629	8
1 Detachment, Weather	1	20	0
1 Detachment, Communications	1	20	0
	187	1611	57

TECHNICAL FACILITIES

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Maintenance Hangar, Air Base (120' x 200')	$1,500,000
1 Command Post	250,000
1 A. C. Warehouse	208,000
1 Ord. & Sig. Warehouse	208,000
Gasoline & oil Storage (30 days' supply) (500,000 gal.)	500,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (1500KW)	300,000
Paint and dope storage	26,000
Total bombproof	$3,060,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000'), Incl. dredging ($3,600,000)	4,500,000
Aprons	200,000
Night Lighting	52,000
Radio Range Station	3,000
3 Maintenance Hangars (1 per Sq.) (120' x 200')	750,000
1 Administration Building	110,000
Utilities	104,000
Fencing	39,000
3 Auxiliary Airdromes ($1,750,000)	5,250,000
Total non-bombproof	$11,008,000
BERMUDA -- Grand Total	$14,068,000*

* Exclusive of land acquisition.

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Incl. 4
Tab. B

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BERMUDA

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

155 mm gun	Sea Coast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage
4	12	$1,206,000
Lands		54,000
		$1,260,000

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Incl. 5
Tab B

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TAB C

MAYAGUANA, BAHAMA ISLANDS

Estimates of Costs of Military Establishments

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1)	-	$ 529,000
b.	Facilities	(See Incl. 1)	-	---
c.	Utilities	(See Incl. 1)	-	104,000
d.	Storage			---
e.	Harbor Defense (Incl. 4)			
	155 mm Guns: 2	SC SL's: 6	-	126,000
f.	Aircraft Warning Service and Communications (Incl. 2)		-	205,000
g.	Air Corps Technical (Incl. 3) Installations (including lands)		-	2,849,000
		Total		$3,813,000

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

BAHAMAS (MAYAGUANA)

Housing

Barracks	$308,000
Quarters	
F. O.	18,000
C. O.	203,000
Sub-Total	($529,000)

Utilities

Electric Power Station	30,000
Water Supply	20,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.	30,000
Sewerage and Disposal	24,000
Sub-Total	($104,000)
Grand Total	$633,000

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Incl. 1
Tab. C

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

AND

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

Rehearse:

1.	Detector	$175,000
	Information Center Facilities	30,000
	Total	$205,000

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AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

3. BAHAMAS. (Mayaguana, Bahama Islands)

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
Airways Detachment	4	50	0

TECHNICAL FACILITIES for 1 COMPOSITE GROUP

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Command Post	$250,000
1 Warehouse (25' x 100')	52,000
Gasoline and Oil Storage (10 days' supply) (150,000 gal.)	150,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (300 KW)	60,000
Total bombproof	$580,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000')	$1,500,000
Aprons & parking area (300' x 1200')	200,000
Night Lighting & Floodlighting	52,000
Radio Range Station	3,000
1 Maintenance Hangar (120' x 200')	250,000
Utilities (incl. tent camp site)	100,000
Fencing	39,000
Land acquisition	50,000
Wharf & roads	30,000
Revetments, protection of airplanes ($1,000 ea.)	45,000
Total non-bombproof	$2,269,000
BAHAMAS -- Grand Total	$2,849,000

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Incl. 3
Tab. C

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SECRET

BAHAMAS

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

155 mm gun	Sea Coast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage
2	6	$126,000

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Incl. 4
Tab C

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TAB B

JAMAICA

Estimates of Costs of Military Establishments

a.	Housing (See Incl. 1)	-	$16,509,000
b.	Facilities " " "	-	5,414,000
c.	Utilities " " "	-	3,604,000
d.	Storage		
	(1) 30 days supply (except ammunition) (Incl. 2)	-	256,000
	(2) Ammunition (except bombs)	-	340,000
	(3) Bomb storage	-	40,000
e.	Harbor defense installations (except housing for personnel under a) (Incl. 5)	-	3,780,000
f.	Aircraft warning service and Communications (Incl. 3)	-	521,000
g.	Air Corps technical installations (Incl. 4)	-	9,298,000
	Total		$39,762,000

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

JAMAICA

Housing	
Barracks	$7,230,000
Quarters	
Nurses	718,000
F. O.	928,000
C. O.	5,585,000
B. O.	585,000
N. C. O.	1,463,000
Sub-Total	(,309,000)
Facilities	
Administration Building	280,000
Hospital	2,925,000
Bakery	107,000
Cold Storage & Ice Plant	281,000
Commissary	172,000
Service Club (Enlisted Men)	145,000
Post Exchange	292,000
Mess-Officers'	143,000
Laundry	251,000
Garage & Q. M. Shop	130,000
Motor Vehicle Housing	377,000
Q. M. Gas & Oil Dispensing	20,000
Gun shed & Maint. Rep. Shop	97,000
Fire Station & Guard House	159,000
Incinerator	35,000
Sub-Total	(, ,)
Utilities	
Shops & Q. M. Utility	72,000
Electric Power Station	1,040,000
Water Supply	741,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.	420,000
Sewerage & Disposal	746,000
Roads	585,000
Sub-Total	(, ,)
Grand Total	$25,527,000

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Incl. 1
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Storage Other Than Ammunition

JAMAICA

Jamaica

Engineers	-	2000 sq. ft.	immediately
		~~10000~~ " "	covered space ultimately
Signal Corps	-	~~8000~~ " "	storage
		1800 " "	photo laboratory
Q.M. Corps	-	~~27483~~ " "	(subsistence) (includes 6035 sq. ft. for H.D. units)
		~~13741~~ " "	(other supplies) (includes 3017 sq. ft. for H.D. units)
Medical	-	2130 sq. ft.	
Ordnance	-	(other than ammunition) 2650 sq. ft.	

Total 64,000 sq. ft. @ $4.00 = $256,000

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Incl. 2
Tab D

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

AND

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

Jamaica:

2 Detectors @ $175,000	$350,000
Information Center Facilities	100,000
Communication Service	11,000
Radio Equipment and Installation	12,000
Operating Buildings	30,000
S. C. Supplies and Personnel	15,000
Photo Equipment	3,000
Total	$521,000

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Incl. 3
Tab D

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AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

4. JAMAICA

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
1 Wing Hq. & Hq. Sq.	12	126	3
1 Group Hq. & Hq. Sq. (Bomb. (H))	23	266	3
1 Bomb. Sq. (H)	38	237	8
1 Reconnaissance Sw. (L/R)	44	271	8
1 Pursuit Sq. (Int.)	34	185	25
1 Air Base Group	38	629	8
1 Detachment, Weather	2	20	0
1 Detachment, Communications	1	20	0
	192	1754	55

TECHNICAL FACILITIES

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Maintenance Hangar, Air Base (120' x 300')	$1,500,000
1 Command Post	250,000
1 A. C. Warehouse	208,000
1 Ord. & Sig. Warehouse	208,000
Gasoline & Oil Storage (30 days' supply) (500,000 gal.)	500,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (1500 KW)	300,000
Paint and dope storage	26,000
Total bombproof	$3,060,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000')	$3,100,000
Aprons	200,000
Radio range station	3,000
Night Lighting	52,000
3 Maintenance Hangars (1 per Sq.) (120' x 200')	750,000
1 Administration Building	110,000
Utilities	104,000
Fencing	39,000
1 Auxiliary Airdrome	1,750,000
Land acquisition and clearing	130,000
Total non-bombproof	$6,238,000
JAMAICA -- Grand Total	$9,298,000

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Incl. 4
Tab. D

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JAMAICA

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

12" gun	155 mm gun	Seacoast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage
3	9	16	$3,775,000
Land			5,000
			$3,780,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 5
Tab D

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SECRET

TABLE

ANTIGUA

Estimates of Costs of Military Establishments

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1)	- $ 551,000
b.	Facilities	" " "	—
c.	Utilities	" " "	- 104,000
d.	Storage		—
e.	Harbor Defense (Incl. 4)		
	155 mm Guns: 2	FC SCR's: 6	- 130,000
f.	Aircraft Warning Service and Communications (Incl. 2)		- 205,000
g.	Air Corps Technical (Incl. 3) Installations (Including lands)		- 2,049,000
	Total		$2,835,000

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

ANTIGUA

Housing		
Barracks		$315,000
Quarters		
F. O.		18,000
C. O.		218,000
	Sub-Total	($551,000)
Utilities		
Electric Power Station		29,000
Water Supply		23,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.		29,000
Sewerage & Disposal		23,000
	Sub-Total	($104,000)
	Grand Total	$655,000

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Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 1
Tab E

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

AND

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

Antiaircraft:

1 Detector	$175,000
Information Center Facilities	30,000
Total	$205,000

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Incl. 2.
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AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

5. **ANTIGUA**

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
Airways Detachment	4	50	0

TECHNICAL FACILITIES for 1 COMPOSITE GROUP

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Command Post	$250,000
1 Warehouse (25' x 100')	52,000
Gasoline & Oil Storage (10 days' supply) (150,000 gal.)	150,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (300 KW)	60,000
Total bombproof	$580,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000')	$1,500,000
Aprons & parking area (300' x 1200')	200,000
Night Lighting & Floodlighting	52,000
Radio Range Station	3,000
1 Maintenance Hangar (120' x 200')	250,000
Utilities (incl. tent camp site)	100,000
Fencing	39,000
Land acquisition	50,000
Wharf & roads	30,000
Revetments, protection of airplanes ($1,000 ea.)	45,000
Total non-bombproof	$2,269,000
ANTIGUA -- Grand Total	$2,849,000

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Incl. 3
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ANTIGUA

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

155 mm gun	Seacoast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage
2	6	$126,000

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Incl. 4
Tab E

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TAB F

SAINT LUCIA

Estimates of Costs of Military Establishments

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1)	- $ 551,000
b.	Facilities	" " "	---
c.	Utilities	" " "	- 104,000
d.	Storage		---
e.	Harbor Defense (Incl. 4)		
	155 mm Guns: 2	SC CL's: 6	- 126,000
f.	Aircraft Warning Service and Communications (Incl. 2)		- [illegible]
g.	Air Corps Technical (Incl. 3) Installations (including lands)		- 2,849,000
		Total	$3,835,000

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

ST. LUCIA

Housing

Barracks		$315,000
Quarters		
F.O.		18,000
C.O.		218,000
	Sub-Total	($551,000)

Utilities

Electric Power Station		29,000
Water Supply		23,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.		29,000
Sewerage & Disposal		23,000
	Sub-Total	($104,000)
	Grand Total	$655,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 1
Tab F

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

AND

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

Saint Lucia:

1 Detector	$175,000
Information Center Facilities	30,000
Total	$205,000

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Tab F.

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SECRET

AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

6. ST. LUCIA

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
Airways Detachment	4	50	0

TECHNICAL FACILITIES for 1 COMPOSITE GROUP

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Command Post	$ 250,000
1 Warehouse (25' x 100')	52,000
Gasoline and Oil Storage (10 days' supply) (150,000 gal.)	150,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (300 KW)	60,000
Total bombproof	$ 580,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000')	$1,500,000
Aprons & parking area (300' x 1200')	200,000
Night Lighting & Floodlighting	52,000
Radio Range Station	3,000
1 Maintenance Hangar (120' x 200')	250,000
Utilities (incl. tent camp site)	100,000
Fencing	39,000
Land acquisition	50,000
Wharf & roads	30,000
Revetments, protection of airplanes ($1,000 ea.)	45,000
Total non-bombproof	$2,269,000
ST. LUCIA -- Grand Total	$2,849,000

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Incl. 3
Tab. F

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SAINT LUCIA

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

155 mm gun	Sea Coast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage
2	6	$126,000

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TAB Q

TRINIDAD

Estimates of Costs of Military Establishments

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1)	- $31,719,000
b.	Facilities	" " "	- 9,907,000
c.	Utilities	" " "	- 6,232,000
d.	Storage		
	(1) 60 days supply (except ammunition) (Incl. 3)		- 1,024,000
	(2) Ammunition, 15 days fire (except bombs and fixed guns)		- 1,020,000
	(3) Bomb storage		- 180,000
e.	Harbor defense installations (except housing included under a) (Incl. 5)		- 2,868,000
f.	Aircraft Warning Services & Communications (See Incl. 2)		- 451,000
g.	Air Corps technical installations (Incl. 4)		- 15,544,000
		Total	$68,945,000

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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

TRINIDAD

Housing		
Barracks		$13,330,000
Quarters		
Nurses		478,000
F. O.		1,474,000
C. O.		8,861,000
B. O.		1,287,000
M. C. O.		6,289,000
	Sub-Total	($31,719,000)
Facilities		
Administration Building		373,000
Hospital		5,525,000
Bakery		184,000
Cold Storage & Ice Plant		429,000
Commissary		418,000
Service Club (Enlisted Men)		309,000
Post Exchange		389,000
Mess-Officers'		315,000
Laundry		523,000
Garage & Q. M. Shop		158,000
Motor Vehicle Housing		686,000
Q. M. Gas & Oil Dispensing		30,000
Gun Shed & Maint. Rep. Shop		129,000
Fire Station & Guard House		380,000
Incinerator		59,000
	Sub-Total	($9,907,000)
Utilities		
Shops & Q. M. Utility		234,000
Electric Power Station		975,000
Water Supply		1,200,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.		751,000
Sewerage & Disposal		1,852,000
Roads		520,000
Land Acquisition		700,000
	Sub-Total	($6,232,000)
	Grand Total	**$47,858,000**

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Incl. 1
Tab G

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TAB H

BRITISH GUIANA

Estimates of Costs of Military Establishments

a.	Housing	(See Incl. 1)	-	$ 551,000
b.	Facilities	" " "		---
c.	Utilities	" " "	-	104,000
d.	Storage			---
e.	Harbor Defense (Incl. 4)			
	155 mm Guns: 2	SC: SL's: 6	-	126,000
f.	Aircraft Warning Service and Communications (Incl. 2)		-	205,000
g.	Air Corps Technical (Incl. 3) Installations (including lands)		-	2,849,000
		Total		$3,835,000

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE
AND
OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

Trinidad:

2 Detectors @ $175,000	$350,000
Information Center Facilities	$ 30,000
Radio Equipment, including installations	$ 12,000
Operating Buildings	$ 30,000
Toll or lease lines, 8 months	$ 11,000
Photo Equipment	$ 3,000
S. C. Supplies & personnel	$ 15,000
Total	$451,000

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Incl. 2
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Storage Other Than Ammunition

TRINIDAD

Trinidad (60 days supply)

Engineers	-	2500 sq. ft.	immediately
		15000 " "	covered space ultimately
Signal Corps	-	10000 " "	
		1800 " "	photo laboratory
Q.M. Corps	-	140358 " "	(subsistence) (includes 11306 sq. ft. for H. D. units)
		70179 " "	(other supplies) (includes 5653 sq. ft. for H. D. units)
Medical	-	~~10549~~ sq. ft.	
Ordnance	-	(other than ammunition) 9310 sq. ft.	

Total 256,000 sq. ft. @ $4.00 = $1,024,000

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Incl. 3
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AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

7. TRINIDAD

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
1 Gp. Hq. & Hq. Sq. (Bomb. (H))	23	266	3
1 Bomb. Sq. (H)	38	237	8
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	44	271	8
1 Pursuit Sq. (Int.)	34	185	25
1 Gp. Hq. & Hq. Sq. (Bomb. (H))	23	266	3
1 Bomb. Sq. (H)	38	237	8
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	44	271	8
1 Pursuit Sq. (Int.)	34	185	25
2 Air Base Groups	76	1258	16
1 Detachment, Weather	2	20	0
1 Detachment, Communications	1	20	0
	357	3216	104

TECHNICAL FACILITIES

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Maintenance Hangar, Air Base (120' x 200')	$ 1,500,000
1 Command Post	250,000
1 A.C. Warehouse	208,000
1 Ord. & Sig. Warehouse	208,000
Gasoline & Oil Storage (60 days' supply) (2,000,000 gal.)	2,000,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (2000 KW)	400,000
Paint and dope storage	26,000
Total bombproof	$ 4,660,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000')	$ 3,100,000
Aprons	300,000
Night Lighting	52,000
Radio Range Station	3,000
6 Maintenance Hangars (1 per Sq.) (120' x 200')	1,500,000
1 Administration Building	110,000
Utilities	130,000
Fencing	39,000
3 Auxiliary Airdromes ($1,750,000)	5,250,000
Land acquisition and clearing	400,000
Total non-bombproof	$10,884,000
TRINIDAD -- Grand Total	$15,544,000

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TRINIDAD

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

12" gun	155 mm gun	Sea Coast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage
2	8	16	$2,863,000
Land			5,000
		Total	$2,868,000

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Incl. 5
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CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATE

FOR PERMANENT HOUSING, FACILITIES, AND UTILITIES

BRITISH GUIANA

Housing

Barracks		$315,000
Quarters		
F. C.		18,000
C. C.		218,000
	Sub-Total	($551,000)

Utilities

Electric Power Station	29,000
Water Supply	23,000
Grading, Drainage, Fencing & Gen. Util.	29,000
Sewerage & Disposal	23,000
Sub-Total	($104,000)
Grand Total	$655,000

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Incl. 1
Tab H

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

AND

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

British Guiana:

1 Detector	$175,000
Information Center Facilities	30,000
Total	$205,000

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Incl. 2
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AIR CORPS TECHNICAL

8. BRITISH GUIANA

AIR CORPS TROOPS	Officers	Enl. Men	Airplanes
Airways Detachment	4	50	0

TECHNICAL FACILITIES for 1 COMPOSITE GROUP

a. Bombproof construction.

1 Command Post	$250,000
1 Warehouse (25' x 100')	52,000
Gasoline and Oil Storage (10 days' supply) (150,000 gal.)	150,000
Tactical Warning Communications System	3,000
Radio facilities	65,000
Electric light plant (Diesel) (300 KW)	60,000
Total bombproof	$580,000

b. Non-bombproof construction.

Runways, grading & drainage (3 - 150' x 5000')	$1,500,000
Aprons & parking area (300' x 1200')	200,000
Night Lighting & Floodlighting	52,000
Radio Range Station	3,000
1 Maintenance Hangar (120' x 200')	250,000
Utilities (incl. tent camp site)	100,000
Fencing	39,000
Land acquisition	50,000
Wharf & roads	30,000
Revetments, protection of airplanes ($1,000 ea.)	45,000
Total non-bombproof	$2,269,000
BRITISH GUIANA -- Grand Total	$2,849,000

Revised 11-19-40
Incl. 3
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BRITISH GUIANA

HARBOR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
(exclusive of housing for Personnel)

155 mm gun	Sea Coast Searchlights	Cost of SL's, all fixed construction including ammunition storage
2	6	$126,000

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(9)

October 21, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.

SUBJECT: Facilities at Air Bases to be Established in Certain British Possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

1. Reference: Conference with Lieutenant Colonel Sherrill, October 29, regarding report of the Greenslade-Severs Board.

2. It is recommended that air base facilities be provided in each of the following British possessions as follows, in the priorities stated:

a. Priority 1.

(1) Trinidad.

Runways and air base facilities including quarters, and administrative, maintenance, and supply establishments for the following Air Corps units, all at proposed Table of Organization strength, with Air Corps Weather and Communications Detachments, and troops of other arms and services as indicated:

Air Units	Officers*	Enlisted Men*
1 Wing Hq. & Hq. Sq.	12	119
1 Heavy Bombardment Group	221	1146
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Pursuit Group (Int.)	199	1016
1 Air Base Group (Rein.)	49	903
1 Det. Weather	2	20
1 Det. Communications	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	560	3562

* Includes attached Medical.

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Other Arms and Services

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Quartermaster Corps		
1 Staff Section	1	2
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	2	2
Det. Co. (L. Maint.)	1	40
½ Co. Trk.	1	50
1 Co. Air Base (2 Op.)	4	149
Corps of Engineers		
1 Co. Avn.	5	160
Ordnance Dept.		
1 Staff Section	1	3
1 Co. Avn.	4	60
1 Co. Bomb.	6	171
1 Co. Fur.	5	73
Signal Corps		
1 Staff Section	2	4
1 Co. Avn.	6	117
1 Plat. Air Base	1	36
Medical Corps		
1 Det. Station Hosp.	10	90
Finance Dept.		
1 Staff Sect.	1	10
Chemical Warfare Service		
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	1	2
TOTAL ARMS AND SERVICES	51	976

Additional Troops

Ground combat troops as required for the ground defense of the base.

(2) Antigua and St. Lucia.

Runways and operating facilities for operation as staging fields and quarters for an airways detachment of 2 officers and 25 enlisted men. Emergency quarters for 50 transient officers and men.

b. Priority 2 - Bermuda.

Runways and air base facilities including quarters, and administrative, maintenance and supply establishments for the following Air Corps units, all at proposed Table of Organization strength with Air Corps Weather and Communications Detachments, and troops of other arms and services as indicated:

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Air Units

	Officers	Enlisted Men*
1 Wing Hq. & Hq. Sq.	12	119
1 Heavy Bombardment Group	221	1146
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Pursuit Group (Int.)	109	1016
1 Air Base Group (Rein.)	49	903
1 Det. Weather	2	20
1 Det. Communications	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	560	3562

* Includes attached Medical.

Other Arms and Services

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Quartermaster Corps		
1 Staff Section	1	2
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	2	2
Det. Co. (L. Maint.)	1	40
2 Co. Trk.	1	50
1 Co. Air Base (2 Sp.)	4	149
Corps of Engineers		
1 Co. Avn.	5	160
Ordnance Dept.		
1 Staff Section	1	3
1 Co. Avn.	4	60
1 Co. Bomb.	6	171
1 Co. Pur.	5	73
Signal Corps		
1 Staff Section	2	4
1 Co. Avn.	6	117
1 Plat. Air Base	1	36
Medical Corps		
1 Det. Station Hosp.	10	90
Finance Dept.		
1 Staff Sect.	1	10
Chemical Warfare Service		
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	1	9
TOTAL ARMS AND SERVICES	51	976

Additional Troops

Ground combat troops as required for the ground defense of the base.

NOTE: In the event that available areas will not accommodate the force listed above, it is recommended that like facilities be provided for the following:

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Air Units

	Officers*	Unlisted Men
1 Heavy Bomb Group (less one Sq.)	155	855
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/H)	76	338
1 Pursuit Sq. (Int.)	58	254
1 Air Base Group	38	627
1 Det. Weather	2	20
1 Det. Communications	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	330	2114

* Includes attached Medical.

Other Arms and Services

Quartermaster Corps		
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	2	2
½ Co. Trk.	1	50
Det. Co. (L. Maint.)	1	40
1 Co. Air Base (1 Sp.)	3	100
Corps of Engineers		
1 Co. Avn.	5	160
Ordnance Dept.		
1 Co. Avn.	4	60
1 Co. Bomb. & Pur.	6	152
Signal Corps		
Det. Co. Avn.	1	44
1 Plat. Air Base	1	36
Medical Corps		
1 Det. Station Hosp.	7	70
Finance Dept.		
1 Sect.	1	5
Chemical Warfare Service		
1 Staff Sect. Sp.	1	3
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	0	6
TOTAL ARMS AND SERVICES	33	728

Additional Troops

Ground combat troops as required for the ground defense of the base.

c. Priority 3 - Antigua and St. Lucia.

Further development of air bases on Antigua and St. Lucia Islands to include quarters, and administrative, maintenance, and supply establishments capable of receiving and continuously operating the following Air Corps units, all at proposed Table of Organization strength with Air Corps Weather and Communications Detachments, and troops of other arms and services as indicated:

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Air Units

	Officers*	Enlisted Men*
1 Heavy Bomb Group	221	1146
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Air Base Group	38	627
1 Det. Weather	1	13
1 Det. Communications	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	337	2149

* Includes attached Medical.

Other Arms and Services

Quartermaster Corps		
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	2	2
1 Co. Trk.	1	50
Det. Co. (L. Maint.)	1	40
1 Co. Air Base (1 Gp.)	3	100
Corps of Engineers		
1 Co. Avn.	5	160
Ordnance Dept.		
1 Co. Avn.	1	60
1 Co. Base.	9	171
Signal Corps		
1 Det. Co. Avn.	1	44
1 Plat. Air Base	1	36
Medical Corps		
1 Det. Station Hosp.	7	70
Finance Dept.		
1 Sect.	1	5
Chemical Warfare Service		
1 Staff Sect. Gp.	1	3
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	0	6
OTHER ARMS AND SERVICES	33	747

Additional Troops

Ground combat troops as required for the ground defense of the base.

Permanent garrison to consist of caretaking and airways detachment consisting of 4 officers and 50 enlisted men, Air Corps, plus such ground combat troops as may be determined as necessary for defense of the base.

d. Priority 4 - British Guiana.

Runways and air base facilities including quarters, and administrative, maintenance, and supply establishments cap-

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able of receiving and continuously operating the following Air Corps units at proposed Table of Organization strength with Air Corps Weather and Communications Detachments, and troops of other arms and services as indicated:

Air Units	Officers*	Enlisted Men*
1 Heavy Bomb Group	221	1146
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Air Base Group	38	627
1 Det. Weather	1	18
1 Det. Communications	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	337	2149

* Includes attached Medical.

Other Arms and Services		
Quartermaster Corps		
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	2	2
1 Co. Trk.	1	50
Det. Co. (L. Maint.)	1	40
1 Co. Air Base (1 Gp.)	3	100
Corps of Engineers		
1 Co. Avn.	5	160
Ordnance Dept.		
1 Co. Avn.	1	60
1 Co. Bomb.	9	171
Signal Corps		
1 Det. Co. Avn.	1	44
1 Plat. Air Base	1	36
Medical Corps		
1 Det. Station Hosp.	7	70
Finance Dept.		
1 Sect.	1	5
Chemical Warfare Service		
1 Staff Sect. Gp.	1	3
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	0	6
OTHER ARMS AND SERVICES	33	747

Additional Troops

Ground combat troops as required for the ground defense of the base.

Permanent garrison to consist of caretaking and airways detachment consisting of 4 officers and 50 enlisted men, Air Corps, plus such ground combat troops as may be determined necessary for defense of the base.

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2. Priority 2 - Jamaica.

Runways and air base facilities including quarters, and administrative, maintenance, and supply establishments to accomodate the following:

Air Units

	Officers*	Enlisted Men
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Air Base Det.	2	70
1 Weather Det.	1	18
1 Communications Det.	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	80	446

* Includes attached Medical.

Other Arms and Services

Quartermaster Corps Det. Co. Air Base	1	25
Corps of Engineers	-	-
Ordnance Dept. Det.		
Signal Corps Det.	1	15
Finance Dept. Det.	1	12
Chemical Warfare Service Det.	-	2
OTHER ARMS AND SERVICES - TOTAL	3	54

Additional Troops

Ground combat troops as required for the ground defense of the base.

Above facilities should be capable of expansion to accomodate a Composite Wing consisting of -

Air Units

	Officers*	Enlisted Men
1 Wing Hq. & Hq. Sq.	12	119
1 Heavy Bombardment Group	221	1146
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Pursuit Group (Int.)	199	1016
1 Air Base Group (Rein.)	49	903
1 Det. Weather	2	20
1 Det. Communications	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	560	3562

* Includes attached Medical.

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2. Priority 5 - Jamaica.

Runways and air base facilities including quarters, and administrative, maintenance, and supply establishments to accommodate the following:

Air Units

	Officers	Enlisted Men*
1 Pursuit Sq. (less 2 sqdns.)	83	508
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Air Base Group (Reduced Str.)	25	418
1 Weather Det.	1	18
1 Communications Det.	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	186	1302

* Includes attached Medical.

Other Arms and Services

Quartermaster Corps Det. Co. Air Base	2	80
Corps of Engineers	-	-
Ordnance Dept. Det.	1	25
Signal Corps Det.	1	21
Finance Dept. Det.	-	2
Chemical Warfare Service Det.	-	6
TOTAL ARMS AND SERVICES	4	134

Additional Troops

Ground combat troops as required for the ground defense of the base.

Above facilities should be capable of expansion to accommodate a Composite Wing consisting of -

Air Units

	Officers*	Enlisted Men*
1 Wing Hq. & Hq. Sq.	12	119
1 Heavy Bombardment Group	221	1146
1 Reconnaissance Sq. (L/R)	76	338
1 Pursuit Group (Int.)	199	1016
1 Air Base Group (Rein.)	49	903
1 Det. Weather	2	20
1 Det. Communications	1	20
TOTAL AIR UNITS	560	3562

*Includes attached Medical

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Other Arms and Services

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Quartermaster Corps		
1 Staff Section	1	2
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	2	2
Det. Co. (L. Maint.)	1	40
1 Co. Trk.	1	50
1 Co. Air Base (2 Op.)	4	149
Corps of Engineers		
1 Co. Avn.	5	160
Ordnance Dept.		
1 Staff Section	1	3
1 Co. Avn.	4	60
1 Co. Bomb.	6	171
1 Co. Pur.	5	73
Signal Corps		
1 Staff Section	2	4
1 Co. Avn.	6	117
1 Plat. Air Base	1	36
Medical Corps		
1 Det. Station Hosp.	10	90
Finance Dept.		
1 Staff Sect.	1	10
Chemical Warfare Service		
1 Staff Sect. Air Base	1	9
TOTAL ARMY AND SERVICES	51	976

f. Priority 6 - Bahamas.

Runways and operating facilities for operation as a staging field and quarters for an airways detachment of 2 officers and 25 enlisted men. Emergency quarters for 50 transient officers and men.

3. The above recommendations are based on the following:

a. It is the opinion of the Chief of the Air Corps that a Composite Wing consisting of one each Bombardment Group (Heavy), Pursuit Group, and Reconnaissance Squadron (L/R), is the smallest task force which can perform the Air Force mission in major outlying bases such as Bermuda and Trinidad.

b. The purpose of establishing Bombardment and reconnaissance aviation at these bases is to extend the range of operation beyond that possible from present bases; hence the longest range aircraft available should be provided.

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c. A reconnaissance Squadron is recommended for Jamaica in lieu of bombardment for the reason that its probable mission is largely reconnaissance. A reconnaissance Squadron is equipped and trained for both reconnaissance and bombardment, whereas a Bombardment Squadron, although capable of performing some reconnaissance missions, is not fully equipped or manned for missions involving photographic reconnaissance.

d. Air base facilities designed to accommodate a heavy bombardment unit are fully adequate for the operation of any similar air unit of lesser range, whereas the reverse is not always true.

e. Other service strengths as shown in each instance, are based on minimum requirements to perform first, second, and third echelon maintenance.

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Major Upston

(9)

June 27, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.

SUBJECT: Units for Emergency Garrisons.

1. Reference: Oral request of Colonel J. T. McNarney, W.P.D.

2. Attached hereto is a list of units which are recommended for selection to form the air components of emergency garrisons for New Foundland, Trinidad, Puerto Rico, and Natal, in the War Plan now being prepared in your office. This list has been coordinated with the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, and, in general, is in consonance with existing emergency plans.

3. With reference to Colonel McNarney's request for information as to when an additional Heavy Bombardment Group and an additional Pursuit Group can be completely equipped, the following is submitted:

a. The attached plan uses all except nine of the 50 B-17 series airplanes now on hand. Predicted delivery schedules of B-17B airplanes now in production, indicate that an additional heavy group can be equipped with airplanes by October 1, 1940. The 19th Bombardment Group, being next in priority, is considered the most logical choice for this purpose. It probably will be necessary to transfer trained combat crews from other heavy units.

b. Predicted deliveries of P-40 airplanes indicate that an additional pursuit group can be equipped with airplanes by September 1, 1940. However, the personnel of the group selected will have had scant experience in operating P-40 airplanes since deliveries of that model have just begun. The 20th Pursuit Group is considered the most logical choice for this purpose.

4. On the assumption that it may be necessary to implement this plan immediately, the selection of models of airplanes, as specified in the attached list, is based upon aircraft now available in the continental United States. Any delay in putting the plan into effect will permit readjustment thereof as new aircraft is delivered by manufacturers.

5. Many of the units whose present complement of aircraft is scheduled for increase or for replacement with other models, do not have the required number of trained combat crews. For that reason it will be necessary, in many cases, to transfer trained combat crews with the airplanes. This can be accomplished by an exchange of personnel between the affected units.

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N E W F O U N D L A N D

No. of the Parent Group	Squadron and Present Location		Types Airplanes Required	Number Required
9th	1st Bomb. Sq. (M)	Mitchel	B-18 & A	13
9th	19th Reconn. Sq. M/M	"	" "	13
8th	Hq.&Hq. Sq. 8th P.G.(F)	Langley		5
8th	33d Pur. Sq. (F)	"		25
	97th Obs. Sq. C & D	Mitchel	O-47A & B	13
10th	Flt. 2d Transp. Sq.	Olmstead	C-39	3)
			O-A4)	1)
	3d Air Base Sq. (S) and Air Base Service Troops	Selfridge		

T R I N I D A D

7th	Hq.&Hq. Sq. 7th Bomb.Gp.(H)	Hamilton	B-17B	2
	9th Bomb. Sq. (H)	"	"	8
	11th Bomb. Sq. (H)	"	"	8
	88th Reconn. Sq. (L/M)	"	B-17	8
8th	35th Pur. Sq. (F)	Langley	P-35-36	25
	3d Obs. Sq. C & D	"	O-47A & B	13
10th	Flt. 6th Transp.Sq.	Olmstead	C-39)	3)
			O-A4)	1)
	5th Air Base Sq. (S) and Air Base Service Troops	Hamilton		

P U E R T O R I C O

28th	Hq.&Hq.Sq. 25th Bomb. Gp. (M)	Langley	B-17B	2
25th	10th Bomb. Sq. (M)	Langley	"	8
	37th Reconn. Sq. (L/M)	Borinquen	"	8
36th	22nd Pursuit Sq.	Langley	P-36-40	25
	13th Obs. Sq.	Scott	O-47A & B	13
10th	Flt. 5th Transp. Sq.	Patterson	C-39)	3)
			O-A4)	1)
	Det. 24th Air Base Sq. (S) (Fillers required to supplement Base Troops now at Borinquen Field or on orders thereto: 11 officers - 223 E.M.)	Kelly Field		
	Air Base Service Troops			

N A T A L

9th	Hq.&Hq.Sq. 9th Bomb. Gp. (M)	Mitchel		3
9th	99th Bomb. Sq. (M)	"	B-18	13
9th	5th Bomb. Sq. (M)	"		13
8th	36th Pur. Sq. (F)	Langley		25
	1st Obs. Sq.	Ft. Riley	O-47A & B	13
10th	7th Transp. Sq. (less 1 flt.)	McClellan	C-39)	7)
			O-A4)	1)
	2d Base Sq. (S) and Air Base Service Troops	Mitchel		

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Revised [illegible] dated [illegible] Stat
11/12/40

Bermuda

1 Composite Group Consisting of:

	Officers	Men
Group Hq & Hq Sq. (Bomb)	23	266
1 Bomb Sq (H)	38	237
1 Bomb Sq (M)	52	254
1 Pursuit Sq (Int)	34	185
1 Air Base Group	38	629
Det Comm	1	18
Det WSA	1	20
Services		

Jamaica

	Officers	Men
1 Wing Hq & Hq Sq	12	126
1 Group Hq & Hq Sq (Bomb H)	23	264
1 Bomb Sq (H)	38	237
1 Recon Sq (LR)	44	271
1 Pursuit Sq (Int)	34	185
1 Air Base Group	38	629
Det Comm	1	20
WSA	2	20
Services		

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Trinidad and British Guiana (each)

	Unskilled att	Skilled att
1 Group Hq + Hq Sq (Bomb A)	23	264
1 Bomb Sq (A)	38	237
1 Rec Sq (LR)	44	271
1 Pursuit Sq (Dut)	34	185
1 Air Base Group	38	629
Det Comm	1	20
" Weo	1	18

Stores

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Recomp Intel
of Gp 247.

Nucleus absorbed

1	Rec Sq (M)	18th R Sq
1	Bomb Sq (M)	1st Bomb Sq
1	Pur Hq (less 2 Sq)	8th Pur Hq + 33d Sq
1	Obsn Sq	?
1	T Jet	?
1	Air Base	3d AB

Puerto Rico

1	Bomb Wg Hq	25th
1	R Sq (LR)	27th R already there
1	Bomb Sq (H)	10th - (25th)
1	Pur Sq	2d (36th)
1	Obsn Sq	?
1	T Jet	?
1	Air Base	27th (Ramey)

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Trinidad

1 Bomb Gp (H) (less 1 Sq)	7th Gp less 22d Sq
1 R Sq (L R)	88th
1 Pur Sq	35th (8th Wg)
1 Obsn Sq	?
1 T Flt	?
1 air Base	5th (Hamilton)

Natal *

1 Bomb Gp (M) (less 1 Sq)	9th Gp (less 1 ab Sq)
1 Pur Sq	36th (8th Wg)
1 Obsn Sq	?
1 T Flt	?
1 air Base	2d AB

* 21st R Sq (L R) if desired

Extra Groups

Pur	20th
Bomb (H)	19th

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St Lucia -

Runways and airfield facilities including gasoline, lubrication maintenance and supply establishment to support operation of receiving and dispatching aircraft ground accommodations + facilities including housing for the entire garrison of one rifle Co.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
WASHINGTON

PLANS DIVISION

DATE_____

TO

CHIEF
___ Gen. Foulois
EXECUTIVE
___ Lt. Col. Streetmeyer
PERSONNEL AND LEGISLATION SECTION
___ Lt. Col. Olds
___ Major Carter
___ Major Kimble
___ Captain Moore
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING & SPECIAL PROJECTS SECTION
___ Major Upston
___ Major Craig
SUPPLY, BUDGET & PROGRAM SECTION
___ Lt. Col. Wilson
___ Lt. Col. Farthing
___ Major Gates
___ Major Vandenberg
RESEARCH SECTION
___ Major Copeland
___
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
___ Secretary
___ Major Fairchild, Coordinator
_____
_____

ADJT. CLERK
___ Miss Neal

___ Information
___ Coordination
___ Preparation of reply
___ Necessary action
___ Note and return
___ Confer with _____
___ Recommendation
___ File

W 3485, AC

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Wing - 11 - 111
med 1 - 8

Bomb gp HQ 216 - 11 05
med gr 2 - 17
3S sq 3 - 2X

Rec Unit
OC 194 - 975
att med 5 - 41

Rec Sq LT 75 - 330
att med 1 - 8

Air Base gp 34 - 595
att med 4 - 32

AB gp (R) 44 - 843
at unit 5 - 40

Sig Aviation 10 - 130

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NOV 12

A letter received by the deputy Chief of Staff contemplates basing the Composite Group initially, set up for British Guiana, at Trinidad. Subsequently Trinidad will have two Composite Groups one of which will be available for immediate movement to British Guiana. Meanwhile all operating Squadrons will be Pooled at British Guiana and Suriname or [redacted] & one Flight detachment of 4 officers and 50 men will be instituted there. This above info was received by Major [illegible] Navy [illegible]

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1 Wng Hq & Hq Sq.
1 Group Hq & Hq Sq (Composite Gp)
1 Bomb Sq (H)
1 Recce Sq (Comb)
1 Recce Sq (L R)
1 Air Base Group
(Wireless-Not Comm Services.

Indad.
Group Hq & Hq Sq.
1 Bomb Sq (H)
1 Recce Sq (Comb)
1 Recce Sq
1 Air Base Group
Det W/T & Comm Service.

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British Guiana.

Same as Trinidad.

St Lucia - Antigua - Bahamas
& Cuba.

Air field - Servicing facilities and housing for personnel [illegible]
[illegible] officers - 5.1 [illegible]
Hotels for the camp for private
temporary [illegible]

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Newfoundland

Sheet 1
Cable
Sheet 1 - 25 mm

Newfoundland
Cable
Sheet - 2-25

St John 2-25.

Facable for Sept.

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Bermuda

1 Corps Sqdn consisting of
Sqdn. Hq & Hq Sq
1 Pursuit Sq (Vul)
1 Hvy Bom Sq.
1 Med Bomb Sq
1 Am Rec Sqdn.

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Br Remains

Runways and airfield facilities including quarters, administrative maintenance and supply establishments capable of receiving and contemporaneously operating one composite air group and one reinforced infantry battalion. Limited facilities for operation and maintenance of six patrol planes

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MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBARDMENT, PURSUIT AND OBSERVATION (C&D) AIRPLANES ON HAND IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AS OF JUNE 24, 1940

B-18 SERIES	B-18	B-18A
Aberdeen	1	1
Bolling	-	12
Langley	5	17
MacDill	1	8
Miami	-	7
Mitchel	2	95
Chicago	2	2
Maxwell	6	6
Scott	1	-
Selfridge	1	1
Wright	3	5
Barksdale	3	49
Brooks	1	1
Kelly	4	-
Lowry	-	3
Randolph	5	-
Hamilton	6	13
March	4	43
McChord	-	1
Moffett	2	-
Sacramento Depot	-	1
Total	47	197

NOTE: B-18 Series airplanes are scheduled for deliveries to foreign stations as follows:

	By 10/1/40	Additional by 7/1/41
To Panama	36	-
To Hawaii	19	73
	55	73

B-17 SERIES	B-17	B-17A	B-17B
Hamilton	1	-	12
Langley	7	1	10
MacDill	4	-	-
March	-	-	15
Miami	1	-	-
Wright	-	-	2
Total	13	1	39

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MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBARDMENT, PURSUIT AND OBSERVATION (C&D) AIRPLANES ON HAND IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AS OF JUNE 24, 1940 (cont.)

OBSERVATION	O-19E	O-31A	O-31C	O-38	O-38B	O-38F	O-43	O-43A	O-46	O-46A	O-47	O-47A	O-47B
Bolling					1								
Boston												1	
Hartford						1							
Langley								1				8	
Logan												1	
Mitchel										4		1	7
Newark						1							
Olmstead								1					
Pope								1				4	
M.A.D.								2					1
Atlanta												1	
Chanute										2	1	1	
Chicago												1	
Richards										3			
Ft.Knox								1				5	
Ft. Leavenworth										1			
Lawson								1				2	
Marshall												8	
Maxwell					3								
Offutt												1	
Patterson								1					
Pt. Columbus												1	
Scott								1				8	
Wichita				1									
Wright												1	1
F.A.D.								1				1	
Higgs												1	
Brooks			1			1						8	
Duncan								2					
Kelly		1											
Lowry										1		1	
Post							1					3	
Randolph									1				
S.A.A.D.												1	1
Clover						1							
Ft. Lewis										9			
Long Beach					1								
Moffett										9			
Oakland												1	
Sac. Dep.										2			
Total	-	1	1	1	5	4	1	12	1	31	1	60	10

NOTE: Observation (C&D) Airplanes are scheduled for delivery to foreign stations as follows:

	By 7/1/41		By 7/1/41
O-46 Series - To Hawaii	7	O-49 SERIES	
O-47 Series - To Panama	4	To Hawaii	4
		To Philippines	4
		To Panama	4

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MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBARDMENT, PURSUIT AND OBSERVATION (O&C) AIRPLANES ON HAND IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AS OF JUNE 24, 1940 (cont.)

PURSUIT	P-12	P-26A	P-26B	P-35	P-36	P-36A	P-36B	P-36C	P-36L	P-36A	P-36F	P-37	P-39B	P-40	XP-41	P-42	PB-2	PB-2A	
Holling	2			1		1													
Boston	3																		
Langley	3					40		3				12		18	1				
Mitchel	6													1					
N.A.F.				1		1													
Atlanta	3																		
Bowman	1																		
Chanute					1	7								1					
Chicago	4																		
Richards	2																		
Maxwell								28	1	1							2	30	
Ft.Columbus	2																		
Selfridge		1	1	50		2		1											
Wright	1			1	2	3	1	2			1	2	1	1		1			
F.A.F.				3		2												6	
Hensley	3																		
Kelly	3																		
Lowry				1		3								1					
Oklahoma City	1																		
Tulsa	1																		
Boeing	1																		
Lindbergh	1																		
Long Beach	3																		
Moffett						54													
Oakland	1																		
Salt Lake	1																		
Sac. Depot	2																		
Memphis	1																		
	45	1	1	64	3	115	1	29	1	1	1	1		22	1	1	2	36	

NOTE: Pursuit airplanes are scheduled for delivery to foreign stations as follows:

P-36 Series	By 10/1/40	Additional by 1/1/41	Additional by 4/1/41	Additional by 7/1/41	Additional by 10/1/41	Additional by 1/1/42
To Hawaii	16			61		
To Panama	7			-		
Totals	23			61		
P-26 Series						
To Philippines	5					
P-40 Series						
To Panama		7		55	38	105
To Puerto Rico					67	
Totals		7		55	105	105

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MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBARDMENT, PURSUIT AND OBSERVATION (C&D) AIRPLANES ON HAND IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AS OF JUNE 24, 1940 (cont.)

SUIT	P-12	P-26A	P-26B	P-35	P-36	P-36A	P-36B	P-36C	P-36D	P-36E	P-36F	P-37	P-39B	I-40	XF-42	F-42	PB-2	PB-2A	P-29A	XF-1
olling	2			1		1														
oston	3					40		3				12		18	1				1(NACA)	
angley	3													1						1
itchel	6			1		1														
.A.D.																				
tlanta	3																			
owman	1				1	7								1						
hanute																				
hicago	4																			
ichards	2							23	1	1							2	30		
axwell																				
t.Columbus	2					2		1												
elfridge		1	1	57	2	3	1	2			1	2	1	1		1				5
right	1			1														6		
.A.D.				3		2														
ensley	3																			
elly	3													1						
owry				1		3														
klahoma City	1																			
ulsa	1																			
oeing	1																			
indbergh	1																			
ong Beach	3					54														
offett																				
akland	1																			
alt Lake	1																			
ac. Depot	2																			
emphis	1																			
	45	1	1	64	3	115	1	29	1	1	1	1		22	1	1	2	36	1	6

NOTE: Pursuit airplanes are scheduled for delivery to foreign stations as follows:

	By 10/1/40	Additional by 1/1/41	Additional by 4/1/41	Additional by 7/1/41	Additional by 10/1/41	Additional by 1/1/42
P-36 Series				81		
To Hawaii	16					
To Panama	7			-		
Totals	23			81		
P-26 Series						
To Philippines	5					
P-46 Series				55	38	105
To Panama		7			67	
To Puerto Rico		-		55	105	105
Totals		7				

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Warning Force strengths

Newfoundland

✓ 18th Recc (M)	13
✓ — Sqn 9th Bomb (M)	13
✓ 8th Pur Gp, less 2 Sqn	30
✓ — Sqn Obs	13
— Flt Transport	3
amphib	1
	73
— Air Base	

Greenland

None (evacuated during open season)

Trinidad

✓ 9th Bomb, less one Sqn	18
✓ 88th Recc (LR)	8
✓ — Sqn 8th Pur	25
✓ — Sqn Obs	13
✓ — Flt Transport	3
amphib	1
	68
— Air Base	

P.P

✓ 25th Bomb Gp (Hyp —	2
✓ 27th Recc (LR)	8
✓ — Sqn 7th Bomb Gp	8
✓ 22 Sqn pursuit	25
✓ — Sqn Obs	13
✓ — Flt Transport	3
amphib	1
	GU
Fillers for base — 0 —	EM

Natal

✓ 9th Bomb, less one Sqn	29
✓ — Sqn 8th Pur	25
✓ — Sqn Obs	13
Sqn, less Flt Transport	7
amphib	1
✓ — Air Base	75

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another Heavy Bomb Group by Oct 1st

another Pursuit Group equipped with Mustangs Pursuit

airplanes could be assembled immediately

another pursuit group equipped with P-40

air plane will be available by Sept 1.

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39
2
47

Transfer combat crews with
B-17's

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There are now on hand
13 B-17, 1 B-17A and 39 B-17B
airplanes. (Tab A)

3 heavy bombardment squadrons each equipped with 8 airplanes will require 24 B-17s

2 Long Range Reconnaissance Squadrons each equipped with 8 airplanes will require 16 airplanes of the B-17 type.

Of 24 B-17 Bs now allotted to the 7th Bomb Group, 15 will remain for assignment to the two L/R reconnaissance squadrons - a shortage of one airplane. However since reconnaissance squadrons will not necessarily operate in formation, hence their airplanes may be mixed. Recommend 8 B-17 ——— in one sq and 5 B-17 and 1 B-17A and 2 B-17Bs in the other

Although as is desirable that Group headquarters be equipped with the type airplane assigned to its squadrons, this is not essential. Recommend B-18 airplanes for the two Heavy Group Hqs.

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NEWFOUNDLAND

~~Present location~~ and number of the parent group	Squadron and present location	Types Airplanes Required	Number Required	No. on Hand	Number to be obtained and where from
9th ~~Mitchel~~	1st Bomb. Sq. (M) Mitchel	B-18 & A	13	8	5 from 9th Bomb. Group (~~Langley~~)
9th ~~Mitchel~~	18th Reconn. Sq. M/R "		13	7	6 " 38th Rec. Sq. (March)
8th ~~Langley~~	Hq. & Hq. Sq. 8th P.G. (F) Langley		5	5 P-36	
8th ~~Langley~~	33d Pur. Sq. (F) Langley		25	25 P-36	
	97 Obs. Sq. C&D Mitchel	O-47A & B	13	8	5 O-47A from Ft. Knox
10th ~~Middletown~~	Flt. 2d Transp. Sq. Olmstead	~~O-A4~~	3)	3)	
			1)	0)	1 O-A4C from Mitchel
	3d Air Base Sq. (S) ~~Mitchel~~ Selfridge				

TRINIDAD

7th ~~Hamilton~~	Hq. & Hq. Sq. 7th Bomb. Gp. (H) Hamilton	B-17B	2	0	2 from March
	9th Bomb. Sq. (H) "	B-17B	8	4	4 from March
	11th " " (H) "	B-17B	8	4	4 from ~~March~~ Langley
	88th Reconn. Sq. (L/R) Hamilton	B-17	8	0	(1 B-17 from Hamilton (7 B-17 from Langley
8th ~~Langley~~	35th Pur. Sq. (F) Langley	P-35-36	25	10 P-36	15 from Moffett
	3d Obs. Sq. C&D "	O-47A & B	13	8	5 O-47A from Brooks
10th ~~Patterson~~	Flt. 6th Transp. Sq. Olmstead	~~O-A4~~	3)	3)	1 O-A4C from West Point
	5th Air Base Sq. (S) Hamilton		1)	0)	

PUERTO RICO

25th ~~Langley~~	Hq. & Hq. Sq. 25th Bomb. Gp. (H) Langley	B-17B	2	-	(1 ~~March~~ (1 Langley
7th ~~Hamilton~~	~~40~~ Bomb. Sq. (H) ~~Hamilton~~		8	4	4 from March
25th ~~Langley~~	~~41st~~ Reconn. Sq. (L/R) ~~Langley~~			0	(4 B-17 from McDill (1 B-17 from Miami (1 ~~B-17A from Langley~~ (2 B-17B from Langley
~~28th~~ ~~Maxwell~~	~~1st Pur. Sq. Maxwell~~		25	24 P-36	1 P-36 from Wright
	15th Obs. Sq. Scott		13	8	(3 O-47A from Post (2 O-47A from Lawson
10th ~~Patterson~~	Flt. 5th Transp. Sq. Patterson	~~O-A4~~	3)	3)	1 O-A4C from Maxwell
			1)	0)	
	~~24th Base Sq. (D)~~ Kelly				

NATAL

9th ~~Mitchel~~	Hq. & Hq. Sq. 9th Bomb. Gp. (M) Mitchel		3	0	
9th ~~Mitchel~~	~~1st~~ Bomb. Sq. (M) "	B-18	13	8	5 from Hamilton
9th ~~Mitchel~~	5th Bomb. Sq. (M) "		13	8	5 " "
8th ~~Langley~~	36th Pur. Sq. (F) Langley		25	0	25 P-36 from Moffett
	1st Obs. Sq. Ft. Riley		13	8	4 O-47A from Pope 1 O-47A from Chanute
10th ~~Patterson~~	7th Transp. Sq. (less 1 flight) McClellan	~~O-A4~~	7)	7)	1 O-A4C from Selfridge
	~~2d~~ Base Sq. (S) ~~Selfridge~~		1)	0)	

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B-17 B

39

Wright	Langley	Morell	Hamilton
1	2	3	1
1	3	4	7
	1	6	4
	3	2	
	1		
2	10	15	12

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B-19s in Heavy units not included in 7th

2d
29th
19th

March
Hamilton
Langley 6

B-17 -
13 Hamilton-1 - 7 Langley - 3 Duncan - Miami 1

YB-17A
1 Langley Field

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129
82

47

210
13

197

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There are now on hand in the continental U.S. 47 B-18 and 197 B-18A airplanes. 26 B-18s are scheduled for transfer to Hawaii by Dec. 30, 1940.

3 Medium Bombardment Squadrons each equipped with 13 airplanes will require 39 B-18A airplanes

Ltr

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B-17's in Heavy units as of June 15th.

unit	B-17 Airplanes	
2d Bomb Gp.	5 (Langley)	5th 99th Bomb Sq (Hamilton)
29th Bomb group	9 (Miami)	--
19th " "	9 (Barksdale)	
7th " "	7 (Hamilton)	5th 12th Bomb Sq (Hamilton)
21st Rec Sq.	7 (Miami)	
41st Rec "	3 Langley	
38th " "	7 (Mather)	4th 38th Rec Sq
88th " "	8 (Hamilton)	

117
56
61

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B-17 types on hand as of June 24, 1940

Centers at U.S.

	B-17-	B-17A	B-17B
Hamilton	1	0	12
Langley	7	1	10
Mac Dill	4	0	0
Omaha	0	0	15
Miami	1	0	0
Wright	0	0	2
Total	13	1	39

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B-18 type aircraft on hand as of Jan 24 1946

	129	210		
	B-18	B-18A		
Puerto Rico		7		
Aberdeen	1	1		
Bolling		12		
Langley	5	17		
Maxwell	1	1		
Presque		1		
Patterson	2	25		
Chicago	2	2		
Maxwell	6	6		
Scott	1			
Selfridge		1		
Wright	3	5		
Barksdale	3	49		
Barksdale	1	1		
Tully	4			
Tinker		5		
Randolph	5			
Hamilton	6	13	47	197
March	4	43	8	13
McChord		1	121	210
Moffett	2			
Sac Dep		1		
Hawaii	53			
Panama		7		

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps
Washington

Date_____

MEMORANDUM FOR:

90 III

How long will it be before we will have a Heavy Group and a Pursuit Group in Force

EXECUTIVE
PLANS DIVISION

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B-17 TYPE AIRPLANES ON HAND AS OF JUNE 24, 1940

	B-17	B-17A	B-17B
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES			
Hamilton	1	0	12
Langley	7	1	10
MacDill	4	0	0
March	0	0	15
Miami	1	0	0
Wright	0	0	2
Total	13	1	39

Remainder of the Supplying Air Force

Langley 0 0 7

Wright 0 0 2

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B-17 TYPE AIRPLANES ON HAND AS OF JUNE 24, 1940

	B-17	B-17A	B-17B
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES			
Hamilton	1	0	12
Langley	7	1	10
MacDill	4	0	0
March	0	0	15
Miami	1	0	0
Wright	0	0	2
Total	13	1	39

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B-17 TYPE AIRPLANES ON HAND AS OF JUNE 24, 1940

	B-17	B-17A	B-17B
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES			
Hamilton	1	0	12
Langley	7	1	10
MacDill	4	0	0
March	0	0	15
Miami	1	0	0
Wright	0	0	2
Total	13	1	39

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B-17 TYPE AIRPLANES ON HAND AS OF JUNE 24, 1940

CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES	B-17	B-17A	B-17B
Hamilton	1	0	12
Langley	7	1	10
MacDill	4	0	0
March	0	0	15
Miami	1	0	0
Wright	0	0	2
Total	13	1	39

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B-17 TYPE AIRPLANES ON HAND AS OF JUNE 24, 1940

	B-17	B-17A	B-17B
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES			
Hamilton	1	0	12
Langley	7	1	10
MacDill	4	0	0
March	0	0	15
Miami	1	0	0
Wright	0	0	2
Total	13	1	39

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B-17 TYPE AIRPLANES ON HAND AS OF JUNE 24, 1940

	B-17	B-17A	B-17B
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES			
Hamilton	1	0	12
Langley	7	1	10
MacDill	4	0	0
March	0	0	15
Miami	1	0	0
Wright	0	0	2
Total	13	1	39

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June 24th 1940, P-56 A

on Hand		assign to 17	2nin	PR	Natal	Bal
Langley	40	30	10			0
Moffett	54		15		25	14
Selfridge	2					
Maxwell	24			24		0
Wright	2			1		1
		30	25	25	25	

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7th Bomb Group -	10 B-17 B 10 B-18 A 1 B-18
88th Rec Sq	1 B-17 B 7 B-18 A 1 B-18
30th Sq -	8 O-47 A 1 O-43
25th Bomb Hq + Hq Sq.	4 - B-17 3 - B-17 B 6 B-18 A 1 B-18
1st Pursuit Group	36 P-35

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18th Rec Sq — 8 Camera & 4 hand — 7 B-17 A

9th Bomb Group — 24 B-18 + B-17 A

8th Pursuit Group — 33 P-36's / 12 P-37's

9th Obs Sq — 8 O-47B

See letter

Aeroplanes in U.S.

1-OA-5	at Langley	1-OA9	Chanute
1-OA4C	at Mitchel	2 "	Maxwell
1-OA3	at Westover	1 "	Wright
1-OA4C	" "	1 "	Patterson
1-OA4C	" Maxwell	1 "	Hamilton
1-OA4C	" Selfridge	1 "	Mayfield
1-OA9	~~Boeing~~		
2 OA9	Langley		
1 "	Mitchel		
1 "	Rockwell		

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ARMY GARRISONS FOR PRINCIPAL RECENTLY AC UI

BASE	RECOMMENDATIONS JOINT PLANNING COM. (AUG. 28, 1940)	PERMANENT GARRISONS RECOMMENDED BY BOARD OF EXPERTS	OFF.	NURSES	ENL. MEN
NEWFOUNDLAND		Concurred in by General Embick			
St. Johns	1 - Bn Inf (Reinf)	1 - Infantry Regt (less 2 Bns)	47	-	1,020
		1 - Battery, Gun, AA, mobile	4	-	180
		1 - Battery, 37mm gun, AA	6	-	203
		1 - Battery, Cal. .50 MG, AA	5	-	164
		1 - Platoon, CA, SL, AA (mobile	1	-	79
		1 - Battery, CAC, 155mm gun, TD	5	-	192
		1 - Company, Engr, combat	4	-	100
		1 - Det. Aircraft Warning Co	2	-	32
		Svc. Units (incl. reinf. Medical)	15	12	200
		Airway Detachment	2	-	21
		Total	91	12	2,191
Newfoundland Airport	1 - Squadron, Bombardment (Heavy) 1 - Bn Inf (Reinf)	Concurred in by General Embick 1 - Airway Detachment	2	-	25
		Concurred in by General Embick			
rgentina (Naval Air Base)	NONE	1 - Infantry Battalion	28	-	904
		1 - Platoon, Anti-Tank Co	1	-	48
		1 - Bn Section, Com Plat	1	-	17
		1 - Bn Section, Trans Plat	1	-	17
		1 - CA Btry, Gun, AA, mobile	4	-	180
		1 - CA Btry, 50 Cal. MG, AA, mobile	5	-	164
		1 - Plat, CA, SL, AA, mobile	1	-	79
		1 & CA Btry, 37mm gun, AA, mobile	6	-	203
		1 - Det. Aircraft Warning Svc.	2	-	[illegible]

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ARMY GARRISONS FOR PRINCIPAL RECENTLY ACQUIRED ATLANTIC BASES

ONS RECOMMENDED

XPERTS

	OFF.	NURSES	ENL. MEN
y General Embick			
ss 2 Bns)	47	-	1,020
mobile	4	-	180
, AA	6	-	203
MG, AA	5	-	164
AA (mobile	1	-	79
gun, TD	5	-	192
bat	4	-	100
ning Co	2	-	32
reinf. Medical)	15	12	200
	2	-	21
	91	12	2,191

BREAKDOWN OF GARRISONS RECOMMENDED
BY
WAR PLANS DIVISION
(With A. C. Units approved by Chief of Staff)

I. NEWFOUNDLAND

1. St. Johns:	T/O	Off	Nurses	Em	Remarks
Force Hqrs	-	10	-	25	
Regt Inf (less 2 inf Bns)	7-11	57	-	1299	
(with attaked Med)					
Hq & Hq Btry and a Tn, Bn,	4-155)				
Sep, CA (AA) (att Med)	4-156)	12	-	126	
Btry, CA (AA) 90m Gun, mobile	4-17	4	-	174	
Btry, CA (AA) 37m Gun, mobile	4-28	6	-	171	
Btry, CA (AA) cal. .50 mg, mobile	4-27	5	-	176	
Plat, CA (AA) SL, mobile	4-18	1	-	74	
Btry, CA, 155mm Gun, TD	4-37	5	-	180	
Sect, Bn, Am Tn CA, 155mm Gun	4-36	1	-	30	
Sect, Btry, SL, CA, 155mm Gun	4-38	-	-	12	
Co. Engrs, Combat	5-175	4	-	176	
Co. AWS, Frontier		8	-	230	
		113		2673	
Services:-					
Det Sig Serv Co	---	2	-	60	
Airways Det (AC Services)	---	2	-	25	
Det Med, Sta Hosp	---	11	25	90	
Det Ord	-	1	-	14	
Det QMC		5	-	70	
Det CWS		-	-	3	
Det Engrs		1	-	10	
Det Fin		1	-	10	
Total Services		23	25	282	
Grand Total		136	25	2955	

ed in by General Embick			
2	-	25	

2. Newfoundland Airport:
Airways Det (AC Services) — Off 2, Em 25

red in by General Embick

	OFF	NURSES	ENL.MEN
	28	-	904
Co	1	-	48
lat	1	-	17
Plat	1	-	17
mobile	4	-	180
G, AA, mobile	5	-	164
mobile	1	-	79
AA, mobile	6	-	203
ing Svc.	2	-	xx

3. Argentina:

Bmn Inf (w att Med)	7-15				
	7-11	31	-	936	
Plat AT Co	7-117	1	-	48	
Bn Sect. Com Plat	7-12	1	-	17	
Bn Sect. Trans Plat	7-13	1	-	17	
Hq & HQ Btry and Am Tn, Bn Sep CA (AA) (w att Med)	4-155				

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			OFF.	NURSES	ENL. MEN
NEWFOUNDLAND		Concurred in by General Embick			
St. Johns	1 - Bn Inf (Reinf)	1 - Infantry Regt (less 2 Bns)	47	-	1,020
		1 - Battery, Gun, AA, mobile	4	-	180
		1 - Battery, 37mm gun, AA	6	-	203
		1 - Battery, Cal. .50 MG, AA	5	-	164
		1 - Platoon, CA, SL, AA (mobile	1	-	79
		1 - Battery, CAC, 155mm gun, TD	5	-	192
		1 - Company, Engr, combat	4	-	100
		1 - Det. Aircraft Warning Co	2	-	32
		Svc. Units (incl. reinf. Medical)	15	12	200
		Airway Detachment	2	-	21
		Total	91	12	2,191
Newfoundland Airport	1 - Squadron, Bombardment (Heavy) 1 - Bn Inf (Reinf)	Concurred in by General Embick 1 - Airway Detachment	2	-	25
		Concurred in by General Embick	OFF	NURSES	ENL.MEN
rgentina (Naval Air Base)	N O N E	1 - Infantry Battalion	28	-	904
		1 - Platoon, Anti-Tank Co	1	-	48
		1 - Bn Section, Com Plat	1	-	17
		1 - Bn Section, Trans Plat	1	-	17
		1 - CA Btry, Gun, AA, mobile	4	-	180
		1 - CA Btry, 50 Cal. MG, AA, mobile	5	-	164
		1 - Plat, CA, SL, AA, mobile	1	-	79
		1 - CA Btry, 37mm gun, AA, mobile	6	-	203
		1 - Det, Aircraft Warning Svc.	2	-	32
		Service Units	11	10	200
		Total	60	10	1,844
		Concurred in by General Embick	OFF	ENL. MEN	
sphenville	N O N E	1 - Airway Detachment	2	25	

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(With A. C. Units approved by Chief of Staff)

by General Embick

	OFF.	NURSES	ENL. MEN
(less 2 Bns)	47	-	1,020
AA, mobile	4	-	180
gun, AA	6	-	203
.50 MG, AA	5	-	164
L, AA (mobile	1	-	79
155mm gun, TD	5	-	192
combat	4	-	100
Warning Co	2	-	32
pl. reinf. Medical)	15	12	200
ont	2	-	21
	91	12	2,191

I. NEWFOUNDLAND

1. St. Johns:

	T/O	Off	Nurses	Bn	Remarks
Force Hqrs	-	10	-	25	
Regt Inf (less 2 reinf Bns) (with attaked Med)	7-11	57	-	1299	
Hq & Hq Btry and Am Tn, Bn, Sep, CA (AA) (w att Med)	4-155) 4-156)	12	-	126	
Btry, CA (AA) 90m Gun, mobile	4-17	4	-	174	
Btry, CA (AA) 37m Gun, mobile	4-28	6	-	171	
Btry, CA (AA) cal. .50 mg, mobile	4-27	5	-	176	
Plat, CA (AA) SL., mobile	4-18	1	-	74	
Btry, CA, 155mm Gun, TD	4-37	5	-	180	
Sect, Bn, Am Tn CA, 155mm Gun	4-36	1	-	30	
Sect, Btry, SL, CA, 155mm Gun	4-38	-	-	12	
Co. Engrs, Combat	5-175	4	-	176	
Co. AWS, Frontier		8	-	230	
		113		2673	

Services:-

Det Sig Serv Co	---	2	-	60
Airways Det (AC Services)	---	2	-	25
Det Med, Sta Hosp	---	11	25	90
Det Ord	-	1	-	14
Det QMC		5	-	70
Det CWS		-	-	3
Det Engrs		1	-	10
Det Fin		1	-	10
Total Services		23	25	282
Grand Total		136	25	2955

urred in by General Embick

nt	2	-	25

2. Newfoundland Airport:

Airways Det (AC Services)		2	-	25

urred in by General Embick

	OFF	NURSES	ENL.MEN
lion	28	-	904
ank Co	1	-	48
Plat	1	-	17
ns Plat	1	-	17
AA, mobile	4	-	180
. MG, AA, mobile	5	-	164
AA, mobile	1	-	79
gun, AA, mobile	6	-	203
arning Svc.	2	-	32
	11	10	200
	60	10	1,844

3. Argentina:

Bn Inf (w att Med)	7-15				
	7-11	31	[illegible]	935	
Plat AT Co	7-117	1	-	48	
Bn Sect. Com Plat	7-12	1	[illegible]	17	
Bn Sect. Trans Plat	7-13	1	-	17	
Hq & Hq Btry and Am Tn, Bn Sep CA (AA) (w att Med)	4-155 4-156	12	-	126	
Btry, CA (AA) [illegible] gun, mobile	4-17	4	-	174	
Btry, CA (AA) 37 mm Gun, mobile	4-28	6	-	171	
Btry, CA (AA) cal. .50 mg, mobile	4-27	5	-	176	
Plat, CA (AA) S.L., mobile	4-18	1	-	74	
1 Pursuit Sq		62	-	1738	

Services:-

Det Sig Serv Co.	-	-	-	-
Det AWS	-	-	-	-
Det Med, Sta Hosp		8	15	50
Det Ord		1	-	10
Det QMC		4	-	56
Det Engrs		-	-	[illegible]
Det Fin		-	-	5
Total Services		13	15	121
Grand Total		75	15	1859

Concurred in by General Embick

	OFF	ENL. MEN
nt	2	25

4. Stephenville

Airways Det (AC Services)		2		25

TOTAL FOR NEWFOUNDLAND [illegible] 40 [illegible]

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BRITISH GUIANA	Dets at principal airfield. To be expaned in emergency to: 1-Inf Regt (Reinf) 1-Composite Group Habor Defense Units at Georgetown	4 off, - 50 EM (Guard & Svc Det) To be expanded in emergency to: 1-Inf Bn (Reinf) 1-Composite Group

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Other Services:-Sig ServCo	-	3	-	78
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	33	98	320
Det QMC	0	15	-	554
Det Ord	-	6	-	192
Det Fin Dept	-	1	-	25
Det CWS	0	1	-	8
Plat Engrs Depot Co	-	1	-	39
Total Other Services	-	60	82	1196 -
GRAND TOTAL TRINIDAD	-	869	92	15385

50 EM (Guard & Svc Det)
panded in emergency to:
F Bn (Reinf)
mposite Group

VIII. BRITISH GUIANA

Co Inf (Composite)		8	-	226
Det AW Co		2	-	32
Airway Det, AC Services		4	-	50
Det Sig Serv Co		-	-	14
Det Med, Sta Hosp		2	-	15
Total Force - BRITISH GUIANA		15	-	337
TOTAL FOR BRITISH GUIANA		15	-	337

SUMMARY ALL BASES

	OFF	NURSES	EM
NEWFOUNDLAND	215	40	4864
BERMUDA	314	40	4424
BAHAMAS (MAYAGUANA)	14	---	328
JAMAICA	524	120	8428
ANTIGUA	15	---	337
SAINT LUCIA	15	---	337
TRINIDAD	869	92	15385
BRITISH GUIANA	15	---	337
TOTAL	1981	292	34440

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ANTIGUA	Date at principal air- 4 off. - 50 EM (Guard & Svc Det). To be expanded in emergency to: 1 - Inf Bn (Reinf) 1 - Composite Group field. To be expanded in emergency to: 1 - Inf Regt (Reinf) 1 - Composite Group. Harbor Denfes Units Supply Troops	To be expended in emergency to:	V. Co Det Air Det Det
SAINT LUCIA	Dets at principal air- 4 off. - 50 EM (Guard & Svc Det). To be expanded in emergency to: 1 - Inf Bn (Reinf) 1 - Composite Group field. To be expanded in emergency to: 1 - Inf Regt(Reinf) 1 - Composite Group. Coast Defense Units Supply Troops	To be expended in emergency to:	VI. Co Det Air Det Det

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Air Corps Services:-					
Det Co Trk QM	-	2	-	50	-
Det Co (L Maint) QM	-	-	-	10	-
Co Air Base QM	-	3	-	110	-
Plat Engr (Avn Co)	-	1	-	48	-
Avn Co SC	-	4	-	100	-
Plat Air Base SC	-	1	-	36	-
Det Ord:					
Sect Hq Wg	-	1	-	0	-
Base Sect (Bn Avn)	-	1½	-	26	-
DP Sect (Bn Avn)	-	0	-	14	-
Co Avn	-	9	-	140	-
Det CWS:					
St Sect Wg	-	1	-	3	-
St Sect Air Base	-	1	-	6	-
Co Decon (less dets)	-	2	-	30	-
Det Medical:					
Attached	-	8	-	20	-
Det Finance:					
Sect Air Base	-	1	-	5	-
Chaplains	-	3	-	0	0
Total Air Corps Services	-	38	-	578	-
OtherServices:-					
Sta Hosp	-	40	120	400	-
Det Med Depot	-	2	-	30	-
Lab (Army)	-	2	-	15	-
Plat Engr Depot Co	-	1	-	39	-
Det QMC	-	5	-	142	-
Det Fin Dept	-	1	-	17	-
Det Ord	-	2	-	68	-
Det Sig Serv Co	-	2	-	40	-
Det CWS	-	1	-	6	-
Total Other Services	-	56	120	757	-
GRAND TOTAL - JAMAICA	-	524	120	8428	-

Svc Det). To be expended in emergency to: V. ANTIGUA
(Reinf)
ite Group

Co Inf (Composite)	-	7	-	226	-
Det AW Co	-	2	-	32	-
Airway Det, AC Services	-	4	-	50	-
Det Sig Serv Co	-	-	-	14	-
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	2	-	15	-
Total Force - ANTIGUA	-	15	-	337	-

Svc Det). To be expended in emergency to: VI. SAINT LUCIA
(Reinf)
ite Group

Co Inf(Composite)	-	7	-	226	-
Det AW Co	-	2	-	32	-
Airway Det, AC Services	-	4	-	50	-
Det Sig Serv Co	-	-	-	14	-
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	2	-	15	-
Total Force - SAINT LUCIA	-	15	-	337	-

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ANTIGUA	Date at principal air- 4 off. - 50 EM (Guard & Svc Det). To be expended in emergency to: field. To be expanded in emergency to: 1 - Inf Regt (Reinf) 1 - Composite Group. Harbor Denfes Units Supply Troops	1 - Inf Bn (Reinf) 1 - Composite Group
SAINT LUCIA	Dets at principal air- 4 off. - 50 EM (Guard & Svc Det). To be expanded in emergency to: field. To be expanded in emergency to: 1 - Inf Regt(Reinf) 1 - Composite Group. Coast Defense Units Supply Troops	1 - Inf Bn (Reinf) 1 - Composite Group
TRINIDAD	1-Inf Div (Reinf) Habor Defense Units 1-Composite Group	1-Inf Regt (Reinf) 1-Composite Air Group To be expaned in emergency to: 1-Corps (2 Inf Divs) 1-Composite Wing

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				1357	-	
GRAND TOTAL - JAMAICA	-	524	120	8428	-	

e Det). To be expended in emergency to: V. ANTIGUA
einf)
Group

Co Inf (Composite)	-	7	-	225	-	
Det AW Co	-	2	-	32	-	
Airway Det, AC Services	-	4	-	50	-	
Det Sig Serv Co	0	-	-	14	-	
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	2	-	15	-	
Total Force - ANTIGUA	-	15	-	337	-	

vc Det). To be expended in emergency to: VI. SAINT LUCIA
(Reinf)
e Group

Co Inf(Composite)	-	7	-	226	-	
Det AW Co	-	2	-	32	-	
Airway Det, AC Services	-	4	-	50	-	
Det Sig Serv Co	-	-	-	14	-	
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	2	-	15	-	
Total Force - SAINT LUCIA	-	15	-	337	-	

VII. TRINIDAD

cy to:

Force Hqrs	-	10	-	25	-	
Regt Inf (w att Med and Chap)	7-11	123	-	3325	-	
Two Regts CA (AA) mobile (w att Med & Chap)	4-11	152	-	3696	-	
Regt CA, 155mm Gun, TD	4-31	82	-	1811	-	
Radio Intel Co		7	-	215	-	
Aircraft Warning Co, Frontier		9	-	200	-	
Regt Engrs (C) (less 1 Co) (w att Med & Chap)	5-171	42	-	1091	-	
Total Ground Units		425	-	10363		
Air Corps Units:-						
2 Groups Hq & Hq Sq	-	46	-	532	-	
2 Bomb Sq (H)	-	76	-	474	-	
2 Reconn Sq (L/R)	-	88	-	542	-	
2 Pursuit Sq (Int)	-	68	-	370	0	
2Air Base Groups	0	76	-	1258	0	
Det Weather	-	2	-	36	-	
Det Communications	-	2	-	40	-	
Total Air Corps Units	-	358	-	3252	-	
Air Corps Services:-						
Dets QM:-						
1 Co (2 gp) (AB)	-	6	-	168	-	
1 Co TK (AB)	-	3	-	110	-	
Det Co (LM)	-	1	-	45	-	
Dets SC:-						
1 Sig Co (Wing)	-	2	0	50	0	
Dets Ord:-						
1 Co Avn (Comp)	-	5	-	154	-	
Dets CWS:-						
St Sect (AB)	-	1	0	6	-	
Det Decon Co	1 -	0	-	20	-	
Dets Med:-						
Attached	-	7	0	16	-	
Det Finance Sect (AB)	0	1	-	5	-	
Chaplains	-	2	-	0		
Total Air Corps Services	-	26	-	574	-	

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BERMUDA	1 - Reinforced Bn	1 Bn Inf (less 1 rifle Co)
	1 - Squadron Bombardment (Heavy)	1 Plat Antiaircraft searchlights 2 Btrys 90 mm antiaircraft guns 1 Btry 37 mm antiaircraft guns 1 Btry .50 Cal antiaircraft machine guns 1 Plat aircraft warning service 1 Plat signal operations company 1 Hq & Hq Squadron 1 Sq Purs (25 planes) 1 Sq Bomb (H) (8 planes) 1 Sq Bomb (M) (13 planes) 1 Air Base Group Total Army personnel to be limited to a permanent maximum of 3000 officers, nurses and enlisted men. In an emergency, facilities should be capable of accommodating 6000 officers, nurses and men.

II. BERMUDA

Force Hqrs
Bn Inf (less 1
Bn Sect, C
Bn Sect, Tr
Btry, CA, 15
Sect, Bn Am
Sect, Stry, S
1 Btry, Hq &
larged
2 Btrys 90 mm
1 Btry 37mm g
Btry, CA (AA),
mobil
Btry, CA (AA),
semi-
Aircraft Warn
Total

Air Corps Uni
1 Composite
1 Group
1 Bomb
1 Bomb
1 Pursu
1 Air B
Det Weat
Det Com

Total Air Corp

Air Corps Se
QM Co C
Plat En
Plat Ai
Det Win
Det Ord
Det Ord
Det Ord
Det CWS
St
Det
Det Med
Att
Att
Det Fin
Sec
Chaplai

Total Air Cor

Other Servic
Det Med,
Det QMC
Det Fin
Det Ord
Det Sig
Det CWS

Total other

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rifle Co)

t searchlights
aircraft guns
ircraft guns
iaircraft machine guns
rning service
ations company

s)
lanes)
planes)

nnel to be limited to a permanent maximum of
urses and enlisted men. In an emergency,
d be capable of accommodating 6000 officers,

II. BERMUDA

Force Hqrs	-	7		10	—
Bn Inf (less 1 Rifle Co (w att Med)	7-15				-
	7-11		-	714	-
Bn Sect, Comm. Plat	7-12	1	-	17	-
Bn Sect, Transp. Plat	7-13	1	-	17	-
Btry, CA, 155mm gun, TD	4-37	5	-	180	-
Sect, Bn Am Tn, Ca, 155mm gun	4-36	1	-	30	-
Sect, Btry, SL, CA, 155mm gun	4-38	1	-	18	-
1 Btry, Hq & Hq Gun Bn (AA) enlarged semi-mobile	4-116	13	-	117	-
2 Btrys 90 mm gun (AA) semi-mobile	4-115	8	-	294	-
1 Btry 37mm gun semi-mobile)	4-125	6	-	148	-
Btry, CA (AA), cal. .50 MG mobile	4-27	5	-	176	-
Btry, CA (AA), SL (- 1 plat.) semi-mobile	4-118	4	-	176	-
Aircraft Warning Co., Frontier	-	3	-	83	
Total	-	79	-	1974	
Air Corps Units:-					
1 Composite Group consisting of:					
1 Group Hq & Hq Sq (Hvy Bom)	-	23	-	266	-
1 Bomb Sq (Hvy)	-	38	-	237	-
1 Bomb Sq (M)	-	52	-	254	-
1 Pursuit Sq (Int)	-	34	-	185	-
1 Air Base Group	-	38	-	629	-
Det Weather	-	1	-	18	-
Det Communication	-	1	-	20	-
Total Air Corps Units	-	187	-	1,609	-
Air Corps Services:-					
QM Co Gp (Sep)(AB)	-	3	-	192	-
Plat Engr (Avn Co)	-	1	-	48	-
Plat Air Base, SC	-	1	-	36	-
Det Wing Sig Co	-	1	-	31	-
Det Ordnance BaseSect (Bn Avn)	-	1	-	6	-
Det Ord DP Sect (Bn Avn)	-	0	-	14	-
Det Ord Plat (Co Avn)	-	3	-	90	-
Det CWS:-					
St Sect (AB)	-	1	-	6	-
Det Decon Co	-	0	-	20	-
Det Medical:-					
Attached - Grp	-	5	-	16	-
Attached - Air Base Gp	-	2	-	0	-
Det Finance:-					
Sect (AB)	-	1	-	5	-
Chaplains	-	2	-	0	0
Total Air Corps Services	-	21	-	464	-
Other Services:-					
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	17	40	160	-
Det QMC	-	5	-	142	-
Det Fin Dept	-	1	-	15	-
Det Ord	-	1	-	14	-
Det Sig Serv Co	-	2	-	40	-
Det CWS	-	1	-	6	0
Total other Services	-	27	40	377	-
[illegible]	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	4484	-

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BAHAMAS (MAYAGUANA)	No permanent garrison. To be expaned in emergency to: 1 Inf Bn (Reinf) 1 Composite group	4 Off. - 50 EM (Guard & Svc Dept). To be expaned in emergency to 1 Inf Bn (Reinf) 1 Composite Group	
JAMAICA	1 - Inf Regt(Reinf) 1 - Sq Bomb Aviation(H) Harbor Defense units to be expaned in emergency to: 1 - Inf Div (Reinf) 1 Camp Hq Harbor Defense Units Supply Troops (in- cluding supply base installations)	One regt of Indfantry (less 2 bns) reinforced to include the necessary harbor defense and antiaircraft units (capable of ready expansion to accommodate on division reinforced). One composite group capable of expansion to one composite wing. Supply point for army garrison capable to ready expansion to meet fall base needs for the Caribbean Theater.	

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1 Pursuit Sq (Int)	-	38	-	185	-
1 Air Base Group	-	38	-	629	-
Det Weather	-	1	-	18	-
Det Communication	-	1	-	20	-
Total Air Corps Units	-	187	-	1,609	-
Air Corps Services:-					
QM Co Gp (Sep)(AB)	-	3	-	192	-
Plat Engr (Avn Co)	-	1	-	48	-
Plat Air Base, SC	-	1	-	36	-
Det Wing Sig Co	-	1	-	31	-
Det Ordnance BaseSect (Bn Avn)	-	1	-	6	-
Det Ord DP Sect (Bn Avn)	-	0	-	14	-
Det Ord Plat (Co Avn)	-	5	-	90	-
Det CWS:-					
St Sect (AB)	-	1	-	6	-
Det Decon Co	-	0	-	20	-
Det Medical:-					
Attached - Grp	-	5	-	16	-
Attached - Air Base Gp	-	2	-	0	-
Det Finance:-					
Sect (AB)	-	1	-	5	-
Chaplains	-	2	-	0	0
Total Air Corps Services	-	21	-	464	-
Other Services:-					
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	17	40	160	-
Det QMC	-	5	-	142	-
Det Fin Dept	-	1	-	15	-
Det Ord	-	1	-	14	-
Det Sig Serv Co	-	2	-	40	[illegible]
Det CWS	-	1	-	6	0
				377	
Total other Services	-	27	40	[illegible]	-
GRAND TOTAL - BERMUDA	-	314	40	4424	-

rd & Svc Dept). To be expaned in emergency to
Inf Bn (Reinf)
Composite Group

III. BAHAMAS

Co. Inf (composite)	-	7	-	226	-
Det AW Co	-	2	-	32	-
Airway Det, AC Services	-	2	-	25	-
Det Sig Serv Co	-	1	-	30	0
Det Med, Sta Hosp	-	2	-	15	-
Total Force	-	14	-	328	-
TOTAL FOR BAHAMAS	-	14	-	328	-

ry (less 2 bns) reinforced to include the
fense and antiaircraft units (capable of ready
odate on division reinforced).
capable of expansion to one composite wing.
my garrison capable to ready expansion to
s for the Caribbean Theater.

IV. JAMAICA

Force Hqrs.				
Regt Inf (less 2 reinf Bns) (w att Med & Chap)	7-11	10	-	25	-
		87		1299	-
Regt CA, 155mm Gun, TD (w att Med & Chap)	4-31	82	-	1811	-
Regt CA (AA) Mobile (w att Med & Chap)	4-11	76	-	1848	-
Co Engrs (C)	5-77	4	-	176	-
Aircraft Warning Co, Frontier	-	9	-	180	-
Total Ground Units	-	239	-	[illegible]	
Air Corps Units:-					
1 Wing Hq & Hq Sq	-	12	-	126	-
1 Group Hq & Hq Sq(HeavyBomb)	-	23	-	266	-
1 Bomb Sq (H)	-	38	-	237	-
1 Reconn Sq (H)	-	44	-	271	-
1 Pursuit Sq (Int)	-	34	-	185	-
1 Air Base Group	-	38	-	629	[illegible]
Det Weather	-	2	-	20	-
Det Communications	-	1	-	20	0
Total Air Corps Units	-	192	-	1,754	-

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22d Bbs Sq. (5) 8 O-47A

16th Bbs Sq (6) 7 O-47A
2 O-43A

Transport flights

2 from Olmsted - 4th + 2d

1 " Williams 5th Ftr Sq

1 " Mitchell 7th + 2d

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NAVAL AND AIR BASE SUMMARY
OF RECOMMENDED FACILITIES

LOCATION	NAVY	ARMY	PERMANENT ARMY
NEWFOUNDLAND Area: 6½ sq.mi.	Naval Base, St.John's. Supply and repair for 6 destroyers or subs. Seaplane base, Argentia, for 24 patrol planes. Repair base for subs and destroyers. Landing Field.	Army Base, St.John's. One Division. Composite Wing at Newfoundland Airport. (U.S.-Canadian Board) Landing Fields at: St.John's. St.George	Regt.(less 2 bns)reinf. at St.John's. Co.Fromabove. Argentia. Detachment Detachment O N EM 122-18 - 3178
BERMUDA Area: 1 sq.mi.	Naval Light Force Base. 4 cruisers, carrier, 9 destroyers, 6 subs. Seaplane Base 24 planes.	Regiment reinf.	Bn (less rifle co.) AA and AWS Composite Group. O N EM 141 -12 -2158
JAMAICA Area: 55 sq.mi.	Naval Station. Repair for 2 sqdns. destroyers and one sqdn subs. Floating drydock. Net depot. Net and boom defenses. Magazines. Two sqdns patrol planes. Recreation and target ranges.	One Division. Composite Wing. Supply point to meet requirements of Carribbean. Harbor Defense. AA Defenses. AWS Bombing ranges.	Regt(less 2 bns)reinf. Bomb Sqdn Heavy O N EM 208-18- 3720
TRINIDAD Area: 32 sq.mi.	Advanced Fleet Base. Graving drydock for battleships. Sub-Base for 18. Patrol plane base for 8 sqdns. Supply depot. Hospital. Housing base personnel.	Corps of 2 Divs. Composite Wing. Hospital. Recreation Area.	Regiment reinf. Composite Group. O N EM 481- 120- 7950
BWAS aguana. a:2 sq.mi.	Seaplane Base for six patrol planes and storehouses for planes. operation of [illegible] tender base	Landing Field.	Limited servicing facilities, quarters and other necessary facilities for a weather, radio, servicing and guard detachment. O EM 2 - 20
IA : 2 sq.mi.	Seaplane Base. Limited facilities for six patrol planes capable of use by two sqdns.	Composite Group. Bn. reinf.	Same. O EM 4 - 50
IA 1.2 sq.mi.	Seaplane Base. Limited facilities for six patrol planes.	Composite Group. Bn. reinf.	Same.
GUIANA own. 2½ sq.mi.	Seaplane Base-6 planes.	Composite Group. Bn. reinf.	Same. TOTAL: 964-168-17,154

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EXPLOITING SUPERIOR AIR POWER



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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power

TO: AC/AS, OC&R

DATE 3 July 1944

FROM: AC/AS, Plans

COMMENT NO. 3

LSK:mnh:5833

1. In continuation of the ideas set forth in Comment No. 2 above the undersigned assumes responsibility for the elimination of paragraph 8 c. (3) in the basic memorandum dated June 17, 1944 and substitutes therefor the following:

"Add sub-paragraph (c) a precaution to the Board that the AAF does not view with favor any plans that include the employment of tactical bombardment aircraft except in the furtherance of their primary mission, or when the diversion of tactical bombardment aircraft will not seriously prejudice the completion of the primary bombardment function. In this specialized employment of bombardment, caution must be taken to avoid letting enthusiasm obscure the primary initial or preparatory function of air attack."

Incl: n/c

RC 10192

L. S. KUTER,
Major General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans.

TO: AC/AS, Plans

DATE 15 JUL 1944

FROM: AC/AS, Operations, Commitments and Requirements

COMMENT NO. 4

Colonel Agee/lcm/73045

Action as indicated has been or will be taken.

2 Incls.
Incl 1 - Memo for Gen. Arnold,
dtd 6 Jun '44, w/Bd Rept No (T) 33
Incl 2 - Memo for CAS, dtd 17 Jun,
subj as above.

H. A. Craig
Major General, U. S. Army
Asst. Chief of Air Staff
Operations, Commitments & Requirements

AFRQ/P

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DOD DIR 5200.9, 27 Sep 80

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

Date 7-2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gen Kuter

I recommend that para 8 c.(3) be eliminated from this directive. I do not believe that it conforms to the C.G.'s expressed views.

H. A. CRAIG
Major General, USA
Assistant Chief of Air Staff
Operations, Commitments & Requirements

EFC-258

4-3654, AF

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

ALL N.	
FILE NO.	AC 1776

SUBJECT: New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power.

TO: AC/AS, Plans, General Eaker

FROM: Secretary, Air Staff

DATE 27 June 44

COMMENT NO. 1

1. The Chief of Air Staff has indicated approval of your memorandum dated June 17, 1944.

2. Please pass on to AC/AS, Plans, for the required action.

GAS

1 Incl.
Memo for CAS w/Incls.

JUN 29 1944

TO: AC/AS, Plans

FROM: C/S, Plans

DATE

COMMENT NO. 2

BJC/rr/72538

1. Forwarded for required action.

Operational Plans Section, AC/AS, Plans, has an active and particular interest in all plans involving large scale decisive airborne operations. In compliance with approved action II 5e, Operational Plans Division will be glad to cooperate with this planning group.

for Shlesinger, Col. G.S.C.,
Colonel, C. A. C.,
Chief, Operational Plans Division

1 Incl
M/O

9444

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3-1109 A.F.

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
ATTENTION:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

JUN 17 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF:

Subject: New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power.

1. Operational Plans Division AAF submits herewith preliminary comment on the subject report of the AAF Board. As the problem is one of paramount importance, a more detailed paper will be presented in the near future.

2. The question of the mass employment of airborne troops in new ways and under novel concepts offers maximum opportunities to effect strategic surprise. Such elements of surprise have been sadly lacking from our day to day development of the war. The North African Landing stands alone as an example of catching the enemy off guard. Although every effort should be made to encourage imaginative planning and the development of new weapons, the AAF must solve the serious logistic problems of mass airborne operations by experience gained from progressive military operations. The Infantry Division is our basic land formation dedicated to an offensive mission. From the beginning of the war there has been an expanding requirement for increased fire power, centered today on heavy artillery (over 105 mm). The present limitations of airborne divisions are largely due to lack of motor transport and heavy fire power. For that reason the question of early relief of airborne divisions has been stressed in past doctrines. Over-enthusiasm for novel means of exploiting air power must be held within the current bounds of these limitations. It is felt that one method that will produce realistic plans will be by directing the Board which is recommended in the subject report (par II 5) to include a planning group to study specific cases, such as mass airborne operations mounted from the Mediterranean, the S. W. Pacific or against Formosa. Such a plan for the Mediterranean, (which includes so-called "airphibious" operations) is currently being prepared in this office. It is too early to draw detailed conclusions as to the merits of this plan.

3. Expansion of mobility and heavy firepower in airborne divisions should be the subject of exhaustive research. New types of aircraft such as the C-82 should be studied with a view to providing the transport of heavy equipment. Rockets, which do not require the great weight of heavy guns but do sacrifice range and accuracy, should be considered to increase fire power.

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4. Due to the need of actual experience in mass airborne operations, it is regrettable that the imaginative plans of General Evans, which received favorable comment from General Marshall, could not have been employed in OVERLORD. These plans were considered to have the prospect of gaining strategic surprise while being sound from the point of reinforcement and relief. In the OVERLORD Airborne operations, the low rate of loss in tugs and the preliminary reports of apparently highly successful landings, under conditions considered more difficult than the Evans Plan, augurs well for the future.

5. The directive to the above mentioned board should be limited to Troop Carrier - airborne operations to avoid the ultimate diversion of VHB's from their primary mission.

6. Smaller airborne operations involving evacuation should be promoted, based on specific projects. The recent air commando operation in Burma is considered an excellent example of developing a particular plan in a practical way rather than to lose ground for the future by over ambitious effort.

7. Expansion of airforce tactical doctrine should be encouraged in closest cooperation with the theaters. The recent successful isolation of the battlefield in Italy should be the subject of careful study to apply the lesson to other theaters. To this end it might be profitable to return an Army Liaison Officer, a Group Commander, a Squadron Commander, all carefully selected. We should be careful to get at the grass roots of this problem as well as the more rarified atmosphere of high command.

8. Action Recommended: It is recommended that:

a. The study of "New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power" be given the highest priority by the AAF.

b. The recommendations of par II, 1 to 4 incl of the subject report be approved.

c. The recommendation of par II, 5, be approved with the following changes:

(1) Sub par (a) to be eliminated.

(2) A new sub paragraph (a) to be inserted to read: (a) this board should have a small planning group to develop specific plans on which to base requirements designed to increase mobility and fire power in airborne divisions.

(3) Add sub paragraph (c) a warning to the board that the AAF does not view with favor any plans that include the employment of tactical bombardment aircraft except in their primary mission.

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d. The AAF Board be directed to prepare for transmission to the Air Force Commanders a study on "Isolation of the Battlefield" based on the Italian Campaign. To effect this program, an Army Liaison Officer, a Group Commander, a Squadron Commander of suitable experience and if possible due for rotational return be ordered from N.A.T.O. to the U.S.

L. S. KUTER
Major General, U.S.A.
Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Plans

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON



6 JUN 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Subject: Board Report on New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power.

1. The attached preliminary report suggests one new tactical concept, that of holding airborne forces in strategic reserve as a means of influencing the ground battle in progress. This concept is considered basically sound and, in itself, justifies the entire Board Project to date.

2. It will be noted that the Board feels we should develop a glider type capable of moving division artillery and transportation. Development of such a glider would be a long term project and would further involve us in the use of four-engine glider tugs. We have the present capability of moving artillery as large as the 105 mm howitzer by C-47 and CG-4A. It is believed that an airborne operation involving the continued necessity for heavier artillery will require, at the outset, seizure of an air head suitable for the air landing of men and equipment. In such a case, heavy artillery and trucks smaller than the 2½ ton 6x6 can be landed by transport and bomber more economically than by glider. The C-82 transport, now under development, will be capable of moving all division artillery.

3. The recommendations concerning training are being or will be implemented as rapidly as commitments and training schedules permit.

4. Our night combat requirements are presently a matter of considerable concern. It is proposed to direct a Board study on the night combat requirements for all types of aviation, present and post-war, as suggested by the Board.

5. It will be noted that the Board recommends the establishment of a Board of Officers representing the major interested commands, whose purpose would be to review and evaluate present airborne doctrine, to determine the military characteristics of the various types of aircraft involved in airborne operations, to investigate the use of bombers for airborne operations, and to recommend balanced

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airborne force requirements. In view of your recent instructions on a similar recommendation made by this Office and presented orally by Colonel Giffin, it is proposed to direct a detailed study of this recommendation. A copy of the study presented to you by Colonel Giffin will be made available to the Board for information purposes.

/ Mcnaig

1 Incl
Report of AAF Bd
Project No (T) 33
1 June 1944, Copy No. 1

Asst. Chief of Air S
Operations, Commitments & Requirements

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

3 June 1944

Dear General Arnold:

Attached hereto is the preliminary Board Report in reply to your letter.

The Board is continuing this study and is starting projects investigating the various items contained in the recommendations.

I am handing this Report to General Craig to be presented to you.

Most sincerely,

EUGENE L. EUBANK,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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REPORT
of
THE ARMY AIR FORCES BOARD

P.R.C.

SUBJECT

NEW MEANS OF EXPLOITING SUPERIOR AIR POWER

PROJECT No. (T) 33

DATE

1 June 1944

COPY No. 1

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S E C R E T

ARMY AIR FORCES BOARD PROJECT NO. (T) 33

NEW MEANS OF EXPLOITING SUPERIOR AIR POWER.

1 June 1944.

I. DISCUSSION:

1. Object: To determine new and different uses to which mounting U.S. air power can be put in fighting and winning the present war.

2. Authority: Letter, General H.H. ARNOLD to Brigadier General E.L. Eubank, dated 11 May 1944, AAF Board file No. 9471.

3. Approach to the problem: a. The object of air attack is destruction. Damage is not enough. Analysis of ways and means required reveals that full use of the as yet little exploited airborne operations and daring expansion of present air force tactical doctrine are possible. Both new means offer innumerable strategic and tactical opportunities, the first in balanced combinations of large scale decisive action and commando operations, and the second, because of greater accuracy and volumn of fire, in applying greatly increased pressure against the enemy. This is particularly true of isolating the battlefield. Both are likewise possible only because of a high degree of air superiority and for the same reason are denied the enemy.

b. This study is concerned mainly with the War against Germany inasmuch as the air distances in the Pacific are such that Japan cannot be attacked by these methods at the present time. In addition, some of the methods of employment described below may not be as specific as might be desired. It was felt that because of lack of up-to-date intelligence information there was too great a danger of overlooking one of the numerous vital factors involved to warrant fully detailed operational plans. However, the AAF Board

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is continuing under high priority the investigation of means of exploiting superior air power in any and all theaters, and a further report will be submitted at a later date.

4. Airborne operations: These operations offer for modern warfare, where the battle areas are saturated with troops and where ground movements of large units cannot be concealed from aerial reconnaissance, a means of envelopment and raiding similar to successful cavalry actions of the past. They fall into two broad categories; large scale operations of one to four divisions (or more), completely supported, supplied, and reinforced by air; and specific commando tasks by smaller forces such as regiments, battalions, and detachments which cannot be supported and must consequently be evacuated upon completion of their missions. Missions to date, for various reasons, have been limited in both concept and execution. The results of a preliminary study are contained in AAF Board Project No. (T) 27, "Long Range Study of Airborne Operations", dated 29 April 1944. Further methods of employment, including some repetitions of the first study, have been investigated since submission of that report. Results:

a. Large scale decisive operations: A mission of this type has never been attempted. In fact, present tactical doctrine contemplates missions of not more than 72 hours before relief or evacuation of the airborne troops concerned. Such a limitation is serious as it precludes the following highly important uses:

(1) Vertical envelopment task forces of one airborne division and one or more air-landing divisions to be used at decisive points after battle has developed. Objectives would normally be vital points in the enemy's rear or on his flank,

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points that if lost will result in a general withdrawal or collapse. These forces should not be committed prematurely as their very existence constitutes a great threat which cannot be ignored and which forces the enemy to with-hold a much larger force until the airborne force has been committed.

(2) One or more airborne divisions to be used as air cavalry. Such units should prove invaluable in turning the tide of a closely balanced contest, preventing the withdrawal or retreat of a defeated army, or changing a retreat into a route. Astounding results could have been achieved if airborne divisions had been available to oppose any of the following actions:

(a) British withdrawal to, and evacuation from, Dunkirk.

(b) German withdrawals through the Tartar Pass and Pripet Marshes.

(c) Rommel's withdrawal to the Tunis-Bizerte area.

(d) Present German withdrawal in Italy.

b. Minor operations: Missions of this category, while not involving large forces initially, are quite capable of far-reaching results, the Burma action for example. There are numerous possible courses here, such as:

(1) Destruction of industrial establishments located in relatively undefended sections of Eastern Germany, and other isolated installations.

(2) Attacks against communications. By the extensive employment of small glider and other detachments, it may be possible to effectively isolate the battlefield in a far shorter time

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than now envisioned by the more conventional methods. The employment of such forces against the Gorge bridges of the Brenner and other vital passes has great potentialities.

(3) Destruction of bomb-proofed industrial installations. Undoubtedly, all reconstruction of bombed-out industry by nations such as Germany, will be bomb-proofed, the only means of destroying same being by men-on-the-ground. Fortunately, economic considerations will probably dictate their construction on the outskirts of towns or cities if not in the country, with consequent vulnerability to airborne attack. A completely adequate defense for all such installations against airborne attack, including anti-aircraft and mechanized units, should prove almost prohibitive in manpower.

As mentioned previously, troops used on missions of this second category normally cannot be supported but must be evacuated or lost. Plans should accordingly always be made for their evacuation. Regiments and battalions will, of course, require the use of seized airdromes for this purpose. Air cover will definitely be required. Troop carrier units should be trained accordingly. The use of liaison aircraft towed in if necessary to conserve gas, amphibian aircraft, gliders snatched from the ground by flying aircraft, and rocket-assisted take-offs are all envisioned. Joining friendly guerilla troops or proceeding to a neutral country may be used in rare cases if the situation so warrants.

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c. Air Force Requirements: Many operations will require participation of other air force combat units if success is to be attained. Day transport and glider formations must be escorted by fighters. Covering fire will normally be required prior to initial attacks of the airborne troops and during evacuation. In some cases, bombardment aircraft may be required for pathfinders and/or towing gliders for reinforcing and resupplying purposes. For large scale vertical envelopment operations, plans should include the following:

(1) Isolation of the immediate battlefield by sustained air force operations.

(2) Provisions for a tactical air-troop carrier-airborne reserve to furnish reinforcements at critical points where needed.

(3) Provisions for air force commando teams capable of destroying or neutralizing specific objectives unexpectedly encountered. All types of combat aviation may be required for this purpose.

(4) Accurate resupply and reinforcement plans within the capabilities of the Air Force to accomplish without interference with above three requirements.

d. Present capabilities: In spite of certain deficiencies, it is believed that decisive airborne operations are now possible, provided proper provisions are made to cover all phases, large scale and minor, outlined above together with the necessary air force support. While available types of equipment are far from ideal (small basic gliders limited in towing speed, large gliders incapable of carrying 105mm artillery and trucks), they are adequate for the purpose. Numbers of transports and gliders are now sufficient. 75mm anti-tank

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guns and artillery, 105mm howitzers, and jeeps can be carried intact by combinations of U.S. and British types of Gliders. Larger sized artillery and transportation may be brought by air in parts and assembled on the ground after arrival. During this phase of operations, the deficiency of the airborne troops in fire power must be made up by combat aviation. Tank threats against the airborne troops must and will be stopped even though relatively large numbers of aircraft be required. The most serious deficiency is the limited development of correct tactics and technique, caused by other obvious higher priorities preventing the initial assignment of required equipment and experienced personnel to troop carrier units. However, the assignment of officers with tactical backgrounds including experience in handling large formations, careful planning, and detailed rehearsals of proposed operations should more than counter this difficulty.

5. Expansion of air force tactical doctrine: Great bombing accuracy and consequently a very high degree of effectiveness is attainable by minimum altitude attacks. However, in the past, such attacks over heavily defended areas have proved prohibitive because of excessive losses. Crossbow tests recently completed at AAF Proving Ground Command, Eglin Field, have shown that aircraft flying on the deck at speeds in excess of 325 miles per hour are much less vulnerable to automatic weapons fire, even with flak towers. Consequently, it is believed that minimum altitude bombing attacks by A-26s (which are to replace the B-26s) and by fighters are now in order in the European Theater. For penetration of deep AA Areas, a high altitude approach followed by a dive to minimum altitude at the initial point should prove quite effective. Losses during

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these attacks can be kept to the minimum by coordination with high altitude bombing attacks of heavy bombers.

b. Isolation of the battlefield: The U.S. Army Air Forces have conclusively proved their ability to control sea communications and thereby isolate a battlefield primarily supplied by water. Such ability in the case of land communications is by no means as clear. Movement of the enemy has been stopped by air attack during the day only, not at night. Light bombardment and night fighter (intruder) units should be designated to carry on during darkness. The tactics and technique required for effective night tactical air force operations is now under consideration by the Army Air Forces Board.

II. ACTION RECOMMENDED: It is recommended that:

1. The development of a glider type capable of moving division artillery and transportation be expedited.

2. Troop carrier training be expanded to include evacuation of airborne units up to and including the regiment.

3. Training standards for fighter and A-26 units include provision for proficiency in minimum altitude bombing.

4. A study be initiated to determine night combat requirements for all types of aviation, present and post-war.

5. A Board of Officers including members from Headquarters Army Air Forces, AAF Board, and Army Ground Forces be appointed to review and evaluate present Troop-Carrier-Airborne Tactical Doctrine, and to determine the military characteristics of transports, gliders, and other aircraft required for airborne operations. The directive to this board should include:

a. Use of bombers for airborne operations impossible of accomplishment by transport aircraft.

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b. Optimum percentages and numbers of transports, gliders, and bombers giving best balanced team for continuous (training, awaiting commitment, preparation, and combat) operations by troop carrier units.

PREPARED BY:
H. G. Montgomery, Jr., Colonel, AC, Chief, Tactics Division, AAF Board

CONCURRED IN BY:
C. F. Damberg, Col., AC, Chief, Aircraft Division, AAF Board.
J. A. Hilger, Col., AC, Chief, Policy Division, AAF Board.
V. C. Huffsmith, Col., Ord. Dept., Chief, Armament Division, AAF Board.
E. H. Rice, Col., AC, Chief, Equipment Division, AAF Board.
W. G. Smith, Col., AC, Chief, Communications Division, AAF Board.
G. W. McGregor, Col., AC, Executive, AAF Board.

APPROVED:

For the Army Air Forces Board:

E. L. EUBANK
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
President

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New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power

To: AC/AS, Plans

13 June 1944
#1
MAL/hd/3373

From: C/AS

The Chief of the Air Staff would like an evaluation from your division preference the attached copy of a report from the Army Air Forces Board, subject: "New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power."

Incl:
Memo to Gen. Arnold fr
fr Gen. Craig dtd 6 June
w/report inclosed

M. A. LIBBY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive, C/AS

TO: Chief of the Air Staff.

DATE 16 June 1944
Comment No. 2
RJC/jw/72530

FROM: AC/AS, Plans

Attached herewith is Memorandum requested in Comment No. 1.

Incl. N/C - retained;
Memo, sbv
subject.

JOS L. LOUTZENHEISER
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief, Operational Plans Div.

(Not with original only)

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By Authority of
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Date

AFREQ
Col Giffin/ek/4627
rewrtn Gen Craig/br/8770

6 JUN 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Subject: Board Report on New Means of Exploiting Superior Air Power.

1. The attached preliminary report suggests one new tactical concept, that of holding airborne forces in strategic reserve as a means of influencing the ground battle in progress. This concept is considered basically sound and, in itself, justifies the entire Board project to date.

2. It will be noted that the Board feels we should develop a glider type capable of moving division artillery and transportation. Development of such a glider would be a long term project and would further involve us in the use of four-engine glider tugs. We have the present capability of moving artillery as large as the 105 mm howitzer by C-47 and CG-4A. It is believed that an airborne operation involving the continued necessity for heavier artillery will require, at the outset, seizure of an air head suitable for the air landing of men and equipment. In such a case, heavy artillery and trucks smaller than the 2½ ton 6x6 can be landed by transport and bomber more economically than by glider. The C-82 transport, now under development, will be capable of moving all division artillery.

3. The recommendations concerning training are being or will be implemented as rapidly as commitments and training schedules permit.

4. Our night combat requirements are presently a matter of considerable concern. It is proposed to direct a Board study on the night combat requirements for all types of aviation, present and post-war, as suggested by the Board.

5. It will be noted that the Board recommends the establishment of a Board of Officers representing the major interested commands, whose purpose would be to review and evaluate present airborne doctrine, to determine the military characteristics of the various types of aircraft involved in airborne operations, to investigate the use of bombers for airborne operations, and to recommend balanced

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INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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airborne force requirements. In view of your recent instructions on a similar recommendation made by this Office and presented orally by Colonel Giffin, it is proposed to direct a detailed study of this recommendation. A copy of the study presented to you by Colonel Giffin will be made available to the Board for information purposes.

1 Incl
Report of AAF Bd
Project No (T) 33
1 June 1944, Copy No. 1

[illegible]
Asst. Chief of Air Staff
Operations, Commitments & Requirements

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16 June 1944

Col Gaylord (for information)

I. INFANTRY DIVISION

Type Vehicles & Div. Artillery	Quantity
Ambulance, 3/4 ton	30
Car, armored, light, M8, w/armament	13
Car, 5-passenger, sedan medium	1
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3Ai, w/o Arm	5
Compressor, air truck, mounted	4
Gun, 57-mm	57
Howitzer, 105-mm, M2,Ai	36
Howitzer, 105-mm, M3	18
Howitzer, 155-mm, M1	12
Tractor, gasoline, engine-driven, 35 DBHP	3
Trailer, Am, M10	60
Trailer, ½-ton	251
Trailer, 1-ton	234
Trailer, 1-ton, 250-gal water tank	5
Trailer, K-52	1
Trailer, 2-wheel, utility, pole, type, 2½-ton	10
Trailer, low bed, 8-ton	3
Truck, ¼-ton	612
Truck, 3/4-ton command	56
Truck, 3/4-ton weapons carrier	153
Truck, 1½-ton, cargo	106
Truck, 2½-ton, cargo	269
Truck, 2½-ton, SWB	84
Truck, 2½-ton, dump	27
Truck, 2½-ton, small arms repair	3
Truck, 4-ton, cargo	18
Truck, 4-ton, wrecker	4
Truck, heavy wrecker	1
Water supply equipment, engineer	4
Welding equipment, set No. 1, electric arc, trailer mounted	1

II. AIRBORNE INFANTRY DIVISION (Light Division)

Howitzer, 75-mm, pack	48
Trailer, ¼-ton	13
Truck, ¼-ton	19
Water Supply Equipment	14

III. AIRBORNE DIVISION

Ambulance, cross-country	2
Car, 5-passenger sedan	3
Gun, 37-mm. AT, or 40-mm, AA	46
Howitzer, 75-mm, pack	36
Trailer, mobile, public address	1
Trailer, 1-ton, cargo	61
Trailer, ¼-ton	168
Truck, ¼-ton	286
[illegible]	[illegible]
Truck, 3/4-ton, comd & rcn	5
Truck, 2½-ton	82

Bergeron
Lt Col.

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Memorandum for Operational Planning Section
(attn Col Gayland)

1. This office concurs generally with the basic estimate of the value of the Army Air Forces Board report Project No(T) 32, dated 1 June 1944.

2. This office is familiar with Col Gilfillan's memorandum and made comments thereon in a memorandum from Col Langhelle to Gen Kuter, subject "Overlord", dated 2 May 1944.

3. Two factors are again pointed out
(a) The reduced output of heavy Bombers, which will be cut, unless additional capacity can be found
(b) The desirability of having ground forces brought in on this project from the beginning.

[illegible]
Col. G.S.C.
Chief, Project Branch.

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TO BE RETURNED TO
TECHNICAL DIVISION

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BOMBING LIST DATA

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SUBJECT	FROM	TO	DATE
Selection of Circular Probable Error (Cap) Applicable to Combat Bombing at 25,000 feet Altitude by Heavy Bombardment Units of the VIII Bomber Command			
2. Memo on Calculations of Force Require		Advisory Com on Bomb.	
3. Charts showing results of practice Bombing of Second Air Force Units			
4. Statistical Analysis 1942 Operations of RAF Bomber Command			
5. Preliminary Analysis of Combat Bombing Accuracy			
6. Publication "Comparison of Barn Door & Door Knob Bombing Techniques"			
7. 8th and 9th Air Forces Bomb Requirements.	CMT	BAR #3	MMAD 2/14/44
8. Principal Industrial Targets in Axis Europe			

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PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL TARGETS IN AXIS EUROPE

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29 July 1943

I - AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

Single-Engine Fighters

A. Assembly

No:	Name:	Location:
1.**	Focke-Wulf	Bremen
2.	Fieseler	Kassel
3.	AGO	Aschersleben
4.	Erla	Leipzig
5.	Arado	Warnemunde
6.	Messerschmitt	Regensburg
7.	Wiener Neustadter	Wiener Neustadt
8.	Manfried Weiss	Budapest
9.		Prague

B. Engine Production

No:	Name:	Location:
1.	Henschel	Kassel
2.	Niedersächsische	Brunswick
3.	Daimler-Benz	Stuttgart
4.	Klockner	Hamburg
5.	B. M. W.	Eisenach
6.	B. M. W.	Allach
7.	B. M. W.	Munich
8.	B. M. W.	Zuhlsdorf
9.	Daimler-Benz	Genshagen
10.	Daimler-Benz	Berlin
11.	Junkers	Vienna
12.		Prague

C. Airframe

No:	Name:	Location:
1.**	Focke-Wulf	Bremen
2.**	Focke-Wulf	Bremen
3.	Fieseler	Kassel
4.	Erla	Leipzig
5.	Arado	Anklam
6.	Manfried Weiss	Budapest

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I - AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION (Cont'd)

Twin-Engine Fighters

A. Assembly

No:	Name:	Location:
1.	M.I.A.G.	Brunswick
2.	Junkers	Bernburg
3.	Messerschmitt	Augsburg

B. Components

No:	Name:	Location:
1.	M.I.A.G.	Brunswick
2.	Junkers	Aschersleben
3.	Junkers	Halberstadt
4.	Junkers	Leopoldshall

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II - BALL BEARING PRODUCTION

No:	Name:	Location:
1.	S. K. F.	Paris
2.	S. K. F.	Paris
3.*	V. K. F.	Stuttgart
4.	S. R. O.	Annecy
5.	V. K. F. # 1	Schweinfurt
6.	V. K. F. # 2	Schweinfurt
7.	Fischer A.G.	Schweinfurt
8.	V. K. F.	Erkner
9.	S.A. Officine-Perosa	Perosa
10.	S.A. Officine-Perosa	Turin

III - CHEMICAL PRODUCTION

No:	Name:	Location:
1.	Leuna-I.G. Farben	Merseburg
2.	Badische Anilin--I.G. Farben	Ludwigshafen
3.	I.G. Farben	Piesteritz
4.	Bayer--I.G. Farben	Leverkusen
5.	I.G. Farben	Bitterfeld
6.	Aussiger Verein	Aussig
7.	I.G. Farben	Rüchst
8.	Nobel	Troisdorf
9.	A.G. für Stickstoff-dünger	Knapsack
10.	I.G. Farben	Wolfen

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IV - PETROLEUM PRODUCTION

No:	Name:	Location:
△ Synthetic		
1.	Cie. Bethune	Bethune
2.	Gelsenberg A.G.	Gelsenkirchen
3.	Union R.B.K.	Wesseling
4.	Ruhroel, A.G.	Bottrop
5.	Hydrierwerke, A.G.	Scholven
6.	Krupp	Wanne Eickel
7.	Brabag	Magdeburg
8.	Leunawerke	Leuna
9.	Brabag	Boehlen
10.	Brabag	Zeitz
11.	Goeringwerke	Brux
12.	Poelitz	Poelitz
13.	I.G.F.	Blechhammer
14.		Vienna
△ Natural		
15. - 26.		Ploesti area
27. - 38.		Stand-by refineries alternate to Ploesti
37.*	Leghorn	

V - RUBBER PRODUCTION

No:	Name:	Location:
▣	Synthetic Rubber Production and Rubber Tires	
1.*	Hüls	Hüls
2.	Schkopau	Schkopau
▣	Rubber Tire Plants	
1.	Englebert	Aachen
2.*	Vorwerk & Sohn	Wuppertal
3.	Dunlop A.G.	Montlucon
4.	Dunlop A.G.	Hanau
5.	Continental A.G.	Hanover
6.	Continental A.G.	Hanover
7.	Phoenix A.G.	Hamburg
8.	Michelin	Clermont-Ferrand
9.	Metzler	Munich
10.	Pirelli	Milan

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VI - SUBMARINE FACILITIES

No:	Name:	Location:
1.	Nordsee	Emden
2.	Deschimag	Bremerhaven
3.	Deschimag	Bremen
4.*	Vulcan	Bremen
5.*	Marinewerft	Wilhelmshaven
6.*	Blohm & Voss	Hamburg
7.	Deutsche Werft	Hamburg
8.	Howaldt	Hamburg
9.	Stülcken	Hamburg
10.*	Flensburger	Flensburg
11.*	Deutsche Werke	Kiel
12.*	Kriegsmarinewerft	Kiel
13.*	Germania Werft	Kiel
14.	Flenderwerfe	Lübeck
15.*	Adero	Spezia (It.)
16.*	Neptun	Rostock
17.*	Oderwerke	Stettin
18.	Vulcan	Stettin
19.	Cantiere Reunite	Monafalcone (It.)
20.	Schichau	Danzig
21.	Danziger	Danzig
22.		Leros
1. - 5.*	French Submarine Refitting Depots	

VII - MISCELLANEOUS

No:	Name:	Location:
1.	Giurgiu Oil Loading Facilities	Giurgiu
2.	Iron Gates Barge Canal & Facilities	
3.	Bor Copper Mine	Bor
4.	Trepca Lead & Zinc Mine	Trepca

*Indicates plant has been damaged
**Indicates plant is no longer in operation

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8th and 9th Air Forces Bomb Requirements.

AC/AS, MM&D

AC/AS, Plans

14 Feb 44 3
CMT/jw/5834

1. In accordance with the request for comments by the AC/AS, Plans (Paragraph 1, Comment No. 2) the following are submitted:

a. In computing the units dropping bombs, the number of H/B Groups should be increased to 41, to include the 1 Pathfinder Group. Also the 36 Groups of Fighter and Fighter-Bombers should be included in the calculations as it is anticipated that these units will drop a large tonnage of bombs. Attention is called to the fact that in the U.K. the program calls for double crews for H/B's and 50% reserve A/C. For the Mediums, Lights and Fighters the program calls for 50% reserve in A/C and crews.

b. In the past, the tonnage of bombs dropped by US AAF units in the U.K. has been restricted by weather, lack of long range fighter escort and shortage of replacement aircraft and crews. It is anticipated that the weather will considerably improve in the next few months. The inauguration of blind bombing missions will increase the tonnage dropped during bad weather. The lack of long range fighter escort is being rapidly remedied. The flow of replacement aircraft and crews has been greatly accelerated. The Air Force Commanders concerned have been instructed that the greatly increased flow of replacement aircraft and crews has been established to permit a decided increase in the tempo of bombing operations. It is anticipated that as a prerequisite to an invasion of the continent and during such an invasion the tactical necessity for, and the short range involved will result in a greatly increased tempo of bombing operations.

JOE L. LOUTZENHISER
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief, Operational Plans Div.

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8th and 9th Air Forces Bomb Requirements.

AC/AS, MM&D, General Echols — 10 Feb.

AC/AS, MM&D, Air Ordnance Officer — 1 cont.

far submitted, although in every instance the stated requirements are exceptionally great, as may be seen from a survey of the inclosures hereto.

6. It is known that most of these items are required for air action in connection with the invasion of Europe. Accordingly, it is believed that any action on this matter should be expedited.

R. C. COUPLAND,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Air Ordnance Officer.

2 Incls:
#1 - Cht. on stated oper. reqmt's
#2 - Summary of required expenditures.

To: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

From: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, MM&D

Date 12 February 1944

Comment No. 2
OPS/jj/2128

1. Your comments are requested on Comment No. 1 above.

2. As you know, procurement and production of bombs have been recently greatly reduced due to the fact that the expenditures were greatly below the estimated rates. It is not believed that action should be undertaken to increase the production of bombs at this time unless it is actually determined that they are necessary. However, if they are necessary, action must be initiated immediately.

O. P. ECHOLS,
Major General, U.S.A.

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8th and 9th Air Forces Bomb Requirements

AC/AS, MM&D, General Echols — 10 Feb. 44

AC/AS, MM&D, Air Ordnance Officer — 1

CGL/is 71068

1. It has been standard practice for the overseas air forces to furnish this Headquarters with a statement of their future bomb and ammunition requirements, based on their plans of operation, in order that a closer coordination may be maintained between procurement and future demands. Such data is invaluable in procurement planning provided the data submitted is based on sound operational planning in the overseas air forces. This information is, of course, supplemented by data compiled by Statistical Control from actual experience.

2. Four cables from the Air Forces in the UK (D1162 of 19 Dec 43; D1174 of 20 Dec 43; K3061 of 12 Jan 44; K3527 of 4 Feb 44) have been received here which set forth the monthly bomb requirements for that theater for eight types of bombs only. A summary of these requests, which are supposed to reflect operational requirements based on future plans in that theater, is set down on Inclosure 1, hereto. It is obvious that if these requirements as stated for each month in 1944 are based on sound planning, additional procurement in large quantities must be initiated at once for certain items.

3. This office has made a study of the stated requirements versus the possibilities of actually being able to use the material. This data is set down on Inclosure #2. It is the opinion of this office that the planned usage rates indicated by the 8th and 9th air forces are impracticable of attainment in light of:

a. Past experience of the airforces in UK,
b. Size of the force planned to be allocated to the UK by June 1944 (peak month),
c. Comparison with accomplishment of the air forces in other theaters,
d. Known limitations on the number of bombing missions an aircraft can make in one month,
e. Known limitations on the possibility of keeping all Unit Equipment aircraft in operating combat condition.

4. It appears to this office that, either we are not apprised of the maximum strength of the air forces which this Headquarters plans to place in the UK in 1944, or the operational plans of the air forces in the UK are derived from assumptions which are beyond the scope of our Air Forces in the UK. In either case it is felt that additional procurement should not be initiated until the situation is clarified by the Chief of the Air Staff. Otherwise, it will be impossible for this office to justify a request for additional procurement to the WDGS or the JPSC.

5. It is believed that if the strength of the force as shown on Inclosure 2 is correct, and the Chief of the Air Staff agrees that the usage rates planned by the air forces in UK appear impossible of attainment, the best way to obtain an understanding of the plans of the air forces there is to have an officer from the staff of General Spaatz, who is familiar with the plans and the logistics of the contemplated operations, come at once to this Headquarters to defend their position. To date cables and air mail letters from that theater have given no satisfactory bases for any of the bomb requirements thus

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Stated Operational Requirements of the
8th and 9th Air Forces for 1944.

	100 lb. GP a.	100 lb. frag. cluster Stabilized a.	100 lb. frag. cluster Parachute b.	250 lb GP c.	500 lb GP c.	100 lb Incend. Bomb. d.	500 lb Incend. Bomb d.	500 lb Incend. Cluster d.	Tons per month *
FEB	60,000	51,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	140,000	-	-	29,050
MAR	140,000	119,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	200,000	-	-	39,450
APR	300,000	255,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	156,000	-	20,000	54,050
MAY	400,000	340,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	172,000	-	22,000	63,200
JUN	400,000	340,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	122,000	13,000	22,500	65,875
JUL	40,000	34,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	124,000	13,000	23,000	35,275
AUG	40,000	34,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	126,000	13,000	23,000	35,500
SEP	40,000	34,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	128,000	14,000	24,000	36,100
OCT	40,000	34,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	131,000	14,000	24,000	36,250
NOV	40,000	34,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	133,000	14,000	24,500	36,475
DEC	40,000	34,000	10,000	48,000	40,000	135,000	14,000	25,000	37,700
	1,540,000	1,309,000	111,000	528,000	440,000	1,567,000	95,000	208,000	464,450

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Stated Operational Requirements of the 8th and 9th Air Forces for 1944 (Continued)

In stock plus procurement	1,148,752	837,221	290,207	866,111	2,152,514	2,682,809	369,917	1,046,235	1,283,387
On hand plus due in 30 Dec 43	207,114	111,546	12,097	68,656	171,663	352,831	0	10,000	88,178

a. Requested by Cable K3527 of 4 Feb 44.
b. Requested by Cable D1162 of 19 Dec 43.
c. Requested by Cable D1174 of 20 Dec 43.
d. Requested by Cable K3061 of 12 Jan 44.

* Largest monthly tonnage allbombs dropped by AF's in UK to date was Dec 43 with 13,550 tons. Total from 7 Dec 41 to 1 Jan 44 was 56,950

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1. Considering average carrying capacity in tons to be:

HB 2 tons (Stat. Control Reports 2 tons in UK)
MB 1 ton (Stat. Control Reports .9 tons in UK)
LB 1 ton (No usage to date)

2. Considering the peak strength in UK from "Cumulative Availability of Combat Groups" published by AC/AS, OC&R to be reached in June 44:

40 HB Groups @ 48 U.E. = 1920
7 MB Groups @ 64 U.E. = 448
4 LB Groups @ 64 U.E. = 256

3. Considering all groups in UK to maintain all their U.E. strength in aircraft in operating condition at all times, although Statistical Control Records show the actual percentages from UK are:

HB 89.1 % of U.E. strength in operating condition.
MB 100.0 % of U.E. strength in operating condition.
LB 89.5 % of U.E. strength in operating condition.

4. On the above considerations, it would be necessary for the planes in 2. to make the following missions every month to dispose of the material being requested for each month and this without touching their stock level quantities:

	Monthly Missions Required by all U.E. Aircraft	Bombing Missions Actual Dec. in UK Highest to date	Bombing Missions Actual Dec. in NWA (Control of Air)
FEB	6.4		
MAR	8.7	HB 4.3	HB 5.5
APR	12.0	MB 3.2	MB 4.9
MAY	14.0	LB ?	LB 8.5
JUN	14.6		
JUL	7.8		
AUG	7.8		
SEP	7.9		
OCT	8.0		
NOV	8.0		
DEC	8.3		

5. The foregoing makes no provision at all for the use of 1000-lb., GP, 2000 lb., GP, 1000-lb., SAP, or any types of special bombs such as 4000-lb., LC, 1600-lb., AP, 1000-lb., AP, 100-lb., smoke, etc. Missions for these would have to be added!

6. Presently authorized stock levels of Ordnance bombs for the UK, based on past usage and the 1 Jan 44 Deputy Chief of Staff directive are for 2½ months:

100 lb GP	67,883	2000 lb GP	4,333
250 lb GP	73,570	100 lb Frag. Clus (s)	19,025
500 lb GP	329,800	100 lb Frag. Clus (p)	2,166
1000 lb GP	30,450	100 lb must. filled	205,961
1000 lb SAP	3,375	(Total tons, all types except mustard filled = 117,345 tons)	

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TAB A

PROBABLE ERROR

Quality of training is the key to success in precision bombing. The returns to be had are tremendous. A reduction of bombing error by one-half multiplies effectiveness by four. The quality in training of bombardiers, of bombing teams and units in the O.T.U. system, as well as in active theaters, is worthy of tremendous emphasis.

The use of a circular probable error of 1,000 feet in the calculations of this study is considered to be not over-optimistic as a measure of our bombing force capability. It is firmly believed that actual results will be better than such a probable error would indicate.

The supporting data for the selection of a probable error are set forth in the following pages of Tab A. A probable error to be of value in estimating capabilities must be based upon evidence of results attained. Thorough training is prerequisite to precision bombing. Training directives under which our O.T.U. system is now working will, if followed completely and thoroughly, provide groups trained to a degree which will permit a reasonable degree of accuracy in bombing. The training of groups now in action has neither been as complete nor as good as groups now in training should be. It is reasonable to expect better results from future groups in the early stages of their combat operations than has been secured during first operations by groups now in combat. It is reasonable to expect groups to improve their bombing accuracy with combat experience. This improvement will be limited if their only bombing is that done on combat missions, mainly because such missions are not frequent enough to provide sufficient practice. Air Force commanders have been urged to conduct bombing practice missions at such times as the situation permits, without interference with combat operations. Such practice should improve bombing effectiveness.

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TAB B

BOMB SIZE SELECTION

"It is important that the size of bomb used for the attack of an objective be appropriate to the requirements of the mission. An objective against which large bombs should be used normally cannot be destroyed by a larger number of smaller bombs of equivalent or even greater total weight. The bomb used should be large enough to produce the desired degree of destruction. On the other hand, it is wasteful to use bombs of substantially larger size than that appropriate for the destruction of the objective. When the extent of the objective is such that it must be hit at more than one point in order to obtain the requisite degree of destruction, the desired effect is best obtained by attacking the several vulnerable points separately, using bombs of an appropriate size." (Paragraph 31, FM 1-10, Tactics and Technique of Air Attack.)

The validity of the last statement quoted above depends upon:

a. The magnitude of the Cep.

b. The location of vulnerable points with respect to the aiming point.

c. The number of bombs per train.

d. The spacing between adjacent bombs of the train.

e. The direction of approach.

f. The bomb dispersion within the train.

The selection of bomb sizes follows generally that described in Training Circular No. 50, dated WD August 11, 1942. Sizes and relative effects have been further considered and agreed upon by explosives experts of the National Defense Research Committee (Dr. John E. Burchard).

The destruction desired by each bomb has been considered to the fullest extent possible in view of available information of the several objectives to be destroyed.

The bomb must likewise be selected on the basis of type. This is especially true and important as between American and British bombs of relatively equal weights. American bombs generally have an importantly greater explosive content and are the only ones considered in this paper. The cost of the bombing effort makes it essential to carry only the most efficient munitions.

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TAB C

BOMB HITS, NUMBER OF.

The number of bomb hits required has been arrived at by a study of the nature of the objective in each case. Experts in each industry have indicated the vulnerable features of a given factory or installation. Where it has been possible to identify a part of the factory upon which all other parts depend, then that vulnerable part has been selected as the primary item to be destroyed. The size of a building housing machinery or equipment to be destroyed has dictated the number of hits required. The nature of the material to be destroyed has usually indicated the greater effectiveness of two bomb hits at different spots rather than a single hit by a bomb of twice the size. Large buildings or areas throughout which machines or equipment are installed require numerous hits for their complete destruction. It has been necessary to estimate the number of square feet within which a given bomb will cause serious destruction and to determine the number of hits required, using the selected area as a "yard-stick". This procedure is necessary in many objectives such as locomotive repair sheds of large size, instrument factories, etc., where no single restricted vital element could be found.

Except as noted below, the American type general purpose bomb will be the most satisfactory and is made the basis of estimates herein. That bomb provides an optimum combination of explosive content with adequate case strength for most purposes. If properly fused it will permit either penetration commensurate with altitude from which dropped or detonation before breakage if object hit is impenetrable. Heavier case combs sacrifice explosive content which is the effective element.

A 100 lb. oil bomb may be a suitable or even preferred substitute for 250 lb. g.p. bombs for part of the destruction of some types of installations. Operations experience should show the extent to which such substitution can best be made. No change in size of force required is made herein in consideration of that possibility.

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TAB D

ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS

The degree of certainty of securing the required number of hits has an important influence on the size of the force necessary. The number of trials, in this case bombs to be released against a given target, depends upon the probable error, the number of hits required on the target of a given size, and the degree of certainty demanded to get those hits. A high degree of certainty demands a greater number of trials. It is normal in operations to demand a high degree of certainty, if the available force permits, against important fleeting targets such as enemy aircraft carriers or elements of a fleet. It is likewise normal to demand a lesser degree of assurance of the success of the given mission if the target is a fixed objective which may be attacked again in case destruction is not achieved on the first mission. The degree of assurance might be put as high as 95% in the former case and as low as 50% in the latter. Repetition of a mission against an objective which is defended by antiaircraft artillery or aircraft, or both, subjects the attacking force to loss on each mission. This factor leads to the selection of a higher degree of assurance than justified against an undefended objective which can be attacked repeatedly without fear of loss.

For the purposes of these calculations, an 85% degree of assurance has been determined as appropriate against the fixed, but normally well defended, objectives under consideration.

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TAB E

MISSION STRENGTH, EFFECTIVE.

The effective mission strength is that number of airplanes each carrying a specified bomb-load which must attack the precise target assigned in order to give the 85% assurance of securing the number of hits required in accordance with the selected circular probable error of 1,000 feet for bombing from an altitude of 25,000 feet.

Theoretically a separate bombing approach should be made for each bomb and each bomb should be individually sighted and released. In practice bombing, bombs are often individually sighted and released — but on combat missions against defended targets, this method may not be feasible. In combat operations the usual procedure is to make one bombing approach during which the bombs are sighted and released in "train" against the target, i.e., as a result of one sighting operation two or more bombs are released from one airplane in timed succession. The spacing between bombs in a train is controlled by the release interval set into the intervalometer prior to release. Properly employed, train bombing is capable of producing almost the same degree of certainty of getting at least one hit on even a relatively small target as would be obtained by the same number of bombs individually sighted and released.

Where the number of bombs to be released in any one train is fixed by the capacity of the racks or the bomb-load which may be carried on a particular mission, the probability that bombs released in train will result in more than one hit on the assigned target depends primarily upon the relationship between the Cep, the dimensions of the target, bomb dispersion within the train, and the initial spacing between individual bombs in the train.

If the number of bombs to be released in train is fixed and the dispersion of individual bombs within the train is estimated or discounted, the spacing of the bombs within the train may be arranged in such a manner that the probable results to be obtained will approach the optimum result attainable with any one train — provided that both the Cep of the bombardment unit executing the attack and the dimensions of the target to be attacked are known.

It is thus apparent that the spacing between individual bombs within a train must be calculated not only on the basis of the target dimension and the direction of approach, but also with regard to the Cep. Thus if the target is large and the Cep

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is small, the probability of obtaining more than one hit with a train of bombs would be increased if the bombs within the train were closely spaced. Conversely, if there is a large differential between the Cep and the target dimensions, the probability of obtaining more than one hit with a train of bombs would be enhanced not by releasing a train of closely spaced bombs, but rather by increasing the interval between the bombs in the train.

The combat experience which has been used to substantiate the selection of the 1,000 feet probable error was built upon releases in train, therefore is acceptable for the train bombing which will normally be done. A second departure from precise method will probably be the use of three plane elements in which the leading bombardier sights for range and deflection, whereas the wing bombardiers sight for range, each one releasing on his own range sighting. They depend upon their position in formation for correct deflection. This practice has also been an element of combat experience to date and has had its effect on results obtained.

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TAB Y

MISSION STRENGTH TO BE DISPATCHED

The mission strength to be dispatched must be greater than the demanded effective mission strength at the target because of the reduction in strength on the way to the target. Of the first 1,000 heavy bombers dispatched by the Eighth Bomber Command, 58% reached and attacked the target. British experience in daylight bombing indicates that 67% of those dispatched reached the target.

It is reasonable to expect that the mechanical difficulties which have caused airplanes to return before completion of their mission are correctible to some extent. The causes have been of the nature which would not appear until operations at high altitudes were begun and perhaps could not have been foreseen. Incomplete training and perhaps incomplete equipment are believed to have caused some to return on account of weather. This condition should improve. On the basis of experience to date, it has been estimated that at least 60% of the dispatched strength would reach and effectively attack the designated target. Thus the effective mission strength required at the target should be multiplied by a factor of 1.66 to determine the strength of the mission to be dispatched.

A recent statement from the Eighth Air Force indicates the belief of their commanders that abortive missions will fall below 25%. The factor 1.66 would therefore appear to give the maximum strength of force to be dispatched.

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TAB G

POINT OF AIM

An assigned point of aim is an essential element of instruction to an attacking force of bombardment airplanes. It is also necessary to make such a selection for purposes of calculation of results to be expected and for the purpose of calculation of forces required.

The smaller the probable error, the greater is the expected concentration of bomb impacts at and near the point of aim. A probable error as large as 1,000 feet will give a random dispersion pattern which will be only slightly more dense near the aiming point than it is a few hundred feet away. This is reflected in the number of bombs required to assure a certain number of hits being within a given relatively small distance from the aiming point. Since the concentration at and near the aiming point is a little greater than farther out, it is essential to specify the item to be destroyed as the aiming point and it is also pertinent to select the aiming point in such a manner that the bombs which miss the aiming point will be most effectively spread to cause incidental damage to other elements within the impact pattern.

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Selection of Circular Probable Error (Cep) Applicable to Combat Bombing at 25,000 Feet Altitude by Heavy Bombardment Units of the VIII Bomber Command.

I. Definition of Cep:

Circular probable error (Cep) is the radius of a circle circumscribed about the point of aim within which circular area 50% of all bombs individually sighted and released under similar conditions will fall — provided the number of trials is large.

II. Methods of Measuring Cep:

a. If points of impact of all bombs are known, Cep may be determined by the relationship Cep = .939 Cem, where Cem is the arithmetic mean radial distance from the center of aim of all bombs dropped under similar conditions.

b. By determining the percentage of bombs included within circles of selected radii, or within rectangles of known dimensions, a value of Cep consistent with the observed distribution may be deduced by considering the percentage of hits to be the single shot probability of hitting the given circle or rectangle. In the case of rectangular targets the estimates of Cep were based upon the Mathematical Statistical Theory of "Maximum Likelihood Estimates".

III. Use of Cep:

Knowledge of the Cep expected at a given altitude under combat conditions makes possible the estimation of the bomb requirements for securing a given per cent assurance of obtaining any desired number of hits on the designated target.

IV. Method of Arriving at the Value of Cep Applicable to Bombing at 25,000' Altitude Under Combat Conditions:

a. Operational Training Unit (O.T.U.) Practice Bombing Accuracy.- Study of current bombing accuracy of heavy bombardment groups in O.T.U. was made in order to arrive at the lower limit of the expected Cep.

A.A.F. Forms 121 for the period July-September 1942, covering O.T.U. bombing, furnished the basic data for this determination. The average circular error for each altitude was plotted on a graph and a straight line was drawn which represented the trend of errors with altitude. (See Tab A-1).

Although a large portion of the O.T.U. bombing was performed at altitudes below 12,000', the curve was extended to 25,000' in order that a measure of the results to be expected in practice bombing at this altitude could be obtained.

Since much of the O.T.U. data was scored by bombardiers' estimates, it was necessary to make a reasonable adjustment for the optimistic bias which normally is present when scoring is based on

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bombardiers' estimate. This adjustment was determined by comparing the curves of estimated scores with those of measured scores obtained from practice bombing of heavy bombardment groups in the six-month period January-June 1942. (See Tab A-II)

This comparison indicated that the Cep as derived from measured scores was uniformly 20% larger than the Cep as obtained from the estimated and measured scores combined.

Since the composition of this data was similar to that of the January-June period, the same correction factor of 20% was applied to the combined scores of the July-September period in order to compensate for the effects of estimated scoring. The dotted curve of Tab A-I has been plotted in order to indicate the result thus obtained.

Reading the dotted curve of Chart No. II it is found that the average circular error for practice bombing at 25,000 feet would be in the neighborhood of 600 feet. The corresponding Cep would be 0.939 x 600 = 563 feet for this altitude.

Preliminary comparison of current O.T.U. bombing with initial results of combat bombing as reported by the U.S.A.A.F. from the various theaters of operations (see following paragraphs) indicates that an increase of approximately 80% in the value of the practice bombing Cep is to be expected as the combined result of —

a. Inadequate opportunity for continued practice after completion of O.T.U. training.

b. Added difficulties of bombing under stress of combat conditions.

Multiplying the present O.T.U. Cep of 563 feet by 1.8 thus results in a Cep of approximately 1000 feet for combat bombing at 25,000 feet altitude.

It is believed that this is a conservative estimate of the bombing accuracy which adequately trained and properly employed heavy bombard-units can reasonably be expected to achieve in combat.

b. Evaluation of Combat Bombing in the Pacific Area:

1. From daily cables regarding operational activities in various theaters of combat an estimate of the Cep was obtained for those missions in which altitude, number of bombs dropped, number of hits reported, and target dimensions were given.

The following table gives the Cep for each theater in the Pacific Area for altitudes of 12,000 feet and 20,000 feet respectively:

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Theater	Cep at 12,000'	Cep at 20,000'
Alaska	400	—
S.W. Pacific	480	725
India and China	—	850
Midway	320	534
Australia	700	—
AVERAGE	475	703

These averages for 12,000' and 20,000' bombing indicate an extrapolated Cep value of 845 feet for bombing at 25,000' altitude.

c. Evaluation of Combat Bombing Accuracy of the VIII Bomber Command:

1. Although considerable information pertaining to heavy bombardment missions carried out against Continental objectives by the VIII Bomber Command is available, careful study reveals in numerous instances that the detailed information necessary for an accurate estimate of VIII Bomber Command's accuracy is lacking.

Since on numerous missions there is no indication of a definite aiming point, the resulting bomb plot frequently resembles those which are characteristic of area bombing. Under such circumstances an evaluation of Cep cannot be satisfactorily undertaken inasmuch as the location of bomb impacts in relation to the point of aim is unknown.

Another factor which complicates the accurate calculation of a Cep for VIII Air Force bombing is the fact that available photographs and bomb plots rarely account for all the bombs dropped on any one mission. It is possible that some of the bombs which are not accounted for may have fallen within the limits of circles used for the determination of Cep. In this case the presence within the target area of such bombs would lower the Cep below the values obtained in this study.

2. It has been possible, however, to select three VIII Bomber Command missions which lend themselves to the determination of Cep. Each of these missions was carried out against a different type of target. The results of the three missions are given in tabular form below:

Target	Date	Altitude	Bombs Released	Cep
1. Rotterdam Shipyards	Aug. 27, 1942	23,000 ft.	40	1020'
2. St. Omer Airdrome	Oct. 2, 1942	24,000 ft.	50	930'
3. Lorient - U-Boat Pens	Oct. 21, 1942	17,500 ft.	30	750'
	Average	21,500 ft.	Average	900'

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The average Cep for these three selected missions is 900 feet. When extrapolated to 25,000 feet altitude this figure becomes 1030 feet.

It is believed that the high Cep values indicated for the VIII Bomber Command are attributable in part either to the absence of a specifically assigned aiming point within the target to be attacked, or to the inability of bombardiers to locate the assigned point of aim, with the result that the bomb dispersion patterns are abnormally larger.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BOMBARDMENT:

Subject: Calculations of Force Required.

1. The bases upon which the calculations are made to determine the strength of bombardment forces needed to neutralize or destroy given objectives are stated below. A discussion is attached in support of each and is referred to by tab.

a. PROBABLE ERROR.

The circular probable error accepted for use in calculation of force required is 1000 feet and is considered to be a conservative estimate of the capabilities of our bombing force for bombing from altitudes as high as 25,000 feet. (See Tab A)

b. BOMB SIZE SELECTION.

The principle applied to the selection of bombs to destroy a given objective is that the bomb must be large enough to cause serious damage to the type of structure, machinery, equipment, or other installation, but not larger than necessary unless the optimum bomb load cannot be carried in the appropriate though smaller bomb size. Emphasis is placed upon a larger number of bombs rather than larger sizes in order to secure the advantage of increased probability of hits as a consequence of the greater number and to disperse the damage done particularly where vulnerable areas of buildings or installations are extensive. (See Tab B)

c. BOMB HITS, NUMBER OF.

The number of bomb hits required depends upon the effective destructive area of each bomb and the extent of the facility to be destroyed. All estimates made in this study are based upon the effectiveness of American type bombs in all cases. Areas as follows are considered satisfactory for purposes of estimates of hits required:

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d. ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS.

The calculations of force required are based on an 85% assurance of securing the number of hits estimated as necessary. (See Tab D)

e. MISSION STRENGTH, EFFECTIVE.

The effective mission strength is the number of airplanes which are required to reach, definitely identify, and attack the assigned target by precision bombing methods. (See Tab E)

f. MISSION STRENGTH TO BE DISPATCHED.

In order that the effective mission strength may reach, definitely identify, and attack the designated target, the strength dispatched has been increased by a factor of 1.66. This increase in strength dispatched will, in accordance with experience to date, permit an average of 60% of the dispatched strength to reach and effectively attack the designated target. (See Tab F)

g. POINT OF AIM.

A point of aim has been selected, for purposes of calculation, such that the vital portion of the objective will be destroyed. If no vital portion could be determined, the point of aim has been selected to give the most efficient distribution of bombs throughout the installation area. The incidental damage caused by bombs which do not hit the aiming point has been considered in determining a point of aim which will result in maximum damage. (See Tab G)

h. RADIUS OF ACTION.

Figures representing the practical radius of action of bombardment airplanes have been furnished by the Director of Military Requirements. These figures enter calculations of force required because of interchangeability of a portion of the bomber load as between bombs and fuel. The attack of objectives at greater distances in some cases reduces the number and weight of bombs which can be carried per airplane, thereby increasing the size of force required. (See Tab H)

i. BOMB LOADS.

The bomb loads used in calculation of force required are maximum loads specified by the Director of Military Requirements. This load depends upon distance to the objective and arrangement of bomb carrying equipment for the suspension of bombs of various sizes. A bomb size next larger than the one considered appropriate is sometimes carried in order to secure a greater and more damaging load. (See Tab I)

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(1) 250 lb. G.P.* bomb fused 1/10th second delay nose and .025 second delay tail —

1 hit per 15,000 sq. ft. of light machine shop, single floor.
1 hit per 15,000 sq. ft. in refining plant distillation or cracking units.

* 100# oil bombs should be used as a partial substitution against appropriate facilities.

(2) 500 lb. G.P. bomb fused 1/10th second delay nose and .025 second delay tail —

1 hit per 20,000 sq. ft. of light machine shop, single floor.
1 hit per 6,000 to 10,000 sq. ft. of light machine shop per three floors.
1 hit per 10,000 sq. ft. in shops where partitioning may be present.
1 hit per 8,000 sq. ft. in hydrogenation compressor buildings.

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(See Tab C)

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CHART II



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CHART I

RESULTS OF PRACTICE BOMBING WITH B-17 AND B-24 AIRPLANES

SECOND HALF F.Y. 1942 (Jan.-June 1942 incl.)



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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF COMBAT BOMBING ACCURACY

(C.E.P. BY THEATER)

It is highly desirable to have good estimates of the actual bombing of active bombardment groups in the various theaters. The sources for such information are Form 34 and daily cables regarding operational activities in each theater. Unfortunately, no Form 34's have been received to date because of transportation difficulties, and information from cables is rarely complete in the requisite details. In order for information to be of use, it must contain the number of bombs released, the altitude of release, the number of hits, and the approximate dimensions of the target.

As is customary in bombing analysis, the measure of accuracy was taken to be the circular probable error (C.E.P.). This statistic was estimated, by means of a maximum likelihood estimate, for each altitude on the basis of the observed number of hits. Due to the paucity of data, estimates are tabled only for the 12000', 20000' and 25000' levels.

While the estimates are very rough, they at least represent an indication of the actual dispersion of bombs under combat conditions. While it is not possible to estimate the error involved, it is highly probable that the estimates err on the conservative side, i.e., the "true" combat CEP is probably less than those given below. It is anticipated that as more complete data is received, much more satisfactory estimates can be made.

For comparative purposes, estimated C.E.P.'s under training conditions for the same groups are also shown.

ESTIMATED CIRCULAR PROBABLE ERROR

Theater	Est.C.E.P. at 25000'	Est.C.E.P. at 20000'	Est.C.E.P. at 12000'	Est. Training C.E.P.** at 12000'
Alaska			400	300 30th H/B Gp.
S.W.Pacific		725	480	350 11th H/B Gp.
India & China		850		350 7th H/B Gp.
(Midway) Hawaii	668	534	320	330 5th,11th H/B Gp.
Australia				
U.K. & N.W.Africa	No estimates possible. These theaters employ area bombing.			

*Bombing in Australia has been performed during uniformly bad weather, at low altitudes. Estimates shown above not very reliable.

**Training C.E.P. obtained from Study #45, June 8, 1942 - Chart #14

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INDIA AND CHINA THROUGH DECEMBER 20, 1942

Date	Target	Estimated Dimensions	Altitude	Number of Releases	Number of Hits	Source
11/22	RR yards and repair shop	400x600	20,000'	30	2	Cabled information transcribed onto Form 34
11/22	12 to 14,000 ton freighter	510x70	22,000'?	46	3	
	5 to 8,000 ton freighter	425x600	22,000'?	99	1	
	Docks	200x800	22,000	28	1	
11/24	Shipping, 12,000 ton freighter	510x70	20,000?	91	5	
11/6	Warehouses, docks, freighters	200x1000?	26,500	30	3?	
11/29	Docks	200x800?	22,000?	25	5	
12/1	Airdrome, runway and disposal area	200x1000?	16,000?	24	2?	
12/11	Docks	200x800?	24,000	29	1	
12/11	Naval vessels	500x800?	20,000	14	0	
12/14	Airdrome, barracks, runway, hangars	200x1000?	16,000	132	6?	
12/20	Airdrome, warehouses	200x1000?	16,000?	142	6?	

? The question mark indicates a guess has been made as to altitude, size of target, or number of hits. Number of hits shown above are probably less than the actual event. Similarly we tried with all other guesses to err in the direction of giving a CEP greater than was actually the case.

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11TH AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH NOVEMBER 28, 1942
(SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER)

Date	Target	Estimated Dimensions	Altitude	Number of Releases	Number of Hits	Source
11/24	3 aircraft carriers	80x675	12,000	24	0	Cable information transcribed onto Form 34
11/25	2 carriers, 2 destroyers	80x675	14,000	32	0	
11/26	2 carriers, 2 destroyers	80x675	12,000	17	3?	
11/28	2 carriers, 2 destroyers	80x675	12,000	17	0	
11/16	carrier	80x675	16,000	14	2	
11/18	8? carriers	80x675	12,000	40	2	
11/18	2 light cruisers	50x500	4,000	16	0	
11/13	Battleship	100x600	14,000	68	5 or 6	
10/25	Battleship	100x600	15,000	28	0	
10/25	Battleship	100x600	13,500	23	1	
10/26	Battleship	100x600	20,000	30	0	
10/26	Battleship	100x600	17,000	13	0	
9/29	Light Cruiser	50x500	8,000	76	0	

? 3 hits guessed at

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11TH AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES TOKYO DECEMBER 20, 1942
(ALASKA DEFENSE COMMAND)

Date	Target	Estimated Dimensions	Altitude	Number of Releases	Number of Hits	Source
Dec. 20	Submarine base		2000' to 3500'	56	1 hit; 2 direct hits	Cable Nos. 104 & 259
Oct. 18	Beached cargo ship	370'x64'	15000'	24	12 hits, 12 misses	Mission chart of 11th
Oct. 17	South Strip, Kiska	150x300 dump area	13900' to 15500'	15	2 (oil & gasoline dumps)	Mission chart
Oct. 9	Hangar area, Kiska		2000'	20	4 bombs south side 16 bombs center	"
Oct. 9	Cargo ship	380'x60'	2000'	26	2 hits	"
Oct. 9	Cargo ship	380'x60'	2000'	12	2 straddle	"
Oct. 6	Cargo ship	370'x64'	10000' to 12000'	12	1 direct hit	"
Oct. 6	Cargo ship	370'x64'	10000' to 12000'	12	1 direct hit	"
Oct. 4	Cargo ship	350'x60'	1000'	24	2 hits	"
Oct. 3	Cargo ship	350'x60'	11500'	15	0 hits	"
Sept. 30	Cargo ships	350'x60'	15000'	48	1 hit; 2 near misses	"
Sept. 28	Submarine	320'x30'	5000'	12	1 hit (sank sub)	"
Sept. 28	Cargo ship	350'x60'	5000'	8	1 hit	"
Sept. 28	Cargo ship	350'x60'	3000'	3	1 near miss dead ahead	"
Sept. 28	Cargo ship	350'x60'	1000'	9	0 hits	"
Sept. 27	Cargo ship	350'x60'	1000' to 3000'	15	0 hits	"
Sept. 26	Freighter	350'x30'	4500' to 5000'	36	2 straddle, all others astern	"
Sept. 24	Cargo ships	350'x60'	10000'	27	0 hits, near misses	"

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BATTLE OF MIDWAY

Date	Target	Estimated Dimensions	Altitude	Number of Releases	Number of Hits	Source
June 3 4:23 p.m.	5 battleships or heavy cruisers	100x600	8000' to 12000'	38	5	Official reports of Battle of Midway by Gen. Emmons
June 4 7:10 a.m.	Aircraft carriers, heavy cruisers, & destroyers	100x600			3	
June 4 8:15 a.m.	2 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 5 destroyers	100x600	20,000	116	5	
June 4 8:10 p.m.	2 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 5 destroyers	100x600	10,000	16	3	
June 4 8:30 p.m.	Destroyer	30x350	3,800	8	2	
June 4 8:30 p.m.	2 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 5 destroyers	100x600	25,000	28	1	
June 5 8:30 p.m.	2 battleships or heavy cruisers	100x600	20,000	39	1	
June 5 8:15 p.m.	1 heavy cruiser	100x600	16,000	56	3	Chief, Statistical Control Air Staff, Management Control (AFMSC-2D) 12/29/42
June 5 8:25 p.m.	1 heavy cruiser	100x600	20,000?	23	-	

? Altitude guessed

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AUSTRALIAN THEATRE AUGUST 30 THROUGH NOVEMBER 28

Date	Target	Estimated Dimensions	Altitude	Number of Releases	Number of Hits	Source
11/27	4 enemy destroyers	356x33	8000' to 11000'	48	3 hits; 1 possible hit	Cable Q-4682
11/27	Troops & gun positions	500'square	4000'	28(I)	13 hits	Forms 34
11/26	Troops & gun positions	500'square	5500'	15(I)	15 hits	Forms 34
11/24	1 light cruiser,4 destroyers	50x500	5000'	104	3 hits;3near misses within 10';3 other near misses	Cable Q-4442
11/23	Enemy troops	500'square	6000'	12(I)	9 hits	Cable Q-4403
11/22	2 enemy destroyers	356x33	6700'	44(F)	1 hit; 1 near miss	Cable Q-4357
11/16	Large merchant vessel	510x70	5000' to 8000'	11	2 hits	Cable Q-4111
11/16	Supply dump	150'x300'	8000'	36(F)	1 direct hit; 15 hits	Forms 34
11/14	Large unidentified vessel	510x70	4000' to 8000'	78	1 direct hit; 1 possible hit	Cable Q-4016
11/9	5000-ton transport	375x55	4000'	5	1 hit	Cable P-112
11/7	Schooner		9000'	1	150' from target	Cable C-950
11/5	Probable light cruiser	50x500	8000'	8	1 near miss	Cable C-932
11/4	Small schooner		2500'	5	0 hits	Cable C-932
11/3	Cathedral	50'x100'	8000'	3	1 hit	Cable C-909
11/2	2 transports	450x60	6500'	45	4 very near misses	Cable C-904
11/2	Convoy, 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer, 2 transports	50x500	5000'	24	0 hits	Cable C-904
11/1	Shipping	450x60	7500'	70	1 probable hit, 2 near misses	Cable C-893
11/1	Shipping	450x60	6800'	60	1 hit, 1 possible hit, 3 near misses	Cable C-893
10/15	Wairopi Bridge		5000'	5	0 hits	Cable A-830
10/15	Wreck	50'x200'	2500'	5	0 hits	Cable C-726
10/15	Probable light cruiser	50x500	1600'	4	2 near misses	Cable C-830
10/10	5000-ton cargo vessel	350x50	5000'	4	Bombs 300' short	Cable C-681

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AUSTRALIAN THEATRE AUGUST 30 THROUGH NOVEMBER 28 (Continued)

Date	Target	Estimated Dimensions	Altitude	Number of Releases	Number of Hits	Source
10/9	Dumps	150'x300'	7750'	302	4 hits	Cable C-672
10/8	Medium cargo vessel	450x60	8000'	6	0 hits	Cable C-664
10/8	Cargo vessel	400x50	1000'	5	Bombs 40 yd. short	Cable C-664
10/8	Wireless transmitter		4500'	15	6 hits, 2 bombs over, 2 short	Cable C-664
10/5	Oil tanks	150'x300'	2000'	12	0 hits	Cable C-652
10/1	Wairopi Bridge		4000'	7	1 hit	Cable C-616
10/1	Wairopi Bridge		4000'	25	2 hits	Cable C-616
10/3	Wairopi Bridge		1400'	6	3 hits, 3 near misses	Cable C-632
10/1	1 15000-ton, 1 7000-ton transport, 1 cruiser, 1 unidentified vessel	500x60	4750'	30(?)	2 hits, 2 possible hits	Cable C-622
10/1	Cruiser	600x60	8000'	28	0 hits	Cable C-622
9/29	6 barges, 2 A/A positions		5000'	15	8 hits	Cable C-602
9/27	12000 to 15000-ton cargo vessel	510x70	8000'	3	1 hit, 1 near miss	Cable C-588
9/25	Wairopi Bridge		3000'	6	1 hit, 2 partial hits	Cable C-580
9/22	1 large vessel	450x60	7000'	20	2 probable hits	Cable C-555
9/15	Cargo ship	400x50	1000'	20	1 hit, 1 near miss	Cable C-506
9/11	Ammunition dump	150'x300'	1500'	2	1 hit	Cable C-1122
9/11	2 enemy destroyers	356x33	1750'	28	1 hit, 1 near miss	Cable C-1122
9/11	2 enemy destroyers	356x33	1000'	19	1 very near miss	Cable C-1122
9/11	Yacht		1000'	5	0 hits	Cable C-1122
9/3	Dumps	105'x300'	5000'	12	7 hits	Cable C-424

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SUBJECT	FROM	TO	DATE
1. Transport Airplanes Equipped with Skis	--	Gen Giles	--
2. Landing of Planes in Poland	Kuter	Chief of AS	8/12/43
3. Use of US Aircraft for Polish subversive activities (Ltr prepared by CMT for sig of Chief of Air Staff)	Plans	"	1/12/43
4. Aid to Poland	Taylor	Whitney Hamilton Dall	
5. Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory			
6. Troop Carrier Training for Polish Air Force Personnel.	Loutz	AC/AS,Training	4/25/44

P.R.C

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DOD DIR 5200.9, 27 Sep 80

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Troop Carrier Training for Polish Air Force personnel

AC/AS, Plans — 21 April 1944

AC/AS, Training, Individual Training Division — 1

GAB:amh/6031

1. Attached letter from the Polish Air Attache with 1st Ind. from Foriegn Liaison Branch, G-2, is forwarded for your comment and recommendation.

2. The troop carrier training requested in basic letter can be given the 8 Polish officers named at the installations listed. G-2 has advised verbally that the training desired is indoctrination in USAAF methods and transition. This could be accomplished in about 30 days.

Att
Ltr. April 14,'44
with 1st Ind.

R. M. Montgomery,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Individual Training Div.

Coordination:
AFACT-4
(Troop Carrier Br.)

TO: AC/AS, Training, Individual Training

4/22/44

FROM: AC/AS, Plans

COMMENT NO. 2
HSW/ff/72538

1. This office sees no objection to training 8 Polish Air Officers in Troop Carrier Command methods and transition if it appears beneficial for diplomatic or other reasons.

2. This training should include a course in instrument flying and minimum altitude navigation.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that certain details may create problems: namely, ability to speak English, and the matter of allowances.

1 Incl
n/c

JOE L. LOUTZENHISER
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief, Operational Plans Div.

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Use of U.S. Aircraft for Polish subversive activities.

Chief of Air Staff.

AC/AS, Plans.

1 Dec 43 1
CMT/jw/3834

In accordance with your request, the attached proposed Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff is submitted for your signature.

Incls:
1-Proposed Memo to JCS
2-Memo for Brig. Gen. Wiles

[redacted]
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Operational Plans Div.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Attention: Colonel C. R. Beck

Subject: Use of U.S. Aircraft for Polish subversive activities.

1. The records indicate that on previous occasions the Poles have made certain requests in London and if not satisfied with the replies received have repeated these requests in Washington.

2. It is recommended that the Polish Liaison Officer, Colonel Mikiewicz, be informed that the determination of the proportion of sorties of the two U.S. Squadrons between Polish activities and other subversive activities in Europe is a matter for the decision of the Commanding General, ETOUSA and the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force and that the total number of sorties that can be made either for the Poles or for other activities is an operational matter within the theater and therefore, no reasonable estimate of the number of such missions that will be performed could be given by any agency in Washington. It is believed that the appropriate approach to this matter for the Poles is through the Polish General Staff in London to the Commanding General, ETOUSA and Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

Incl:
~~Memo for Maj.Gen.~~
~~Giles, 29 Nov 43~~

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

29 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General B. M. Giles,
Chief of the Air Staff,
Army Air Forces.

Subject: Use of U.S. Aircraft for Polish subversive activities.

It will be recalled that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 119th meeting on 17 September 1943, agreed that one squadron initially and eventually two squadrons of U.S. heavy bombers not operational for full daylight combat would be organized to operate from the U.K. under the Commanding General, 8th Air Force, for the support of sabotage and intelligence activities by Polish and other underground groups in Europe.

Colonel L. Z. Mitkiewicz, Polish Liaison Officer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, called at the office of the Secretariat this morning, stating that he had returned recently from the U.K. and while there had discussed with General Eaker the use of American aircraft in furtherance of the Polish activities. He stated that General Eaker had informed him that the first squadron would be organized and ready for operation about 1 December 1943 and that the other squadron would be ready about 1 January 1944. The C.C.S. decision gave no indication of the percentage of the services of the squadrons which will be devoted to Polish activities as compared with other underground groups. This allocation, of course, should be reserved to General Devers. Colonel Mitkiewicz is quite anxious to have for planning purposes an estimate as to the total sorties that the Poles may expect during the period 1 December 1943 and 30 April 1944. He well understands that the work of the American squadrons must be coordinated with similar work undertaken by the R.A.F. bomber command. However, he did indicate that the British gave the Poles far less sorties than had been promised during the month of September 1943.

If it is considered desirable to do so, it is requested that the Secretariat be furnished information to serve as the basis of a reply to the Polish inquiry.

C. R. PECK,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive Secretary

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September 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Whitney
Colonel Hamilton
Colonel Ball

Subject: Aid to Poland

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the allocation of 1 Squadron of Heavy Bombardment type aircraft of the 8th Air Force, to be used for night flights to Poland to aid in subversive activities. It is not contemplated any landings will be made in Poland at this time. It is possible that an additional Squadron will be authorized at a later date.

Generals' Devers and Baker have been informed. It is contemplated that such airplanes and crews will be selected as will not reduce the daylight strategic bombing effort from the U. K.

Colonel A. L. Johnson has a Disposition Form from OPD on this matter.

CHARLES M. TAYLOR
Colonel, G. S. C.

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Security Cable (Copy No. 21)
in Colonel's Lewis' office.

Sent out to London, from CCS
Sept. 17th, stating that no
airplanes at this time to be given
the Poles for operations by them.
London suggests that no opera-
tional H/B (U.S.) could be used
for this purpose as well as
forming two Sqs from personnel
in the Th.

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Landing of Planes in Poland.

Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans.

1

CVR/jw/5834

In compliance with your memo dated 8/27/43, subject same as above, you will find attached the draft of a letter to Mr. Harry Hopkins with signature left blank, as requested.

L. S. KUTER
Brigadier General, USA

Incl:
Memo 8/27/43 (Routing slip)
Memo for Gen. Arnold 8/13
R&R (1 to 4, inclusive)
Memo for Gen. Giles
Proposed letter to Mr. Hopkins.

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ROUTING SLIP

August 27, 1943

TO: AC/AS, Plans

FROM: Deputy C/S
(Major J. H. Brewer
Phone 73691 Room 3E-1031

1. General Perrin requests that a "brief" letter be prepared for transmission to Mr. Harry Hopkins briefing the data contained in the attached papers and explaining why the project should be dropped.

2. The signature on the letter should be left blank.

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13 August, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Subject: Landing of Planes in Poland.

1. Reference the President's directive to find a suitable ski equipped airplane to fly from U.K. to Poland, the only airplane at present which is suitably equipped is a C-47. Its lack of speed and defensive power renders its use impractical. No developments for skis or water-snow-ice floats have been carried on for tactical types suitable for this mission, and by the time that such equipment could be produced, the need will probably be gone.

2. It is recommended that the President be advised and the project dropped.

EDWIN S. PERRIN,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

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AC/AS, Plans
CVW/jw/5834

wtn. 8/28/43

Mr. Harry Hopkins,
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hopkins,

On a recent date the President called General Giles into his office and discussed the possibility of landing some of our larger type of aircraft on skis in Poland for the purpose of carrying in and bringing out special observers.

We have made a detailed study of the problems concerned, both technical and practical, including a conference with the Polish Military Attache and members of their Military Mission, in an endeavor to make the scheme work. However, there appear to be serious drawbacks.

Our only ski equipped airplane of suitable range for this project is the C-47 transport. This airplane can also be equipped with amphibious floats to operate on land, water, snow or ice. Its lack of speed and defensive power, however, makes it an easy prey to enemy attack, and its use in a service of this hazardous nature cannot be recommended.

No suitable long range combat type aircraft has been developed with ski or amphibious float equipment. It is estimated, that approximately one year would be required for the engineering, construction, and experimentation in connection with such a development, at which time it is possible that this service to Poland will not be needed.

Other factors which were brought out in this investigation were that snow conditions in the United Kingdom cannot be counted on to permit ski operation, and that the present elaborate system of espionage and surveillance conducted by the Germans in Poland precludes the possibility of making such landings undetected. In view of all the foregoing facts, it is suggested that the project be dropped.

I have tried to be as brief as possible and I hope that the subject has been covered as fully as desired.

Sincerely yours,

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Landing of Planes in Poland.

Chief of the Air Staff

Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Plans

4

CVW/jw/6722

Referring to the basic subject in Comment 1 and the request contained in paragraph 2 of Comment 3, namely that "more than ordinary efforts be made to comply with it", the following information and recommendations are herewith submitted.

1. The service desired by the Poles envisages flights from U. K. to a point in Poland (1200 miles) for the purpose of establishing a closer liaison between the Free Polish Forces in Poland and Headquarters in London. Observers would be carried both in and out of Poland by this service.

2. Investigation of airplane types which have been tested with skis reveals that the C-47 twin-engined transport is the only type so tested capable of conducting the proposed service.

a. The C-47 twin-engined transport equipped with skis could accomplish a 2500 mile flight without refuelling. Payload outbound from U. K. is estimated at 8 persons (including a crew of three), 20 passengers could be carried on the return flight from Poland.

b. Two C-47 ski equipped aircraft will shortly be available for further complete testing, and such tests are contemplated during the coming fall.

c. Ten sets of skis to fit C-47 type airplane have been ordered and will be available within a month.

d. Indicated performance characteristics are satisfactory.

3. At present a service of this general nature but without landings in Poland is operated by the British using Lancaster heavy bombers for the purpose. Messages and equipment are dropped by parachute, as landings in Poland are considered too dangerous under the active surveillance of the Germans.

4. At the conference held on July 31, referred to in paragraph 1 of Comment 2, the Polish Military Attache suggested the impracticability of a proposed service with ski equipped aircraft due to:

a. Lack of proper snow conditions in U. K.

b. Inability to provide landing grounds in Poland which would be free from German surveillance.

5. It should further be pointed out that this aircraft without armament and with a cruising speed of 140 miles per hour would be extremely vulnerable to enemy attack and that evasive tactics of any sort would seriously jeopardize the fuel supply necessary to complete the round-trip flight.

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Landing of Planes in Poland.

Chief of the Air Staff.

Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Plans. 4 (cont'd)

CVM/jw/5722

6. The Polish Military Attache suggested the possibility of landings on water or pick-ups by air. Sufficient information was not at hand at the time to reply to these questions.

7. Subsequent investigation of these two alternate solutions to the problem reveal the following:

a. Pick-up of human cargo from airplanes with the high stalling speed of the C-47 has not been tested, but its success is classified as improbable. The L-1A (small liaison type) airplane will be used this summer for such tests, but results will not be known for at least three months.

b. Preliminary tests on the C-47 equipped with amphibious floats are very promising. This type of landing gear is designed to permit the airplane to land on water, snow, or ice. Performance characteristics indicate that, other considerations being eliminated, this airplane equipped with amphibious floats could perform the required service with a crew of three and a cargo of 1000 pounds outbound from U. K.

c. The drawbacks pointed out in paragraph 5 also apply to 7 b.

8. In accordance with Military Policy No. 13 (rewritten May 9, 1942) and No. 25 August 27, 1942, no engineering plans have been drawn nor are any contemplated to equip twin-engine or four-engine combat airplanes with either skis or floats. If, however, a directive is issued to draw such plans and conduct such experiments, it is estimated that a period of one year would be required for the experimental production and tests.

Conclusions:

1. That the C-47 air transport plane is the only plane now being tested with skis capable of conducting the proposed service, but that unpredictable snow conditions in England, a lack of secluded landing ground in Poland, plus the vulnerability of the airplane to hostile attack mitigate strongly against the advisability of such a service.

2. That preliminary tests indicate that the C-47 air transport plane equipped with amphibious floats can land or take off on water, snow, or ice, and will carry a sufficient load over the required distance to fulfill the needs of the proposed service, but that its vulnerability to hostile attack suggests its use only in cases of extreme emergency.

3. That air pick-up of human cargo is not sufficiently tested to be seriously considered at this time.

4. That the hazards of any type of landing in Poland are numerous, but that this question has only been explored in a very superficial manner, and that obstacles may not be insurmountable.

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Landing of Planes in Poland.

Chief of the Air Staff.

Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Plans. #(cont'd).

CVV/jw/6722

5. That heretofore the problems of this particular Polish - U. K. air liaison service has been a responsibility of the British.

6. That under present risks of German interdiction and surveillance a fast multi-engined combat type aircraft equipped with floats offers more likelihood of successful operation than a transport type equipped with floats.

7. That a year would be required to develop such a piece of equipment at which time the necessity for the service may not exist.

Recommendations:

If this project is of sufficient importance to justify the time and expense involved, it is recommended that:

a. A further conference be held with the Poles to investigate in more detail the feasibility of water landings in Poland.

b. That immediate steps be taken to implement an engineering study to equip either the B-25, B-26, B-17 or B-24 airplanes with amphibious floats.

for
L. S. HUTER
Brigadier General, USA

Concurrences:

_____

_____

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Landing of Planes in Pozza

Comment No. 2 wtn. by Plans, 7/31/43, CVW/jw

To. Asst. Chief of Air Staff

From: Chief of the Air Staff.

2 August 1943
#3
MAL/mdg/5265

1. Note General Gilesobservations written on your Comment #2 above, which indicates that he coesn't consider you have complied with his directive.

2. General Gilesis well aware of the difficulties which surmount the project as outlined to him by the President. However, in view of the source of the original directive, it is imperative that more than ordinary efforts be made to comply with it.

3. No indication appears in you comment that this matter had been discussed with the Asst. Chief of Air Staff, M&D as directed in General Giles Comment #1.

4. It is desired, in the future, that in all cases of papers being transmitted to the Chief of the Air Staff signature or initials of either the Chief or Acting Chief of the Plans Division appear on such comments.

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Colon l, G. S. C,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

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To: Chief of the Air Staff

DATE [illegible]
Comment No. 2
CM/jw 5834

From: Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff

1. Reference to the above subject, a conference was held with the Polish Military Attache and representatives of the Polish Military Mission and Colonel Whitney of this office on July 31.

2. It was agreed that the proposal to equip airplanes with skiis for the purpose of taking Observers to and from Poland was impractical for the following reasons:

a. Suitable landing grounds in United Kingdom do not exist.

b. Landings in Poland could not be arranged under the surveillance of the Germans.

3. It was therefore agreed that the project should be dropped.

L. S. KUTER
Brigadier General, USA

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CONFIDENTIAL

ENG-T-1145, 4/7/43

SKIS

C-64A	210	(6 exp.)
C-47	10	
L-1A	48	
L-4A	100	
C-27	2	
P-40	252	(2 exp.)Retract.
P-39		(2 exp.)Retract.
C-73	5	sets (see ltr to Mat.Con.to Bay 4/21/43)
P-38, P-47, P-51 & P-63	30	sets ea (R&R Comment #10 fr Req.Div.dtd 6/10/43 & Teletype AFDMA-2-289 dtd 6/11/43)

WHEEL SKIS

AT-6	30	(2 exp.)
AT-7	22	(2 exp.)
C-64A	10	(emergency)

AMPH.FLOATS

C-47	42	(2 exp.)
L-1A	27	(3 exp.)

FLOATS

C-64A	50	
AT-7 (C-45)	3	plus 20 sets (directed by Req.Div. on 3/25/43 & W.F. directed by teletype 3/30/43)
L-5	1	set exp.

Action taken on this by R&R 3/19/43. No reply to date 4/15/43 - being followed up this date 4/15/43.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Giles

Subject: Transport Airplanes Equipped with Skis

1. Transports now in production which have been successfully operated on skis are the Douglas C-47 and C-53, and the Noorduyn C-64. Characteristics of these airplanes equipped with skis are:

	Engines	Gross Weight	Payload 500 Miles	Payload 1,000 Miles	Payload 2,000 Miles
C-47	2	29,000	8,000	6,900	4,500
C-64	1	7,400	1,500	600	---

2. Certain older models, no longer in production, have been equipped with skis, but as only a very few of these are still in existence, it is assumed that they would be of no interest in connection with the Poland Project. Curtiss C-46, Douglas C-54, Lockheed C-60 and Consolidated C-87 have not been equipped with skis. These, however, are now being produced in relatively limited numbers. Eighty per cent of the total number of medium and heavy transports from production at present are C-47s and C-53s.

3. There are now on order 210 sets of skis for C-64s and ten sets for C-47s, the latter being interchangeable for the C-53. Also on order are 42 sets of amphibious floats for C-47s or C-53s which can be used for ski type landings, but as these are considerably heavier (approximately ten to one) than the skis, it is not recommended that they be used.

4. A production capacity for approximately 20 sets of C-47 skis per month is now available. From two to three months would be required to increase this facility as additional tooling would be necessary.

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Memorandum for General Giles

Transport Airplanes Equipped with Skis

5. Cargo space available in tactical airplanes is so limited that they would be of very restricted value. The largest types in operation, including B-17s and B-24s, have not been equipped with skis.

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Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory

TO: Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff — Date 1/22/43

FROM: Chief of the Air Staff — Cmt. No. 3
WEH:JT 5246

Due to General Spaatz' present location, General Stratemeyer desires that the letter be addressed to the Commanding General, 8th Air Force instead of to General Spaatz personally.

Incls. n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Colonel, G. S. C.

TO: Chief of the Air Staff — DATE 1/2

FROM: Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff — Comment No. 4
GS/mnh 71127

Change has been accomplished as requested in above comment.

Incls.
n/c

O. A. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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Subject: Bombin of German Occupied Polish Territory

1-12-43
1
MAL:hjb 5265

Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff

Chief of Air Staff

1. Note the attached

2. For necessary action to comply with the Chief of Staff's statement to the effect that the problem has been referred to our Forces in England.

3. Reply will also be prepared returning these papers to Secretary of the General Staff stating action actually taken by the Army Air Forces.

MILLARD A. LIBBY
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Incl. n/c

TO: Chief of the Air Staff

DATE

FROM: Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff

Comment No. 2
CMT/jw/5834

1. Attached is a proposed letter in compliance with paragraph 2 of Item #1 above.

2. Attached also is disposition form to Secretary of the General Staff in compliance with paragraph 3 of Item #1 above.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incl. n/c
Added - proposed ltr. and
Disp.form to
Sec'y Gen.Stf.

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X sec. G/S

X Information

AFAEP
CMT/ju/5834

1. Attached is copy of letter from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to the Commanding General, 9th Air Force, in compliance with request of the Secretary of the General Staff.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

G. A. Anderson
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

Incls:
1-D.F., 1/10/43
w/ 6 incls.
2-copy of ltr to
CG/9th AF

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OPD 381 ETO (1-1-43)

Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory. 1-10-43.

X Chief of Air Staff, AAF.

X Necessary action.

1. Your attention is invited to Disposition Slip, Office of Secretary, General Staff enclosed herewith.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Enclosures:
1. D/S fm OCS, 1-9-43 (with orig memo)
2. Memo for C/S fm OPD, 1-5-43.
3. Ltr fm C/S to Gen Sikorski, 1-8-43 (dup)
4. Memo fr C/S fm CG, AAF.
5. Proposed memo fm C/S to Gen Sikorski (dup) (not used)
6. Aide memoire fr C/S fm Col Marecki. 12-30-42. w/overlay.

G. ORDWAY, JR.
Col., G.S.C.
Asst. Executive, OPD.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Operations Division
Washington

OPD 381 ETO (1-1-43) January 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory.

1. In compliance with your comment on General Arnold's memorandum, the feasibility of bombing German occupied Polish territory was discussed with Air Commodore Strafford of the British Mission.

2. Air Commodore Strafford stated that he considered General Sikorski's proposal to bomb settlements in Poland, which have been occupied by Germans, tactically unsound. The distances which aircraft would have to cover would be too long for effective bombing, and the settlements which have been indicated as targets would be difficult objectives for night bombers to locate. He felt that the results desired by the Poles from this undertaking could not probably be achieved, and that an attempt to employ bombardment aircraft on this mission would be an uneconomical use of the weapon.

3. Air Commodore Strafford concurred with the ideas expressed in General Arnold's suggested reply to General Sikorski. It is recommended that the letter be sent.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

1 Incl:
Memo fm Gen. Arnold to Gen. Marshall, 1-1-43, w/2 Incls, as listed.

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January 8, 1943.

WDCSA 381 ETO (1-5-43)

General Wladyslow Sikorski,
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief
of Polish Armed Forces,
Polish Embassy,
2633 Sixteenth Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Sikorski:

Colonel Marecki has transmitted to me by aide-memoire of December 30, 1942, your request for collaboration of the American Air Force in the proposed bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans in the eastern territories of the Polish General Government.

I am deeply shocked by the vivid description of the inhuman and criminal activities of the Germans in this area. I can well understand the danger, under such circumstances, that your people may be driven to acts of despair which it would be difficult indeed to restrain.

Your request for the bombing of designated areas in Poland to aid the morale of your people has been given most serious consideration. While the disposition of our Air Forces at the present time indicates unfavorable action in this premise, your request has been forwarded to our Forces in England to obtain their further opinion in the matter. I regret that more definite action cannot be taken at this time.

You understand, I am sure, that we are bending every effort to build up the largest possible striking force to hit the enemy. We intend to hit him and hit him again wherever we can reach him. By relentless attack on those areas that we can reach most effectively, we may hope

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to accomplish great destruction and to divert a substantial portion of the enemy's strength and so relieve, to an increasing extent, the tragic situation in your own country.

You may be assured that, in all of our planning, the strategic importance of Poland and the urgent necessity of giving her all possible support in her valiant struggle for freedom will not be overlooked.

Faithfully yours,

(sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

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(Pre ved by Advisory Council)

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces
Washington

January 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Subject: Bombing of German-occupied Polish Territory.

Herewith is a draft of suggested reply to General Sikorski's request for collaboration of our Air Forces in the bombing of German-occupied Polish territory.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incls.
1-Ltr fr Marshall
to Gen Sikorski
2-Ltr fr Col. Marecki
to Marshall, w/
Annex

Note written in ink: (OPD - Consider this and discuss it with British)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Staff
Washington

COPY

NOT USED

General Wladyslow Sikorski,
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief
of Polish Armed Forces,
Polish Embassy,
2633 Sixteenth Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Sikorski:

Colonel Marecki has transmitted to me by aide-memoire of December 30, 1942, your request for collaboration of the American Air Force in the proposed bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans in the eastern territories of the Polish General Government.

I am deeply shocked by the vivid description of the inhuman and criminal activities of the Germans in this area. I can well understand the danger, under such circumstances, that your people may be driven to acts of despair which it would be difficult indeed to restrain.

It is, therefore, only with the greatest regret that I have been forced to accept the conclusion, reached with equal reluctance by General Arnold, that the present disposition and capabilities of our Air Forces will not permit us to render the desired assistance. Our nearest available base is in England, over 1000 miles from the area in question. Effective bombing attacks requiring such a deep penetration of enemy territory would not be possible with forces now available.

You understand, I am sure, that we are bending every effort to build up the largest possible striking force to hit the enemy. We intend to hit him and hit him again wherever we can reach him. By relentless attack on those areas that we can reach most effectively, we may hope to accomplish great destruction and to divert a substantial portion of the enemy's strength and so relieve, to an increasing extent, the tragic situation in your own country.

You may be assured that, in all of our planning, the strategic importance of Poland and the urgent necessity of giving her all possible support in her valiant struggle for freedom will not be overlooked.

NOT USED

Sincerely your,

Chief of Staff

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Aide-Memoire for General George Marshall

Chief of Staff, United States Army.

General Sikorski asked me to impart to you the unusually dangerous situation which has arisen during the past month on the territory of our Country.

According to a message received on 25th December from the C.O.C. our Forces in Poland, the Germans have commenced a whole-scale extermination of the population and the settlement in their place of Germans in the eastern territories of the General Gouvernement. Since November 20th they deported some 10,000 farmers' families from the area indicated on the attached sketch. It is a planned undertaking with the purpose of surrounding from the east the most active part of Poland with German element. The extermination is connected with the breaking up of families, transportation of children to the Reich and execution by firing squads of all who resist and is conducted in a most inhuman and criminal manner. This action is provoking a mass flight of the population, seeking shelter in the forests.

The C.O.C. our Forces in Poland has given order for active resistance and increased diversive activity, at the same time appealing for assistance in the undertaken defensive operations. The situation is so critical that it may lead to the outbreak of an insurrection, as an act of despair which it would be difficult for General Sikorski to hold back.

We are consequently threatened either with the premature destruction of our forces in the Country in a struggle resulting from the necessity of self-defense, or else those forces will gradually diminish through disorganisation and waste, as a result of the planned annihilation of the people. We would no longer be able, in either case, to rely upon the participation of the Country in the future operations of the Allies on European Continent, setting aside the sacrifice of the nation.

This course might be avoided by giving immediate assistance to the self-defense of the Country through the bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans. Since this goes beyond our own possibilities, the Commander-in-Chief is obliged to appeal to you for obtaining the execution of this undertaking through the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the collaboration of the American Air Force, in order to prevent an abortive engagement of our Armed Forces in the Country, which from the operational point of view would at the present moment be desparate.

The targets would be indicated by our General Staff following the signal of our C.O.C. in the Country.

General Sikorski is simultaneously drawing the attention to this matter of Field Marshal Sir John Dill as British Ranking Member, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Washington, D. C.
30 December, 1942.

Andrzej Marecki
Colonel

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Most Secret

Annex to Aide-Memoire, dated 30 December, 1942

for the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

For General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff, United States Army.

Warszawa

Lublin
Area of Polish Action against
the extermination of the
Polish Population and settlement
of German colonists.

Krakow

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Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory.

Major General Carl Spaatz
The Commanding General, 8th Air Force
A.P.O. 8637, c/o P.M., N. Y.

1. It is desired that you furnish this Headquarters with your opinion in the matter of Army Air Force collaboration in the proposed bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans in the eastern territories of the Polish General Government. Your opinion is requested in compliance with paragraph 2 of the enclosed letter from General Marshall to General Sikorski.

2. There is also enclosed for your information a copy of an Aide-Memoire from Colonel Marecki setting forth General Sikorski's request.

Encl. 1. ltr frm
Gen. Marshall (copy)
2. ltr frm
Col. Marecki (copy)

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Subject: Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory

1-12-43
1
MAL:hjb 5265

Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff

Chief of Air Staff

1. Note the attached

2. For necessary action to comply with the Chief of Staff's statement to the effect that the problem has been referred to our Forces in England.

3. Reply will also be prepared returning these papers to Secretary of the General Staff stating action actually taken by the Army Air Forces.

MILLARD A. LIBBY
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Incl. n/c

TO: Chief of the Air Staff

DATE

FROM: Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff

Comment No. 2
CNT/jw/5834

1. Attached is a proposed letter in compliance with paragraph 2 of Item #1 above.

2. Attached also is disposition form to Secretary of the General Staff in compliance with paragraph 3 of Item #1 above.

O. A. ANDERSON
Brig. General, U.S.A.

Incl. n/c
Added - proposed ltr. and
Disp.form to
Sec'y Gen.Stf.

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X sec. G/S

X Information

AFASF
CRT/jw/5834

1. Attached is copy of letter from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to the Commanding General, 8th Air Force, in compliance with request of the Secretary of the General Staff.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

D. A. Anderson
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

Incls:
1-D.F., 1/10/43
w/ 6 incls.
2-cpy of ltr to
CG/8th AF

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OPD 381 ETO (1-1-43)

Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory. 1-10-43.

X Chief of Air Staff, AAF.

X Necessary action.

1. Your attention is invited to Disposition Slip, Office of Secretary, General Staff enclosed herewith.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff.

G. ORDWAY, JR.
Col., G.S.C.
Asst. Executive, OPD.

Enclosures:
1. D/S fm OCS, 1-8-43
2. Memo for C/S fm OPD, 1-5-43.
3. Ltr fm C/S to Gen Sikorski, 1-8-43 (dup)
4. Memo fr C/S fm CG, AAF.
5. Proposed memo fm C/S to Gen Sikorski (dup) (not used)
6. Aide memoire fr C/S fm Col Marecki. 12-30-42. w/overlay.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Operations Division
Washington

OPD 391 ETO (1-1-43) January 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory.

1. In compliance with your comment on General Arnold's memorandum, the feasibility of bombing German occupied Polish territory was discussed with Air Commodore Strafford of the British Mission.

2. Air Commodore Strafford stated that he considered General Sikorski's proposal to bomb settlements in Poland, which have been occupied by Germans, tactically unsound. The distances which aircraft would have to cover would be too long for effective bombing, and the settlements which have been indicated as targets would be difficult objectives for night bombers to locate. He felt that the results desired by the Poles from this undertaking could not probably be achieved, and that an attempt to employ bombardment aircraft on this mission would be an uneconomical use of the weapon.

3. Air Commodore Strafford concurred with the ideas expressed in General Arnold's suggested reply to General Sikorski. It is recommended that the letter be sent.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

1 Incl:
Memo fm Gen. Arnold to Gen. Marshall, 1-1-43, w/2 Incls, as listed.

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January 8, 1943.

WDSSA 381 WPD (1-8-43)

General Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief
of Polish Armed Forces,
Polish Embassy,
2633 Sixteenth Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Sikorski:

Colonel Marecki has transmitted to me by aide-memoire of December 30, 1942, your request for collaboration of the American Air Force in the proposed bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans in the eastern territories of the Polish General Government.

I am deeply shocked by the vivid description of the inhuman and criminal activities of the Germans in this area. I can well understand the danger, under such circumstances, that your people may be driven to acts of despair which it would be difficult indeed to restrain.

Your request for the bombing of designated areas in Poland to aid the morale of your people has been given most serious consideration. While the disposition of our Air Forces at the present time indicates unfavorable action in this premise, your request has been forwarded to our Forces in England to obtain their further opinion in the matter. I regret that more definite action cannot be taken at this time.

You understand, I am sure, that we are bending every effort to build up the largest possible striking force to hit the enemy. We intend to hit him and hit him again wherever we can reach him. By relentless attack on those areas that we can reach most effectively, we may hope

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to accomplish great destruction and to divert a substantial portion of the enemy's strength and so relieve, to an increasing extent, the tragic situation in your own country.

You may be assured that, in all of our planning, the strategic importance of Poland and the urgent necessity of giving her all possible support in her valiant struggle for freedom will not be overlooked.

Faithfully yours,

(sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

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(Approved by Advisory Council)

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces
Washington

January 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Subject: Bombing of German-occupied Polish Territory.

Herewith is a draft of suggested reply to General Sikorski's request for collaboration of our Air Forces in the bombing of German-occupied Polish territory.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incls.
1-Ltr fr Marshall
to Gen Sikorski
2-Ltr fr Col. Mareski
to Marshall, w/
Annex

Note written in ink: (OPD - Consider this and discuss it with British)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Staff
Washington

General Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief
of Polish Armed Forces,
Polish Embassy,
2639 Sixteenth Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

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Dear General Sikorski:

Colonel Marecki has transmitted to me by aide-memoire of December 30, 1942, your request for collaboration of the American Air Force in the proposed bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans in the eastern territories of the Polish General Gouvernement.

I am deeply shocked by the vivid description of the inhuman and criminal activities of the Germans in this area. I can well understand the danger, under such circumstances, that your people may be driven to acts of despair which it would be difficult indeed to restrain.

It is, therefore, only with the greatest regret that I have been forced to accept the conclusion, reached with equal reluctance by General Arnold, that the present disposition and capabilities of our Air Forces will not permit us to render the desired assistance. Our nearest available base is in England, over 1000 miles from the area in question. Effective bombing attacks requiring such a deep penetration of enemy territory would not be possible with forces now available.

You understand, I am sure, that we are bending every effort to build up the largest possible striking force to hit the enemy. We intend to hit him and hit him again wherever we can reach him. By relentless attack on those areas that we can reach most effectively, we may hope to accomplish great destruction and to divert a substantial portion of the enemy's strength and so relieve, to an increasing extent, the tragic situation in your own country.

You may be assured that, in all of our planning, the strategic importance of Poland and the urgent necessity of giving her all possible support in her valiant struggle for freedom will not be overlooked.

Sincerely your,

Chief of Staff

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Aide-Memoire for General George Marshall

Chief of Staff, United States Army.

General Sikorski asked me to impart to you the unusually dangerous situation which has arisen during the past month on the territory of our Country.

According to a message received on 25th December from the C.O.C. our Forces in Poland, the Germans have commenced a whole-scale extermination of the population and the settlement in their place of Germans in the eastern territories of the General Gouvernement. Since November 28th they deported some 10,000 farmers' families from the area indicated on the attached sketch. It is a planned undertaking with the purpose of surrounding from the east the most active part of Poland with German element. The extermination is connected with the breaking up of families, transportation of children to the Reich and execution by firing squads of all who resist and is conducted in a most inhuman and criminal manner. This action is provoking a mass flight of the population, seeking shelter in the forests.

The C.O.C. our Forces in Poland has given order for active resistance and increased diversive activity, at the same time appealing for assistance in the undertaken defensive operations. The situation is so critical that it may lead to the outbreak of an insurrection, as an act of despair which it would be difficult for General Sikorski to hold back.

We are consequently threatened either with the premature destruction of our forces in the Country in a struggle resulting from the necessity of self-defense, or else those forces will gradually diminish through disorganisation and waste, as a result of the planned annihilation of the people. We would no longer be able, in either case, to rely upon the participation of the Country in the future operations of the Allies on European Continent, setting aside the sacrifice of the nation.

This course might be avoided by giving immediate assistance to the self-defense of the Country through the bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans. Since this goes beyond our own possibilities, the Commander-in-Chief is obliged to appeal to you for obtaining the execution of this undertaking through the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the collaboration of the American Air Force, in order to prevent an abortive engagement of our Armed Forces in the Country, which from the operational point of view would at the present moment be desperate.

The targets would be indicated by our General Staff following the signal of our C.O.C. in the Country.

General Sikorski is simultaneously drawing the attention to this matter of Field Marshal Sir John Dill as British Ranking Member, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Washington, D. C.
30 December, 1942.

Andrzej Marecki
Colonel

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Annex to Aide-Memoire, dated 30 December, 1942

for the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

For General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff, United States Army.



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Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory.

Major General Carl Spaatz
The Commanding General, 8th Air Force
A.P.O. 8887, c/o P.M., N. Y.

1. It is desired that you furnish this Headquarters with your opinion in the matter of Army Air Force collaboration in the proposed bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans in the eastern territories of the Polish General Government. Your opinion is requested in compliance with paragraph 2 of the enclosed letter from General Marshall to General Sikorski.

2. There is also enclosed for your information a copy of an Aide-Memoire from Colonel Marecki setting forth General Sikorski's request.

Encl. 1. ltr frm
Gen. Marshall
2. ltr frm
Col. Marecki

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

P.R.C.

AIR SITUATION

IN THE

PACIFIC

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AIR SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC

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AIR SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC

INDEX

P.R.C

1. Commitments and Status of Aircraft

Present commitments and status of aircraft in the Pacific (Army and Navy) are contained in Tab "A".

2. Flow of Aircraft

It is contemplated that aircraft and crews will be sent to theaters as contained in Tab "B".

3. Recommended Deployment of Aircraft for 1943

The sub-committee appointed as a result of directive contained in CPS 58/D, deployment of U.S. Forces in 1943, recommended minimum forces for the South Pacific and maximum forces for the Southwest Pacific (Tab "C").

4. Capacity of South Pacific Theater

The approximate capacity of the South Pacific theater is contained in Tab "D", according to latest available information.

5. Contemplated Operations

The Combined Chiefs of Staff on July 7, 1942, in consideration of strategic concept (CCS/91) for the U. S. and Great Britain, decided to (a) conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic-Western European Theater and (b) to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters. Plans for operations in the Pacific area were approved as contained in JCS/112 which outlines the tasks planned by joint Army and Navy action (Tab "E").

6. Concept of Future Operations

CCS 155/1 dated January 19, 1943, outlines concept of future operations in the Pacific.

7. Japanese Capabilities

Japanese capabilities in the Pacific together with hostile air strength are contained in Tab "F".

8. Navy use of Army Air Strength, 13th Air Force

The South Pacific has been under Admiral Halsey's operational control since October 1, 1942. His method of using the bombardment aircraft of the 13th Air Force is contained in Tab "G".

9. Japanese sea strength, naval and maritime installations in Micronesia shown in Tab "H".

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TAB (A)

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SECRET

PRESENT COMMITMENTS AND STATUS OF AIRCRAFT

CENTRAL PACIFIC
Combat A/C only

1. ARMY

*Commitments (As of July 1, 1943)

Units	Unit Eq	Reserve	Total A/C
1 H/B Gp	48	18	66
1 D/B Sq	13	11	24
3 Ftr Gps plus 2 Sq	350	172	522
1 T/C Sq	13	2	15
TOTALS	424	203	627

Status (As of March 14, 1943)

Units	OH	NMR	Total A/C in Theater
H/B	43	0	43
D/B	10	8	18
Ftrs	244	0	244
T/C	14	0	14
	311	8	319

2. NAVY

Commitments (JCS 97/8)

No commitments made.

Status (As of March 13, 1943)

Units	OH	NMR	Total A/C in Theater
VPB	89	0	89
VTB	31	0	31
VSB	112	0	112
VF	30	0	30
	262	0	262

RECAPITULATION

Total Combat A/C in Theater:

Army 319

Navy 262

Royal Navy 36

617

* No increase in commitment of units after July 1, 1943 is anticipated.

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PRESENT COMMITMENTS AND STATUS OF AIRCRAFT

SOUTH PACIFIC

Combat A/C only

1. ARMY

*Commitments (as of July 1, 1943)

Status (as of March 14, 1943)

Units	Unit Eq	Reserve	Total A/C	Units	OH	NR	Total A/C in Theater
2 H/B Gps (6 Sq of 12)	72	0	72	H/B	66	5	71
1 M/B Gp	52	0	52	M/B	30	16	46
2 Ftr Gps (6 Sq of 25)	150	0	150	Ftrs	241	0	241
1 T/C Sq	13	0	13	T/C	18	0	18
TOTALS	287	0	287		355	21	376

2. NAVY

Commitments (JCS 97/8)

Status (as of March 13, 1943)

Units	Unit Eq		Total A/C	Units	OH	NR	Total A/C in Theater
VPB	60		60	VPB	63	0	63
VTB	12		12	VTB	117	11	128
VSB	63		63	VSB	237	13	250
VF	72		72	VF	274	11	285
TOTALS	207		207		691	35	726

RECAPITULATION

Total combat A/C in theater:

Army 376

Navy 726

RNZAF 205

1307

367 **

1674

* No increase in commitment of units after July 1, 1943 is anticipated.

** 86 VTB, 111 VSB, and 170 VF carrier-based aircraft (as of March 3, 1943)

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PRESENT COMMITMENTS AND STATUS OF AIRCRAFT

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Combat A/C only

1. ARMY

* Commitments (as of July 1, 1943) Status (as of March 14, 1943)

Units	Unit Eq	Reserve	Total A/C	Units	OH	UNS	Total A/C in Theater
2 H/B Gps	96	55	151	H/B	102	7	109
2 M/B Gps less 2 Sq	88	44	132	M/B	81	0	81
1 D/B Gp	64	34	98	D/B	28	0	28
3 Ftr Gps	225	112	337	Ftrs	350	0	350
3 T/C Gps	156	23	179	T/C	99	0	99
TOTALS	629	268	897		660	7	667

2. NAVY

Commitments (JCS 97/8) Status (as of March 13, 1943)

Units	Unit Eq	Total A/C	Units	OH	UNS	Total A/C in Theater
VPB		24	VPB	13		13
TOTALS		24		13		13

RECAPITULATION

Total Combat A/C in Theater:

Army	667
Navy	13
RAAF	441
Dutch	12
	1133

* No increase in commitment of units after July 1, 1943 is anticipated.

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PRESENT COMMITMENTS AND STATUS OF AIRCRAFT

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Combat Aircraft Only

1. ARMY

* Commitments (as of July 1, 1943) Status (as of March 3, 1943)

Units	Unit Eq	Reserve	Total A/C	Units	OH	UNR	Total A/C in Theater
2 H/B Gps	96	55	151	H/B	105	0	105
2 M/B Gps less 2 Sq	88	44	132	M/B	82	2	84
1 D/B Gp	64	34	98	D/B	29	0	29
3 Ftr Gps	225	112	337	Ftrs	355	8	363
3 T/C Gps	156	23	179	T/C	102	0	102
TOTALS	629	268	897		673	10	683

2. NAVY

Commitments (JCS 97/8) Status (as of March 3, 1943)

Units	Unit Eq		Total A/C	Units	OH	UNR	Total A/C in Theater
VPB			24	VPB	13		13
TOTALS			24		13		13

RECAPITULATION

Total combat A/C in theater:

Army 683

Navy 13

R.A.A.F. 436

Dutch 14

1146

NOTE: No increase in commitment of units is anticipated.

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TAB (B)

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TAB "B"

Inclosure #1 - Flow of aircraft and replacement combat crews

Inclosure #2 - Airplane Allocation Chart

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	MARCH				APRIL				MAY				JUNE				JULY				
	A/C		CREWS		A/C		CREWS		A/C		CREWS		A/C		CREWS		A/C		CREWS		
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW	TOTAL	FLOW
*HEAVY BOMBARDMENT	0	114	11	78	0	114	0	68	14	114	16	73	35	135			15	136			22
*MEDIUM BOMBARDMENT	7	81	14	83	17	82	0	70	25	90	13	70	18	90			18	90			13
DIVE BOMBARDMENT	0	34	10	79	0	29	19	79	0	24	9	79	0	20	9	79	0	16	9	79	0
FIGHTER	0	328	36	450	25	308	24	450	10	273	36	450	25	253	41	455	75	283	46	465	77
TRANSPORT	10	105	8	104	10	105	8	104	10	105	8	104	10	105	8	104	10	105	8	104	10
SOUTH PACIFIC																					
*HEAVY BOMBARDMENT	40	96	28	62	6	98	16	68	14	98	11	68	10	94			7	87			12
*MEDIUM BOMBARDMENT	15	52	12	34	6	48	4	29	14	52	4	24	10	52			10	52			10
DIVE BOMBARDMENT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FIGHTER	0	243	24	150	20	233	24	150	20	223	24	150	32	225	24	150	48	243	24	150	40
TRANSPORT	3	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1
CENTRAL PACIFIC																					
*HEAVY BOMBARDMENT	2	48	0	34	3	49	0	34	3	50	0	33	2	50			2	49			10
*MEDIUM BOMBARDMENT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DIVE BOMBARDMENT	1	19	0	26	1	19	1	26	1	18	1	26	1	18	1	26	1	17	1	26	1
FIGHTER	0	248	6	225	0	235	6	225	20	243	6	225	0	231	6	225	30	249	6	225	32
TRANSPORT	0	8	0	13	1	8	1	13	0	8	0	13	1	8	1	13	0	8	0	13	6

NOTE: Above figures were developed for planning purposes. Number A/C and RCC dispatched will vary in proportion to their availability and actual Theater Requirements based on losses. Output of OTU shown as allotment for following month (estimated date of arrival in Theater).

*RCC figures available through May only.

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JUNE			JULY			AUGUST			SEPTEMBER			OCTOBER			NOVEMBER			DECEMBER			JANUARY 1944		
	CREWS		A/C		CREWS	A/C		CREWS	A/C		CREWS	A/C		CREWS	A/C		CREWS	A/C		CREWS	A/C		CREWS
TAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN TOTAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN TOTAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN TOTAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN TOTAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN TOTAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN TOTAL	PLAN	TOTAL	PLAN TOTAL
35			15	136		22	144		11	141		12	130		13	138		13	137		13	136	
90			18	90		18	90		18	90		18	90		18	90		18	90		18	90	
20	9	79	0	16	9	79	0	14	9	79	0	11	9	72	0	9	9	74	74	81	9	79	12	80	9	73	28	95	9	79
53	41	455	75	283	46	465	77	315	46	475	68	337	46	485	89	380	46	435	76	405	45	500	92	446	44	500	95	487	44	500
05	8	104	10	105	8	104	10	105	8	104	25	120	8	104	10	120	8	104	10	120	8	104	10	120	8	104	10	120	8	104
94			7	87			12	85			12	83			30	99			13	98			13	97			13	96		
52			10	52			10	52			10	52			10	52			10	52			10	52			10	52		
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35	24	150	48	243	24	150	40	253	24	150	52	275	24	150	43	287	24	150	45	299	24	150	33	299	24	150	33	299	24	150
3	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	1	13	3	15	1	13	1	15	1	13	1	15	1	13	1	15	1	13	1	15	1	13
0			2	49			10	57			6	61			2	61			2	61			2	61			2	61		
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	1	26	1	17	1	26	1	16	1	26	1	16	1	26	1	16	1	26	1	16	1	26	1	16	1	26	1	16	1	26
1	6	225	30	249	6	225	32	268	6	225	31	286	6	225	41	312	6	225	50	355	6	225	51	301	6	225	18	302	6	225
8	1	13	0	8	0	13	6	13	1	13	0	13	0	13	3	15	1	13	1	15	0	13	1	15	1	13	0	15	1	13

OPERATIONAL PLANS DIV.- AIR STAFF. 10 MAR. '43

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HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANE
SUMMARY

ACTIVITY & LOCATION	AIR FORCE	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS AS OF JANUARY 31, 1943	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY
COMBAT PROGRAM									
Central Pacific	7th	B-17 70 25 95	- 2	- - 2	- - 2	- - 2	- - 2	1 - 1 - -	
		B-24 90 24 120	3 1 43	2 3 1 47	2 3 1 48	2 2 1 48	2 2 1 48	2 2 10	
South Pacific	13th	B-17	- 43	34 7 - 27	5 - 22	4 - 18	3 - 15 2 -		
		B-24 72	46 2 7	72 7 6 2 71	9 14 2 76	10 10 2 76	11 7 2 72	12 12	
Australia	5th	B-17	- 60	53 7 - 46	7 - 39	6 - 33	5 - 28 4 -		
		B-24 70 40 110 90 24 120	12 2 56	61 7 14 2 68	7 11 2 75	5 35 2 102	9 19 2 108 10 22		

SECRET

MEDIUM BOMBER AIRPLANE ALLOCA
Summary

ACTIVITY & LOCATION	AIR FORCE	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS AS OF JANUARY 31, 1943	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY
COMBAT PROGRAM									
AUSTRALIA	5th	B-17							
		B-26							
SOUTH PACIFIC	13th	B-17							
		B-26							

Dive Bombardment Airplane Allocat
SUMMARY

O-CIRCLED FIGURES ARE MINUS (TRANSFERS)

ACTIVITY & LOCATION	NAME OF UNIT	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS AS OF 1/31/43	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
Australia	5AF	A-20.	10. 1 23	5 0 1 28	5 0 1 23	4 0 1 19	4 0 1 15	3 0 1 12 2
		A-24	7 1 0	6 0 0	6 1 0	5 0 0	5 1 0	4 0
		A-25 57 14 71						
Hawaii	7AF	A-20.	0 4 3	0 0 3	0 0 3	1 0 2	0 0 2	1 0 1 1
		A-24 16	16 0 1 1 4 16	1 1 4 16	1 1 4 16	1 1 4 16	1 1 4 16	1 1
Total us Japan			26 1 4 33 7	1 1 4 53	6 1 1 4 48	7 1 1 4 42	5 1 1 4 38	6 1 1 4 33 4

SECRET

FIGHTER AIRPLANE ALLOCA
Summary

ACTIVITY & LOCATION	AIR FORCE	REQUIREMENTS	STATUS AS OF JANUARY 31, 1943	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY
COMBAT PROGRAM									

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ER AIRPLANE ALLOCATION
SUMMARY SECRET

P. R. E. - PLANES READY AND BEING PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
* Included in following months On Hand
E. L. - ESTIMATED LOSSES
FL - TOTAL FLOWING TO THEATRE (replacement plus increase)
ON HAND (in foreign theatres this includes planes enroute)

MONTHS

MAY				JUNE				JULY				AUGUST				SEPTEMBER				OCTOBER				NOVEMBER				DECEMBER				JANUARY			
		ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND	
P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL	
-		2		1	-			1	-	-																									
2	1	68		2	2	1		68	2	10	1	92	2	6	1	N		3		N		3		60	2	2	1	60	2	1	1	74			
-		16		3	-			16	2	-		13	2	-		11		5		1	3	-		1	3	-		1	3	-		4			
10	2	76		11	7	2		72	12	12	2	72	12	12	2	90	11	12	2	90	11	12	2	90	11	12	2	90	11	12	2	90	11	12	2
-		33		6	-			28	4	-		76	3	-		77		19	3	-		18	3	-		17	1	-		16	3	-		15	
35	2	102		9	14	2		100	18	22	2	120	11	11	2	120	11	11	2	120	11	11	2	120	11	11	2	120	11	11	2	120	11	11	2

RPLANE ALLOCATION
mary

P. R. E. - PLANES READY AND BEING PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
* Included in following months On Hand
E. L. - ESTIMATED LOSSES
FL - TOTAL FLOWING TO THEATRE (replacement plus increase)
ON HAND (in foreign theatres this includes planes enroute)

MONTHS

				JUNE				JULY				AUGUST				SEPTEMBER				OCTOBER				NOVEMBER				DECEMBER				JANUARY			
		ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND	
P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL	

lane Allocation

P.R.E. - PLANES READY AND BEING PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
E.L. - ESTIMATED LOSSES
FL - TOTAL FLOWING TO THEATRE (replacement plus increase)
ON HAND (in foreign theatres this includes planes enroute)
* Includes A.W.P.

MONTHS

May				June				July				Aug				Sept				Oct				Nov				Dec				Jan			
		ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND	
P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL	
4	0	1	15	3	0	1	12	2	0	1	10	2	0	1	8	2	0	1	6	1	0	1	5	1	0	1	4	0	0	1	4	1	0	1	3
0	0		5	1	0		4	0	0		4	1	0		3	0	0		3	1	0		2	1	0		2	1	0		1	1	0		1
																				0	74		74	12	12		74	12	28		90	12	10		90
0	0		2	1	0		1	1	0		0																								
1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16
5	1	1¼	38	6	1	1¼	33	4	1	1¼	30	4	1	1¼	27	3	1	1¼	25	3	75	1¼	97	14	13	1¼	96	14	29	1¼	111	14	13	1¼	110

SECRET

RPLANE ALLOCATION
Summary

P. R. E. - PLANES READY AND BEING PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
* Included in following months On Hand
E. L. - ESTIMATED LOSSES
FL - TOTAL FLOWING TO THEATRE (replacement plus increase)
ON HAND (in foreign theatres this includes planes enroute)

MONTHS

				JUNE				JULY				AUGUST				SEPTEMBER				OCTOBER				NOVEMBER				DECEMBER				JANUARY			
		ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND				ON HAND	
P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL		P.R.E.	E.L.	FL	

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Dive Bombardment Airplane Alloc

SUMMARY

O-Circled Figures are minus (transfers)

Activity & Location	Name of Unit	Requirements: Basic No.	Unit Equip.	Maintenance	Status as of 1/31/43	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
Australia	5AF	A-20			10 1 23	5 0 1 28	5 0 1 23	4 0 1 19	4 0 1 15	3 0 1
		A-24			7	1 0 6	0 0 6	1 0 5	0 0 5	1 0
		A-25	57	14 71						
Hawaii	7AF	A-20			0 4 3	0 0 3	0 0 3	1 0 2	0 0 2	1 0
		A-24			16 0	1 1 4 16	1 1 4 16	1 1 4 16	1 1 4 16	1 1 4
Total US Japan					26 1 4 33	7 1 4 53	6 1 4 48	7 1 4 42	5 1 4 38	6 1 4

SECRET

FIGHTER AIRPLANE ALL

Summary

Activity & Location	Air Force	Requirements: Basic Mark	Unit Equip.	Maintenance	Total	Status as of January 31, 1943	February	March	April	May	June
COMBAT PROGRAM											
AUSTRALIA	5th	P-38	75	82	157	6 1 1 3	1 - 1 9	1 1 0 1 7	1 1 0 1 9	1 1 0 1 9	1 1 0 1
		P-39	75	82	157	1 16	2 1 11	2 1 0 1 12	2 - 1 11	2 1 1 11	1 1
		P-40	75	83	158	1 9	1 1 6	1 1 7	1 1 6	1 1 5	1
(Night Fighter Sq)		P-61	12	6	18						
SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS	13th	P-38	25	15	40	5	5	5	5	5	5
		P-39	75	45	120	1 12	2 1 1	2 1 1	2 1 1	2 1 1	1 1
		P-40	50	30	80	9	8	7	6	6	6
CENTRAL PACIFIC	7th	P-39	150	75	225	1 42	1 40	1 38	1 36	1 34	1 32
		P-40	175	87	262	2 19	2 18	2 16	2 14	2 12	2 10
(Night Fighter Sq)		P-61	12	6	18	21	20	19	17	16	15

Addition:
Active Theatres - 10%
Areas - 5%
Maintenance Reserve - 15%

ALLOCATION OF TRANSPORT A

SECRET

Activity & Location	[redacted] number or Group	Requirements: Basic Mark	Unit Equip.	Maintenance	Total	Status as of January 31, 1943	February [b]	March [b]	April [b]	May [b]	June [b]	July
TROOP CARRIER COMMAND												
Southwest Pacific												
374th and 317th Groups	7-8		104	16	120	2 105	105	105	105	105	105	
		C-47				(2) (67)	10 10	10 10	10 10	10 10	10 10	
		C-53				(3)						
		C-60				(10)						
		Other usable types				(25)						
South Pacific												
13th Squadron		C-47	13	2	15	2 1/4 11	1 3 13	1 1 13	1 1 13	1 1 13	1 1 13	1 1
		Other				2						
Hawaii												
19th Squadron			13	2	15	1/4 8	8	8	8	8	8	
		C-47				(1)		1 1		1 1		1 1
		C-53				(4)						5
		Other usable				(3)						
		Other				6						

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Airplane Allocation

E L = ESTIMATED LOSSES

F L = TOTAL FLOWING TO THEATRE. (replacements plus increase)

ON HAND (in foreign theatres this includes planes enroute & includes R.R.D.

MONTHS

Apr.				May				June				July				Aug				Sept.				Oct.				Nov.				Dec.				Jan			
			GR PLANES				USF PLANES				USF PLANES				GR PLANES																									
4	0	1	19	4	0	1	15	3	0	1	12	2	0	1	10	2	0	1	8	2	0	1	6	1	0	1	5	1	0	1	4	0	0	1	4	1	0	1	3
1	0		0	0	0		5	1	0		4	0	0		4	1	0		3	0	0		3	1	0		2	0	0		2	1	0		1	0	0		1
1	0		2	0	0		2	1	0		1	1	0		0									0	74		74	12	12		74	12	28		90	12	10		90
1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16	1	1	¼	16
7	1	¼	42	5	1	¼	38	6	1	¼	33	4	1	¼	30	4	1	¼	27	3	1	¼	25	3	75	¼	97	14	13	¼	96	14	29	¼	111	14	13	¼	110

SECRET

TER AIRPLANE ALLOCATION

Summary

P R L = PLANES READY AND BEING PREPARED FOR DELIVERY * included in following months "On Hand"

E L = ESTIMATED LOSSES

F L = TOTAL FLOWING TO THEATRE (replacements plus increase)

ON HAND (in foreign theatres this includes planes enroute)

MONTHS

	MAY				JUNE				JULY				AUGUST				SEPTEMBER				OCTOBER				NOVEMBER				DECEMBER				JANUARY			
HAND	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES	EL	FL	ON HAND GPS	PLANES
	15	10	1	81	15	10	1	71	15	10	1	71	15	10	1	66	15	15	1	66	15	15	1	66	15	15	1	66	15	15	1	66	15	15	1	66	15	15	1	66
11	20	15	1	114	15	15	1	114	15	15	1	114	15	15	1	111	15	15	1	111	15	15	1	111	15	15	1	111	15	15	1	111	15	15	1	111	15	15	1	111
14	10		1	69	15	60	1	93	15	60	1	118	15	60	1	143	15	40	1	166	15	40	1	191	15	40	1	218	15	40	1	243	15	15	1	243	15	15	1	243
								12				12	1	3		14	1	19		32	6	6		32	6	22		48	9	25		64	12	28		80				
	52			52				52				52				52				52				52	5	5		52	5	5		52	5	5		52				
17	15	15	2	104	15	15	2	114	15	15	2	104	15	15	2	104	15	15	2	114	15	15	2	105	15	15	2	105	15	15	2	105	15	15	2	105	15	15	2	105
66	10	12		68	10	28		96	10	20		96	10	20		106	10	20		116	10	20		126	10	10		126	10	10		126	10	10		126	10	10		126
														12		12	1	3		14	3	3		16	3	3		16	3	3		16	3	3		16				
56	3	1		63	3	10	1	60	3	10	1	67	3	10	1	74	4	20	1	90	5	39	1	124	5	30	1	149	6	7	1	150	7	7	1	150				
169	8			141	8	30	2	173	9	20	2	181	9	20	2	195	10	20	2	205	10	20	2	215	10	20	2	225	10	10	2	225	10	10	2	225				
15	1			17	1			16	1	2		17	1	1		17	1	1		17	1	1		17	1	1		17	1	1		17	1	1		17				

ON OF TRANSPORT AIRPLANES

SECRET

PAGE 1 of 2

P R L = PLANES READY AND BEING PREPARED FOR DELIVERY * included in following months "On Hand"

E L = ESTIMATED LOSSES

F L = TOTAL FLOWING TO THEATRE (replacements plus increase)

ON HAND (in foreign theatres this includes planes enroute)

MONTHS

	MAY b				JUNE b				JULY b				AUGUST b				SEPTEMBER b				OCTOBER b				NOVEMBER b				DECEMBER b				JANUARY b			
	EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND		EL	FL	ON HAND	
				105				105				105				120				120				120				120				120				120
	10	10			10	10			10	10			10	25			10	10			10	10			10	10			10	10			10	10		
				13				13				13				15				15				15				15				15				15
	1	1			1	1			1	1			1	3			1	1			1	1			1	1			1	1			1	1		
				8				8				13				13				15				15				15				15				15
	1	1							1	1							1	3			1	1			1	1							1	1		
									5																											

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TAB
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DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES IN 1943

UNIT	SOUTHWEST PACIFIC								SOUTH PACIFIC								CE	
	Present and En-route by Mar. 31, '43		April 1, 1943 June 30/43		July 1, '43 to Sept 30, '43		Oct. 1, '43 to Dec 31, '43		Present and En-route by Mar. 31, '43		Apr 1 '43 to June 30 '43		July 1, 43 to Sept 30 '43		Oct 1 '43 to Dec 31 '43		Present and En-route by Mar. 31 '43	Apr June
	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Shi
BOMB GROUP (H)	-	2	-	2	1	3	-	3	-	2	-	2	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	
BOMB GROUP (M)	-	1½	½	2	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	
BOMB GROUP (L&D)	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼		
FIGHTER GROUP	-	3	½	3½	1	4½	-	4½	-	1½	¼	1¾	¼	2	¼	2¼	-	3	-	
T/C GROUP	-	2	-	2	1	3	1	4	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼		
OBSN GROUP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	¼	¼	½	-	½	-	¼		
PHOTO RCN GROUP	-	¼	¼	3/4	¼	1	-	1	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	¼	½	-	-		

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DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES IN 1943

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC								SOUTH PACIFIC								CENTRAL PACIFIC							
sent En- te by 31,'43		April 1, 1943 June 30/43		July 1, '43 to Sept 30, '43		Oct. 1,'43 to Dec 31, '43		Present and En-route by Mar. 31'43		Apr 1 '43 to June 30'43		July 1,43 to Sept 30'43		Oct 1 '43 to Dec 31 '43		Present and En-route by Mar. 31'43		Apr 1 '43 to June 30'43		July 1 '43 to Sept 30'43		Oct 1 '43 to Dec 31'43	
-	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total	Shipped	Total
2		-	2	1	3	-	3	-	2	-	2	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1
1½		½	2	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1		-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼
3		½	3½	1	4½	-	4½	-	1½	¼	1¾	¼	2	¼	2¼	-	3	-1	2	-	2	-	2
2		-	2	1	3	1	4	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼
-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	¼	¼	½	-	½	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼
¼		¼	3/4	¼	1	-	1	-	¼	-	¼	-	¼	¼	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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TAB "D"

ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT CAPACITY SOUTH PACIFIC

Totals for South Pacific (Army)

	H/B	M, L or D/B *	Fighters
# GUADALCANAL			
Henderson **		6 Sqs	
Fighter Strips			8 Sqs
Koli Point ***	4 Sqs		
# ESPIRITU SANTO			
Bomber 1	3 Sqs		
Bomber 2	4 Sqs		
Fighter 1			2 Sqs
# EFATE			
Bomber 1	2 Sqs		
Fighter 1			1 Sq
Fighter 2			1 Sq
# NEW CALEDONIA			
P. de G.	2 Sqs		
Tontouta	2 Sqs		
Magenta			1 Sq
La Foa			1 Sq
FIJI			
Nandi	2 Sqs		
Norewa			2 Sqs
Drasi	1 Sq		1 Sq
Nausori	1 Sq		1 Sq
	21 Sqs	6 Sqs	18 Sq

TOTAL H/B 21 x 12 = 252

M,L or D/B 6 x 13 = 78

Fighters 18 x 25 = 450

* Light or Dive Bombers could probably be substituted for any amount of M/B mentioned above.

** Henderson Field - probably one and one-half Medium Group could operate from Henderson Field proper and one Fighter Group from each of the two fighter strips. Not enough hard standings for all weather heavy bomber use.

*** Koli Point, when complete - probably one Heavy Bombardment Group could use the field.

Estimates by Brig. Gen. LaVerne G. Saunders

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TAB (E)

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TAB "E"

I. EXTENT OF LIMITED OFFENSIVE CONTEMPLATED FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff (JCS 112) agreed in July to continue offensive operations in the South Pacific as follows:

a. TASK 1, seizure and occupation of Santa Cruz Island, Tulagi, and adjacent positions.

b. TASK 2, seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomons Islands, of Lae, Salamaua and the northeast coast of New Guinea.

c. TASK 3, seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Guinea-New Ireland area.

2. It was agreed that the composition of the forces to be used, the timing of the tasks and the passage of command would be determined by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and that direct command of tactical operations of the Amphibious forces would remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout the conduct of all three tasks.

3. For TASK 1 (seizure and occupation of Santa Cruz Island, Tulagi, and adjacent positions), the Task Force Commander would be designated by CINCPAC.

4. For TASK 2 (seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomon Islands and of Lae, Salamaua and northeast New Guinea), the Task Force engaged in this operation would be under the direction of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

5. For TASK 3 (seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Guinea-New Ireland area) the Task Force engaged in this operation would be under the direction of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

NOTE: At the request of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, on September 21, 1942, the subject of joint operations in the Southwest Pacific area was to be re-studied in view of the immediate action against the Tulagi area, chiefly Guadalcanal and the Papuan Peninsula.

II. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PLANNING DECISION AS TO ADEQUACY OF AIR POWER TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY 1 APRIL.

Early in January, 1943, the Joint Staff Planners(JPS 48/4) studied the entire situation in the South and Southwest Pacific and concluded that the number of planes available February 28, 1943 was sufficient to continue the offensive operations contemplated by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff for the execution of TASK 2.

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TAB (F)

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March 5, 1943

ESTIMATES OF JAPANESE AIR CAPABILITIES, FORCES, AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE NEW GUINEA, CELEBES, BORNEO, SUMATRA, TIMOR AREA.

1. Estimate of the Enemy (Air)

a. The most recent estimate of enemy air strength in the area is as follows:

	F	B	F/P	F/B	O	Total
New Guinea	35	--	--	--	--	35
Ambon	18	9	4	3	--	34
Celebes	53	56	12	--	12	133
Borneo	--	6	--	--	6	12
Sumatra	6	6	3	--	6	21
Java	6	6	3	--	6	21
Timor	16	11	3	--	4	34
	134	94	25	3	34	290

b. Estimate of Japanese air capabilities in the area with an indication of the most likely course of action to be followed by the Japanese.

Following the early Japanese raids on Darwin in 1942, the Japanese air position in this area has been one of consolidation and defense. The airfields at Koepang and Dilli were expanded and a new field was built on the Eastern end of Timor. To protest the eastern approaches to Java, air bases were built at Waingapoe on Soemba and at Bima on Soembawa. The former Dutch air bases in the rear areas at Ambon, Kendari, Bali, and in Java were taken over and expanded by the Japanese primarily for the establishment of an aerial defensive line.

From the advance air bases that are now available to the Japanese in Timor, the Japanese could launch an air offensive against the Darwin Area. The development of the Timika landing field will give the Japanese a base for aerial operations against Allied installations on the Cap York Peninsula. The enemy will also attempt to stem Allied advances along the North Coast of New Guinea, using his air bases at Madang, Wowak, and Hollandia.

Withethe exception of these offensive capabilities the Japanese appear to be entirely on the defensive in this area. Their aerial defensive line extends from Malaya, through Sumatra, Java, Timor, Ambon, and Northorn New Guinea eastward to Melanasia. With ample air basing facilities, and the enemy's present ability to bring heavy air reinforcements into the area within a short time, consider-

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TAB "F"

Inclosure #1 - Estimate of Japanese Air Strength and Capabilities in the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomons.

Inclosure #2 - Estimate of Japanese Air Capabilities, Forces, and Installations in the New Guinea, Celebes, Borneo, Sumatra, Timor Area.

Inclosure #3 - Japanese Capability for Reinforcing S.W.P.A. (Air)

Inclosure #4 - Estimate Jap Plane Strength in South and Southwest Pacific

Inclosure #5 - Comparison of Combat Air Strength in the Pacific (Allied and Japanese)

Inclosure #6 - Estimate of Japanese Air Strength as of February 28, 1943

Inclosure #7 - Map delineating information contained in Inclosure #6

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WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1943

ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE AIR STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES IN THE BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO AND THE SOLOMONS.

1. The most recent estimate of Japanese air strength in this area is as follows:

	F	B	F/P	F/B	O	Total
New Britian	24	54	9	8	8	103
New Ireland	9	32	4		6	51
Solomons	72	2	24	14	4	146
	105	118	37	22	18	300

2. Japanese Air Strength in the remainder of the Southwest Pacific area is as follows:

	F	B	F/P	F/B	O	Total
New Guinea	35	--	--	--	--	35
Ambon	18	9	4	3	--	34
Celebes	53	56	12	--	12	133
Borneo	--	6	--	--	6	12
Sumatra	6	6	3	--	6	21
Java	6	6	3	--	6	21
Timor	16	11	3	--	4	34
	134	94	25	3	34	290

3. Japanese Air Capabilities in the Bismark Archipelago and the Solomons.

Repeated efforts on the part of the Japanese to dislodge Allied forces from the lower Solomons have failed. Until the Allied forces are ejected from the area, the enemy cannot undertake any major offensive action against eastern Australia or New Caledonia, his original objectives at the time he moved into the Solomons.

Failing to eject the Allied Forces from the area, the enemy is currently on the defensive. While he may attempt local offensives from time to time, his main concern will be to retain his hold in the upper Solomons and in the Bismark Archipelago, and thus prevent or delay the Allies from obtaining bases for further action against his main line of defense, i.e., the Caroline Islands.

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Inclosure #1

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The air phase of these defensive operations will consist of:

(a) Interdiction of Allied bombing attacks by fighter patrols based chiefly at Kahili and Rabaul;

(b) Bomber attacks against the Allied air base on Guadalcanal and against any Allied sea-borne forces moving northward. Enemy bombers are based mostly at Rabaul and Buka.

RICHARD W. BONNYVALLE,
Lt. Colonel, A. C.,
Chief, Far East Branch,
Air Unit, I.C.

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able air opposition may be expected toward any Allied attempt to pierce this defensive line.

c. Estimate of Japanese Capability of Reinforcing Timor (Air).

It is estimated that the following aircraft could be brought into Timor within a period of thirty days:

	F	B	F/P	F/B	OS	Total
Celebes	45	48	12	--	12	117
New Guinea	15	--	--	--	--	15
Ambon	15	--	4	3	--	22
Malaya	15	24	--	--	6	45
Total	90	72	16	3	18	199

In addition to the above land-based aircraft, the enemy could bring down to the Timor area one or two carriers, (maximum of about 100 ship-based aircraft), and two or three seaplane carriers, (maximum of 39 float planes). Summarizing these figures, the following total is obtained:

Land-based aircraft	199
Carrier based aircraft	100
Carrier based float planes	39
Total	338

d. Location of enemy air fields in the area.

See attached map, which shows principal airports and seaplane anchorages in the area.

e. Estimated (Air) saturation point of the area.

1. The saturation point of the area as a whole, is practically unlimited. Sufficient airports, landing strips, and seaplane anchorages exist to base considerably more aircraft than the Japanese will conceivably ever bring into this theater. It will be noted on the attached airport map that a series of air bases extend along the defensive line mentioned in Paragraph 1 (b) above; in addition to which the air bases in the rear areas afford easy staging routes, enabling the enemy to fly aircraft into the area from Malaya, the Philippines, and the Aroline Islands. These rear airports also afford assembly, repair and depot facilities.

2. The saturation point for Timor, insofar as land based aircraft is concerned, is estimated to be approximately 125 aircraft. In addition, about 50 floatplanes could be based at Dilli and Koepang. (Carrier based aircraft and floatplanes are not included in the foregoing figures). It is obvious, therefore, that not all of the aerial reinforcements shown in Para. 1 (c) above will be brought into the Timor area at one time, but will be available to replace losses.

Approved

THOMAS G. LANPHIER
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Acting Chief, Air Unit, [illegible]

RICHARD W. BONNEVALLE
Lt. Colonel, A. C.
Chief, Far East Branch, Air Unit

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MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL EDWARDSON, AIR STAFF, PLANS.

Subject: Japanese Capability for Reinforcing S.W.P.A. (Air)

1. Supplementing my memorandum of March 5, 1943, relative to Japanese air capabilities in the NEI - New Guinea Area, the following is an estimate of the number of enemy aircraft which could be brought into this area from Japan and other areas within a thirty-day period:

From	F	B	F/F	F/B	O	Total
Japan Proper						
Army	48	48			12	108
Navy	24	48	12	6	--	90
Manchuria-Korea (Army)	24	24				48
Formosa-Philippines "	12	24			12	48
Micronesia (Navy)	48	24	24	12	--	108
TOTAL	156	168	36	18	24	402

2. Although it is estimated that the Japanese have currently an air strength of approximately 300 aircraft in the New Britain - Solomon's Area, it is not believed that the enemy will transfer much of this strength to the NEI - New Guinea Area, unless the scale of effort in the Solomons areas decreases considerably.

3. Summarizing the figures in the previous memorandum with the above, the following totals are obtained:

Currently in the NEI - New Guinea Area	290
Estimated reinforcements from Malaya	45
Estimated reinforcements shown above	402
Carrier-based aircraft	100
Carrier-based float planes	39
GRAND TOTAL available in area or for movement to area	876

RICHARD W. BONNEVALLE
Lt. Colonel, A.C.
Chief, War East Branch, Air Unit, M.I.S.

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ESTIMATE JAP PLANE STRENGTH IN SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

SOUTH PACIFIC

	Gen. MacArthur As of 8 Mar '43	ONI-MIS As of 28 Feb '43	MIS As of 6 Mar '43
New Guinea	9		
New Britain	140	384 (Total)	300 (Total)
New Ireland	60		
Solomons	101		
	310		

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Timor	54		
Celebes	118	None	199* (Total)
Ambon	34		
Aroe Is	5		
	211		

*If Borneo, Sumatra and Java are included, the total threat will consist of 290 combat aircraft.

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COMPARISON OF COMBAT AIR STRENGTH IN THE PACIFIC

(ALLIED AND JAPANESE)

CENTRAL PACIFIC

Allied

Army - 319

Navy - 226

545

Japanese

Army - None

Navy - 100 *

100

* Possible carrier

SOUTH PACIFIC

Allied

Army - 365

Navy - 732 (land-based)
367 (carrier-based)

RNZAF - 205

1669

Japanese

Army)
) - 300
Navy)

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Allied

Army - 683

Navy - 13

RAAF - 436

NEI - 14

1146

Japanese

Army)
) - 290 *
Navy)

Army - 423 **

Navy - 139 ***

852

* New Guinea-Celebes-Sumatra-Timor area

** Reinforcements land-based within 30 days

*** Reinforcements carrier-based

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JOINT MIS-OPI

ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE AIR STRENGTH AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1943.

						Total	
1. Japanese Empire, Karafuto, Kuriles							
Army	135	120	48	—	—	303	—
Navy							
Ship-based	93	105	—	49	—	—	347
Land-based	108	303	6	33	24	—	374
2. Manchukuo - Korea							
Army	240	216	36	—	—	492	—
Navy							
Ship-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Land-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Formosa - Philippines							
Army	30	24	24	—	—	78	—
Navy							
Ship-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Land-based	18	27	—	—	—	—	45
4. China - Hainan							
Army	75	120	36	—	—	231	—
Navy							
Ship-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Land-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Burma - Thailand Indo-China							
Army	120	120	36	—	—	276	—
Navy							
Ship-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Land-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Andamans							
Army	30	24	24	—	—	78	—
Navy							
Ship-based	—	—	—	7	—	—	7
Land-based	—	21	—	9	—	—	30
8. Melanesia - New Guinea, New Britain, Solomons							
Army	75	72	12	—	—	159	—
Navy							
Ship-based	—	—	—	99	—	—	99
Land-based	108	45	9	36	27	—	225
9. Micronesia - Carolines, Marshalls, Marianas							
Army	30	48	—	—	—	78	—
Navy							
Ship-based	48	69	—	77	—	—	194
Land-based	99	103	—	54	36	—	292
10. Ship-based (location unknown)	—	—	—	82	—	—	82
11. N.W. Pacific Area							
Navy							
Ship-based	—	—	—	2	—	—	2
Land-based	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12. Aircraft in transit to combat Theatres							
Army	45	24	—	—	—	69	—
Navy	—	50	—	—	—	—	50
TOTALS	1338	1469	249	466	87	1866	1743

OVERALL BREAKDOWN — Total Army 1866
Total Navy ship-based
Total Navy land-based

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ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE AIR STRENGTH AS O

2. Manchukuo - Korea	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	N	Total
Army	240	216	36	--	--	492	--	
Navy								
Ship-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Land-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	

4. China - Hainan	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	N	Total
Army	75	120	36	--	--	231	--	
Navy								
Ship-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Land-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	

C H I N A

5. Burma - Thailand Indo-China	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	N	Total
Army	120	120	36	--	--	276	--	
Navy								
Ship-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Land-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	

6. Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Andamans	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	N	Total
Army	30	24	24	--	--	78	--	
Navy								
Ship-based	--	--	--	7	--	--	7	
Land-based	--	21	--	9	--	--	30	

Aircraft in transit to combat Theatres	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	N	Total
Army	45	24	--	--	--	69	--	
Navy	--	50	--	--	--	--	50	

Ship-based	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	N	Total

Timor - Inner Seas	F
Army	30
Navy	

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

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

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ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE AIR STRENGTH A

3. Manchukuo - Korea	F	B	O	FP	FB	Total A	N
Army	240	216	36	--	--	492	--
Navy							
Ship-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Land-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

4. China - Hainan	F	B	O	FP	FB	Total A	N
Army	75	120	36	--	--	231	--
Navy							
Ship-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Land-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

5. Burma - Thailand Indo-China	F	B	O	FP	FB	Total A	N
Army	120	120	36	--	--	276	--
Navy							
Ship-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Land-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

6. Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Andamans	F	B	O	FP	FB	Total A	N
Army	30	24	24	--	--	78	--
Navy							
Ship-based	--	--	--	7	--	--	7
Land-based	--	21	--	9	--	--	30

Aircraft in transit to combat Theatres	F	B	O	FP	FB	Total A	N
Army	45	24	--	--	--	69	--
Navy	--	50	--	--	--	--	50

Ship-based (location unknown)	F	B	O	FP	FB	Total A	N
	--	--	--	82	--	--	82

7. Timor - Inner Seas	
Army	
Navy	
Ship-based	
Land-based	

TOTAL AIRCRAFT IN COMBAT THEATRES

F	B	O	FP	FB	N	A
1338	1469	249	466	87	1866	1743

OVERALL BREAKDOWN

Total Army	1366
Total Navy ship-based	631
Total Navy land-based	1112
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STRENGTH AS OF 28 FEB. 1943



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	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	Total
Land-based	108	207	6	33	24	--	378

U.S. Pacific Area	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	Total
Navy							
Ship-based	--	--	--	2	--	--	2
Land-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

F. Former-Philippines	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	N	Total
Army	30	24	24	--	--	78	--	
Navy								
Ship-based	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Land-based	13	27	--	--	--	--	45	

B. Micronesia-Carolines, Marshalls, Marianas	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	Total
Army	30	48	--	--	--	2	--
Navy							
Ship-based	48	69	--	27	--	--	144
Land-based	99	108	--	84	36	--	327

. Melanesia - New Guinea, New Britain, Solomons	F	B	O	FP	FB	A	Total
Army	75	72	12	--	--	159	--
Navy							
Ship-based	--	--	--	93	--	--	93
Land-based	108	45	9	36	27	--	225

FB	A	N	Total
--	102	--	
--	--	--	
--	--	96	

OPERATIONAL PLANS DIVISION - AIR STAFF
6 MAR. 1943

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TAB "G"

Inclosure #1 - Memo re improper employment of bombardment forces in the South Pacific

Inclosure #2 - M&R - Search Missions in the South Pacific Theatre w/4 attachments as listed.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces
Washington

March 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL J. HALVERSEN,
Operational Plans Division.

In compliance with your request concerning improper employment of our bombardment forces in the South Pacific, the following is submitted.

1. Employment of Numbers.

a. The failure to use a striking force of sufficient size to insure effective results, was the most glaring misuse of heavy bombardment in this area. Initially, base facilities and air drome layouts prevented this proper employment of numbers. Air drome layouts and congestion of aircraft thereon prevented a force of sufficient size to take off, when a target appeared, to do the job. Navy personnel failed to grasp the necessity for proper construction of taxi-ways and landing surfaces for use of heavy bombbardment. The logistical set-up in this area entered into the picture and was a severe hindrance to the construction of air dromes. It was difficult to impress on operational headquarters the necessity for the use of no less than 9 heavy bombers on a maneuvering target. Later they did accept this doctrine. B-17's were invariably required to strike at maximum ranges which reduced their effectiveness because of half a bomb load. Insufficient fuel, and unsuitable field conditions at Guadalcanal, made it necessary for most of the missions to strike from the base at Santos.

2. Medium Bombardment.

a. I recommended strongly that the B-26's be used as a weapon of opportunity from Guadalcanal when that airdrome was made suitable for the use of this equipment; that these airplanes be kept alerted there with either aerial torpedoes or bombs to be used at minimum altitude against targets of opportunity that came "down the groove" continuously from the Buin-Tonelli area.

b. B-26's were later ordered to Guadalcanal but were used mainly to do medium altitude bombing on a field at Munda. They disapproved of skip bombing and probably did not like the idea of B-26's being employed to drop torpedoes.

3. Targets and Missions.

a. B-17's were constantly ordered on strikes from Santos against the "Tokyo Express" coming "down the groove" from Bougainville. As these forces consisted wholly of destroyers, it was very difficult to operate with half a bomb load against this type of surface vessel and expect any effective results. They were finally convinced that these missions were unprofitable.

b. B-17's were twice ordered on missions as air coverage, once for our own carrier task force after both the B-17's and carrier planes had attacked shipping in the Buin area, and then again as air coverage for landing operations at Guadalcanal. However, operation headquarters have been convinced that B-17's are not the best fighters in the world.

Inclosure #1

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4. Search Missions.

a. Striking force efforts have been hindered because of search requirements, especially prior to the important battles. Usually 9 B-17's were required daily during critical times. This required from two to three spares. This search requirement varied from 1/3 to 1/4 of the total number of B-17's in commission. This phase of operations had a deterrent effect on the mental attitude of the crews, as they all desired the striking force missions. Statistics were compiled but are not available to me now, as to the flying effort required for search missions up to November 1, 1942. As I recall, the search effort up to that time was 50% of the total tactical flying. We all conceded that intelligence is very important and that the Navy did not have sufficient PBY's to cover the area. However, I do not believe that their crews and equipment were pushed as much as ours. I have been a recent search plan of the South Pacific area which calls for 16 B-17's daily for search from the bases at Fiji, Santos and Guadalcanal. It was my understanding that a Navy patrol squadron of 10 B-24's was committed to Santos for that purpose. A diversion of such a great percentage of heavy bombardment is certainly a great hindrance to a successful accomplishment of our prime effort.

L. G. SAUNDERS,
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.

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h. ARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECO D SHEET

SUBJECT: Search Missions in the South Pacific Theatre

Date March 7,1943

TO: Ass't Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans (Attn. Col. Halversen)

FROM: Ass't Chief of Air Staff, A-2

COMMENT No. 1
LGL cg 5804

1. In response to your request for such data as we have available concerning the Search Missions which are being flown in the South Pacific Theatre, there is herewith transmitted the following:

a. Three photostats obtained from the Pacific Theatre, OS OPD, two of which purport to show the Search Sectors from Guadalcanal commencing Jan. 15, 1943 and the plans engaged in those searches, and the third, the Search Sectors from Fiji, commencing January 15, 1943 and the planes engaged in those searches.

The Pacific Theatre, OS OPD advises that this material was received by it from New Caledonia and that no plan of the searches from Espiritu Santo was received.

b. Paraphrase of that portion of CM-IN #1113 from New Caledonia, dated March 3, 1943, describing the searches to be made from and after March 1, 1943.

Edgar P. Sorensen
Colonel, G.S.C.

Incls:
Incl. 1 - Photostat of Guadalcanal Search Sectors
" 2 - " " " " "
" 3 - " " Fiji Search Sectors
" 4 - Paraphrase of CM-IN #1113, New Caledonia, Mar. 3/43.

SECRET Inclosure #2

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

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

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

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Paraphrase of

CM-IN 01113, from New Caledonia, dated March 3rd.

From and after March 1st search sectors from Espiritu Santo will extend to a depth of 800 miles and will be covered as follows:

2 B-17 from 292° to 304°)
1 B-17 " 316° to 322°) Daily
1 B-17 " 322° to 328°)

Search sector from Fiji will extend to depth of 800 miles and will be covered by 2 B-17's from 342° to 354°.

Guadalcanal search -X- will be made by P-38 photo plane; B by 2 fighters; D by 2 fighters and E by one fighter, with the same coverage as before.

Search sector 310° to 040° will be made to a depth of 800 miles by 10 B-17's.

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TAB H

Inclosure #1 - Japanese Sea Strength

Inclosure #2 - Japanese Maritime Concentrations and Naval Installations in MICRONESIA

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Inclosure #2



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

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

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INFORMATION RECEIVED INFORMALLY FROM ONI ON MARCH 11, 1943:

Subject: Japanese Maritime Concentrations and Naval Installations in Micronesia

I. Maritime Concentrations

Palau and Truk are main concentration points for Japanese merchant shipping in the South and Southwest Pacific. Truk is the main concentration point for shipping destined for the Bismarck-Solomons area as well as the Marshall Islands. Palau is the main concentration point for shipping destined for New Guinea. Rabaul and Kavieng are the main forward bases.

It is estimated that 75,000 tons of merchant shipping are now concentrated in the Marshall Islands; 200,000 tons in the Bismarck area; 50,000 tons in the Buin-Shortlands area; 200,000 tons at Rabaul and Kavieng and 50,000 to 75,000 tons in New Guinea.

II. Naval Installations

1. Marshall Islands

a. Eniwetok (Brown or Engebi) Atoll (11°25' N., 162°23' E)

There are two good entrances, Wide Passage (south channel) and Deep Entrance (east channel). The anchorage in 20 to 30 fathoms is unlimited, but subject to slight swell and unprotected from wind. There are sand beaches suitable for landings on the lagoon side of most of the islands. The lagoon of Eniwetok is used frequently by Japanese naval vessels.

b. Bikini Atoll (11°37' N., 165°32' E)

Bikini is second only to Eniwetok as a potential naval base and is of greater importance than either Jaluit or Kotje. Little progress has been made in developing base facilities.

A lagoon (10 miles by 20 miles) has been periodically surveyed by Japanese warships. It is regarded by the Japanese as one of the most suitable fleet anchorages (along with Rongelap) in the Mandated Islands and is earmarked as a submarine base.

c. Rongelap Atoll (8°00' N., 168°10' E)

Rongelap is a Japanese fleet anchorage and submarine base. It is also used as a Fleet base for certain units during maneuvers. A new dock and repair facilities were reported in January, 1942.

d. Jaluit (Bonham) Atoll (5°55' N., 169°39' E)

Class "D" naval anchorage - will accommodate cruiser squadron and destroyers. May be suitable for larger ships.

Inclosure #2

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Jaluit is a destroyer base. There is unlimited anchorage in the eastern part of the lagoon. Jaluit is the operating base of the Marshall Islands Naval Patrol, consisting of armed sampans capable of 12-30 knots. Navy yard reported.

e. Wotje (Romanzov) Atoll (9°27' N., 170°14' E)

The best anchorage area: (1) west of Wotje Island, (2) Christmas Harbor, (3) Goat Island and (4) Bird Island. The island is frequently described as a base for submarine operations east of the Marshalls. Japanese submarines have conducted drills at Wotje.

f. Ebin (Boston) (4°35' N., 168°42' E)

Ebin Channel is deep but narrow, permitting entry of only smaller boats (destroyers, submarines and gun boats); cannot be entered at night. Larger ships anchor outside just west of Enksumij Islet. There are anchorages: (1) off S.W. point of Ebin Islet — 15 fathoms; (2) between Mej and Enilok.

g. Kwajalein Atoll (9°24' N., 167°28' E)

It is reported that Nellu Island is used by fairly large vessels. Fleet anchorage at Ebu Island. This atoll is reported as a submarine base.

h. Majuro (or Arrowsmith) Atoll (7°7' N., 171°22' E)

This atoll is roughly oval in shape, 26 miles long by 6 miles wide, enclosing a lagoon with one main entrance on the northern side between Catalin Isl. and Erochi Islet. This entrance is about 1½ miles wide and has two channels.

Anchorages: Naval classification, possibly "A". Used by German cruisers in 1940.

i. Maloelap (8°40' N., 171°10' E)

Construction work, including minor Naval base in progress (1941). Used as German Raider base July - December, 1940. A Guard Division (armed merchantmen) was based here October, 1942 (Taroa Island).

j. Mille (Mulgrave) Atoll (6°13' N., 171°49' E)

Anchorage: Naval classification "A". The lagoon may be suitable for a small floating dock. Considerable construction work was reported in progress in December, 1942. A destroyer division and defense force were based here (1942)

k. Mejit (New Year) Island (10°17' N., 170°53' E)

The British report Mejit Island as being developed (1942).

l. Narru (or Musquillo) Atoll (8°00' N., 168°10' E)

Navy yard reported by the British.

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2. The Caroline Islands

a. Truk Islands (Hogulin) (7°18' N., 151°48' E)

Truk is the largest atoll of the Caroline Group and the best suited for use as an advanced fleet base. It is the primary supply base for the whole Mandated Area and is the main resistance point in the Mid-Pacific. Truk is the Japanese Pearl Harbor without the ship repair facilities.

The Japanese Second Fleet and minor units have based at Truk, which serves as focal point for warships used in Southwest Pacific operations.

There is a wharf and repair facilities for very large vessels on Dublon and Eten Islands. A floating dry dock reported as 360-390 feet long (March 1942) and capable of holding ships up to 20000 tons is moored ½ mile north of the seaplane base at S.E. corner of Dublon.

b. Helen Reef (2°55' N., 131°48' E)

There is a lagoon (10 miles by 4 miles) which might be suitable for submarines and seaplanes and as an anchorage for a fleet and convoy. Well protected from submarines attack, but completely exposed to view.

c. Kusaie (Nulan) Island (5°22' N., 162°56' E)

There is reason to believe that a submarine base is located on Kusaie. The harbors of Kusaie can be mined and closed without difficulty.

d. Lamotrek (7°30' N., 146°22' E)

Possible naval anchorage on western side of island.

e. Nomoi (Mortlock) Islands (5°17' N., 153°46' E)

Possible fleet anchorage. Chamisso Harbor is the principal anchorage and appears to afford anchorage to a fleet of ten ships with no restriction on size, but information is scanty.

f. Ponape (7°00' N., 158°18' E)

A possible destroyer and submarine base. A patrol force and defense detachment are based there (1942).

g. Sorol Island (8°08' N., 140°25' E)

Reported submarine base.

3. The Palau (Pelews) Group (7°17' N., 134°29' E)

a. Palau is seat of government of the entire Mandated Islands. In 1941, a large scale program for the development of a submarine and possibly a seaplane base was reported under way. Narrow gorges with very deep water occur in many places in the Palau Group and are ideal for concealing operations at such a base.

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b. Malakal anchorage is to the southwest of Malakal Island and is a "C" anchorage. Dredging has been carried out and the harbor cleared of coral reefs.

c. Shonian Harbor, to the south of Amatoti Island is a "B" anchorage.

d. Kossol Passage, lying to the south of the group is classified as a "B" anchorage.

e. Angaur Island is reported to have a good anchorage, allowing vessels of 5000-6000 tons to go right up to the short pier on the west side of the island.

f. Koror Island - passage for vessels up to 5000 tons has been blasted out.

g. A submarine base is reported to be under construction on Ngajangel Island.

4. The Marianas

a. Saipan Island (15°14' N., 145°44' E)

Garupa Roads is an open roadstead of almost unlimited anchorages. Presence of a 7000 ton vessel well up in the harbor (1942) indicates some improvements in harbor. Probably a submarine base.

NOTE: Class "A" anchorage suitable for a fleet, including BB's

Class "B" anchorage suitable for cruisers

Class "C" anchorage suitable for DD's, SS's and gun boats.

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TO BE RETURNED TO

P.R.O.

PROPOSED PLAN FOR AIR ATTACK SUPPLEMENTING THE EAKER PROGRAM TO ISOLATE AND PARALYZE THE AXIS SUBMARINE BASES IN BRITTANY

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SUPPLEMENTING THE EAKER PROGRAM TO

ISOLATE AND PARALYZE THE AXIS SUBMARINE

BASES IN BRITTANY

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BOMBING TARGETS TO DISR[illegible] TRAFFIC TO SUBMARINE BASES ON [illegible] WEST COAST OF FRANCE

In studying the possibility of disrupting the land supply lines from German sources of supply to the submarine bases on the west coast of France at BREST, LORIENT, ST. NAZAIRE, LA PALLICE, and BORDEAUX, it is of course, necessary to make some estimates as to the requirements of these bases.

This matter has been discussed with the Navy and a very rough estimate has been made based on 100 submarines in the five bases for a period of one month as follows:

Fuel oil	15,000 tons
Food for crews and for cruises	25,000 tons
Torpedoes, one ton each	1,000 tons
Miscellaneous repair material	5,000 tons
Food for 25,000 workers and families (Some food is raised in the neighborhood)	25,000 tons
Renewal of machine tools, concrete, defense ammunition, etc.	100,000 tons
Total	171,000 tons

It must be realized that some material is brought in by water through the English Channel and some by blockade runners but the great majority must come to the bases by rail and highway.

In order to get some approximation of the amount required by each base, the total of 171,000 tons has been apportioned in proportion to the number of pens in each base. Therefore, the tonnage required per month and per day would be as follows:

	Tons per month	Tons per day
BREST	36,400	1213
LORIENT	47,300	1577
ST. NAZAIRE	36,400	1213
LA PALLICE	23,600	787
BORDEAUX	27,300	910
	171,000	5,700

The tonnage required by each base is so small that with so many highways available and a number of railroads, it would be almost impossible to cut off

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the land supply to the ports but a study has been made of the vulnerable points on the railroads, highways and canals on the Brittany Peninsula in an effort to determine the amount of damage that might be done by bombing certain important bridges.

It is believed that successful bombing of these bridges would, to some extent, disorganize service to the bases, but that it would be possible to almost immediately re route the small tonnage required and that the turn around time of the submarine would probably not be effected. Undoubtedly, fair stock piles are kept at or near the bases at all times, though possibly some of these have been destroyed by the recent heavy bombing of LORIENT and ST. NAZAIRE.

This study comprises the ports of BREST, LORIENT and ST. NAZAIRE due to the fact that their location on the Brittany Peninsula results in a smaller number of supply routes than to LA PALLICE and BORDEAUX to the south. Also, they are nearer air bases in England.

As shown on the attached map, 6 airplane routes have ben taken which, by the destruction of bridges, would cut the supply lines to BREST, LORIENT and ST. NAZAIRE.

On the combined route 1,4,6, which would cut off BREST and LORIENT, there are 12 principal highway bridges over streams and 2 main line railway bridges, a total of 14 targets.

On 1,4,5 which would cut off ST. NAZAIRE as well as BREST and LORIENT, there are 13 highway bridges and 5 railway, a total of 18 targets.

On 2,4,6 cutting off BREST and LORIENT there are 14 highway bridges and two railway, a total of 16 targets.

On 2,4,5 which would cut off ST. NAZAIRE as well as BREST and LORIENT, there are 18 highway bridges and 6 railway, a total of 24 targets.

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On 3-6, cutting off BREST and LORIENT, there are 5 highway, 2 main line railway, and 4 single track bridges, a total of 11 targets.

On 3-5, cutting off ST. NAZAIRE as well as BREST and LORIENT, there are 10 highway and 7 railway bridges, a total of 17 targets.

If it should be determined to make a further study of the problem of disrupting the supply lines to the bases, it would appear that route 3-6 cutting off BREST and LORIENT offers the best prospect as the number of targets is smaller than on any other.

The principal highway and railroad bridges on route 3-6 are as follows; and are marked on the attached map in order from north to south.

(a) Single track R.R. bridge over the RANCE River between the towns of ST. SAMSON and LA VICOMTE SUR RANCE.

(b) Route Nationale highway bridge at DINAN.

(c) Single track R.R. bridge over the RANCE Canal about 4 kilometers north of RENNES. This is a north and south railroad and is perhaps not very important provided the bridges on the east and west railroad were destroyed. The railroad crosses the RANCE Canal at 3 other points between ST. GREGOIRE just north of RENNES and MONTREUIL SUR ILLE, 22 kilometers north of RENNES.

(d) Main line east and west railway bridge, one kilometer west of RENNES over the VILAINE River.

(e) Route Nationale highway bridge in RENNES over the RANCE Canal.

There is a R.R. junction just north of the R.R. bridge (d) and less than one kilometer to the N.E. of the junction the single track R.R. from the north crosses over the main east and west highway.

(f) Route Nationale highway bridge over the VILAINE River 14 kilometers S.W. of RENNES.

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(c) Single track north and south R.R. line, bridge over the VILAINE River at LE CARROUG, 14 kilometers S.W. of RENNES and 2 kilometers E. of (f).

(h) 1½ kilometers S.W. of MESSAC, which is 29 kilometers N.E. of REDON, a single track line branches off to the west from the north and south railroad line and crosses the VILAINE on a bridge. About ½ kilometers to the north east of the R.R. bridge, an important highway crosses the river and just N.W. of the R.R. bridge, the highway crosses the R.R.

Between MESSAC and REDON, the R.R. crosses the river in two other places.

(i) At REDON a double track R.R. to the west crosses the VILAINE River and immediately south of the R.R. bridge there is an important highway bridge and apparently the OUST Canal crosses the river on a bridge just south of the highway bridge. All three are very close together.

(j) At LA ROCHE BERNARD, one of the main east and west arteries of the Route Nationale crosses the VILAINE River.

There are, therefore, on route 3-6 five important highway bridges over rivers, four single track railroad bridges that seem important, two important main line double track railroad bridges and one bridge carrying a canal over a river.

It would appear that the most important of these targets are the following:

(a) The single track R.R. bridge over the RANCE between ST. SAMSON and LA VICOMTE.

(b) The highway bridge at DINAN.

(d) Main line R.R. bridge west of RENNES.

(e) Highway bridge over the canal in RENNES and the R.R. junction at RENNES.

(h) The R.R. and highway bridges near MESSAC.

(i) The R.R. highway and canal bridge at REDON.

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(j) The highway bridge at LA ROCHE BERNARD.

The destruction of these seven targets should have quite a demoralizing but perhaps temporary effect on transportation to BREST and LORIENT.

If it is desired to still further reduce the targets the most important probably are the following:

(a) The R.R. bridge over the RANCE.

(b) The highway bridge and town of DINAN. A railroad runs through the west part of the town but the bridge over the river RANCE is to the north at (a).

(d) The bridges and junction at RENNES.

(i) The R.R. highway and canal bridge at REDON.

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BRITTANY: TERRAIN AND VE

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GULF OF ST. MA

Brehat I.
Minard Pt.
Batz I.
Portusval Pt.
C. Frehel
St. Brieuc Bay
Morlaix
Guingamp
Ile d'Ouessant
Fromveur Channel
BREST
ST. BRIEUC
Dinan
St. Mathieu Pt.
D'ARREE
MONTS
Nivet Canal
Chateaulin
Aulne R.
C. Chèrre
Douarnenez Bay
MONTAGNES NOIRES
Raz Pt.
Pontivy
Oust R.
QUIMPER
Audierne Bay
Penmarch Pt.
Blavet R.
Lorient
Redon
VANNES
Groix I.
Vilaine R.
Quiberon Bay
Belle I.
St. Nazaire
St. Gildas Pt.
BAY OF BISCAY
Bourgneuf Bay
Noirmoutier I.

SECRET

VEGETATION

WOODS

CANALIZED STREAM OR CANAL

0 10 20 30
MILES

0 10 20 30 40 50 60
KILOMETERS

MAP NO. 1485 JANUARY 8, 1943

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Y: TERRAIN AND VEGETATION



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BRITTANY: RAILRO

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GULF OF ST. MA

BISCAY

BREST
QUIMPER
VANNES
ST. BRIEUC
Lamballe
Dinan
Landerneau
Morlaix
Lannion
Guingamp
Carhaix
Châteaulin
Pontivy
Loudéac
Ploërmel
Lorient
Quimperlé
Concarneau
Rosporden
Douarnenez
Camaret-sur-Mer
Le Conquet
Porspoder
Plouescat
Roscoff
Plouaret
Plouha
St. Michel-en-Grève
Guerlesquin
Landivisiau
Lesneven
Plabennec
Brest
Carhaix-Plouguer
Gourin
Quimperlé
Scaër
Lanvaux
Locminé
Hennebont
Port Louis
Auray
Quiberon
Redon
Surzur
La Roche-Bernard
Pontchâteau
Herbignac
Pléneuf
Matignon
St. Alban
St. Cast
St. Malo
Dinard
Dinan
Le Brohinière
St. Méen
Porhoët
Mauron
Gacé
Pornic
Préfailles
Noirmoutier
Belle I.
Guérande
St. Nazaire
La Croisic
Pirlac sur Mer
Loire

1
2
4
6

RAILROADS
STANDARD GAUGE, DOUBLE TRACK
STANDARD GAUGE, SINGLE TRACK
NARROW GAUGE

VILLAGE
TOWN
CITY OR LARGE TOWN

CANALIZED STREAM OR CANAL

MILES
KILOMETERS

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TTANY: RAILROADS


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GULF OF ST. MALO
BISCAY
Belle I.
Noirmoutier
Roscoff
Plouescat
Lannion
Morlaix
Guingamp
ST. BRIEUC
Landivisiau
Carhaix
Brest
Châteaulin
Quimper
Rosporden
Concarneau
Quimperlé
Pontivy
Carhaix
Loudéac
Lamballe
St. Alban
Matignon
St. Cast
St. Malo
St. Servan
Cancale
Dol de B.
Dinan
Pleine-Fougères
Pontorson
Avranches
Granville
Coutances
Carentan
Hyenville
Reguéville
Condé-sur-Vire
Fougères
Vitré
Liffré
RENNES
St. Méen
La Brohinière
Becherel
Ploërmel
Guer
Maure
Porhoet
Josselin
Malestroit
Redon
VANNES
Auray
Hennebont
Lorient
Port Louis
Groix
La-Trinité-sur-Mer
Quiberon
Port Navalo
Surzur
La Roche-bernard
Herbignac
Pontchâteau
Pirlac sur Mer
Guerande
St. Nazaire
la Croisic
Savenay
la Chapelle-sur-Erdre
NANTES
St. Pomblanc
Pornic
Préfailles
Bourgneuf en Retz
Beauvoir-sur-Mer
Fromentine
Machecoul
Challans
Aizenay
Ancenis
Vallet
Beaupréau
Châteaubriant
Pouancé
Segré
Craon
Mayenne
Laval
Vitré
Fougères
Mortagne-Perchaud
la Querche de B.
la Chapelle-Glain
Candé
Guémené Penfao
Pougeray
Massac
Maure
Loudéac
Pontivy
Rosporden
Plouay
Locminé
Auray
Hennebont
Lorient
Port Louis
Groix
Quiberon
Surzur
Redon
Pontchâteau
Savenay
Guerande
St. Nazaire
la Croisic
NANTES
Pornic
Préfailles
Bourgneuf en Retz
Noirmoutier

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PROVISIONAL EDITION

BRITTANY: ROAD

SECRET

GULF OF ST. MA

Ile d'Ouessant

BREST

QUIMPER

Pont l'Abbé

Le Conquet

Plabennec

Daoulas

Landivisiau

Morlaix

Lannion

Brignogan

St. Pol de Leon

Lesneven

Landerneau

Huelgoat

Carhaix

Callac

Guingamp

ST. BRIEUC

Lamballe

Matignon

Plancoet

Dinan

Jugon

Caulnes

Quedillac

St. Méen

Montf

Loudéac

Pontivy

Mur de B

Rostrenen

Gourin

Châteaulin

Pleyben

Carhaix

Brest

Briec

Douarnenez

Plogoff

Audierne

Le Faouët

Plouay

Quimperlé

Hennebont

Lorient

Port Louis

Lacmine

Josselin

Ploërmel

Guer

Malestroit

Meucon

VANNES

Auray

La-Trinité-sur-M

Groix

Quiberon

Belle I.

Muzillac

La Roche-Bernard

Pontchâteau

Pirjac-sur-M

Guerande

la Croisic

St. Brevin

St. Nazaire

Préfailles

Pornic

Normoutier

BAY OF BISCAY

1

2

4

SECRET

ROADS

MACADAM ROAD

NATIONAL HIGHWAY

VILLAGE

TOWN

CITY OR LARGE TOWN

CANALIZED STREAM OR CANAL

MILES

KILOMETERS

MAP NO. 1486 JANUARY

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BRITTANY: ROADS

SECRET



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Memorandum for General Anderson

. . .

Tab A - Estimate of submarine base requirements

. . .

Tab B - Key targets

. . .

Tab C - Estimation for Minimum Altitude Bombing of RR bridges and Viaducts

Bomb and Sortie Requirements

Memorandum from Major Goodman, C. E.

. . .

Tab D - Assessment of Effect of Attack on Rennes and Sotteville

. . .

Tab E - Weather Conditions on Brittany Peninsula

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May 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Anderson.

Subject: Proposed Plan for Air Attack, Supplementing the Eaker Program to Isolate and Paralyze the Axis Submarine Bases in Brittany.

Statement of the Problem:

To formulate a plan, supplementing the Eaker program for high level precision bombing of submarine bases in Brittany, to isolate and paralyze these bases by periodic low level and medium altitude bombing attacks on their logistical set-up in the area.

I. Discussion.

1. The submarine bases of Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire on the Brittany peninsula service and repair monthly from seventy-five to eighty per cent of the total Axis submarine fleet operating in the Atlantic Ocean. Their neutralization by high level precision bombing has been given high priority in the Eaker plan. The continued operation of these bases depends on the delivery to them of adequate supplies of fuel oil, repair material, torpedoes, and food for the crews and workers. (Tab A).

2. The periodic destruction of the key targets selected on the transportation system on the Brittany peninsula connecting these bases with their necessary sources of supply will tend to isolate and paralyze these bases. (Tab B).

3. The number of sorties by aircraft types and the number of bombs required to achieve the desired results is set forth in Tab C.

4. Air bases in the United Kingdom for the proposed operations are adequate.

5. The effect of the recent bombings of Rennes (March 8, 1943) and Sotteville(March 12, 1943) on the railway network of the Brittany peninsula is shown in Tab D.

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6. Weather conditions in the United Kingdom and in Brittany during the summer months are suitable for sustained operations. (Tab E)

II. Advantages of the Plan:

1. Supplements the Eaker plan by destroying the logistical set-up which is now supplying submarine bases on the Brittany peninsula.

2. Would reduce the number of effective submarines at sea by increasing the turn-about time of submarines at those bases.

3. Would impose additional loads on the new submarine bases being constructed further south in the Bay of Biscay.

4. Would draw to this area for its defense German fighter squadrons now employed elsewhere, thereby reducing the fighter defense at other vital German industrial targets to the Northeast.

5. Would reduce the supplies to 14 German airdromes known to be in the area.

6. Much enemy rolling stock would be either destroyed or rendered immobile for considerable periods of time, thereby increasing the strain on already overburdened Axis rolling stock.

7. The destruction of numerous and widely separated logistical targets, as proposed, would complicate their problem of repair and delay the reopening of those supply routes.

8. Provides cover and deception for other cross-channel operations.

9. Adds to the "war of nerves" program.

10. Would be added training for air force units of the Eighth Air Force which are not required in implementing the Eaker plan, but which will be used in subsequent operations.

11. Would necessitate flying supplies into the area, thereby pulling transport aircraft and gliders away from other fronts and vital projects.

12. Would necessitate new drafting of workers to rehandle the shipping of supplies over secondary water and highway systems.

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III. Disadvantages of the Plan:

1. Numerous small roads and canals in Brittany provide an emergency transportation system over which a small part of the required supplies could still be shipped to the submarine bases.

2. Small items of critical supply could be flown direct to the submarine bases.

3. An alternate sea route for a percentage of the required tonnage through ports in the Bay of Biscay would in time have to be developed.

IV. Conclusions:

Periodic low level and medium altitude bombing attacks, as envisaged in this plan, against the logistical set-up on the Brittany peninsula, co-ordinated with high level bombing attacks directed under the Baker plan, will greatly reduce the number of submarines which the Axis can effectively operate in the North Atlantic.

V. Recommendations:

That this plan for co-ordinated air attack on Axis submarine bases in Brittany be submitted to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force for further study.

REUBEN KYLE, JR.
Colonel, G. S. C.

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TAB
A

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It is estimated that 90 submarines using the bases of Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire for a period of one month will require the following supply items:

Fuel oil	12,500 tons
Food for crews	22,500 tons
Torpedoes (1 ton each)	900 tons
Miscellaneous repair material	4,000 tons
Food imported for 35,000 workers and families	22,500 tons
Renewal of machine tools, concrete, ammunition, etc.	80,000 tons
TOTAL	183,400 tons

A limited amount of tonnage is brought in by water routes, particularly in winter months, but the great majority of the tonnage must depend upon the rail, highway, and canal system.

The approximate tonnage required for each base, when operating at capacity per day will be:

Brest	- 25 submarines	1516 tons per day
Lorient	- 41 submarines	1946 tons per day
St. Nazaire	- 26 submarines	1516 tons per day
TOTAL		4978 or approximately 5000 tons per day.

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TAB
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SECRET SECURITY

POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (N INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD		RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS	Sheet 1 of 15
		ROAD	RAILROAD			
1.	La Roche-Bernard	On N 165	None shown	Vilaine R.	High steel arch - no dimensions. See shee	
2.	Redon	On N 164	-	Vilaine R.	Concrete or masonry arch. See Phote neg. no. 178.132.	
	Redon	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	Steel girder or truss - See phote neg. no. 178.132. RR bridge can easily carry trucks.	
3.	1 mi E Guipry	Bain de Bretagne-Guipry Road	-	Vilaine R.	No information	
	1 mi E Guipry	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	No information. RR bridge can carry trucks.	
4.	3 mi N Guichen	On N 177	-	Vilaine R.	No information	
	3 mi N Guichen	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	No information. RR bridgecan carry trucks.	
5.	Merdelle	On N 124	-	Meu R.	No information	
	Merdelle	-	Rennes-Guer	Meu R.	No information.RR bridgecan carry trucks	
6.	Montfort	On N 164b	-	Meu R.	No information	
	Montfort	-	Rennes-St. Brieuc	Meu R.	No information RR bridge can carry trucks	
7.	Montauban	Connecting N 12 & N 164b	-	Meu R.	(No information - probably stone arches. (These bridges connect two parallel main reads 2 to 5 mi. apart.	
8.	W "	"	-	Meu R.		
9.	W "	"	-	Meu R.		
10.	¼ mi W Quedillac	Connecting N 12 & N 166	-	Tributary to Rance R.	No information	

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POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (N INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD) ROAD	RAILROAD	RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS
11.	Chapelle-Blanche (S of Coulnes)	On N 12	-	Rance R.	No information
	"	-	Rennes-St.Brieuc	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge can beused by truck
12.	7 mi due S Dinan	-	St. Meen-Dinan	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge might be used.
13.	Dinan	On N 176	-	Rance R.	High masonry arch. No dimensions.
	"	On N 176	-	Rance R.	Low masonry arch. No dimensions.
14.	4 mi. NE Dinan	-	Dinan-Del	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge might be used.
15.	Port St. Jean	Chateaument-Dinan	-	Rance R.	No.information. (Probably a good sized bridge)
16.	4 mi N Tinteniac	Rennes-Chateaument	-	Rance Canal	No information (Note RR bridge not included)
17.	½ mi N Hede	Rennes-Del	-	Rance Canal	No information
18.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 12	-	Flume R.	No information
19.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 164b	-	Flume R.	No information
.	3 mi W Rennes	On N 24	-	Flume R.	No information
21.	3 mi N Bain de Bretagne	On N 137	-	Semmon R.	No information
22.	Blain	Rennes-St. Nazaire	-	Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
23.	6 mi E Blain	On N 137	-	Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
24.	Pont Chateau	On N 165	-	Ht Brive R	No information (Note RR bridge that might be used)

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POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (A INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD) ROAD	RAILROAD	RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS
25.	2 mi N St. Nazaire	Blain-St. Nazaire	-	Canals	No information. Road and RR cross several small canals in this area.
26.	11 mi due W Nantes	Nantes-St. Peimboeuf	-	Acheneau R.	No information
27.	9 mi SW Nantes	Nantes-Pornic	-	Acheneau R.	No information (Note RR bridge)
28.	St. Leger	-	Nantes-Pornic	Tenu R.	No information
29.	5 mi S Pornic	-	Le Pellice-Pornic	Tenu R.	No information
		ROAD	RAILROAD		
	TOTAL (known)	26	10		

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TAB C

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SECURITY

ESTIMATION FOR MINIMUM ALTITUDE BOMBING
OF RAILROAD BRIDGES AND VIADUCTS

1. Assumptions

a. Overhead cover and/or diversionary missions would permit bomb-carrying fighter aircraft to reach the target areas.

b. After bombing the fighter planes could protect themselves on the return trip.

c. Preference in aircraft would be, if available in the United Kingdom --

(1) B-25 with eight forward firing guns, (see photograph) which would neutralize enemy antiaircraft and permit more accurate bombing. These guns would also be effective against trains and locomotives. Bomb load at required range --

20 x 100#
16 x 250#
6 x 500#
2 x 1000# *
1 x 2000#

(2) B-26 -

30 x 100#
14 x 250#
8 x 500#
4 x 1000#
2 x 2000#

(3) A-20A - (If R.A.F. Havocs are used).

20 x 100#
8 x 250#
2 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20B -

14 x 100#
8 x 250#
3 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20 C & G -

4 x 100#
4 x 250#
5 x 500#

* B-25C from #606B up and B-25D from #201B up can carry 3 x 1000#.

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Minimum Alt. Bombing of RR Bridges & Viaducts Cont'd

(4) P-38 Type -
2 x 100#
2 x 250#
2 x 500#
2 x 1000#

(5) P-40 Type -
1 x 100#
1 x 250# *
1 x 500#
1 x 1000# (Assumed from theater reports)

(6) P-39 Type -
1 x 100#
1 x 250#
1 x 500#
1 x 1000# (?)

(7) P-51 or A-36 -
2 x 100#
2 x 250#
2 x 500#
1 x 1000# (?)

(8) P-47 - (Capacity Assumed)
1 x 100#
1 x 250#
1 x 500#
1 x 1000#

d. Bomb Sizes --

Steel bridges	-	500-lb. GP
Masonry bridges	-	1000-lb. GP
Masonry viaducts	-	1000-lb. GP

e. Fusing for minimum altitude bombing should be --

Nose	-	None
Tail	-	5 seconds

f. One hit would be required for each bridge. Long masonry bridges or viaducts, especially those with two levels, would require two hits. Twenty percent (1 out of 5) of the bombs released should be effective.

* Have carried 4 x 250#.

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#1

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
Dinan Junction														
1	Lessard, Lamballe-Dol	Steel Viaduct	538	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
2	Br. Rance R, Dinan-Montaubon	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Montaubon Junction														
3	Br. Garun R, Montaubon-Rennes	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	Br. Meu R, Montaubon-Ploermel	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
5	Br. Rance R, Montaubon-Lamballe	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Guer Junction														
6	Br. Vilaine R, Guer-Messac	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Redon Junction														
7	Messac Br, Redon-Rennes	Concrete?	72	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Avessac Br, Redon-Rennes	Unstated	1630	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
9	Redon Br, Savenay-Redon	"	250	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5

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B[illegible] and Sortie Requirements #1 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
10	Prairie St., Savenay-Redon	Concrete?	50	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
11	Severac Br, Savenay-Redon	Concrete?	41	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
12	Severac Br, Savenay-Redon	Steel	50	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	Redon Br, Redon-Landerneau	Unstated	240	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	Redon Br, Redon-Landerneau	Concrete?	60	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
15	RR Br, St. Nazaire Redon	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						23	19	42	45	75	75	53	53	75
16	La Roche-Pornic			500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
17	La Roche-Paimbouef			500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						2	2	4	6	10	10	6	6	10
						25	21	46	51	85	85	59	59	85

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#2

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
St. Brieuc Junction														
1	St. Brieuc, Rennes-Brest	Masonry*	980	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
2	Yffiniac RR, Rennes-Brest (Br. #1)	Steel	325	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
3	" (Br. #2)	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	La Meaugen, Rennes-Brest	Masonry		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	RR Br, St. Brieuc-Paimpol-Lannion	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Loudeac Junction														
6	Unstated	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
7	Plouguenast, Loudeac-Yffiniac	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
8	RR Br, Loudeac-St. Meen	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
9	RR Br, Loudeac-Pontivy	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
10	RR Br, Loudeac-Rostrenen	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements Cont'd.

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No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
11	RR Br, (Oust R) Loudeac-Rostrenen	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
12	RR Br, Loudeac-Pontivy	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	RR Br, Pontivy-Lorient	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	RR Br, Pontivy-Ploermel (le Runio R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
15	" (Evel R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
16	RR Br, Pontivy-Gourin	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Baud Junction														
17	RR Br, Pontivy-Lorient	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
18	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
19	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
20	RR Br, Baud-Gourin	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Hennebont Junction														
21	Hennebont, Pontivy-Lorient													
Lorient Junction														
22	Lorient Br, Redon-Landerneau	Masonry* Steel	1304	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
23	Laita, Redon-Landerneau	Masonry*		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
						34	28	66	70	120	120	84	84	120

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#3

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
Morlaix Junction														
1	Plouignean, Rennes-Brest	Masonry*	950	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
2	Coatdon RR Br, Rennes-Brest.	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
3	Guimiliau RR Br, Rennes-Brest	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	RR Br, Morlaix-Plouescat	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Landerneau Junction														
5	St. Thegonnec, Rennes-Brest	Viaduct "		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	Kerhuon, Rennes-Brest	Viaduct "	650	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	RR Br, Landerneau-Quimper	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
8	Dasulas, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry*	1164	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
Chateaulin Junction														
9	Pont de Buis, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry	724	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements cont'd.

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No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
10	Chateaulin, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry*	1164	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
11	RR Br, Lorient-Brest (Odet R)	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
12	RR Br, Lorient-Brest (le Steir R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
15	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						33	24	63	51	90	90	72	72	90

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#4

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
1	Dol RR Brs, Dol-St.Malo	Unstated		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
2	Dol RR Br, Dinan-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
3	Dol RR Br, Dinan-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
4	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Dinan	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Redon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Guer	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	Rennes RR Br, SE, Rennes-Grand Fougeray	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
9	Blain RR Br, Redon-Blain-Nantes	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
10	Nantes RR Br, Nantes-Chateaubriant	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5

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B and Sortie Requirements #4 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
11	Nantes RR Br, Bras de la Madeleine.	Unstated	600'	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
12	Nantes RR Br, Bras de la Pirmil.	"	800'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
13	St. Leger RR, Nantes-Pornic	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
				Sub-total-	65	39	26	65	39	65	65	65	65	65
16	Muzillac RR Br, Vannes-St. Nazaire	"	820'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
17	La Roche-Bernard RR Br, Vannes-St. Nazaire	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
18	Ploermel RR Br, Guer-Ploermel-Montaubon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
19	Ploermel RR Br, Guer-Ploermel-Montaubon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
				Sub-total-	20	12	8	20	12	20	20	20	20	20
				Total-	85	51	34	85	51	85	85	85	85	85

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
#5
(Highway Bridges)

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
1	Dol Rd. Br, Dol-Dinan Rd. (Gaioult R)	Unstated		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
2	Dol Rd. Br, Dol-Dinan Rd. (Cardequin R)	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
3	Ploermel Rd. Br, Rennes-Baud Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
4	Blain Rd. Br, Chateaubriant-Savenay Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	Muzillac Rd., Vannes-Nantes Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	La Roche-Bernard Rd. Br, Vannes-Nantes Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	Nantes Rd. Br, Bras de la Madeleine R	"	450'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Nantes Rd. Br, Bras de Pirmil R.	"	800'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
9	St. Leger Rd. Br, Nantes-Pornic Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
					45	27	18	45	27	45	45	45	45	45

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Tab C

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ESTIMATION FOR MINIMUM ALTITUDE BOMBING OF RAILROAD BRIDGES AND VIADUCTS

1. Assumptions.

a. Overhead cover and/or diversionary missions would permit bomb-carrying fighter aircraft to reach the target areas.

b. After bombing the fighter planes could protect themselves on the return trip.

c. Preference in aircraft would be, if available in the United Kingdom --

(1) B-25 with eight forward firing guns, (see photograph) which would neutralize enemy antiaircraft and permit more accurate bombing. These guns would also be effective against trains and locomotives. Bomb load at required range --

20 x 100#
16 x 250#
6 x 500#
2 x 1000# *
1 x 2000#

(2) B-26 -

30 x 100#
14 x 250#
8 x 500#
4 x 1000#
2 x 2000#

(3) A-20A - (If R.A.F. Havocs are used).

20 x 100#
8 x 250#
2 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20B -

14 x 100#
8 x 250#
3 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20 C & G -

4 x 100#
4 x 250#
4 x 500#

* B-25C from #606B up and B-25D from #201B up can carry 3 x 1000#.

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Minimum Alt. Bombing of RR Bridges & Viaducts cont'd

(4) P-38 Type -
2 x 100#
2 x 250#
2 x 500#
2 x 1000#

(5) P-40 Type -
1 x 100#
1 x 250# *
1 x 500#
1 x 1000# (Assumed from theater reports)

(6) P-39 Type -
1 x 100#
1 x 250#
1 x 500#
1 x 1000# (?)

(7) P-51 or A-36 -
2 x 100#
2 x 250#
2 x 500#
1 x 1000# (?)

(8) P-47 - (Capacity Assumed)
1 x 100#
1 x 250#
1 x 500#
1 x 1000#

d. Bomb Sizes --

Steel bridges	-	500-lb GP
Masonry bridges	-	1000-lb GP
Masonry viaducts	-	1000-lb. GP

e. Fusing for minimum altitude bombing should be --

Nose	-	None
Tail	-	5 seconds

f. One hit would be required for each bridge. Long masonry bridges or viaducts, especially those with two levels, would require two hits. Twenty percent (1 out of 5) of the bombs released should be effective.

* Have carried 4 x 250#.

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#1

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
Dinan Junction														
1	Lessard, Lamballe-Dol	Steel Viaduct	538	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
2	Br. Rance R, Dinan-Montaubon	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Montaubon Junction														
3	Br. Garun R, Montaubon-Rennes	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	Br. Meu R, Montaubon-Ploermel	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
5	Br. Rance R, Montaubon-Lamballe	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Guer Junction														
6	Br. Vilaine R, Guer-Messac	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Redon Junction														
7	Messac Br, Redon-Rennes	Concrete?	72	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Avessac Br, Redon-Rennes	Unstated	1630	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
9	Redon Br, Savenay-Redon	"	250	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements #1 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	Noi	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
10	Prairie St., Savenay-Redon	Concrete?	50	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
11	Severac Br, Savenay-Redon	Concrete?	41	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
12	Severac Br, Savenay-Redon	Steel	50	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	Redon Br, Redon-Landerneau	Unstated	240	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	Redon Br, Redon-Landerneau	Concrete?	60	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
15	RR Br, St. Nazaire Redon	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						23	19	42	45	75	75	53	53	75
16	La Roche-Pornic			500	3	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
17	La Roche-Paimboeuf			500	3	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						2	2	4	6	10	10	6	6	10
						25	21	46	51	85	85	59	59	85

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
#2

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
St. Brieuc Junction														
1	St. Brieuc, Rennes-Brest	Masonry*	980	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
2	Yffiniac RR, Rennes-Brest (Br. #1)	Steel	325	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
3	" (Br. #2)	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	La Meaugen, Rennes-Brest	Masonry		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	RR Br, St. Brieuc-Paimpol-Lannion	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Loudeac Junction														
6	Unstated	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
7	Plouguenast, Loudeac-Yffiniac	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
8	RR Br, Loudeac-St. Meen	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
9	RR Br, Loudeac-Pontivy	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
10	RR Br, Loudeac-Rostrenen	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements #2 Cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
11	RR Br, (Oust R) Loudeac-Rostrenen	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5*	5	3	3	5
12	RR Br, Loudeac, Pontivy	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	RR Br, Pontivy-Lorient	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	RR Br, Pontivy-Ploermel (le Runio R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
15	" (Evel R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
16	RR Br, Pontivy-Gourin	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
	Baud Junction													
17	RR Br, Pontivy-Lorient	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
18	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
19	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
20	RR Br, Baud-Gourin	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
	Hannebont Junction													
21	Hannebont, Pontivy-Lorient													
	Lorient Junction													
22	Lorient Br, Redon-Landerneau	Masonry* Steel	1304	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
23	Laita, Redon-Landerneau	Masonry*		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
						34	28	66	70	120	120	84	84	120

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#3

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
Morlaix Junction														
1	Plouignean, Rennes-Brest	Masonry*	950	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
2	Coatdon RR Br, Rennes-Brest	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
3	Guimiliau RR Br, Rennes-Brest	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	RR Br, Morlaix-Plouescat	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Landerneau Junction														
5	St. Thegonnec, Rennes-Brest	Viaduct "		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	Kerhuon, Rennes-Brest	Viaduct "	650	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	RR Br, Landerneau-Quimper	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
8	Daoulas, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry*	1164	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
Chateulin Junction														
9	Pont de Buis, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry	734	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements #3 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
10	Chateulin, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry*	1164	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
11	RR Br, Lorient-Brest (Odet R)	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
12	RR Br, Lorient-Brest (Le Steir R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
15	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						33	34	63	51	90	90	72	72	90

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#4

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
1	Dol RR Brs, Dol-St. Malo	Unstated		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
2	Dol RR Br, Dinan-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
3	Dol RR Br, Dinan-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
4	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Dinan	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Redon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Guer	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	Rennes RR Br, SE, Rennes-Grand Fougeray	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
9	Blain RR Br, Redon-Blain	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
10	Nantes RR Br, Nantes-Chateaubriant	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirement #4 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
11	Nantes RR Br, Bras de la Madeleine.	Unstated	600'	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
12	Nantes RR Br, Bras de la Pirmil.	"	800'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
13	St. Leger RR, Nantes-Pornic	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
				Sub-total-	65	39	26	65	39	65	65	65	65	65
16	Muzillac RR Br, Vannes-St. Nazaire	"	820'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
17	La Roche, Bernard RR Br, Vannes-St. Nazaire	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
18	Ploermel RR Br, Guer-Ploermel-Montaubon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
19	Ploermel RR Br, Guer-Ploermel-Montaubon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
				Sub-total-	20	12	8	20	12	20	20	20	20	20
				Total-	85	51	34	85	51	85	85	85	85	85

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#5

(Highway Bridges)

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
1	Dol Rd. Br, Dol-Dinan Rd. (Gaioult R)	Unstated		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
2	Dol Rd. Br, Dol-Dinan Rd. (Cardequin R)	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
3	Ploermel Rd. Br, Rennes-Baud Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
4	Blain Rd., Br, Chateaubriant-Savenay Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	Muzillac Rd., Vannes-Nantes Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	La Roche-Bernard Rd., Br, Vannes-Nantes Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	Nantes Rd. Br., Bras De la Madeleine R	"	450'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Nantes Rd Br, Bras de Pirmil R.	"	800'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
9	St. Leger Rd., Br, Nantes-Pornic Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
					45	27	18	45	27	45	45	45	45	45

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GRAND TOTAL

MINIMUM ALTITUDE ATTACKS

	Bombs Required		Type of Plane								
	500#	1000#	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
	65	22	25	21	46	51	85	85	59	59	80
	90	30	34	28	66	70	120	120	84	84	120
	45	45	33	24	63	51	90	90	72	72	90
	0	85	51	34	85	51	85	85	85	85	85
	0	45	27	18	45	27	45	45	45	45	45
Total	200	227	170	125	305	250	425	425	345	345	420

MARSHALING YARDS
(High Altitude Attack)
Preliminary Estimation

	Location	Bomb Requirements Size	No.	Attacking Planes Required B-17
	Rennes	500	400	50
	Dol	500	400	50
	Nantes	500	400	50
	Chateaubriand	500	400	50
	Blain	500	400	50
Total			2000	250

NOTE:

1. The estimation of sortie requirements necessary to neutralize the targets includes only those planes which must actually attack the aiming point. Additional planes must be added to furnish fighter cover and to provide for those planes that may become abortive.

*2. Total striking Force and number of missions required to accomplish desired results is as follows:

Type Aircraft	Number of Groups	Missions
B-17	5	4
P-39	4	4
B-26	2	3
A-36	4	4
A-20	4	4

*Assumptions in computing the above figures: Groups were taken at reduced T/O. 60% of group aircraft operational, 60% of sorties effective.

These figures do not include the number of fighter aircraft required for cover protection and escort.

3. The highway system is so extensive that its effective paralysis is not considered possible. Secondary roads are not sufficiently inferior in quality to preclude routing of all types of supplies over them.

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4. Air engineers are preparing a final map based on additional data which when received will be added to this report as a supplemental exhibet. It is expected that the total number of sorties required will be increased somewhat as a result of this study. The striking force required will remain as indicated in paragraph 2, above.

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TAB C

* The total striking force necessary to accomplish the desired results is as follows:

** Type Aircraft	Number of Groups	Missions
B-17	5	2
P-39	4	2
B-26	2	2
A-36	4	2
A-20	4	2
P-47	4	2

No provision has been made for fighter cover and protection.

* Assuming that it is desired to destroy the listed targets almost simultaneously and on the assumption that groups are at reduced T/O, that 60% of group aircraft are operational and that 70% of sorties are effective.

** The B-17's are assigned to the five railway yards and one of the other types to be assigned as preferred for attack on railway and highway bridges.

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June 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Whitney.

Subject: Plan for Breton Peninsula

An engineering study of the severing of communications in a line roughly north from St. Nazaire to St. Malo indicates that even though every possible target is included along that line, road communications could not be severed successfully for over two days and rail communications over ten days at the maximum. This time limitation does not mean that full communication facilities will be restored as traffic will be restricted to one-way instead of two-way movement, which will result in the slowing down and an increased load on their rail and motor transport. The maximum damage which can be accomplished includes destruction of the bridges at points 1 to 15 and the marshalling yards at Nantes, Blain, Chateaubriant, Rennes and Dol.

M. J. GOODMAN
Major, C. E.

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BRETON PENINSULA

MARSHALLING YARDS

Rennes
Dol
Nantes
Chateaubriand
Blain

ROUNDHOUSE - RUNNING REPAIRS

St. Malo
Dinan
Rennes
Redon
St. Nazaire
Savenay
Nantes
Le Croisice
Vannes
Auray
Lorient
Quimper
Landerneau
Brest
Morlaix
St. Brieuc
Lamballe

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TAB D

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air rces
Office Chief of the Air Staff
Washington, D. C.

Date May 30 1943

TO: Lt. Col. George
Lt. Col. Walker
Lt. Col. Craig
Lt. Col. Anderson
Major Hansell
Captain Alling
Captain Oscanyan
Captain Taylor
Major Gillespie
Mr. McPherson

FOR: Col. Kyle—
Here is the
document
requested from
Orlando.

Burbank
Lt Col AC

Put this in your copy file
Col Boulton Paine

A-W.P. DIVISION

AAF-176

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COPY

R A I L W A Y R E S E A R C H S E R V I C E

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECT OF ATTACK

ON

RENNES CLASSIFICATION YARD
8.3.43
AND

SOTTEVILLE (ROUEN) CLASSIFICATION YARD
12.3.43

Introduction

The report is prepared in response to a special request.

Full photographic cover has not yet been received in regard to the whole of the railway facilities at Rennes (including reception tracks to the east of the sorting sidings, the locomotive depot and locomotive repair shops, and the junctions at the west end of the station).

Reliance is, therefore, largely placed on:

C.I.U. Report K.1499 of 14.3.43
C.I.U. Report F. 328 of 16.3.43

In the case of Rouen (Sotteville), the cover supplied is more complete, but, similarly, reliance is placed on:

C.I.U. Report K.1506 of 14.3.43 and supplement of 15.3.43
C.I.U. Report F. 329 of 16.3.43

General Background

Rennes yard is the strategic key to the whole of the railway network of Brittany, as traffic to and from St. Malo via Dol; Brest, Lannion and St. Brieuc via Lamballe; Quimper, Lorient and Vannes via Redon; all concentrate at Rennes, which also contains locomotive shops for heavy repairs, and repair facilities for passenger, freight and tank cars.

The only routes by which traffic to Brittany can keep around Rennes are via Folligny, Dol, Lamballe, partly single track, and via Nantes, Savenay and Redon, a good double-track line, to which the key is at Tours (St. Pierre-des-Corps). In effect, and as far as information goes, the large viaduct at Morlaix was out of service owing to aerial attack at the end of January, and, consequently, the repairs necessitated its being out of use during a large part of February and during the first few days of March at least. The route via Dol, therefore, will not then have been effective for traffice much beyond Plouaret. On the Redon, Vannes, Auray, Lorient line, the cutting of the line at Lorient on 6.3.43 rendered that alternative route out of service beyond Hennebont.

This demonstrates how attacks, which virtually coincide, increase

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the effect in geometric rather than arithmetic progression in respect of damage to railway facilities.

Rouen - Sotteville, referred to in detail later, is also complementary in that routing of traffic between Brittany and Germany (and the U.S.S.R.) flowing through Rennes also flows, to a material extent, through Rouen (Sotteville).

Attacks on a smaller scale on the locomotive depots at Amiens (Longueau), Laon, Tergnier and the classification yards at Le Mans cannot be separated from the general picture.

Functions of Rennes

Except for the yards at Le Mans, and Troyes in the Paris area, Rennes is the only other yard available between Paris and Brest (387 miles);

with its 12 reception tracks and 32 sorting tracks, it can deal with 4,000 wagons per day, though the average in peace time is about 2400. It is a hump yard (with one hump), equipped with car retarders of a delicate design. These retarders are certainly out of service and cannot bereplaced in war-time; they took two years to construct and install. A car retarder hump is so steep that hand braking is probably out of the question, and present assessment of damage leads to the view that the yard cannot be operated even on a limited scale for many weeks. In brief, Rennes, when repaired, can not be much more than a storage yard, though some flat switching might be carried out. The expedient of lowering the hump cannot easily be adopted at Rennes as the hump consists of a concrete bridge over a roadway.

War traffics handled at Rennes include:

A. Divisional movements between Brittany and the Eastern Front, which have attained up to 24 trains per day, say, one Division in three days. (A typical example of such a movement was "Tennisball", comprising 62 trains from Brittany to Germany (for U.S.S.R?) between 20.10.42 and 26.10.42);

B. Oil and other supplies for German navy and U-boats at Brest and Lorient;

C. Munitions and guns to and from Brittany coast;

D. Foodstuffs, supplies and stores to naval base at St. Malo and Channel Islands;

E. Cement, barbed wire, hutments and stores to and from Brittany coast;

F. Bunker coal for German shipping, Brest, Lorient, etc.;

G. Troops, guns, etc. to and from large training depot at Guer;

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H. Luftwaffe sotres, petrol, aircraft spare parts, bombs, etc. to Lannion, Rennes, St. Jacques and other airfields;

I. Troops, etc. to training area at Pont l'Abbe beyond Quimper.

The divisional and other troop trains usually stop at Rennes Station for feeding, etc.

Rennes itself is a large military and air base, and the military platform near the yard is in constant use.

All these movements will have been stopped for some considerable time, and the locomotive position on the Le Mans- Brittany lines will become even more serious owing to the immobilization of over 70 locomotives in the Rennes area.

Another matter of no mean importance is the destruction of points and crossings, which are in urgent demand for Russia and which are in short supply.

Functions of Rouen (Sotteville)

Sotteville yard is one of vital strategic importance to the German High Command, since it controls all traffic between Paris and the Le Havre areas, as well as traffic moving between the Region Ouest and the Region Nord of the French Railway.

The bridge over the Seine at the north end of Sotteville yard is the lowest rail crossing over that river; the only satisfactory alternative route for traffic between Brittany and West Normandy and the Nord Region, Belgium, etc. is that via Mantes, Acheres and Creil.

Concentration of rolling stock at Sotteville has been heavy over long periods, averaging about 2,000 wagons.

The yard is equipped with Frolich type car retarders, as used at Hamm and Trappes. It is not clear from the photographic cover if these retarders have been severely damaged; if that should be so, they can hardly be replaced during the war.

The locomotive depot provides power for a wide area, i.e. Paris to Le Havre and to Laigle and Amiens. It has apparently been severely damaged; unfortunately, the well-equipped Quatre Mares locomotive repair shops have escaped all damage on this and on earlier raids. They are of vital importance in view of damage already accomplished at Hellemmes, Longueau, Laon and other centers where heavy repairs can be carried out.

Rouen (Sotteville) handles the following traffic for the Wehrmacht on the routes already specified:

A. Divisional movements from Western France to Northern France, Belgium, Germany and the Eastern Front at a rate which may attain 24 trains per day in each direction;

B. Oil, spare parts, ammunition, mines, etc. for Brest, Lorient and

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other Atlantic boast naval bases;

C. Supplies, livestock, st res for Wehrmacht in Pas-de-Calais, Nord, Belgium, etc.;

D. Petrol, spare parts, bombs, etc. for Luftwaffe in Western France;

E. Engineer's stores, construction material, cement, hutments, etc. from Dieppe to St. Nazaire;

F. Coal traffic from Northern France to Normandy and Brittany.

Short-Term Results

It is not possible to estimate the results with exactitude, since much will depend on the rapidity with which repairs will be effected at both yards. At Rouen, little but the removal of damaged wagons was done during the first 6 hours after the attack, and at Rennes, with several direct hits on the main lines, the filling of craters alone will require some days, and through running cannot be normal for some weeks.

Expressed in brief, the short-period results of these two heavy and most accurate attacks will disorganize military traffic to and from Western France for several weeks, perhaps, longer, and will virtually cut off Brittany from the Paris area except by circuitous routes. If any heavy military moves were in progress or planned - and this will not be known for some weeks - they will have to be amended and battle order adjusted accordingly to fit the new situation. Serious delay to the arrival of Divisions on the Eastern Front is by no means improbable.

Placing Rennes out of service isolates Brittany in somewhat similar manner to the effect on the New England States, if the New Haven's Cedar Hill yard could take no traffic, or if the Southern Pacific's Roseville facilities were out of use, and the Californian coast area would thereby be largely isolated.

Sotteville may be compared in a sense to the Potomac yard of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac at Alexandria, Va. Effect of dislocation would be felt from New York to South Carolina and beyond; similarly, the Sotteville position will be felt at least as far as Ghent and Liege.

Long-Period Results

Grave as the damage is over a short period to the Axis war effort, there is a further consideration.

The results at Rennes provide the most successful picture yet received in this war of a yard neatly and completely put out of service. The effect of the Sotteville attack is probably hardly less serious.

In the view of this writer, who is familiar with the railway working at all the yards mentioned in this memorandum (with the exception of

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Roseville), these attacks will force the German High Command to realize for the first time the full effect of the power of the Allied Air Forces to hamstring the railway network over a wide area. These two-hours' work brought to a complete stop railway working on the main lines of Normandy and Brittany, which will take weeks, if not months, to repair fully. This factor is likely to alter the whole concept of the German ability to hold the Atlantic Coast against an Allied attack. Similarly, its success should be fully understood by those responsible for Allied plans. The lesson to be learnt is that a skillful and heavy attack, if directed to the right points, can tie up a whole railway system for days and completely cut off an area.

This effect could not be repeated in the Ruhr, Northern Rhine or Belgian areas, where alternative routes are manifold, but in France or Italy, where the railway system is less dense, its possibility has been proved and is clearly capable of repetition.

By these two attacks, the U.S. Army Air Corps has proved what has been maintained as impractical by many since 1939.

All those concerned must be exceedingly gratified with the results for the credit side of the results are immense, the debit side consisting only of any aircraft losses sustained and casualties to the French civil population.

Sgd.
C.R.R. Sherrington

20.3.43

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TAB E

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SECRET SECURITY Tab D

Report No. 379

WEATHER CONDITONS AFFECTING BOMBING OPERATIONS

ON THE

BRITTANY PENINSULA, JUNE THROUGH SEPTEMBER

Weather conditions during the summer months, June through September, will be generally favorable for bombing operations over the Brittany peninsula. Although considerable low cloudiness will be encountered, contact weather (ceiling greater than 1,000 feet, visibility greater than 3½ miles) ordinarily prevails from 80 to 90 % of the time during daylight hours. In the poorest months contact weather may decrease to 65% and in good months may be as high as 100%. Low clouds are much more prevalent during the night, the usual condition being for low stratus clouds or sea fogs to drift over the land at night and burn off during the day. Ceilings are lower and cloud amounts greater during the early morning than during the afternoon. Ceilings of greater than 5,000 feet with visibility of 6 miles or more occur approximately 50% of the time during the daylight hours.

Rain occurs on 12 to 14 days per month, but the summer storms are usually mild and only infrequently accompanied by winds of gale velocity. Except in unusual weather situations, the icing level is at about 8,000 to 10,000 feet. Thunderstorms are not frequent, occurring on an average of about one day per month.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

C. V. Whitney
Lt. Colonel, A. C.

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PLAN FOR AIR ATTACK ON SUBMARINE
BASES IN BRITTANY
(Supplementary Material)

145.81-42
MAY-JUL 1943
CATALOGED

P.R.C.

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DOD DIR 5200.9, 27 Sep 80

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PLAN FOR AIR ATTACK ON SUBMARINE BASES IN BRITTANY

(Supplementary Material)

2925-3

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DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.9, 27 Sep 80

P.R.C.

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May 29, 1943 PRC

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Anderson.

Subject: Proposed Plan for Air Attack, Supplementing the Eaker Program, to Isolate and Paralyze the Axis Submarine Bases in Brittany.

Statement of the Problem:

To formulate a plan, supplementing the Eaker program for high level precision bombing of submarine bases in Brittany, to isolate and paralyze these bases by periodic low level and medium altitude bombing attacks on their logistical set-up in the area.

I. Discussion.

1. The submarine bases of Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire on the Brittany peninsula service and repair monthly from seventy-five to eighty per cent of the total Axis submarine fleet operating in the Atlantic Ocean. Their neutralization by high level precision bombing has been given high priority in the Eaker plan. The continued operation of these bases depends on the delivery to them of adequate supplies of fuel oil, repair material, torpedoes, and food for the crews and workers. (Tab A).

2. The periodic destruction of the key targets selected on the transportation system on the Brittany peninsula connecting these bases with their necessary sources of supply will tend to isolate and paralyze these bases. (Tab B).

3. The number of sorties by aircraft types and the number of bombs required to achieve the desired results is set forth in Tab C.

4. Air bases in the United Kingdom for the proposed operations are adequate.

5. The effect of the recent bombings of Rennes (March 8, 1943) and Sotteville (March 12, 1943) on the railway network of the Brittany peninsula is shown in Tab D.

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6. Weather conditions in the United Kingdom and in Brittany during the summer months are suitable for sustained operations. (Tab E)

II. Advantages of the Plan:

1. Supplements the Eaker plan by destroying the logistical set-up which is now supplying submarine bases on the Brittany peninsula.

2. Would reduce the number of effective submarines at sea by increasing the turn-about time of submarines at those bases.

3. Would impose additional loads on the new submarine bases being constructed further south in the Bay of Biscay.

4. Would draw to this area for its defense German fighter squadrons now employed elsewhere, thereby reducing the fighter defense at other vital German industrial targets to the Northeast.

5. Would reduce the supplies to 14 German airdromes known to be in the area.

6. Much enemy rolling stock would be either destroyed or rendered immobile for considerable periods of time, thereby increasing the strain on already overburdened Axis rolling stock.

7. The destruction of numerous and widely separated logistical targets, as proposed, would complicate their problem of repair and delay the reopening of those supply routes.

8. Provides cover and deception for other cross-channel operations.

9. Adds to the "war of nerves" program.

10. Would be added training for air force units of the Eighth Air Force which are not required in implementing the Eaker plan, but which will be used in subsequent operations.

11. Would necessitate flying supplies into the area, thereby pulling transport aircraft and gliders away from other fronts and vital projects.

12. Would necessitate new drafting of workers to rehandle the shipping of supplies over secondary water and highway systems.

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III. Disadvantages of the Plan:

1. Numerous small roads and canals in Brittany provide an emergency transportation system over which a small part of the required supplies could still be shipped to the submarine bases.

2. Small items of critical supply could be flown direct to the submarine bases.

3. An alternate sea route for a percentage of the required tonnage through ports in the Bay of Biscay would in time have to be developed.

IV. Conclusions:

Periodic low level and medium altitude bombing attacks, as envisaged in this plan, against the logistical set-up on the Brittany peninsula, co-ordinated with high level bombing attacks directed under the Baker plan, will greatly reduce the number of submarines which the Axis can effectively operate in the North Atlantic.

V. Recommendations:

That this plan for co-ordinated air attack on Axis submarine bases in Brittany be submitted to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force for further study.

REUBEN KYLE, JR.
Colonel, G. S. C.

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It is estimated that 90 submarines using the bases of Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire for a period of one month will require the following supply items:

Fuel oil	13,500 tons
Food for crews	27,500 tons
Torpedoes (1 ton each)	900 tons
Miscellaneous repair material	4,000 tons
Food imported for 25,000 workers and families	22,500 tons
Renewal of machine tools, concrete, ammunition, etc.	30,000 tons
TOTAL	153,400 tons

A limited amount of tonnage is brought in by water routes, particularly in winter months, but the great majority of the tonnage must depend upon the rail, highway, and canal system.

The approximate tonnage required for each base, when operating at capacity per day will be:

Brest	- 25 submarines	1516 tons per day
Lorient	- 41 submarines	1946 tons per day
St. Nazaire	- 26 submarines	1516 tons per day
TOTAL		4978 or approximately 5000 tons per day.

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POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (N INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD)		RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS	Sheet 1 of 15
		ROAD	RAILROAD			
1.	La Roche-Bernard	On N 165	None shown	Vilaine R.	High steel arch - no dimensions. See shee	
2.	Redon	On N 164	-	Vilaine R.	Concrete or masonry arch. See Photo neg. no. 178.132.	
	Redon	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	Steel girder or truss - See photo neg. no. 178.132. RR bridge can easily carry trucks.	
3.	1 mi N Guipry	Bain de Bretagne-Guipry Road	-	Vilaine R.	No information	
	1 mi E Guipry	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	No information. RR bridge can carry trucks.	
4.	3 mi N Guichen	On N 177	-	Vilaine R.	No information	
	3 mi N Guichen	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	No information. RR bridgecan carry trucks.	
5.	Mordelle	On N 124	-	Meu R.	No information	
	Mordelle	-	Rennes-Quer	Meu R.	No information.RR bridgecan carry trucks	
6.	Montfort	On N 164b	-	Meu R.	No information	
	Montfort	-	Rennes-St. Brieuc	Meu R.	No information RR bridge can carry trucks	
7.	Montauban	Connecting N 12 & N 164b	-	Meu R.)	(No information - probably stone arches.	
8.	W "	"	-	Meu R.)	(These bridges connect two parallel main	
9.	W "	"	-	Meu R.)	(roads 2 to 5 mi. apart.	
10.	½ mi W Quedillac	Connecting N 12 & N 166	-	Tributary to Rance R.	No information	

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SECURITY

POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (N INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD) ROAD	RAILROAD	RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS
11.	Chapelle-Blanche (S of Coulnes)	On N 12	-	Rance R.	No information
	"	-	Rennes-St.Brieuc	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge can beused by trucks
12.	7 mi due S Dinan	-	St. Meen-Dinan	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge might be used.
13.	Dinan	On N 176	-	Rance R.	High masonry arch. No dimensions.
	"	On N 176	-	Rance R.	Low masonry arch. No dimensions.
14.	4 mi. NE Dinan	-	Dinan-Del	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge might be used.
15.	Pert St. Jean	Chateaumont-Dinan	-	Rance R.	No.information. (Probably a good sized bridge)
16.	4 mi N Tinteniac	Rennes-Chateaument	-	Rance Canal	No information (Note RR bridge not included)
17.	½ mi N Hede	Rennes-Del	-	Rance Canal	No information
18.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 12	-	Flume R.	No information
.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 164b	-	Flume R.	No information
20.	3 mi W Rennes	On N 24	-	Flume R.	No information
21.	3 mi N Bain de Bretagne	On N 137	-	Semnen R.	No information
22.	Blain	Rennes-St. Nazaire	-	Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
23.	6 mi E Blain	On N 137	-	Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
24.	Pont Chateau	On N 165	-	Ht Brive R	No information (Note RR bridge that might be used)

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POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (A INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD) ROAD	RAILROAD	RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS
25.	2 mi N St. Nazaire	Blain-St. Nazaire	-	Canals	No information. Road and RR cross several small canals in this area.
26.	11 mi due W Nantes	Nantes-St. Peimbeent	-	Acheneau R.	No information
27.	9 mi SW Nantes	Nantes-Pornic	-	Acheneau R.	No information (Note RR bridge)
28.	St. Leger	-	Nantes-Pornic	Temu R.	No information
29.	5 mi S Pornic	-	La Pellice-Pornic	Temu R.	No information

	ROAD	RAILROAD
TOTAL (known)	26	10

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Tab C

SECRET SECURITY

ESTIMATION FOR MINIMUM ALTITUDE BOMBING
OF RAILROAD BRIDGES AND VIADUCTS

1. Assumptions.

a. Overhead cover and/or diversionary missions would permit bomb-carrying fighter aircraft to reach the target areas.

b. After bombing the fighter planes could protect themselves on the return trip.

c. Preference in aircraft would be, if available in the United Kingdom --

(1) B-25 with eight forward firing guns, (see photograph) which would neutralize enemy antiaircraft and permit more accurate bombing. These guns would also be effective against trains and locomotives. Bomb load at required range --

20 x 100#
16 x 250#
6 x 500#
2 x 1000# *
1 x 2000#

(2) B-26 -

30 x 100#
14 x 250#
8 x 500#
4 x 1000#
2 x 2000#

(3) A-20A - (If R.A.F. Havocs are used).

20 x 100#
8 x 250#
2 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20B -

14 x 100#
8 x 250#
3 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20 C & G -

4 x 100#
4 x 250#
4 x 500#

* B-25C from #6063 up and B-25D from #2013 up can carry 3 x 1000#.

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Minimum Alt. Bombing of RR Bridges & Viaducts cont'd

(4) P-38 Type -
- 2 x 100#
- 2 x 250#
- 2 x 500#
- 2 x 1000#

(5) P-40 Type -
- 1 x 100#
- 1 x 250# *
- 1 x 500#
- 1 x 1000# (Assumed from theater reports)

(6) P-39 Type -
- 1 x 100#
- 1 x 250#
- 1 x 500#
- 1 x 1000# (?)

(7) P-51 or A-36 -
- 2 x 100#
- 2 x 250#
- 2 x 500#
- 1 x 1000# (?)

(8) P-47 - (Capacity Assumed)
- 1 x 100#
- 1 x 250#
- 1 x 500#
- 1 x 1000#

d. Bomb Sizes --

Steel bridges	-	500-lb GP
Masonry bridges	-	1000-lb GP
Masonry viaducts	-	1000-lb. GP

e. Fusing for minimum altitude bombing should be --

Nose	-	None
Tail	-	5 seconds

f. One hit would be required for each bridge. Long masonry bridges or viaducts, especially those with two levels, would require two hits. Twenty percent (1 out of 5) of the bombs released should be effective.

* Have carried 4 x 250#.

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
#1

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
Dinan Junction														
1	Lessard, Lamballe-Dol	Steel Viaduct	538	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
2	Br. Rance R, Dinan-Montaubon	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Montaubon Junction														
3	Br. Garun R, Montaubon-Rennes	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	Br. Meu R, Montaubon-Ploermel	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
5	Br. Rance R, Montaubon-Lamballe	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Guer Junction														
6	Br. Vilaine R, Guer-Messac	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Redon Junction														
7	Messac Br, Redon-Rennes	Concrete?	72	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Avessac Br, Redon-Rennes	Unstated	1630	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
9	Redon Br, Savenay-Redon	"	250	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements #1 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
10	Prairie St., Savenay-Redon	Concrete?	50	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
11	Severac Br, Savenay-Redon	Concrete?	41	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
12	Severac Br, Savenay-Redon	Steel	50	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	Redon Br, Redon-Landerneau	Unstated	240	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	Redon Br, Redon-Landerneau	Concrete?	60	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
15	RR Br, St. Nazaire Redon	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						23	19	42	45	75	75	53	53	75
16	**La Roche-Pornic**			**500**	**5**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**5**	**5**	**3**	**3**	**5**
17	**La Roche-Paimboeuf**			**500**	**5**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**5**	**5**	**3**	**3**	**5**
						2	**3**	**4**	**6**	**10**	**10**	**6**	**6**	**10**
						25	**21**	**46**	**51**	**85**	**85**	**59**	**59**	**85**

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
#2

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
St. Brieuc Junction														
1	St. Brieuc, Rennes-Brest	Masonry*	980	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
2	Yffiniac RR, Rennes-Brest (Br. #1)	Steel	325	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
3	" (Br. #2)	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	La Meaugen, Rennes-Brest	Masonry		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	RR Br, St. Brieuc-Paimpol-Lannion	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Loudeac Junction														
6	Unstated	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
7	Plouguenast, Loudeac-Yffiniac	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
8	RR Br, Loudeac-St. Meen	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
9	RR Br, Loudeac-Pontivy	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
10	RR Br, Loudeac-Rostrenen	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements #2 Cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
11	RR Br, (Oust R) Loudeac-Rostrenen	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
12	RR Br, Loudeac, Pontivy	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	RR Br, Pontivy-Lorient	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	RR Br, Pontivy-Ploermel (le Runio R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
15	" (Evel R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
16	RR Br, Pontivy-Gourin	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
	Baud Junction													
17	RR Br, Pontivy-Lorient	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
18	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
19	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
20	RR Br, Baud-Gourin	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
	Hannebont Junction													
21	Hannebont, Pontivy-Lorient													
	Lorient Junction													
22	Lorient Br, Redon-Landerneau	Masonry* Steel	1304	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
23	Laita, Redon-Landerneau	Masonry*		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
						34	28	66	70	120	120	84	84	120

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
#3

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
Morlaix Junction														
1	Plouignean, Rennes-Brest	Masonry*	950	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
2	Coatdon RR Br, Rennes-Brest	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
3	Guimiliau RR Br, Rennes-Brest	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
4	RR Br, Morlaix-Plouescat	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Landerneau Junction														
5	St. Thegonnec, Rennes-Brest	Viaduct "		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	Kerhuon, Rennes-Brest	Viaduct "	650	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	RR Br, Landerneau-Quimper	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
8	Dasulas, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry*	1164	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
Chateulin Junction														
9	Pont de Buis, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry	724	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirements #3 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane								
				Size	No.	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
10	Chateulin, Landerneau-Quimper	Masonry*	1164	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
11	RR Br, Lorient-Brest (Odet R)	Unstated		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
12	RR Br, Lorient-Brest (Le Steir R)	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
13	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
14	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
15	"	"		500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
						33	24	63	51	90	90	72	72	90

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
#4

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
1	Dol RR Brs, Dol-St. Malo	Unstated		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
2	Dol RR Br, Dinan-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
3	Dol RR Br, Dinan-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
4	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Dinan	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Redon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Guer	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	Rennes RR Br, SE, Rennes-Grand Fougeray	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Rennes RR Br, Rennes-Dol	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
9	Blain RR Br, Redon-Blain	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
10	Nantes RR Br, Nantes-Chateaubriant	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5

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Bomb and Sortie Requirement #4 cont'd.

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
11	Nantes RR Br, Bras de la Madeleine.	Unstated	600'	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
12	Nantes RR Br, Bras de la Pirmil.	"	800'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
13	St. Leger RR, Nantes-Pornic	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
				Sub-total-	65	39	26	65	39	65	65	65	65	65
16	Muzillac RR Br, Vannes-St. Nazaire	"	820'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
17	La Roche, Bernard RR Br, Vennes-St. Nazaire	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
18	Ploermel RR Br, Guer-Ploermel-Montaubon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
19	Ploermel RR Br, Guer-Ploermel-Montaubon	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
				Sub-total-	20	12	8	20	12	20	20	20	20	20
				Total-	85	51	34	85	51	85	85	85	85	85

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

#5

(Highway Bridges)

No.	Target	Type	Length (ft.)	Bomb Requirements Size	Bomb Requirements No.	Attacking Sortie Requirements by Type of Plane B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
1	Dol Rd. Br, Dol-Dinan Rd. (Gaioult R)	Unstated		1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
2	Dol Rd. Br, Dol-Dinan Rd. (Cardequin R)	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
3	Ploermel Rd. Br, Rennes-Baud Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
4	Blain Rd., Br, Chateaubriant-Savenay Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
5	Muzillac Rd., Vannes-Nantes Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
6	La Roche-Bernard Rd., Br, Vannes-Nantes Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
7	Nantes Rd. Br., Bras De la Madeleine R	"	450'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
8	Nantes Rd Br, Bras de Pirmil R.	"	800'	"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
9	St. Leger Rd., Br, Nantes-Pornic Rd.	"		"	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
					45	27	18	45	27	45	45	45	45	45

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GRAND TOTAL

MINIMUM ALTITUDE ATTACKS

Bombs Required		Type of Plane								
500#	1000#	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
65	22	25	21	46	51	85	85	59	59	80
90	30	34	28	66	70	120	120	84	84	120
45	45	33	24	63	51	90	90	72	72	90
0	85	51	34	85	51	85	85	85	85	85
0	45	27	18	45	27	45	45	45	45	45
Total 300	227	170	125	305	250	425	425	345	345	420

MARSHALING YARDS
(High Altitude Attack)
Preliminary Estimation

Location	Bomb Requirements		Attacking Planes Required
	Size	No.	B-17
Rennes	500	400	50
Dol	500	400	50
Nantes	500	400	50
Chateaubriand	500	400	50
Blain	500	400	50
Total		2000	250

NOTE:

1. The estimation of sortie requirements necessary to neutralize the targets includes only those planes which must actually attack the aiming point. Additional planes must be added to furnish fighter cover and to provide for those planes that may become abortive.

*2. Total striking Force and number of missions required to accomplish desired results is as follows:

Type Aircraft	Number of Groups	Missions
B-17	5	4
P-39	4	4
B-26	2	3
A-36	4	4
A-20	4	4

*Assumptions in computing the above figures: Groups were taken at reduced T/O. 60% of group aircraft operational, 60% of sorties effective.

These figurss do not include the number of fighter aircraft required for cover protection and escort.

3. The highway system is so extensive that its effective paralysis is not considered possible. Secondary roads are not sufficiently inferior in quality to preclude routing of all types of supplies over them.

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4. Air engineers are preparing a final map based on additional data which when received will be added to this report as a supplemental exhibet. It is expected that the total number of sorties required will be increased somewhat as a result of this study. The striking force required will remain as indicated in paragraph 2, above.

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June 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Whitney.

Subject: Plan for Breton Peninsula

An engineering study of the severing of communications in a line roughly north from St. Nazaire to St. Malo indicates that even though every possible target is included along that line, road communications could not be severed successfully for over two days and rail communications over ten days at the maximum. This time limitation does not mean that full communication facilities will be restored as traffic will be restricted to one-way instead of two-way movement, which will result in the slowing down and an increased load on their rail and motor transport. The maximum damage which can be accomplished includes destruction of the bridges at points 1 to 15 and the marshalling yards at Nantes, Blain, Chateaubriant, Rennes and Dol.

M. J. GOODMAN
Major, C. E.

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SECURITY

BRETON PENINSULA

MARSHALLING YARDS

Rennes
Dol
Nantes
Chateaubriand
Blain

MOTORHOUSE - RUNNING REPAIRS

St. Malo
Dinan
Rennes
Redon
St. Nazaire
Savenay
Nantes
Le Croisice
Vannes
Auray
Lorient
Quimper
Landernean
Brest
Morlaix
St. Brieuc
Lamballe

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SECRET SECURITY

POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (N INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD ROAD	RAILROAD	RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS	Sheet 1 of 15
1.	La Roche-Bernard	On N 165	None shown	Vilaine R.	High steel arch - no dimensions. See shee	
2.	Redon	On N 164	-	Vilaine R.	Concrete or masonry arch. See Photo neg. no. 178.132.	
	Redon	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	Steel girder or truss - See photo neg. no. 178.132. RR bridge can easily carry trucks.	
3.	1 mi E Guipry	Bain de Bretagne-Guipry Road	-	Vilaine R.	No information	
	1 mi E Guipry	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	No information. RR bridge can carry trucks.	
4.	3 mi N Guichen	On N 177	-	Vilaine R.	No information	
	3 mi N Guichen	-	Rennes-Vannes	Vilaine R.	No information. RR bridgecan carry trucks.	
5.	Mordelle	On N 124	-	Meu R.	No information	
	Mordelle	-	Rennes-Guer	Meu R.	No information. RR bridgecan carry trucks	
6.	Montfort	On N 164b	-	Meu R.	No information	
	Montfort	-	Rennes-St. Brieuc	Meu R.	No information RR bridge can carry trucks	
7.	Montauban	Connecting N 12 & N 164b	-	Meu R.	(No information - probably stone arches. (These bridges connect two parallel main roads 2 to 5 mi. apart.	
8.	" "	"	-	Meu R.		
9.	" "	"	-	Meu R.		
10.	¼ mi W Quedillac	Connecting N 12 & N 166	-	Tributary te Rance R.	No information	

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POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (N INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD) ROAD	RAILROAD	RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS
11.	Chapelle-Blanche (S of Coulnes)	On N 12	-	Rance R.	No information
	"	-	Rennes-St.Brieuc	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge can beused by truck
12.	7 mi due S Dinan	-	St. Meen-Dinan	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge might be used.
13.	Dinan	On N 176	-	Rance R.	High masonry arch. No dimensions.
	"	On N 176	-	Rance R.	Low masonry arch. No dimensions.
14.	4 mi. NE Dinan	-	Dinan-Del	Rance R.	No information. RR bridge might be used.
15.	Pert St. Jean	Chateaument-Dinan	-	Rance R.	No.information. (Probably a good sized bridge)
16.	4 mi N Tinteniac	Rennes-Chateaument	-	Rance Canal	No information (Note RR bridge not included)
17.	½ mi N Mede	Rennes-Del	-	Rance Canal	No information
18.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 12	-	Flume R.	No information
.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 164b	-	Flume R.	No information
20.	3 mi W Rennes	On N 24	-	Flume R.	No information
21.	3 mi N Bain de Bretagne	On N 137	-	Semmen R.	No information
22.	Blain	Rennes-St. Nazaire	-	Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
23.	6 mi E Blain	On N 137	-	Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
24.	Pont Chateau	On N 165	-	Ht Brive R	No information (Note RR bridge that might be used)

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POINT NUMBER	LOCATION	BRIDGE AND ROUTE (N INDICATES NATIONAL ROAD) ROAD	RAILROAD	RIVER CROSSED	REMARKS
25.	2 mi N St. Nazaire	Blain-St. Nazaire	-	Canals	No information. Road and RR cross several small canals in this area.
26.	11 mi due W Nantes	Nantes-St. Paimboeuf	-	Acheneau R.	No information
27.	9 mi SW Nantes	Nantes-Pernic	-	Acheneau R.	No information (Note RR bridge)
28.	St. Leger	-	Nantes-Pernic	Temu R.	No information
29.	5 mi S Pernic	-	La Pellice-Pernic	Temu R.	No information

	ROAD	RAILROAD
TOTAL (known)	26	10

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TAB C

SEC.

* The total striking force necessary to accomplish the desired results is as follows:

** Type Aircraft	Number of Groups	Missions
B-17	5	2
P-38	4	2
B-26	4	2
A-36	4	2
A-20	4	2
P-47	4	2

No provision has been made for fighter cover and protection.

* Assuming that it is desired to destroy the listed targets almost simultaneously and on the assumption that groups are at reduced T/O, that 60% of group aircraft are operational and that 70% of sorties are effective.

** The B-17's are assigned to the five railway yards and one of the other types to be assigned as preferred for attack on railway and highway bridges.

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June 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Whitney.

Subject: Plan for Breton Peninsula

An engineering study of the severing of communications in a line roughly north from St. Nazaire to St. Malo indicates that even though every possible target is included along that line, road communications could not be severed successfully for over two days and rail communications over ten days at the maximum. This time limitation does not mean that full communication facilities will be restored as traffic will be restricted to one-way instead of two-way movement, which will result in the slowing down and an increased load on their rail and motor transport. The maximum damage which can be accomplished includes destruction of the bridges at points 1 to 15 and the marshalling yards at Nantes, Blain, Chateaubriant, Rennes and Dol.

M. J. GOODMAN
Major, C. E.

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SECURITY

BRETON PENINSULA

MARSHALLING YARDS

Rennes
Dol
Nantes
Chateaubriand
Blain

SOUTHWOUSE - RUNNING REPAIRS

St. Malo
Dinan
Rennes
Redon
St. Nazaire
Savenay
Nantes
Le Croisice
Vannes
Auray
Lorient
Quimper
Landernean
Brest
Morlaix
St. Brieuc
Lamballe

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Report No. 379

SECURITY

Tab B

WEATHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING BOMBING OPERATIONS

ON THE

BRITTANY PENINSULA, JUNE THROUGH SEPTEMBER

Weather conditions during the summer months, June through September, will be generally favorable for bombing operations over the Brittany peninsula. Although considerable low cloudiness will be encountered, contact weather (ceiling greater than 1,000 feet, visibility greater than 2½ miles) ordinarily prevails from 80 to 90 % of the time during daylight hours. In the poorest months contact weather may decrease to 65% and in good months may be as high as 100%. Low clouds are much more prevalent during the night, the usual condition being for low stratus clouds or sea fogs to drift over the land at night and burn off during the day. Ceilings are lower and cloud amounts greater during the early morning than during the afternoon. Ceilings of greater than 5,000 feet with visibility of 6 miles or more occur approximately 50% of the time during the daylight hours.

Rain occurs on 12 to 14 days per month, but the summer storms are usually mild and only infrequently accompanied by winds of gale velocity. Except in unusual weather situations, the icing level is at about 8,000 to 10,000 feet. Thunderstorms are not frequent, occurring on an average of about one day per month.

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June 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL LYLE:

Subject: Interview with Colonel Robert L. Scott.

1. Colonel Scott's criticism of our plan of low level bombing attack on Brittany Peninsula was invited.

2. He stated that:

a. The assumptions on which our plan was based were practical.

b. That selected pilots could accomplish the results envisaged.

c. That recent tests at Eglin Field, Orlando, Florida had proved that the P-38 and the P-51 could carry two 1,000 lb bombs each.

d. He recommended that the proposed attack be carried out first, by heavy bombers to create diversions and secondly, that the fighters approach the coast of France at the minimum altitude to avoid radar detection and execute their attack by climbing just prior to reaching their targets. He stated that release of bombs at approximately 2,500 feet altitude proved to be the most effective in the India - China theater of war.

e. He strongly advised diving at the target on a line parallel to the span of the bridge and aiming at the abutment.

f. He did not believe that the fighter bombers would require fighter escort.

C. V. Whitney.

C. V. WHITNEY
Lt. Colonel, A.C.

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Ruben Kyle, Jr.

Subject: Destruction of Bridges in Northern Burma by Bomb-Carrying P-40's.

1. The following is a list of attacks carried out by P-40's during the past month. In almost every case a total of 8 P-40's were used on the missions - 2 acting as a top cover. Details of these attacks were derived from cables and from daily intelligence extracts from the Tenth Air Force:

On April 13 - 6 P-40's dropped 4x500 lb. bombs on the Bridge at Shaduzup - bridge demolished by two hits.

On April14 - 16 P-40's dropped 12x1000 lb. bombs on airdromes at Mauywet and Myitkyina - all hits scored on airdromes and runways - 5 craters made at Mauywet 20'deep30' diameter.

On April 16 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x1000 lb. bombs on bridge at Mogaung - 1 hit scored on approach - 2 near misses.

On April 16 - 8 P-40's dropped 3x1000 lb. bombs on bridge at Pinbaw - Bridge destroyed with direct hits.

On April 16 - 8 P-40's dropped 3x1000 lb. bombs on bridge at Mogaung - 1 hit scored on approach, 1 hit on corner which turned bridge sideways, 1 direct hit was a dud.

On April 17 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x500 lb. bombs on bridge at Namti - 3 near misses.

On April 17 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x300 lb. bombs on bridge at Kamaing - 1 hit scored on each approach.

On April 19 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x1000 lb. bombs on bridge at Namti - south approach destroyed and a direct hit scored in middle of bridge.

On April 19 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x1000lb. bombs on bridge 10 miles northwest of Myitkyina - scored 4 hits - approach span down-center twisted.

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On May 2 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x1000 lb. bombs on bridge 6 miles northwest of Myitkyina - although 2 bombs were duds, bridge was destroyed.

On May 2 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x1000 lb. bombs on the Nansankyin Bridge - destroyed one approach and damaged structure.

On May 8 - 8 P-40's dropped 6x1000 lb. bombs on the Loilaw Bridge - bridge destroyed.

S. T. Terhune

S. T. TERHUNE
Captain, A.C.
Geographic Section
Current Intelligence Branch

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e 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL KYLE:

Subject: Interview with Colonel Robert L. Scott.

1. Colonel Scott's criticism of our plan of low level bombing attack on Brittany Peninsula was invited.

2. He stated that:

a. The assumptions on which our plan was based were practical.

b. That selected pilots could accomplish the results envisaged.

c. That recent tests at Eglin Field, Orlando, Florida had proved that the P-38 and the P-51 could carry two 1,000 lb bombs each.

d. He recommended that the proposed attack be carried out first, by heavy bombers to create diversions and secondly, that the fighters approach the coast of France at the minimum altitude to avoid radar detection and execute their attack by climbing just prior to reaching their targets. He stated that release of bombs at approximately 2,500 feet altitude proved to be the most effective in the India - China theater of war.

e. He strongly advised diving at the target on a line parallel to the span of the bridge and aiming at the abutment.

f. He did not believe that the fighter bombers would require fighter escort.

C. V. WHITNEY
Lt. Colonel, A.C.

file
Brittany Peninsula
C V W

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July 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GENERAL KUTER:

Subject: Brittany Plan

1. Attached herewith is a letter for General Arnold's signature in compliance with your Memo of July 17th.

2. The Brittany Plan had been conceived by this office as a prelude to the 'over-lord' as suggested by General Baker, paragraph 4 of his letter of July 12th, attached. The plan was given a misleading title for security purposes only.

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl:
1-pro.ltr to
CG/8th AF
2-ltr frm 8th AF
3-ltr to CG/8th AF
July 10, 1943

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CVW/jw/6702

wtn. 7/19/43

'BRITTANY' Plan.

Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

1. Your comments on the 'BRITTANY' Plan have been noted and in accordance with the request in paragraph 2 of your letter of July 12, 1943, subject as above, the plan is herewith returned for such further reference as you may find necessary.

H. H. ARNOLD
General, USA
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 633
c/o POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

July 12, 1943

SUBJECT: "BRITTANY' Plan.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, WASHINGTON, D.C.

1. Enclosed herewith is the comment of the Operational Planning Staff after a review of the BRITTANY Plan. It will be noted that the Operational Planners have recommanded that the BRITTANY Plan as outlined is not within the power of our accomplsihment at the present time with the forces available, without a serious distraction from the emploument of all of our aircraft for the destruction of materiel targets in Germany under the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan. With this I agree. I have coordinated this opinion with the Theater Commander and his Chief of Staff and it represents our well-considered view.

2. I think the planners who devised the BRITTANY Plan are to be congratulated on the overall idea they have originated. I believe that eventually we shall be able to undertake it and I am asking General Hansell to bring back to me the copy of the Plan I am returning in order that we may have it available.

3. The serious defects in the present accomplishment of the Plan lies in the following regards:

a. It calls for the employment of heavy bombers on targets less important than the submarine bases themselves and the targets listed in the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan.

b. It calls for the attack of targets which will result in some cases in the killing of large numbers of civilians, and which are not now cleared, but are definitely barred by the British Chiefs of Staff.

c. It calls for the employment of medium bombers beyond their present operational range, and particularly beyond the range of any fighter support which could be given them. The loss of medium bombers would therefore be high if they were employed beyond fighter cover.

d. All our present fighter strength and more is required for the support of our medium and heavy bombers under the Combined Bomber offensive Plan. We would, therefore, have insufficient fighter cover in the destruction of the targets listed in the BRITTANY Plan.

4. I believe the BRITTANY Plan will more properly come at that phase in our air operations out of U.K. which is directly connected with 'OVERLORD'. If our present predicted rate of build-up matures, we should be able to undertake this task in the late Winter of this year or early Spring of 1944.

IRA C. EAKER
Major General, U. S. A.
Commanding

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BRITISH MOST SECRET

AMERICAN SECRET

Combined Operational Planning Committee,
c/o Headquarters VIII Bomber Command,
U. S. ARMY APO 634

10th July, 1943.

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

SUBJECT: Plan for the Attack on Communications in Brittany. Ref:-COPC/S.2001

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in your memorandum dated June 29th, 1943, my Committee has made a study of the plan submitted by the War Department for the attack on communications in Birttany. Owing to the short time available, this study has of necessity been cursory. The following comments are, however, submitted for what they are worth:-

(1) The plan is basically strategic rather than tactical and its execution involves the use of forces which are not available to the Eighth Air Force. For example, this Air Force does not possess operational units equipped with P-39s, A-36s or A-20s; moreover, the P-47 is not yet equipped to carry bombs, and it is doubtful whether it will ever be able to carry a bomb larger than the 500 lb.

(2) In consequence, certain substitutes in aircraft types would have to be made, and in addition we should be compelled to call upon the R.A.F. to provide us with 4 Squadrons of medium bombers. On this assumption it is estimated that the following forces would be required to undertake this plan, on the basis of the War Department calculations:-

Type	Group	Missions
B-17	5.	2.
P-47	8.	2.
B-26	7.	2.
R.A.F. Mitchells	½ (2 Sqdns)	2.
R.A.F. Bostons	½ (2 Sqdns)	2.

(3) The whole of the above force will not, however, be available for operations in this Theater before November 1943.

(4) The War Department plan makes no allowance for fighter escort. The fighter forces now in this Theater are already inadequate to meet our current requirements, and their inadequacy will increase proportionately with the flow of heavy and medium bombers to this Theater. The diversion of fighters to the Brittany plan will, therefore, only accentuate the shortage of fighters still further.

(5) Certain selected targets in the Brittany plan are located in or near populated French centers, and have not been cleared for bombing by the Target Selection Committee.

(6) Only the eight most Northern targets are within range of bomb-carrying P-47s, and none are within range of fighter-bomber Spitfires.

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(7) It would not be possible to provide fighter protection to medium and light bomber forces, as their targets are out of range of our fighters, except the P-47 fitted with long range tanks. In consequence we must expect heavy losses unless long range P-47s are used in this capacity; but this in turn would detract from the fighter bomber effort.

(8) The suggestion that we possess units which are not required for the Eaker plan is wishful thinking. We require, and can make full use of, every available unit for this purpose. In consequence, the Brittany plan could only be undertaken at the expense of the main combined air offensive against Germany.

(9) In order to execute the Brittany plan all short range aircraft would have to operate from bases in South West England, thus rendering them unavailable for operations in other areas for at least 3 consecutive days.

(10) It is reasonable to assume that the enemy has a stored emergency reserve of materials and supplies in the port areas concerned. In consequence, even assuming that all the targets listed have been destroyed, approximately 70% of them would have to be attacked again within 7 days, and the operation would have to be repeated at frequent and regular intervals in order to achieve our aim.

(11) Moreover, considerable quantities of supplies could be transferred by river caraft on the River Loire, at the estuary of which is located St. Nazaire, the most important enemy submarine base.

(12) Finally, the tactical employment of the B-26 is still undecided, and it is not known whether it will be possible to operate them at a greater radius than 225 miles. It may therefore be necessary to allot a greater proportion of heavy bombers for the execution of the Brittany plan.

Conclusions.

2. We have accordingly reached the following general conclusions:-

(1) The Brittany plan can be undertaken from this Theater and the necessary forces will ultimately be available for this purpose.

(2) But this can only be done at the expense of the combined air offensive against Germany - i.e., the Eaker plan.

(3) Losses will be disproportionately heavy until the strength and effectiveness of the German fighter force is reduced considerably.

(4) Attacks against the targets listed under the Brittany plan will have to be sustained and will have to be repeated at intervals of approximately one week, thus resulting in attrition and the sterilization of a considerable proportion of our available forces.

(5) There are only a limited number of airfields in the South West of England, and these are already over-crowded. The execution of the Brittany plan will only add to the congestion and will inevitably result in operational inefficiency.

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Recommendation.

3. My Committee are unanimously of theopinion that the Brittany plan, although attractive, should not be embarked upon at this stage as it is bound to detract seriously from the Eaker plan, which presumably still constitutes our major aim. In short, we consider that the Brittany plan, at the present time, would prove to be an uneconomical, and unjustifiable diversion.

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May 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieut. Col. M. W. Moss.

SUBJECT: Siebel Ferries.

1. Please refer to my memorandum of May 24, copy attached, regarding Siebel Ferries, which was prepared for the Colonel in response to a request from Major Dall - Plans. There is attached also a memorandum prepared by Dr. Dixon subsequent to mine of May 24 and based on additional information obtained by him from Mr. Bennett, Office of Naval Intelligence. Mr. Bennett was asked for information about Siebel Ferries, but was not consulted concerning the general problem of their use in supplying submarine bases in the event that such bases are isolated from inland transportation.

2. It is suggested that Lt. Mudge may wish to call Major Dall's attention to Dr. Dixon's memorandum, inasmuch as the Lieutenant is preparing material for Major Dall and other officers in Plans on this general subject at this time.

Paul E Bloom
PAUL E. BLOOM,
Captain, Air Corps.

2 Incls.
As noted above.

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May 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieut. Colonel M. W. Moss.

SUBJECT: Siebel Ferries.

1. In connection with the Colonel's request of this morning for information on Siebel Ferries, I have attempted to assemble material that might shed some light on the possibility of using these vessels to supply submarine bases in the event that inland transportation to these bases is interrupted.

Time has not permitted a thorough investigation of the possibility of using these vessels for the foregoing purposes, but certain general statements can be made concerning their use at this time.

2. The Siebel Ferries were designed by the Germans for use in connection with the proposed invasion of England. They are not ferries in the usual sense of the term and were not designed for commercial use. They have been known to be used for the transport of tanks, munitions and men from Italy to Tunis. They have also been used in northern European waters as harbor craft and for short runs along the coast.

3. The Siebel Ferries are small vessels averaging possibly 200 tons. Their size is stated at 80 by 50 feet. They are Diesel powered and have a range of no more than 200 miles. So far as the current movement of cargo is concerned they are an advantage to the Germans but are not a necessity. The exact number of these vessels available to the Axis is unknown, but it is estimated that several hundred have been built.

4. There is no question but what the Siebel Ferries could be used for the supply of submarine bases in the event that these bases are isolated from land transportation. Movement of supplies

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to these bases, however, is not dependent upon the existence of the Siebel Ferries. It is estimated that there are thousands of fishing craft and other small vessels that could be pressed into the supply of submarine bases.

Paul E. Bloom

PAUL E. BLOOM,
Captain, Air Corps.

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RAILROAD OBJECTIVES - BRETON PENINSULA

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
			Dinan Junction			
	Lessard Viaduct (Rance R)	Lamballe-Dol	S		95'	538'
29.	RR Br (Rance R)	Dinan-Montauban				
			Montauban Junction			
28.	RR Br (Rance R)	Montauban-Lamballe				
27.	RR Br (Garun R)	Montauban-Rennes				
26.	RR Br (Meu R)	Montauban-Ploermel				
			Guer Junction			
25.	RR Br (Vilaine R)	Guer-Messac				
			Redon Junction			
	Messac Br (Vilaine R)	Redon-Rennes			72'	72'
	Avessac Br (Lake Murin)	" "				1630'
	Redon Br (Oust R)	Redon-Landerneau		3		240'
	Redon Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "		1		60'
	Redon Br (Vilaine R)	Savenay-Redon		5		250'
	Prairie St. Nicholas Br (over stream)	" "		1		50
	Severac Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "	Skew	1		41'
	Severac Br (Isac R)	" "	S	1		50'

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NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
		Pont Chateau			
		No bridges listed			
		Montoir de Bretagne			
24. RR Br (Etier de Mean)	St. Nazaire-Redon				

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	NAME	APPROXIMATE COORDINATES	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
1.	Yffiniac RR Br (Urne R)		Rennes-Brest	S			325'
2.	St. Brienc Viaduct (Gouedic R) 980' E of RR Sta		" "	M		130'	980'
3.	La Meaugen Viaduct (Gouet R)		" "	M		195'	
4.	Plouignean (Morlaix) Viaduct (Dessen R)		" "	M	Upper 14 Lower 9	205'	950'
5.	St. Thegonnec Viaduct (Penze R)		" "			104'	
6.	Kerhuon Viaduct (Kerhoun Bay)		" "			127'	650'
7.	Lessard Viaduct (Rance R)		Lamballe-Dol	S		98'	538'
8.	Severac Br (Isac R)		Savenay-Redon	S	1		50'
9.	Severac Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)		" "	Skew	1		41'
10.	Prairie St. Nicholas Br (over stream)		" "		1		50'
11.	Redon Br (Vilaine R)		" "		5		250'
12.	Redon Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)		Redon-Landerneau		1		60'

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	NAME	APPROXIMATE COORDINATES	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
13.	Redon Br (Oust R)		Redon-Landerneau		3		240'
14.	St. Anne (Auray R)		" "		10	90'	390'
15.	Hennebont Viaduct (Blavet R)		" "	M	11	80'	776'
16.	Lorient Br (Scoff R)		" "	M & S			1304'
17.	Laita Viaduct (Laita R)		" "	M	6	108'	
18.	Chateaulin Viaduct (Aulne R) 1 mi N		" "	M	12	160'	1164'
19.	Pont de Buis Viaduct (Doujine R)		" "	M	9	130'	724'
20.	Dasulas Viaduct (Dasulas R)		" "	M	15	121'	1164'
21.	Avessac Br (Lake Murin)		Redon-Rennes				1630'
22.	Messac Br (Vilaine R)		" "			72'	72'
23.	Laille Br (Vilaine R)		" "	M	3		

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AIRPORT DATA, BRETON PENINSULA
as of April, 1942

Bases

1. Rennes
2. Dinan
3. Dinard
4. Gael (48° 06' - 2° 12' W)
5. St. Nazaire
6. Vannes (47° 43' - 2° 42' W)
7. Lorient
8. Quimper
9. Chateaulin
10,11. Brest
12. (48° 25' N- 3° 55' W) 10 mi S of Morlaix
13. Lannion (48° 45' N - 3° 12' W)
14. St. Brieuc

Bases shown on map have facilities for the servicing and maintenance of fighter squadrons.

The following is an estimate of Axis fighter aircraft immediately available to repel attack in this area, i. e. based on Breton Peninsula. Data taken from a G-2 report as of January 11, 1943.

Single-Engine Fighters	7 squadrons
Twin-Engine Fighters	3 squadrons

Estimate of Total Axis fighters available to this area:

1. From France (except for the Gulf of Lions region)

Single-Engine Fighters	7 squadrons
Twin-Engine Fighters	7 squadrons

2. From Belgium

Single-Engine Fighters	3 squadrons
Twin-Engine Fighters	3 squadrons

3. From Holland

Single-Engine Fighters	1 squadron
Twin-Engine Fighters	12 squadrons

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AA Defenses

As of January 11, 275 AA guns were reported at Brest. Other concentrations of AA:

Dinard
St. Malo
Rennes
St. Nazaire
Vannes
Quiberon
Lorient
Pont L'Abbe
Quimper
Londivisidu
Morlaix
Lannion
St. Brieuc

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TAB C

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* The total striking force necessary to accomplish the desired results is as follows:

** Type Aircraft	Number of Groups	Missions
B-17	5	2
P-39	4	2
B-26	2	2
A-36	4	2
A-20	4	2
P-47	4	2

No provision has been made for fighter cover and protection.

* Assuming that it is desired to destroy the listed targets almost simultaneously and on the assumption that groups are at reduced T/O, that 60% of group aircraft are operational and that 70% of sorties are effective.

** The B-17's are assigned to the five railway yards and one of the other types to be assigned as preferred for attack on railway and highway bridges.

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Tab D

Report No. 379

WEATHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING BOMBING OPERATIONS

ON THE

BRITTANY PENINSULA, JUNE THROUGH SEPTEMBER

Weather conditions during the summer months, June through September, will be generally favorable for bombing operations over the Brittany peninsula. Although considerable low cloudiness will be encountered, contact weather (ceiling greater than 1,000 feet, visibility greater than 2½ miles) ordinarily prevails from 80 to 90 % of the time during daylight hours. In the poorest months contact weather may decrease to 65% and in good months may be as nigh as 100%. Low clouds are much more prevalent during the night, the usual condition being for low stratus clouds or sea fogs to drift over the land at night and burn off during the day. Ceilings are lower and cloud amounts greater during the early morning than during the afternoon. Ceilings of greater than 5,000 feet with visibility of 6 miles or more occur approximately 50% of the time during the daylight hours.

Rain occurs on 12 to 14 days per month, but the summer storms are usually mild and only infrequently accompanied by winds of gale velocity. Except in unusual weather situations, the icing level is at about 8,000 to 10,000 feet. Thunderstorms are not frequent, occurring on an average of about one day per month.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

C. V. Whitney
Lt. Colonel, A. C.

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May 29, 1943

Based on a preliminary study of the Breton peninsula plan I would say that road and rail communications would be so seriously damaged that it would take enemy engineers anywhere from 10 to 30 days to restore these communications to the point where supplies in any appreciable amount could be delivered to the submarine bases. Canal facilities will probably be the easiest to restore, with highways next, and railroads last. Many of the large bridges would be irreplaceable in this period of time and re-routing would be necessary, which would slow down the flow of supplies considerably at best.

The map used in this study is on too small a scale and is too inaccurate for satisfactory engineer analysis. There are many more highway targets which should be included in order to complete the destruction picture. These would be more obvious on a larger scale map showing more detail with respect to rivers and streams that the highway systems crossed.

M. G. GOODMAN
Major, C.E.

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENT
HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

NO.	LOCATION	TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS SIZE	BOMB REQUIREMENTS NUMBER	ATTACKING SORTIE REQ B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40
			TOTALS (Brought forward)			78	52	134	82	140
20	W. Rennes	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
21	Bain de Bretagne	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
22	Blain	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
23	E. Blain	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
24	Pont Chateau	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
25	St. Nazaire	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
26	W. Nantes	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
27	S. W. Nantes	Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
28	Nantes	Railroad	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
29	Nantes	Railroad	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
			GRAND TOTAL			108	72	184	112	190

* 2 Hits Required.

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENT
HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS SIZE	BOMB REQUIREMENTS NUMBER	ATTACKING SORTIE REQUIREMENTS B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
		TOTALS (Brought forward)		78	52	134	82	140	140	136	136	140
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
		GRAND TOTAL		108	72	184	112	190	190	186	186	190

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ESTIMATION FOR MINIMUM ALTITUDE BOMBING
OF RAILROAD BRIDGES AND VIADUCTS

1. Assumptions

a. Overhead cover and/or diversionary missions would permit bomb-carrying fighter aircraft to reach the target areas.

b. After bombing the fighter planes could protect themselves on the return trip.

c. Preference in aircraft would be, if available in the United Kingdom --

(1) B-25 with eight forward firing guns, (see photograph) which would neutralize enemy antiaircraft and permit more accurate bombing. These guns would also be effective against trains and locomotives. Bomb load at required range --

20 x 100#
16 x 250#
6 x 500#
2 x 1000# *
1 x 2000#

(2) B-26 -

30 x 100#
14 x 250#
8 x 500#
4 x 1000#
2 x 2000#

(3) A-20A - (If R.A.F. Havocs are used).

20 x 100#
8 x 250#
2 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20B -

14 x 100#
8 x 250#
3 x 500#
1 x 1000#

A-20 C & G -

4 x 100#
4 x 250#
4 x 500#

* B-25C from #606B up and B-25D from #201B up can carry 3 x 1000#.

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Minimum Alt. Bombing of RR Bridges & Viaducts cont'd

(4) P-38 Type -
2 x 100#
2 x 250#
2 x 500#
2 x 1000#

(5) P-40 Type -
1 x 100#
1 x 250# *
1 x 500#
1 x 1000# (Assumed from theater reports)

(6) P-39 Type -
1 x 100#
1 x 250#
1 x 500#
1 x 1000# (?)

(7) P-51 or A-36 -
2 x 100#
2 x 250#
2 x 500#
1 x 1000# (?)

(8) P-47 - (Capacity Assumed)
1 x 100#
1 x 250#
1 x 500#
1 x 1000#

d. Bomb Sizes --

Steel bridges	-	500-lb. GP
Masonry bridges	-	1000-lb. GP
Masonry viaducts	-	1000-lb. GP

e. Fusing for minimum altitude bombing should be --

Nose	-	None
Tail	-	5 seconds

f. One hit would be required for each bridge. Long masonry bridges or viaducts, especially those with two levels, would require two hits. Twenty percent (1 out of 5) of the bombs released should be effective.

* Have carried 4 x 250#.

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Tab B

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase I

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
			DOL JUNCTION			
1.	Dol RR Brs (NW of town over Dol marshes)	Dol-St. Malo	---	---	---	---
2.	Dol RR Br (Gaioult R)	Dinan-Dol	---	---	---	---
3.	Dol RR Br (Cardequin R)	Dinan-Dol	---	---	---	---
			RENNES JUNCTION			
4.	Rennes RR Br, W (Vilaine R)	Rennes-Dinan	---	---	---	---
5.	Rennes RR Br, S (Seiche R)	Rennes-Redon	---	---	---	---
6.	Rennes RR Br, SW (Seiche R)	Rennes-Guer	---	---	---	---
7.	Rennes RR Br, SE (Seiche R)	Rennes-Grand Fougeray	---	---	---	---
8.	Rennes RR Br, N (Rance R)	Rennes-Dol	---	---	---	---
			BLAIN JUNCTION			
9.	Blain RR Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	Redon-Blain-Nantes	---	---	---	---
			NANTES JUNCTION			
10.	Nantes RR Br, N (Erdre R)	Nantes-Chateaubriant	---	---	---	---
11.	Nantes RR Br (Bras de la Madeleine			---	---	600'

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
12.	Nantes RR Br (Bras de la Pirmil)		---	---	---	800
13.	St. Leger RR Br (le Tenu R)	Nantes-Pornic	---	---	---	---

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase II

NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
DINAN JUNCTION					
1. Lessard Viaduct (Rance R)	Lamballe-Dol	S	---	98'	538'
2. RR Br (Rance R)	Dinan-Montaubon	---	---	---	---
MONTAUBON JUNCTION					
3. RR Br, (Garun R)	Montaubon-Rennes	---	---	---	---
4. RR Br (Meu R)	Montaubon-Ploermel	---	---	---	---
5. RR Br (Rance R)	Montaubon-Lamballe	---	---	---	---
GUER JUNCTION					
6. RR Br (Vilaine R)	Guer-Messac	---	---	---	---
REDON JUNCTION					
7. Messac Br (Vilaine R)	Redon-Rennes	---	---	72'	72'
8. Avessac Br (Lake Murin)	" "	---	---	---	1630'
9. Redon Br (Vilaine R)	Savenay-Redon	---	5	---	250'
10. Prairie St. Nicholas Br.	" "	---	1	---	50'
11. Severac Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "	Skew	1	---	41'
12. Severac Br (Isac R)	" "	S	1	---	50'

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
13.	Redon Br (Oust R)	Redon-Landerneau	---	3	---	240'
14.	Redon Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "	---	1	---	60'
15.	RR Br (Etier de Mean)	St. Nazaire-Redon	---	---	---	---
		ST. NAZAIRE JUNCTION				
16.	Muzillac RR Br (St. Eloi R)	Vannes-St. Nazaire	---	---	---	---
17.	La Roche-Bernard RR Br (La Vilaine R)	" "	---	---	---	820'
		GUER JUNCTION				
18	Ploermel RR Br, N (Etang au Duc)	Guer-Ploermel-Montaubon	---	---	---	---
19.	Ploermel RR Br, S (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "	---	---	---	---

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase III

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Span	Height	Length
		ST. BRIEUC JUNCTION				
1.	St. Brieuc Viaduct (Gouedic R) 980' E of RR Station	Rennes-Brest	M	---	130'	980'
2.	Yffiniac RR Br #1 (Hrne R)	" " " "	S	---	---	325'
3.	Yffiniac RR Br #2 (Caler R)	" "	---	---	---	---
4.	La Meaugen Viaduct (Gouet R)	" "	M	---	195'	---
5.	RR Br (Gouet R)	St. Brieuc-Paimpol-Lannion	---	---	---	---
		LOUDEAC JUNCTION				
6.						
7.	Plouguenast RR Br	Loudeac-Yffiniac	---	---	---	---
8.	RR Br	Loudeac-St. Meen	---	---	---	---
9.	RR Br	Loudeac-Pontivy	---	---	---	---
10.	RR Br	Loudeac-Rostrenen	---	---	---	---
11.	RR Br (Oust R)	Loudeac-Rostrenen	---	---	---	---

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
		PONTIVY JUNCTION				
12.	RR Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	Loudeac-Pontivy	---	---	---	---
13.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
14.	RR Br (le Hunio R)	Pontivy Ploermel	---	---	---	---
15.	RR Br	Pontivy-Ploermel	---	---	---	---
16.	RR Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	Pontivy-Gourin	---	---	---	---
		BAUD JUNCTION				
17.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
18.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
19.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
20.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Baud Gourin	---	---	---	---
		HENNEBONT JUNCTION				
21.	Hennebont (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
		LORIENT JUNCTION				
22.	Lorient Br (Scoff R)	Redon-Landerneau	M & S	---	---	1304'
23.	Laita Viaduct (Laita R)	Redon-Landerneau	M	6	108'	---

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase IV

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
		Morlaix Junction				
1.	Plouigneau (Morlaix) Viaduct (Dossen R)	Rennes-Brest	M	14 upper 9 lower	205'	950'
2.	Coatdon RR Br (le Douron R)	" "	---	---	---	---
3.	Guimiliau RR Br (le Ponze R)	" "	---	---	---	---
4.	RR Br	Morlaix-Plouescat	---	---	---	---
		Landerneau Junction				
5.	St. Thegonnec Viaduct (Penze R)	Rennes-Brest	---	---	104'	---
6.	Kerhuon Viaduct (Kerhuon Bay)	" "	---	---	127'	650'
7.	RR Br (de l'Hopital R)	Landerneau-Quimper	---	---	---	---
8.	Daoulas Viaduct (Daoulas R)	" "	M	15	121'	1164'
		CHATEAULIN JUNCTION				
9.	Pont de Buis (Doujine R)	Landerneau-Quimper	M	9	130'	724'
10.	Chateaulin Viaduct (Aulne R) 1 mi N of Sta	" "	M	12	160'	1164'
		Quimper Junction				
11.	RR Br (Odet R)	Lorient-Brest	---	---	---	---

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
12.	RR Br (le Steir R)	Lorient-Brest	—	—	—	—
13. 14. 15.	RR Brs (le Steir R)	" "	—	—	—	—

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BRETON PENINSULA

Road Objectives

	NAME	LOCATION
1.	St. Brieuc Rd. Br.	Over le Gouet R. 2 miles N of RR Br.
2.	Gouarec Rd. Br.	Over le Sulon R. immediately S of RR Br.
3.	Pontivy Rd. Br.	Over Brest Canal.
4.	Quimperle Rd. Br.	Over Quimperle R. ½ mile above RR. Br.
5.	Lorient Rd. Br.	Over Scoff R. paralleling narrow gauge RR. Br. approximately ½ mile N of standard gauge RR. Br.
6.	Dol Rd. Br.	Over Gaioult R. on Dol - Dinan Rd.
7.	Dol Rd. Br.	Over Cardequin R. on Dol - Dinan Rd.
8.	Ploermel Rd. Br.	Over Etang au Duc R. on Rennes - Baud Rd.
9.	Blain Rd. Br.	Over Brest-Nantes Canal on Chateaubriant - Savenay Rd.
10.	Muzillac Rd. Br.	Over St. Eloi R. on Vannes - Nantes Rd.
11.	La Roche-Bernard Rd. Br.	Over La Vilaine R. on Vannes - Nantes Rd.
12.	Nantes Rd. Br.	Over Bras de la Madeleine R. 450' long.
13.	Nantes Rd. Br.	Over Bras de Pirmil R. 800' long.
14.	St. Leger Rd. Br.	Over le Tenu R. on Nantes - Pornic Rd.
15.	Ploermel - Lorient Rd. Br.	Over Brest Canal. 8 miles West of Ploermel.
16.	Ploermel - Vannes Rd. Br.	Over Brest Canal. 4 miles South of Ploermel.

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BRITON PENINSULA

MARSHALLING YARDS

Rennes
Dol
Nantes
Chateaubriand
Blain

ROUNDHOUSE - RUNNING REPAIRS

St. Malo
Dinan
Rennes
Redon
St. Nazaire
Savenay
Nantes
Le Croisice
Vannes
Auray
Lorient
Quimper
Landerneau
Brest
Morlaix
St. Brieuc
Lamballe

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase I

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
			DOL JUNCTION			
1.	Dol RR Brs (NW of town over Dol marshes)	Dol-St. Malo	---	---	---	---
2.	Dol RR Br (Gaioult R)	Dinan-Dol	---	---	---	---
3.	Dol RR Br (Cardequin R)	Dinan-Dol	---	---	---	---
			RENNES JUNCTION			
4.	Rennes RR Br, W (Vilaine R)	Rennes-Dinan	---	---	---	---
5.	Rennes RR Br, S (Seiche R)	Rennes-Redon	---	---	---	---
6.	Rennes RR Br, SW (Seiche R)	Rennes-Guer	---	---	---	---
7.	Rennes RR Br, SE (Seiche R)	Rennes-Grand Fougeray	---	---	---	---
8.	Rennes RR Br, N (Rance R)	Rennes-Dol	---	---	---	---
			BLAIN JUNCTION			
9.	Blain RR Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	Redon-Blain-Nantes	---	---	---	---
			NANTES JUNCTION			
10.	Nantes RR Br, N (Erdre R)	Nantes-Chateaubriant	---	---	---	---
11.	Nantes RR Br (Bras de la Madeleine			---	---	600'

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
12.	Nantes RR Br (Bras de la Pirmil)		---	---	---	800
13.	St. Leger RR Br (le Tenu R)	Nantes-Pornic	---	---	---	---

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase II

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
		DINAN JUNCTION				
1.	Lessard Viaduct (Rance R)	Lamballe-Dol	S	---	98'	538'
2.	RR Br (Rance R)	Dinan-Montaubon	---	---	---	---
		MONTAUBON JUNCTION				
3.	RR Br, (Garun R)	Montaubon-Rennes	---	---	---	---
4.	RR Br (Meu R)	Montaubon-Ploermel	---	---	---	---
5.	RR Br (Rance R)	Montaubon-Lamballe	---	---	---	---
		GUER JUNCTION				
6.	RR Br (Vilaine R)	Guer-Messac	---	---	---	---
		REDON JUNCTION				
7.	Messac Br (Vilaine R)	Redon-Rennes	---	---	72'	72'
8.	Avessac Br (Lake Murin)	" "	---	---	---	1630'
9.	Redon Br (Vilaine R)	Savenay-Redon	---	5	---	250'
10.	Prairie St. Nicholas Br.	" "	---	1	---	50'
11.	Severac Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "	Skew	1	---	41'
12.	Severac Br (Isac R)	" "	S	1	---	50'

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
13.	Redon Br (Oust R)	Redon-Landerneau	---	3	---	340'
14.	Redon Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "	---	1	---	60'
15.	RR Br (Etier de Mean)	St. Nazaire-Redon	---	---	---	---
		ST. NAZAIRE JUNCTION				
16.	Muzillac RR Br (St. Eloi R)	Vannes-St. Nazaire	---	---	---	---
17.	La Roche-Bernard RR Br (La Vilaine R)	" "	---	---	---	820'
		OUER JUNCTION				
18	Ploermel RR Br, N (Etang au Duc)	Ouer-Ploermel-Montaubon	---	---	---	---
19.	Ploermel RR Br, S (Nantes-Brest Canal)	" "	---	---	---	---

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase III

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Span	Height	Length
		ST. BRIEUC JUNCTION				
1.	St. Brieuc Viaduct (Gouedic R) 980' E of RR Station	Rennes-Brest	M	---	130'	980'
2.	Yffiniac RR Br #1 (Urne R)	" " " "	S	---	---	325'
3.	Yffiniac RR Br #2 (Caler R)	" "	---	---	---	---
4.	La Meaugen Viaduct (Gouet R)	" "	M	---	195'	---
5.	RR Br (Gouet R)	St. Brieuc-Paimpol-Lannion	---	---	---	---
		LOUDEAC JUNCTION				
6.						
7.	Plouguenast RR Br	Loudeac-Yffiniac	---	---	---	---
8.	RR Br	Loudeac-St. Meen	---	---	---	---
9.	RR Br	Loudeac-Pontivy	---	---	---	---
10.	RR Br	Loudéac-Rostrenen	---	---	---	---
11.	RR Br (Oust R)	Loudeac-Rostrenen	---	---	---	---

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
		PONTIVY JUNCTION				
12.	RR Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	Loudeac-Pontivy	---	---	---	---
13.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
14.	RR Br (le Hunio R)	Pontivy Ploermel	---	---	---	---
15.	RR Br	Pontivy-Ploermel	---	---	---	---
16.	RR Br (Nantes-Brest Canal)	Pontivy-Gourin	---	---	---	---
		BAUD JUNCTION				
17.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
18.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
19.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
20.	RR Br (Blavet Canal)	Baud Gourin	---	---	---	---
		HENNEBONT JUNCTION				
21.	Hennebont (Blavet Canal)	Pontivy-Lorient	---	---	---	---
		LORIENT JUNCTION				
22.	Lorient Br (Scoff R)	Redon-Landerneau	M & S	---	---	1304'
23.	Laita Viaduct (Laita R)	Redon-Landerneau	M	6	108'	---

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BRETON PENINSULA

Railroad Objectives
Phase IV

	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
		Morlaix Junction				
1.	Plouignean (Morlaix) Viaduct (Dossen R)	Rennes-Brest	M	14 upper 9 lower	205'	950'
2.	Coatdon RR Br (le Douron R)	" "	---	---	---	---
3.	Guimiliau RR Br (le Ponxe R)	" "	---	---	---	---
4.	RR Br	Morlaix-Plouescat	---	---	---	---
		Landerneau Junction				
5.	St. Thegonnec Viaduct (Penze R)	Rennes-Brest	---	---	104'	---
6.	Kerhuon Viaduct (Kerhuon Bay)	" "	---	---	127'	650'
7.	RR Br (de l'Hopital R)	Landerneau-Quimper	---	---	---	---
8.	Daoulas Viaduct (Daoulas R)	" "	M	15	121'	1164'
		CHATEAULIN JUNCTION				
9.	Pont de Buis (Doujine R)	Landerneau-Quimper	M	9	130'	724'
10.	Chateaulin Viaduct (Aulne R) 1 mi N of Sta	" "	M	12	160'	1164'
		Quimper Junction				
11.	RR Br (Odet R)	Lorient-Brest	---	---	---	---

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	NAME	LINE	CONSTRUCTION	DIMENSIONS Spans	Height	Length
12.	RR Br (le Steir R)	Lorient-Brest	---	---	---	---
13. 14. 15.	RR Brs (le Steir R)	" "	---	---	---	---

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BRETON PENINSULA

Road Objectives

	NAME	LOCATION
1.	St. Brieuc Rd. Br.	Over le Gouet R. 2 miles N of RR Br.
2.	Gouarec Rd. Br.	Over le Sulon R. immediately S of RR Br.
3.	Pontivy Rd. Br.	Over Brest Canal.
4.	Quimperle Rd. Br.	Over Quimperle R. ½ mile above RR. Br.
5.	Lorient Rd. Br.	Over Scoff R. paralleling narrow gauge RR. Br. approximately ½ mile N of standard gauge RR. Br.
6.	Dol Rd. Br.	Over Caioult R. on Dol - Dinan Rd.
7.	Dol Rd. Br.	Over Cardequin R. on Dol - Dinan Rd.
8.	Ploermel Rd. Br.	Over Etang au Duc R. on Rennes - Baud Rd.
9.	Blain Rd. Br.	Over Brest-Nantes Canal on Chateaubriant - Savenay Rd.
10.	Muzillac Rd. Br.	Over St. Eloi R. on Vannes - Nantes Rd.
11.	La Roche-Bernard Rd. Br.	Over La Vilaine R. on Vannes - Nantes Rd.
12.	Nantes Rd. Br.	Over Bras de la Madeleine R. 450' long.
13.	Nantes Rd. Br.	Over Bras de Pirmil R. 800' long.
14.	St. Leger Rd. Br.	Over le Tenu R. on Nantes - Pornic Rd.
15.	Ploermel - Lorient Rd. Br.	Over Brest Canal. 8 miles West of Ploermel.
16.	Ploermel - Vannes Rd. Br.	Over Brest Canal. 4 miles South of Ploermel.

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BRETON PENINSULA

MARSHALLING YARDS

Rennes
Dol
Nantes
Chateaubriand
Blain

ROUNDHOUSE - RUNNING DEPOTS

St. Malo
Dinan
Rennes
Redon
St. Nazaire
Savenay
Nantes
Le Croisice
Vannes
Auray
Lorient
Quimper
Landerneau
Brest
Morlaix
St. Brieuc
Lamballe

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Point Number	Location	Bridge #	Route	River Crossed	Remarks
			Rance		
11.	Chapelle-Blanche	On N 12		Rance R	No information
			Rennes-St Brieuc	Rance R	No information
	7 mi due S Dinan		St Meen-Dinan	Rance R	No information
13.	Dinan	On N 176		Rance R	
	"	On N 176		Rance R	
14.	4 mi NE Dinan		Dinan-Dol	Rance R	
15.	Pont St Jean	Dol-Dinan		Rance R	No information
16.	4 mi N Tinteniac	Rennes-Chateaubourg		Rance Canal	No information
17.	2 mi N Hede	Rennes-Dol		Rance Canal	No information
18.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 12		Flume R	No information
19.	5 mi W Rennes	On N 164a		Flume R	No information
20.	3 mi W Rennes	On N 24		Flume R	
21.	3 mi N Bain-de-Bretagne	On N 137		Seiche R	No information
22	Blain	Rennes-St Nazaire		Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
23	6 mi E Blain	On N 137		Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
24	Pont Chateau	On N 165		Ht Brivet R	No information

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Bridges	Route	River Crossed	Remarks
Road	Related		
On N 12		Rance R.	No information
	Rennes-St Brieuc	Rance R.	No information. Re or ase [illegible]
	St Meen-Dinan	Rance R.	No information. Rft [illegible]
On N 176		Rance R.	748 meters [illegible]
On N 176		Rance R.	new [illegible]
		Rance R.	No information. Rft [illegible]
Contournet Dam		Rance R.	No information. [illegible]
Rennes-Chateauneuf		Rance Canal	No information. (Note [illegible]
Rennes-Dol		Rance Canal	No information
On N 12		Flume R.	No information
On N 164		Flume R.	No information
On N 27		Flume R.	No information
On N 137		Seaward R.	No information
Rennes-St Nazaire		Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
On N 137		Brest-Nantes Canal	No information
On N 165		Ht River R.	No information (Note [illegible]

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ESTIMATION FOR MINIMUM ALTITUDE BOMBING OF HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

1. Assumptions and bases of calculations:

a. Overhead cover and/or diversionary missions will permit bomb-carrying fighter aircraft to reach the target area.

b. Bomb sizes:

(1) Steel bridges - 500-lb. G.P.

(2) Masonry bridges - 1000-lb. G.P.

c. Fuzing for minimum altitude bombing:

(1) Nose - none.

(2) Tail - 5 seconds.

d. One hit required for each bridge.

(1) Long masonry bridges and those with two levels would require two hits. Twenty percent (one out of five) of the bombs released should be effective.

e. Number of bombs carried by aircraft at tactical range as follows:

(1)

Wt. Bombs	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
500#	6	8	4	2	1	1	2	2	1
1000#	2	4	1	2	1	1	1	1	1

HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBING OF MARSHALLING YARDS

1. Assumptions and bases of calculations:

a. Bombs will be released from an altitude of 25,000 feet.

b. The Cep will be 1,000 feet.

c. 500-lb. G.P. bombs will be used with a 0.1 second nose fuze and 0.025 second tail fuze.

d. Carrying capacity at required range would be 10 x 500-lb. GP bomb per heavy bomber.

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

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NO.	LOCATION	TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS		ATTACKING SORTIE				
				SIZE	NUMBER	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40
1	La Roche-Bernard	Highway	High Steel	500#	5	1	1	2	3	5
2	Redon	Highway	Masonry 400' long	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
	Redon	Railroad	Steel 150' long	500	5	1	1	2	3	5
3	E. Guipry	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
	E. Guipry	Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
4	E. Guichen	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
	E. Guichen	Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
5	Mordelle	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
	Mordelle	Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
6	MONTFORT	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
	Montfort	Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
7	Montauban	Highway	Probably Stone	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
8	"	Highway	Probably Stone	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
9	"	Highway	Probably Stone	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
			TOTALS (Carried Forward)			38	26	64	42	70

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

SECRET

TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS		ATTACKING SORTIE REQUIREMENTS								
		SIZE	NUMBER	B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
Highway	High Steel	500#	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Highway	Masonry 400' long	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	Steel 150' long	500	5	1	1	2	3	5	5	3	3	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	Probably Stone	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	Probably Stone	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	Probably Stone	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
	TOTALS (Carried Forward)			38	26	64	42	70	70	66	66	70

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

SECRET

NO.	LOCATION	TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS SIZE	BOMB REQUIREMENTS NUMBER	ATTACKING SQ B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40
			TOTALS (Brought Forward)			38	26	64	42	70
10	W. Quedillac	Highway	Probably Stone	1000?	5	3	2	5	3	5
11	Chapelle Blanche	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
	" "	Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
12	S. Dinan	Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
13*	Dinan	Highway	Masonry High 600' long	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10
	Dinan	Highway	Stone - Low 150' long	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
14	N.E. Dinan	Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
15*	Port St. Jean	Highway	No Information Large?	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10
16	N. Tinteniac	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
17	N. Hede	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
18	W. Rennes	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
19	W. Rennes	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5
			TOTALS (Carried Forward)			78	52	134	82	140

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

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TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS SIZE	NUMBER	ATTACKING SORTIE REQUIREMENTS B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
	TOTALS (Brought Forward)			38	26	64	42	70	70	66	66	70
Highway	Probably Stone	1000#	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	Masonry High 600' long	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
Highway	Stone - Low 150' long	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Railroad	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information Large?	1000	10	5	3	10	5	10	10	10	10	10
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
	TOTALS (Carried Forward)			78	52	134	82	140	140	136	136	140

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

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NO.	LOCATION	TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS SIZE	BOMB REQUIREMENTS NUMBER	ATTACKING SORTIES B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-[illegible]
			TOTALS (Brought Forward)			78	52	134	82	14
20	W. Rennes	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
21	Bain de Bretagne	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
22	Blain	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
23	E. Blain	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
24	Pont Chateau	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
25	St. Nazaire	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
26	W. Nantes	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
27	S.W. Nantes	Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	
			GRAND TOTAL			102	68	174	106	18

* 2 Hits Required.

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS
HIGHWAY AND RAILROAD BRIDGES

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TYPE OF BRIDGE	CONSTRUCTION	BOMB REQUIREMENTS SIZE	BOMB REQUIREMENTS NUMBER	ATTACKING SORTIE REQUIREMENTS B-25	B-26	A-20	P-38	P-40	P-39	P-51	A-36	P-47
		TOTALS (Brought Forward)		78	52	134	82	140	140	136	136	140
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Highway	No Information	1000	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
	GRAND TOTAL			102	68	174	106	180	180	176	176	180

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

MARSHALLING YARDS

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NO.	LOCATION	AIMING POINT	APPROXIMATE VULNERABLE DIMENSIONS	SQUARE FEET	SQUARE FEET PER BOMB	SSP	SIZE OF BOMB	HITS REQUIRED	NO. BOMBS THAT MUST BE RELEASED
1	Rennes	Choke Point	300' x 450'	135,000	15,000	.032	500#	10	400
2	Nantes Chantenay Yard	East Choke Point	410' x 150'	61,500	15,000	.015	500#	5	475
3	Pol	Center of Yard	2000' x 50'	1200,000	15,000	.02	500#	6	410
4	Blain	Center of Yard	2000' x 50'	100,000	15,000	.02	500#	6	410
						TOTAL			1695

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BOMB AND SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

MARSHALLING YARDS

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AIMING POINT	APPROXIMATE VULNERABLE DIMENSIONS	SQUARE FEET	SQUARE FEET PER BOMB	SSP	SIZE OF BOMB	HITS REQUIRED	NO. BOMBS THAT MUST BE RELEASED	NO. HEAVY BOMBERS ATTACKING
Choke Point	300' x 450'	135,000	15,000	.032	500#	10	400	40
st Choke Point	410' x 150'	61,500	15,000	.015	500#	5	475	48
ter of Yard	2000' x 50'	1000,000	15,000	.02	500#	6	410	41
ter of Yard	2000' x 50'	100,000	15,000	.02	500#	6	410	41
				TOTAL			1695	170

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145.81-43
4 July 1943-
TO BE RETURNED TO HISTORICAL

Enemy Reaction to Raids on Japanese Cities, 1943
Memos for General Halverson

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Enemy Reaction to Raids on Japanese Cities, 1943
Memos for General Halverson

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
W/ R DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.9, 27 Sep 58

July 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KUTER:

Subject: Deployment of B-29 Aircraft in India-Burma-China Theatre during 1944.

I. Statement of Problem

To determine the number of B-29 groups (28 A/C each) that can be profitably employed against Japan from bases in the India-Burma-China Theatre by the end of 1944, based on availability of B-29 aircraft and the logistical supply problem.

II. Assumptions.

1. That the only supply routes into China are by air.

2. That targets in Japan offer rewards commensurate with the effort.

3. That Chinese ground forces and the 14th Air Force are capable of defending the air bases in China.

4. That B-29 crews will be available in sufficient numbers to match B-29 production.

5. That India-Burma-China Theatre airdromes will be available.

III. Discussion

1. B-29 Production. Based on estimates shown in Tab "B", there will be thirteen groups of B-29's available for the India-Burma-China Theatre by December 1944 provided this theatre is given priority.

2. B-29 Characteristics indicate: (Tab "C")

a) A radius of action of 1470 miles with a maximum load of ten tons and a radius of 2300 miles with a maximum load of two tons or an average of five tons based on the average distance between central Chinese bases, Hengyeng area, and the target objectives between Nagasaki and Tokio.

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS

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b) The B-29 requires runways 8500 feet in length of which there are none at present but with the Chinese labor available, a construction program, if started now, should be able to parallel group arrivals in the theatre.

c) The planned B-29 group will have twenty-eight A/C of which it is estimated fourteen A/C will be operational to the extent of five sorties per month.

3. Defense of Air Bases. General Chennault has stated that a force of four fighter groups of which two will be Chinese; two medium bomb groups, of which one will be Chinese; one heavy bomb group and one reconnaissance squadron will be sufficient for air operations in China proper. This includes defense of Air Transport Command terminals, defense of 14th Air Force tactical air bases, support of the Chinese ground forces, attrition of the Japanese air forces and operations against coastal shipping. It is estimated that Air Transport Command will carry 10,000 tons per month over the"hump" beginning September and that a substantial increase will occur after the monsoons in November. This should more than take care of General Chennault's stated requirements of 7,100 tons a month for the above air forces and allow an increase of two fighter groups and two night fighter squadrons for the added protection needed to cover the estimated eight B-29 airdromes in the Hengyeng area and eight B-29 airdromes in the Chengtu area.

4. Air Base Requirements.

a) Due to logistics it is believed that the thirteen B-29 groups should be based in the Calcutta area using forward airdromes in the Hengyeng area for topping off en route to Japan (see Tab "D").

b) It is estimated that thirteen airdromes in the Calcutta area will be needed as bases for the thirteen B-29 groups and seven airdromes in the Hengyeng area. A further seven airdromes in the Chungking-Chengtu area should also be available as an alternate landing area for the B-29's on their return from missions over Japan.

c) As all of these airdromes will require runways with a minimum length of 8,500 feet, twenty-eight hard standings and additional depth in foundation to hold the gross weight of 143,000 lbs., work should be started in the very near future.

5. Targets.

a) As shown in Tab "A", 75% of the priority targets in Japan lie between Tokio and Nagesaki. These can best be reached

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from bases in China, assuming that Siberian bases will not be available. The balance of the targets lie north of Tokio and within range of B-29's based in the Aleutians which indicates that two groups of B-29's could be based at Shemya during the summer months to good advantage, not only to cover the northern Japanese targets but also to disperse the Japanese fighter force.

b) For the Calcutta-based B-29's, there are other lucrative targets such as Bankok, Singapore, Saigon, Hongkong and Manila all of which lie within non-stop B-29 range of Calcutta.

6. Force Required. It is estimated that a force of not less than one hundred B-29's should be put over Japan proper. This will take all of the operational planes of seven groups. Until the B-29 force can be built up to thirteen groups of which six will act as cargo planes between Calcutta and the Hengyeng area to supply gasoline for topping off it is believed the first groups can best be used to advantage against the targets outlined in III, 5, b).

7. Supply

a) A.T.C. estimates of cargo tonnage between Assam and China begin with 10,000 tons in September, 1943 and increase during contact flying weather to a possible figure of 20,000 tons per month until May when the monsoon begins and tonnage will probably return to the 10,000 figure.

b) The limited Burma offensive during 1943-1944 may establish a junction on the ground between Ledo and Paochan on the Burma Road but it is not believed much benefit will derive from this until a pipeline can be laid, which will probably not be until 1945, assuming the Burma offensive is successful.

c) As stated previously, A.T.C. cargo deliveries can do little more than take care of the Chinese ground force needs to a limited extent and the 14th Air Force needs as outlined above which will necessitate the B-29 groups supporting themselves until such time as the Burma Road is open via Rangoon or until a Chinese seaport such as Hongkong is open to us.

d) In an effort to determine the approximate number of B-29 A/C required to transport gasoline to the staging area at Kweilin area, the following basic assumptions were made:

(1) That five missions of 100 A/C each be flown each month (500 sorties)

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(2) That combat A/C arrive in the Kweilin area loaded with five 2000 lb. bombs.

Based on the above, it is estimated that approximately 3,500,000 gallons per month of gasoline must be flown to the staging areas to permit topping off and return of combat A/C to the base area in Calcutta. The maximum pay load of gasoline which can be flown to the staging area is approximately 4500 gallons per A/C. On the further assumption that there will be only twelve flying days per month, this results in the need of sixty-four loads per day. Considering 50% operation capacity of A/C, it is estimated that 128 A/C or 4½ gps will be necessary for transport of gasoline and oil only. No consideration was given to other logistical problems involved.

8. Enemy Reaction to Attacks. Tab "E" gives estimate of maximum Japanese effort to counteract our bombing activities.

IV. Conclusions

1. That lucrative targets exist for the B-29's based in India-Burma-China Theatre.

2. That there are severe logistical problems involved in sustaining our effort.

3. That it is possible to supply staging areas with B-29 A/C.

4. That it is practicable and profitable to deploy B-29 groups in the India-Burma-China Theatre.

5. That it is most desirable to obtain a seaport with rail connections in China.

6. That every effort should be made to accommodate two groups of B-29's in the western Aleutians.

7. That a force of twelve B-29 groups is the minimum with which a sustained effort should be made against Japan proper from India-Burma-China theatres.

8. That steps should be taken at once to acquaint the British and Chinese with the project, if approved.

JOE L. LOUISENHEISER
Colonel, G. S. C.

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

TOKYO YOKOHAMA YOKOSUKA TARGETS		
Classification	Pr Ty	Key
Aircraft	3	9
Naval Bases and Shipyds	3	3
Iron and Steel		2
Petroleum	2	3
Chemicals	1	3
Automobiles, Motors	1	7
Rubber Products	1	2
Arms, Munitions		4
Communications		8
Electric Power		8
Machines and Tools		9
R R Transportation		1
Total	11	59

YAWATA WAKAMATSU KOKURA TARGETS		
Classification	Pr Ty	Key
Non Ferrous Metals	1	1
Iron and Steel	3	2
Chemicals	2	2
Arms, Munitions	-	1
RR Transportation		1
Total	6	7

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

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA - YOKOSUKA TARGETS

Classification	Pr'ty	Key
Aircraft	3	4
Naval Bases and Ship yds	3	4
Iron and Steel		2
Petroleum	2	3
Chemicals	1	3
Automobiles, Motors	1	2*
Rubber Products	1	2
Arms, Munitions		4
Communications		5
Electric Power		6
Machines and Tools		9
R R Transportation		1
Total	11	54

MUKDEN FUSHUN ANSHAN PENNSHIH TARGETS

Classification	Pr'ty	Key
Iron and Steel	1	2
Petroleum		2
Chemicals	2	3
Rubber Products		1
Arms, Munitions		1
Electric Power		4
Total	3	13

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

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

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

TAB A

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

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

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TAB B

B-29 Availability

1943

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
PRODUCTION						3	6	11	18	24	31	37
GPS AVAILABLE												

1944

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
PRODUCTION	45	59	68	77	86	108	123	132	146	141	148	167
GPS AVAILABLE	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	7	8	10	11	13

1945

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug
PRODUCTION	183	186	196	206	216	221	265	265
GPS AVAILABLE	15	16	18	19	21	23	25	28

Above based on (1) 50% Res. 25% attrition for 8 Gps
(2) 50% Res. 20% attrition for 20 Gps

28 Gps available by Sept. 1945

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces
ashington

3 July 1943

TAB C

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL J. HALVERSEN:

Subject: B-29 Range Summary

Table Showing Take-Off Distance and Maximum Range for Maximum Bomb Loads Obtainable with Various Bomb Bay Fuel Tank Arrangement - All Tanks Full.

650 and 1650 Gallon Non-Droppable Self-Sealing Bomb Bay Fuel Tanks Used for Fuel Loads Over 5608 Gallons (Space for 4 650 Gallon and 2 1650 Gallon Tanks)

Ranges Corrected for Warm-up, Takeoff, and Reserve by Deducting 25% from Theoretical Range.

Bomb Sizes	Maximum Bomb Capacity	Starting G. W.	Range	Takeoff Distance over 50' Obstacle
I. No Bomb Bay Tanks - 5608 Gallon Fuel Capacity				
500#	20,000 (40)	130,122	2,940 Mi.	6,700 Ft.
1000#	12,000 (12)	122,122	3,095	5,800
2000#	16,000 (8)	126,122	3,020	6,250
4000#	16,000 (4)	126,122	3,020	6,250
II. One 650 Gal. Bomb Bay Tank - 6,258 Gallon Fuel Capacity				
500#	16,000 (32)	130,772	3,260	6,800
1000#	9,000 (9)	123,772	3,390	6,000
2000#	12,000 (6)	126,772	3,340	6,320
4000#	12,000 (3)	126,772	3,340	6,320
III. Two 650 Gal. Bomb Bay Tanks - 6908 Gallon Fuel Capacity				
500#	14,000 (28)	133,372	3,530	7,100
1000#	8,000 (8)	127,372	3,655	6,400
2000#	10,000 (5)	129,372	3,610	6,620
4000#	8,000 (2)	127,372	3,655	6,400
IV. Two 650 Gal. Bomb Bay Tanks and One 1650 Gal. Tank - 8,558 Gallon Fuel Capacity.				
500#	10,000 (20)	140,572	3,860	8,040
1000#	6,000 (6)	136,572	4,250	7,520
2000#	8,000 (4)	138,572	4,210	7,780
4000#	8,000 (2)	138,572	4,210	7,780

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	Bomb Sizes	Maximum Bomb Capacity	Starting G.W.	Range	Takeoff Distance over 50' Obstacle
V.	Three 650 Gal. and One 1650 Gal. Bomb Bay Tanks - 9,208 Gallon Fuel Capacity.				
	500#	6000 (12)	141,172	4,470	8,120
	1000#	3,000 (3)	138,172	4,350	7,720
	2000#	4,000 (2)	139,172	4,520	7,850
	4000#	4,000 (1)	139,172	4,520	7,850
VI.	Four 650 Gal. and One 1650 Gal. Bomb Bay Tanks - 9,858 Gallon Fuel Capacity.				
	500#	4,000 (8)	143,722	4,710	8,460
	1000#	2,000 (2)	141,772	4,760	8,200
	2000#	2,000 (1)	141,772	4,760	8,200
	4000#	0			
VII.	Four 650 Gal. and Two 1650 Gal. Bomb Bay Tanks - 11,508 Gallon Fuel Capacity.				
		No Bomb Capacity			

/s/ KENNETH H. GIBSON,
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps.

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

PLAN:

1. To have 5 missi
2. A/C leave CALCU with range of

REQUIREMENT

1. Gasoline requir CALCUTTA to K 2 x 3500 x 50
2. Pay load B-29 11,508 - 7000
3. Loads required
4. A/C required to 64 per day
5. Number of group 64 x 2 = 128

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

PLAN:

1. To have 5 missions per month of 100 A/C each

2. A/C leave CALCUTTA area with 10 - 2000# bombs with range of 3610 miles.

REQUIREMENT

1. Gasoline required in KWEILIN area
   CALCUTTA to KWEILIN - 1700 mi. (3800 gal. gas)
   2 x 3500 x 500 = 3,500,000 gal. storage at KWEILIN

2. Pay load B-29
   11,508 - 7000 = 4508 gals.

3. Loads required to transport 3,500,000 gals = 776

4. A/C required to transport in 12 flying days = 64 per day

5. Number of groups required -
   64 x 2 = 128 A/C or 5 gps.

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

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TSITSIHAR
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Harbin
(Pinkiang)
KIRIN
Hsinking
FENGTIEN
(MOUKDEN)
Antung
Dairen
(JAPAN)
Ryojun
(Port Arthur)
KWANTUNG
(JAPAN)
CHOSEN
KOREA
Keijo
Seoul
Fusan
Vladivostok
Voroshiloff
Spassk
Olga
Tetyukhe
Sviyagino
Iman
Hwachwan
Tangyuan
Mutankiang
Yenki
Hunchun
Zalif Petra Velikoro
(G of Peter the Great)
Suchan
Valentinovo
Vladimirovka
Khrebet
HOKKAIDO
Otaru
Sapporo
Hakodate
Muroran
Asahigawa
NIHON KAI
(SEA OF JAPAN)
HONSHU
Niigata
Akita
Yamagata
Toyama
Fukui
Gifu
Nagoya
Kyoto
Osaka
Kobe
Nara
Toyohashi
Hiroshima
Okayama
Tokushima
Wakayama
Matsuyama
Kochi
SHIKOKU
KYUSHU
Moji
Saga
Oita
Kumamoto
Miyazaki
Kagoshima
Shimonoseki
Tsushima St.
TSUSHIMA
SAISHU I.
(Quelpart I.)
GOTO
Yaku I.
ISLE OF TANE
HWANG HAI
(YELLOW SEA)
Mouth of Hwang Ho
(Yellow R.)
Yang Tze Kiang
Kou
SHANGHAI
Wusung
Wutsin
Chinkiang
Tsingtao
Weihaiwei
Chefoo
Yehsien
Penglai
Laoyao
Kaishu
Jinsen
Shunsen
Koryo
Kakusan
Taiden
Taikyu
Jenchu
Shinshu
Urusan
Kunsan
Mokpo
Kanko
Seikoshin
Heijo
Gensen
Chinnampo
Fuchow
Chengtzetwan
Nishichosen Wan
Hulutao
Liaotung Wan
Chinhsien
Tashihkiao
Pehpiao
Kulun
Changwu
Sinmin
Sinlitun
Tahushan
Liaoyuan
Szepingkai
Sian
Sifeng
Kaiyuan
Hailung
Fusung
Antu
Linkiang
Tunghwa
Lintzutou
Mampochin
Keizanchin
Kisshu
Seishin
Rashin
Tumankan
Tatengshan
Tunhwa
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Lupei
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Taoan
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Siachengtze
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Taisha
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Kyoto
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Okayama
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ISLE OF TANE
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Jenchu
Shinshu
Masan
Fusan
Shinkai
Urusan
Kakusan
Taiden
Taikyu
Koshu
Rin
Jinsen
Seoul
Keijo
Kaishu
Chinnampo
Gensen
Heijo
Kanko
Seikoshin
Antung
Tashihkiao
Hulutao
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

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

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
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1700 mi.
Brahmaputra
Namcha Barwa
7756
7150
6983
5234
6024
Dibrugarh
Tinsukia
Lumding
Myitkyina
Paan
Kangting
Sichang
Likiang
Yungpeh
Hweili
Hweitseh
Weining
Kweiyang
Anshun
Tuyun
Kinping
Sungtao
Szenan
Szechow
Chenyuan
Tsunyi
Tating
Chaotung
Suiyung
Chishuiting
Lungchang
Fushun
Pahsien
Chungking
Tzeliutsing
Loshan
Kienyang
Changchung
Shahopu
Chungshien
Iphin
Paoshan
Tengchung
Shunning
Kunming
Yunnan
1950
Tsuyung
Kutsing
Panhsien
Anlung
Hiakiang
Chongon
Chengkiang
Szechengo
Hungi
Poseh
Ishan
Kienshui
Kwangnan
Shihping
Kokiu
Pishihchai
Mengtsz
Wenshan
Ningerh
Lantsang
Lashio
Naba
Katha
Bharno
Ye-u
Madaya
Mandalay
Paleik
Thazi
Wan Tup
Shwenyaung
Kyaukpadaung
Pyinmana
M.Sing
M.Chieng Hai
Prome
Kyangin
Henzada
Letpadan
Pegu
Chiengmai
Vientiane
Xieng Khouang
Thanh Hoa
Vinh
Ha Tinh
Nam Dinh
Hanoi
Hai Duong
Haiphong
Do Son
Mon Cay
Tunghing
Pakhoi
Wai Chow
Aihsien
Laokay
Lai Chau
Yen Bay
Lang Son
Na Cham
Dong Dang
Lungchow
Tsungshan
Cao Bang
Bac Quang
Ha Giang
Tienpao
Wuming
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Nanning
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Song Thu Bon
Song Ca
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Song Ngan Sau
Song Ma
Song Chu
Song Mu
Song Bung
Song Vu Gia
Song Ba
Song Kon
Song Da
Song Thao
Song Lo
Song Gam
Song Hsi Chiang
Song Yu Kiang
Song Kwei
Song Li
Song Peh Pan
Song Hung Shui
Song Nan Pan
Song Wu
Song Yalung Kiang
Song Lang Tsang Kiang
Song Sha Kiang
Song Gyu
Song Le Kiang (Salween)
Song Pan
Song Kiang
Song Fou Kiang
Song Chang Kiang
Song Min Kiang
Song Tatu Ho
Song Tatu
Song Peh Kiang
Song Hsiatze
Song Kiang
Song Yu Kiang
Song Kiang
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LEGEND

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" Loose surface, Gravel, etc.	
" Thru dirt	
" Local dirt	
Railroads; Main thru lines	
" Trans-Siberian	
" Local or connecting lines	
Boundaries; International	
" State or Province	
Town; First importance	◉ PEIP
" Second importance	◎ Han
" Third importance	○ Tsing
" Fourth importance	○ Chefo
Limit of navigation for large Steamers	
" " " " small "	
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A.P.PIROLA

ENGINEER REPRODUCTION PLANT, THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE
1939

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

ENGINEER REPRODUCTION PLANT, THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
1939

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

3 July 1943

Asst. Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

4 July 43 Wm L.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

SUBJECT : Study of Enemy Reaction to U.S. AAF Heavy Bomber Attacks on Japan from Chinese Bases.

1. The attached Intelligence Estimate is in compliance with verbal request from Colonel J. Halversen made to Major J. P. Harrison afternoon of 2 July 1943.

2. It represents the best opinion of this office based on information available and possible within the short period allowed for its completion.

TAB E

W. M. BURGESS,
Colonel, A. C.
Chief, Informational Division

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4 July 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel J. Halversen

SUBJECT: Enemy Reacttion to Heavy U.S.A.A.F. Attacks on Vital Targets In Japan.

Problem

Five probable enemy reactions and capabilities have been considered separately and are discussed in more detail in attached memorandum.

Summary of Discussion

1. Capture or Destruction of Allied Air Transport Bases in Assam - (It is not felt that enemy has capability for success - see pp 1 and 2).

2. Interception of Transport Planes en Route - (It is not believed enemy capable of inflicting serious attrition - see pp 2 and 3).

3. Capture or Destruction of Transport Terminal Bases in China. - (It is believed these bases can be successfully defended from enemy land and air attack - see pp 3).

4. Capture or Destruction of Forward Bases in Eastern China - (Enemy probably has capability for capturing or destroying any allied bases in Chekiang or Fukien Province but it is thought that contemplated bases in Kwangsi, Hunan or Kiangsi can be successfully defended - see pp 3, 4 and 5; also pp 7 for estimated available enemy fighter and bomber strength).

5. Increased Fighter and Antiaircraft Protection in and over the Japanese Islands - (Enemy will greatly strengthen home defenses and might base as much as 40% of entire available fighters within the main Japanese Islands (see pp 5, 6 and 7)).

J. P. HARRISON
Major, Air Corps
AC/AS, Intelligence

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3 JULY 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel J. Halversen

SUBJECT: Possible Enemy Reaction to U.S.A.A.F. Attacks on Vital Targets in Japan.

I. Premise

1. For the purpose of this study it will be assumed that,

a. The Japanese Air Force will be approximately at its present strength (the enemy's present position and policy of strategic defense will permit him to limit losses and, if necessary, sacrifice to a considerable extent his air strength in outlying positions in order to anticipate and meet the eventual threat to the heart of the Empire):

b. Allied pressure continues on the South and Southwest Pacific, new allied drives have developed against Burma, the position in Manchuria and China remain approximately as at present:

c. U.S.A.A.F. has begun long range attacks.

II. Probable Enemy Reaction. The enemy must do all possible to meet and offset this threat, and may be expected to consider and attempt any one or more of the following:

1. Interdiction, capture or destruction of allied air transport bases in Assam.

a. A land drive might be attempted from bases in Burma, either directly against airdromes in Assam or much further south in an effort to sever the rail and river transport of gasoline and supplies from the Calcutta area to these bases. Obviously, success would at once bring about the collapse of all air transport between India and China and hence the complete collapse of

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the contemplated air threat to Japan from Chinese bases. However, it is not felt that any such offensive action can be or will be within the enemy's capability since on the contrary it is felt that he, himself, will at the very least be on the defensive in Burma at such time and allied forces easily capable of successfully defending the Assam bases from any land attack.

b. Offensive air action against our Assam bases might be attempted following the building up of bomber and protective fighter strength in Burma. Success of such operations would depend upon the enemy's being able to attain much greater air strength in Central and Northern Burma than is likely to be within their capability. Also the success of such attacks would depend upon the enemy being able to achieve the element of surprise and this in turn upon his ability to capture and destroy outlying air warning stations which have been and are being established. Such attacks will doubtless be attempted but it is felt that same can and would be effectively met and, at most, the enemy could only hope to delay and impair for brief periods the air transport route by such methods.

2. Interception of transport planes en route from India to China.

a. While, for the most part, protection can be given by our fighter planes based in the Dinjan area and at Yunnanyi, this factor and possibility must always be considered.

b. Already, the enemy has good airbases in Central Burma within easy fighter range of the air transport route and less adequate but serviceable fighter strips further north, near Myitkyina. However, enemy aircraft based anywhere within range of our own fighters would be extremely vulnerable to allied

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attacks and it is not thought that interception of our transport planes in flight is likely ever to seriously curtail the transport service.

3. Attempted capture or destruction of terminal bases in China.

a. Land attacks from northern Indochina or western Yunnan, directed against our bases in the Kunming area, might be undertaken (this possibility has been dealt with in a separate report and it is felt that available Chinese forces with even moderate air support within our capability can successfully defend these bases from land attack). Ample warning of such intended enemy action would be available and ample opportunity had for taking the necessary steps in conjunction with the Chinese to successfully defend the area.

b. Strong enemy air attacks against these bases might be attempted, but with a splendid air warning net already established it is felt that such attacks in the future, as in the past, would prove too costly for the enemy to persist in same or achieve anything more than sporadic and infrequent success.

c. There has also been considered the possiblity for the enemy, by limited land drives, to obtain vital bases nearer to the Kunming area than those presently available to him. However, such limited success would not, it is felt, particularly alter the situation since the difficulties of bringing supplies to such airdromes would be greatly increased and further they would, in turn, be more vulnerable to our attack.

4. Capture or destruction of forward bases in Hunan, Kiangsi, northern Fukien, Chekiang and Kwangsi.

a. Until and unless the allied ground position in eastern China is materially strengthened and improved, it is felt that the

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enemy will have a capability of capturing and destroying any major forward bases which might be contemplated for use in the Provinces of Chekiang and Fukien. Easily and quickly the enemy can bring in strong and substantial reinforcements for initiating fresh land drives into these Provinces which would be difficult, if not impossible, to check until the immediate objective of capturing and destroying such forward bases has been achieved. Thus, until the allied capacity for ground defense of these two Provinces should be materially improved or at least until the capability for sustained air superiority over these easternmost Provinces lies within our capability, it would seem exceedingly dangerous to rely upon any continued employment of airfields located here.

b. Heavy bomber bases now available or proposed for development and usage in South Hunan, Northwest Kwangsi or South-Central Kiangsi can be much more easily defended from land attack as well as from air attack by the enemy. Nevertheless, the enemy may be expected (in the circumstances under discussion or long before in anticipation of such developments) to seriously consider a strong offensive land action against these bases and will certainly make renewed and strong air attacks on same. The possibility of a combination of land drives south from Yochow, southwest from Nanchang, and north from the Canton area must be considered. It is probable that such offensive land actions by the enemy would meet the initial success and even possible that they might reach one or more of these forward bases. At the same time, here again as the enemy penetrated inland his supply problems become increasingly more susceptible to attack by guerrilla forces and by air action. It is felt that the major contemplated bases in the particular area can be successfully defended but the available Chinese

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armies would require considerably greater air support than enjoyed at any time in the past in order to successfully repel a series of coordinated and determined land offensives. Again, ample warning would be available of such intended enemy land action and steps could be taken in advance which would greatly strengthen the defending forces.

c. In this area, the enemy would have a capacity for quickly increasing his air establishment permanently based in central and southern China.

5. Increased fighter protection in and over the Japanese Islands.

a. Unless one or more of the preceding enemy plans have been undertaken and proven entirely successful, it is obvious that he must have stronger home defenses both in antiaircraft and fighters in order to protect his vitals. This strengthening of home defenses has undoubtedly been in progress already for many months and will likely increase before Allied attacks begin to really strike hard at vital points in Japan. If necessary to protect Japan Proper, the enemy may be expected to greatly decrease his air strength elsewhere and to abandon entirely the air establishments now set up in certain distant outlying positions. This retrenchment would obviously be in proportion to the size and effectiveness of the effort against Japan Proper.

b. Since no fighter escort would be possible for our bombers, our formations must expect determined and even suicidal interception while approaching over and returning from these targets. While no evidence of a stronger or more effective fighter plane is as yet apparent, one must not lose sight of this possibility.

III. Present Location and Possible Changes in Disposition of Japanese Air Force to Meet such a Threat.

1. Attached is a map showing estimated Japanese air strength and locations as of 30 June, 1943 (M.I.S.-O.N.I. estimate).

2. Since it is felt that from the standpoint of air defense the most likely enemy reaction and capability would take place in Japan

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Proper and eastern China, these two areas will be considered separately with particular regard to his capacity for increased fighter protection.

a. In Japan, ample airfields and other facilities exist for the enemy to base and sustain a number of fighter planes beyond any capacity which they are likely to have for added strength above the present establishment. Eliminating then any question of logistics, it is estimated that the enemy could and would in such circumstances keep at home bases a large percentage of new fighter production and in addition might bring in for added strength additional fighter planes as follows:

From Manchuria	50
From Micronesia	30
From Melanesia	75
From elsewhere	100
Total	255

Such changes in disposition would make available to the enemy for home defense a total of about 550 fighter planes (or about 40% of their entire fighter strength). In addition, an uncertain number of float planes might be employed.

b. It is not felt that the enemy, except in the greatest extremity, would weaken further their fighter establishment in other theatres, and it seems unlikely that they could, in any case, for the defense of Japan against bombing attacks, afford to further reduce the fighter strength based in Manchuria by more than 50.

c. As already stated above, it is likely that in order to offset attrition they would, if necessary, begin to allocate a large part of new fighter production to home defense and would be prepared to abandon, as they have done in the past, all reinforcements or replacements to certain outlying positions.

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3. For air operations against our bases in eastern China, the enemy has already established bases in central China, in the Canton, Hong Kong area and newly established bases at Kwangchowan which would permit them, if desired, to bring in and support a considerably increased number of fighters and bombers.

a. Before building up home fighter defenses to such an extent as described above, the enemy could shift both fighter and bomber strength from the more southern areas and without unduly weakening their position elsewhere add as much as an additional 100 of each to the present strength of approximately 174 fighters and 220 bombers based in all of China, Hainan Island and Formosa. A good portion of this total strength of approximately 274 fighters and 320 bombers could be brought to bear against our bases or in support of their own land action as earlier described. For such operations they could quickly shift to nearer-by bases most of the aircraft which may now be based in northern China and the Philippines.

4. The M.I.S.-O.N.I. estimate for serviceability of the Japanese Air Force is about 50%. Since facilities will be better at home bases, the anticipated serviceability of planes available in Japan will run much higher.

5. In above estimates no cognizance has been taken of operational type planes used for training purposes in Japan. Although a portion of the fighter types might be modified and used for defensive purposes, such employment would not it is felt add appreciably to their fighter defense.

J. P. HARRISON
Major, A. C.
AC/AS, Intelligence

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

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Activation of B-29 and MTU Groups

TO: Chief of the Air Staff DATE 29 Dec 1943

FROM: AC/AS Operations, Commitments & Requirements COMMENT NO. 2
WMM:br 6705

1. Attached hereto are:

a. A Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subject: "Implementation of the B-29 Program within the present strength of the Army Air Forces."

b. A staff study for General Arnold.

2. These papers were submitted to the Acting Chief of Air Staff on December 22.

3. On December 23 General Arnold approved the staff study and signed the Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

P.R.C.

4. Since all the above information is known by your office, these papers are furnished to complete your records.

/s/ Craig
H. A. CRAIG,
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.

2 Incls. listed above

TO: AC/AS - Plans DATE 30 Dec 1943

FROM: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff COMMENT NO. 3
WMR/ig/5458

1. Noted by General Vandenberg.

2. Forwarded for Plans files in view of General Eater's further discussion with General Upston on this subject.

/s/ Wm Hunt
WILLIAM M. HUNT
Lt. Colonel, C. S. C.
Asst Secretary, Air Staff

Incls:
n/c

3-1109 A.F

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Activitation of B-29 and RTU Groups.

TO: AC/AS Operations, Commitments & Requirements. ✓
AC/AS Plans.

DATE 16 Dec '43

FROM: Chief of the Air Staff.

COMMENT NO. 1

1. In order to implement the decision to activate 16 B-29 Groups and 5 RTU Groups over and above the present B-29 Program, it is directed that you prepare a paper for my signature to General McNarney, making recommendations as follows:

a. Number of Air Force personnel, including ground and air, that can be returned from Alaska, the Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaii, Greenland and Iceland.

b. The reductions that can be made in the major commands of this country toward implementing this decision.

c. The number of units, such as squadrons and groups, that can be brought from the theaters listed above. Believe that some of these stations can be reduced in service units and combat units.

2. Prepare your plans based upon the assumption that this is the last major addition to the 273 Group Program.

3. Consider inactivating all units in this country that are not committed to foreign theaters or to special projects; also to cut down emergency pools of personnel that have been built up by some of the commands in the states.

4. Include in the letter to General McNarney a strong request that Ground Forces and Service Forces be directed to make a survey with a view to reducing their stations and establishments and to furnish to the Army Air Forces all available personnel and the required equipment that can be spared.

5. It is directed that this letter be prepared and in my hands by Wednesday, December 22, 1943.

BARNEY M. GILES,
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

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AFRPG
WEB:mls Ext. 4563

Dec 23 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Implementation of the B-29 Program within the present strength of the Army Air Forces.

I. Discussion.

1. The implementation of the B-29 program calls for an increase in the 31 December 1944 Army Air Forces Troop Basis of 130,000 officers, warrant officers and enlisted men.

2. Some part of this increase can be offset by decreasing the quiet theatres as follows:

	Off	W.O.	E.M.
Sixth Air Force (see Tab A)	548	18	2725
Antilles Air Command (see Tab B)	816	16	4149
Seventh Air Force (see Tab C)		None	
Eleventh Air Force (see Tab D)	63		638
North Atlantic Bases (see Tab E)	17	4	319
Total	1444	38	7831

However in all instances the present authorized strength in units of these Air Forces and Commands is the requirements of the theatre as expressed by the Operational Plans Division, War Department General Staff.

3. Recent decision that unit equipment of groups will be

Heavy Bombardment	48
Medium and Light Bombardment	57
Fighter (except those now at 100)	75
Troop Carrier	64

results in a saving of approximately 6,000. This is more than offset by an error in the G-3 proposed troop basis which inadvertantly omits the double crews for heavy bombardment above the 35 unit equipment stage. This equals 10,400 officers and men.

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4. The Zone of Interior establishments of the Army Air Forces have been authorized personnel as follows:

		Off.	W.O.	E.M.
Continental Overhead	31 Oct. 1943	129,785	4340	779,449
Continental Overhead as recommended by G-3	31 Dec. 1943	122,709	3925	739,179
	30 June 1944	119,026	3723	699,876
	31 Dec. 1944	107,509	3087	584,984

This results in the following cumulative reductions:

31 Dec. 1943	7,076	415	40,270
30 June 1944	10,759	617	109,573
31 Dec. 1944	22,276	1253	194,465

This reduction requires that the Aircraft Warning Service of the Defense Commands be reduced to practically zero, that all units be bulked under exact manning tables and that the training establishment of the Army Air Forces be reduced to the absolute minimum required to produce replacements.

5. This is the personnel that must be retained within the Army Air Forces if, under the present strategic situation, the implementation of the B-29 program is to be accomplished within the personnel now assigned to the Army Air Forces.

6. In the processing of the proposed Army Air Forces Troop Basis a long series of conferences were held and it is believed that all possible reductions were made. Further reductions in continental commands can only be made by reducing the assigned mission of these Air Forces and Commands.

II Action recommended.
The Secretary of War directs:

1. That the authorized strength of the Army Air Forces for 31 December 1944 as set forth in the Army Air Forces Troop Basis proposed by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff be increased by 130,767.

2. A study be made with a view to reducing the quiet theaters as indicated in paragraph 2 and when approved the Army Air Forces Troop Basis be reduced accordingly.

H.H.ARNOLD
General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, A.A.F.

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PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

Sixth Air Force

Item	Unit	No. Units	Strength Off.	W.O.	E.M.
1	Extra Crews (HB)	48	192	0	288
2	Fighter Squadrons (SE)	3	117	0	756
3	Extra Crews Fighter (SE)	138	138	0	0
4	AF Radio Sqdn (Mobile)	1	27	0	311
5	Signal Co Service Gp	2	6	0	194
6	Military Police Co	1	4	0	100
7	Aircraft Warning Service	Bulk	64	18	1076
	Total		548	18	2725

Facts Pa

The Sixth Air Force has been gradually reduced in strength until at the present time it is little more than a token force. In making this reduction it was reasoned that the Sixth Air Force because of its proximity to the United States could be easily re-enforced. There are sufficient bases in Panama to house re-enforcements and since under present world conditions no attack could be made of any duration the housekeeping troops are sufficient to take care of re-enforcements for short periods of time.

Further reductions may be made but only with the result that there will be no air-defense of the Panama Canal. The reductions listed above call for removing 50% of the fighter strength plus all extra crews for both bombardment and fighter and for placing the AWS on two shifts per day from 0400-0800 and from 1600-2000.

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PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

A. ANTILLES AIR COMMAND

Item		No. Units	Off.	W.O.	E.M.
1	Bomb Group (H)	1	288	1	1275
2	Extra Crews (H)	32	96	0	96
3	Reconnaissance Sqdn	1	37	0	233
4	Service Group, Hq & Hq Sq	7	124	0	624
5	Service Squadrons	6	42	12	1362
6	Ordnance Supply & Maint Co	3	12	0	228
7	Signal Co Service Gp.	1	3	0	97
8	Signal AWS	Bulk	14	3	234
	Total		816	16	4149

Facts

The Antilles Air Command like the Sixth Air Force has already been reduced to the minimum consistent with its mission. Reductions as above will necessitate the closing of certain Air Bases and will restrict to some extent the service which can be provided to the Air Transport Command. Here again the mission of the Antilles Air Command must be changed if these reductions are made.

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PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

Seventh Air Force

None

Facts:

The Seventh Air Force is a combat air force and is now being built up to provide the necessary force to carry out its assigned mission.

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PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

Eleventh Air Force

Item	Unit	No. Units	Strength Off.	W.O.	E.M.
1	Bomber Command	1	19	0	90
2	Fighter Command	1	29	0	169
3	Chemical Co, Air Operations	1	4	0	130
4	Ord. Supply & Maint. Co.	1	4	0	76
5	Service Squadron	1	7	0	213
	Total		63	0	638

Facts

In this connection it is pointed out that CCS 428, dated 15 December 1943 indicates that we must plan for augmentation of the defenses in the Aleutians in order to permit certain offensive operations from that area.

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RECOMMENDED REDUCTIONS

North Atlantic Bases

Item	Unit	No. Units	Strength Off.	W.O.	E.M.
	ICELAND				
		None			
	GREENLAND				
		None			
	NEWFOUNDLAND				
1	Ordnance Supply & Maint. Co.	1	4	0	76
2	Signal AWS	Bulk	8	2	132
	Total		12	2	208
	BERMUDA				
1	Signal AWS	Bulk	5	2	111
			5	2	111
	CENTRAL CANADA				
		None			
	GRAND TOTAL		17	4	319

Facts

This reduction will necessitate the Signal Aircraft Warning Service to operate on part time basis only.

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22 December 1943

STAFF STUDY FOR GENERAL ARNOLD

Subject: Implementation of the B-29 Program within the Present Authorized Strength of the Army Air Forces.

I. Facts Bearing on the Problem

1. The implementation of the B-29 Program calls for an additional 130,767 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men by 31 December 1944.

2. This can be accomplished within the authorized strength of the Army Air Forces as of 31 December 1943 but will necessitate

a. Stripping the Eastern and Western Defense Commands (This is planned in the proposed 1944 C-3 Troop Basis for the Army Air Forces).

b. Reducing the pilot training program to 60,000 annually.

c. Reducing the technical training program to a monthly output of approximately 10,000 students per month.

d. Making required cuts in ZI overhead as required by C-3, WDGS and the War Department Manpower Board.

3. The above action will produce a total of 157,341 position vacancies within the Army Air Forces. This exceeds the required strength for the B-29 program by approximately 26,500.

4. We can obtain the following personnel immediately.

a. Reduction of AWS in Eastern and Western Defense Command - 11,800

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b. Reclassification upward of candidates awaiting pilot training under the 93,600 program - 30,000

c. Reduction in overhead of the Technical Training Installations as a result of student cutback (1 Jan- 1 April incl) 30,000

Total 71,800

d. This will take care of our intake into the Army Air Forces for the B-29 Program until 1 May 1944 when further cutbacks must be made.

5. BUT -

a. The Army Air Forces authorized strength for 31 December 1944 has been reduced 157,341 below the authorized strength of 31 December 1943.

b. Therefore any savings such as mentioned in Par. 4 above must be returned to the War Department to pay the debt of 157,341.

II. Action recommended.

It is recommended that:

1. The Army Air Forces be authorized to retain all but 26,500 of the personnel now set up for 31 December 1943 in the troop basis for the Army Air Forces as proposed by G-3, War Department General Staff.

2. The Eastern and Western Defense Commands be stripped insofar as Air Force Troops are concerned.

3. That the implementation of the B-29 Program be accomplished within the authorized strength of the Army Air Forces as of 31 December 1943 with only that induction necessary to make up the deficit which exists between the actual and authorized strength as of 31 December 1943.

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

P.R.S

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Comparison of Ultimate Annual Requirements
Program with Anticipated Tactical Ava
During any Twelve Months Period

Based on VV-5



All Attrition Computed at 20% per Month Based on [illegible] Strength
Unless Otherwise Noted

PRESTO CROSS SECTION
No. 311-G

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Ultimate Annual Requirements of 273 Group
with Anticipated Tactical Availability
ing any Twelve Months Period

Based on WW-



Based on IE Strength

Prepared by ACAS/Plans
17 July 1943

PREFERRED CRIB SECTION
No 311-G

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Method of Computing Attrition

Director of Bombardment
Director of Air Support
Director of Statistical Control

January 6, 1942

A-3 Division

1
WRB:enc 6701

1. Some confusion has arisen as to methods of computing attrition and resultant strengths for the purpose of the "Allocation" chart.

2. For purposes of illustration and to confirm information made available to the J.C.S., the following example of computation for the South and Southwest Pacific are forwarded for your guidance and your records are to be corrected accordingly:

	Reported as of 12/31/42	Factors in Jan. and Feb., 1943 Sending	Estimated Attrition (Two months period)	Estimated Strength as of 2/28/43	Current Commitment
			South Pacific		
H. B.	48	44	24	68	70
M. B.	26	22	10	38	52
Fighter	234	48*	40	242	150(+25 (1)

P.R.C.

(1) plus 25 refers to New Zealand Squadron.

			Southwest Pacific		
H. B.	128	26	28	126	110
M. B.	95	21	17	99	132
LB/DB	35	10*	14	31	87
Fighter	370	50*	90	330	338 (-)

* Does not include direct allocations to Australian and New Zealand governments.

3. Attrition is to be computed against T/O strength or actual, whichever is smaller.

ROBERT W. HARPER
Colonel, G. S. C.

Copy to AFAEP (Col. Lutzenheiser)

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

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QUALITATIVE AND DATA OF JAPANESE PLANE LOSSES IN S. W. PACIFIC

Summary from A-2

		Fire	Bombers	Flying Boats	Float	Planes	Trk Ch	Total
Solomons (New Guinea, New Britain & Solomons)	MacArthur 12/15	102	97	20	32		9	260
" " "	ONI-FIS 12/15 (Includes Carrier Based)	174	160	18	139		30	521
Timor & Inner Seas	MacArthur 12/15	33	57	2	22		10	124
" "								
" "	ONI-FIS 12/15 (Includes Carrier Based)	87	73	-	--		6	161

A-2 states that inclusion of carrier based aircraft in ONI-FIS reports may account for much of the discrepancy but not all of that noted above, and that General MacArthur's figures are probably low.

P.R.C.

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ARMY AIR FORCES PROGRAM

1943

Units to be available the first of month indicated.

Unit	T/O	DATE	OFF	AO	AI	AGGR	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
Air Force, Hq & Hq Sq	1-[illegible]-1S-[illegible]S	7-1-42	52	3	198	253		1		
Bomber Command, Hq & Hq Sq	1-100-1	7-1-41	30	0	157	187				
Bomb Wing, Hq & Hq Sq (M & H)	1-110-1	11-21-42	43	0	116	159	1	1		1
Bomb Group (H) and Hq Sq	1-112	7-1-42	18	0	38	56	1	3	3	3
Bomb Sq (H)	1-117	7-1-42	68	0	335	403	4	12	12	12
Bomb Group (M) Hq & Hq Sq	1-112	7-1-42	18	0	35	53	2	2	1	1
Bomb Sq (M)	1-117	7-1-42	84	0	289	373	8	8	4	4
Fighter Command, Hq & Hq Sq	1-200-1	7-1-41	32	0	169	201				
Fighter Wing, Hq & Hq Sq	1-10-1S	9-26-42	32	0	114	146		1		
Air Defense Wing Hq	1-550-1	11-26-42	53	0	188	241	1			
Air Defense Region, Hq & Hq Sq	M/T 1-3550	11-26-42	31	0	104	135				
Fighter Group (SE)	1-12	7-1-42	20	0	49	69	1			2
Fighter Sq (SE)	1-27	7-1-42	38	0	249	287	3			6
Fighter Group (TE)	1-12	7-1-42	20	0	49	69				
Fighter Sq (TE)	1-37	7-1-42	38	0	278	316				
Air Support Cmd, Hq & Hq Sq	1-500-1	7-1-42	54	0	215	269			1	
Bomb Wing, Hq & Hq Sq (L & D)	1-130-1	11-21-42	45	1	122	168				1
Bomb Group (L)	1-112	7-1-42	20	0	35	55				
Bomb Sq (L)	1-137	7-1-42	35	0	267	302				
Bomb Group (D)	1-112	7-1-42	20	0	35	55	1	1		
Bomb Sq (D)	1-147	7-1-42	43	0	280	323	4	4		
Troop Carrier Wing, Hq & Hq Sq	1-310-1	7-1-42	32	4	158	194				
Troop Carrier Group	1-312	7-1-42	19	0	59	78		1	1	1
Troop Carrier Sq	1-317	9-4-42	46	1	299	346		4	4	4
Observation Group	1-252	8-15-42	19	0	59	78				
Observation Sq	1-267	7-1-42	37	0	231	268				
Photo Gp, Recon & Mapping Hq	1-752	9-4-42	16	1	34	51		1	1	
Photo Mapping Sq	1-758	11-21-42	72	2	235	309		1	1	
Photo Recon Sq	1-757	11-21-42	39	2	213	254		3	3	
Night Fighter Sq	1-67	10-1-42	40	0	450	490		2	2	
Fighter Control Sq	1-47	12-11-42	24	0	222	246				
Photo Intel Det	1-747S	9-15-42	Variable							
Airdrome Sq	1-487-S	10-15-42	12	0	270	282			8	6
Service Group, Hq & Hq Sq	1-412	9-25-42	28	0	136	164	4	2	4	2
Service Sq	1-417	9-14-42	7	2	213	222	8	4	8	4
Service Sq (Additional)	1-417	9-14-42	7	2	213	222				
Signal Co, Serv Gp	11-237	11-1-42	3	0	97	100	4	2	4	2
Ordnance Co Avn (AB)	9-167	12-22-41	4	1	60	65	4	2	4	2
QM Truck Co, Avn	10-517	7-1-42	3	0	99	102	8	4	8	4
Ordnance MM Co, Avn (Q)	10-487	7-1-42	2	0	46	48	8	4	8	4
QM Co, Service Gp Avn	10-437	7-1-42	5	0	76	81	4	2	4	2
Air Depot Group, Hq & Hq Sq	1-852	7-1-42	19	0	150	169	2	3	2	1
Repair Squadron	1-857	7-1-42	10	0	340	350	2	3	2	1
Supply Squadron	1-858	7-1-42	8	0	129	137	2	3	2	1
QM Truck Co, Avn	10-517	7-1-42	3	0	99	102	2	3	2	1
Ord MM Co, Avn (Q)	9-7	9-21-42	2	0	46	48	2	3	2	1
QM Plat AD Group	10-427	7-1-42	2	0	22	24	2	3	2	1
Med Supply Plat, Avn	8-497	6-3-42	2	0	19	21	2	3	2	1
Signal Depot Co, Avn	11-287	7-1-42	7	3	216	226	2	3	2	1
Signal Depot Co, Avn (Add Units)	11-287	11-1-42	7	3	216	226				
QM Co Depot Subsist, (Avn)	10-447	7-1-42	2	0	55	57	1	1		1
QM Co Depot Gas & Oil (Avn)	10-447	7-1-42	2	0	30	32	1	1		1
Medical Air Evac Transport Sq	8-417	11-20-42	4	0	27	31				

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Assistant Chief of the Air Staff
Program Planning
Task Force Division

February 15, 1943.

Y AIR FORCES PROGRAM

1943

o be available the first of month indicated.

NO	NI	ACOR	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
3	198	253		1					1		1						
0	187	187							1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	
0	116	159	1	1		1	1		1	3	3	5	5	6	6	4	
0	38	56	1	3	3	3	3	2	1	3	3	5	5	6	6	4	
0	335	403	4	12	12	12	12	8	4	12	12	20	20	24	24	16	
0	35	53	2	2	1	1		1		1	1	1	1				
0	289	373	8	8	4	4		4		4	4	4	4				
0	169	201						1	1								
0	114	146		1						2	1		1	1			
0	188	241	1					4		4	1	1					
0	104	135						14	1	3	3	1	3	1	2	2	
0	49	69	1			2	2	2	3	3	2	3	9	3	6	6	
0	249	287	3			6	6	6	9	9	6	3	1	1			1
0	49	69									1		3	3			
0	278	316									3	1					
0	215	269			1				1			1	1		1		
1	122	168				1				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	35	55										4	4	4	4	4	4
0	267	302															
0	35	55	1	1							2	2	2	2	2	1	
0	280	323	4	4							8	8	8	8	8	4	
4	158	194												1			
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1	299	346		4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	8	4	4	4	4
0	59	78						1	1	1							
0	231	268						4	4	4							
1	34	51		1	1				1				1				
2	235	309		1	1				1				1				
2	213	254		3	3				3				3				
0	450	490		2	2				1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
0	222	246	-						8	9	10	5					
able								4									
0	270	282			8	6			25	30	19	5	3				
0	136	164	4	2	4	2	4	7	7	5	7	9	6	10	9	8	9
2	213	222	8	4	8	4	8	14	14	10	14	18	12	20	18	16	18
2	213	222						8	8	8	6						
0	97	100	4	2	4	2	4	7	7	5	7	9	6	10	9	8	9
1	60	65	4	2	4	2	4	7	7	5	7	9	6	10	9	8	9
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3	216	226						3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
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0	30	32	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				

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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0	Nursol	92				
Air Support Com Sq	1-547	2-18-42	11	0	107	118	1		
Replacement Control Dep, Hq & Hq Sq	20-45	4-1-42	18	0	113	131			
Cml Co, Air Operations (H)	3-457	7-1-42	4	0	130	134		1	
Cml Co, Air Operations (M)	3-457	7-1-42	4	0	130	134	2	1	2
Cml Co, Air Operations (L)	3-457	7-1-42	4	0	130	134			
Cml Co, Air Operations (D)	3-457	7-1-42	4	0	130	134			
Cml Maintenance Co	3-47	4-1-42	4	0	119	123			
Cml Depot Co (Avn)	3-418	2-28-42	4	0	78	82			
Engr AF Hq Co	5-800-2	8-1-42	12	0	213	225	1		
Engr Topo, Avn	5-447	2-6-42	8	0	147	155			
Engr Avn Bn	5-415	4-1-42	31	0	776	807	3	2	3
Engr (Avn) (Airborne)	Tent		5	0	120	125			1
Engr Camouflage Bn Avn	5-95	4-1-42	30	1	445	476			1
Ord Co Am Avn	9-17	4-1-42	6	0	180	186	1		
Ord Co MM Avn	9-7	9-21-42	8	1	216	225	1		
Ord Depot Co	9-57	4-1-42	6	0	180	186	1		
QM Co Boat (Avn)	10-497	2-11-42	3	8	48	59	1		1
QM Laundry Co (Semi-Mobile)	10-167	4-1-42	5	0	295	300			
QM Bakery Co	10-147	4-1-42	5	0	163	168			
QM Sterilization Co	10-177	4-1-42	3	0	156	159			1
QM Refrigeration Co (Mobile)	10-247	4-1-42	4	0	115	119			
QM Salvage & Repair Co (Semi-mobile)	10-237	4-1-42	3	0	208	211			
Sig Pigeon Co	11-39	4-1-42	11	0	168	179			
Sig Co Avn	11-217	5-19-42	6	0	175	181			
Sig Co, Avn (Less RI Plat)	11-217	5-19-42	5	0	143	148			
Sig Radio Intel Co, Avn	11-297	12-23-42	8	0	192	200			1
Sig Radio Intel Co	11-77	4-1-42							
Sig Co Wing	11-247	7-1-42	3	0	86	89	4	5	3
Sig Bn, Air Support Command	11-335	5-19-42	21	0	488	509			
Sig Cons Bn Avn (with Med Det)	11-225	7-1-42	17	1	407	425			6
Sig AW Co	11-400	7-1-42	Variable				10	8	3
Sig AW Bn	11-400	7-1-42	41	17	946	1005		1	
Sig AW Reporting Plat	11-400 Col.	5C team	3	1	74	78			
AB Security Bn	7-415	4-1-42	18	0	422	440		23	
MP Co, Avn	19-217	5-1-42	4	0	100	104	5	4	7
Sig AW Siting & Testing Co	11-400	11-11-42	4	2	70	76		1	
Sig AW Co (Regional)	11-437	9-15-42	37	3	135	175			
Observation Sq	1-267	7-1-42	35	0	204	239			
Sig Hq & Hq Co (Fighter Comd)	11-450-1	9-4-41	11	2	220	233	1		
Army Air Forces, Air Serv Comd,Hq&Hq Sq	1-400-2S	1-11-43	47	2	329	388			
Medical Dispensary Det (Avn)	M/T		3	0	11	14			

	T/O	Date	Off	WO	M	Aggr
* Observation Hq.	1-252 C-1	1/26/43	22	0	76	98

Add 2 Fighter Gps May 1944
Add 9 Observation Gps 1/2 Strength

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Bnurso1		92															
0	107	118	1					2	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	2	
								3									
0	113	131															
0	130	134		1		3	2	5	3	2	3	4	3	5	5	6	(6)
0	130	134	2	1	2		1	1		1		1		1	1		
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0	78	82						1					1				
0	213	225	1								1						
0	147	155									1						
0	776	807	3	2	3	2	8		5	3	2	6	5	8	2	11	6
0	120	125			1	4	6		1		1	1	1		1	1	1
1	445	476			1	1		1	1	1							
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0	180	186	1								1						
8	48	59	1		1				1		1						
0	295	300									1						
0	163	168									1						
0	156	159			1												
0	115	119									1						
0	208	211									1						
0	168	179				1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
0	175	181					1	2	2		2						
0	143	148						1	2		1						
0	192	200			1	5		1			1						
0	86	89	4	5	3		3	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	3	3	4
0	488	509						1		1	1			1			
1	407	425			6	6	4	2			2						
ble			10	8	3	2	4	4	5	7	9	10	9	7	7	8	9
17	946	1005		1		1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
1	74	78						2			2	2	2	2	2	1	1
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0	100	104	5	4	7	5	4	18	15	12	20	19	17	17	15	15	17
2	70	76		1			1										
3	135	175															
0	204	239						1	1								
2	220	233	1					1			1		1		1		
2	329	388								1	1		1	1	1		
0	11	14											11	1	1	1	1

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/15/43 NRD

SECURITY

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-15-43)

March 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That necessary action be taken to prepare the units listed below for service in the United Kingdom and to move them to the port of embarkation designated by the Commanding General, Services of Supply at the proper time.

Unit	Responsible Agency
35th Air Dep Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
100th Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
380th Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
381st Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
384th Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
344th Bomb Gp (M)	AAF
Hq & Hq Sq, 40th Bomb Wing	AAF
348th Fighter Gp (SE)	AAF
353d Fighter Gp (SE)	AAF
22d Photo Rcn Sq	AAF
1118th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1119th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1120th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1139th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1140th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1141st MP Co (Avn)	AAF
63d Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
83d Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
79th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF

2. Units will move at T/O strength and with T/BA or T/E equipment as applicable, with modifications applicable to this theater.

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237

[redacted] SECURITY

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-15-43) March 15, 1943.

Subject: Units for Movement to the United Kingdom.

3. The above units with their organic equipment will be prepared for movement to the port of embarkation not later than May 1, 1943. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces will report to Operations Division, W.D.G.S. when the flight echelons of the above units are prepared to move to the United Kingdom.

4. The Commanding General, Services of Supply will: -

a. Inform those concerned as to designation of the port.

b. Furnish transportation for the movement.

c. Make the overseas movement to the United Kingdom based on priority to be furnished separately.

5. Above units are included in the six months' troop projection list.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

SECURITY

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VIII - 2

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 July 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD

I notice from the Daily Status sheet over the past two weeks a sharp reduction in 4-engine bombers allocated to the Eighth Air Force. I assume that this is occasioned by the diversion of three groups of B-24's to Africa. Presumably this has the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff but it is, of course, a complete negation of the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan which was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff only a few months ago. It is, I believe, significant that this diversion was made prior to the building up of the Eighth Air Force even to its first required strength and it must inevitably react on the ability of the Eighth Air Force to perform the engagements which it undertook. If such undertakings are not performed by the Combined Bomber Offensive the reaction on the Air Forces in particular, and air power in general, will be obvious.

It seems to me symptomatic of the concept of side issues and dispersion against which we have struggled so long and so hard and I wonder if you know of any way in which we can emphasize the fact that nowhere in Europe are there as many productive targets in a concentrated area as there are available to the Eighth Air Force itself. The best thought in England, as well as on this side, seems to agree that there is no such thing as a single "end-the-war" target. Hence the sensible thing to do would appear to be to concentrate all air power possible against a series of productive targets, as has been laid out in the air plan on which the Combined Bomber Offensive is based.

The argument that "it only takes a few planes and we are only going to use them for three weeks" is, of course, wholly unrealistic. Actually, the last time Colonel Timberlake's B-24 group was "borrowed for ten days" it remained in the African Theater for approximately three months. Any "temporary" diversion, therefore, actually has all of the characteristics of permanency.

As I see it, we either have to stick to the policy of concentrating and carrying out an orderly program with a possibility of materially shortening the war, or our efforts will be diverted, dispersed, diluted and ultimately damned.

What do you think we can appropriately do about it?

7/4/43

ROBERT A. LOVETT
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[redacted]

V III-2

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

JUL 18 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Subject: Diversions from the Combined Bomber Offensive.

1. Mr. Lovett's letter of July 16th emphasizes the necessity for persistence in adhering to the plan for the combined bomber offensive. His letter refers only to the movement of the three B-24 groups to Africa and infers that it is a "diversion" and an unproductive effort to hit a single "end the war" target. He infers that this movement is an act by which "our efforts will be diverted, dispersed, diluted and ultimately damned" and asks what can we "appropriately do about it."

2. This issue having been raised and put on paper, a strong written reply may be warranted. If you so desire, I shall prepare one.

3. I recommend that you discuss this subject with Mr. Lovett (possibly during your session with him on Monday, July 19) along the following lines:

"a. I agree with you wholeheartedly that greatest diligence must be shown toward preventing the dilution of our bomber effort against Germany. Each Joint and Combined Staff meeting brings this matter up. My stand on this matter is undoubtedly viewed by Admiral King as bullheaded.

"b. The further efforts we might take in this matter lie in the field of Public Relations. At present in Sicily and in New Guinea, ground troops are in contact, lines are moving forward, small towns and numbered hills are being taken, "our boys are fighting gallantly," flags are waving, bands are playing and the whole public attention is focused in these directions. The bitter, critical, still uphill, but all important, battle in the air over Germany is almost totally lost to the public and to the majority of the military. I have directed War Department Public Relations' attention toward restoring a proper balance between the relative theaters during the past week and I am from time to time inserting this thought by direct action.

Wolfe to see file

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VIII-2

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SECURITY

"c. On the particular movement of the units from England referred to in your note, it is quite evident that the purpose for which these B-24 groups were moved has not been properly explained to you. Rather than diverting units from the combined bomber offensive against Germany, this movement permits heavy bombers which, due to their characteristics and number, were not being employed in the United Kingdom, to move to an air base area from which they not only can be employed, but from which they should reach and destroy an objective, the character of which is very high on the priority list for the combined bomber offensive. Let me make it perfectly clear that these units were not diverted from their task. They were moved to a base from which they could perform a most important element of that overall task and which could not be accomplished by any units in the United Kingdom.

"d. The particular mission has been worked out in detail, studied carefully by Brereton, is now being carefully rehearsed and will be executed at noon, Sunday, July 25.

"e. Your note expressed concern lest these groups remain in North Africa. Far from being concerned, I am seriously considering keeping them there permanently. They and the two B-24 groups now in North Africa would form a large and powerful force. From Sicily, they might approach the very important German objectives along the Danube through very light defenses and quite probably make far greater contribution toward the success of the combined bomber offensive than the same units could possibly accomplish in England."

L. S. KUTER,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans.

7/24/43 received by messenger from Gen. Arnold's office (secretary) JBC

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[redacted] SECURITY SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

By authority A. C. of S., G-
Date 8 Oct 1943 (Initials)

6 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SORENSEN

Subject: Recent Information Concerning the German Air Force

1. There are indications that GAF night bombers operating in the Mediterranean are again employing "Window" or a similar device, to cause false indications on Allied radar equipment like those reported in September. These efforts seem to be experimental in nature and have been conducted on a small scale.

2. FW-190's were seen recently over the Baltic Sea conducting operations that appeared to be experiments with a discus-shaped anti-shipping bomb. The bombs were dropped from an altitude of 80/100 feet and seemed to skip across the surface of the water for several hundred feet without sinking.

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General
A. C. of S., G-2

[redacted]

Removed Under E.O. 13526, 1.5(c)

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECURITY

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Space Allocation on Convoy for Aircraft

1. A total of at least 459 aircraft will be available for water shipment to the Twelfth Air Force during the month of March, 1943.

2. Arrangements have been made to ship 220 aircraft early in March.

3. One hundred two more airplanes comprising 35 P-38 types and 67 A-36 types are expected to be available at the port of embarkation when a special convoy, designated UG6½, will be loading for departure to North Africa about the middle of March. However, no space for aircraft has been allocated by the War Department on convoy 6½, and informal inquiry in OrD indicates no plan for such allocation.

4. The remaining 137 of the 459 airplanes will be available for water shipment on convoy 7 leaving late in March. In addition to these 137, convoy 7 will be asked to take all or any remaining of the 102 airplanes not taken by convoy 6½.

5. It is recommended that the urgent need for a space allocation on UG6½ for as many of the 102 airplanes as possible be presented directly to the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

L. P. Whitten

L. P. WHITTEN
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.
Director of Base Services

Incl.-1
#1 Details re above

6/16/43 1) Above received in this office from C A S for file.
by Miss Ingram
2) For file in "Security" file.

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SECURITY [redacted]

DETAILS OF AIRCRAFT TO BE AVAILABLE DURING MARCH

1. It is anticipated that 42 P-40 crated airplanes and 18 A-36 crated airplanes and 160 P-38 deck-loaded airplanes will be water shipped on convoy UG6 and two British ACV's departing next week. These figures represent all airplanes destined for water shipment to the Twelfth Air Force which are available at the port of embarkation and expected to arrive at the port in time for preparation and loading.

2. At the time convoy 6½ will be loading, present production and delivery dates of airplanes to be water shipped to the Twelfth Air Force, indicate that 35 P-38 airplanes will be available at the port of embarkation for deck-loading and also 67 A-36 crated airplanes for above and below deck-loading. No allocation of space has been made to AAF on UG6½, and neither OPD nor SOS have expressed any hope of space being available for the shipment of these airplanes.

3. In addition to the airplanes mentioned in paragraph 2 as being available for convoy 6½, production and availability dates at the port of embarkation indicate the following airplanes for water shipment on convoy 7: 20 P-38 airplanes for deck-loading; 37 A-36 crated airplanes; 30 P-39 crated airplanes; and, 50 P-40 crated airplanes.

4. Should space not be made available on convoy 6½ for the 35 P-38 types and 67 A-36 types (described in paragraph 2), and these airplanes held for convoy 7, total available airplanes for water shipment on convoy 7 would be: 55 P-38 types; 104 A-36 types; 30 P-39 types; and, 50 P-40 types.

5. On the basis of no space being available on convoy 6½, 239 airplanes will be ready for water shipment on convoy 7. Operational Plans has advised this Directorate that these figures represent minimum requirements, and that plans are now in formation for increasing reserves and replacements. The revised schedule contemplated would increase the shipping requirements for convoy 7 by fifty odd airplanes which would make an overall figure of 289 airplanes.

6. Unless space is made available for the 102 airplanes expected to be ready at the time convoy 6½ is loading (1) these airplanes will have to wait at port two weeks for shipping space (2) shipping space required for convoy 7 will be extreme (3) even if shipping requirements for all 239 airplanes should be met by utilizing convoy space and two ACV's, the theatre would have this amount all arriving at one time for assembly which would create a bad situation in the theatre.

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HEADQU[illegible]TERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

[redacted]

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Amendment No. 1 - Schedule of Units to All Theatres.

TO: The Air Adjutant

DATE May 25, 1943

FROM: AC/AS, OC&R, Allocations & Programs Division
Theatre Branch

COMMENT NO. 1
BFC:mk 73085

1. The following changes have taken place in the Schedule of Units to all Theatres since publication of the basic Schedule revised May 13, 1943.

2. It is suggested that in order to keep the Schedule up to date changes referred to on the attached amendment be noted on the Schedule and the list of amendments returned to this office.

Incl: (1)
Cpy #5, Amend. No. 1
Schd of Units to all
Theatres, dtd 5-24-43.

[illegible] for
O. P. WEYLAND
Colonel, Air Corps

BFC

MAY 27 '43 PM

RECEIVED
CLASSIFIED FILE UNIT
AAG - AAF

May 28, 1943
Comment No. 2.
JBC:JB 5789

TO:AC/AS, OC&R, Allocations and Programs Division

FROM: Air Adjutant General

1. Schedule of May 13th referred to in comment No. 1 above is on file in this office.

2. Since it is believed to be inadvisable to alter that schedule after it has been filed, it is suggested that a copy of the Amendment No. 1 dated May 24th, which is attached to this R&R, be furnished this office for file with the schedule.

JBC
JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.C.D.,
Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

1 Incl. n-c

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3-1109 A.F.

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECURITY

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Rec'd Dist HF
3/20/43

SUBJECT: Organization, Training and Equipment of Units for Overseas Service.

TO: Commanding General,
First Air Force,
Mitchel Field, New York.

1. Inclosed is a list of units projected for overseas movement during the period February 20, 1943 to August 31, 1943, furnished as a guide for advance planning and information.

2. The following procedure has been established by the War Department to aid in the preparation of units for overseas duty:

a. Units will be warned by this Headquarters ninety days in advance of the projected date of movement to the Port of Embarkation when practicable. During this ninety-day period emphasis will be placed on the necessity of allowing no relaxation of training. Packing, crating and other physical preparations for the move will be subordinated to intensified training whenever feasible.

b. Insofar as practicable organic equipment will be shipped to home stations of specific units to allow familiarization with new type equipment prior to movement to Port of Embarkation.

c. A status report is required for each unit prior to its departure to the Port of Embarkation. This report is normally completed by War Organization and Movement (see inclosures 1 and 2). In addition the unit will be inspected by the Inspector General. This report is submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval to insure that the unit is properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations (see inclosure 3).

3. It is recommended that appropriate measures be taken to insure that the units under your control (see inclosure 4) are properly

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

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SECURITY

organized, trained and equipped for combat and service operations and prepared to move to the Port of Embarkation at the proper time.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

MAR 20 1943
1642586

John B. Cooley

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Incls:
#1 - Form 3-6515-A, AF
#2 - Form 3-6515-B, AF
#3 - Ltr AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M dtd 1-5-43, subj: Org, Trng and Equip of Units for Overseas Service
#4 - Schd of Units to all theaters frm 2-20-43 to 8-31-43, dtd 3-1-43
Copy No. 30.

Distribution:
Commanding Generals:
First Air Force
Second Air Force
Third Air Force
Fourth Air Force
Air Service Command
Flying Training Command
Technical Training Command
Troop Carrier Command
Anti-Submarine Command
AAF School of Applied Tactics
Air Transport Command
Proving Ground Command
Commanding Officers:
Bolling Field, D. C.
AAB, Colorado Springs, Colo.

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SECURITY

SUBJECT: Organization, Training and Equipment of Units for Overseas Service.

TO: Commanding General,
Technical Training Command,
Knollwood Field, North Carolina.

1. Inclosed is a list of units projected for overseas movement during the period February 20, 1943 to August 31, 1943, furnished as a guide for advance planning and information.

2. The following salient points will be noted:

a. Units will be warned by this headquarters ninety days in advance of the projected date of movement to the Port of Embarkation when practicable. During this ninety-day period emphasis will be placed on the necessity of allowing no relaxation of training. Packing, crating and other physical preparations for the move will be subordinated to intensified training whenever feasible.

b. Insofar as practicable organic equipment will be shipped to home stations of specific units to allow familiarization with new type equipment prior to movement to Port of Embarkation.

c. A status report is required for each unit prior to its departure to the Port of Embarkation. This report is formally completed by War Organization and Movement (see inclosures 1 and 2). In addition the unit will be inspected by the Inspector General. This report is submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval to insure that the unit is properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations (see inclosure 3).

3. It is a continuing responsibility of higher commands in supervising the preparation of units for overseas duty. Measures as

Incl #2

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SECURITY

are necessary will be taken by you to insure that the units under your control which appear on inclosure four (4) are properly organized, trained and equipped for combat and service operations and prepared to move to the Port of Embarkation at the proper time.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

John B. Cooley

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Incls:
#1 - Form 3-6515-A, AF
#2 - Form 3-6515-B, AF
#3 - Ltr AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M dtd 1-5-43, subj: Org, Trng and Equip of Units for Overseas Service
#4 - Schd of Units to all theaters frm 2-20-43 to 8-31-43, dtd 3-1-43
Copy No. 22.

Distribution:
Commanding Generals:
First Air Force
Second Air Force
Third Air Force
Fourth Air Force
Air Service Command
Flying Training Command
Troop CarrierCommand
Anti-Submarine Command
AAF School of Applied Tactics
Air Transport Command
Proving Ground Command
Commanding Officers:
Bolling Field, D. C.
AAB, Colorado Springs, Colo.

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SECURITY

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SC-1

SUBJECT: Organization, Training and Equipment of Units for Overseas Service.

TO: Commanding General,
Second Air Force,
St. George Wright, Washington.

1. Inclosed is a list of units projected for overseas movement during the period February 20, 1943 to August 31, 1943, furnished as a guide for advance planning and information.

2. The following salient points will be noted:

a. Units will be warned by this Headquarters ninety days in advance of the projected date of movement to the Port of Embarkation when practicable. During this ninety-day period emphasis will be placed on the necessity of allowing no relaxation of training. Packing, crating and other physical preparations for the move will be subordinated to intensified training whenever feasible.

b. Insofar as practicable organic equipment will be shipped to home stations of specific units to allow familiarization with new type equipment prior to movement to Port of Embarkation.

c. A status report is required for each unit prior to its departure to the Port of Embarkation. This report is normally completed by War Organization and Movement (see inclosures 1 and 2). In addition the unit will be inspected by the Inspector General. This report is submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval to insure that the unit is properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations (see inclosure 3).

3. It is a continuing responsibility of higher commands in supervising the preparation of units for overseas duty. Measures as

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SECURITY

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By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

John B. Cooley.

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Incls:
#1 - Form 3-6515-A, AF
#2 - Form 3-6515-B, AF
#3 - Ltr AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M dtd 1-5-43, subj: Org, Trng and Equip of Units for Overseas Service
#4 - Schd of Units to all theaters frm 2-20-43 to 8-31-43, dtd 3-1-43 Copy No. 27.

Distribution:
Commanding Generals:
First Air Force
Second Air Force
Third Air Force
Fourth Air Force
Air Service Command
Flying Training Command
Technical Training Command
Troop Carrier Command
Anti-Submarine Command
AAF School of Applied Tactics
Air Transport Command
Proving Ground Command
Commanding Officers:
Bolling Field, D. C.
AAB, Colorado Springs, Colo.

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SECURITY

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SECURITY

SUBJECT: Organization, Training and Equipment of Units for Overseas Service.

TO: Commanding General,
Third Air Force,
Tampa, Florida.

1. Inclosed is a list of units projected for overseas movement during the period February 20, 1943 to August 31, 1943, furnished as a guide for advance planning and information.

2. The following salient points will be noted:

a. Units will be warned by this Headquarters ninety days in advance of the projected date of movement to the Port of Embarkation when practicable. During this ninety-day period emphasis will be placed on the necessity of allowing no relaxation of training. Packing, crating and other physical preparations for the move will be subordinated to intensified training whenever feasible.

b. Insofar as practicable organic equipment will be shipped to home stations of specific units to allow familiarization with new type equipment prior to movement to Port of Embarkation.

c. A status report is required for each unit prior to its departure to the Port of Embarkation. This report is normally completed by War Organization and Movement (see inclosures 1 and 2). In addition the unit will be inspected by the Inspector General. This report is submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval to insure that the unit is properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations (see inclosure 3).

3. It is a continuing responsibility of higher commands in supervising the preparation of units for overseas duty. Measures as

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

SECURITY

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SECURITY

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By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

John B. Cooley,

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Incls:
#1 - Form 3-6515-A, AF
#2 - Form 3-6515-B, AF
#3 - Ltr AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M dtd 1-5-43, subj: Org, Trng and Equip of Units for Overseas Service
#4 - Schd of Units to all theaters frm 2-20-43 to 8-31-43, dtd 3-1-43 Copy No. 18

Distribution:
Commanding Generals:
First Air Force
Second Air Force
Third Air Force
Fourth Air Force
Air Service Command
Flying Training Command
Technical Training Command
Troop Carrier Command
Anti-Submarine Command
AAF School of Applied Tactics
Air Transport Command
Proving Ground Command
Commanding Officers:
Bolling Field, D. C.
AAB, Colorado Springs, Colo.

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SECURITY

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SECURITY

SUBJECT: Organization, training and equipment of units for Overseas Service.

TO: Commanding General,
Flying Training Command,
Fort Worth, Texas.

1. Inclosed is a list of units projected for overseas movement during the period February 20, 1943 to August 31, 1943, furnished as a guide for advance planning and information.

2. The following salient points will be noted:

a. Units will be warned by this Headquarters ninety days in advance of the projected date of movement to the Port of Embarkation when practicable. During this ninety-day period emphasis will be placed on the necessity of allowing no relaxation of training. Packing, crating and other physical preparations for the move will be subordinated to intensified training whenever feasible.

b. Insofar as practicable organic equipment will be shipped to home stations of speed ie units to allow familiarization with new type equipment prior to movement to Port of Embarkation.

c. A status report is required for each unit prior to its departure to the Port of Embarkation. This report is normally completed by War Organization and Movement (see inclosures 1 and 2). In addition the unit will be inspected by the Inspector General. This report is submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval to insure that the unit is properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations (see inclosure 3).

3. It is a continuing responsibility of higher commands in supervising the preparation of units for overseas duty. Measures as

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

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are necessary will be taken by you to insure that the units under your control which appear on inclosure four (4) are properly organized, trained and equipped for combat and service operations and prepared to move to the Port of Embarkation at the proper time.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

RECEIVED MAR 20 1943 FLYING TRAINING COMMAND A.F.

John B. Cooley,

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Incls:
#1 - Form 3-6515-A, AF
#2 - Form 3-6515-B, AF
#3 - Ltr AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M dtd 1-5-43, subj: Org, Trng and Equip of Units for Overseas Service
#4 - Schd of Units to all theaters frm 2-20-43 to 8-31-43, dtd 3-1-43 Copy No. 21.

Distribution:
Commanding Generals:
First Air Force
Second Air Force
Third Air Force
Fourth Air Force
Air Service Command
Flying Training Command
Technical Training Command
Troop Carrier Command
Anti-Submarine Command
AAF School of Applied Tactics
Air Transport Command
Proving Ground Command
Commanding Officers:
Bolling Field, D. C.
AAB, Colorado Springs, Colo.

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APRIL 29, 1943

5

AMENDMENT NO. 1
CHANGES IN TABLE OF ARMY UNITS
DEC 1, 1942 THRU DEC. 31, 1943

SECURITY

UNITED STATES

The following units will be deleted.

AIR

(3) undesignated Military Police Co, Avn

ATTIC

(5) undesignated Military Police Co Avn
678th Sig Co Serv Gp

The following units will be added.

AIR

1283rd Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1284th Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1285th Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]

ATTIC

1286th Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1287th Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1288th Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1289th Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1290th Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1291st Military Police Co Avn. T/O 19-217, dated 6-1-43, [illegible]
1917th Sig Co Serv Co. T/O 11-57, dated 11-1-43, [illegible]

Change the 21st Section in the 21st Quartermaster Mine Det Pack to read: strength of 21 Off - [illegible]

Change the footnote on the 70th Station Hospital (2) Avn to read: "Record as complete if the Sq will be ready for movement by July 1st. If record is completed [illegible] 1st" to "Aircraft for [illegible] Sq will have been received and will show [illegible] ready for movement 7-1-43."

[illegible]

The following units will be deleted

AIR

87th Engr Avn Bn
87th Engr Avn Bn

[redacted]

SECURITY

12

-1-

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NORTH AFRICA (Con't)

SECURITY

The following units will be added.

JUNE

*1912th Ord Amm Co Avn	T/O 9-17,	dated 4-1-42,
*1914th Ord Amm Co Avn	T/O 9-17,	dated 4-1-42,
*1962d Ord Dep Co Avn	T/O 9-57,	dated 4-1-42,
2008th Ord Maint Co, AF	T/O 9-257,	dated 2-11-42,
2011th Ord Maint Co, AF	T/O 9-257,	dated 2-11-42,

JULY

836th Engr Avn Bn	T/O 5-415,	dated 4-1-42,
*1883d Engr Avn Bn	T/O 5-415,	dated 4-1-42,
*1952d Ord Dep Co Avn	T/O 9-57,	dated 4-1-42,

SCHEDULE

The following units will be deleted.

AUGUST

418th Night Fighter Sq
48th Air Depot Gp, Hq & Hq Sq

OCTOBER

421st Night Fighter Sq

The following units will be added.

MAY

21st Med Supply Plat, Avn	T/O 8-497, dated 6-3-42,
1088th Qm Co Serv Gp, Avn	T/O 10-407, dated 7-1-42,
47lst Qm Plat Air Dep Gp	T/O 10-517, dated 7-1-42,
*1918th Qm Trk Co, Avn	T/O 10-517, dated 7-1-42,
*1954th Qm Trk Co, Avn	T/O 10-517, dated 7-1-42,
*1960d Qm Trk Co, Avn	T/O 10-517, dated 7-1-42,
*2012th Qm Trk Co Avn	T/O 10-517, dated 7-1-42,
*2019th Qm Trk Co Avn	T/O 10-517, dated 7-1-42,
1351th Qm Dep Co, Subsistence, Avn	T/O 10-407, dated 7-1-42,
1411th Qm Dep Co, Class III, Avr	T/O 10-407, dated 7-1-42,

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* Negro enlisted personnel

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65

5

[redacted] SECURITY

SOUTH PACIFIC (Cont'd)

SERVICE

47th Air Dep Gp, Sq C Co Sc — I/O [illegible], dated 7-7-43, 4 Off - 0 WO - 2 EM

AVIATION

41st Bomb Fighter Sc — I/O [illegible], dated 7-7-43, 4 Off - [illegible] WO - [illegible] EM

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC

The following units will be added,

AAF

20th Base Supply Sq — I/O [illegible], dated 7-2-43, [illegible]
10th AAF Band — [illegible], dated 1-1-43, [illegible]

AIR CORPS

The following units will be added,

AAF

7th Fighter Command — T/O [illegible], dated 5-3-43, [illegible]
803d Eng, Av Bn, Sq Hq — T/O [illegible], dated 2-10-43, 6 Off - 5 WO - 61 EM

INFANTRY

The following unit will be added,

AAF

7th Service Gp — T/O [illegible], dated 5-1-43, 7 Off - [illegible] WO - [illegible] EM

QUARTERMASTER

The following units will be deleted,

183d Engr Avn Bn
21st Def Supply Plat, Avn,
19th Ord Amm Co Avn,
106th Ord Bas Co Avn,
211th Sig Base Sec, AF
102d Qm Co Serv Sp Avn,
41st Qm Plat Air Dep Gp
152th Qm Co Dep Spec Svc Avn
111th Qm Co Dep Class III Avn
119th Qm Trk Co Avn
152th Qm Trk Co Avn
163d Qm Trk Co Avn
212th Qm Trk Co Avn
230th Qm Trk Co Avn
93th Sig Depot Co Avn

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Supplemental 9/21/42

...Service Command - Wright Field:

Brigadier General L. T. Miller
Colonel J. H. Hicks
Colonel J. B. Givens
Colonel C. P. Kane
Colonel J. W. Sury
Colonel I. R. Selby
Mr. V. J. Myer
Colonel J. C. Gordon
2nd Lieut. J. P. Turner
Colonel C. B. Stone
Major General H. J. Miller - Gravelly Point.

Office of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-2:

Colonel R. C. Coupland
Miss Catherine Haynes
Captain W. M. Burgoyne

Office of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans:
Miss Regina Sullivan
Miss Margaret M. Ewing
1st Lieut. Raymond Farrell

Air Transport Command:
Brigadier General H. L. George
Lt. Colonel Robert M. Love
Mrs. Ruth M. Huddleston
Miss Ann Larson
Lt Col. P.N. Montague

Classified Mail Section, AAF:
1st Lieut. C. P. Carter
Mr. W. R. Boucher

Office of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-2:
Major G. E. Sisco

Third Ground Air Support
Colonel Crostwaite

Director of Weather:
Colonel Don Z. Zimmerman

Air Adjutant General:
Maj. H. B. Hohman

13

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/13/43

OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43)

March 13, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa.
(List 8-A)

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That necessary action be taken to prepare the units listed below for service in North Africa and to move them to the port of embarkation designated by the Commanding General, Services of Supply at the proper time.

Unit	Responsible Agency
a. 77th Serv Sq	AAF
b. 80th Serv Sq	AAF
c. 81st Serv Sq	AAF
d. 2029th QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
e. 2035th QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
f. 2036th QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
g. 2037th QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
h. 2038th QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
i. 2041st QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
j. 2042d QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
k. 2043d QM Co (Trk) (Avn)	AAF
l. 1726th Ord Co (MM) (Avn)	AAF
m. 1793d Ord Co (MM) (Avn)	AAF
n. 1795th Ord Co (MM) (Avn)	AAF
o. 1101st Ord Co (AB)	AAF
p. 1102d Ord Co (AB)	AAF
q. 177th QM Co, Serv Gp	AAF
r. 85th Sig Co, Serv Gp	AAF
s. 906th Sig Co (Dep) (Avn)	AAF
t. 52d Hq & Hq Sq, Trp Carrier Wing	AAF
u. 61st Trp Carrier Gp	AAF
v. 313th Trp Carrier Gp	AAF
w. 314th Trp Carrier Gp	AAF

2. Units will move at T/O strength and with T/BA equipment or T/E as applicable with modifications which may be applicable as indicated in memorandum, this office, dated January 22, 1943, addressed to the Commanding Generals,

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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240

[redacted] SECURITY

OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43) March 13, 1943.

Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa.

Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces and Services of Supply, Subject: Equipment of Units Earmarked for Special Operations, OPD 400 TF (1-22-43).

3. a. Units listed above whose location is east of the Mississippi River will have their organic equipment prepared for movement to the port of embarkation by April 10, 1943 and be prepared for movement to the port of embarkation on April 16, 1943, less organic equipment, with exceptions listed in sub-paragraph c below.

b. Units listed above whose location is west of the Mississippi River will have their organic equipment prepared for movement to the port of embarkation by April 6, 1943 and be prepared for movement to the port of embarkation on April 12, 1943, less organic equipment, with exceptions listed in sub-paragraph c below.

c. The 52d Hq & Hq Sq, Troop Carrier Wing and the 61st, 313th, and the 314th Troop Carrier Groups will have their organic equipment prepared for movement to the port of embarkation by April 23, 1943 and be prepared for movement to the port of embarkation on May 2, 1943, less organic equipment.

d. The agency controlling units will make every effort to prepare organic equipment of units for movement as early as possible in advance of the dates prescribed in sub-paragraphs a, b and c above and will inform the proper port commander of the earliest date equipment can be made available in each case.

APR 1 '43 PM

4. The Commanding General, Services of Supply will: -

a. Inform those concerned as to designation of the port.

b. Furnish transportation for the movement.

c. Make the overseas movement to North Africa based on priority to be furnished separately.

RECEIVED CLASSIFIED FILE UNIT

5. The exact destinations of above units will be furnished when the information becomes available.

6. Units listed above are included in the six months' troop projection list for April with the following exceptions which are not included in the six months' troop projection list:

1102d Ord Co (AB)
906th Sig Co (Dep) (Avn)

B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/3/43 NLC.

SECURITY

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-3-43)

March 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

APR 1 '43 PM

RECEIVED
ASSIGNED FILE UNIT

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

1. The Chief of Staff directs:

a. That necessary action be taken to prepare the units listed below for service in the United Kingdom and to move them to the port of embarkation designated by the Commanding General, Services of Supply at the proper time.

Unit	Responsible Agency
345th Bomb Gp (M)	AAF
94th Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
95th Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
96th Bomb Gp (H)	AAF

2. Units will move at T/O strength and with T/BA equipment with modifications applicable to this theater.

3. The air echelons of above units will be prepared to move from home stations by March 20, 1943. The ground echelons of above units will be prepared for movement to the port of embarkation by April 30, 1943. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces will report to Operations Division, W.D.G.S. when the flight echelons of the above units are prepared to move to the United Kingdom.

4. The Commanding General, Services of Supply will: -

a. Inform those concerned as to designation of the port.

b. Furnish transportation for the movement.

c. Make the overseas movement based on priority to be furnished separately.

5. Above units are included in the six months' troop projection list.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

for C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

15

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235

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/15/93 KAC

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-3-43)

March 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

That memorandum, this office, dated March 3, 1943, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Services of Supply, above subject, be amended as follows:

Delete paragraph 3 and substitute the following therefor:

"3. The above units with their organic equipment will be prepared for movement to the port of embarkation by April 5, 1943. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces will report to Operations Division, W.D.G.S. when the flight echelons of the above units are prepared to move to the United Kingdom."

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

16

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AFADS
WMB/gwd
Ext. 4849

March 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION:

Subject: Aircraft Scheduled for Shipment to the North African Theater during the Four Months, Beginning with March, 1943.

1. A study has been made of the airplanes assigned and allocated for water shipment to North Africa during the four months beginning with March, 1943. Sixteen hundred and eighty-one (1681) airplanes are scheduled to be shipped (fourteen hundred and forty-nine (1449) for the Army Air Forces and two hundred and thirty-two (232) for the French), and of these, three hundred and thirty-three (333) will go deck-loaded, requiring 286,400 square feet of deck space. The remaining thirteen hundred and forty-eight (1348) airplanes are to be shipped crated, and will require 77,046.5 ship tons space.

2. Airplanes assigned for March and April are expected to be available by convoy as follows:

a. UGS-6½ (Middle March)

49	P-38's -	1033.9 ship tons,	39,200 sq. ft. deck space
135	P-39's -	4806.0 ship tons	
58	A-36's -	3700.4 ship tons	
TOTAL 242	planes -	9540.3 ship tons,	39,200 sq. ft. deck space

b. UGS-7 (Late March)

24	P-38's -	506.4 ship tons,	19,200 sq. ft. deck space
50	P-40's -	3230.0 ship tons	
18	A-36's -	1148.4 ship tons	
15	C-78's -	1708.5 ship tons	
TOTAL 107	planes -	6593.3 ship tons,	19,200 sq. ft. deck space

c. UGS-7½ (Early April)

30	P-38's -	633.0 ship tons,	24,000 sq. ft. deck space
5	P-39's -	178.0 ship tons	
60	P-39N's -	2136.0 ship tons	
50	P-40L's -	3230.0 ship tons	
50	P-47D's -	3390.0 ship tons	
51	A-36's -	3253.8 ship tons	
7	L-4B's -	125.3 ship tons	
TOTAL 253	planes	12946.1 ship tons,	24,000 sq. ft. deck space

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Ft. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Mob.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Trans.
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
Judge Adv.
Budget
Fiscal
Mess Unit
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pf.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

Original carried to OPD by Col Patterson 3/11/43

This paper was marked "Secret" by OPD.

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d. UGS-8 (Late April)

10	P-38's	- 211.1 ship tons,	8000 sq.ft.deck space
35	P-39's	- 1246.0 ship tons	
25	P-39Q's	- 890.0 ship tons	
68	P-40L's	- 4392.8 ship tons	
45	A-36's	- 2871.0 ship tons	
30	A-35's	- 2868.0 ship tons	
15	C-78's	- 1708.5 ship tons	
7	L-4B's	- 125.3 ship tons	
TOTAL 235	planes	- 14312.7 ship tons,	8000 sq.ft.deck space

3. Airplanes contemplated and allocated for May and June are expected to be available for shipment as follows (Production schedule is too far ahead for accurate forecasting by individual convoys, although it is believed that the entire May total will be ready for shipment on UGS-8½ (Mid May) and UGS-9 (Late May.):

a. May Estimate

70	P-38's	- 1477.1 ship tons,	56000 sq.ft.deck space
125	P-39's	- 4450.0 ship tons	
10	P-47's	- 678.0 ship tons	
15	P-51's	- 957.0 ship tons	
60	P-51B's	- 3828.0 ship tons	
96	A-36's	- 6124.8 ship tons	
30	A-35's	- 2868.0 ship tons	
15	C-78's	- 1708.5 ship tons	
14	L-4B's	- 250.6 ship tons	
TOTAL 435	planes	- 22342.0 ship tons,	56000 sq.ft.deck space

b. June Estimate

150	P-38's	- 3165.0 ship tons,	120,000 sq.ft.deck space
87	P-39's	- 3097.2 ship tons	
10	P-47's	- 678.0 ship tons	
10	P-51's	- 638.0 ship tons	
15	C-78's	- 1708.5 ship tons	
93	A-36's	- 5933.4 ship tons	
30	A-35's	- 2868.0 ship tons	
14	L-4B's	- 250.6 ship tons	
TOTAL 409	planes	- 18338.7 ship tons,	120,000 sq.ft.deck space

5. a. If the tankers continue sailing to North Africa from New York, it is expected that the entire three hundred and thirty-three (333) P-38 airplanes (Paragraph 1) can be deck-loaded on them. The success of a present flyaway project may result in forty (40) P-38

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airplanes a month going flyaway to North Africa, and correspondingly reducing the amount for water shipment by eighty (80) - forty (40) in May and forty (40) in June.

b. No allocation was made by the theater commander for shipping deck-loaded or crated aircraft on UGS-6; the theater commander allocated 7000 ship tons for crated aircraft only on UGS-7. Arrangements were ultimately made by the Transportation Division of the Director of Base Services for thirty (30) P-39 airplanes for the French to be loaded on UGS-6½, and for the loading of the remainder of the crated aircraft, available for UGS-6½ and all those ready for UGS-7, to go on UGS-7.

c. The only other allocation of space made by the theater commander for future convoys is one of forty-six hundred (4600) ship tons for crated aircraft on UGS-8.

6. In addition to the sixteen hundred and eighty-one (1681) airplanes referred to in paragraph 1 for the North African area, one hundred and fifty (150) P-40 airplanes are expected to be shipped to Lagos during March and April, for assembly and flyaway delivery to the Middle East. Of these, sixty (60) are being water-shipped in March and the remaining ninety (90) the first half of April. The Director of Air Defense advises that no other shipments of fighter planes to the Middle East are contemplated until the P-51B airplanes are available, which will be late May or June at the earliest. These figures are quoted for information purposes, since Middle East commitments would have to be considered in case shipment of aircraft for North Africa was made via Lagos.

7. In order to use the facility at Lagos to its maximum, approximately ninety (90) airplanes a month will be shipped to Lagos, regardless of the Air Force to which they are ultimately assigned. Should vessels be set up for Lagos during late April, May, and early June, one hundred and fifty (150) to one hundred and fifty (150) crated airplanes for the 12th Air Force could be shipped to Lagos for assembly during that period, and the requirements for space on convoys 8, 8½, 9 and 9½ could be correspondingly reduced.

8. There are seven hundred (700) gliders set up for shipment to the 12th Air Force prior to May 31, and four hundred (400) of these are set up in space reserved on UGS-8.

9. If there is no change in the priority now enjoyed by airplanes and gliders in the shipping program, all projected shipments can be accomplished as scheduled. This has been informally concurred in by the Water Division, Transportation Corps of the Services of Supply.

10. All of the above is subject to the availability of airplanes at the Port of Embarkation by the dates contemplated.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

RICHARD H. BALLARD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
[redacted] Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4.

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
Sec. O&M
Ind. Lr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Transit
Traffic
Flight Maint.
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Security
J. Advoc.
Purchases
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND [redacted] SHEET

TALLY NO.	1-1/1149
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Shipment of Aircraft to North Africa.

TO: Director of Base Services (Transportation Division) DATE March 2, 1943.

FROM: Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, A-4. COMMENT NO. 1
WMB/gwd/4349

1. The attached letter is forwarded to you for necessary action.

2. In the light of recent decisions to reinforce the Theatre, referred to in basic communication, with more than the normal reserve supply of aircraft, it is desired that your Directorate prepare the shipping plan to move these aircraft over a period of the next four (4) months. This plan should include the following:

a. The number of aircraft planned for the theatre by the Directors of Air Support and Air Defense.

b. Dates when this aircraft will be available to East Coast ports for water shipment.

c. Requirements to move these aircraft by boat, and the amount of shipping now set up or in sight to move them.

3. It is realized these schedules will be tentative and subject to production [illegible] to some extent to weather and Command decisions that might interfere with present plans.

4. These schedules should be submitted to this Division for appropriate action by March 10, 1943.

Incl:
Ltr.dtd. 2/26/43, frm.Col. Schneider to AFADS, above subject.

RICHARD H. BALLARD,
Colonel, G. S. C.

Suspense: March 10, 1943

TO: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4 March 9, 1943

FROM: Base Services Comment #2
RBS-7-H/RPM-tb/6972

1. A study has been made of the airplanes assigned and allocated for water shipment to North Africa during the four months beginning with March.

2. Sixteen hundred eighty one airplanes are scheduled to be shipped [illegible]49 for AAF and 232 for the French). Of these, 333 will go deck-loaded and will require 266,400 square feet of deck space. The remaining 1348 airplanes are to be

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET [SECRET]

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Shipment of Aircraft to North Africa

TO: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4

DATE March 9, 1943

FROM: Base Services

COMMENT NO. 2

shipped crated and will require 77046.6 ship ton space.

3. Airplanes assigned for March and April are expected to be available by convoy as follows:

UG 6½ (Middle March)

P-38 - 49 - ship tons 1033.9
deck space 39200 sq.ft.
P-39 - 135 - ship tons 4806.0
A-36 - 58 - ship tons 3700.4
TOTAL - 242 PLANES, 9540.3 SHIP TONS
DECK SPACE - 39200 sq.ft.

UG 7 (Late March)

P-38 - 24 - ship tons 506.4
deck space 19200 sq.ft.
P-40 - 50 - ship tons 3230.0
A-36 - 18 - ship tons 1148.4
C-78 - 15 - ship tons 1708.5
TOTAL - 107 PLANES, 6593.3 SHIP TONS
DECK SPACE - 19200 sq.ft.

UG 7½ (Early April)

P-38 - 30 - ship tons 633.0
deck space 24000 sq.ft.
P-39 - 5 - ship tons 178.0
P-39N - 60 - ship tons 2136.0
P-40L - 50 - ship tons 3230.0
P-47D - 50 - ship tons 3390.0
A-36 - 51 - ship tons 3253.8
L-4B - 7 - ship tons 125.3
TOTAL - 253 PLANES, 12946.1 SHIP TONS
DECK SPACE - 24000 sq.ft.

UG 8 (Late April)

P-38 - 10 - ship tons 211.1
deck space 8000 sq.ft.
P-39 - 35 - ship tons 1246.0
P-39Q - 25 - ship tons 890.0
P-40L - 68 - ship tons 4392.8
A-36 - 45 - ship tons 2871.0
A-35 - 30 - ship tons 2868.0
C-78 - 15 - ship tons 1708.5
L-4B - 7 - ship tons 125.3
TOTAL - 235 PLANES, 14312.7 SHIP TONS
DECK SPACE - 8000 sq.ft.

4. Airplanes contemplated and allocated for May and June are expected to be available for shipment as follows (production schedule is too far ahead for accurate forecasting by individual convoys, although it is believed the entire May total will be ready for shipment on UG 8½ (Mid-May) and UG 9 (Late May):

May Estimate

P-38 - 70 - ship tons 1477.1
deck space 56000 sq.ft.
P-39 - 125 - ship tons 4450.0
P-47 - 10 - ship tons 678.0
P-51 - 15 - ship tons 957.0
P-51B - 60 - ship tons 3828.0
A-36 - 96 - ship tons 6124.8
A-35 - 30 - ship tons 2868.0
C-78 - 15 - ship tons 1708.5
L-4B - 14 - ship tons 250.6
TOTAL - 435 PLANES 22342.0 SHIP TONS
DECK SPACE - 56000 sq. ft.

June Estimate

P-38 - 150 - ship tons 3165.00
deck space 120,000 sq.ft.
P-39 - 87 - ship tons 3097.2
P-47 - 10 - ship tons 678.0
P-51 - 10 - ship tons 638.0
C-78 - 15 - ship tons 1708.5
A-36 - 93 - ship tons 5933.4
A-35 - 30 - ship tons 2868.0
L-4B - 14 - ship tons 250.6
TOTAL - 409 PLANES 18338.7 SHIP TONS
DECK SPACE - 120,000 sq.ft.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Shipment of Aircraft to North Africa.

TO: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4 DATE 3/9/43

FROM: Base Services. COMMENT NO. 2 (Cont'd)

5. (a) If the tankers continue sailing to North Africa from New York, it is expected the entire 333 P-38 airplanes can be deck-loaded on them. The success of a present flyaway project may result in 40 P-38 airplanes a month going flyaway to North Africa and correspondingly reducing the amount for water shipment by eighty (40 in May and 40 in June).

(b) No allocation was made by the theatre commander for shipping deck-loaded or crated aircraft on UG 6; the theatre commander allocated 7000 ship tons for crated aircraft only on UG 7. Arrangements were ultimately made by Transportation Division, Base Services, for 30 P-39 airplanes for the French to be loaded on UG 6½, and for the loading of the remainder of the crated aircraft available for UG 6½ and all those ready for UG 7, to go on UG 7.

(c) The only other allocation of space made by the theatre commander for future convoys is one of 4600 ship tons for crated aircraft on UG 8.

6. In addition to the 1681 airplanes above referred to for North Africa, 150 40 airplanes are expected to be shipped to Lagos during March and April, for assembly and flyaway delivery to the Middle East. Of these, 60 are being water-shipped in March and the remaining 90 the first half of April. Air Defense advises that no other shipments of fighter planes to the Middle East are contemplated until P-51B airplanes are available which will be late May or June at the earliest. These figures are quoted for information purposes as the Middle East commitments would have to be considered in case shipment of airplanes for North Africa were made via Lagos.

7. In order to use the facility at Lagos to its maximum, 100 airplanes a month will be shipped to Lagos regardless to which Air Force they are ultimately assigned. Should vessels be set up for Lagos during late April, May, and early June, 100 to 150 crated airplanes for the 12th Air Force could be shipped to Lagos for assembly during that period and the requirements for space on convoys 8, 8½, 9 and 9½ correspondingly reduced.

8. There are 700 gliders set up for shipment to 12th Air Force prior to May 31. Four hundred of these are set up in space reserved on UG 8.

9. If there is no change in the priority now enjoyed by airplanes and gliders in the shipping program, all projected shipments can be accomplished as scheduled. This has been informally concurred in by Water Division, Transportation Corps, SOS.

10. The above is, of course, all subject to the availability of airplanes at the port of embarkation by the dates contemplated.

Incl. n/c

L. P. WHITTEN
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.

3-1109 A.F.

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IMMEDIATE ACTION

1745

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington

February 26, 1943

TO: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4

SUBJECT: Shipment of Aircraft to North Africa

1. There are now nine fighter Groups in the 12th Air Force, with a total TBA aircraft strength of 975 airplanes. Some of the airplanes destined for these Groups are still in the United Kingdom, however.

2. On the basis of 30 per cent attrition per month, approximately 200 fighters must be shipped each month to maintain the strength of fighter units. Additional aircraft are required to maintain observation and photographic units equipped with fighter type aircraft.

3. The Director of Air Defense has indicated that during the next few months, a large number of fighter aircraft over and above normal loss replacements will be shipped to the 12th Air Force.

4. The Director of Air Support has indicated that during the next few months some 180 A-36 type aircraft will also be shipped to the 12th Air Force by water.

5. There is every reason to believe that during the next few months a considerable number of airplanes will be shipped by water to northwest Africa to equip air units of the French army.

6. All in all, it would appear reasonable to anticipate that somewhere between 450 and 500 fighter and dive bomber airplanes will have to be shipped to north Africa monthly during the next few months to build up and support the 12th Air Force and French army air units. Past experience hardly warrants an assumption that sufficient space will be made available on UGS convoys for the movement of any such number of airplanes each month.

Q. M. C. Form 336 (Old Form 403)
Approved December 1, 1925

O—2—8424 GPO

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7. It is requested that you investigate the possibility of shipping aircraft by vessels other than the normal cargo and tanker vessels of UGS convoys. It is suggested that consideration be given to shipments to Gulf of Guinea ports for erection in the Gulf area and flight delivery to the theater. The utilization of Dakar instead of Lagos (and the relative vulnerability of the respective shipping routes) are pertinent questions.

Max F. Schneider

MAX F. SCHNEIDER
Colonel, G. S. C.

Copy: General Dunton
General Farthing
Major Carter
Major Ettenger

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234

HEADQUARTERS A[redacted]RCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECURITY

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	65-S

SUBJECT: Designated Units available for Movement to North Africa.

TO: Base Services

DATE March 2, 1943

FROM: Program Planning

COMMENT NO. 1

RHK:cj 73085

Confirmation of the stated availability of the following units is desired:

April 15th

77th Service Squadron
80th Service Squadron
81st Service Squadron

1989th QM Truck Co, Avn
2029th QM Truck Co, Avn
2035th QM Truck Co, Avn
2036th QM Truck Co, Avn
2037th QM Truck Co, Avn
2038th QM Truck Co, Avn
2041st QM Truck Co, Avn
2042nd QM Truck Co, Avn
2043rd QM Truck Co, Avn

177th QM Co, Service Group

1101st Ord Co, Avn (AB)
1102nd Ord Co, Avn (AB)

85th Signal Co, Service Group

1726th Ord MM Co, Avn (Q)
1793rd Ord MM Co, Avn (Q)
1795th Ord MM Co, Avn (Q)
1797th Ord MM Co, Avn (Q)

June 1st

46th Air Depot Gp, Hq & Hq Sq
46th Repair Squadron
46th Supply Squadron
446th QM Plat AD Group
1688th Ord MM Co, Avn (Q)
2465th QM Truck Co, Avn
47th Medical Supply Plat, Avn

Received from Program Planning at 5:10 P.M. March 11, 1943

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18

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECURITY

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	65-S

SUBJECT: Designated Units available for Movement to North Africa.

TO: Base Services

DATE March 2, 1943

FROM: Program Planning

COMMENT NO. 1 (Cont'd)
RBS:ej 73085

August 1st

1192nd Military Police Co, Avn
1193rd Military Police Co, Avn
1194th Military Police Co, Avn
1195th Military Police Co, Avn
1196th Military Police Co, Avn
1197th Military Police Co, Avn
1198th Military Police Co, Avn
1199th Military Police Co, Avn
1200th Military Police Co, Avn
1201st Military Police Co, Avn
1202nd Military Police Co, Avn

ARMY I. MOORE,
Colonel, G.S.C.

TO: Program Planning.

DATE March 2, 1943

FROM: Base Services.

COMMENT NO. 2.
RBS-6-A/RLC:esg/72371

1. The availability dates of units listed above are hereby confirmed.

L. P. WHITTEN,
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army.

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BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S. G-3 DIV
3/20/43 ACL
SECURITY

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-20-43)

March 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Movement of Unit to United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That memorandum, this office, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Services of Supply, dated March 15, 1943, Subject: Movement of Units to United Kingdom, listing units for service in the United Kingdom, be changed as follows:

Readiness date for unit listed below changed from May 1, 1943 to April 5, 1943.

Unit

380th Bomb Gp (H)

To Central Files. Action complete. This unit deleted by letter amendment 4/8/43 320

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

Returned to files by Lt. Brannen.
APR 21 '43 AM

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FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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3/18/43 HCC

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

OPD 370.5 TF (3-17-43)

March 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY GROUND FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That directives for the movement of units to North Africa be amended as indicated in the following paragraphs.

2. Destinations of units listed in paragraph 1 of memorandum, this office, dated March 13, 1943, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Services of Supply, Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa. (List 8-A), OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43), are as follows:

CENTER TASK FORCE

2043d QM Co (Trk) (Avn)

WESTERN TASK FORCE

Remaining units listed in paragraph 1

3. Destinations of units listed in paragraph 1 of memorandum, this office, dated March 13, 1943, addressed to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa. (List 8-B), OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43), are as follows:

CENTER TASK FORCE

105th Sta Hosp (500 bed)
80th Sta Hosp (500 bed)
81st Sta Hosp (500 bed)
255th QM Bn (Serv)
Hq & Hq Co, Military Rwy Serv
759th Engr Bn (Rwy Opns)
719th Engr Bn (Rwy Opns)
11th Fld Hosp
379th MP Co (Esc Cd)
715th Engr Bn (Rwy Opns)

APR 1 '43 PM

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FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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OPD 370.5 TF (3-17-43) March 17, 1943.

Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa.

704th Engr Hq & Hq Co Rwy Gr Div
235th Ord Co (Bomb Disp)
701st Engr Hq & Hq Co Rwy Gr Div
338th Engr Regt (GS)

WESTERN TASK FORCE

13th Repl Bn
4th Bn, 301st Ord Base Regt (Amm & Sup)
92d Cml Co (Comp)
33d Repl Bn
29th Repl Bn
30th Repl Bn
31st Repl Bn

a. Add the following units to paragraph 1 of above memorandum.

CENTER TASK FORCE

236th Ord Co (Bomb Disp), Responsible Agency SOS

WESTERN TASK FORCE

2d Bn, 302d Ord Base Regt (Amm & Sup), Responsible Agency SOS, (WDC)

4. Destinations of units listed in paragraph 1 of memorandum, this office, dated March 13, 1943, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply, Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa. (List 8-C), OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43), are as follows:

CENTER TASK FORCE

94th Ord Co (MM)
3d Cml Bn (Mtz) (Less Co C)
630th CA Bn (AA) (AW) (Mob)
305th QM Co (Rhd)
3d Bn, 27th QM Regt (Trk) (Less Cos M & I)
376th Engr Bn (Sep)
41st Cml Co (Lab)
Hq & Hq Btry, 44th CA Brig (AA)
Hq & Hq Btry, 35th CA Brig (AA)
Hq & Hq Btry, 107th CA Gp (Gun)
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th CA Gp (Gun)
83d Cml Bn (Mtz)
337th Engr Regt (GS)
214th CA Bn (AA) (Gun)
403d CA Bn (AA) (Gun)

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OPD 370.5 TF (3-17-43) March 17, 1943.

Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa.

230th QM Co (Salv Coll)
Co C, 64th QM Bn (Ldry)
48th QM Co (Graves Reg) (Less 1 Plat)
Co C, 301st QM Bn (Ster)
167th CA Bn (AA) (Gun) (SM)
84th Cml Bn (Mtz)
206th Sig Co (Dep)
261st Ord Co (MM) (AA)
8th Ord Co (MM)
410th CA Bn (AA) (Gun)
232d QM Co (Salv Coll)
Hq & Hq Btry, 9th CA AA AW Gp
435th CA Bn (AA) (AW) (Mob)
640th Engr Co (Cam) (Sep)
Co, 85th Engr Bn (Hv Pont)
Co B, 301st QM Bn (Ster)
Cos A & B, 302d QM Bn (Ster)
57th QM Co (Sales Comm)
36th Med Bn (Amb) (Mtr) (Less Co A)
24th Cml Co (Decon)
25th Cml Co (Decon)
26th Cml Co (Decon)
476th Ord Co (Evac) (As Casuals)
477th Ord Co (Evac) (As Casuals)
Co D, 468th QM Regt (Trk)
201st CA Bn (AA) (AW) (Mob)

APR 1 '43 PM

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AG - AAB

WESTERN TASK FORCE

Co A, 249th QM Bn (Serv)
Co C, 62d QM Bn (Ldry)
209th QM Bn (Gas Sup) (Less Co D)
38th Ord Co (MM)
223d QM Co (Salv Rep)
30th Sig Bn (Const)
28th Ord Co (MM)
378th Engr Bn (Sep)
386th Engr Bn (Sep)
53d Cml Co (Impreg)
52d Cml Co (Impreg)
21st Cml Co (Impreg) (Less 1 Plat)

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

- 3 -

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

DATE MAR 9 1943

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

DISPOSITION FORM

FILE NOS.

SUBJECT: Airborne Engineer Avn Bns for Australia.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF of the ARMY AIR FORCES 3/9/43 WDC INITIALS

SEND TO		FOR					
	OSW		ACTION		COORDINATION		INFORMATION		S/W DIRECTS
	USW		APPROVAL		FILING		INVESTIGATION		SIGNATURE
	ASW		COMMENT		FORWARDING		NOTE & RETURN		
	ASWA		CONCURRENCE		INDORSEMENT		RECOMMENDATION		
	C/S								
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	AGF								
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	G-3								
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X	OPD								
	TAG								
	JAG								
	IG								
	SG								
	L&L								
	BOWD								
	BPR								

RNT:ese 73085

1. Directive authorizing the movement of two (2) Airborne Engineer Aviation Battalions to Australia, OPD 320.2 AUS (10-29-42) dated Nov. 4, 1942, stated that these units were to move at strength and with equipment indicated by WD letter AGO 320.2 (8-25-42) MR-M-AF, dated Aug. 25, 1942, Subject: "Constitution and Activation of 871st Airborne Engineer Aviation Battalions," as amended by AG 320.2 (9-11-42) MR-M-AF, dated Sept. 16, 1942, same subject.

2. The tentative T/O and special list of equipment has been replaced by T/O 5-455, Feb. 15, 1943 which has been approved by the WD. The approved T/O provides for an augmentation of strength from twenty-nine (29) officers and four hundred and eighty-seven (487) enlisted men to thirty (30) officers and five hundred and sixteen (516) enlisted men with the required increase in equipment.

3. It is desired that directive to move the 871st and 872nd Airborne Engineer Aviation Battalions to Australia be amended to authorize the augmentation of strength and additional equipment required under T/O 5-455, Feb. 15, 1943.

4. An immediate disposition of this proposal is requested in order to effect the changes necessary prior to the scheduled movement date, April 1, 1943, set for these units.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Incl. - T/O in dup.

MAR 9 A.M.

IN OPD WDGS

John B. Cooley,

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

21

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BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S., OPD

3/15/43 MDC
Date Initials

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-15-43)

March 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That necessary action be taken to prepare the units listed below for service in the United Kingdom and to move them to the port of embarkation designated by the Commanding General, Services of Supply at the proper time.

Unit	Responsible Agency
70th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
78th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
82d Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
100th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
312th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services)	AAF
1108th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1109th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1110th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1060th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1061st MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1062d MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1063d MP Co (Avn)	AAF
1064th MP Co (Avn)	AAF
806th Cml Co Air Opns	AAF
869th Cml Co Air Opns	AAF
879th Cml Co Air Opns	AAF
850th Engr Bn (Avn)	AAF
851st Engr Bn (Avn)	AAF
862d Engr Bn (Avn)	AAF
351st Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
379th Bomb Gp (H)	AAF
52d Fighter Control Sq	AAF
55th Dep Sup Sq	AAF
8th AAF Combat Camera Unit	AAF
Hq & Hq Sq, 20th Bomb Wing	AAF

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

22

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OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-15-43) SECURITY March 15, 1943.

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

2. Units will move at T/O strength and with T/BA or T/E equipment as applicable, with modifications applicable to this theater.

3. The above units with their organic equipment will be prepared for movement to the port of embarkation not later than April 5, 1943. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces will report to Operations Division, W.D.G.S. when the flight echelons of the above units are prepared to move to the United Kingdom.

4. The Commanding General, Services of Supply will: -

a. Inform those concerned as to designation of the port.

b. Furnish transportation for the movement.

c. Make the overseas movement to the United Kingdom based on priority to be furnished separately.

5. Above units are included in the six months' troop projection list.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	259
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa. SECURITY

TO: War Organization and Movement

DATE March 19,1943

FROM: Program Planning

COMMENT NO. 1
JWB:ese 3753

For your information and necessary action.

Incl. - Memo OPD 370.5 TF (3-17-43) dtd 3-17-43.

A. L. MOORE,
Colonel, G. S. C.

TO: Program Planning. (Col Baylor)

Date: March 26, 1943
Comment No. 2
DLP/vmf - 5238

FROM: War Organization and Movement.

Action has been taken in compliance with paragraph 2, attached Memorandum from OPD, March 17, 1943, Subject "Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa."

F. W. EVANS,
Brig.Gen.,USA,
Dir/W O & M.

1 Incl.
No change.

TO: Central Files

DATE: April 5, 1943

FROM: AC/AS, O C & R, Theatre Branch

COMMENT NO. 3
NCO:jmt 5009

No further action necessary. Inclosures withdrawn before reaching this office.

O. P. WEYLAND,
Colonel, Air Corps

23

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET [redacted] SECRET

TALLY NO.	258
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Movement of Units to North Africa. (List 8-A) SECURITY

DATE March 19,1943

TO: War Organization and Movement

FROM: Program Planning

COMMENT NO. 1
JWB:ese 3753

For your information and necessary action.

A. L. MOORE,
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl.- Memo OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43)
dtd 3-13-43.

TO: Program Planning. (Col. Bayler)

Date: March 26, 1943
Comment No. 2
DLP/vmf - 5238

FROM: War Organization and Movement.

Movement orders are being issued as directed in the attached Memorandum from OPD, WDGS, March 13, 1943, Subject "Movement of Units to North Africa." (List 8-A).

for
F. W. EVANS,
Brig.Gen.,USA,
Dir/W O & M.

1 Incl.
No change.

TO: Central Files

DATE: April 5, 1943

FROM: AC/AS, O C & R, Theatre Branch

Comment No. 3
WNCO:jmt 5009

No further action necessary. Inclosures withdrawn before reaching this office.

J. W. Bayler
O. P. WEYLAND,
Colonel, Air Corps

24

SECURITY [redacted]

3-1109 A F.

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257

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/22/93 HCC

SECURITY

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-15-43)

March 22, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That memorandum, this office, dated March 15, 1943, above subject, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces listing units for movement to the port of embarkation not later than May 1, 1943 be amended as follows:

Add the following units to paragraph 1:

HQ & HQ Sq	4th Air Defense Wing,	Responsible Agency - AAF
HQ & HQ Sq	5th Air Defense Wing,	Responsible Agency - AAF
	50th Fighter Control Sq,	Responsible Agency - AAF

2. Above units are included in the six months' troop projection list.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

To Central Files
Action completed
4/23/43 DHP

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AG - A&P

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SECURITY

Returned to files
by H. Branner.
4-23-43

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/25/43 HCL

OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43)

March 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa.
(List 8-A)

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That memorandum, this office, dated March 13, 1943, above subject, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, as amended on March 17, 1943 by memorandum for the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa, OPD 370.5 TF (3-17-43); March 20 and 22, 1943, be further amended as follows:

Delete the following unit from paragraph 1:

906th Sig Co (Dep) (Avn), Responsible Agency - AAF

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/22/43 HCC.

OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43)

March 22, 1943.

APR 1 '43 PM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa.
(List 8-A)

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That memorandum, this office, dated March 13, 1943, above subject, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, as amended on March 17, 1943 by memorandum for the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa, OPD 370.5 TF (3-17-43), and March 20, 1943 be further amended as follows:

Add the following unit to paragraph 1:

2496th QM Co (Trk) (Avn), Responsible Agency - AAF

2. That the destination of above unit is Western Task Force.

3. That readiness dates set forth in paragraph 4c of original directive apply to unit listed above.

4. That above unit is not included in the six months' troop projection list.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

Above complied
3/23 BDD

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S. OPD
3/20/43 HCC

SECURITY

OPD 370.5 TF (3-13-43)

March 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Movement of Units to North Africa.
(List 8-A)

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That memorandum, this office, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, dated March 13, 1943, above subject, as amended on March 17, 1943 by memorandum for the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, dated March 17, 1943, Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to North Africa, OPD 370.5 TF (3-17-43), be further amended as follows:

Add the following unit to paragraph 1:

For WTF: 302d Sig Co, Wing, Responsible Agency - AAF

0264 CCC

Action completed
3/22 PM

ADJ 1 '43 PM

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THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

28

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368

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES [redacted]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	7-4/120
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Designation of a Control Depot.

TO: Program Planning

DATE Feb. 25, 1943

FROM: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4

COMMENT NO. 2
WMK/fmv 74380

1. It is recommended that no immediate action be taken on the first indorsement of the attached letter in view of the memorandum from General Hanley, copy of which is attached hereto.

2. Since both Puerto Rico and Trinidad are stop over points of the South Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command, it will be necessary to wait for recommendations from the Air Service Command before taking any final action.

3. In connection with this correspondence see R&R forwarded to your office this date subject, "Service Personnel in the Puerto Rican-Trinidad Area".

RICHARD H. BALLARD
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl n/c
1 added
1 ltr fm Gen. Hanley
2-22-43

TO: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4

DATE March 5, 1943

FROM: Program Planning

Comment No. 3
LBP:mcr-5324

1. After a thorough study of the attached correspondence, the conclusion has been reached that no action is required by Program Planning.

2. It is requested that an appropriate reply be made by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4, to the basic communication.

3. A letter received this date from the Sixth Air Force, in connection with this matter, is being added to this R&R as an inclosure. Request that an appropriate reply likewise be made to this later communication.

A. L. MOORE
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl n/c
1 added
Ltr, dtd 2-17-43
Subj: "Air Depots, Trinidad and Puerto Rico"

29

Copy in Central File - See 2d Ind to CG Air Service Command 3/16/43

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268

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Designation of a Control Depot.

TO: A-4, Assistant Chief of Staff

DATE

FROM: Program Planning

COMMENT NO. 1

LBP/mcr/5324

1. For remarks and recommendation.

2. According to the records of this office, the following Air Depots have been officially established by the War Department:

AIR DEPOT	LOCATION
Duncan	Duncan Field, San Antonio, Texas
McClellan	McClellan Field, Alabama
Mobile	Mobile, Alabama
Ogden	Hill Field, Utah
Olmsted	Middletown, Penn.
Rome	Rome, New York
Albrook	Albrook Field, Panama
Hickam	Hickam Field, Hawaii
Nichols	Hawaii
Warner Robins	Warner Robins, Georgia
Oklahoma City	Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma
Fairfield	Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
San Bernardino	Morrow Field, San Bernardino, California
Alaskan	Ladd Field, Alaska
Sacramento	Sacramento, California
Spokane	Spokane, Washington

3. The following is a list of locations of all existing Air Depot Groups:

DEPOT GROUP	LOCATION
1	Panama
2	United Kingdom
3	India
4	Australia
5	United Kingdom
6	Alaska
7	United Kingdom
8	Accra, Gold Coast, Africa
9	United Kingdom
10	United Kingdom

Security

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

268

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Designation of a Control Depot.

TO: A-4, Assistant Chief of Staff

FROM: Program Planning

DATE

COMMENT NO. 1

LBP/mcr/5324

DEPOT GROUP (Cont.)		LOCATION
11		North Africa
12		(On Movement to Australia)
13		New Caledonia
14		Duncan Field, Texas
15		Duncan Field, Texas
16		Duncan Field, Texas
17		Middle East
18		Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
19		Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
20		North Africa
21		United Kingdom
22		Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
23		Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
24		Trinidad
25		Puerto Rico
26		Middle East
27		Australia
*28	(Repair Sq. Only)	(On movement to New Caledonia)
29		Brookley Field, Alabama
30		Hill Field, Utah
31		Hill Field, Utah
32		Hill Field, Utah
33		Hill Field, Utah
34		(On movement to North Africa)
35		McClellan Field, Alabama
36		North Africa
37		North Africa
38		(On Movement to North Africa)
**39	(Engine Overhaul section of Rpr. Sq) only	" " "
40		Middletown, Penn.
41		Duncan Field, Texas
42		Duncan Field, Texas
43		Duncan Field, Texas
44		Duncan Field, Texas
45		Duncan Field, Texas
46		Duncan Field, Texas
47		Duncan Field, Texas
48		Duncan Field, Texas
49		Duncan Field, Texas

*Remainder of unit in Brookley, Ala.
** Remainder of unit in Alaska

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268

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	1120
FILE NO.	[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Designation of a Control Depot.

TO: A-4, Assistant Chief of Staff

DATE

FROM: Program Planning

COMMENT NO. 1
LBP/mcr/5324

DEPOT GROUP (Cont)		LOCATION
50		Duncan Field, Texas
51		Duncan Field, Texas
52		Duncan Field, Texas
53		Duncan Field, Texas
54		Duncan Field, Texas
55		Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
56		Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
57		Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio
58		Middletown, Penn.
59		Middletown, Penn.
60		Hill Field, Utah
61		Hill Field, Utah
62		Hill Field, Utah
63		Hill Field, Utah
64		Hill Field, Utah
65		Brookley Field, Alabama
66		Brookley Field, Alabama
67		Brookley Field, Alabama
68		Brookley Field, Alabama
69		Brookley Field, Alabama
70		Brookley Field, Alabama
*71		Brookley Field, Alabama
*72		Brookley Field, Alabama
*73		Brookley Field, Alabama
*74		Brookley Field, Alabama
*75		Brookley Field, Alabama
*76		McClellan Field, Alabama
*77		McClellan Field, Alabama
*78		McClellan Field, Alabama
*79		McClellan Field, Alabama
80		India
81		Australia
82	(Hqs & Hqs Sq)	Middle East
	(Repair Sq.	India
	(Supply Sq.	India

Well for LBP

A. L. MOORE
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl: Ltr dtd 12-11-42,
w/1 Ind.

* Affiliated Only

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECURITY

267

TALLY NO.

FILE NO.

SUBJECT: Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Avn) (Q) for USAFICA.

TO: Base Services

DATE FEB 20

FROM: Program Planning

COMMENT NO. 1

NOO:ese 5009

Re attached memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, it is requested that the telephonic information (17 Feb 43) designating the required unit as the 1785th Ord MM Co Avn (Q) be confirmed and that a statement be appended, hereto, indicating the probable capability of the subject unit to accomplish its primary mission in accordance with current WD policy on May 1, 1943, the proposed date of movement.

A. L. MOORE,
Colonel, G.S.C.

Incl. - Ltr,
OPD 320.2 Africa (1-27-43)
dtd 2-15-43.

TO: Program Planning.

DATE: MAR 3 1943

FR Base Services.

COMMENT NO. 2

RBS-9/WEM:eh/71596
AAF 320.21

1. Information received in this office from Ordnance Officer, Air Service Command (Major Bryson) states that the 1785th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company Aviation (Q) will be able to accomplish its primary mission on May 1, 1943.

Incl: n/c

for L. P. WHITTEN,
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

30

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SECURITY [redacted] 267
BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S, OPD

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

2-15-43 RL

OPD 320.2 Africa (1-27-43) February 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Avn)(Q) for USAFICA.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That you take the necessary action to designate the following for overseas service with U. S. Army Forces in Central Africa, unit to be ready for such service by May 1, 1943:

UNIT	STRENGTH O	EM
One (1) Ordnance MM Company (Avn)(Q) (T/O 10-487, dated July 1, 1942)	2	46

a. The above unit is within the Army Air Forces allotment under the current troop basis.

b. A movement directive covering the above unit will issue from this Division as soon as it is reasonably certain that the necessary shipping at the projected date of readiness will be available.

c. The above unit is not included in the list of units required for overseas service, projected six months into the future (to June 1943), furnished your Headquarters by this Division.

THOS. T. HANDY
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff

J. E. UPSTON
[illegible], Executive Group, OPD, G.S.

ARCHIVES
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A.G.O. - WAR DEPT.
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261

Diversion of Air Depot Groups.

Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, Program Planning — Mar. 16, 1943

War Organization and Movement. 2

JWT:ie 5238

Warning orders have been issued on the units listed in comment 1.

F. W. EVANS,
Brig. Gen, U.S.A.
Dir., W. O. & M.

TO: Air Adjutant — Date March 17, 1943

FROM: Program Planning — Comment No. 3
WOC:ese 5009

For filing.

A. L. MOORE,
Colonel, G. S. C.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SECURITY

261

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Diversion of Air Depot Groups.

TO: War Organization and Movement DATE 3-9-43 1943

FROM: Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, Program Planning. COMMENT NO. 1
JWB:mls 3753

1. Colonel Lee, OPD, is preparing a Directive to accomplish the following changes:

a. Divert the 19th Air Depot Group from April 1, U. K. to April 1, North Africa movement.

b. Divert the 46th Air Depot Group from June - North Africa to June U. K. movement.

2. The Air Depot Groups listed above will be shipped as shown below:

19th Air Depot Group
Hq & Hq Sq
19th Repair Sq.
19th Supply Sq.
19th Med. Supply Plat (Avn)
1706th Ord MM Co Avn (Q)
419th QM Plat Air Depot Gp.
2471 QM Trk. Co, Avn

46th Air Depot Group
Hq & Hq Sq
46th Repair Sq.
46th Supply Sq.
47th Med. Supply Plat (Avn)
446th QM Plat. Air Depot Gp.

3. It is requested that suitable priorities for personnel and equipment be established and that the necessary warning orders be issued.

AUBREY L. MOORE
Colonel, G. S. C.

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272

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S., OPD
1/19/43 HAC
Date Initials

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (12-22-42)

January 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

That memorandum, this office, dated December 22, 1942, above subject, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Services of Supply, listing units for movement from home stations by February 2, 1943, OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (12-22-42), be amended as follows:

Delete the Following:

Unit	Responsible Agency	
308th Bomb Gp (H) (less Flight Ech)	AAF	05287

Add the Following:

Det, Hq & Hq Sq, European Wing ATC (18 officers, 154 enlisted men)	AAF	94498

Adm Confidential
Central Files
WAT
27 Jan 1943

O.K. for Central Files

RECEIVED
JAN 27 1943
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C.B. Ferenbaugh

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

SECURITY

1-23-43.
Duplicate copy obtained from Col Bayless (AFDPD)

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271

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

1/11/43 WDB

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (1-19-43)

January 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY:

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That necessary action be taken to prepare the units listed below for service in the United Kingdom and to move them to the port of embarkation designated by the Commanding General, Services of Supply at the proper time.

OK for Central files ? IR

Units	Responsible Agency
Hq & Hq Sq, 14th Bomb Wing	AAF
2nd Bomb Group (H)	AAF
80th Fighter Group (SE)	AAF
859th Engr Bn, Avn (Sep)	AAF
861st Engr Bn, Avn (Sep)	AAF
1059th Military Police Co, Avn	AAF
1st Service Group, Hq & Hq Sq	AAF
5th Service Squadron	AAF
17th Service Squadron	AAF
66th Sig Co Serv Group	AAF
1065th Ord Co (Avn) AB	AAF
1929th QM Co Truck	AAF
1096th QM Co Truck	AAF
1754th Ord MM Co Avn (Q)	AAF
1755th Ord MM Co Avn (Q)	AAF
151st QM Co Serv Group	AAF
138th Signal Radio Intel Co	AAF
445th Signal Bn Constr Avn	AAF
330th Signal Co Wing	AAF
327th Signal Co Wing	AAF
14th Replacement Control Depot	AAF
14th Photo Recn Sq	AAF

427 Col Hubbard OK Baylor 1/23/43

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2. Units will move at T/O strength and with T/BA equipment with modifications applicable to this theater.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

1-23-43 Duplicate copy delivered to Col Baylor (AFDPC)

- 1 -

Central File WDI 27 Jan 1943

Action completed

SECURITY

34

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271

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (1-19-43) 1-19-43.

"Movement of Units to the United Kingdom"

3. All units listed above will be prepared to leave home stations by February 20, 1943.

4. The Commanding General, Services of Supply will: -

a. Inform those concerned as to designation of the port.

b. Furnish transportation for the movement.

c. Make the overseas movement based on priority to be furnished separately.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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273

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

FILE
NOS

DATE MAR 26 1943

DISPOSITION FORM

3/26/43 gsc

SUBJECT: Amendment No. 1 to "Sched of Units to all Theaters Feb. 20, 1943 thru Aug. 31, 1943

SEND TO		FOR							
	OSW		ACTION		COORDINATION		INFORMATION		S/W DIRECTS
	USW		APPROVAL		FILING		INVESTIGATION		SIGNATURE
	ASW		COMMENT		FORWARDING		NOTE & RETURN		
	ASWA		CONCURRENCE		INDORSEMENT		RECOMMENDATION		
	G/S								
	Sec G/S								
	AGF								
	SOS								
	G-1								
	G-2								
	G-3								
	G-4								
x	OPD								
	TAG								
	JAG								
	IG								
	SG								
	L&L								
	BOWD								
	BPR								

BFC:faw 73085

1. Attached is a list of unit changes which have taken place since publication of the "Schedule of Units to all Theaters February 20, 1943 thru August 31, 1943 (revised)".

2. The indicated corrections should be made on the original list.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

John B. Cooley

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Incls:
3 Cpys, Amend. No. 1

MAR 27 '43 PM

(N)
OPD WDGS

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273

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AI[illegible] DEFENSE NO. [illegible]
SCHEDULE OF [illegible] NING TO ALL [illegible] CHANGES
[illegible] 20, 19[illegible] THRU AUG. [illegible], 19[illegible]

[illegible] OF [illegible] D NINGHOM

The following units will be [illegible]ed.

MAY

380th Bomb Gp ([illegible]d)
1775th Q.M. [illegible]. Avn (Q)

JUNE

328th Sig Bn Avn (less 1 Co)

The following units will be [illegible]

APRIL

380th Bomb Gp (H) (to go April)
1775th Q.M. [illegible]. Avn (Q)

MAY

Hq & Hq Sq, 4th Air Defense Wg — AO 1-550.2, dated 1[illegible]6-42, 53 Off - 188 EM
Hq & Hq Sq, 5th Air Defense Wg — AO 1-550.1 dated 1[illegible]6-42, 53 Off - 188 EM
50th Fighter Control Sq — AO 1-47, dated 1[illegible]1-42, 24 Off - 222 EM

JULY

78th Airdrome Sq — AO 1-4878, dated 10-15-42, 12 Off - 270 EM
79th Airdrome Sq — AO 1-4878, dated 10-15-42, 12 Off - 270 EM
80th Airdrome Sq — AO 1-4878, dated 10-15-42, 12 Off - 270 EM
81st Airdrome Sq — AO 1-4878, dated 10-15-42, 12 Off - 270 EM

[illegible] AFRICA

The following unit will be add[illegible]

APRIL 15

1102nd Ord Co Avn (AB)

- 1 -

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274

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/25/43 HLL

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-25-43)

March 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That memorandums this office, directing the movement of units to the United Kingdom be amended as indicated in the following paragraphs.

2. That memorandum, this office, dated December 22, 1942, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom, listing units for movement from home stations by January 20, 1943, be amended as follows:

Delete the following units from paragraph 1:

1922d QM Co (Trk) (Avn), Responsible Agency - AAF
1946th QM Co (Trk) (Avn), Responsible Agency - AAF

3. That memorandum, this office, dated January 19, 1943, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom, listing units for movement from home stations by March 1, 1943, as amended on January 25 and 28, 1943, be further amended as follows:

Delete the following units from paragraph 1:

1929th QM Co (Trk) (Avn), Responsible Agency - AAF
1906th QM Co (Trk) (Avn), Responsible Agency - AAF

Change the following unit in paragraph 1 to read as follows:

80th Fighter Gp (SE) (Plus initial month's attrition),
Responsible Agency - AAF

RECEIVED
MAR 27 1943
AAF

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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276

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit (3-25-43) March 25, 1943.

Subject: Amendment to Directives for Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

4. That memorandum, this office, dated March 15, 1943, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom, listing units for movement to the port of embarkationnot later than May 1, 1943, as amended on March 20 and 22, 1943, be further amended as follows:

Change the following units in paragraph 1 to read as follows:

35th AD Gp (w/Associated Services) (Less QM Co (Trk) (Avn), Ord Co (MM) (Avn) (Q) and Med Sup Plat (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF
63d Serv Gp (w/Associated Services) (Less 2 QM Cos (Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF
83d Serv Gp (w/Associated Services(Less 2 QM Cos (Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agnecy - AAF
79th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services) (Less 2 QM Cos Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF
348th Fighter Gp (SE) (Plus initial month's attrition), Responsible Agency - AAF
353d Fighter Gp (SE) (Plus initial month's attrition), Responsible Agency - AAF

5. That memorandum, this office, dated March 15, 1943, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom, listing units for movement to the port of embarkation not later than April 5, 1943, be amended as follows:

Change the following units in paragraph 1 to read as follows:

70th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services) (Less 2 QM Cos (Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF
78th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services) (Less 2 QM Cos (Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF
100th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services(Less 2 QM Cos (Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF
312th Serv Gp (w/Associated Services) (Less 2 QM Cos (Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF
82d Serv Gp (w/Associated Services) (Less 2004th QM Co (Trk) (Avn)), Responsible Agency - AAF

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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193

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF — AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S., OPD
DISPOSITION FORM
OPERATIONS DIVISION

Date 26 June 43 Initials

SECURITY

AG
~~EX~~ OPD 381 Sec (26 Jun 43)

SUBJECT Movement of Units to UK.

Date 26 June 43

TO	___ C/S	___ G-1	___ G-2	___ G-3	___ G-4	___ Air Staff	
	___ TAG	___ OPD	___ USW	___ ASW	___ ASWA	___ CG	___ Army
	___ AC	___ BLP	___ BOWD	___ ExRA	___ NGB	___ CG	___ Army Corps
	___ INF	___ FA	___ CAV	___ CA	___ ENGR	___ CG	___ CA
	___ ORD	___ QMG	___ CSO	___ SG	___ FIN	___ CG	___ DEPT
	___ GHQ	___ JAG	___ CWS	___ IG	___ B/PR	X CG AAF	
FOR	___ S/W directs	___ Comment or Concurrence				___ Necessary action	
	___ Draft of reply	___ Remark and recommendation				___ Information for reply	
	___ Direct reply	___ Inviting attention to				___ Ind. approved	
	___ Approved	___ See notation of _____				___ Primary interest	
	___ Disapproved	___ Information				___ Notation and return	
	___ File	___ Consult _____				___ Noted _____	
BY	___ Spcl Msgr	___ Radio	___ Air Mail		___ Immed. Action Ltr	___ Letter. . . .	

1. Reference is made to:

a. Memorandum for the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces, from OPD, dated 22 June, 1943, OPD 381 Sec (19 Jun 43), subject as above.

b. Disposition form to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, from OPD, dated 25 June 1943, OPD 381 Sec (25 Jun 43), subject as above.

2. Paragraph 2 of Reference a. is changed to read as follows:

"2. In view of the urgency for these units in the UK, the highest priority is established for the transport of 19 officers, 80 Enlisted Men, 12,000 pounds (750 cubic feet) of equipment by air from Newfoundland and the United States to the UK. All services and maintenance personnel necessary for the operation of the flight echelons will be furnished by the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations until complete ground echelons arrive in UK."

By order of the Chief of Staff:

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

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CHARLES W. McCARTHY,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief, Liaison Section,
Secretary, OPD, G. S.

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286

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BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S. OPD

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

4 May 43 FB
Date Initials

OPD 452.6 (6-3-43)

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES.

Subject: Glider Shipments to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

That paragraph "1" of Memorandum to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and Commanding General, Army Service Forces, May 28, 1943, subject as above, be changed to read as follows:

"That such action be taken as necessary for the procurement and shipment of eleven hundred (1100) CG-4A gliders to the European Theater of Operations; four hundred (400) of which to arrive as soon as possible and not later than August 1, 1943; the balance of seven hundred (700) to arrive in the theater prior to September 30, 1943. **The shipment of these gliders will not displace high priority Air Force shipments.**"

For file.
6/26/43.
Action taken as directed.
WDGS, OPD, informed of same by memo. for WDGS, OPD, dated June 23, 1943, subject: as above.
William H. Baldwin
1st Lt. AC
Office of Special Asst. Glider Program

J. E. HULL,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

38

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S, OPD
5-28-43 (Date) JWB (Initials)

OPD 452.6 (5-26-43) May 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Glider Shipments to United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

1. That such action be taken as necessary for the procurement and shipment of twenty-two hundred (2200) CG-4A gliders to the European Theater of Operations; four hundred (400) of which to arrive as soon as possible, not later than 1 August, 1943; seven hundred (700) to arrive prior to 30 September, 1943; not to exceed nine hundred (900) to arrive prior to 31 December, 1943, and the remainder to arrive prior to 1 April, 1944.

2. That Operations Division, War Department General Staff, be advised from time to time as above shipments are made.

For file
6/26/43
For action taken
See notation on
Memo. to CG, AAF,
Subject: as above,
dated June 4, 1943.
William H Baldwin
1st Lt. AC
Office, Special
Asst. 1 Gliders
Program

J. E. HULL,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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278

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

[redacted]
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
6/8/43 [signature]
Date Initials

May 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Units Available for Movement to United Kingdom

1. The following units will be available for movement from their home station on dates indicated:

387th Bomb Group (M)	June 1
718th Signal AW Co	June 1
719th Signal AW Co	June 1
871st Cml Co Air Opns (M&H)	June 1
874th Cml Co Air Opns (M&H)	June 1
755th Cml Depot Co Avn	June 1
899th Signal Depot Co Avn	June 1
2001st Ord Maintenance Co AF	June 10
2006th Ord Maintenance Co AF	June 10
385th Bomb Group (H)	June 15
388th Bomb Group (H)	June 15
389th Bomb Group (H)	June 15
352nd Fighter Group	June 15
355th Fighter Group	June 15
33rd Air Depot Group, Hq & Hq Sq	June 15
33rd Depot Repair Sq	June 15
33rd Depot Supply Sq	June 15
433rd QM Plat AD Group	June 15
84th Service Group, Hq & Hq Sq	June 15
97th Service Group, Hq & Hq Sq	June 15
15th Station Complement Sq	June 15
16th Station Complement Sq	June 15
17th Station Complement Sq	June 15
18th Station Complement Sq	June 15
19th Station Complement Sq	June 15
20th Station Complement Sq	June 15
21st Station Complement Sq	June 15
99th Service Sq	June 15
315th Service Sq	June 15
382nd Service Sq	June 15
384th Service Sq	June 15

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278

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1087th QM Service Group Avn	June 15
1806th Ord Supply & Maint Co Avn	June 15
1807th Ord Supply & Maint Co Avn	June 15
1808th Ord Supply & Maint Co Avn	June 15
1809th Ord Supply & Maint Co Avn	June 15
2054th QM Truck Co Avn	June 15
2055th QM Truck Co Avn	June 15
2056th QM Truck Co Avn	June 15
2057th QM Truck Co Avn	June 15
1029th Sig Co Service Group	June 15
1074th Sig Co Service Group	June 15
1142nd Military Police Co Avn	June 15
1143rd Military Police Co Avn	June 15
1144th Military Police Co Avn	June 15
1145th Military Police Co Avn	June 15
1175th Military Police Co Avn	June 15
1176th Military Police Co Avn	June 15
759th Cml Depot Co Avn	June 15
312th Depot Repair Sq	June 25
46th Air Depot Group, Hq & Hq Sq	July 4
46th Depot Repair Sq	July 4
46th Depot Supply Sq	July 4
446th QM Plat AD Group	July 4

2. It is requested that a directive providing for the movement of the units listed above be forwarded at an appropriate time.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

MAY 9 A.M.
5 9/6 ac

IN
OPD. WDGS.

O. P. WEYLAND,
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Allocations & Programs Division
Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff
Operations, Commitments & Requirements

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277

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

3/30/43 HCR

OPD 370.5 Gr Brit
(3-15-43)

March 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

Subject: Movement of Units to the United Kingdom.

The Chief of Staff directs:

That memorandum, this office, dated March 15, 1943, above subject, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces and Services of Supply, listing units for movement to the port of embarkation not later than May 1, 1943, be amended as follows:

Delete the following units listed in paragraph 1:

380th Bomb Gp (H)

348th Fighter Gp (SE) plus one month's attrition

To Central Files.
Units deleted
4/8

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

APR 21 '43 AM

APR 1 1943

C. B. FERENBAUGH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief European Section,
Theater Group, OPD, GS.

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MAG. Misc. 1

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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297

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SECURITY

COPY NO 4

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Army Service Forces
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington

SPX 400.22 (30 June 43)
OB-S-SPDDL-M

BSK/msr 23-039 Pentagon

1 July 1943

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: T.A.G. :
: Initials: [illegible] :
: Date: 1 July 43 :

SUBJECT: Advance Shipments to the United Kingdom (For August Troop Basis).

TO: Chief Signal Officer
(Attn: Colonel Back);
Chief of Transportation.

1. Reference is made to letter, AG 400.22 (16 May 43)OB-S-SPDDL-M, 16 May 1943, subject: Standing Operating Procedure for Shipments of Equipment and Supplies to United Kingdom.

2. It is desired that the Chief Signal Officer take necessary action to make available to the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, on call as advance shipment for troops scheduled for movement to the United Kingdom in August as indicated on Inclosure #1, all the Tables of Basic Allowances and Tables of Equipment, less housekeeping equipment as defined in paragraph 3a (1) of Preparation of Overseas Movement. In computing allowance for these units, forty-five (45) days' maintenance for status report items will be added for inclusion in the advance shipment.

a. Combat vehicles authorized radio sets are being furnished so equipped by the Ordnance Depots. Consequently, no action will be taken toward furnishing radio sets for combat vehicles as initial equipment.

3. The equipment will be issued at the top of the A-2 priority list.

4. Markings for pre-shipment of supplies and equipment furnished in compliance with this directive will be secured direct from the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation.

5. It is desired that the Chief Signal Officer submit to the Director, Stock Control Division, Army Service Forces, on or before 10 July 1943, a report on the above shipment showing:

a. Essential items of equipment that cannot be made available to the Port by 1 August 1943, for Army Air Force Units.

b. Essential items of equipment that cannot be made available to the Port by 1 August 1943, for Army Ground Force Units.

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297

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SPX 400.22 (30 June 43)OR-C-SPDDM-M (Cont'd) 1 July 1943

c. Essential items of equipment that cannot be made available to the Port by 1 August 1943, for Army Service Force units.

6. It is also desired that the Chief Signal Officer submit to the Director, Stock Control Division, Army Service Forces, a weekly report on the above shipment showing:

a. The total quantity, tonnage and cubage to be shipped.

b. The quantities, tonnage and cubage actually shipped from depots.

c. The quantities, tonnage and cubage actually arriving at Port of Embarkation.

d. The quantities, tonnage and cubage available at Depots but not called for by the Port of Embarkation.

7. The Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, will be advised of location, tonnage and cubage involved in these shipments.

8. It is desired that the Chief of Transportation provide the necessary transportation to deliver supplies and equipment being shipped in compliance with this letter. Initial readiness date is 1 August 1943.

By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL:

C.E.P. Gart
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Aug. Troop List

COPIES FURNISHED:
Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation (5);
Commanding General, European Theater of Operations (3);
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, WDGS (3);
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, WDGS (3);
Director of Operations, ASF (3);
Director, Planning Division, ASF (3);
The Inspector General (3);
Director, Stock Control Division, ASF (10);
Overseas Supply Division, New York Port of Embarkation (3);
Director of Materiel, ASF (3);
Chief, New York Field Branch, (Attn: Col. Malcolm Syrne)
1st Ave., & 58th St. Bldg. "G", Rm 221, Brooklyn, N.Y.

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AUGUST TROOP LIST

QUANTITY	UNIT	T/O	T/BA or T/E
2	Hq & Hq Det Ord Bn	9-76	9-76
1	Hq & Hq Det Ord Amm Bn	9-15 Col 2 & 5	9
1	Ord Dep Sup Co	9-57 Ch.1	9
6	Ord Amm Co	9-17	9
3	Ord Hv Auto Maint Co	9-197	9-197
5	Ord Med Auto Maint Co	9-127	9-127
6	QM Truck Co	10-57 Ch.1	10
4	QM Serv Bn	10-65	10
1	Hq & Hq Det QM Ser Bn	(10-66 and (10-65 Col 5 & 6	10
4	QM Serv Co	10-67 Ch.1	10
1	Ord MT Sup Co (Q)	10-48	10
1	QM Bakery Co	10-147	10
3	CA AA AW Bn (M)	44-25	(44-25M (44-26 (44-27
4	FA Bn (155 mm How)	6-35 Ch.3	6 Ch.6
1	MP Co (Corps)	19-37	19
1	Tank Bn (M)	17-35	17 Ch.1
1	Hq & Hq Co Eng Combat Gp	5-192 (Tent)	5-192 (Tent)
3	Eng Combat Bn	5-15 Ch.1	(5-16 M (5-16 (5-17
1	Eng Depot Co	5-47	5 Ch.1
2	Eng Dump Trk Co	5-88	5 Ch.1
2	Eng Maint Co	5-157	5 Ch.1
1	Hq & Hq Btry FA Brig	(6-10-1 Ch.2 (and Col 3 Page 2 of 6-50	6 Ch.6
1	Hq & Hq Btry FA Gp	6-12	6-12
1	FA Obs Bn	6-75 Ch.1	6 Ch.6
1	Med Bn (MTZ)	8-65 Ch.2	(Spec. 8-66 (8-67 (8-68
1	Eng Topo Co (Corps)	5-167	5 Ch.1
1	Hq & Hq Btry CA/AA Gp	44-12	44-12
1	Inf Bn (Sep) W/Bn Med Sect., Transp Plat attached	(7-15 Ch.1 (Col 4 Page 2 of 7-11 (Col 8 of 7-13	7 Ch.2

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Enclosure #1

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QUANTITY	UNIT	T/O	T/BA or T/E
2	Hq & Hq Det Ord Bn	9-76	9-76
5	Ord Ammn Co	9-17	9
4	Ord Depot Co	9-57 Ch.1	9
2	Ord Evac Co	9-187	1-187
7	Ord Base Depot Co	9-377	9-377
1	Ord Motor Veh Dist Co	9-337	9-337
11	APU	12-605 Col. 8	12-605
1	MRU Mob "Z"	12-327	12-327
2	Repl Bn	20-45	12
1	Bn QM Truck	10-55	10 Ch.1
1	QM Ster Bn	10-175 Ch.1	10 Ch.1
1	QM Sales Co	10-157 Ch.1	10 Ch.1
1	QM Salvage Rep Co	10-237	10 Ch.1
1	QM Salvage Col Co	10-137 Ch.1	10 Ch.1
2	Sig Const Bn	11-25 Ch.1	11 Ch.1

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NO.	UNIT	T/O	T/BA or T/E
1	Eng Regt GS	5-21 Ch.2	5-21M 5-22 5-27
1	Eng Co Dp Trk	5-38	5 Ch.2
1	Eng Co Maint	5-157	5 Ch.2
4	Eng Hvy Shop Co	5-257	5 Ch.2
1	Eng Base Depot Co	5-267	5-267
6	Eng Mobile SL Maint Unit	5-387	5-387
16	Finance Disb Section	7-1 (Col.11)	Spec List (File SPX 400 (4-27-43)OR-S-SPDDL-M)
2	Station Hosp (750)	8-560 (Col.17) Ch.2 and WD Cir. 499	8-560 (750 bed)
2	General Hospital (1000)	8-550 Ch.2 and WD Cir. 499	8-550
3	Field Hospital	8-510 and WD Cir. 499	8-510
1	Gen Disp Med	8-650	8-650
1	Med Bn Gas Treat	8-125 Ch.1	8 Ch.1
2	Hospital Train	8-520 Ch.1	8-520 Ch.1
3	Med San Co	8-117	8-117
5	Hq & Hq Det Port Bn	55-116	55-116 and Spec List of Equip for Port Bns. date 3 Jun 43 (File SP400 5-31-43)OR-S-SPDDL-M
20	Port Co	55-117	55-117 and Spec List
1	Base Depot Co TC	55-260	55-260
1	Railway Shop Bn	55-235	5 Ch.2 and Spec List to be prepared by CG, ASF(Ch/S.
1	Group Reg Sta. TC	Spec List 2nd Ind. to Letter AG dtd. 24 Dec. 42, (File 320 (12 22 42) OR-I-SP-M.	Special List File SPX 400 OR-SPDDL-1.

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SECURITY CONTROL

HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General

10 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Air Organization, European Theater of Operations

1. While Arnold was here I conferred with him, getting his ideas on the subject. Immediately upon Brereton's arrival, he, Eaker and I, discussed the United States organization to be placed immediately in effect, and also the organization to be created for the support of OVERLORD. We have reached the following agreement, which has my full concurrence and approval:

a. The Ninth Air Force will be formed in the United Kingdom, composed of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Ninth Air Force, to be moved from the Middle East, with General Brereton as Commanding General. It will have transferred to it all of the tactical air force units of the Eighth Air Force as previously set up for the Eighth Air Support Command. The present Eighth Air Force Service Command will be divided to form an Air Service Command for the Ninth Air Force, which General Miller will command. General Knerr will be retained with the Eighth Air Force and named as the Commanding General Air Service Command. In setting up this dual service organization a duplication of function will be avoided insofar as possible.

b. The present complement and troop basis as established in the Bradley Plan, for the Eighth Air Force, will provide all of the personnel required for the two air forces Eighth and Ninth. The Bradley Plan will provide adequate complement for the proposed organization because it visualizes the Eighth Air Support Command, which now becomes the Ninth Air Force. There will obviously be some minor alterations, chiefly organizational, such as inclusion of the Ninth Air Force Headquarters which was not visualized at the time the Bradley Plan was drawn up. These changes can be made here, using the personnel set forth in the Bradley Plan and those transferred from the Middle East. As we form the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and bring them to eventual size, we shall, wherever possible, effect saving in man power because of the known critical state of the man power situation.

2. I have discussed with Eaker and Brereton, and also with General Arnold while he was here, a Headquarters for the Air Commander-in-Chief, AEAF. We are all in agreement that a Headquarters should not be provided with a personnel complement for detailed administrative control, as well as operational control, as originally proposed. Our view is that the Headquarters of the AEAF should contain only the officer strength for overall supervision, the command and direction of the constituent air forces, and particularly for operational

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and tactical control. Detailed administrative matters should be handled by the constituent air forces and certain Headquarters establishments, and command and staff echelons already provided in the Air Force. A very important additional reason for revising the plan of AEAF Headquarters lies in the fact that experienced United States officers, in the numbers required by Leigh-Mallory for his Headquarters, cannot possibly be supplied from the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces; General Arnold has indicated that they are not available in the United States. If we, therefore, go along with Leigh-Mallory and agree to the large number of U. S. officers required by him and we, on the American side are unable to supply our quota, we will find the over-all Headquarters with 75-80% R.A.F. officers of senior rank, and only 25-20% U. S. Air Force officers. We all believe, therefore, that the AEAF Headquarters should be kept small, - much smaller than the one proposed by Leigh-Mallory and submitted to you through COSSAC. A copy of this proposal is enclosed. We hope for your support on this point.

3. After my conference with Baker and Brereton, I am completely convinced that we can work out the formation of the Ninth Air Force with its Air Service Command, and all supporting services without any difficulty, and that the two air forces commanders can coordinate the POINTBLANK and OVERLORD operations entirely satisfactorily. This is assured in my opinion by your recent action in naming Baker as Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom.

/s/ JACOB L. DEVERS
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 633
C/O POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

11 September, 1943.

General H. H. Arnold, USA.,
Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

We all wish that you could have stayed with us longer but we are appreciative that you found the time to spend even a week with us, and were delighted to learn of your safe return.

General Brereton has been with us three days now. He has been over the Tactical Air Force setup, has had conferences with Leigh-Mallory, Morgan and Hansell. Yesterday afternoon General Devers called him and me in for a conference and we went over the whole setup. As a result, General Devers wrote a memorandum to General Marshall. I have obtained his permission to send a copy to you with this letter. We are all agreed as to its contents. I think you need have no concern about Louie Brereton and I working in complete harmony to build up the Ninth Air Force for the OVERLORD task and in the meantime working together for the accomplishment of POINT BLANK at the maximum rate.

Yesterday morning I prepared a cablegram to you outlining our analysis of the enemy reaction to the STARKEY effort the day before. I read it to Edwards and he thought General Devers should sign it. I, of course, had no objection. My only concern was to get it to you as soon as possible.

I believe that the reaction to STARKEY should be carefully considered. It may have tremendous implications. We are certain of the facts we presented to you. They may be summarized by saying that the Germans will not fight in the air unless targets in Germany are attacked, and they are disposing their air forces apparently with that end in view. Their attitude also shows great wariness to meet our Allied fighters. Here, however, is to me the most remarkable possibility about the German reaction. They not only did not send their air forces out against the convoy but they did not fire at the convoy with their coastal batteries and they showed no intention to resist the landing in force. It may be said that this was because they knew that our operation was but a feint. On the other hand, I doubt that the Germans could be absolutely sure that it was a complete feint. Is there not a possibility that their plan does not call for heavy resistance to an Allied invasion? I think this possibility has tremendous implications, and,

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while it may have little merit, it certainly should not be overlooked.

Here is something which, because of its source, is intended for your eyes only and I hope you will treat it accordingly. In connection with STARKEY, a small paratroop force made a landing in the Pas de Calais area. These troops spent several days in that area without the slightest opposition. They were well treated by the French. Their freedom of movement was such that they went swimming daily and were well fed and well treated. This is a further straw in the wind supporting the possibility I mentioned above. This small detachment is now back in this country.

We have information which indicates that the Germans are becoming very dissatisfied with their present government. It has been said that at least 75% of the average German population believes that a change in the government is desirable. Many people in German cities openly speak of the present necessity for the overthrow of the Nazi regime and a military government taking over.

In accordance with your direction, I have assembled all of the Commanders and have gone over with them completely our maintenance position and have issued a definite directive that the Air Service Command is to have technical control and supervision over maintenance down to the airplane. I have also cautioned that every airplane which cannot be made ready for the next mission coming up must be transferred and tagged to the Air Service Command and the Air Service Command made responsible for its maintenance. This is now thoroughly understood by everybody and there is complete agreement on it. The maintenance personnel in the squadron will do first and second echelon maintenance and the Air Service Command are going to be required to supervise, control and perform all third and fourth echelon maintenance, wherever the airplane may be. I will report to you in about thirty days how this is working out.

I personally appreciate very much the suggestions you made while here and your comment on our organization. I know that it was entirely constructive and every possible effort is going to be made by me and everybody under me to carry out your ideas.

Sincerely,

IRA C. EAKER
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding

1 Incl-
Cpy Memo, to Gen. Marshall from
Gen. Devers dated 10/9/43.

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AFAEP
LMG/jn/4152

wtn 21 Jan 44

JAN 25 1944

Lt General Robert C. Richardson, Jr
Commanding General, US Army Forces
Central Pacific Area
APO 958, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear General Richardson:

The information requested in your letter of 4 January 1944 is attached hereto in tabular form. Inclosure 1 indicates the AAF deployment, as per approved program, for the Central Pacific Area without regard to the possible collapse of Germany.

Inclosure 2 shows the proposed augmentation up to 1 July 1945 in the Central Pacific Area based on the assumption that victory over Germany will be accomplished in October 1944. I have accepted these figures for planning purposes, and the Army members of the Joint War Planners Committee are also in agreement with them. Some final revision may be made by the Joint Staff Planners in order to reconcile our own augmentation with that of the Navy, but I do not believe that any changes will be appreciable.

The figures in Inclosure 2 are the latest tentative planning figures and supercede those shown in the 30 June 1944 redeployment table which I referred to in my security control cable No 9531, 15 Jan 1944, COMGENCENTPAC to Hale. The only differences between the total build-up shown in the 30 June table referred to and the figures in Inclosure 2 are as follows: The number of H/B groups shown in the 30 June table is reduced from 18 to 14 and the number of fighter and fighter bomber groups is reduced from 15 to 12.

I appreciate your deep interest in the airfields in the Hawaiian area and your active measures to assure retention of their ready availability for future use. I hope the proposed augmentation figures will give you the additional ammunition you require.

Willis Hale is doing every bit of the great job your letter com-

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OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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mended, and I well realize that there are no conditions anywhere more difficult than those under which he is operating.

My kind regards to you.

2 Incls
Incl No 1--Availability of
Combat Groups
Incl No 2--Redeployment of
Combat Units

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INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION			- 2 -			

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CUMULATIVE AVAILABILITY OF COMBAT GROUPS

For the

CENTRAL PACIFIC, PER APPROVED PROGRAM

(AAF Deployment Program, Revised 15 January 1944)

	1944 Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
VHB Gps	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H/B Gps	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
M & I/B Gps	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ftr&F/B Gps*	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Recon Gps	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T/C Gps	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ftr/B Sq	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Night Ftr Sq	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
T/C Sq	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Recon Sq	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

* 4 squadrons per group

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REDEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT UNITS IN CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

Showing Month of Shipment

AFTER CAPITULATION OF GERMANY

(Month of Shipment)

	Victory over Germany Oct 44	Nov 44 V+1	Dec V+2	Jan 45 V+3	Feb V+4	Mar V+5	Apr V+6	May V+7	June V+8	July V+9
H/B Ops	3	3	3	6 +3UK	10 +4UK	10	10	11 +1NA	16 +5NA	14 -2*
M & L/B Ops	1	1	1	1	1	4 +3UK	4	4	4	4
Ftr&Ftr/B Ops	2	2	2	2	6 +4UK	10 +4UK	12 +2UK	12	12	12
Recon Ops	0	0	0	0	2 +2UK	2	2	2	2	2
T/C Ops	0	0	0	2 +1½UK	2	2	2	2	2	2
Ftr&Ftr/B Sq	1	1	1	1	2 +1AP	2	2	2	2	2
Night Ftr Sq	1	1	2 +1US	4 +2UK	4	4	4	4	4	4
T/C Sq	2	2	2	0 -2**	0	0	0	0	0	0
Recon Sq	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Emergency Rescue Sq	0	1½ +1SWP +½US	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½

UK--United Kingdom; NA--North Africa; AB--Atlantic Bases; SWP Southwest Pacific

* 2 H/B converted to VHB

** 2 separate T/C sq join ½ T/C Gp from UK making a complete T/C Gp

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
APO 958

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
AG 373/649

4 January 1944

1/15/44
Declassified
per letter
dated
Feb 1976
RHQ

General H. H. Arnold,
U.S. Army Air Forces,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Arnold:

I am writing this letter in the hope that you can give me a forecast of air support for this theater when Germany collapses and the transfer of air power commences, for the reason that I wish to protect the Army's interests in the airfields in this Hawaiian group which have been built for the Seventh Air Force.

To review the situation: last year when this group was a defensive outpost only a few bombers were sent out. The Navy made application to use the airfield at Hilo to train one carrier squadron. Emmons granted permission and they built installations for that purpose. Subsequently they asked for an increase to two carrier squadrons, which Emmons also granted. I think his action was sound at that time, because we were over-built for the number of airplanes that had been set up for Hawaii.

The Navy have now asked to use Barking Sands, on the Island of Kauai, for the training of carrier squadrons. For the moment this field is unoccupied, as we were obliged to send practically all of our bombardment and most of the fighter aircraft to the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, where they now are. I therefore do not feel justified in refusing the use of an idle installation; but at the same time this installation, I feel, will be very necessary for the use of the Seventh Air Force when the air power is transferred to this theater. I have therefore authorized the Navy to use Barking Sands under certain conditions. A copy of my letter to the Navy is attached.

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General Richardson to
General Arnold,
4 January 1944.

I have discussed with the Admirals the necessity of the Navy studying their future requirements so that they might commence building fields if they need them for the training of carrier squadrons and not to rely on the use of Army fields, including Hilo. It has been proposed that a board be convened to survey the joint needs. I should like to have some ammunition for this board because at the present writing I do not know what the plans of your office are. It would be most helpful to me and to the Seventh Air Force to be able to go in to the board strengthened by the plans of your office so that the integrity of Army fields in the last analysis may be preserved for the use of our own air forces this coming summer.

Willis Hale is doing a great job in the Gilberts.

Very sincerely,

Robert C. Richardson

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr.,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

Happy New Year

Incl:
(1) Copy of 1/fr ComGenCentPac to
Comdt 14th Nav Dist, 2 Jan 44,
"Availability of Army Fields...etc."

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 958

2 January 1944

SUBJECT: Availability of Army Fields for Use of Aircraft Carrier Groups, Hawaiian Area.

TO: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject "Availability of Army Fields for Use of Aircraft Carrier Groups, Hawaiian Area", dated 22 December 1943, file C-VV/ND14 serial 05291, in which you request information as to the availability of Barking Sands Field at Kauai for temporary use by carrier aircraft squadrons.

2. The use of Barking Sands Field temporarily is concurred in under the following conditions:

a. That all existing buildings upon the premises be not altered, moved, or removed from their present location unless approved in writing by the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area.

b. That all major construction upon the Air Base shall be with the approval of the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area.

c. That all buildings, equipment, and installations upon the Air Base shall be kept in good repair by the using service at all times.

d. That all movable property left upon the Air Base shall be receipted for and that such property shall not be removed from said Base unless permission is given in writing by the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area. That such facilities as may be required for use by the Army be made available for that purpose.

e. That an officer familiar with the installations upon the Air Base shall be designated by the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area, to make periodic inspections

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284

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of all installations, equipment and buildings thereon. This representative shall act as Liaison Officer for any requests for alterations or construction. He shall direct the taking of photographs or sketches of any installation or alteration for the purpose of record. The Commander of the station will be required to furnish this inspecting officer information concerning contemplated construction.

f. That any personnel left to maintain and operate the AF station and the WD Station of the Fighter Control Squadron shall be under the exclusive control of the Army and shall not be interfered with in their duties. said personnel shall be rationed with the Navy if desired by the Army.

g. Army airplanes operating within the area of this Air Base will be governed by normal Army operations procedure and will not be held up from landing or taking off by any local regulation.

h. That the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area, may terminate the use of said Army Air Base by the Navy by a two-week written request; and, that within said period, personnel of the Army will be allowed upon the premises to see that all equipment is in good working order and to familiarize themselves as to the operation of said equipment to preclude a stoppage of service at the termination of its use by the Navy.

i. That upon termination of the use by the Navy, all improvements upon the Air Base shall become the property of the Army.

j. Information is requested as to whether the use of the field is desired under the above conditions and the date on which occupancy by carrier based aircraft is desired.

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr.,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

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SAVE

IN REPLY REFER TO:

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

Auth: C.G., A.A.F.
Date: 20 May 1946
Initials: HHH
COPY NO.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2

SUBJECT: Testimony of AAF Witness before subcommittee of Senate Judiciary Committee investigating the preparation of legislation aimed at protection of this country's technical knowledge and industrial "know how"

FACTS BEARING UPON THE SUBJECT

1. A Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee, composed of Messrs. Eastland, McFarland and Wherry, is conducting an investigation in an attempt to prepare legislation aimed at protection of this country's technical knowledge and industrial "know how". The intention has been unofficially announced that members of the armed forces, in particular the AAF, will be called as witnesses.

2. Numerous articles have appeared in the newspapers concerning this investigation which, by the use of such expressions as "senate investigation into the post war protection of this country's secret instruments of war", imply that the investigation is being conducted in regard to classified information. (See reference a for sample new item). This is a false implication. The subcommittee is concerned with unclassified information and equipment.

3. The investigation is prompted by increased Russian activity to enter into contracts with United States commercial agencies for (a) the sale of equipment which was developed and produced by the commercial agencies during the war under classified contracts with the War and Navy Departments and which contracts have been terminated and the classification removed from the equipment, (b) the "know how" in the production of this equipment, and (c) to participate and collaborate in the research conducted in the U. S. laboratories of certain commercial agencies. Particular attention is being directed to the field of radar and electronics equipment although other types of equipment are effected. (See references b and c for correspondence on two cases).

4. The Commercial agencies, on their own initiative, have contacted the State Department and the AAF for opinion as to the advisability of entering into contracts with the Russians. The State Department has officially stated that it "has no legal authority to prevent the sale or manufacture of unclassified material abroad" but has unofficially advised the commercial agencies that entering into such contracts with the Russians is not considered advisable. In the case of the AAF contact the AAF has reflected this opinion in its reply. (See reference d for Department of State press release).

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5. In declassifying much of the equipment in question the War Department has been influenced by the directive contained in the Presidential Executive Orders 9568 and 9604. Order 9568 affects scientific and technical data developed by, or for, or with funds of any department or agency of the Government. Order 9604 affects scientific and technical data obtained from the enemy by any department or agency of the Government. Both orders direct that the data, which has been classified for purposes of national military security, will be declassified insofar as it may be done without prejudice to the public interest, and dissemination to the end that such data may be of maximum benefit to the public. (See references c, f and g for War Department Memo and Executive Orders.)

6. Dissemination of data under the Executive Orders mentioned above is accomplished by the Publication Board Department of Commerce whose bibliography is available to foreign subscribers. (See reference h for sample of bibliography).

7. Senator Eastland has drafted a proposed amendment to the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 to prohibit the release of radar and electronic equipment and the information and machinery pertaining thereto to any foreign government or national thereof. This proposed amendment was designed to solve the particular problems of the radar and electronic equipment. (See reference i for draft of proposed amendment). The committee has since determined that such an amendment is inadequate and is now considering either a general strengthening of the Espionage Act to cover all types of information or the possibilities of the establishment of a governmental agency to control the information.

8. The War Department has prepared drafts of two proposed pieces of legislation which have bearing on this subject. One bill provides for the permanent control of the export of technical data and the other provides for extending the patent secrecy into peace time. (See references j, k and l for memorandum for record and drafts of two proposed bills).

9. The SWNCC subcommittee for Military Information Control has been considering for many months the problem of the influence of unclassified military information on the future security of the United States. On the premise that the presently accepted concept of the security of the United States, as dependent upon the safeguarding of that information which the military sees fit to classify, two draft memoranda have been prepared with the purpose of confronting SWNCC with the need for a study of the national security to determine whether the concept should be changed to include unclassified military information, in particular that information which in developing a foreign country commercially also develops its military potential. These memoranda (See references m and n) have not been forwarded to SWNCC. (See reference o for Navy Comment and p for SWNCC-MIC minutes discussing papers). A third memorandum, requested by Mr. Peterson, Assistant Secretary of War, has been prepared and is presently being considered by SWNCC-MIC. Lt. Col. Houston has a copy of the first draft of this memorandum.

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DISCUSSION

10. The narrow concept of the use of military security classification in connection with military information is the use of the classification to obtain military advantage. Under this concept the decision to place a classification upon any item of military equipment or information is based upon an estimate of the military advantage to be gained at the time by withholding the information or equipment from the enemy. This estimate can be made in terms of the physical damage which could be inflicted upon the nation if the information or equipment were possessed by an enemy or in terms of the effects the possession of the information and equipment by the enemy would have upon the success of operational plans. In either case the military advantage to be gained by classification is greatest during periods of hostilities and at the initial conception of the information or equipment. With the conquering of the enemy and the resulting cessation of hostilities the military advantage drops to its minimum and increases only as certain foreign nations increase in stature as potential enemies.

11. The present period represents a period of minimum military advantage. As the result, much of the information and equipment which is basically commercial in its application but which, by virtue of its military application during hostilities, was classified in accordance with the military advantage to be gained, has now been declassified. Much radar and electronic equipment and the information pertaining thereto is in this category. To retain classification on this information and equipment is overstressing the military advantage, prevents commercial exploitation, and can be considered in violation of the Presidential Executive Orders.

12. The War and Navy Departments are charged with the military security of the United States. Inherent in that charge is the maintenance of military advantage over all actual or potential enemies. From a strictly military point of view, the use of classification in accordance with the narrow concept presented above is the most reasonable and workable method. Under this concept the War Department controls the information through classification only as long as it is of military advantage to do so and at the end of that period releases control by declassification, i.e. canceling classification. With this declassification it is assumed that, even if the information were delivered immediately and directly to an active enemy during a period of hostility or to any foreign nation during a period of no hostilities, the military security of the nation is not placed in jeopardy.

13. This narrow concept is presently accepted by the War Department with the full realization that upon release of control by the War Department the information and equipment, with the exception of arms, ammunition and implements of war, are subject to no further control by any governmental agency. Traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war is subject to State Department control. (See reference q for State Department Regulation).

14. In broad terms the Espionage Act, June 15, 1917, provides a penalty for the disclosure to a foreign government of any information relating to the national defense with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of a

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foreign nation. While this act states "any information", there have been very few attempts at prosecution under this act and all, as far as can be determined, have been concerned with transmittal of classified information. This has resulted in a general feeling that, in the case of unclassified information, the Espionage Act is a mere threat. In any event, at best, The Espionage Act is a punitive measure and not a control measure. It is not operative until after the information has been released.

15. Realizing that each successive war is a step in the progression towards total war, i.e. commitment of the entire population and resources to the prosecution of a war, the War Department has become increasingly concerned over the one way traffic in information, equipment and "know how" to foreign countries. The military advantage gained by the United States in World War II was based to a large extent upon exploitation of commercial research and particularly upon commercial "know how" in production methods. In the event of another war the exploitation will be more intensive and in all probability will be hampered by conditions which did not exist in the United States in World War II, e.g. blackout, dispersal and destruction through direct enemy attack.

16. To receive nothing in exchange for the information and equipment supplied to foreign countries decreases the military advantage over any potential enemy. With very few exceptions, aside from the monetary return now being received by United States commercial agencies, the foreign countries have very little of value to offer in exchange. To stop the flow of information and equipment to foreign countries would deprive the United States commercial agencies of the exploitation of foreign markets. Both the free flow and the prohibition are disadvantageous to the country, the one militarily and the other economically.

17. The two positions represent extremes which up to the present have been greatly out of balance in favor of "free flow". The present situation appears to be adding weight to the military side and may result in a compromise. Such a compromise might permit of controlled flow in which, in addition to the monetary return, the United States Government will be able to obtain governmental concessions from the foreign government, e.g. reciprocal patent agreements, reciprocal trade agreement, etc. From these will stem military benefits.

18. At least the situation should be studied in the light of the national interests. To assure complete consideration the study should not be accomplished by the War, Navy, or State Departments individually or collectively but by a governmental agency with representation from the State, War, and Navy Departments and from other governmental departments, e.g. Commerce, Interior etc, and from the commercial and industrial firms engaged in national and international trade.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

19. It is recommended that the AAF witness before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee testify substantially as follows:

a. The War Department, and particularly the AAF, is in full accord with the aim of the subcommittee, i.e. protection of this country's technical knowledge and industrial "know how" and welcomes the opportunity to assist in the committee's work.

b. The War Department is concerned over the present lack of control and resultant "free flow" of U. S. technical knowledge, materials and industrial "know how" to foreign countries. In the hands of an unscrupulous potential enemy country these materials and knowledge could go far to increase and strengthen the military economy and war potential of such a nation.

c. Under the present policy the War and Navy Departments can exercise control only through the use of their systems of classification or where strategic materials are in short supply. Since one of the strongest single factors in our war potential is the efficiency and capacity of our industry, the War Department is extremely interested in protecting and fostering our industrial capacity in every possible way. Excessive use of our system of classification would result in denying the use of many patents and processes essential to our industrial expansion. Therefore the War Department desires to restrict the use of its classification system to the protection of direct military advantage.

d. The War Department is extremely interested in the exercise of some means of control on a governmental level which would protect our industry and would insure a reciprocal flow of information for whatever we release. It is believed, therefore, that an agency should be constituted on governmental level to study the national interest in connection with the present situation in flow of declassified and unclassified information to foreign nations. In order to give full and complete consideration to the problem, the agency should have representatives from the State, War, and Navy Departments; other Departments such as Commerce and Interior; and from the commercial and industrial firms engaged in national and international trade.

Harold B. Houston

HAROLD B. HOUSTON
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps

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References

a. "War Secrets Cnus put on Army, Navy". Page 7, 20 April 1946, Index prepared by O.I.S.

b. Memorandum for record prepared by Mr. Kyton, Chief Politico Control Section, State Department, Memo of conversation with RCA representatives concerning proposed contract with Russians which contract would permit Russians to collaborate on RCA's U. S. laboratories in unclassified general research.

c. AAF correspondence file on Jack R. Holtz' Negotiations with Russia and China." Russia denied contract with Jack R. Holtz for sale of production and patent rights covering A-3A Automatic Pilot, B-1 Generator and JB-4 Starter, including training of Russian experts in production methods.

d. Department of State Press Release #268 dated 20 April 1946.

e. W.D. Memorandum, 4 September 1940, Subject: Classification, Reclassification and Declassification of Scientific and Technical Information.

f. Presidential Executive Order 9568 dated 8 June 1945 "Providing for the Release of Scientific Information.

g. Presidential Executive Order 9604 dated 25 August 1946 "Providing for the Release of Scientific Information (Extension and Amendment of Executive Order 9568)".

h. Vol. I No. 8 "Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Reports" 1 March 1946, distributed by the Office of the Publication Board, Department of Commerce.

i. Draft of S.1933 introduced in the Senate of the United States by Mr. Eastland 15 March 1946 "To Amend the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917."

j. Memorandum for records prepared by Lt. Col. Houston, dated 22 April 1946, on conference concerning proposed legislation prepared by G-2 to continue patents in secrecy and to control exportation of technical data.

k. G-2 draft of "A Bill to Amend Section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714) as amended, relating to the exportation of certain commodities."

l. G-2 draft of "A Bill to amend the Act relating to preventing the publication of inventions in the national interest, and for other purposes".

m. Draft memorandum for SWNCC by SWNCC - 107 recommending "that SWNCC state, as a matter of governmental policy, that access of all foreign representatives to unclassified research and development projects must have prior approval of SWNCC."

[redacted]

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n. Draft memorandum for SWNCC by SWNCC-MIC recommending "that the SWNCC initiate action through appropriate government channels to effect legislation restraining American industry from disclosing its research and industrial "know how" to foreign governments or nationals without prior approval of SWNCC and to prohibit the sale of commercial and military materials to foreign governments or nationals without prior approval of SWNCC.

o. Navy Department, Office of Research and Inventions, to CNO dated 13 March 1946, subject: "Research Collaboration between USA and representatives of USSR - Proposed contract for."

p. Minutes of SWNCC-MIC meetings, 12 and 13 March 1946. Discussion of "release of unclassified commercial research and development information to foreign governments".

q. "International Traffic in Arms." Regulations issued on June 2, 1942 by the Secretary of State, governing registration and licensing under section 12 of the joint resolution approved November 4, 1939 and related laws.

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HEADQUARTERS
ICELAND BASE COMMAND

23 February, 1943

Short title: Lava Project.

Subject: Replacement of Units composing the Iceland Base Command.

To : Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

1. As directed in your radio No. 1796, February 8th, I am transmitting by Brigadier General A.D. Warnook, 5th Infantry Division, my plans for relief of units in Iceland. Prior to his assignment to the 5th Division, General Warnock was Deputy Chief of Staff of Headquarters Iceland Base Command. In that capacity he has had a very intimate contact with the development and expansion of the tactical and administrative plans of this command. I consider him thoroughly qualified to perform this special mission.

2. The 5th Infantry Division relief plan (Inclosure No. 1) is presented separately from the other elements of the Iceland Base Command and is given the short title: LAVA ROCK. This plan provides for the relief of the division in combat positions by three (3) approximately equal increments. This will provide reasonable assurance of continuity of the defense of Iceland and at the same time not unduly prolong the division's assembly elsewhere.

3. The new combat units must be sufficiently trained to take over combat missions on arrival, and because of limited local facilities they should have completed their annual qualifications in arms and have had some combat practice. They should bring full allowance of training equipment as authorized in T/BA for a unit in the Zone of Interior.

4. Continuity of the defense is provided for by the retention of key personnel from outgoing units for subsequent shipment and by the arrival here of advance parties from incoming units. Adjustments will be made locally between shipments so that all elements of the 5th Division can be dispatched promptly from Reykjavik by the same transports which bring relieving units.

5. Plans for the relief of elements of the Iceland Base Command other than the 5th Infantry Division are in three general categories:

a. Part I - Units which for various reasons should be relieved as individuals. Short title: LAVA SAND. (Inclosure No. 2)

b. Part II - Units which can be relieved expeditiously by organization from Reykjavik. Short title: LAVA HILL. (Inclosure No. 3)

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Letter, IBC, 23 February, 1943, short title: LAVA PROJECT (Cont'd)

c. Part III - Units of the Eastern Defense Area to be relieved as units and shipped through ports other than Reykjavik. Short title: LAVA DIRT. (Inclosure No. 4)

6. In Parts I and II no effort has been made to set up priorities of departure nor convoy groups as these matters depend upon available shipping and other factors not known at this base. The following factors are important from the local viewpoint:

a. In order to avoid delays in turn-around of vessels, units and individuals must be collected and held near the Port of Reykjavik. By crowding and utilizing all available shelter approximately 2000 above the authorized strength of the command is the maximum which can be economically sheltered at any one time.

b. Troops in Iceland are sheltered in small camps which are capable of very little expansion within existing facilities. Thus large numbers of casuals cannot be properly processed without excessive camp overhead. Therefore from the local situation frequent small shipments of individual replacements is preferred over the occasional large shipment.

c. Based upon the date of arrival of the individuals of units listed in Part I, beginning in May 1943, an average turnover of 750 per month for the succeeding 12-13 months will result in a tour of about 18 months in Iceland in each individual case. Similarly, the units listed in Part II will require a turnover rate of approximately 750 per month for about 15 months to effect a tour of about 18 months in Iceland. Minor differences should be disregarded.

d. It is presumed that the 5th Infantry Division will have priority in shipment over most of the units listed in Part II. In such case, units aggregating up to approximately 2000 per month may be shipped as necessary to provide desired priority and rate of turnover.

e. In departing from the principle of equality in length of tour in Iceland, consideration should be given to the adverse morale effect on those units which remain. This is particularly true where units of less service in Iceland are returned to the United States before troops of longer service in Iceland.

7. Eastern Defense Area. - a. The combat elements and certain service troops of the Eastern Defense Area can best be relieved by a strong advance detachment shipped to Reykjavik followed in not less than 30 days (preferably 45 days) by the remainder of the relieving units as indicated in Part III of the Plan for Replacement of IBC Units Other Than the 5th Division. The advance detachments will be transhipped by intra-island ships and will complete plans for reception of parent units and provide for continuity of defense missions.

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The advance parties to be made large enough to relieve isolated detachments at minor ports and provide time for special training in new materiel in order that outgoing units may be shipped from deep water ports as complete units.

b. From a security viewpoint it is considered best to effect the relief of the Eastern Defense Area troops after October 1 and before March 1st; preferably before December 1st. The short hours of daylight will facilitate air coverage during stay in ports. After March 1st, road conditions by reason of thawing make relief prior to June impracticable. From June until October weather conditions are most favorabel for hostile operations. During this period, the feasibility of relief will depend upon developments in the general European situation.

8. Rotation of Individuals. Part I lists the units which should be replaced as individuals. It is believed that the following factors should govern their replacement:

a. Normal period of service of individuals except Air Force and nurses to be fixed at approximately 18 months in Iceland with authority granted to curtail or extend period of service to provide flexibility and to insure combat efficiency of this command.

b. Normal period of service of individuals of Air Force units to be 1 year as provided in WD Circular 211, 1942.

c. Nurses. The following policy recommended by letter 19 Oct 42 to Commanding General, ETO, should be adopted for rotation of nurses, where the unit replacement of hospitals does not effect similar results:

(1) Minimum service at this base, 6 months.

(2) Basis for return (as individuals): Health, morale, and length of service.

(3) Nurses to remain in Iceland until replacement arrives.

(4) Replacement to be by individuals for general assignment.

(5) War Department to forward nurses at a monthly rate of approximately 6% and not to exceed 10% in any single shipment. (Note: A period of service for nurses in Iceland of about 1 year is desirable and conforms to the policy of the American Red Cross for their female workers in Iceland. - Radio AG, R4622, Dec 24, 1942, announced the policy of shipment from United States of 10 nurses per month to be replaced without awaiting arrival of replacement.)

d. That replacements be furnished on requisitions submitted from this base.

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Letter, IBC, 23 February, 1943, short title: LAVA PROJECT (Cont'd)

e. That outgoing individuals be retained in Iceland until the arrival in Iceland of their replacement.

f. That key personnel may be retained for at least 30 days after the arrival of their replacements when considered necessary by Commanding General, this base, to maintain efficiency.

g. That not to exceed 15% of the personnel of any unit be required to be replaced in any month by basics without special qualifications.

h. IBC Staff. - (1) Replacements for the personnel of the General and Special Staff Sections of my headquarters to be by requisition on the War Department for officers of appropriate grade, or one lower grade, with special qualifications to fill the specific staff positions.

(2) Heads of General and Special Staff Sections to be Regular Army personnel.

(3) Heads of the General Staff Sections to be selected graduates of the Command and General Staff School of 1940, or earlier, classes or more recent graduates of the same school in the course peculiar to the specific staff section for which desired.

(4) In the selection of regular officers as replacements, consideration should be given to the valuable experience gained in Iceland by the officers who are to be replaced.

i. Rotation of general officers to be by individual request of the Commanding General this base.

9. Code System. For secrecy and brevity of radio messages, the attached detailed plans bear code letters for each line and a four letter word for each pertinent column.

10. Parts of Plan of Relief of 5th Infantry Division Applicable to Other Units. The appropriate parts of paragraph 4, Equipment (including itemized lists of items to be taken), and the references quoted in paragraph 5 of the Plan of Relief of the 5th Division are applicable with obvious modifications to the plan of relief of other units.

C. H. Bonesteel.

C. H. BONESTEEL,
Major General, Commanding
United States Army Forces in Iceland.

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Letter, IBC, 23 February, 1943, short title: LAVA PROJECT (Cont'd)

4 Inclosures - Copy No. 1 and Copy No. 2, each.

Incl # 1 - General Plan of Relief of 5th Inf Div. Short Title: LAVA ROCK.

Incl # 2 - Plan for the Replacement of IBC Units other than 5th Division, Part I, Replacement by Rotation of Individuals. Short Title: LAVA SAND.

Incl # 3 - Plan for the Replacement of IBC Units other than 5th Division, Part II, Replacement by Unit - Western Defense Area. Short Title: LAVA HILL.

Incl # 4 - Plan for the Replacement of IBC Units other than 5th Division, Part III, Replacement by Unit - Eastern Defense Area. Short Title: LAVA DIRT.

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COPY NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS
ICELAND BASE COMMAND

23 February, 1943

GENERAL PLAN FOR RELIEF OF 5TH INF DIV FROM ICELAND

SHORT TITLE: LAVA ROCK

1. MISSION. To relieve and transfer from Iceland the 5th Infantry Division by unit replacement on combat positions in three approximately equal increments without jeopardizing the continued defense of Iceland. See attached Plan of Relief (Inclosure No. 4).

2. SECRECY. Secrecy is of paramount importance. During the planning stage only those persons personally approved in each case by the Commanding General, IBC, will be informed that a relief and transfer of the 5th Infantry Division to another European area is contemplated.

Initially, personnel working on the plans will be ostensibly working on a Command Post or Field Exercise to be held later in the Spring. This exercise to feature a plan of reinforcing outlying garrisons by water by units from the vicinity of Reykjavik.

Subsequently, when the preparation of detailed plans must be started by lower units, their real purpose will be concealed under preparations by the First Increment to relieve in a similar manner the corresponding units of the Eastern Defense Area.

No advance detachments to be sent in prior to the arrival of the relieving troops of the first increment.

3. General Plan of Relief. See attached Plan of Relief (Incl No. 4).

a. Relief of 5th Division not to be unduly prolonged after starting because of secrecy considerations and administrative difficulties. Four (4) months should suffice to complete relief; two (2) months minimum.

b. 5th Division to be relieved on positions by increments approximating a combat team. The increment relieved to be shipped out on same transport which brings relieving increment.

c. Command of WESTERN DEFENSE AREA to pass to new division commander upon departure of bulk of 5th Division, or at the discretion of the Commanding General, Iceland Base Command. Advance detachments of command and communications agencies of new division to arrive in first increment in order to become familiar with local conditions and provide for continuation of experienced command agencies.

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Incl No. 1 to Letter to the Chief of Staff, short title: LAVA PROJECT.

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d. Elements of WESTERN DEFENSE AREA to be readjusted between increments as required to enable all shipments therefrom to be effected from Port of Reykjavik without delay in turn around of vessels.

e. The combat team which relieves 2d Infantry later to relieve 5th Division elements of the NORTHWEST sector in order to facilitate subsequent relief of 11th Infantry. This same combat team to be reinforced by elements of last Infantry regiment in order to relieve the infantry of the HOFN and VESTMANNAEYJAR garrisons.

f. Sequence of Departure of 5th Division Combat Teams. From consideration of continued readiness for combat (by having experienced units ready to support the troops in the defense area considered most vital and which will require the longest time to become familiar with defense plan) combat teams of the WESTERN DEFENSE AREA should be replaced in the following general sequence:

10th Inf; 46th FA Bn	-	Reykjavik Area.
2d Inf; 50th FA Bn	-	Hvalfjordur - Alafoss Area.
11th Inf; 19th FA Bn	-	Kaldadarnes - Keflavik Areas.

g. Dossier. The Commanding General, WESTERN DEFENSE AREA, and the commanding officers of all sectors, sub-sectors, defense posts, units, and camps will assemble or prepare a complete file of tactical orders, plans of defense, situation maps and other material which will assist the incoming unit. An up to date list of these documents to be maintained and upon relief will be turned over to the relieving commander, checked and receipted for by him.

h. Advance and Turn-over Detachments. Continuity of the defense to be maintained by the retention here of key personnel from outgoing units for subsequent shipment and by the arrival here of advance parties from incoming units, except that no advance parties are to precede first increment of relieving troops. For details see Plan of Relief (Inclosure No. 4).

4. Equipment. As a principle, in order to conserve shipping, organization equipment will be turned over to relieving units and relieved units will be reequipped at their destinations.

a. The following equipment to accompany both incoming and outgoing units:

(1) Individual clothing (winter only) and equipment as prescribed in T/BA 21.

(2) Organizational equipment normally carried on the individual and equipment required for administration as per itemized list, Annexes 1 to 9, inclusive.

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General Plan for Relief of 5th Inf Div from Iceland, 23 February, 1943 (Cont'd)

(3) Organization equipment required at once for housekeeping at destination but not required during sea voyage as per itemized list, Annexes 10 to 17, inclusive. These items to be placed on board transports at Port of Embarkation in the United States for the relieved units of each increment and left on board for use of the outgoing units upon arrival at destination.

b. Departing units to draw all other equipment and supplies at destination.

c. Arctic clothing and equipage prescribed in Army Regulations 615-45 for Iceland to be turned in by out-going units, renovated and re-issued to incoming units.

d. War Department Recreation Sets and similar equipment issued to departing units to be turned over on receipt to relieving unit. One copy of receipt to be forwarded to Special Services Officer, Headquarters Iceland Base Command.

e. Surplus baggage in possession of outgoing units to be disposed of as follows:

(1) Trunk lockers in the hands of enlisted men of departing units - to be turned in for redistribution to remaining and incoming troops.

(2) Organization Fund furniture and bulky property - to be sold or otherwise disposed of locally.

(3) Colors and guidons - to be shipped to Quartermaster at last home station of unit in United States, or otherwise as directed by War Department.

(4) Excess personal property - to be shipped to United States by individual at government expense.

f. Provision to be made by War Department for:

(1) Summer clothing if required.

(2) Special chemically impregnated clothing.

(3) Emergency rations for entire voyage - to remain aboard vessel for out-going units.

(4) Administrative features of movement orders for outgoing as well as incoming units, in order to coordinate supply and reequipment of units at destinations.

(5) Marking of equipment and supplies - special attention to marking of barracks bags (AR 850-5) to avoid confusion during relief.

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(6) Shipment to this base of all organization equipment still due outgoing units, especially motor vehicles.

4. Unless otherwise directed by War Department, both incoming and outgoing units to carry for full T/O strength the items prescribed in Annexes 1 to 9, inclusive.

5. Security measures and G-2 Plan. See Inclosure No. 3.

C. H. BONESTEEL,
Major General, Commanding
United States Army Forces in Iceland.

4 Incls -

Incl 1 - List of equipment to accompany both incoming and outgoing units, containing Annexes 1 to 9, inclusive.
Incl 2 - List of organization equipment required by outgoing units for housekeeping, containing Annexes 10 to 17, inclusive.
Incl 3 - G-2 Plan.
Incl 4 - Plan of Relief.

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LIST OF EQUIPMENT TO ACCOMPANY BOTH

INCOMING AND OUTGOING

UNITS

The attached Annexes 1 to 9, inclusive, show in detail the organizational equipment normally carried on the individual and equipment required for administration.

These items are to accompany both incoming and outgoing units.

Incl No 1 (LAVA ROCK)

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EQUIPMENT

1. To accompany incoming and outgoing units.

   (a) Individual clothing and equipment (winter clothing only) as prescribed in T/BA 21.

   (b) Organizational equipment normally carried on the individual and equipment required for administration as per itemized list, Annex 1 - 9 Incl.

   (c) Organization equipment required for housekeeping as per itemized list Annex 10 - 17 incl. Note: These items to be placed on board transport at Port of Embarkation in the United States and to be left on board for use of the outgoing units upon arrival at destination.

2. Units to draw all other equipment and supplies at destination.

3. Arctic Clothing and Equipage prescribed in AR 615-45 for Iceland will be turned in by outgoing units, renovated and re-issued to incoming units.

4. Surplus baggage in possession of outgoing units will be disposed of as follows:

   (a) Trunk lockers -- turned in for redistribution.

   (b) Company Fund property -- To be sold or otherwise disposed of locally.

   (c) Colors and guidons -- To be shipped to QM at last home station of unit in United States.

   (d) Excess personal property -- To be shipped to United States by individual at government expense.

5. Provision to be made by WD for:

   (a) Summer clothing if required.

   (b) Special chemically impregnated clothing.

   (c) Emergency rations for entire voyage -- to remain aboard vessel for outgoing units.

   (d) Movement order for outgoing as well as incoming units.

   (e) Marking of equipment and supplies -- special attention to marking of barracks bags (AR 850-5) to avoid confusion during relief.

   (f) Shipment to the base of all organization equipment still due outgoing units, especially motor vehicles.

   (g) Equalizing quantity of organization equipment accompanying incoming and outgoing units due to difference in personnel authorized and actually

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EQUIPMENT (CONTINUED)

present. (Recommend that the prescribed items be carried by both incoming and outgoing units for full T/BA strength. Personnel left behind to retain only the equipment normally carried by a casual).

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT

Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per Indiv
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Set, antidim	1	Per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of the masks issued may be diaphragm
Respirator, dust	2	Per M vehicle (except Mtcl)
	1	Per Mtcl

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

Compass, lensatic, luminous dial, w/case	1	Per AT Plat; Com Plat; LMG Sec; LMG Sqd; MG Plat; MG Sec; MG Sqd; Mortar Plat; Mortar Sec; Mortar Sqd; How Plat; How Sec; Rifle Plat; Intell NCO; Reconn NCO; Inst NCO; NCOs and Scouts of Intell and Reconn Plat; O (except Chap and atchd Med)
Compass, Watch	1	Per 1st Sgt; T Sgt; Msgr; Bglr; Obsrv Intell; Lineman; Cfr; Mtcylt; Sq Ldr and Asst Sqd Ldr of Rifle Sqd; Indiv of Intell and Reconn Plat not issued lensatic compass; Chaplain; O and NCOs first 4 grades of attached Med

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Brassard, Geneva Convention	1	Per Chap; Indiv (attached Med)
Brassard, Green Cross	1	Per Indiv (Vet)
Foot Powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM or fraction thereof
Kit, Dental Officers	1	Per Dental O
Dental Privates	1	Per Pvt, Pvt 1cl, Technician, Med Dept on Dent Serv
Medical, Noncommissioned Officers	1	Per NCO, Med Dept on Med Serv
Medical, Officers	1	Per Med O
Medical, Privates	1	Per Technician, Pvt 1cl, Pvt, Med Dept on Med Serv
Veterinary, Officers	1	Per Vet O
Veterinary, Noncommissioned Officers	1	Per NCO, Med Dept on Vet Serv
Veterinary, Privates	1	Per Technician, Pvt 1cl, Pvt, Med Dept on Vet Serv
[illegible]	1	Per Indiv
[illegible]	1	Per Indiv

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ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT		
AMMUNITION		
Cartridge, cal. .30	60	Per Indiv armed w/carbine
Cartridge, cal. .45	21	Per Indiv armed w/pistol, automatic or revolver, cal 45
Cartridge, cal. .30	320	Per Rifle, automatic, Browning, cal 30. Carried: 80 by each Auto Rifleman; 120 by each Asst Auto Rifleman; 120 by each Ammunition Carrier; all in 20-round magazines
Cartridge, cal. .30	48	Per Indiv armed w/rifle, cal 30, M1
Cartridge, cal. .30	40	Per Indiv armed w/rifle, cal 30, M1903
~~Cartridge, Special blank M3~~	~~11~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade M1~~
EQUIPMENT		
Binoculars, M3	1	Per Agent; Cml Sec DHq; Med Det; C (except Med, Dent and Chap); 1st Sgt Intell Staff Sgt; Sgt or Cpl Obsrv, Intell; NCO of Intell and Reconn Plat; Reconn Corp; Plat Sgt; Reconn and Sig Sgt; Sec Ldr of LMG, Mortar, MG, AT and How Secs; Scouts; Obsrv Intell of Bn Hq Co
Carbine, cal. .30, M1 or Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	1	Per Indiv shown armed with Carbine in T/O; Bandsman, Rifle, US cal 30 M1903 may be issued in lieu
Cleaning and preserving materials and tools and equipment used therewith	(a)	(a) Units will take necessary cleaning accessories for individual arms in possession of troops
Knife, trench, M1	1	Per Indiv armed w/Carbine or Automatic Rifle in Rifle, Hv W and Bn Hq Cos
~~Launcher, grenade, M1~~	~~1~~	~~Per rifle cal 30 M1903 issued for AT Defense~~
~~Pad, recoil~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade M1~~
Pistol, automatic, cal. .45 or Revolver, cal. .45	1	Per Indiv shown armed with pistol in T/O (except bandsman)
Rifle, Browning, automatic, cal. .30	1	Per Indiv shown armed with automatic rifle in T/O
Rifle, US cal .30, M1 or M1903	1	Per Indiv shown armed with rifle in T/O. Those Indiv for whom Rifle M1903 is specified will be armed with Rifle M1903.
~~Sight, Grenade launcher, M2~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, Grenade, M1~~
Watch, 7-jewel, wrist	1	Per Com Chief; Com Sgt; 1st Sgt; Mess Sgt; Radio Operator; Reconn and Sig Sgt; Sec Chief; Sec Ldr; Sgt Major; Sup Sgt; Plat Sgt; Sb Operator; T Chief; T Sgt; NCO first 3 grades in Hq and higher Hq and Hq Cos and Hq Spec Troops

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Axe, intrenching, M1910	1	Per 10 EM
Bags, money, leather	2	Per Div Finance Officer
Carrier, axe, intrenching, M1910	1	Per axe, intrenching
Carrier, pickmattock, intrenching, M1910	1	Per pickmattock, intrenching
Carrier, shovel, intrenching, M1910	1	Per shovel, intrenching
Carrier, wire cutter, M1938	1	Per wire cutter, light, M1938
Case, brief, leather	2	Per Div Finance Office
	1	Per Inspectors Sec, DHQ
Case, dispatch, canvas	1	Per O; NCO first 3 grades (except Plat Sgt); Sup Sgt
Chest, fiber, record, company	1	Per Co; Med Det w/Inf Rgt
Cover, Protective	1	Per Indiv
Cutter, wire, M1938	1	Per 10 EM
Desk, fiber, field, headquarters	20	Per DHQ
	3	Per Regtl Hq
	1	Per Bn Hq
Desk, fiber, field, company	1	Per Co; Bn Hq Det
Files, paper, arch, w/o index and cover	5	Per Ord Sec DHQ; Sig Sec DHQ
Files, paper, clip, wood back	5	Per Sig Sec DHQ, JAG Sec DHQ
Flags, aircraft and auto, (bunting):		
Brig Gen	1	Per Brig Gen
Maj Gen	1	Per Maj Gen
Flags, boat and field, (bunting):		
Brig Gen	1	Per Brig Gen
Maj Gen	1	Per Maj Gen
Flags, Geneva Convention, Red Cross, (bunting) ambulance and marker	1	Per Hq Sec, Regt Med Det
	2	Per Bn Med Sec
	1	Per Bn of Regt
Flags, National Colors, Service	1	Per Regt
Silk	2	Per Div Finance Office; JAG Sec DHQ
Lockers, trunk	2	Per Ord Sec, DHQ
Machine, Computing, listing, manual complete w/carrying case	4	Per Div Finance Office
Computing, non-listing, manual	1	Per QM Sec DHQ
Duplicating, fluid process	1	Per DHQ; Regtl Hq Co
Duplicating, stencil process	1	Per Sig Sec DHQ
	5	Per DHQ
Numbering	2	Per Div Finance Office
Paper fastening, wire staple, preformed	1	Per Div JA Office
	4	Per Div Finance Office; QM Sec DHQ
Payroll, hand operated	2	Per Div Finance Office
Perforators, 2-hole	1	Per Div Finance Office; JAG Sec DHQ
Pickmattock, intrenching, M1910	3	Per 10 EM
Pocket, Magazine f/Carbine, cal. .30 M1	2	Per Indiv armed w/Carbine
Safes, field, key-lock	1	Per QM Sec DHQ; Inspectors Sec DHQ Cml Sec DHQ; Chaplains Sec DHQ; JAG Sec DHQ; Ord Sec DHQ
	3	Per DHQ
	5	Per Div Finance Office; Sig Sec DHQ
Shovels, intrenching, M1910	5	Per 10 EM
Slings, color, web, OD	1	Per Color

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT CONTINUED

Stamp, rubber, official	3	Per Regtl and higher Hq; Sep Bn Hq
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bugler
Typewriters, portable	1	Per desk, fiber, field, company, complete; desk fiber, field, headquarters, complete
Whistles, thunderer	1	Per O; WO; NCOs first 4 grades

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Flashlight, TL-122-A	1	Per O, NCO, Ord Sec DHQ; in other units; per Com Chief; 1st Sgt; Mech (014); Mess Sgt; O; Plat Sgt; Sec Ldr; Sgt Major; Sqd Ldr Hv W Co; Sq Ldr AT Co; Sup Sgt; T Sgt; Truckmaster; Vehicle driver; Lineman
	3	Per Cml Sec DHQ; Ord Sec DHQ

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT

Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of the masks issued may be diaphragm
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Respirator, dust, M1	1	Per Motorcycle
	2	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle except motorcycle
Sets, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

Compass, watch	3	Per Hq Sec; Bn Sec or Det, atchd Med
	4	Per Btry

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Brassard, Geneva Convention	1	Per Indiv of Med and Dent Serv
Foot powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM or fraction thereof
Kit, Dental Officers	1	Per Dent O below grade Lt Col
Dental Privates	1	Per Pvt 1cl or Pvt, MD on Dent Serv
Medical Noncommissioned Officers	1	Per NCO, MD on Med Serv
Medical Officers	1	Per Med O below grade Lt Col
Medical Privates	1	Per Pvt 1cl or Pvt, MD on Med Serv
Packet, first-aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1" spool by 5 yards	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulfanilimide, USP, 7.5 gr tab; 12 in box	1	Box per Indiv

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT
AMMUNITION

Cartridge, ball, cal. .45	21	Per Indiv armed w/pistol
Cartridge, cal. .30	60	Per Indiv armed with carbine cal 30
	40	Per Indiv armed w/rifle cal 30 M1903 in lieu of carbine
~~Cartridge, cal. .30, Special blank, M3~~	~~11~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade, M1~~

EQUIPMENT

Carbine, cal. .30, M1 or Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	1	Per EM (except NCO's of 1st 3 grades and men armed with rifle)
Binocular, M5	4	Per Fire Btry; Regtl and higher Hq Btry
Compass, M2 Complete	8	Per Bn Hq Btry
	1	Per Hq Btry, Div Arty
Watch, pocket, 15 or more jewels, complete	3	Per Bn Hq Btry; Fire Btry
Watch, stop, type B, class 15	1	Per Btry
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel, complete	1	Per Met Sec, Div Arty Hq Btry
	2	Per Hq Sec; Det atchd Med

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ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT CONTINUED
EQUIPMENT CONTINUED

Watch, wrist, 7 jewel, complete (Cont'd)	4	Per Fire Btry; Serv Btry
	6	Per Hq Btry, Div Arty
	10	Per Bn Hq Btry
~~Launcher, grenade, M1 w/pad, recoil~~	~~8~~	~~Per Hq Btry~~
	14	Per Serv Btry; Fire Btry
Pistol, automatic, cal. .45	1	Per O; WO; NCO 1st 3 grades
~~Rifle, US Cal .30 M1903~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade, M1~~
Cleaning and preserving materials and tools and equipment used therewith	(a)	(a) Units will take necessary cleaning accessories for individual arms in possession of troops

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Case, canvas, dispatch, M1938	4	Per Fire Btry
	5	Per Serv Btry; Hq Btry, Div Arty
	7	Per Bn Hq Btry
Chest, record, fiber, company	1	Per Btry
Cover, protective	1	Per Indiv
Desk, fiber, field, headquarters, complete	1	Per Serv Btry
	2	Per Hq Btry, Div Arty
	3	Per Bn Hq Btry
Desk, fiber, field, company, complete	1	Per Btry
Flag, aircraft, and automobile, bunting, Brig Gen	1	Per Brig Gen
Flag, boat and field, bunting, Brig Gen	1	Per Brig Gen
Flag, national standard, Service Silk	1	Per Hq Btry, Div Arty
	1	Per Bn Hq Btry
Kit, sewing	1	Per 12 EM
Machine, duplicating, stencil process	1	Per Det Hq Btry; Bn
Pocket, magazing, f/carbine	2	Per Indiv armed w/carbine
Safe, field, key lock	1	Per Bn Hq Btry
Sling, color, web	1	Per standard
Stamp, rubber, official	3	Per Div Arty Hq Btry; Bn Hq Btry
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bugler
Typewriter, portable	1	Per desk, fiber, field
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per Arty O and WO
	7	Add per Btry

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Flashlight, TL-122-A	1	Per O; NCO; Cook, mechanic

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT		
Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of the masks issued may be diaphragm
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Respirator, dust, M1	1	Per Motorcycle
	2	Per fual consuming motor vehicle except motorcycle
Set, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv
ENGINEER EQUIPMENT		
Compass, lensatic, with leather case, luminous dial	4	Per Co
Compass, watch	1	Per WO, NCO (except technician), bglr, mtclt in Bn; O, NCO first 4 grades (except technician) of Med Det
Knife, pocket, engineer, 4-blade w/cleris	1	Per EM
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT		
Brassard, Geneva Convention	1	Per Indiv (Med and Dent Serv)
Foot Powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM or fraction thereof
Kit, Dental, Officers	1	Per Dent O
Dental, Privates	1	Per Pvt lcl or Pvt MD on Dent Serv
Medical, Officers	1	Per Med O
Medical, Noncommissioned Officers	1	Per NCO, MD on Med Serv
Medical, Privates	1	Per Pvt lcl or Pvt MD on Med Serv
Packet, first-aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1" spool by 5 yards	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulfanilimide, USP, 7.5 gr tab; 12 in box	1	Box per Indiv
ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT		
EQUIPMENT		
Binocular, M3	1	Per Med Det
Carbine, cal. .30, M1	1	Per NCO, 3rd and 4th grade; bglr; cook; Mtclt; radio operator
~~Launcher, grenade, cal. .30, M1~~	~~9~~	~~Per Ltr Co~~
~~Pad, recoil~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade, M1~~
Pistol, automatic, cal. .45	1	Per O, WO and EM of 1st 2 grades May be issued in lieu of Pistol, auto
Revolver, cal. .45	9	Per Ltr Co
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	1	Per EM not armed with Carbine, Pistol, rifle cal 30 M1903
Rifle, cal. .30, M1		
Watch, pocket, 15 or more jewel, complete	1	Per Co; Bn Hq
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel, complete	1	Per atchd Med & Dent O
Cleaning and preserving materials, tools and equipment used therewith	(a)	(a) Units will take necessary cleaning accessories for individual arms in possession of troops
~~Sight, Grenade launcher, M1~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~

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ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT
AMMUNITION

Cartridge, cal. .30	60	Per Carbine
Cartridge, cal. .45	21	Per Pistol
Cartridge, cal. .30	48	Per Rifle, cal 30, M1.
~~Cartridge, rifle grenade, cal. .30, M9~~	~~11~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade, cal 30, M1~~

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Carrier, wire cutter	1	Per wire cutter
Case, canvas, dispatch	1	Per O; WO; 1st Sgt; Sup Sgt; Mtclt
Chest, fiber, record, company	1	Per Co; atchd Med
Cover, Protective	1	Per Indiv
Cutter, wire, M1938	10	Per Ltr Co
Desk, Fiber, field, headquarters	2	Per Bn Hq
Desk, fiber, field, company	1	Per Co
Flag, Geneva Convention, Red Cross, (bunting), ambulance marker	1	Per Med Sec
Flag, National standard, (silk)	1	Per Bn
Kit, sewing	1	Per 12 EM
Machine, duplicating	1	Per Bn Hq
Pocket, magazine, f/carbine cal. .30, M1	2	Per Indiv armed w/carbine
Safe, field, key lock	1	Per Bn Hq
Sling, color, web	1	Per Standard
Stamp, rubber, official	3	Per Bn Hq
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bglr
Typewriter, portable	1	Per desk, fiber, field, Hq; desk, fiber, field, Co.
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per O; WO; 1st Sgt; Plat Sgt; Truck-master

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Flashlight TL-122-A	1	Per fuel consuming vehicle; O, WO and NCO 1st 4 grades of atchd Med
	8	Per Ltr Co
	20	Per H & S Co

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT

Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of the masks issued may be diaphragm
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Respirator, dust, M1	2	Per fuel consuming vehicle except motorcycle
	1	Per Mtcl
Set, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

Compass, lensatic, w/leather case, luminous dial	1	Per Coll Co; Bn Hq
Compass, watch	3	Per Hq Det
	16	Per Coll Co

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Brassard, Geneva Convention	1	Per Indiv (Med and Dent Serv)
Foot Powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM or fraction thereof
Kit, Dental Officers	1	Per Dent O
Dental Pvt's	1	Per Pvt 1cl or Pvt, MD on Dent Serv
Medical Officers	1	Per Med O
Medical Noncommissioned Officers	1	Per NCO, MD on Med Serv
Medical Privates	1	Per Pvt 1cl or Pvt, MD on Med Serv
Packet, first-aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1" spool by 5 yards	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulfanilimide, USP, 7.5 gr tab; 12 in box	1	Box per Indiv

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

Binocular, M3	1	Per CO Med Bn
Watch, wrist, 7-jewel, complete	1	Per Bn Hq; Clear Co
	3	Per Hq Det
	6	Per Coll Co

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Axe, intrenching	1	Per 2 EM
Carrier, axe, intrenching	1	Per Axe, intrenching
Carrier, shovel, intrenching	1	Per Shovel, intrenching
Carrier, wire cutter	1	Per Cutter, wire
Case, canvas, dispatch	1	Per Field O; Staff O; Co CO; Plat Cmdr; NCO 1st 3 grades
Chest, record, fiber, company, complete	1	Per Co; Hq Det
Cover, protective	1	Per Indiv
Cutter, wire, M1938	2	Per Hq Det; Co

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT CONTINUED

Desk, fiber, field, headquarters	4	Per Hq Det
Desk, fiber, field, company	1	Per Co; Hq Det
Flags, Geneva Convention, Red Cross, (bunting)	4	Per Co
Flag, field, hospital	1	Per Clear Co
Flag, National Standard, silk	1	Per Bn
Machine, duplicating, spirit	1	Per Hq Det
Safe, field, key-lock	1	Per Clear Co
	2	Per Hq Det Bn
Shovel, intrenching	1	Per 2 EM
Sling, color, web	1	Per Standard
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bgler
Typewriter, portable	1	Per Desk, fiber, field
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per Bn CO; Co CO; Lt in Co; 1st Sgt; Plat Sgt; Truckmaster

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Flashlight, TL-122-A	1	Per O; WO; NCO; Litter Sqd in Coll Co; fuel consuming motor vehicle

Annex 7 4

54th Med Bn

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT

Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	2	Per 5 Indiv
Mask, gas, diaphragm	3	Per 5 Indiv
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Respirator, dust, M1	1	Per Mtcl
	2	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle except Mtcl
Set, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

Compass, watch	12	Per Co

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Foot Powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM
Packet, first aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1" spool by 5 yds	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulfanilamide, USP, 7.5 gr tab, 12 in box	1	Box per Indiv

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

Cartridge, cal. .30	40	Per Indiv armed w/Rifle M1903
	60	Per Indiv armed w/Carbine
Cartridge, cal. .45	21	Per Indiv armed w/Pistol
	30	Per Indiv armed w/sub machine gun
Carbine, cal. .30, M1 or Rifle Cal. .30, M1903	1	Per Indiv below field grade except chauffeurs and truck drivers
Pistol, automatic, cal. .45	1	Per Field O
Submachine gun, cal. .45, Thompson, M1928	1	Per Chaufeur and truck driver
Watch, pocket, 15 or more jewel, complete	1	Per Co
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	10	Per Co
Cleaning and preserving materials, tools and equipment used therewith	(a)	(a) Units will take necessary cleaning accessories for individual arms in possession of troops

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Case, canvas, dispatch	1	Per O; WO
Case, canvas for 30-round magazine, submachine gun	1	Per sub-machine gun
Chest, fiber, record, company	1	Per Co

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT CONTINUED

Cover, protective	1	Per Indiv
Desk, fiber, field, headquarters	1	Per Co
Desk, fiber, field, company	1	Per Co
Kit, sewing	1	Per 12 EM
Safe, field, key lock	1	Per Co
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bglr
Typewriter, portable	1	Per Co
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per O; WO; EM of following specifications: 238, 410, 502, 566, 585, 642, 644, 673, 813, M16, 824

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Flashlight, TL-122-A	1	Per O; WO; M/Sgt; T/Sgt; S/Sgt; 1st Sgt; Tech 3rd Grade; EM of following specifications: 245, 344, 345, 641, 643, 675; 2 EM of following specifications: 309, 704, 741, 766, 776, 650

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT

Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per individual
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of the masks issued may be diaphragm
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Respirator, dust, M1	2	Per fuel consuming vehicle except Mtcl
	1	Per Mtcl
Set, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

Compass, lensatic, w/leather case	1	Per O; Plat Sgt; Intell Sgt; Reconn Sgt; Sqd Ldr; Msgr; Scout; S Car Cmdr

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Foot Powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM or fraction thereof
Packet, first aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1" spool by 5 yds	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulfanilamide, USP, 7.5 gr tab, 12 in box	1	Box per Indiv

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT
AMMUNITION

Cartridge, cal. .30	60	Per Indiv armed w/Carbine
Cartridge, cal. .30	40	Per Indiv armed w/Rifle, M1903
Cartridge, cal. .45	21	Per Indiv armed w/Pistol
	30	Per Indiv armed w/Submachine gun
~~Cartridge, Cal. .30, grenade~~	~~11~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~

EQUIPMENT

Binoculars, M3	1	Per O; 1st Sgt; Sqd Ldrs; Scouts; Plat and Sec Sgts; Reconn and Intell Sgts;
Watch, wrist, 7-jewel, complete	1	Per Tr Hq, Plat
Watch, stop, complete	1	Per Tr
Carbine, cal. .30 or Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	62	Per Tr
Gun, submachine, cal. .45, M1928	18	Per Tr
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	76	Per Tr
~~Launcher, grenade, M1~~	~~1~~	~~Per Rifle, cal. .30, M1903~~
Pistols, automatic, cal. .45	45	Per Tr
~~Rod, recoil~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
~~Sight, grenade launcher, M1~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
Cleaning and preserving materials and tools and equipment used therewith	(a)	(a) Units will take necessary cleaning accessories for individual arms in possession of troops

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Axe, intrenching, M1910	20	Per Tr
Carriers, axe, intrenching	1	Per Axe, intrenching
Carriers, wire cutter, M1938	1	Per Cutter, wire, M1938
Case, canvas, dispatch	1	Per O; NCO 1st 3 grades; Plat Sgt; Sec Sgt;
Case, web, 30-round magazine	1	Per Sub machine gun
Chest, fiber, record, company	2	Per Tr
Cutter, wire, M1938	20	Per Tr
Cover, protective	1	Per Indiv
Desk, fiber, field, company	1	Per Tr
Kit, sewing	1	Per 12 EM
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bglr
Typewriter, portable	1	Per Desk, fiber, field, company
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per O; WO; 1st Sgt; Plat Sgt; Truckmaster

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Flashlight, type TL-122-A	5	Per Tr
	1	Per O; WO; NCO; Rad Mech; Motor vehicle mechanic

Annex [illegible]

5th Recon Tr

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT		
Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of masks issued to be diaphragm
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Respirator, dust, M1	1	Per Mtcl
	2	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle except Mtcl
Set, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv
ENGINEER EQUIPMENT		
Compass, watch	1	Per O; WO; NCO
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT		
Foot powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM
Packet, first aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1-Inch by 5 yds	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulfanilamide, USP, 7.5 gr tab, 12 in box	1	Per Indiv
ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT		
Carbine, cal. .30, M1 or Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	101	Per Co
~~Launcher, grenade~~	~~7~~	~~Per Co~~
Pistol, automatic, cal. .45	10	Per Co
Rifle, cal. .30, M1	90	Per Co
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	5	Per Co
~~Rod, Recoil~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
~~Sight, grenade launcher~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
Cartridge, cal. .30	60	Per Indiv armed w/Carbine
	48	Per Indiv armed w/Rifle M1
	40	Per Indiv armed W/Rifle M1903 in lieu of Carbine
~~Cartridge, grenade, cal. .30~~	~~11~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
Cartridge, cal. .45	21	Per Indiv armed w/Pistol
Cleaning and preserving materials, tools, and equipment used therewith	(a)	(a) Units will take necessary cleaning accessories for individual arms in possession of troops
QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT		
Case, canvas, dispatch	1	Per O; NCO 1st 3 grades
Chest, fiber, record, company	1	Per Co
Cover, protective	1	Per Indiv
Desk, fiber, field, company	1	Per Co
Kit, sewing	1	Per 12 EM
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bglr
Typewriter, portable	1	Per Desk, fiber, field, company
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per O; 1st Sgt; Truckmaster
SIGNAL EQUIPMENT		
Flashlight, TL-122-A	1	Per O; NCO 1st 4 grades; Chauffeur

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[illegible]	1	4 oz tube or can per Indiv
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Set, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of the masks issued to be diaphragm
Respirator, dust	1	Per Mtcl
	2	Per fuel consuming vehicle except Mtcl
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT		
Boot powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM
Packet, first aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1" x 5 yds	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulphanilimide, USP, 7.5 gr tab, 12 tab	1	Box per Indiv
ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT		
Carbine, cal. .30, M1 or Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	106	Per Co
~~Launcher, grenade~~	~~2~~	~~Per Co~~
Submachine gun, Thompson, M1928, cal 45	13	Per Co
Pistol, cal. .45, automatic	5	Per Co
Rifles, cal. .30, M1903	35	Per Co
~~Pouch, rocket~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
~~Sight, grenade launcher~~	~~1~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
Cartridge, cal. .30	60	Per Indiv armed w/carbine
	40	Per Indiv armed w/rifle
~~Cartridge, cal. .30, grenade~~	~~11~~	~~Per Launcher, grenade~~
Cartridge, cal. .45	21	Per Indiv armed w/pistol
	30	Per Indiv armed w/submachine gun
Watch, wrist, 7-jewel	2	Per Co
Cleaning and preserving materials, tools and equipment used therewith	(a)	(a) Units will take necessary cleaning accessories for individual arms in possession of troops
QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT		
Case, canvas, dispatch	2	Per Co
Case, canvas, 30 round magazine	1	Per Indiv armed w/submachine gun
Chest, fiber, record, company	1	Per Co
Cover, protective	1	Per Indiv
Desk, fiber, field, company	1	Per Co
Typewriter, portable	1	Per Desk, fiber, field, company
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per O; 1st Sgt; Sec Sgt
SIGNAL EQUIPMENT		
Flashlight, type TL-122-A	5	Per Co
	1	Per O; NCO

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CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT

Impregnite, shoe, M1	1	8 oz tube or can per Indiv
Mask, gas, service	1	Per Indiv. Not to exceed 30% of the masks issued may be diaphragm
Ointment, protective, M1	1	4 oz tube per Indiv
Respirator, dust, M1	1	Per Mtcl
	2	Per fuel consuming vehicle except Mtcl
Set, anti-dim	1	Per Indiv

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

Compass, watch	1	Per Lineman; 1st Sgt; Sec Ldr; Msgr; T Sgt; O

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Foot powder, 1/4 pound	1	Per O; WO; 4 EM
Packet, first aid	1	Per Indiv
Plaster, adhesive, 1" spool by 5 yds	1	Per 8 Indiv
Sulfanilamide, USP, 7.5 gr tab, 12 in box	1	Box per Indiv

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

Binocular, M3	1	Per O; Sec Ldr; Motor Sgt; Sqd
Carbine, cal. .30, M1	76	Per Plat Inf Div
Cartridge, ball, cal. .45	21	Per Pistol
Cartridge, ball, cal. .30	60	Per Indiv armed w/Carbine
	40	Per Indiv armed w/Rifle, M1903
Pistol, automatic, cal. .45, M1911	4	Per Plat Inf Div
Watch, wrist, 7-jewel, complete	1	Per Sgt Maj; 1st Sgt; Plat Ldr; Sec Ldr

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Axe, intrenching, M1910	1	Per 10 EM
Carrier, axe, intrenching	1	Per Axe, intrenching, M1910
Carrier, pickmattock, intrenching, M1910	1	Per Pickmattock, intrenching, M1910
Carrier, shovel, intrenching, M1910	1	Per Shovel, intrenching, M1910
Carrier, wire cutter, M1938	1	Per Cutter, wire, M1938
Case, canvas, dispatch, M1936	1	Per Mtr Sgt; 1st Sgt; Comm Sgt
Cutter, wire, heavy, M1938	1	Per 10 EM
Pickmattock, intrenching, M1910	1	Per 10 EM
Shovel, intrenching, M1910	1	Per 2 EM
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	Per Bglr
Whistle, thunderer	1	Per O
Whistle, Military Police	1	Per MP

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Flashlight, TL-122-A	1	Per O; Auto Mech; Chauffeur; Plat Ldr; Sec Ldr; Sqd Ldr; MP; Sup Sgt

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LIST OF ORGANIZATION EQUIPMENT

REQUIRED BY OUTGOING UNITS FOR HOUSEKEEPING

Annexes 10 to 17, inclusive, attached hereto contain itemized lists of organization equipment required at once for housekeeping but not required during sea voyage. These items to be placed on board transports at Port of Embarkation in the United States for relieved units of each increment and left on board for use of the outgoing units upon arrival at destination.

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MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Battalion Medical Equipment (Medical components only)	1	Per Bn Med Sec
Case, meat and dairy inspection	1	Per Div Vet
Chest, MD #4	1	Per Med Det
Chest, MD #60	1	Per Dental O
Regimental Hq Medical Equipment (Medical components only)	1	Per Hq Sec, Regtl Med Det

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bags, canvas, water, sterilizing	1	Per 100 Indiv or fraction thereof; Bn Med Sec; Hq Sec, Regt Med Det
Buckets, general purpose	2	Per Co; Cml Sec DHQ; Bn Med Sec
	3	Per Hq Sec, Regt Med Det
	4	Add Per Div Hq Co
Cans, corrugated, nesting, galvanized, w/cover, 10-gal	1	Per Co
	2	Add per Div Hq Co
16-gal	1	Per Co
	2	Add per Div Hq Co
24-gal	1	Per Co
	2	Add per Div Hq Co
32-gal	1	Per Co
	2	Add per Div Hq Co
Chairs, folding, metal or wood	1	Per O, WO or Clk, DHQ
	4	Per Chap Sec, DHQ
Chest, commissary, complete, w/equipment	1	Per Serv Co
Containers, round, insulated, M1941, w/inserts	2	Per 50 Indiv or fraction thereof
Flies, tent, wall, large, complete, w/pins and poles	1	Per Co;
	2	Add per DHQ
Heater, water, f/Field range, M1937	3	Per Field range, M1937
Lanterns, electric, portable, hand	14	Per Regtl Hq Co
	9	Per Serv Co
	4	Per Ord Dec DHQ; Med Sec DHQ; Bn Hq Co
	3	Per Rifle Co; Hv W Co; Div Hq Co; AT Co; JAG Sec DHQ
	2	Per QM Sec DHQ; Cml Sec DHQ; Sig Sec DHQ
	1	Per Desk, fiber, field, headquarters, complete
Lanterns, gasoline, w/mantle and pump	2	Per QM Sec DHQ; JAG Sec DHQ
	4	Per Div Finance Office
Lanterns, kerosene, Army	4	Per Med Sec DHQ
Outfit, Chaplains, Christian faith	1	Per Chaplain, Christian faith
Jewish faith	1	Per Chaplain, Jewish faith

1855

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT CONTINUED

Outfit, Officers' mess	1	Per 6 O's or fraction thereof in Bn or higher Hq
Paulin, canvas, 20.5' x 40'	2	Per Cml Sec DHQ
Ranges, field, M1937, 4-unit set	1	Per Co of 226-300 men
3-unit set	1	Per Co of 125-225 men
2-unit set	1	Per Co of 51-124 men (except Div Hq Co)
	3	Per Div Hq Co
1-unit set	1	Per Co of 1-50 men
Roll, commissary, complete	1	Per Div Hq Co; Serv Co
Screen, latrine, complete w/pins and poles	1	Per Co (except Hq Co Div); Bn Hq; Rgt Hq
	4	Hq Co Div
Stoves, tent, complete	1	Per tent except shelter tent
Tables, camp, folding	65	Per DHQ
Tents, command post, complete, w/pins and poles	1	Per Bn Hq
	2	Per Sig Sec DHQ; Med Sec DHQ
	3	Per Ord Sec DHQ
	5	Per Regtl Hq
	15	Per DHQ
Tents, pyramidal, complete, w/pins and poles	1	Per Hq Sec, Regtl Med Det
Tents, wall, small, complete, w/pins and poles	1	Per Cen O; Regtl Hq; Bn Hq; Chaplains Sec DHQ; JAG Sec DHQ; Bn Med Sec
	5	Per Med Sec DHQ
Typewriter, portable	1	Per outfit, chaplain

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MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Chest, MD, No. 4	1	Per Med Det
Chest, MD, No. 60	1	Per Dent O
Regimental Hq Medical equipment	1	Per Bn Med Det

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bag, canval, water sterilizing	1	Per Hq Sec or Det atchd Med; Btry
Bucket, general purpose, 14 quart	2	Per Btry; add 2 per Hq Btry
	3	Per Med Det
Cans, corrugated, nesting, galvanized, w/cover 10 gal.	1	Per Btry; Add 1 per Hq Btry
16 gal.	1	Per Btry; Add 1 per Hq Btry
24 gal.	1	Per Btry
32 gal.	1	Per Btry
Container, round, insulated, M1941, w/inserts	1	Per 25 Indiv or major fraction thereof
Fly, tent, wall, large w/pins and poles	1	Per Btry; Add 1 per Hq Btry
Lantern, electric, portable	2	Per Med Det
	4	Per Fire Btry
	7	Per Serv Btry, Hq Btry
Lantern, kerosene, Army	2	Per Btry
Outfit, Chaplains, Christian Faith	1	Per Cahplain, Christian Faith
Jewish Faith	1	Per Chaplain, Jewish faith
Outfit, Officers Mess	1	Per 6 officers or less in Bn or higher Hq
Paulin, canvas, 12' x 17'	1	Per Btry
	3	Add per Serv Btry
Paulin, canvas, 20' x 40'	1	Per Serv Btry
Ranges, field, M1937, 2-unit w/extra burner	1	Per Serv Btry
3-unit w/extra burner	1	Per Hq Btry; Fire Btry
Roll, commissary	1	Per Serv Btry
Screen, latrine, complete w/poles and pins	1	Per Btry; Add 1 per Hq Btry
Stove, tent, complete	1	Per Btry;
	3	Per Bn Hq; Hq Div Arty
Tent, pyramidal, complete w/pins and poles	1	Per Med Det; Serv Btry
Tent, wall, small, complete w/fly, pins, and poles	1	Per Gen O; Med Det; Bn Hq
Typewriter, portable	1	Per Outfit, Chaplain

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MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Chest, MD #4	1	Per Med Det
Chest, MD #60	1	Per Dent O
Regimental headquarters medical equipment, (Medical components only)	1	Per Med Det

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bag, canvas, water sterilizing	1	Per 100 Indiv or fraction thereof
Bucket, general purpose, 14 qt	3	Per Med Det
Cans, corrugated, nesting, galvanized, w/cover, 10 gal.	1	Per Co of 175 or less
	1	Add per Co for each add 150 or fraction thereof
16 gal.	1	Per Co of 175 or less
	1	Add per Co for each add 150 or fraction thereof
24 gal.	1	Per Co of 175 or less
	1	Add per Co for each add 150 or fraction thereof
32 gal.	1	Per Co of 175 or less
	1	Add per Co for each add 150 or fraction thereof
Case, assembly, water heater, range, field, M1937	3	Per range, field, M1937, 1, 2, 3 or 4 cabinet unit.
Chest, commissary, complete	1	Per H & S Co
Container, round, insulate, M1941, w/inserts	1	Per 25 Indiv or fraction thereof
Fly, tent, wall, large, w/pins and poles	1	Per Co
	2	Per Bn Hq
Lantern, electric, portable, hand	2	Per Bn Hq; atchd Med
	3	Per Co
Lantern, gasoline, w/mantles and pump	2	Per Co; atchd Med
Lantern, kerosine, Army	1	Per Co; Bn Hq
Outfit, Chaplains, Christian Faith	1	Per Chaplain, Christian Faith
Jewish Faith	1	Per Chaplain, Jewish Faith
Outfit, Officers mess	1	Per 6 O's of Bn Hq
Ranges, field, M1937, 1-Unit	1	Per Co of 50 men or less
2-unit	1	Per Co of 51-100 men
3-unit	1	Per Co of 101-225
4-unit	1	Per Co of 226 men or more
Screen, latrine, complete w/poles and pins	1	Per Co; Bn Hq
Shield, water heater case, range, field, M1937	3	Per range, field, M1937, 1, 2, 3, or 4 - cabinet unit
Stove, tent, complete	1	Per tent except shelter tent
Tent, command post, complete w/pins and poles	1	Per Co
Tent, storage, w/fly, pins and poles	3	Per Bn Hq
Tent, pyramidal, w/pins and poles	3	Per Bn Hq
	1	Per Bn Med Det
Tent, wall, large, complete w/fly, pins & poles	1	Per Bn Hq
small	1	Per Bn Hq
Typewriter, portable	1	Per Outfit, Chaplains
Unit, fire, range field	1	Per range, field, M1937, 1, 2, 3 or 4 - cabinet unit

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MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

Chest, MD #60	1	Per Dent O
Unit Equipment (Med components only)		
Med Bn (Tglr Div)		
Hq Det	1	Per Hq Det
Coll Co	1	Per Coll Co
Clear Co	1	Per Clear Co

QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bag, canvas, water sterilizing	1	Per 100 Indiv or fraction thereof
	2	Add per Clear Co; Coll Co
Bucket, general purpose, 14-qt	1	Per 100 EM or fraction thereof
	1	Add per cook
	6	Add per Coll Co
	12	Add per Clear Co
Cans, corrugated, nesting, w/cover		
10-gal	1	Per 150 Indiv or fraction thereof
16-gal	1	Per 150 Indiv or fraction thereof
24-gal	1	Per 150 Indiv or fraction thereof
32-gal	1	Per 150 Indiv or fraction thereof
Container, round, insulated, M1941, w/inserts	1	Per 25 Indiv or major fraction thereof
Fly, tent, wall, large	1	Per Orgn having cook asgd
Lantern, portable, gasoline	3	Per Co; Hq Det
	4	Per Bn Hq
	6	Add per Clear Co
Lantern, kerosene, Army	2	Per Co; Bn Hq
	4	Add per Coll Co
	6	Per Hq Det
	12	Add per Clear Co
Outfit, Chaplains, Christian Faith	1	Per Chaplain, Christian Faith
Jewish faith	1	Per Chaplain, Jewish Faith
Outfit, officers' mess	1	Per 6 O's or fraction thereof in Bn Hq
Paulin, canvas, 20' x 40'	3	Per Clear Co
Paulin, canvas, 12' x 17'	2	Per Hq Det
	5	Per Clear Co
Range, field, M1937, 2-unit	1	Per Hq Det
3-unit	1	Per Coll Co
	2	Per Clear Co
Heater, water, f/range field, M1937	3	Per Hq Det; Coll Co
	6	Per Clear Co
Roll, commissary, complete	1	Per Bn
Screen, latrine, complete w/pins and poles	1	Per Co; Hq Det; 1 Add per Clear Co
Stove, tent,	1	Per tent except shelter tents
Tent, command post, complete w/pins and poles	1	Per Bn
Tent, hospital ward, complete w/pins and poles	12	Per Clear Co

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT CONTINUED

Tent, pyramidal, complete w/fly, pins and poles	1	Per Hq Det
	2	Per Coll Co
Tent, wall, large, complete w/fly, pins and poles	1	Per Clear Co; Hq Det
	4	Per Coll Co
Tent, wall, small, complete w/fly, pins and poles	1	Per Field O
Typewriter, portable	1	Per outfit, chaplains

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bag, canvas, water, sterilizing	1	Per 100 men or fraction thereof
Bucket, general purpose, 14 qt	2	Per Co
Cans, corrugated, nesting, galvanized, w/cover, 10-gal	2	Per Co
16-gal	2	Per Co
24-gal	2	Per Co
32-gal	2	Per Co
Container, round, insulated, M1941, w/inserts	1	Per 25 Indiv or major fraction thereof
Fly, tent, wall, large	1	Per Co
Heater, water, f/range, field, M1937	3	Per range, field, M1937
Lantern, electric, portable	10	Per Co
Lantern, gasoline, w/mantles and pump	4	Per Co
Lantern, kerosene, Army	2	Per Co
Outfit, officers' mess	1	Per 6 O's or fraction thereof
Range, field, M1937, 4-unit	1	Per Co
Screen, latrine, complete, w/pins and poles	1	Per Co
Stove, cooking, gasoline, M1941, 1 burner	3	Per Co
Stove, tent, complete, M1941	1	Per tent, except shelter tents
Tent, command post, complete w/pins and poles	4	Per Opn Plat, Co, Inf Div
Tent, pyramidal, complete w/pins and poles	1	Per Co
Tent, wall, large, w/fly, pins and poles	2	Per Co

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bag, water, sterilizing	2	Per Tr
Buckets, general purpose, 14-qt	2	Per Tr
Can, corrugated, nesting, galvanized, w/cover, 24-gal	2	Per Tr
32-gal	2	Per Tr
Containers, round, insulated, M1941, w/inserts	2	Per Plat
Flies, tent, wall, large, w/pins and poles	1	Per Tr
Heater, water, f/range, M1937	3	Per range, field, M1937
Lanterns, electric, portable, hand	5	Per Tr
Lantern, kerosene, Army	3	Per Tr
Range, field, M1937, 3-unit	1	Per Tr
Paulins, canvas, 12' x 17'	2	Per Tr
Screen, latrine, w/pins and poles	1	Per Tr

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bag, canvas, water, sterilizing	1	Per 100 Indiv or fraction thereof
Bucket, general purpose, 14-qt	2	Per Co
Cans, corrugated, nesting, galvanized,		
w/cover, 10-gal	2	Per Co
16-gal	2	Per Co
24-gal	2	Per Co
32-gal	2	Per Co
Fly, tent, wall, large, w/pins and poles	1	Per Co
Heaters, water, f/range, M1937	3	Per Range, field, M1937
Lantern, electric, portable, hand	2	Per Co
Lantern, gasoline, w/mantle and pump	3	Per Co
Range, field, M-1937, 3-unit	1	Per Co
Screen, latrine, w/pins and poles	1	Per Co

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QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

Bag, canvas, water	1	Per 100 Indiv or fraction thereof
Cans, corrugated, nesting, galvanized, w/cover, 10 gal	1	Per Co
16 gal	1	Per Co
24 gal	1	Per Co
32 gal	1	Per Co
Container, round, insulated, M1941, w/inserts	2	Per Co
Fly, tent, wall, large, w/pins and poles	1	Per Co
Lanterns, electric, portable, hand	4	Per Co
Outfit, officers' mess	1	Per 6 O's
Paulin, canvas, 20' x 40'	1	Per Co
Range, field, M1937, complete with equipment, 3-unit (w/extra burner)	1	Per Co
Screen, latrine, w/pins and poles	1	Per Co
Stove, tent, complete	1	Per tent, except shelter tent
Tent, storage, complete, w/fly, pins and poles	1	Per Co
Tent, wall, large, w/fly, pins and poles	1	Per Co

Annex M, 17

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40

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G-2 PLAN

1. INCOMING UNITS:

a. All incoming units to be issued a copy of the attached "Security Measures" (Incl 1) by the War Department at the time that movement orders are issued.

b. Mail censorship to be established enroute and instructions given to troops while enroute aboard ship in the provisions of "Security Measures" (Incl 1).

2. OUTGOING UNITS:

a. All documents and papers listed in "List of Intelligence Documents to be left in Iceland" (Incl 2) to be turned over on receipt to corresponding incoming units.

b. Unit commanders to be responsible for check of individuals and baggage for contraband. Certificate required by "Security and Censorship" letter this headquarters (Incl 3) to be executed by each unit commander covering all members of his unit.

Incl.
No 1 - Security Measures.
No 2 - List of Intelligence Documents to be left in Iceland.
No 3 - Security and Censorship Certificate.

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SECURITY MEASURES

The following security measures published in Bulletin No. 2, 1 July, 1942, are extracted for your information and compliance:

30. b. Correspondence with unknown Civilians: - (1) Organization commanders will at once initiate necessary action to insure that all personnel of their commands are instructed that it is contrary to War Department policy for soldiers to correspond with unknown civilians.

(2) The names and addresses of soldiers will not be given to unknown persons as they may fall into the hands of subversive or other persons whose motives are inimical to the war effort.

33. DOGS: - No dogs from any source will be owned, kept or fed, by any member or this command on any camp reservation occupied by the United States Troops.

41. a. INSIGNIA, UNIT DESIGNATIONS: - Unit designations shown on identification cards or any similar forms whether pertaining to the individual concerned or the countersigning officer will be obliterated.

80½. VISITORS REGISTRY BOOKS: - Members of this command will not register their organization, unit camp, or A.P.O. number in any visitor's registry book, either in private homes or public places. Such books are usually found at various water falls, inns, and other points of scenic or historical interest. Individuals may register their name and home address if desired. This notice will be immediately brought to the attention of all concerned.

81. CENSORSHIP, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: - a. The object of censorship is to prevent information of military value from reaching an unfriendly country. Censorship is required in order to assist in carrying out the mission of this Command and to secure the safety of the territory in which this Command is located.

b. Censorship will apply to all personnel of this Command and to all civilians attached to Army, including civilian employees of this Command, American Red Cross representatives of this Command, and American press and radio representatives accredited to this Command.

c. All members of this Command including civilians attached will be instructed not to evade censorship.

d. Writing for Press: - Only press representatives accredited with the Command Censor will be permitted to broadcast or to write for newspapers or magazines. Writing of letters or stories for the press whether signed or anonymous is prohibited for all members of this Command.

Incl 1 to G-2 Plan.

42

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81. e. Handling of personal Checking Accounts:- The War Department has issued instructions that all persons in the military service, in handling their personal funds, immediately discontinue the use of checks which have printed thereon any reference to a particular unit or organization and that they refrain from placing after signatures, as drawers or indorsers, in the handling of such funds, any unit or organization designation, or any other information which might disclose to persons handling such check the strength, designation, or location of any military organization or task force either within or outside the continental limits of the United States. This will not apply to persons officially handling unit and similary funds as custodians thereof as provided in AR 210-50.

f. Personal Papers and Photographs.

(1) Individuals departing from this Command will have their personal papers and photographs that they desire to take with them checked, stamped, and sealed by the Command Censor prior to departure.

(2) This should be accomplished as soon as possible after notice of possible departure is received by each individual personally visiting the Command Censor's office with papers to be checked.

82. CENSORSHIP, MAIL:- a. In accordance with Section IX, FM 30-25, the following instructions are announced regarding private correspondence and will be rigidly adhered to. V-mail forms will not be used for letters written in a foreign language:

(1) All private correspondence shall be in plain language, and in English only. Permission for the use of any other language must be obtained from the Command Censor who will furnish necessary forms upon request.

(2) The use of codes, ciphers and shorthand in private correspondence is forbidden.

(3) Under no circumstances will open or hidden references be made in any private correspondence, to any of the following:

(a) Location of the writer, either directly or by inference. Specifically no mention will be made of geographical location or any subject which would indicate that the writer is in this Command.

(b) The APO number will not be connected with its geographical location, either directly or by inference.

(c) Location or movement of any naval, military or air force organization or detachment, or presence or absence of reinforcements.

(d) Armament or equipment of any kind.

(e) Distinguishing signs used for identification of organizations or their transportation or baggage.

(f) Plans and forecasts or orders for future operations, whether known or merely surmised.

(g) The use, condition, or probable extension of roads, airfields, harbor facilities or other transportation facilities.

(h) Location or names of billets, bivouacs or camps.

(i) Casualties before official publication.

(j) Criticism or statements which might tend to bring our forces, forces of our Allies, or local civilians into disrepute.

(k) Strength, efficiency, morale, or organization of our or Allied Forces in this Command.

(l) State of maintenance of Services, including references to reserves or supplies.

(m) Results of enemy action, which if published, would tend to encourage him, to cause despondency in our own forces or people, or to incite a feeling of hostility among the people of this country.

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(n) Specific meteorological data.

(4) Local post cards will not be mailed. Plain U.S. postal cards will be signed with full name of the sender and will show the return address.

(5) Hospital Mail:- Letters of hospital enlisted patients will be censored by the Regimental censor of the hospital concerned. Letters of hospitalized officers will be forwarded to the Command Censor.

(6) Parcels of enlisted men and civilians will be examined and signed by the company, battery or detachment censor before being dispatched and will bear on the outside a statement of their contents. Officers, Nurses and American Red Cross workers will censor and certify the list of contents on the outside of their parcels.

(7) Souvenirs, coins, etc. typically of local country, will not be mailed.

(8) Pictures which directly or by inference show the sender as being in this country will not be mailed.

(9) The careful checking of letters, postcards and packages to insure that none of the restrictions listed herein have been violated will speed up the process of censorship and expedite the delivery of mail. The attention of all concerned is invited to the fact that letters which do not conform to these instructions will not be forwarded, and in some cases, might not be returned to the writer, but are liable to such disposition as the Commanding General may direct.

b. Mailing:- (1) General:- All private correspondence and packages will be mailed in a United States Army Post Office in this Command. They will not be given to individuals leaving this country by plane or ship with a view of being posted elsewhere than this country. The carriers of contraband matter will share responsibility with the sender and in each instance that discovery of violation occurs, appropriate action will be taken by this headquarters against the personnel involved.

(2) Enlisted Men and Civilian Employees:- Enlisted men and civilian employees may mail letters in one or two ways as follows:

(a) Place letters, unsealed, in organization mail box or pouch.

(b) Place letter or letters, unsealed, in a blue envelope obtained from their organization. Seal the blue envelope and mail to the Command Censor. More than one letter may be placed inside the blue envelope, provided they are all written by the same person. Do not use the blue envelope except for strictly personal or family matters. Enlisted men will not be induced or compelled to send their letters in blue envelopes.

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(c) Addressing Envelopes: - Example.

Pvt Richard E. Doe, (Serial Number)
Co A, _____Inf
"U.S. Army"
APO _____, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

Free

Mrs. Richard E. Doe
221 E. Main Street
Indianapolis, Indiana

---

(3) Officers, Nurses, American Red Cross: - (a) Officers, members of the Army Nurse Corps, and American Red Cross workers will censor and seal their own mail and sign it in lower left hand corner. It will be spot checked by the Command Censor.

(b) Addressing Envelopes: - Example

Capt John B. Doe
Co A, _____Inf
"U.S. Army"
APO ____, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

Free

Mrs. John B. Doe
221 Clifton Blvd
Cleveland, Ohio

Signed John B. Doe
Capt, _____Inf

Incl 1 to G-2 Plan.

45

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83. CENSORSHIP, PHOTOGRAPHIC: - a. The taking of pictures by individuals of this Command is prohibited.

b. Cameras will not be brought to this Command by individuals. Only authorized Regimental Photographers may bring cameras.

c. Regimental Photographers: -

(1) Regiments, Separate Battalions, and equivalent units may appoint Official Photographer to take pictures, for official use only, of their organizations.

(2) Appointments will be by written order. One copy of the order will be forwarded to the Command Censor for purpose of record.

(3) Cameras used by Regimental Photographers will be registered with the Command Censor on forms to be furnished by him.

(4) Generally photographs taken by the Regimental Photographer will be of two types as follows:

(a) Official and classified: - This includes such photographs as the unit commander desires for training, historical record of similar purposes.

(b) Semi-official or informal: - This is a type which involves taking photos for individuals and more or less for their own personal use, basically for morale or similar purposes.

(5) Manner of Handling: -

(a) All exposed rolls of film, film packs, and motion picture film will be submitted to the Command Photographic Officer for developing. He, in turn, sends the negatives to the Command Censor for censorship. Each type of photography is treated as follows by the Command Censor:

(1) Strictly official pictures desired by the unit commander concerned will be classified by the Command Censor. The negative if classified in this instance will be retained in the files of the Command Photographic Officer who will make as many classified prints of each such picture as are required for strictly official use.

(2) Semi-official or informal negatives will be censored and those not jeopardizing security will be returned to the unit concerned by the Command Censor.

(b) The Regimental Photographer may have as many prints made of a semi-official or informal negative that has been passed by the Command Censor as is desired. Commericial photographic laboratories will accept censored negatives for printing.

(6) The Regimental Photographer will indicate the purpose for which the film is desired according to the types listed in paragraph 4 above when submitting it to the Command Photographic Officer for processing.

d. The Command Photo Laboratory will not make pictures for individuals, either as gifts or for sale.

e. Photos that are classified may not be mailed or taken out of this Command by individuals. Informal and unclassified photographs may be mailed or taken out of this Command provided they have been examined, passed and stamped by the Command Censor.

f. The official Photo Section of the Air Force will continue to function in their normal duties. The Commanding Officer, Air Force, is responsible that proper censorship is maintained.

g. Organizations and Official activities not authorized an official photographer may arrange for the taking of pictures for official use by contacting the Command Photographic Officer.

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84. CENSORSHIP, CABLE AND RADIO: -

a. Outgoing Messages: -

(1) All private cable and radio messages will be submitted in triplicate and on the proper forms to the Command Censor for censorship. Proper forms and information relative to their preparation and filing may be secured at the Command Censor's Office.

(2) The addressee shall be indicated by at least the first and last name, street address, town or city, and state.

(3) The location of the writer, either directly or by inference, must not be disclosed. This is accomplished by using "SANS ORIGIN" as the place of origin.

(4) All messages must be signed and the signature shall consist of at least the first and last name. The sender's organization, branch or grade will not be used.

88. CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS: - All classified documents received from or dispatched to British offices will be stamped or marked in the manner prescribed in AR 380-5 with one of the following statements:

British Most Secret - Equals U. S. Secret
British Secret - Equals U. S. Confidential
British Confidential - Equals U. S. Restricted

89. SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION: - a. All officers and such enlisted men as are concerned will be instructed each quarter in the following regarding the safeguarding of military information:

Section I, AR 380-5 - General
Section II, AR 380-5 - Documents
Section III, AR 380-5 - Registered Documents
Section IV, AR 380-5 - Cryptographic Security
Section V, FM 30-25 - Preparation and Use of Documents

b. All newly arrived personnel concerned will be similarly instructed as soon as practicable after debarkation.

c. (1) All personnel will avoid talk or discussion of military and naval matters while in any public place or where there is even a remote possibility that the information may reach the enemy. They will view with suspicion any persons asking questions about or discussing such subjects and will report them to the Counter Intelligence Officer, this headquarters.

(2) All personnel connected with the military service who receive information of proposed movements of organizations, detachments or individuals are forbidden to make public the details of such movements.

(3) The names of organization, ports of embarkation, or ships to be used in troops movements, or the date of departure, arrival, or embarkation will not be disclosed.

(4) When it is necessary to advise relatives or other civilians of approaching departure, persons connected with the military service will not convey any information in regard to probable time and date of departure from or arrival at any station, names of ships, ports of embarkation, or the destination of organizations or individuals.

d. Unit commanders are responsible that their commands are instructed in the provisions indicated above and in the dangers involved in leakage of information concerning troop movements.

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90. RECORDINGS:- In accordance with War Department Circular 239, 1942 recordings will not be made, broadcast or mailed.

171. Account with Local Banks:- Individuals may open a checking account with the local bank in local currency. U.S. money accounts will not be opened with local banks.

172. Transfer of Funds to and from Troops Overseas:- Effective immediately, all funds, unit, organizational, or personal, sent to or from foreign countries will be transferred by United States postal money order only (Cir 377 WD 1942). This prohibits the purchase from local banks of drafts on US banks. Individuals may transfer funds by cable or wireless provided such transfer does not reveal unit designation, APO, or rank of individual.

173. Checks and Drafts:- The purpose of this provision is to prevent the revelation of the location of individuals or organizations through the transfer of funds. Specifically the following additional instructions will be observed in this Command.

a. Checks and drafts on banks and business organizations in the United States:

(1) May be sent or returned to the United States payable to an individual or to a business organization, or for deposit in a bank.

(2) Will not be cashed or deposited at a bank, or transferred to any individual or business organization (other than Post Exchange or any US government agency) in this or other foreign country.

b. Checks and drafts on banks and also business organizations in this Command.

(1) May be cashed at a bank or transferred to any individual or business organization in this Command.

(2) Will not be sent or taken out of this Command.

c. US Treasurer checks, will be handled same as checks and drafts on banks and business organizations in the United States (173a above).

212½. b. Organization Funds in Local Bank:-

(1) Accounts in effect 31 Jan 1943: No Change.

(2) New Accounts opened, organization name or custodian changed after 31 Jan 1943:

(3) When a change in custodians or organization name occurs the old custodian will draw all money out of the bank and close the account. The new custodian will open the new account under the number system without any reference being made between the old and the new accounts.

(4) Accounts will be by Numbers starting with 1000. Organization names or designations will not be used.

(5) Account numbers will be obtained from the Inspector General.

(6) The bank will be furnished a letter giving:

Account Number
Signature of Custodian certified by Finance Officer
Telephone Number of Custodian

(7) Checks will be signed by account number and signature of custodian.

(8) Bank's records will carry the account by numbers with custodian's name in parenthesis.

(9) Statements will be called for at the bank by the custodian, or delivered to a representative selected by him on his written request.

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LIST OF INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS AND MATTERS TO BE LEFT IN ICELAND

Documents Published or Reproduced by G-2, USAF

Censorship Manual
Critical Areas for Air Action Against Iceland (A list of Actual and Possible Landing Grounds)
Combat Instructions #26, Memo Hq &SAF, 25 Aug 42, and Instructions for US Army Coastal Watchers
Combat Instructions #21 and 30
"History of Iceland since British Occupation" consisting of Iceland (C) Force Intelligence Reviews 1 and 2, and British Troops in Iceland (C) Intelligence Review No 3.
"Relations between the British Garrison and the Icelanders" 10 May 40 to 23 Apr 42
Record of Events, Iceland Base Command
Suspect Lists - EDA
Hafnarfjordur
Keflavik
Reykjavik

Military Intelligence Service Publications

Campaign Studies
Counter Intelligence Bulletins
Digests and Lessons of Recent Military Operations - The German Campaign in Poland, Sept 1 to Oct 5, 1939
Infantry Intelligence Bulletins, War Department
Information Bulletins
Intelligence Bulletins
Special Series, MIS Publications
Surveys - Denmark
Eire
Northern Ireland
Norway
The Maritime Provinces and the Gaspe Peninsula of Canada
Spain
Tactical and Technical Trends
War and Weather Publications

US Army Air Force Intelligence Service Publications

The Attack on Crete and Notes on the German XI Air Corps
Counter Intelligence Bulletins
Informational Intelligence Summaries

US Navy Intelligence Publications

ONI 54-R - US Naval Ships and Aircraft
ONI 204 - German Naval Vessels
ONI 208 - Merchant Ship Recognition Manual
ONI 220 A - Axis Vichy French Submarines

Encl 2

49

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US Navy Intelligence Publications (Cont'd)

ONI 220 B - UN Submarines
ONI 220 M - Axis Submarine Manual
Information Bulletins, US Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

British Publications

Air Publications 1480 A (Parts 1 and 2) and 1480 B
The German Armored Forces in the Field, 1942, the War Office
Periodical Notes on the German Army, The War Office
Confidential Traffic Regulations - Akureyri, Reykjavik, Hrutafjordur, Seydisfjordur, Reydarfjordur
Public Traffic Regulations, Vestmannaeyjar

Misc Publications, Documents, Charts and Discs

Aircraft Recognition Manual, the Inter Service Journal
Censorship Stamps
Charts on the Identification of Aircraft
Misc Charts (Silhouettes) on Naval Vessels
Composite German Manual - Interpretation of Aerial Photographs AP-13
Discs on the Identification of Aircraft
Field Manuals (30 Series) - All in excess of those authorized by FM 21-6
Maps
Model Airplanes
Silhouette Handbook on the Identification of US Army Air Force Airplanes
Technical Manuals (30 Series) - All in excess of those authorized by FM 21-6
(Note:- All TM 30-256 (Icelandic Phrase Book) to be left in Iceland)

50

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RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
ICELAND BASE COMMAND

_____
(Date)

Subject: Security and Censorship.

To: Personnel Departing from Iceland.

1. Reference is made to Paragraph 81 f, Bulletin No. 2, Headquarters U.S.A.F. Personal papers and documents to be carried will be submitted to the Base Censor for stamping. These include letters, diaries, notebooks, maps, photographs, negatives, film, and in general any material which may endanger the military security of any armed forces.

2. Iceland Base Command Identification Cards will be turned in to Commanding Officer prior to departure to U.S.

3. Ammunition or inflammables will not be packed in other than hand baggage.

4. All persons and luggage leaving Iceland are subject to adequate search to insure compliance with the above. Appropriate action will be taken in cases of infractions.

5. Details of your departure will be discussed only with authorized persons in necessary conduct of official military business.

6. The certificate below will be signed and this sheet presented to security personnel prior to boarding.

By command of Major General BONESTEEL:

L. S. Smith

L. S. SMITH
Col AGD
Adj Gen

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I understand and have complied with the above directive and further that I will not discuss or reveal any item of a military nature regarding Iceland except to authorized persons in necessary conduct of official military business.

Signature_____

Rank and Orgn_____

TO BE ISSUED EACH INDIVIDUAL LEAVING ICELAND AT TIME OF ISSUANCE OF ORDERS.

Incl 3

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51

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Column Code:

Old Units: HEAD

New Units: TAIL

PLAN OF RELIEF, 5TH INFANTRY [illegible]

Short Title: LAV[illegible]

Outgoing (3 Increments)

Line Code	Units of 5th Inf Div	T/O	Date of T/O	Strength Off	Strength WO	Strength EM	Column: EYES First Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Column: EARS Second Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM
AA	Hq, 5th Inf Div	7-1	1 Jun 42	44	9	116	Det	5	2	15	[illegible]nder	39	7	101
AB	Hq Co & MP Plat	7-2	19 Jun 42	10	3	211	Det MP Pl	1		20	Co (-det)	9	3	191
AC	Hq & Hq Btry, Div Arty	6-10-1	29 Oct 42	12	1	109	Det	3		10	Btry (-det)	9	1	99
AD	19th FA Bn (75-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566								
AE	21st FA Bn (105-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566								
AF	46th FA Bn (75-gun)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566	Bn (-det)	24	2	556	Det	6		10
AG	50th FA Bn (75-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566					Bn (-det)	24	2	556
AH	2d Inf (less Can Co)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205	1 Bn (-co, det) Bn Med Det	21 2		674 36	Regt (-dets)	97	6	2449
AI	10th Inf (less CanCo)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205	Regt (-det)	116	6	3141	Det	23		64
AJ	11th Inf (less CanCo)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205								
AK	5th Med Bn	8-15	1 Apr 42	35		470	1 Coll Co	5		102	Bn (-2 Coll cos)	25		266
AL	5th QM Co, 5th InfDiv	10-17	15 Sep 42	10		196	Det	2		15	Co (-det)	8		181
AM	5th Cav Ron Tr	2-67	1 Apr 42	7		194								
AN	5th Sig Co	11-7	1 Apr 42	10	1	311	Det	2		15	Co (-det)	8	1	256
AO	7th Engr Bn	5-15	1 Apr 42	28	2	738	1 Co	5		194	Bn (-2 cos)	18	2	350
AP	705th Ord LM Co	9-8	1 Sep 42	9	1	145	Det	2		10	Co (-det)	7	1	135
	TOTAL			859	43	14369		187	10	4786		275	23	4696

Incoming (3 Increments)

Line Code	Units of ___ Inf Div	T/O	Date of T/O	Strength Off	Strength WO	Strength EM	First Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Second Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM
BA	Hq, ___ Inf Div	7-1	1 Jun 42	44	9	116	Adv Det	10	3	25	[illegible]ainder	34	6	91
BB	Hq Co & MP Plat	7-2	18 Jun 42	10	3	211	Det MP Pl	1		20	(-det)	9	3	191
BC	Hq & Hq Btry, Div Arty	6-10-1	29 Oct 42	12	1	109	Adv Det	3		20	y (-det)	9	1	89
BD	___ FA Bn (75-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566					Adv Det	6		10

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COPY NO. 1

Title: LAVA ROCK

PLAN OF RELIEF, 5TH INFANTRY DIV

Outgoing (3 Increments)

Date of T/O	Strength Off	WO	EM	Column: EYES First Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Column: Second Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Column: NOSE Third Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Line Code
Jun 42	44	9	116	Det	5	2	15	Remainder	39	7	101					AA
Jun 42	10	8	211	Det MP Pl	1		20	Co (-det)	9	3	191					AB
Oct 42	12	1	109	Det	3		10	Btry (-det)	9	1	99					AC
Oct 42	30	2	566									Bn	30	2	566	AD
Oct 42	30	2	566									Bn	30	2	566	AE
Oct 42	30	2	566	Bn (-det)	24	2	556	Det	6		10					AF
Oct 42	30	2	566					Bn (-det)	24	2	556	Det	6		10	AG
Apr 42	138	6	3205	1 Bn (-co), det) Bn Med Det	21 2		674 36	Regt (-dets)	97	6	2449	Det	18		46	AH
Apr 42	138	6	3205	Regt (-det)	116	6	3141	Det	23		64					AI
Apr 42	138	6	3205									Regt	138	6	3205	AJ
Apr 42	55		470	1 Coll Co	5		102	Bn (-2 Coll cos)	25		266	1 Coll Co	5		102	AK
Sep 42	10		196	Det	2		15	Co (-det)	8		181					AL
Apr 42	7		194									Tr	7		194	AM
Apr 42	10	1	311	Det	2		15	Co (-det)	8	1	256					AN
Apr 42	28	2	738	1 Co	5		194	Bn (-3 cos)	18	2	350	1 Co	5		194	AO
Sep 42	9	1	145	Det	2		10	Co (-det)	7	1	135					AP
TOTAL	869	43	14569		187	10	4788		273	23	4698		259	10	4883	

Incoming (3 Increments)

Date of T/O	Strength Off	WO	EM	First Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Second Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Third Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Line Code
Jun 42	44	9	116	Adv Det	10	3	25	Remainder	34	6	91					BA
Jun 42	10	8	211	Det MP Pl	1		20	Co (-det)	9	3	191					BB
Oct 42	12	1	109	Adv Det	3		20	Btry (-det)	9	1	89					BC
Oct 42	30	2	566					Adv Det	6		10	Bn (-det)	24	2	556	BD

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AF	46th FA Bn (75-gun)	[illegible]													-det)	24	2	656	Det
AG	50th FA Bn (75-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566									-dets)	97	6	2449	Det
AH	2d Inf (less Can Co)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205	Bn Med Det	2		36									
AI	10th Inf (less CanCo)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205	Regt (-det)	116	6	3141						23		64	
AJ	11th Inf (less CanCo)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205													Reg
AK	5th Med Bn	8-15	1 Apr 42	35		470	1 Coll Co	5		102					-2 1 cos)	25		266	1
AL	5th QM Co, 5th InfDiv	10-17	15 Sep 42	10		196	Det	2		15					-det)	8		181	
AM	5th Cav Ron Tr	2-67	1 Apr 42	7		194													Tr
AN	5th Sig Co	11-7	1 Apr 42	10	1	311	Det	2		15					-det)	8	1	256	
AO	7th Engr Bn	5-15	1 Apr 42	28	2	738	1 Co	5		194					(-2 cos)	18	2	350	1
AP	705th Ord LM Co	9-8	1 Sep 42	9	1	145	Det	2		10					(-det)	7	1	135	
	TOTAL			459	43	14569		187	10	4788						275	25	4698	

Incoming (3 Increments)

Line Code	Units of ___ Inf Div	T/O	Date of T/O	Strength Off	EM		First Increment Unit	Off	EM		Second Increment Unit	Off	EM	
BA	Hq, ____ Inf Div	7-1	1 Jun 42	44	9	116	Adv Det	10	3	25	Remainder	34	6	91
BB	Hq Co & MP Plat	7-2	18 Jun 42	10	8	221	Det MP Pl	1		20	Co (-det)	9	3	191
BC	Hq & Hq Btry, Div Arty	6-10-1	29 Oct 42	12	1	109	Adv Det	3		20	Btry (-det)	9	1	89
BD	___ FA Bn (75-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566					Adv Det	6		10
BE	___ FA Bn (105-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566					Adv Det	6		10
BF	___ FA Bn (75-gun)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566	Bn	30	2	566				
BG	___ FA Bn (75-how)	6-25	29 Oct 42	30	2	566					Bn	30	2	566
BH	___ Inf (less Can Co)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205	Bn (-1 co) Bn Med Det	26 2		692 36	Regt (-dets)	110	6	2477
BI	___ Inf (less Can Co)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205	Regt	138	6	3205				
BJ	___ Inf (less Can Co)	7-11	1 Apr 42	138	6	3205					1 M Co Adv Det	5 22		132 80
BK	___ Med Bn	9-15	1 Apr 42	35		470	1 Coll Co & Bn Hq Det	7		102	Bn (-dets)	23		266
BL	___ QM Co, ___ Inf Div	10-17	15 Sep 42	10		196	Adv Det	2		15	Co (-det)	8		181
BM	___ Cav Ron Tr	2-67	1 Apr 42	7		194					Adv Det	1		3
BN	___ Sig Co	11-7	1 Apr 42	10	1	311	Adv Det	5		150	Co (-det)	5	1	161
BO	___ Engr Bn	5-15	1 Apr 42	28	2	738	1 Co & Bn Hq Det	7		200	Bn (-2 cos & det)	16	2	544
BP	___ Ord LM Co	9-8	1 Sep 42	9	1	146	Adv Det	4		20	Co (-det)	5	1	125
	TOTAL			699	43	14369		235	11	5051		290	22	4788

Advance (or turnover) detachment to consist of:

CA	Infantry: Officers	1 per Company, per Bn Hq
CB		2 additional per Regtl Hq
CC	NCO's	4 per Rifle Co; AT Co
CD		3 per Regtl Hq Co; Bn Hq Co; Serv Co; Hv Weapons Co
CE	Field Arty: Officers	1 per Btry.
CF		1 additional per Bn
CG	NCO's	2 per Btry

Incl No. 4 (ROCK)

13526

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Oct 42	30	2	566	Bn (-det)															
Oct 42	30	2	566							Bn (-det)				24	2	556	Det	6	
Apr 42	138	6	3205	1 Bn (-Co, det) Bn Med Det		21 2		674 36		Regt (-dets)				97	6	2449	Det	18	
Apr 42	138	6	3205	Regt (-det)		116	6	3141		Det				23		64			
Apr 42	138	6	3205														Regt	138	6
Apr 42	35		470	1 Coll Co		5		102		Bn (-dets) Coll Co				25		266	1 Coll Co	5	
Sep 42	10		196	Det		2		15		Co (-det)				8		181			
Apr 42	7		194														Tr	7	
Apr 42	10	1	311	Det		2		15		Co (-det)				8	1	256			
Apr 42	28	2	738	1 Co		5		194		Bn (-dets)				18	2	350	1 Co	5	
Sep 42	9	1	145	Det		2		10		Co (-det)				7	1	135			
TOTAL	669	43	14369			187	10	4788						273	23	4698		239	1

Incoming (3 Increments)

Date of T/O	Strength Off	WO	EM	First Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Second Increment Unit	Off	WO	EM	Third Increment Unit	Off
Jun 42	44	9	116	Adv Det	10	3	25	Remainder	34	6	91		
Jun 42	10	3	211	Det MP Pl	1		20	Co (-det)	9	3	191		
Oct 42	12	1	109	Adv Det	3		20	Btry (-det)	9	1	89		
Oct 42	30	2	566					Adv Det	6		10	Bn (-det)	24
Oct 42	30	2	566					Adv Det	6		10	Bn (-det)	24
Oct 42	30	2	566	Bn	30	2	566						
Oct 42	30	2	566					Bn	30	2	566		
Apr 42	138	6	3205	Bn (-1 Co) Bn Med Det	78 2		692 36	Regt (-dets)	110	6	2477		
Apr 42	138	6	3205	Regt	138	6	3205						
Apr 42	138	6	3205					R Co Adv Det	6 22		192 60	Regt (-dets)	110
Apr 42	35		470	1 Coll Co & Bn Hq Det	7		102	Bn (-dets)	25		266	1 Coll Co	5
Sep 42	10		196	Adv Det	2		15	Co (-det)	8		181		
Apr 42	7		194					Adv Det	1		3	Tr (-det)	6
Apr 42	10	1	311	Adv Det	5		150	Co (-det)	5	1	161		
Apr 42	28	2	738	1 Co & Bn Hq Det	7		200	Bn (-2 cos & det)	16	2	344	1 Co	5
Sep 42	9	1	145	Adv Det	4		20	Co (-det)	5	1	125		
TOTAL	699	42	14369		235	11	5051		290	22	4788		174

nk to consist of:
per Company, per Bn Hq
additional per Regtl Hq

per Rifle Co; AT Co
per Regtl Hq Co; Bn Hq Co; Serv Co; Hy Weapons Co

per Btry
additional per Bn

per Btry

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HEADQUARTERS
ICELAND BASE COMMAND

22 February, 1943

PLAN FOR REPLACEMENT OF IBC UNITS OTHER THAN 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

PART I Short Title: LAVA SAND

Replacement by Rotation of Individuals

Line Code	Units	T/O	Authorized Strength Off WO EnlMen	Date of Arrival Note 1	Remarks
	AIR FORCE				
DA	Hq & Hq Sq 24th Comp Wing	Special	23 178	Various	2,5,8
DB	Det A Fi Command	Special	13 26	Jul 42	2,5,8
DC	2d Service Group		40 4 557		2
DD	Hq & Hq Sq	1-412		Various	2
DE	4th Serv Sq	1-417		1941	2
DF	575th Serv Sq	1-417		Various	2
DG	81st Sig Co, Serv Gp	11-257	2 1 70	Sep 41	2,5
DH	214th QM Co, Serv Gp, Avn	10-457	5 84	Dec 41	2
DI	342d Comp Gp		96 578		2
DJ	Hq	1-12		Various	2
DK	33d Fi Sq (SE)	1-27		Aug 41	2
DL	50th Fi Sq (TE)	1-37		Oct 42	2
DM	556th Sig AW Bn	11-400	78 19 1574		2,5,6,8
	Increment (175)			Aug 41	
	Increment (189)			Dec 41	
	Increment (700)			Aug 42	
	Increment (99)			Oct 42	
DN	559th Cml Plat	3-457	1 35	Aug 41	2
DO	694th Ord Co, Avn (Fur)	9-157	5 85	Aug 41	2
DP	824th Engr Avn Bn	5-415	51 776		5
	Co A			Aug 41	
	Remainder			Jan 42	

SECRET

Incl No. 2 to Letter to Chief of Staff, Short Title: LAVA PROJECT.

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Plan for Replacement of IBC Units Other Than 5th Inf Div - Part I (Cont'd)

Line Code	Units	T/O	Authorized Strength Off	WO	EnlMen	Date of Arrival Note 1	Remarks
	AIR FORCE (CONT'D)						
DQ	Det 1st Radio Sq	Special	2		10		2,4
DR	Det 8th AC Wea Sq	Special	4	2	27	Various	2,4
DS	Det 17th Airways Com Sq	1-447	6		44	Various	2,4
DT	31st Ferrying Sq Increment (100) Increment (137)	1-657	102		288	 Jun 42 Jan 43	2,4
	TOTAL AIR FORCE (less Engrs)		377	26	3350 3753		
	COAST ARTILLERY						
EA	Hq & Hq Btry, 47th CA Brig	4-10-1	12	4	87	May 42	5
EB	25th Sep CA Bn (HD) (plus Btry D) (8a gun btry less 1 gun sec)	4-95 M	30	3	631	May 42	7,9
EC	26th Sep CA Bn (HD) (plus Btry D) (8a gun btry less 1 gun sec)	4-95 M	30	3	631	Aug 42	6,7,9
ED	1st Bn, 244th CA (155-mm Gun) (TD) w/1st plat Btry G (SL) & 1st Bn Sec Med Det Atchd	4-51 4-55 4-58	20	2	504	Aug 42	6,9
EE	494th CA Bn (AA) (SM) (Sep)	4-175	31	3	722	Aug 42	7
EF	495th CA Bn (AA) (SM) (Sep)	4-175	31	2	722	Aug 42	7
	ENGINEERS						
EG	Base Fire Brig	Special			22	Various	5,8
EH	Engr Utilities Det	Special	7		114	Various	5,8
EI	394th Engr Depot Co	5-47	6		188	Jan 42	5
EJ	475th Engr Maint Co	5-157	6		175	Dec 41	5

Incl No. 2 to Letter to Chief of Staff, Short Title: LAVA PROJECT.

54

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Plan for Replacement of IBC Units Other Than 8th Inf Div - Part I (Cont'd)

Line Code	Units	T/O	Authorized Strength Off	WO	Aml	Men	Date of Arrival Note 1	Remarks
	ORDNANCE							
KK	Det Storehouse Pl 203d Ord Dep Co	9-57	1			19	Sep 41	5
KL	940th Ord HM Co	9-9	7	1		215	Sep 41	5
	CHEMICAL							
KM	Det Base CWS	Special				12	May 42	5,6
KN	66th Cml Depot Co (1 Record, storage & main sec of Adm plat; & 1st Serv Plat)	3-67	1			82	May 42	5,6
	SIGNAL							
KO	50th Sig Bn (less Constr Co)	11-15	27	1		643	Jan 42	5
KP	826th Sig Serv Co (Sep)	Special	5			138	Sep 41	5,8
	QUARTERMASTER							
KQ	QM Det, USAF	Special	5			162	Sep 41	5,6,8
KR	58th QM Sales Co(1 pl less 1 sec)	10-167	1			45	Aug 42	5,6
KS	80th QM Co (Depot, supply)	10-227	4			148	Dec 41	5
	TRANSPORTATION CORPS							
KT	Det Port Hq (TC)	Special	5			28	Jan 42	5,8
	MEDICAL							
KU	Det A Medical Supply Dep	Special	2			25	Sep 41	5
KV	Det B Medical Supply Dep	Special	2			25	May 42	5
KW	Det 2d Medical Lab	8-611	1			4	May 42	5
KX	Sanitary Det, 32d Med Bn					15	Sep 41	5
	MISCELLANEOUS							
KY	Hq & Hq Co, USAF	200-18-IBC 200-28-IBC	100	23		302	Sep 41	5,8
KZ	CIC Det	Special	9			105	Various	5,8
FA	Control Room Det, USAF	Special	8			21	Various	5,6,8

Incl No. 2 to Letter to Chief of Staff, Short Title: LAVA PROJECT.

55

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Plan for Replacement of IBC Units Other Than 6th Inf Div - Incl 2 (Cont'd)

Line Code	Units	T/O	Authorized Strength Off	EM	Date of Arrival Note 1	Remarks
	MISCELLANEOUS (CONT'D)					
FB	Finance Det, USAF	Special	7	71		5,6,8
	Increment (30)				Dec 41	
	Increment (40)				May 42	
FC	3d Specl Serv Unit	28-17	6	116	Aug 42	5,6
FD	812th MP Co	19-37	5	192	Dec 41	5
FE	Hq & Hq Co Eastern Sector	Special	7	68	Various	5,8
FF	Hq & Hq Co Northern Sector	Special	10	71	Various	5,8
FG	Det APO 611	Special	1	7	Aug 42	5,8
FH	Det APO 612	Special	1	6	Aug 42	5,8
FI	Det APO 613	Special		5	Aug 42	5,8
FJ	Det APO 614	Special		6	Aug 42	5,8
	TOTAL (less Air Force) -		386	41 6293		= 6722
	Air Force (- Engrs) -		377	26 3250		= 3753
						10475

FK Note 1. Month of arrival in ICELAND of bulk of unit or increment as stated.

FL Note 2. Air Force unit. Considered preferable to replace by individuals as provided by War Department Circular 211, 1942.

FM Note 3. Air Force unit. The 824th Engr Avn Battalion should be replaced by units. Because of heavy committments at Keflavik requiring continuity of effort, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company should be replaced in increments and the letter companies should be replaced not more rapidly than 2 companies per month. This unit is also included in Part II.

FN Note 4. Air Force unit which does not operate exclusively under the commanding General this base.

FO Note 5. This unit is performing functions largely by individuals which require special knowledge of local conditions which cannot be obtained within a short period of time.

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58

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Plan for Replacement of IBC Units Other than 5th Inf Div - Part I (Cont'd)

Line Code	
FP	Note 6. This unit is dispersed into small units or detachments, the simultaneous replacement of which is impracticable.
FQ	Note 7. This unit is armed at least in part with British materiel which requires special training for proper employment.
FR	Note 8. This unit is a special authorization for this command performing functions the continuity of which is essential.
FS	Note 9. This unit is armed with dual armament not common to the normal unit.

Encl No. 2 to Letter to Chief of Staff, Short Title: IBC PROJECT.

57

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PLAN FOR REPLACEMENT OF ICELAND [illegible] AND UNITS OTHER THA[illegible]

PART II - REPLACEMENT BY UNI[illegible] STERN DEFENSE AREA.

Column Code:
Old Units: FOOT
New Units: FEET

Line Code:	Unit to be Relieved	Date of arrival	T/O	Authorized Strength O	WO	EM	Column Code: LEGS FIRST SHIPMENT Outgoing Unit	O	WO	EM	Column Code: KNEE [illegible] SHIPMENT [illegible]coming Unit	O	WO	E
GA	61st CA (AA)(SM)(less band)	Mar 42	4-111	93	9	2024	Det Hq & Hq Btry	3	1	10	Adv Det Hq&Hq Btry	6	2	
GB											Adv Det 1st Bn	6		2
GC							2d Bn (-det)	27	2	701	2d Bn	32	2	7
GD							3d Bn (-det)	10	2	250	3d Bn (-1 Btry)	12	2	2
GE							Atchd Med & Chap	4		25	Atchd Med & Chap	4		2
								44	5	998		60	6	10
GF	Btry H,260th CA Bn(AA-AW(SM)	Oct 42	4-127	6		157					Btry	6		1
GG	Hq & Hq Btry,Btry A, 1st Pl	Oct 42	4-176	19	2	353					Entire Det(Note 3)	19	2	3
	Btry C(SL)& Med Det, 414th		4-175											
	Sep CA Bn (AA) (Gun) (SM)		4-138											
			4-117											
GH	698th Sep CA Btry(AA-AW, SM)	Aug 42	4-127	6		157	Btry (Note 4,5)	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		1
GI	699th Sep CA Btry(AA-AW, SM)	Aug 42	4-127	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		1
GJ	824th Engr Avn Bn (Sep)	Jan 42	5-415	31		776	Det Hq & Hq Co	5		100	Det Hq & Hq Co (-det)	7		1
GK	Co "A"	Aug 41					Co A (Note 4)	5		178	2 Cos (Note 4)	10		3
GL							Co C (Note 4)	5		178				
GM							Det Atchd Med	2		10	Atchd Med (-det)&Chap	3		1
								17		466		20		5
GN	5th Engr Combat Regt	Sep 41	5-171	52	3	1410	Det Hq&Hq & S Co	5		90	Det Hq&Hq & S Co	6		8
GO	1st Bn	Jan 42					1st Bn (Note 4)	17		590	1 Bn(Note 3)& Chap	18		59
GP														
GQ							Det Atchd Med	3		20	Atchd Med (-det)	3		2
								25		690		27		69
GR	635th Engr Cam Co	Aug 42	5-97	5		82					Co (Note 3)	5		8
GS	34th Ord MM Co	May 42	9-7	8	1	216					Co (Note 3)	8	1	21
GT	50th Ord Am Co	May 42	9-17	6		180	Co (Note 4,5)	6		180	Co (Note 4)	6		18
GU	54th Ord Am Co Aug	May 42	9-17	6		180					Co (Note 3)	6		18
GV	6th B Plat Sig Photomail Co	Aug 42	11-367	2		19						2		1
GW	26th Sig Constr Bn (Note 6)	Jul 42	11-25	23	1	571						5		2
GX	54th Sig Bn (less 1 ConstrCo)	Jul 42	11-15	27	1	643					1 Constr Co	21	1	5
GY	121st Sig Rad Int Co	May 42	11-77	7	1	251					Co (Note 3)	7	1	2
GZ	Co B 23d QM Trk Regt	Dec 41	10-57	4		120	Co (Note 4)	4		120	Co (Note 4)	4		12
HA	1st Pl 50th QM Graves Reg Co	1942	10-297	1		24	Plat (Note 4)	1		24	Plat (Note 4)	1		2
HB	Co B 60th QM Bn (Ldry)	May 42	10-165	5		295						1		
HC	70th QM RefrigCo(Reduced str)	Sep 41	10-217	2		52					unit	2		5
HD	Co A 95th QM Bkry Bn	Sep 41	10-147	5		163					(Note 3)	2		6
		May 42												
HE	1st Sec,1stPl,78th QM Bky Co	Oct 42	10-147			9					te 3)			
HF	215th QM Salv Rep Co	Sep 41	10-237	3		208					(Note 3)	1		
		May 42												
HG	Co A 241st QM Serv Bn (W)	Jan 42	10-67	3		224						1		
HH	392d Port Bn (TC) Co B	Aug 41	10-265	19	2	923	Cos A & B	8		456	1 Co)	15	2	6
	Co A	Jun 42									3, 1 company)			
	Other	Aug 42												
HI	10th L Tank Co (rein)	Mar 42	17-17	5		129						1		
HJ	Plat 60lst L Tank Co (rein)	Oct 42	17-17	1		34					Plat (Note 3)	1		
HK	759th L Tank Bn	Aug 42	17-75	36	2	553					Adv Det	8	1	
HL	11th Sta Hosp (W-Bed)	Sep 41	8-535	43		49	Hosp (Note 4,	3		20	Hosp (Note 4)	8		8

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REPLACEMENT OF ICELAND BASE COMMAND [illegible] OTHER THAN 5TH INF DIV

COPY NO. 1

II - REPLACEMENT BY UNITS - WESTERN DEFENSE AREA. ~~CODE:---LAVA HILL~~ Short Title: LAVA HILL

Column Code: LEGS				Column Code: KNEE				Column Code: TOES				Column Code: MAIL			
1ST SHIPMENT				FIRST SHIPMENT				SECOND SHIPMENT				SECOND SHIPMENT			
Outgoing				Incoming				Outgoing				Incoming			Line
	O	WO	EM	Unit	O	WO	EM	Unit	O	WO	EM	Unit	O	WO	EM	Code
Hq Btry	3	1	10	Adv Det Hq Btry	6	2	50	Hq & Hq Btry (-det)	8	2	79	Hq & Hq Btry (-det)	5	1	39	GA
				Adv Det 1st Bn	6		25	1st Bn	24	2	696	1st Bn (-det)	18	2	671	GB
det)	27	2	701	2d Bn	32	2	721	Det 2d Bn	5		20					GC
det)	10	2	250	3d Bn (-1 Btry)	12	2	265	Det 3d Bn (Note 2)	7		217	1 Btry 3d Bn	5		202	GD
d & Chap	4		25	Atchd Med & Chap	4		25	Atchd Med & Chap	5		26	Atchd Med & Chap	5		26	GE
	44	5	986		60	6	1086		49	4	1038		33	3	938	
				Btry	5		157	Btry	6		157					GF
				Entire Det(Note 3)	19	2	353	Entire Det(Note 3)	19	2	353					GG
te 4,5)	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		157									GH
te 4)	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		157									GI
Hq Co	5		100	Hq & Hq Co (-det)	7		151	Hq & Hq Co (-det)	7		128	Det Hq & Hq Co	5		77	GJ
te 4)	5		178	2 Cos (Note 4)	10		356	Co B (Note 4)	5		178					GK
te 4)	5		178									1 Co (Note 4)	5		178	GL
l Med	2		10	AtchdMed(-det)&Chap	3		10	AtchdMed(-det)&Chap	2		4	Det Atchd Med	1		4	GM
	17		466		20		517		14		310		11		259	
& S Co	5		80	Det Hq&Hq & S Co	6		81	Hq & Hq&S Co (-det)	6	3	109	Hq & Hq&S Co (-det)	5	3	108	GN
Note 4)	17		590	1 Bn(Note 3)& Chap	18		590									GO
								2d Bn(Note 3)& Chap	18		590	1 Bn	17		590	GP
l Med	3		20	Atchd Med (-det)	3		21	Atchd Med (-det)	3		21	Det Atchd Med	3		20	GQ
	25		690		27		692		27	3	720		26	3	718	
				Co (Note 3)	5		82	Co (Note 3)	5		82					GR
				Co (Note 3)	8	1	216	Co (Note 3)	8	1	216					GS
4,5)	6		180	Co (Note 4)	6		180									GT
				Co (Note 3)	6		180	Co (Note 3)	6		180					GU
				Unit	2		19	Unit	2		19					GV
				Adv Det	5		25	Bn	23	1	571	Bn (-Adv det)	18	1	546	GW
				Bn less Constr Co	21	1	388	Entire Bn	27	1	643	Constr Co (Note 4)	6		256	GX
				Co (Note 3)	7	1	251	Co (Note 3)	7	1	251					GY
4)	4		120	Co (Note 4)	4		120									GZ
e 4)	1		24	Plat (Note 4)	1		24									HA
				Adv Det	1		10	Co	5		295	Co (-det)	4		285	HB
				Entire unit	2		52	Entire unit	2		52					HC
				Adv Det (Note 3)	2		63	Co (Note 3)	5		163	Co (-det)	3		100	HD
				Sec (Note 3)			9	Sec (Note 3)			9					HE
				1 Plat (Note 3)	1		92	Co (Note 3)	3		208	Co (-plat)	2		116	HF
				Adv Det	1		10	Co	3		224	Co (-Adv det)	2		214	HG
	8		456	Bn (less 2 Cos) (Note 3, 1 company)	15	2	695	Bn (-2 cos) (Note 3,1 company)	11	2	467	1 Co	4		228	HH
				Adv Det	1		10	Co	5		129	Co (-Adv det)	4		119	HI
				Plat (Note 3)	1		34	Plat (Note 3)	1		34					HJ
				Adv Det	8	1	45	Bn	36	2	595	Bn (-Adv det)	28	1	548	HK
4)	8	N8	49	Hosp (Note 4)	8	N8	49									HL
																HM

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New Units: FEET

Line Code	Unit to be Relieved	Date of arrival	Authorized Strength T/O	Authorized Strength O	Authorized Strength WO	Authorized Strength EM	Column Code: LEGS FIRST SHIPMENT Outgoing Unit	Outgoing O	Outgoing WO	Outgoing EM	Column Code: KNEE SHIPMENT Incoming Unit	Incoming O	Incoming WO	Incoming EM
GA	61st CA (AA)(SM)(less band)	Mar 42	4-111	93	9	2024	Det Hq & Hq Btry	3	1	10	Adv Det Hq & Hq Btry	6	2	50
GB											Adv Det 1st Bn	6		25
GC							2d Bn (-det)	27	2	701	2d Bn	32	2	721
GD							3d Bn (-det)	10	2	250	3d Bn (- Btry)	12	2	265
GE							Atchd Med & Chap	4		25	Atchd Med & Chap	4		25
								44	5	986		80	6	1086
GF	Btry H,260th CA Bn(AA-AW)(SM)	Oct 42	4-127	6		157					Btry	6		157
GG	Hq & Hq Btry,Btry A, 1st Pl Btry C(SL)& Med Det, 414th Sep CA Bn (AA) (Gun) (SM)	Oct 42	4-176	19	2	353					Entire Unit (Note 3)	19	2	353
			4-175											
			4-138											
			4-117											
GH	698th Sep CA Btry(AA-AW, SM)	Aug 42	4-127	6		157	Btry (Note 4,5)	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		157
GI	699th Sep CA Btry(AA-AW, SM)	Aug 42	4-127	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		157	Btry (Note 4)	6		157
GJ	824th Engr Avn Bn (Sep)	Jan 42	5-415	31		776	Det Hq & Hq Co	5		100	Hq & Hq Co (-det)	7		151
GK	Co "A"	Aug 41					Co A (Note 4)	5		178	2 Cos (Note 4)	10		356
GL							Co C (Note 4)	5		178				
GM							Det Atchd Med	2		10	Atchd Med (-det)&Chap	3		10
								17		466		20		517
GN	5th Engr Combat Regt	Sep 41	5-171	52	3	1410	Det Hq&Hq & S Co	5		80	Det Hq&Hq & S Co	6		81
GO	1st Bn	Jan 42					1st Bn (Note 4)	17		590	1 Bn(Note 3)& Chap	18		590
GP														
GQ							Det Atchd Med	3		20	Atchd Med (-det)	3		21
								25		690		27		692
GR	635th Engr Cam Co	Aug 42	5-97	5		82					Co (Note 4)	5		82
GS	34th Ord MM Co	May 42	9-7	8	1	216					Co (Note 4)	8	1	216
GT	50th Ord Am Co	May 42	9-17	6		180	Co (Note 4,5)	6		180	Co (Note 4)	6		180
GU	54th Ord Am Co Aug	May 42	9-17	6		180					Co (Note 4)	6		180
GV	6th B Plat Sig Photomail Co	Aug 42	11-367	2		19					Unit	2		19
GW	28th Sig Constr Bn (Note 6)	Jul 42	11-26	23	1	571					Adv Det	5		25
GX	54th Sig Bn (less 1 ConstrCo)	Jul 42	11-15	27	1	643					Bn less Constr Co	21	1	385
GY	121st Sig Rad Int Co	May 42	11-77	7	1	251					Co (Note 3)	7	1	251
GZ	Co B 23d QM Trk Regt	Dec 41	10-57	4		120	Co (Note 4)	4		120	Co (Note 4)	4		120
HA	1st Pl 50th QM Graves Reg Co	1942	10-297	1		24	Plat (Note 4)	1		24	Plat (Note 4)	1		24
HB	Co B 60th QM Bn (Ldry)	May 42	10-165	5		295					Adv Det	1		10
HC	70th QM RefrigCo(Reduced str)	Sep 41	10-217	2		52					Entire Unit	2		52
HD	Co A 95th QM Bkry Bn	Sep 41	10-147	5		163					Adv Det (Note 3)	2		63
		May 42												
HE	1st Sec,1stPl,78th QM Bky Co	Oct 42	10-147			9					Sec (Note 3)			
HF	215th QM Salv Rep Co	Sep 41	10-237	3		208					1 Plat (Note 3)	1		92
		May 42												
HG	Co A 241st QM Serv Bn (W)	Jan 42	10-87	3		224					Adv Det	1		10
HH	392d Port Bn (TC) Co B	Aug 41	10-265	19	2	923	Cos A & B	8		456	Bn (less 1 Co) (Note 3, 1 company)	15	2	695
	Co A	Jun 42												
	Other	Aug 42												
HI	10th L Tank Co (rein)	Mar 42	17-17	5		129					Adv Det	1		10
HJ	Plat 801st L Tank Co (rein)	Oct 42	17-17	1		34					Plat (Note 3)	1		34
HK	759th L Tank Bn	Aug 42	17-75	36	2	593					Adv Det	8	1	45
HL	11th Sta Hosp (75-Bed)	Sep 41	8-560	8	N8	49	Hosp (Note 4)	8	N8	49	Hosp (Note 4)	8	N8	49
HM	72d Sta Hosp (50-Bed)	Aug 42	8-560	7	N6	41	Hosp (Note 4)	7	N6	41	Hosp (Note 4)	7	N6	41
HN	92d Sta Hosp (75-Bed)	Aug 42	8-560	8	N8	49					Hosp (Note 3)	8	N8	49
HO	167th Sta Hosp (250-Bed)	Sep 41	8-560	21	30	150	Hosp (Notes 4,5,7)	21	30	150	Hosp (Notes 4,5,7)	21	30	150
HP	168th Sta Hosp (250-Bed)	Sep 41	8-560	21	30	150	Hosp (Notes 4,5,7)	21	30	150	Hosp (Notes 4,5,7)	21	30	150
HQ	208th Gen Hosp (1000-Bed)	Mar 42	8-550	56	1	500	1/2 Hosp	28	1	250	1/2 Hosp	28	1	250
				105				53				53		
	TOTALS			502	23	10889		202	6	3876		334	15	653
				187				127				135		
	AGGREGATE TOTALS			11601				4211				6797		

HR Note 1. All units listed in Part II to be shipped to and from the Port of Reykjavik.

HS Note 2. Includes 1 SL Btry and 2 O and 15 EM, Hq Btry, left behind from first shipment to insure continuity of operation.

HT Note 3. This relieving unit at least in part must be transhipped from Reykjavik by local ships and the relieved unit collected at Reykjavik for subsequent shipment; at least 30 days required for these movements.

HU Note 4. No advance detachment or turnover details required; continuity of operations to be provided locally by temporary detail of personnel from other similar units or by transfer of key personnel as required.

SECRET

HV Note 5 must

HW Note 6 this

HX Note 7 500 the

...el No. 3 (La...

Column Code: KNEE				Column Code: TOES				Column Code: NAIL				
FIRST SHIPMENT				SECOND SHIPMENT				SECOND SHIPMENT				
Outgoing				Outgoing				Incoming				Line
EM	Unit	O	WO	EM	Unit	O	WO	EM	Unit	O	WO	EM	Code
10	Adv Det H[illegible] Btry	6	2	50	Hq & Hq Btry (-dets)	8	2	79	Hq & Hq Btry (-det)	5	1	39	GA
	Adv Det [illegible]	6		25	1st Bn	24	2	696	1st Bn (-det)	18	2	671	GB
701	2d Bn	32	2	721	Det 2d Bn	5		20					GC
250	3d Bn (-1 [illegible]y)	12	2	265	Det 3d Bn (Note 2)	7		217	1 Btry 3d Bn	5		202	GD
25	Atchd Med [illegible] Chap	4		25	Atchd Med & Chap	5		26	Atchd Med & Chap	5		26	GE
986		60	6	1086		49	4	1038		33	3	938	
	Btry	6		157	Btry	6		157					GF
	Entire D[illegible]te 3)	19	2	353	Entire Det (Note 3)	19	2	353					GG
157	Btry (Not[illegible])	6		157									GH
157	Btry (Not[illegible])	6		157									GI
100	Hq & Hq [illegible] -det)	7		151	Hq & Hq Co (-det)	7		128	Det Hq & Hq Co	5		77	GJ
178	2 Cos (N[illegible] 4)	10		356	Co B (Note 4)	5		178					GK
178									1 Co (Note 4)	5		178	GL
10	AtchdMed [illegible]t)&Chap	3		10	AtchdMed(-det)&Chap	2		4	Det Atchd Med	1		4	GM
466		20		517		14		310		11		259	
80	Det Hq&H[illegible] Co	6		81	Hq & Hq&S Co (-det)	6	3	109	Hq & Hq&S Co (-det)	5	3	108	GN
590	1 Bn(Note [illegible]& Chap	18		590									GQ
					2d Bn(Note 3)& Chap	18		590	1 Bn	17		590	GP
20	Atchd Med [illegible]det)	3		21	Atchd Med (-det)	3		21	Det Atchd Med	3		20	GQ
690		27		692		27	3	720		25	3	718	
	Co (Note 3)	5		82	Co (Note 3)	5		82					GR
	Co (Note 3)	8	1	216	Co (Note 3)	8	1	216					GS
180	Co (Note 3)	6		180									GT
	Co (Note 3)	6		180	Co (Note 3)	6		180					GU
	Unit	2		19	Unit	2		19					GV
	Adv Det	5		25	Bn	23	1	571	Bn (-Adv det)	18	1	546	GW
	Bn less Constr Co	21	1	388	Entire Bn	27	1	643	Constr Co (Note 4)	6		255	GX
	Co (Note 3)	7	1	251	Co (Note 3)	7	1	251					GY
120	Co (Note 3)	4		120									GZ
24	Plat (Note 3)	1		24									HA
	Adv Det	1		10	Co	5		295	Co (-det)	4		286	HB
	Entire unit	2		52	Entire unit	2		52					HC
	Adv Det (Note 3)	2		63	Co (Note 3)	5		163	Co (-det)	3		100	HD
	Sec (Note 3)			9	Sec (Note 3)			9					HE
	1 Plat (Note 3)	1		92	Co (Note 3)	3		208	Co (-plat)	2		116	HF
	Adv Det	1		10	Co	3		224	Co (-Adv det)	2		214	HG
456	Bn (less [illegible] Co) (Note 3, 1 company)	15	2	695	Bn (-2 cos) (Note 3,1 company)	11	2	467	1 Co	4		228	HH
	Adv Det	1		10	Co	5		129	Co (-Adv det)	4		119	HJ
	Plat (Note 3)	1		34	Plat (Note 3)	1		34					HJ
	Adv Det	8	1	45	Bn	36	2	593	Bn (-Adv det)	28	1	548	HK
49	Hosp (Note 4)	8	N8	49									HL
41	Hosp (Note 4)	7	N6	41									HM
	Hosp (Note 3)	8	N8	49	Hosp (Note 3)	8	N8	49					HN
150	Hosp (Notes 4,5,7)	21	30	150									HO
150	Hosp (Notes 4,5,7)	21	30	150									HP
250	1/2 Hosp	28	1	250	1/2 Hosp	28		250	1/2 Hosp	28		250	HQ
		53				52				52			
3878		334	15	6313		300	17	7013		168	8	4578	
7		135				60				52			
11		6797				7390				4804			

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HV Note 5. This unit and the unit which appears in the next line below must not be transferred simultaneously.

HW Note 6. 26th Signal Construction Battalion is on temporary duty in this command and was allotted from HPO.

HX Note 7. The 167th and 168th Station Hospitals should be increased to 500 beds each and full personnel for both 500 bed hospitals sent in and the 167th and 168th ah now constituted (250 bed, each) withdrawn.

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[illegible]: No. 2 (LAVA HILL) to Letter to Chief of Staff. Short Title: LAVA PROJECT.

E.O. 13526.

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Column Code:

Old Units: ZIPS

New Units: BUTT

PLAN FOR REPLACEMENT OF [illegible] BASE COMMAND UNIT
OTHER [illegible]

PART III - REPLACEMENT BY UNITS EASTERN DEFENSE AREA.

Line Code:	Unit to be Relieved	Date of Arrival	P/O	Authorized Strength OFF	WO	EM	Column Code: [illegible] First Shipment Incoming Unit	O	W	EM	Column Second Out Unit
KA	AKUREYRI TROOPS										
KB	118th Inf (less elements at	Aug 42	7-11	97	6	2180	Det Hq & Hq Co	3	1	10	Hq&Hq Co, B
KC	Seydisfjordur and Budareyri)						Det Serv Co	3	1	10	Serv Co(les
KD							Det AT Co			3	2 AT Plats
KE							Det Med Det	1		6	Atchd Med (
KF							Adv Det 3d Bn	6		24	2d Bn
KG							Adv Det & 1 Pl 3d Bn	7		70	3d Bn
								20		123	
KH	115th FA Bn (75-mm How) (less	Aug 42	6-25	24	2	488	Det Hq & Hq Btry	3		15	Hq & Hq Btr
KI	elements at Seydisfjordur and						Dets Btrys A & C	2		10	Btrys A & C
KJ	Budareyri						Det Serv Btry	1		6	Serv Btry (
KK							Det Med Det			1	Med Det
								6		32	
KL	1 Plat Co B 61st QM Bn (Ldry)	May 42	10-167	1		66	Adv Det			6	1 Plat
KM	142d QM Trk Co(-2 pls less 1 1/2Sec)	Aug 42	10-57	2		79	Adv Det	1		3	Co less det
KN	120th Sta Hosp (500-Bed)	Aug 42	8-560	33	1	275	Adv Det	5		25	Hosp
						55					
KO	Co B 66th Ord MM Bn (Q)(-2 Rein Con	Aug 42	10-27	5		118	Adv Det	1		15	Co (-dets)
	Rep Secs)										
				9							
	Total AKUREYRI			162	55	3151		55	5	204	
KP	SEYDISFJORDUR TROOPS										
KQ	Det 118th Inf	Aug 42	7-11	17		452	Adv Det Hq&Hq Co	1		6	Det Hq & Hq
KR											Det 1st Bn
KS							Adv Det AT Pl			1	AT Pl (-1 s
KT											1 Plat Co B
KU							Adv Det Co C	1		10	Co C
KV							Adv Det Co D	1		5	Co D (less
KW											Det 1st Bn
								3		21	
KX	Det 115th FA Bn (manning four	Aug 42	6-25	3		67	Btry B (less det)	2		54	Btry B (les
KY	British 25-pounders)						Det Hq Btry			3	Det Hq Btry
KZ							Det Serv Btry	1		10	Det Serv Bt
								3		67	
LA	2 Secs Co B 61st QM Bn Ldry	May 42	10-167			32	Adv Det			4	2 Secs
LB	1 Plat (-1 Sec) 142d QM Trk Co	Aug 42	10-57	1		17	Adv Det			2	Plat (-dets
LC	14th Sta Hosp (75-Bed)	Aug 42	8-560	8	N8	49	Adv Det	2		10	Hosp
LD	1 Co,Rep Sec(Rein)Co C 66thOrdMM Bn (Q)	Aug 42	10-27	1		37	Adv Det			3	Sec
	Total SEYDISFJORDUR			30	N8	654		3		165	
LE	[illegible]										

[illegible] PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED [illegible]

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PLAN FOR REPLACEMENT OF ICELAND BASE COMMAND UNITS — COPY NO. 1
OTHER THAN 5TH AIR DIV

III - REPLACEMENT BY UNITS EASTERN DEFENSE AREA. ~~CODE--LAVA DIRT~~ Short Title: LAVA DIRT

Column Code: HAND			Column Code: NECK			Column Code: HAIR			
First Shipment			Second Shipment			Second Shipment			
Incoming			Outgoing			Incoming			Line
Unit	O	W	EM	Unit	Off	WO	EM	Unit	Off	WO	EM	Code
												KA
Det Hq & Hq Co	3		10	Hq&Hq Co, Band & Chap	14	3	146	Hq&Hq Co(-),Band & Chap	11	3	136	KB
Det Serv Co	3		10	Serv Co(less 1 Bn Sec)	9	3	108	Serv Co(-1 Bn Sec, det)	6	3	98	KC
Det AT Co	1		5	2 AT Plats AT Co	2		68	2 AT Pls AT Co (-det)	2		65	KD
Det Med Det	1		6	Atchd Med (-1 Bn Sec)	8		90	Med Det (-1 Bn Sec,det)	7		84	KE
Adv Det 3d Bn	8		24	2d Bn	32		884	2d Bn (-Adv det)	26		840	KF
Adv Det & 1 Pl 3d Bn	7		10	3d Bn	32		884	3d Bn (-Adv det, plat)	26		814	KG
	20		123		97	6	2180		77	6	2057	
Det Hq & Hq Btry	3		15	Hq & Hq Btry (-dets)	12	1	148	Hq & Hq Btry (-dets)	9	1	131	KH
Dets Btrys A & C	8		10	Btrys A & C	8		214	Btrys A & C (-dets)	6		204	KI
Det Serv Btry	1		6	Serv Btry (-det)	3	1	57	Serv Btry (-dets)	2	1	61	KJ
Det Med Det			1	Med Det	1		16	Med Det (-det)	1		15	KK
	6		32		24	2	435		18	2	401	
Adv Det			6	1 Plat	1		66	Plat (-det)	1		60	KL
Adv Det	4		9	Co less dets	2		79	Co (less dets)	1		76	KM
Adv Det	5	5	25	Hosp	33	1	276	Hosp (-det)	28	1	260	KN
							56				50	
Adv Det	1		15	Co (-dets)	5		118	Co (-dets)	4		103	KO
			2				9				9	
	33	6	204		162	55	3151		129	50	2947	
												KP
Adv Det Hq&Hq Co 1st Bn	1		6	Det Hq & Hq Co 1st Bn	4		49	Det Hq & Hq Co 1st Bn	3		44	KQ
				Det 1st Bn Sec Serv Co			7	Det 1st Bn Sec Serv Co			7	KR
Adv Det AT Pl			1	AT Pl (-1 sec) AT Co	1		20	AT Pl(-1 sec,dot)AT Co	1		19	KS
				1 Plat Co B	1		45	1 Plat Co B	1		45	KT
Adv Det Co C	2		10	Co C	6		192	Co C (-det)	5		182	KU
Adv Det Co D	1		8	Co B (less 1 MG pl)	4		134	Co D (-1 MG pl, det)	3		129	KV
				Det 1st Bn Med Det	1		5	Det Med Det	1		5	KW
	4		21		17		452		14		431	
Btry B (less det)	2		54	Btry B (less det)	2		54					KX
Det Hq Btry			3	Det Hq Btry			3					KY
Det Serv Btry	1		10	Det Serv Btry	1		10					KZ
	3		67		3		67					
Adv Det			4	2 Secs			32	2 Secs (-det)			28	LA
Adv Det			2	Plat (-dets)	1		17	Plat (less 1 sec & det)	1		15	LB
Adv Det	2		10	Hosp	8	N8	49	Hosp (less det)	6	N8	39	LC
Adv Det			6	Sec	1		37	Sec (-det)	1		33	LD
	2		16		30	N8	654		22	N8	545	

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Old Units: ZIPS
New Units: BUTT

PART III - REPLACEMENT BY UNIT [illegible] DEFENSE AREA.

Line Code	Unit to be Relieved	Date of Arrival	T/O	Authorized Strength OFF	WO	EM	Column Code: First Shipment Incoming Unit	Column Cod Second Shi Outgoin Unit
KA	AKUREYRI TROOPS							
KB	118th Inf (less elements at	Aug 42	7-11	97	6	2180	Det Hq & Hq Co	10 HqHq Co, Band
KC	Seydisfjordur and Budareyri)						Det Serv Co	10 Serv Co(less 1
KD							Det AT Co	3 2 AT Plats AT C
KE							Det Med Det	6 Atchd Med (-1 E
KF							Adv Det 3d Bn	24 2d Bn
KG							Adv Det & 1 Pl 3d Bn	70 3d Bn
								123
KH	115th FA Bn (75-mm How) (less	Aug 42	6-25	24	2	433	Det Hq & Hq Btry	3 15 Hq & Hq Btry (-
KI	elements at Seydisfjordur and						Dets Btrys A & C	2 10 Btrys A & C
KJ	Budareyri						Det Serv Btry	1 6 Serv Btry (-det
KK							Det Med Det	1 Med Det
								32
KL	1 Plat Co B 61st QM Bn (Ldry)	May 42	10-167	1		66	Adv Det	6 1 Plat
KM	142d QM Trk Co(-2 pls less 1 1/2Sec)	Aug 42	10-57	2		79	Adv Det	3 Co less dets
KN	14th Sta Hosp (500-Bed)	Aug 42	8-560	33	1	275	Adv Det	25 Hosp
				55				
KO	Co D 66th Ord MM Bn (Q)(-2 Rein Con	Aug 42	10-27	5		118	Adv Det	15 Co (-dets)
	Rep Secs)			9				
	Total AKUREYRI			162	55	3151		336 204
KP	SEYDISFJORDUR TROOPS							
KQ	Det 118th Inf	Aug 42	7-11	17		452	Adv Det HqHq Co 1st Bn	1 5 Det Hq & Hq Co
KR								Det 1st Bn Sec
KS							Adv Det AT Pl	1 AT Pl (-1 sec)
KT								1 Plat Co B
KU							Adv Det Co C	10 Co C
KV							Adv Det Co D	5 Co D (less 1 MG
KW								Det 1st Bn Med
								21
KX	Det 115th FA Bn (manning four	Aug 42	6-25	3		67	Btry B (less det)	52 Btry B (less d
KY	British 25-pounders)						Det Hq Btry	3 Det Hq Btry
KZ							Det Serv Btry	10 Det Serv Btry
								67
LA	2 Secs Co B 61st QM Bn Ldry	May 42	10-167			32	Adv Det	4 2 Secs
LB	1 Plat (-1 Sec) 142d QM Trk Co	Aug 42	10-57	1		17	Adv Det	2 Plat (-dets)
LC	14th Sta Hosp (75-Bed)	Aug 42	8-560	8	N8	49	Adv Det	10 Hosp
LD	1 ConRepSec(Rein)Co D 66thOrdMM Bn Q	Aug 42	10-27	1		37	Adv Det	5 Sec
	Total SEYDISFJORDUR			30	N8	654		165
LE	BUDAREYRI TROOPS							
LF	Det 118th Inf	Aug 42	7-11	24		573	Adv Det HqHq Co 1st Bn	5 HqHq Co 1st Bn
LG								1st Bn Sec Serv
LH							Adv Det Co Hq AT Co	2 Co Hq AT Co
LI								1 Sec AT Plat A
LJ							Det Mine Plat AT Co	2 Mine Plat AT Co
LK							Adv Det Co A	5 Co A
LL							Adv Det Co B	5 Co B (less 1 pl
LM							Adv Det MG Pl Co D	3 1 MG Plat Co D
LN							Adv Det 1st Bn Med Sec	3 1st Bn Med Det
LO								Chaplain
								65
LP	Det 115th FA Bn (manning four	Aug 42	6-25	3		56	Det Btry B	53 Det Btry B
LQ	British 25-pounders)						Det Hq Btry	7 Det Hq Btry
LR							Det Serv Btry	6 Det Serv Btry
LS	1 Plat (-2 secs) Co B 61 QM Bn Ldry	Aug 42	10-167	1		34	Adv Det	5 Plat (less 2 se
LT	1 Pl (-1/2 sec) 142d QM Trk Co	Aug 42	10-57	1		24	Adv Det	3 Plat (less 1/2
LU	15th Sta Hosp (75-Bed)	Aug 42	8-560	8	N8	49	Adv Det	10 Hosp
LV	1 ConRepSec(Rein)Co D 66thOrdMMBn(Q)	Aug 42	10-27	1		40	Adv Det	5 Sec
	Total BUDAREYRI			38	N8	786		155
	AGGREGATE TOTALS			71 W	230	9 4591	5 W	466

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...EFENSE AREA. ~~CODE: --LAVA DIRT~~ Short Title: LAVA DIRT

Column Code: NECK — Second Shipment — Outgoing — Unit	Off	WO	EM	Column Code: HAIR — Second Shipment — Incoming — Unit	Off	WO	EM	Line Code
								KA
10: Hq&Hq Co, Band & Chap	14	3	146	Hq&Hq Co(-),Band & Chap	11	3	136	KB
10: Serv Co(less 1 Bn Sec)	9	3	108	Serv Co(-1 Bn Sec, det)	6	3	98	KC
6: 2 AT Plats AT Co	2		68	2 AT Pls AT Co (-det)	2		66	KD
6: Atchd Med (-1 Bn Sec)	8		90	Med Det (-1 Bn Sec,det)	7		84	KE
24: 2d Bn	22		884	2d Bn (-Adv det)	26		860	KF
40: 3d Bn	32		884	3d Bn (-Adv det, plat)	25		814	KG
	97	6	2180		77	6	2067	
15: Hq & Hq Btry (-dets)	12	1	148	Hq & Hq Btry (-dets)	9	1	131	KH
10: Btrys A & C	8		214	Btrys A & C (-dets)	6		204	KI
6: Serv Btry (-det)	3	1	57	Serv Btry (-dets)	2	1	51	KJ
1: Med Det	1		16	Med Det (-det)	1		15	KK
	24	2	433		18	2	401	
6: 1 Plat	1		66	Plat (-det)	1		60	KL
3: Co less dets	2		79	Co (less dets)	1		76	KM
25: Hosp	33	1	276	Hosp (-det)	28	1	250	KN
		56				50		
15: Co (-dets)	5		118	Co (-dets)	4		103	KO
		9				9		
204	162	55	3151		129	50	2947	
								KP
6: Det Hq & Hq Co 1st Bn	4		49	Det Hq & Hq Co 1st Bn	8		44	KQ
Det 1st Bn Sec Serv Co			7	Det 1st Bn Sec Serv Co			7	KR
1: AT Pl (-1 sec) AT Co	1		20	AT Pl(-1 sec,dot)AT Co	1		19	KS
1 Plat Co B	1		45	1 Plat Co B	1		45	KT
10: Co C	6		192	Co C (-det)	5		182	KU
5: Co D (less 1 MG pl)	4		134	Co D (-1 MG pl, det)	3		129	KV
Det 1st Bn Med Det	1		6	Det Med Det	1		5	KW
21	17		452		14		431	
54: Btry B (less det)	2		54					KX
3: Det Hq Btry			3					KY
10: Det Serv Btry	1		10					KZ
67	3		67					
4: 2 Secs			32	2 Secs (-det)			28	LA
2: Plat (-dets)	1		17	Plat (less 1 sec & det)	1		15	LB
10: Hosp	8	M8	49	Hosp (less det)	6	M8	39	LC
8: Sec	1		37	Sec (-det)	1		32	LD
165	30	M8	654		22	M8	545	
								LE
5: Hq&Hq Co 1st Bn (-det)	5		81	Hq&Hq Co 1st Bn (-det)	4		76	LF
1st Bn Sec Serv Co(-)	1		4	1st Bn Sec Serv Co (-)	1		4	LG
2: Co Hq AT Co	3		30	Co Hq AT Co (-det)	2		28	LH
1 Sec AT Plat AT Co			14	1 Sec AT Plat AT Co			14	LI
2: Mine Plat AT Co	1		30	Mine Plat AT Co (-det)	1		28	LJ
45: Co A	6		192	Co A (less 1 plat)	4		147	LK
5: Co B (less 1 plat)	5		147	Co B (less 1 pl, det)	5		142	LL
3: 1 MG Plat Co D	1		44	1 MG Pl Co D (-det)	1		41	LM
3: 1st Bn Med Det (-det)	1		31	1st Bn Med Det (-dets)	1		28	LN
Chaplain	1			Chaplain	1			LO
85	24		573		20		508	
83: Det Btry B	2		53					LP
7: Det Hq Btry	1		7					LQ
8: Det Serv Btry			8					LR
5: Plat (less 2 secs)	1		34	Plat (-2 secs, det)	1		29	LS
3: Plat (less 1/2 sec)	1		24	Plat (-1/2 sec, det)	1		21	LT
10: Hosp	8	M8	49	Hosp (-det)	6	M8	39	LU
8: Sec	1		40	Sec (-det)	1		34	LV
155	38	M8	786		28	M8	651	
51: 466	71 M	230	9 4591		66 M	179	9 4123	
524		4901				4377		

Incl No. 4 (LAVA DIRT) to Letter to Chief of Staff, Short Title: LAVA PROJECT.

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February 23, 1943.

SUBJECT: DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY FORCES 1943.

References: (a) Memorandum for Committee, February 10, 1943, From Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD.
(b) CCS 155/1
(c) JCS 218

REPORT BY COMMITTEE

1. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM:

To study and submit recommendations as to the deployment of United States Army units, air and ground, by quarter during 1943. Specifically to determine and allocate from available means, the forces which should be deployed in area of operations, to satisfy the strategic concept for 1943 established at the Casablanca Conferences (CCS 155/1).

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Appendices: Appendix A, with map, shows the deployment of forces as of December 31, 1943 required for the conduct of operations in 1943 as set forth in CCS 155/1. The tabs of Appendix A show the recommended quarterly changes for each area and the reasons therefor. Appendix B shows availability of forces as presently projected for 1943. Appendix C shows the shipping requirements for each theater by quarters to effect the proposed deployment.

b. Considerations: In establishing the optimum deployment of forces (Appendix A), consideration was given

(1) The relative importance of operations in each area as set forth in CCS 155/1. For this prupose ar were divided into (a) areas of major operations and (b) areas of passive defense and limited operations. Areas of maj operations were then arranged in order of priority. This arrangement is shown in Appendix C.

(2) The desirable target dates for major operations.

(3) The availability of trained major combat units (Appendix B). No investigation has been made of the availability of other than major units.

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(1) The relative importance of operations in each area as set forth in CCS 155/1. For this prupose areas divided into (a) areas of major operations and (b) areas of passive defense and limited operations. Areas of major tions were then arranged in order of priority. This arrangement is shown in Appendix C.

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(4) Loss replacements including normal attrition and battle losses, and whether current practices the return of cadres and rotation of personnel should be continued.

(5) Shipping requirements for the proposed deployment (Appendix C).

c. Anti-submarine Command: In view of the fact that the Anti-submarine Command is separate and is pr being reorganized so that units can be shifted as the submarine threat shifts, no attempt has been made to deploy to specific locations. The deployment is limited to those units presently projected and available to the U.S. Ar (Tab 1, Appendix A).

d. Assistance to Russia: Adequate services are provided for the air ferry routes and the Persian G Service Command to insure delivery of supplies to Russia.

d. Areas of Planned Operations: Adequate forces have been deployed for the operations agreed upon fo 1943 as follows:

(1) Completion of the projected special operation from North Africa.

(2) Build up of air forces in the United Kingdom to the maximum extent of availability of units.

(3) The capture of Rabaul only, without providing for additional operations such as against the Gilbert and Marshall Islands or the Aleutians.

(4) Build up of ground forces in the United Kingdom to the maximum extent of available port capac

f. Areas of Passive Defense and Limited Operations: The recommended reductions of garrisons in such are based on changes in our basic strategic concept, and on changes in the vulnerability of these areas, as set f J.C.S. 218. Ceilings are recommended for these garrisons which provide forces adequate to defend against the thr forth in J.C.S. 218. Previously planned strengths are reduced from a total of 831,530 to 694,180, a reduction of

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(4) Loss replacements including normal attrition and battle losses, and whether current practices for return of cadres and rotation of personnel should be continued.

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f. Areas of Passive Defense and Limited Operations: The recommended reductions of garrisons in such areas based on changes in our basic strategic concept, and on changes in the vulnerability of these areas, as set forth in .S. 218. Ceilings are recommended for these garrisons which provide forces adequate to defend against the threats set th in J.C.S. 218. Previously planned strengths are reduced from a total of 831,530 to 694,180, a reduction of 137,350

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Economy of shipping is of utmost importance. The movement of a unit to a theater requi ten ship tons of cargo per man as compared to one ship ton per month to maintain him there. It is esse to prevent movement of additional units to defense garrisons against which the enemy threat has decreas must be made, and rigidly adhered to, that these ceilings not be raised except as a result of major cha tegic situation. Changes within the authorized strength should be favorably considered only when they by conversion of troops already in the theater and without major movements of equipment. The reduction some theaters are small when considered individually. In some cases the shipping saved may not always diversion to other theaters. However, the recommended reduction in personnel will result in a saving power and reductions in maintenance requirements and in construction projects which the reduced garriso

No major changes in the four defense commands of the continental United States are reco allotted strengths of these commands is in excess of that required adequately to defend these areas. H service units are available for shipment to active theaters, they are undergoing training, and shipping

g. Unassigned Forces in the United States: If the recommended deployments for all theaters and the current Troop Basis for 1943 is, in general, adhered to, there will remain trained and unassigne United States on December 31, 1943, the major combat units listed in Appendix B. There will be a short divisions for the United Kingdom, which can be corrected by immediate conversion of existing separate and completion of divisional training in the theater.

h. Loss Replacements: In order to make the most efficient use of available shipping in the the war effort, no specific provision is made for return of cadres or rotation of personnel.

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Economy of shipping is of utmost importance. The movement of a unit to a theater requires aproximately tons of cargo per man as compared to one ship ton per month to maintain him there. It is essential, therefore, nt movement of additional units to defense garrisons against which the enemy threat has decreased. Decision made, and rigidly adhered to, that these ceilings not be raised except as a result of major changes in the strasituation. Changes within the authorized strength should be favorably considered only when they can be accomplished ersion of troops already in the theater and without major movements of equipment. The reductions in garrisons in eaters are small when considered individually. In some cases the shipping saved may not always be suitable for on to other theaters. However, the recommended reduction in personnel will result in a saving of trained mannd reductions in maintenance requirements and in construction projects which the reduced garrison will not require.

No major changes in the four defense commands of the continental United States are recommended. The d strengths of these commands is in excess of that required adequately to defend these areas. However, general units are available for shipment to active theaters, they are undergoing training, and shipping is not involved.

g. Unassigned Forces in the United States: If the recommended deployments for all theaters are effected current Troop Basis for 1943 is, in general, adhered to, there will remain trained and unassigned in the States on December 31, 1943, the major combat units listed in Appendix B. There will be a shortage of 3 airborne ns for the United Kingdom, which can be corrected by immediate conversion of existing separate component units plation of divisional training in the theater.

h. Less Replacements: In order to make the most efficient use of available shipping in the prosecution of effort, no specific provision is made for return of cadres or rotation of personnel.

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1. Shipping Implications: Appendix C shows the shipping requirements b quarter to implement operations set forth in CCS 155/1. A preliminary study of shipping capabilities in 1943 based on continu allocations of U.S. shipping to the Navy and current British assistance, and without accurate information Navy requirements or possible British assistance, indicates that shipping requirements for 19 3 operation only in part. Further study based on accurate information of Navy future requirements and British assist fore necessary before a final determination of capabilities can be made. If shipping is limited to that preliminary study, and priority is given, first to the maintenance of forces deployed in all areas for ca and then to the movement of forces required for planned operations to areas in the priority shown in Appe situation outlined below will obtain:

(1) Forces for areas of passive defense and limited operations will be brought to the dep figures recommended.

(2) Forces required for the Anti-submarine Command, Persian Gulf Service Command, North Af Air Forces in the United Kingdom, and China-Burma-India Area, will be deployed as recommended.

(3) Forces required for the Southwest Pacific area can be shipped in 1943. A shortage of l South Pacific area is expected. Forces for both of these areas cannot be shipped as early as desired. Tr clude initiation of the final phase of the Rabaul operation until late in 1943.

(4) Of the balanced ground force of 6 U.S. divisions required in the United Kingdom, only divisions and supporting troops will be available for cross-channel operations by August 1, 194 , the limi by weather. Unless the British can furnish additional forces, this will preclude initiation of cross-cha until the spring of 1944. A balanced ground force of only 6 U.S. divisions can be moved to the United Kin December 31, 1943.

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1. Shipping Implications: Appendix C shows the shipping requirements b quarter to implement the 1943 rations set forth in CCS 155/1. A preliminary study of shipping capabilities in 1943 based on continuing current locations of U.S. shipping to the Navy and current British assistance, and without accurate information either of y requirements or possible British assistance, indicates that shipping requirements for 1943 operations can be met y in part. Further study based on accurate information of Navy future requirements and British assistance is there- necessary before a final determination of capabilities can be made. If shipping is limited to that assumed in this liminary study, and priority is given, first to the maintenance of forces deployed in all areas for each quarter, then to the movement of forces required for planned operations to areas in the priority shown in Appendix C, the ation outlined below will obtain:

(1) Forces for areas of passive defense and limited operations will be brought to the deployment ures recommended.

(2) Forces required for the Anti-submarine Command, Persian Gulf Service Command, North African Theater, Forces in the United Kingdom, and China-Burma-India Area, will be deployed as recommended.

(3) Forces required for the Southwest Pacific area can be shipped in 1943. A shortage of 13,000 in the h Pacific area is expected. Forces for both of these areas cannot be shipped as early as desired. This will pre- e initiation of the final phase of the Rabaul operation until late in 1943.

(4) Of the balanced ground force of 6 U.S. divisions required in the United Kingdom, only 2 or 3 U.S. isions and supporting troops will be available for cross-channel operations by August 1, 194 , the limiting date set weather. Unless the British can furnish additional forces, this will preclude initiation of cross-channel operations l the spring of 1944. A balanced ground force of only 6 U.S. divisions can be moved to the United Kingdom by mber 1, 1943.

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4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the deployment of forces shown in Appendix A be approved.

b. That the ceilings for forces in passive defense areas be announced to the theater commanders concer that they be directed to effect reductions to the established ceilings, with the understanding that the major gro and air units shown in tables to be withdrawn, must be included in the reduction; that they be further advised th new troop units will be authorized other than can be effected within the authorized ceiling and without major mo of equipment.

c. That the current practice of rotating personnel in overseas garrisons be drastically curtailed.

d. That the deployment be reviewed quarterly and at such times as may be required by strategic develo

e. That, after approval, the deployment of major units proposed herein be completed by the Operations Division, W.D.G.S., to include units of all types.

f. That the 1943 Troop Basis be revised to provide the units required to effect the complete deploym to provide a balanced pool of units in excess thereof.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the deployment of forces shown in Appendix A be approved.

b. That the ceilings for forces in massive defense areas be announced to the theater commanders concerned; ay be directed to effect reductions to the established ceilings, with the understanding that the major ground units shown in tables to be withdrawn, must be included in the reduction; that they be further advised that no op units will be authorized other than can be effected within the authorized ceiling and without major movements ment.

c. That the current practice of rotating personnel in overseas garrisons be drastically curtailed.

d. That the deployment be reviewed quarterly and at such times as may be required by strategic developments.

e. That, after approval, the deployment of major units proposed herein be completed by the Operations , W.D.G.S., to include units of all types.

f. That the 1943 Troop Basis be revised to provide the units required to effect the complete deployment and ide a balanced pool of units in excess thereof.

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SHORTAGES IN DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. ARMY FORCES IN 1943
BASED ON CURRENT ALLOCATIONS & SHIPPING
WITH NO APPRECIABLE TRANSLATION OF OFFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS AND/OR BRITISH ASSISTANCE

		End of 1st Quarter 1943	2nd Quarter 1943			3rd Quarter 1943			4th Quarter 1943		
		Estimated Deployment	Additional desired shipped	Additional that can be shipped	SHORTAGE	Additional desired shipped	Additional that can be shipped	CUMULATIVE SHORTAGE	Additional desired shipped	Additional that can be shipped	CUMULATIVE SHORTAGE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	Major Units	2 Divisions	1 Division	1 Division	0	1 Division	1 Division	0	0 Division	0 Division	0
		9 3/4 air groups	1 1/2 air grps	1 1/2 air grs	0	3 1/4 air grs	3 1/4 air grs	0	1 air group	1 air group	0
	Personnel Strength (In Units)	147,650	66,000	61,900	-4,100	46,700	40,800	0	15,990	15,990	0
	Replacements		10,400	10,400	0	15,200	15,200	0	15,200	15,200	0
SOUTH PACIFIC	Major Units	4 Divisions	1 Division	0 Division	-1 Div.	0 Division	0 Division	-1 Div.	0 Division	1 Division	0
		5 1/4 air groups	1/4 air group	0 air groups	-1/4 air gp	1/2 air group	0 air groups	-3/4 air gp	1/2 air group	1 1/4 air grs	0
	Personnel Strength (In Units)	134,450	30,320	0	-30,320	16,500	6,500	-47,320	6,790	41,310	-12
	Replacements		10,200	10,200	0	10,200	10,200	0	10,200	10,200	0
UNITED KINGDOM (Ground)	Major Units	1 Division	6 Divisions	1 Division	-4 Div	4 Divisions	2 Divisions	-7 Div.	2 Divisions	2 Divisions	-7
	Personnel Strength (In Units)	74,000	220,000	18,140	-201,860	120,000	118,010	-223,850	46,000	109,490	-169
	Replacements		4,200	4,200	0	4,200	4,200	0	4,200	4,200	

Note: If only 50,000 troops and replacements instead of 250,000 are sent to the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, the deployment of 13 Divisions in the United Kingdom can be accomplished. This number of Divisions cannot be exceeded because of limited port capacity.

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SHORTAGES IN DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. ARMY FORCES IN 1943
BASED ON CURRENT ALLOCATIONS AND SHIPPING
WITHOUT ADJUSTMENTS INCIDENT TO OPERATIONS AND BRITISH ASSISTANCE

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of 1st Quarter 1943	2nd Quarter 1943			3rd Quarter 1943			4th Quarter 1943			Summary for December 31, 1943		
Estimated Deployment	Additional desired shipped	Additional that can be shipped	SHORTAGE	Additional desired shipped	Additional that can be shipped	CUMULATIVE SHORTAGE	Additional desired shipped	Additional that can be shipped	CUMULATIVE SHORTAGE	Desired deployment	Expected deployment	SHORTAGE
Divisions	1 Division	1 Division	0	1 Division	1 Division	0	0 Division	0 Division	0	4 Divisions	4 Divisions	0
3/4 air groups	1 1/2 air grs	1 1/2 air grs	0	1 1/2 air grs	1 1/2 air grs	0	1 air group	1 air group	0	15 1/2 air grs	15 1/2 air grs	0
142,640	66,000	61,900	-4,100	46,700	50,800	0	14,990	14,990	0	273,340	273,340	0
	10,600	10,600	0	14,200	14,200	0	14,200	14,200	0			0
Divisions	1 Division	0 Division	-1 Div.	0 Division	0 Division	-1 Div.	0 Division	1 Division	0	5 Divisions	5 Divisions	0
1/4 air groups	1/4 air group	0 air groups	-1/4 air gr	1/2 air group	0 air groups	-3/4 air gr	1/2 air group	1 1/4 air grs	0	6 1/2 air grs	6 1/2 air grs	0
134,460	37,320	0	-37,320	16,600	6,600	-47,320	6,730	41,310	-12,740	196,000	183,260	-12,740
	10,200	10,200	0	10,200	10,200	0	10,200	10,200	0			0
Division	6 Divisions	1 Division	-5 Div.	4 Divisions	2 Divisions	-7 Div.	2 Divisions	2 Divisions	-7 Div.	13 Divisions	6 Divisions	-7 Div.
74,000	220,000	18,140	-201,860	120,000	118,010	-223,840	55,000	109,490	-169,360	489,000	319,640	-169,360
	4,200	4,200	0	4,200	4,200	0	4,200	4,200	0			0

ly 150,000 troops and replacements instead of 240,000 are sent to the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, eployment of 13 Divisions in the United Kingdom can be accomplished. This number of Divisions cannot eeded because of limited port capacity.

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

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DYMENT OF U.S. ARMY FORCES IN 1943

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

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ARMY FORCES IN 1943

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

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

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DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame Number	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol.	Pt.	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
4	145.81-26	1941-1942			Joint Planning Committee.	U	
111	145.81-26A	Dec/41			Joint Planning Committee.	U	
412	145.81-26B	Dec/41			American-British Staff Conf.	U	
494	145.81-27	Sep/41			Defense Aids.	U	
533	145.81-28	May/41			Airplans.	U	
542	145.81-29	1942-1943			Operation Listed.	U	
730	145.81-30	Mar/44			Counter AF Action.	U	
804	145.81-31	Jan/44			British Proposals.	U	
832	145.81-32	Dec/43			AF Troop Bases for ETO.	U	
842	145.81-33	Sep/44			Air Sea Rescue,	U	
859	145.81-34	Oct/44			Aviation Gas for USSR.	U	
885	145.81-35	Feb/44			Italian Bases.	U	
956	145.81-36	1943			North Africa.	U	
1169	145.81-37	1941			Army Garrisons & Units.	U	
1311	145.81-38	1944			Exploiting Superior Air Power.	U	
1338	145.81-39	1944			Bombing List Data.	U	
1379	145.81-40	1943-1944			Poland.	U	
1429	145.81-41	Mar/43			Air Situation in Pacific.	U	

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DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame Number	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol.	Pt.	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
1488	145.81-42	Apr/43			Plan for Breton Peninsula/	U	
1551	145.81-42	May-Jul/43			Air Attack on Submarines.	U	
1648	145.81-43	Jul/43			Enemy Reaction to Raids on Japanese Cities.		
1688	145.81-44	Dec/43			Activation of B-29 & RTU GP	U	
1702	145.81-45	1943			Requirements of 273 GP.	U	
1708	145.81-46	Jan/42			Method of Computing Attrition.	U	
1712	145.81-47	1942			Japanese Plane Strength.	U	
1716	145.81-48	Feb/43			AAF Program.	U	
1723	145.81-49	Feb/43			Movement of Units to United Kingdom.	U	
1911	Index				Index		

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